characters, as it were: one of these is universal, arising from the fact
of our being all alike endowed with reason and with that superiority
which lifts us above the brute. From this all morality and propriety are
derived, and upon it depends the rational method of ascertaining our
duty. #Individual endowments.# The other character is the one that is
assigned to individuals in particular. In the matter of physical
endowment there are great differences: some, we see, excel in speed for
the race, others in strength for wrestling; so in point of personal
appearance, some have stateliness, others comeliness. *108* Diversities
of character are greater still. Lucius Crassus and Lucius Philippus had
a large fund of wit; Gaius Caesar, Lucius's son, had a still richer fund
and employed it with more studied purpose. Contemporary with them,
Marcus Scaurus and Marcus Drusus, the younger, were examples of unusual
seriousness; Gaius Laelius, of unbounded jollity; while his intimate
friend, Scipio, cherished more serious ideals and lived a more austere
life. Among the Greeks, history tells us, Socrates was fascinating and
witty, a genial conversationalist; he was what the Greeks call εἴρων--in
every conversation, pretending to need information and professing
admiration for the wisdom of his companion. Pythagoras and Pericles, on
the other hand, reached the heights of influence and power without any
seasoning of mirthfulness. We read that Hannibal, among the Carthaginian
generals, and Quintus Maximus, among our own, were shrewd and ready at
concealing their plans, covering up their tracks, disguising their
movements, laying stratagems, forestalling the enemy's designs. In these
qualities the Greeks rank Themistocles and Jason of Pherae above all
others. Especially crafty and shrewd was the device of Solon, who, to
make his own life safer and at the same time to do a considerably larger
service for his country, feigned insanity.
*109* Then there are others, quite different from these, straightforward
and open, who think that nothing should be done by underhand means or
treachery. They are lovers of truth, haters of fraud. There are others
still who will stoop to anything, truckle to anybody, if only they may
gain their ends. Such, we saw, were Sulla and Marcus Crassus. The most
crafty and most persevering man of this type was Lysander of Sparta, we
are told; of the opposite type was Callicratidas, who succeeded Lysander
as admiral of the fleet. So we find that another, no matter how eminent
he may be, will condescend in social intercourse to make himself appear
but a very ordinary person. Such graciousness of manner we have seen in
the case of Catulus--both father and son--and also of Quintus Mucius
Mancia. I have heard from my elders that Publius Scipio Nasica was
another master of this art; but his father, on the other hand--the man
who punished Tiberius Gracchus for his nefarious undertakings--had no
such gracious manner in social intercourse [...], and because of that
very fact he rose to greatness and fame.
Countless other dissimilarities exist in natures and characters, and
they are not in the least to be criticized.
*110* XXXI. Admodum autem tenenda sunt sua cuique non vitiosa, sed tamen
propria, quo facilius decorum illud, quod quaerimus, retineatur. Sic
enim est faciendum, ut contra universam naturam nihil contendamus, ea
tamen conservata propriam nostram sequamur, ut, etiamsi sint alia
graviora atque meliora, tamen nos studia nostra nostrae naturae
regula[103] metiamur; neque enim attinet naturae repugnare nec quicquam
sequi, quod assequi non queas. Ex quo magis emergit, quale sit decorum
illud, ideo quia nihil decet invita Minerva, ut aiunt, id est adversante
et repugnante natura.
*111* Omnino si quicquam est decorum, nihil est profecto magis quam
aequabilitas _cum_[104] universae vitae, tum singularum actionum, quam
conservare non possis, si aliorum naturam imitans omittas tuam. Ut enim
sermone eo debemus uti, qui innatus[105] est nobis, ne, ut quidam,
Graeca verba inculcantes iure optimo rideamur, sic in actiones omnemque
vitam nullam discrepantiam conferre debemus. *112* Atque haec
differentia naturarum tantam habet vim, ut non numquam mortem sibi ipse
consciscere alius debeat, alius [in eadem causa] non debeat.[106] Num
enim alia in causa M. Cato fuit, alia ceteri, qui se in Africa Caesari
tradiderunt? Atqui ceteris forsitan vitio datum esset, si se
interemissent, propterea quod lenior eorum vita et mores fuerant
faciliores, Catoni cum incredibilem tribuisset natura gravitatem eamque
ipse perpetua constantia roboravisset semperque in proposito susceptoque
consilio permansisset, moriendum potius quam tyranni vultus aspiciendus
fuit.
*113* Quam multa passus est Ulixes in illo errore diuturno, cum et
mulieribus, si Circe et Calypso mulieres appellandae sunt, inserviret et
in omni sermone omnibus affabilem [et iucundum][107] esse se vellet!
domi vero etiam contumelias servorum ancillarumque pertulit, ut ad id
aliquando, quod cupiebat, veniret. At Aiax, quo animo traditur, milies
oppetere mortem quam illa perpeti maluisset.
Quae contemplantes expendere oportebit, quid quisque habeat sui, eaque
moderari nec velle experiri, quam se aliena deceant; id enim maxime
quemque decet, quod est cuiusque maxime suum.
*114* _Suum_[108] quisque igitur noscat ingenium acremque se et bonorum
et vitiorum suorum iudicem praebeat, ne scaenici plus quam nos videantur
habere prudentiae. Illi enim non optimas, sed sibi accommodatissimas
fabulas eligunt; qui voce freti sunt, Epigonos Medumque, qui gestu,
Melanippam, Clytemnestram, semper Rupilius, quem ego memini, Antiopam,
non saepe Aesopus Aiacem. Ergo histrio hoc videbit in scaena, non
videbit sapiens vir in vita?
Ad quas igitur res aptissimi erimus, in iis potissimum elaborabimus; sin
aliquando necessitas nos ad ea detruserit, quae nostri ingenii non
erunt, omnis adhibenda erit cura, meditatio, diligentia, ut ea si non
decore, at quam minime indecore facere possimus; nec tam[109] est
enitendum, ut bona, quae nobis data non sint, sequamur, quam ut vitia
fugiamus.
[103] _studia nostra nostrae naturae regula_ Ernesti, Bt.,
Heine; _studia nostra nostra_ (corr. ex _nostri_) _regula_ A;
_studia nostrae regulae_ B; _studia nostrae regulā_ H;
_studia nostra regula_ a; _studia_ (corr. in _studii_)
_nostri regula_ b; _studia nostra naturae regula_ L c,
Nonius; _studia nostrae naturae regula_ Müller.
[104] _cum_ Lambinus, Edd.; not in MSS.
[105] _innatus_ Bt., Edd.; _notus_ MSS.
[106] _alius in eadem causa non debeat_ L c p, Müller, Heine;
not in A B H b; _alius non debeat_ a; _alius_ [_in eadem
causa_] _non debeat_ Bt., Ed.
[107] _et iocundum_ L c p; not in A B H a b; [_et iucundum_]
Bt., Ed.
[108] _Suum_ Orelli; not in MSS.; but p has _ingenium suum_.
[109] _tam_ L c, Edd.; _tam_ (i.e. _tamen_) A B H b.
#Conduct must accord with individual endowments.#
*110* XXXI. Everybody, however, must resolutely hold fast to his own
peculiar gifts, in so far as they are peculiar only and not vicious, in
order that propriety, which is the object of our inquiry, may the more
easily be secured. For we must so act as not to oppose the universal
laws of human nature, but, while safeguarding those, to follow the bent
of our own particular nature; and even if other careers should be better
and nobler, we may still regulate our own pursuits by the standard of
our own nature. For it is of no avail to fight against one's nature or
to aim at what is impossible of attainment. From this fact the nature of
that propriety defined above comes into still clearer light, inasmuch as
nothing is proper that "goes against the grain," as the saying is--that
is, if it is in direct opposition to one's natural genius.
*111* If there is any such thing as propriety at all, it can be nothing
more than uniform consistency in the course of our life as a whole and
all its individual actions. And this uniform consistency one could not
maintain by copying the personal traits of others and eliminating one's
own. For as we ought to employ our mother-tongue, lest, like certain
people who are continually dragging in Greek words, we draw well
deserved ridicule upon ourselves, so we ought not to introduce anything
foreign into our actions or our life in general. *112* #The same course
may be right for one, wrong for another.# Indeed, such diversity of
character carries with it so great significance that suicide may be for
one man a duty, for another [under the same circumstances] a crime. Did
Marcus Cato find himself in one predicament, and were the others, who
surrendered to Caesar in Africa, in another? And yet, perhaps, they
would have been condemned, if they had taken their lives; for their mode
of life had been less austere and their characters more pliable. But
Cato had been endowed by nature with an austerity beyond belief, and he
himself had strengthened it by unswerving consistency and had remained
ever true to his purpose and fixed resolve; and it was for him to die
rather than to look upon the face of a tyrant.
*113* How much Ulysses endured on those long wanderings, when he
submitted to the service even of women (if Circe and Calypso may be
called women) and strove in every word to be courteous and complaisant
to all! And arrived at home, he brooked even the insults of his
men-servants and maid-servants, in order to attain in the end the object
of his desire. But Ajax, with the temper he is represented as having,
would have chosen to meet death a thousand times rather than suffer such
indignities!
#Let every one sustain his own character.#
If we take this into consideration, we shall see that it is each man's
duty to weigh well what are his own peculiar traits of character, to
regulate these properly, and not to wish to try how another man's would
suit him. For the more peculiarly his own a man's character is, the
better it fits him.
*114* Every one, therefore, should make a proper estimate of his own
natural ability and show himself a critical judge of his own merits and
defects; in this respect, we should not let actors display more
practical wisdom than we have. They select, not the best plays, but the
ones best suited to their talents. Those who rely most upon the quality
of their voice take the Epigoni and the Medus; those who place more
stress upon the action, choose the Melanippa and the Clytaemnestra;
Rupilius, whom I remember, always played in the Antiope, Aesopus rarely
in the Ajax. Shall a player have regard to this in choosing his rôle
upon the stage, and a wise man fail to do so in selecting his part in
life?
We shall, therefore, work to the best advantage in that rôle to which we
are best adapted. But if at some time stress of circumstances shall
thrust us aside into some uncongenial part, we must devote to it all
possible thought, practice, and pains, that we may be able to perform
it, if not with propriety, at least with as little impropriety as
possible; and we need not strive so hard to attain to points of
excellence that have not been vouchsafed to us as to correct the faults
we have.
*115* XXXII. Ac duabus iis personis, quas supra dixi, tertia adiungitur,
quam casus aliqui aut tempus imponit; quarta etiam, quam nobismet ipsi
iudicio nostro accommodamus. Nam regna, imperia, nobilitas, honores,
divitiae,[110] opes eaque, quae sunt his contraria, in casu sita
temporibus gubernantur; ipsi autem gerere quam personam velimus, a
nostra voluntate proficiscitur. Itaque se alii ad philosophiam, alii ad
ius civile, alii ad eloquentiam applicant, ipsarumque virtutum in alia
alius mavult excellere.
*116* Quorum vero patres aut maiores aliqua gloria praestiterunt, ii
student plerumque eodem in genere laudis excellere, ut Q. Mucius P. f.
in iure civili, Pauli filius Africanus in re militari. Quidam autem ad
eas laudes, quas a patribus acceperunt, addunt aliquam suam, ut hic idem
Africanus eloquentia cumulavit bellicam gloriam; quod idem fecit
Timotheus Cononis filius, qui cum belli laude non inferior fuisset quam
pater, ad eam laudem doctrinae et ingenii gloriam adiecit. Fit autem
interdum, ut non nulli omissa imitatione maiorum suum quoddam institutum
consequantur, maximeque in eo plerumque elaborant ii,[111] qui magna
sibi proponunt obscuris orti maioribus.
*117* Haec igitur omnia, cum quaerimus, quid deceat, complecti animo et
cogitatione debemus; in primis autem constituendum est, quos nos et
quales esse velimus et in quo genere vitae, quae deliberatio est omnium
difficillima. Ineunte enim adulescentia, cum est maxima imbecillitas
consilii, tum id sibi quisque genus aetatis degendae constituit, quod
maxime adamavit; itaque ante implicatur aliquo certo genere cursuque
vivendi, quam potuit, quod optimum esset, iudicare.
#Mem. II, i, 21-34#
*118* Nam quod[112] Herculem Prodicus[113] dicit, ut est apud
Xenophontem, cum primum pubesceret, quod tempus a natura ad deligendum,
quam quisque viam vivendi sit ingressurus, datum est, exisse in
solitudinem atque ibi sedentem diu secum multumque dubitasse, cum duas
cerneret vias, unam Voluptatis, alteram Virtutis, utram ingredi melius
esset, hoc Herculi "Iovis satu edito" potuit fortasse contingere, nobis
non item,[114] qui imitamur, quos cuique visum est, atque ad eorum
studia institutaque impellimur; plerumque autem parentium praeceptis
imbuti ad eorum consuetudinem moremque deducimur; alii multitudinis
iudicio feruntur, quaeque maiori parti pulcherrima videntur, ea maxime
exoptant; non nulli tamen sive felicitate quadam sive bonitate naturae
sine[115] parentium disciplina rectam vitae secuti sunt viam.
[110] _nobilitas, h., divitiae_ Unger; _nobilitatem, h.,
divitias_ MSS.
[111] _ii_ Edd.; _hii_ A H b; _hij_ c; _hi_ B a.
[112] _Nam quod_ L c, Edd.; _namque_ A B H a b.
[113] _Prodicus_ Manutius, Edd.; _prodigus_ L c; _prodigum_ B
H b.
[114] _item_ Edd.; _idem_ MSS.
[115] _sine_ Stuerenburg, Edd. plerique; _sive_ MSS., Bt.^1
*115* XXXII. To the two above-mentioned characters[AB] is added a third,
which some chance or some circumstance imposes, and a fourth also, which
we assume by our own deliberate choice. Regal powers and military
commands, nobility of birth and political office, wealth and influence,
and their opposites depend upon chance and are, therefore, controlled
by circumstances. #Selection of a career:# But what rôle we ourselves
may choose to sustain is decided by our own free choice. And so some
turn to philosophy, others to the civil law, and still others to
oratory, while in case of the virtues themselves one man prefers to
excel in one, another in another.
#(1) inheritance,#
*116* They, whose fathers or forefathers have achieved distinction in
some particular field, often strive to attain eminence in the same
department of service: for example, Quintus, the son of Publius Mucius,
in the law; Africanus, the son of Paulus, in the army. And to that
distinction which they have severally inherited from their fathers some
have added lustre of their own; for example, that same Africanus, who
crowned his inherited military glory with his own eloquence. Timotheus,
Conon's son, did the same: he proved himself not inferior to his father
in military renown and added to that distinction the glory of culture
and intellectual power. #(2) choice,# It happens sometimes, too, that a
man declines to follow in the footsteps of his fathers and pursues a
vocation of his own. And in such callings those very frequently achieve
signal success who, though sprung from humble parentage, have set their
aims high.
*117* All these questions, therefore, we ought to bear thoughtfully in
mind, when we inquire into the nature of propriety; but above all we
must decide who and what manner of men we wish to be and what calling in
life we would follow; and this is the most difficult problem in the
world. For it is in the years of early youth, when our judgment is most
immature, that each of us decides that his calling in life shall be that
to which he has taken a special liking. And thus he becomes engaged in
some particular calling and career in life, before he is fit to decide
intelligently what is best for him.
#Hercules at the parting of the ways.#
*118* For we cannot all have the experience of Hercules, as we find it
in the words of Prodicus in Xenophon: "When Hercules was just coming
into youth's estate (the time which Nature has appointed unto every man
for choosing the path of life on which he would enter), he went out into
a desert place. And as he saw two paths, the path of Pleasure and the
path of Virtue, he sat down and debated long and earnestly which one it
were better for him to take." This might, perhaps, happen to a Hercules,
"scion of the seed of Jove"; but it cannot well happen to us; for we
copy, each the model he fancies, and we are constrained to adopt their
pursuits and vocations. But usually, we are so imbued with the teachings
of our parents, that we fall irresistibly into their manners and
customs. #(3) accident,# Others drift with the current of popular
opinion and make especial choice of those callings which the majority
find most attractive. Some, however, as the result either of some happy
fortune or of natural ability, enter upon the right path of life,
without parental guidance.
[AB] The universal and the individual; § 107.
*119* XXXIII. Illud autem maxime rarum genus est eorum, qui aut
excellenti[116] ingenii magnitudine aut praeclara eruditione atque
doctrina aut utraque re ornati spatium etiam deliberandi habuerunt, quem
potissimum vitae cursum sequi vellent; in qua deliberatione ad suam
cuiusque naturam consilium est omne revocandum. Nam cum in omnibus, quae
aguntur, ex eo, quo modo quisque natus est, ut supra dictum est, quid
deceat, exquirimus, tum in tota vita constituenda multo est ei rei[117]
cura maior adhibenda, ut constare in perpetuitate vitae possimus
nobismet ipsis nec in ullo officio claudicare.
*120* Ad hanc autem rationem quoniam maximam vim natura habet, fortuna
proximam, utriusque omnino habenda ratio est in deligendo genere vitae,
sed naturae magis; multo enim et firmior est et constantior, ut fortuna
non numquam tamquam ipsa mortalis cum immortali natura pugnare videatur.
Qui igitur ad naturae suae non vitiosae genus consilium vivendi omne
contulerit, is constantiam teneat (id enim maxime decet), nisi forte se
intellexerit errasse in deligendo genere vitae. Quod si acciderit
(potest autem accidere), facienda morum institutorumque mutatio est. Eam
mutationem si tempora adiuvabunt, facilius commodiusque faciemus; sin
minus, sensim erit pedetemptimque facienda, ut amicitias, quae minus
delectent et minus probentur, magis decere censent sapientes sensim
diluere quam repente praecidere. *121* Commutato autem genere vitae omni
ratione curandum est, ut id bono consilio fecisse videamur.
Sed quoniam paulo ante dictum est imitandos esse maiores, primum illud
exceptum sit, ne vitia sint imitanda, deinde si natura non feret, ut
quaedam imitari possit[118] (ut superioris filius Africani, qui hunc
Paulo natum adoptavit, propter infirmitatem valetudinis non tam potuit
patris similis esse, quam ille fuerat sui); si igitur non poterit sive
causas defensitare sive populum contionibus tenere sive bella gerere,
illa tamen praestare debebit, quae erunt in ipsius potestate, iustitiam,
fidem, liberalitatem, modestiam, temperantiam, quo minus ab eo id, quod
desit, requiratur. Optima autem hereditas a patribus traditur liberis
omnique patrimonio praestantior gloria virtutis rerumque gestarum, cui
dedecori esse nefas [et vitium][119] iudicandum est.
[116] _excellenti_ L c; _excellente_ A B H a b; _excellentis_
p.
[117] _est ei rei_ Gruter, Edd.; _est eius rei_ L c p; _est
rei_ A B H b; _est ei_ a.
[118] _possit_ J. M. Heusinger, Edd.; _possint_ MSS.
[119] _et_ (_sed_ b) _vitium_ A B H a b; [_et vitium_] Bt.^2,
Ed.; _et vicium_ c; _et impium_ L p, Bt.^1, Heine.
*119* XXXIII. There is one class of people that is very rarely met with:
it is composed of those who are endowed with marked natural ability, or
exceptional advantages of education and culture, or both, and who also
have time to consider carefully what career in life they prefer to
follow; and in this deliberation the decision must turn wholly upon each
individual's natural bent. #(4) natural bias.# For we try to find out
from each one's native disposition, as was said above, just what is
proper for him; and this we require not only in case of each individual
act but also in ordering the whole course of one's life; and this last
is a matter to which still greater care must be given, in order that we
may be true to ourselves throughout all our lives and not falter in the
discharge of any duty.
*120* But since the most powerful influence in the choice of a career is
exerted by Nature, and the next most powerful by Fortune, we must, of
course, take account of them both in deciding upon our calling in life;
but of the two, Nature claims the more attention. For Nature is so much
more stable and steadfast, that for Fortune to come into conflict with
Nature seems like a combat between a mortal and a goddess. If,
therefore, anyone has conformed his whole plan of life to the kind of
nature that is his (that is, his better nature), let him go on with it
consistently--for that is the essence of Propriety--unless, perchance,
he should discover that he has made a mistake in choosing his life work.
#Change of vocation.# If this should happen (and it can easily happen),
he must change his vocation and mode of life. If circumstances favour
such change, it will be effected with greater ease and convenience. If
not, it must be made gradually, step by step, just as, when friendships
become no longer pleasing or desirable, it is more proper (so wise men
think) to undo the bond little by little than to sever it at a stroke.
*121* And when we have once changed our calling in life, we must take
all possible care to make it clear that we have done so with good
reason.
But whereas I said a moment ago that we have to follow in the steps of
our fathers, let me make the following exceptions: first, we need not
imitate their faults; second, we need not imitate certain other things,
if our nature does not permit such imitation; for example, the son of
the elder Africanus (that Scipio who adopted the younger Africanus, the
son of Paulus) could not on account of ill-health be so much like his
father as Africanus had been like his. If, then, a man is unable to
conduct cases at the bar or to hold the people spell-bound with his
eloquence or to conduct wars, still it will be his duty to practise
these other virtues, which are within his reach--justice, good faith,
generosity, temperance, self-control--that his deficiencies in other
respects may be less conspicuous. The noblest heritage, however, that is
handed down from fathers to children, and one more precious than any
inherited wealth, is a reputation for virtue and worthy deeds; and to
dishonour this must be branded as a sin and a shame.
*122* XXXIV. Et quoniam officia non eadem disparibus aetatibus
tribuuntur aliaque sunt iuvenum, alia seniorum, aliquid etiam de hac
distinctione dicendum est.
Est igitur adulescentis maiores natu vereri exque iis deligere optimos
et probatissimos, quorum consilio atque auctoritate nitatur; ineuntis
enim aetatis inscitia senum constituenda et regenda prudentia est.
Maxime autem haec aetas a libidinibus arcenda est exercendaque in labore
patientiaque et animi et corporis, ut eorum et in bellicis et in
civilibus officiis vigeat industria. Atque etiam cum relaxare animos et
dare se iucunditati volent, caveant intemperantiam, meminerint
verecundiae, quod erit facilius, si _ne_ in eius modi quidem rebus
maiores natu nolent[120] interesse.
*123* Senibus autem labores corporis minuendi, exercitationes animi
etiam augendae videntur; danda vero opera, ut et amicos et iuventutem et
maxime rem publicam consilio et prudentia quam plurimum adiuvent. Nihil
autem magis cavendum est senectuti, quam ne languori se desidiaeque
dedat; luxuria vero cum omni aetati turpis, tum senectuti foedissima
est; sin autem etiam libidinum intemperantia accessit, duplex malum est,
quod et ipsa senectus dedecus concipit et facit adulescentium
impudentiorem intemperantiam.
*124* Ac ne illud quidem alienum est, de magistratuum, de privatorum,
[de civium,][121] de peregrinorum officiis dicere.
Est igitur proprium munus magistratus intellegere se gerere personam
civitatis debereque eius dignitatem et decus sustinere, servare leges,
iura discribere,[122] ea fidei suae commissa meminisse.
Privatum autem oportet aequo et pari cum civibus iure vivere neque
summissum et abiectum neque se efferentem,[123] tum in re publica ea
velle, quae tranquilla et honesta sint; talem enim solemus et sentire
bonum civem et dicere.
*125* Peregrini autem atque incolae officium est nihil praeter suum
negotium agere, nihil de alio anquirere minimeque esse in aliena re
publica curiosum.
Ita fere officia reperientur, cum quaeretur, quid deceat, et quid aptum
sit personis, temporibus, aetatibus. Nihil est autem, quod tam deceat,
quam in omni re gerenda consilioque capiendo servare constantiam.
[120] _si ne in ... nolent_ Stuerenburg, Edd.; _si in ...
nolint_ A B H a b; _si in ... volent_ L c; _si in ... non
nolint_ Lambinus.
[121] _de civium_ MSS.; [_de civium_] Hieron., Wolff, Edd.
[122] _discribere_ Bt., Ed., Heine; _describere_ MSS.
[123] _efferentem_ A H^1 L a b c; _ecferentem_ B H^2, Ed.
*122* XXXIV. Since, too, the duties that properly belong to different
times of life are not the same, but some belong to the young, others to
those more advanced in years, a word must be said on this distinction
also.
#Duties of#
#(1) youth,#
It is, then, the duty of a young man to show deference to his elders and
to attach himself to the best and most approved of them, so as to
receive the benefit of their counsel and influence. For the inexperience
of youth requires the practical wisdom of age to strengthen and direct
it. And this time of life is above all to be protected against
sensuality and trained to toil and endurance of both mind and body, so
as to be strong for active duty in military and civil service. And even
when they wish to relax their minds and give themselves up to enjoyment
they should beware of excesses and bear in mind the rules of modesty.
And this will be easier, if the young are not unwilling to have their
elders join them even in their pleasures.
#(2) age,#
*123* The old, on the other hand, should, it seems, have their physical
labours reduced; their mental activities should be actually increased.
They should endeavour, too, by means of their counsel and practical
wisdom to be of as much service as possible to their friends and to the
young, and above all to the state. But there is nothing against which
old age has to be more on its guard than against surrendering to
feebleness and idleness, while luxury, a vice in any time of life, is in
old age especially scandalous. But if excess in sensual indulgence is
added to luxurious living, it is a twofold evil; for old age not only
disgraces itself; it also serves to make the excesses of the young more
shameless.
*124* At this point it is not at all irrelevant to discuss the duties of
magistrates, of private individuals, [of native citizens,] and of
foreigners.
#(3) magistrates,#
It is, then, peculiarly the place of a magistrate to bear in mind that
he represents the state and that it is his duty to uphold its honour and
its dignity, to enforce the law, to dispense to all their constitutional
rights, and to remember that all this has been committed to him as a
sacred trust.
#(4) private citizens,#
The private individual ought first, in private relations, to live on
fair and equal terms with his fellow-citizens, with a spirit neither
servile and grovelling nor yet domineering; and second, in matters
pertaining to the state, to labour for her peace and honour; for such a
man we are accustomed to esteem and call a good citizen.
#(5) aliens.#
*125* As for the foreigner or the resident alien, it is his duty to
attend strictly to his own concerns, not to pry into other people's
business, and under no condition to meddle in the politics of a country
not his own.
#Duty and Propriety.#
In this way I think we shall have a fairly clear view of our duties when
the question arises what is proper and what is appropriate to each
character, circumstance, and age. But there is nothing so essentially
proper as to maintain consistency in the performance of every act and in
the conception of every plan.
*126* XXXV. Sed quoniam decorum illud in omnibus factis, dictis, in
corporis denique motu et statu cernitur idque positum est in tribus
rebus, formositate, ordine, ornatu ad actionem apto, difficilibus ad
eloquendum, sed satis erit intellegi, in his autem tribus continetur
cura etiam illa, ut probemur iis, quibuscum apud quosque vivamus, his
quoque de rebus pauca dicantur.
Principio corporis nostri magnam natura ipsa videtur habuisse rationem,
quae formam nostram reliquamque figuram, in qua esset species honesta,
eam posuit in promptu, quae partes autem corporis ad naturae
necessitatem datae aspectum essent deformem habiturae atque foedum,[124]
eas contexit atque abdidit. *127* Hanc naturae tam diligentem fabricam
imitata est hominum verecundia. Quae enim natura occultavit, eadem
omnes, qui sana mente sunt, removent ab oculis ipsique necessitati dant
operam ut quam occultissime pareant; quarumque partium corporis usus
sunt necessarii, eas neque partes neque earum usus suis nominibus
appellant; quodque facere turpe non est,[125] modo occulte, id dicere
obscenum est. Itaque nec actio rerum illarum aperta petulantia vacat nec
orationis obscenitas.
*128* Nec vero audiendi sunt Cynici, aut si qui fuerunt Stoici paene
Cynici, qui reprehendunt et irrident, quod ea, quae turpia[126] non sint,
verbis flagitiosa ducamus, illa autem, quae turpia[127] sint, nominibus
appellemus suis. Latrocinari, fraudare, adulterare re[128] turpe est,
sed dicitur non obscene; liberis dare operam re honestum est, nomine
obscenum; pluraque in eam sententiam ab eisdem contra verecundiam
disputantur. Nos autem naturam sequamur et ab omni, quod abhorret ab
oculorum auriumque approbatione, fugiamus; status incessus, sessio
accubitio, vultus oculi manuum motus teneat illud decorum.
*129* Quibus in rebus duo maxime sunt fugienda, ne quid effeminatum aut
molle et ne quid durum aut rusticum sit. Nec vero histrionibus
oratoribusque concedendum est, ut iis haec apta sint, nobis dissoluta.
Scaenicorum quidem mos tantam habet vetere disciplina verecundiam, ut in
scaenam sine subligaculo prodeat nemo; verentur enim, ne, si quo casu
evenerit, ut corporis partes quaedam aperiantur, aspiciantur non decore.
Nostro quidem more cum parentibus puberes filii, cum soceris generi non
lavantur. Retinenda igitur est huius generis verecundia, praesertim
natura ipsa magistra et duce.
[124] _foedum_ Klotz, Müller, Heine; _formam_ A B H a b;
_turpem_ L c, Bt.
[125] _turpe non est_ a, Edd.; _non turpe est_ L; _non turpe_
(om. _est_) c; _turpe non turpe est_ A B H b (the first
_turpe_ crossed out in A B).
[126] _quae turpia_ B b, Edd.; _quae re turpia_, L c; _quae
... autem_ om. H.
[127] _quae turpia_ B H b, Edd.; _quae re turpia_ L c.
[128] _re_ B H, Edd.; not in A L b c p.
#Propriety in bodily actions.#
*126* XXXV. But the propriety to which I refer shows itself also in
every deed, in every word, even in every movement and attitude of the
body. And in outward, visible propriety there are three
elements--beauty, tact, and taste; these conceptions are difficult to
express in words, but it will be enough for my purpose if they are
understood. In these three elements is included also our concern for the
good opinion of those with whom and amongst whom we live. For these
reasons I should like to say a few words about this kind of propriety
also.
First of all, Nature seems to have had a wonderful plan in the
construction of our bodies. Our face and our figure generally, in so far
as it has a comely appearance, she has placed in sight; but the parts of
the body that are given us only to serve the needs of nature and that
would present an unsightly and unpleasant appearance she has covered up
and concealed from view. *127* #Modesty.# Man's modesty has followed
this careful contrivance of Nature's; all right-minded people keep out
of sight what Nature has hidden and take pains to respond to nature's
demands as privately as possible; and in the case of those parts of the
body which only serve nature's needs, neither the parts nor the
functions are called by their real names. To perform these functions--if
only it be done in private--is nothing immoral; but to speak of them is
indecent. And so neither public performance of those acts nor vulgar
mention of them is free from indecency.
*128* But we should give no heed to the Cynics (or to some Stoics who
are practically Cynics) who censure and ridicule us for holding that the
mere mention of some actions that are not immoral is shameful, while
other things that are immoral we call by their real names. Robbery,
fraud, and adultery, for example, are immoral in deed, but it is not
indecent to name them. To beget children in wedlock is in deed morally
right; to speak of it is indecent. And they assail modesty with a great
many other arguments to the same purport. But as for us, let us follow
nature and shun everything that is offensive to our eyes or our ears.
So, in standing or walking, in sitting or reclining, in our expression,
our eyes, or the movements of our hands, let us preserve what we have
called "propriety."
*129* In these matters we must avoid especially the two extremes: our
conduct and speech should not be effeminate and over-nice, on the one
hand, nor coarse and boorish, on the other. And we surely must not admit
that while this rule applies to actors and orators, it is not binding
upon us. As for stage-people, their custom, because of its traditional
discipline, carries modesty to such a point that an actor would never
step out upon the stage without a breech-cloth on, for fear he might
make an improper exhibition, if by some accident certain parts of his
person should happen to become exposed. And in our own custom, grown
sons do not bathe with their fathers, nor sons-in-law with their
fathers-in-law. We must, therefore, keep to the path of this sort of
modesty, especially when Nature is our teacher and guide.
*130* XXXVI. Cum autem pulchritudinis duo genera sint, quorum in altero
venustas sit, in altero dignitas, venustatem muliebrem ducere debemus,
dignitatem virilem. Ergo et a forma removeatur omnis viro non dignus
ornatus, et huic simile vitium in gestu motuque caveatur. Nam et
palaestrici motus sunt saepe odiosiores, et histrionum non nulli gestus
ineptiis non vacant,[129] et in utroque genere quae sunt recta et
simplicia, laudantur. Formae autem dignitas coloris bonitate tuenda est,
color exercitationibus corporis. Adhibenda praeterea munditia est non
odiosa neque exquisita nimis, tantum quae fugiat agrestem et inhumanam
neglegentiam. Eadem ratio est habenda vestitus, in quo, sicut in
plerisque rebus, mediocritas optima est.
*131* Cavendum autem est, ne aut tarditatibus utamur _in_[130] ingressu
mollioribus, ut pomparum ferculis similes esse videamur, aut in
festinationibus suscipiamus nimias celeritates, quae cum fiunt,
anhelitus moventur, vultus mutantur, ora torquentur; ex quibus magna
significatio fit non adesse constantiam. Sed multo etiam magis
elaborandum est, ne animi motus a natura recedant; quod assequemur, si
cavebimus, ne in perturbationes atque exanimationes incidamus, et si
attentos animos ad decoris conservationem tenebimus.
*132* Motus autem animorum duplices sunt, alteri cogitationis, alteri
appetitus; cogitatio in vero exquirendo maxime versatur, appetitus
impellit ad agendum. Curandum est igitur, ut cogitatione ad res quam
optimas utamur, appetitum rationi oboedientem praebeamus.
[129] _ineptiis non vacant_ A B H a b; _inepti non vacant
offensione_ L c p.
[130] _in_ Edd.; not in MSS.
#Propriety:#
#(1) in outward appearance;#
*130* XXXVI. Again, there are two orders of beauty: in the one,
loveliness predominates; in the other, dignity; of these, we ought to
regard loveliness as the attribute of woman, and dignity as the
attribute of man. Therefore, let all finery not suitable to a man's
dignity be kept off his person, and let him guard against the like fault
in gesture and action. The manners taught in the palaestra,[AC] for
example, are often rather objectionable, and the gestures of actors on
the stage are not always free from affectation; but simple, unaffected
manners are commendable in both instances. Now dignity of mien is also
to be enhanced by a good complexion; the complexion is the result of
physical exercise. We must besides present an appearance of
neatness--not too punctilious or exquisite, but just enough to avoid
boorish and ill-bred slovenliness. We must follow the same principle in
regard to dress. In this, as in most things, the best rule is the golden
mean.
#(2) in inward self-control.#
*131* We must be careful, too, not to fall into a habit of listless
sauntering in our gait, so as to look like carriers in festal
processions, or of hurrying too fast, when time presses. If we do this,
it puts us out of breath, our looks are changed, our features distorted;
and all this is clear evidence of a lack of poise. But it is much more
important that we succeed in keeping our mental operations in harmony
with nature's laws. And we shall not fail in this if we guard against
violent excitement or depression, and if we keep our minds intent on the
observance of propriety.
*132* Our mental operations, moreover, are of two kinds: some have to do
with thought, others with impulse. Thought is occupied chiefly with the
discovery of truth; impulse prompts to action. We must be careful,
therefore, to employ our thoughts on themes as elevating as possible and
to keep our impulses under the control of reason.
[AC] The Greek palaestra, a public school of wrestling and
athletics, adopted by the Romans became a place of exercise
where the youth were trained in gestures and attitudes, a
nursery of foppish manners.
XXXVII. Et quoniam magna vis orationis est, eaque duplex, altera
contentionis, altera sermonis, contentio disceptationibus tribuatur
iudiciorum, contionum, senatus, sermo in circulis, disputationibus,
congressionibus familiarium versetur, sequatur etiam convivia.
Contentionis praecepta rhetorum sunt, nulla sermonis, quamquam haud scio
an possint haec quoque esse. Sed discentium studiis inveniuntur
magistri, huic autem qui studeant, sunt nulli, rhetorum turba referta
omnia; quamquam, quae[131] verborum sententiarumque praecepta sunt,
eadem ad sermonem pertinebunt.
*133* Sed cum orationis indicem vocem habeamus, in voce autem duo
sequamur, ut clara sit, ut suavis, utrumque omnino a natura petundum
est, verum alterum exercitatio augebit, alterum imitatio presse
loquentium et leniter.
Nihil fuit in Catulis, ut eos exquisito iudicio putares uti litterarum,
quamquam erant litterati; sed et alii; hi autem optime uti lingua Latina
putabantur; sonus erat dulcis, litterae neque expressae neque oppressae,
ne aut obscurum esset aut putidum, sine contentione vox nec languens nec
canora. Uberior oratio L. Crassi nec minus faceta, sed bene loquendi de
Catulis opinio non minor. Sale vero et facetiis Caesar, Catuli patris
frater, vicit omnes, ut in illo ipso forensi genere dicendi contentiones
aliorum sermone vinceret.
In omnibus igitur his elaborandum est, si in omni re quid deceat
exquirimus.
*134* Sit ergo hic sermo, in quo Socratici maxime excellunt, lenis
minimeque pertinax, insit in eo lepos; nec vero, tamquam in possessionem
suam venerit, excludat alios, sed cum reliquis in rebus, tum in sermone
communi vicissitudinem non iniquam putet; ac videat in primis, quibus de
rebus loquatur; si seriis, severitatem adhibeat, si iocosis, leporem; in
primisque provideat, ne sermo vitium aliquod indicet inesse in moribus;
quod maxime tum solet evenire, cum studiose de absentibus detrahendi
causa aut per ridiculum aut severe maledice contumelioseque dicitur.
*135* Habentur autem plerumque sermones aut de domesticis negotiis aut
de re publica aut de artium studiis atque doctrina. Danda igitur opera
est, ut, etiamsi aberrare ad alia coeperit, ad haec revocetur oratio,
sed utcumque aderunt; neque enim isdem[132] de rebus nec omni tempore
nec similiter delectamur. Animadvertendum est etiam, quatenus sermo
delectationem habeat, et, ut incipiendi ratio fuerit, ita sit desinendi
modus.
[131] _quae_ A^2 c, Edd.; _quoniam_ (per compend.) A^1 B H a
b.
[132] _enim isdem_ (_hisdem_ B H) A B H b, Müller; _enim
omnes isdem_ L c, most Edd.
#Propriety in speech: oratory and conversation.#
XXXVII. The power of speech in the attainment of propriety is great, and
its function is twofold: the first is oratory; the second, conversation.
Oratory is the kind of discourse to be employed in pleadings in court
and speeches in popular assemblies and in the senate; conversation
should find its natural place in social gatherings, in informal
discussions, and in intercourse with friends; it should also seek
admission at dinners. There are rules for oratory laid down by
rhetoricians; there are none for conversation; and yet I do not know why
there should not be. But where there are students to learn, teachers are
found; there are, however, none who make conversation a subject of
study, whereas pupils throng about the rhetoricians everywhere. And yet
the same rules that we have for words and sentences in rhetoric will
apply also to conversation.
*133* Now since we have the voice as the organ of speech, we should aim
to secure two properties for it: that it be clear, and that it be
musical. We must, of course, look to nature for both gifts. But
distinctness may be improved by practice; the musical qualities, by
imitating those who speak with smooth and articulate enunciation.
There was nothing in the two Catuli to lead one to suppose that they had
a refined literary taste; they were men of culture, it is true; and so
were others; but the Catuli were looked upon as the perfect masters of
the Latin tongue. Their pronunciation was charming; their words were
neither mouthed nor mumbled: they avoided both indistinctness and
affectation; their voices were free from strain, yet neither faint nor
shrill. More copious was the speech of Lucius Crassus and not less
brilliant, but the reputation of the two Catuli for eloquence was fully
equal to his. But in wit and humour Caesar, the elder Catulus's
half-brother, surpassed them all: even at the bar he would with his
conversational style defeat other advocates with their elaborate
orations.
If, therefore, we are aiming to secure propriety in every circumstance
of life, we must master all these points.
#Conversation as an art.#
*134* Conversation, then, in which the Socratics are the best models,
should have these qualities. It should be easy and not in the least
dogmatic; it should have the spice of wit. And the one who engages in
conversation should not debar others from participating in it, as if he
were entering upon a private monopoly; but, as in other things, so in a
general conversation he should think it not unfair for each to have his
turn. He should observe, first and foremost, what the subject of
conversation is. If it is grave, he should treat it with seriousness; if
humorous, with wit. And above all, he should be on the watch that his
conversation shall not betray some defect in his character. This is most
likely to occur, when people in jest or in earnest take delight in
making malicious and slanderous statements about the absent, on purpose
to injure their reputations.
*135* The subjects of conversation are usually affairs of the home or
politics or the practice of the professions and learning. Accordingly,
if the talk begins to drift off to other channels, pains should be taken
to bring it back again to the matter in hand--but with due consideration
to the company present; for we are not all interested in the same things
at all times or in the same degree. We must observe, too, how far the
conversation is agreeable and, as it had a reason for its beginning, so
there should be a point at which to close it tactfully.
*136* XXXVIII. Sed quo modo in omni vita rectissime praecipitur, ut
perturbationes fugiamus, id est motus animi nimios rationi non
optemperantes, sic eius modi motibus sermo debet vacare, ne aut ira
exsistat aut cupiditas aliqua aut pigritia aut ignavia aut tale aliquid
appareat, maximeque curandum est, ut eos, quibuscum sermonem conferemus,
et vereri et diligere videamur.
Obiurgationes etiam non numquam incidunt necessariae, in quibus utendum
est fortasse et vocis contentione maiore et verborum gravitate acriore,
id agendum etiam, ut ea facere videamur irati. Sed, ut ad urendum et
secandum, sic ad hoc genus castigandi raro invitique veniemus nec umquam
nisi necessario, si nulla reperietur alia medicina; sed tamen ira procul
absit, cum qua nihil recte fieri, nihil considerate potest. *137* Magnam
autem partem[133] clementi castigatione licet uti, gravitate tamen
adiuncta, ut severitas adhibeatur et contumelia repellatur, atque etiam
illud ipsum, quod acerbitatis habet obiurgatio, significandum est,
ipsius id causa, qui obiurgetur, esse susceptum.
Rectum est autem etiam in illis contentionibus, quae cum inimicissimis
fiunt, etiamsi nobis indigna audiamus, tamen gravitatem retinere,
iracundiam pellere. Quae enim cum aliqua perturbatione fiunt, ea nec
constanter fieri possunt neque iis, qui adsunt, probari.
Deforme etiam est de se ipsum praedicare falsa praesertim et cum
irrisione audientium imitari militem gloriosum.
[133] _magnam autem partem_ Lambinus, Edd.; _magna autem
parte_ MSS.
#Propriety of speech#
*136* XXXVIII. But as we have a most excellent rule for every phase of
life, to avoid exhibitions of passion, that is, mental excitement that
is excessive and uncontrolled by reason; so our conversation ought to be
free from such emotions: let there be no exhibition of anger or
inordinate desire, of indolence or indifference, or anything of the
kind. We must also take the greatest care to show courtesy and
consideration toward those with whom we converse.
#(1) in reproofs,#
It may sometimes happen that there is need of administering reproof. On
such occasions we should, perhaps, use a more emphatic tone of voice and
more forcible and severe terms and even assume an appearance of being
angry. But we shall have recourse to this sort of reproof, as we do to
cautery and amputation, rarely and reluctantly--never at all, unless it
is unavoidable and no other remedy can be discovered. We may seem angry,
but anger should be far from us; for in anger nothing right or judicious
can be done. *137* In most cases, we may apply a mild reproof, so
combined, however, with earnestness, that while severity is shown,
offensive language is avoided. Nay more, we must show clearly that even
that very harshness which goes with our reproof is designed for the good
of the person reproved.
#(2) in disputes,#
The right course, moreover, even in our differences with our bitterest
enemies, is to maintain our dignity and to repress our anger, even
though we are treated outrageously. For what is done under some degree
of excitement cannot be done with perfect self-respect or the approval
of those who witness it.
#(3) in self-praise.#
It is bad taste also to talk about oneself--especially if what one says
is not true--and, amid the derision of one's hearers, to play "The
Braggart Captain."[AD]
[AD] Like Pyrgopolinices in the _Miles Gloriosus_ of Plautus,
or Thraso in the _Eunuchus_ of Terence.
*138* XXXIX. Et quoniam omnia persequimur, volumus quidem certe,
dicendum est etiam, qualem hominis honorati et principis domum placeat
esse, cuius finis est usus,[134] ad quem accommodanda est aedificandi
descriptio et tamen adhibenda commoditatis dignitatisque diligentia.
Cn. Octavio, qui primus ex illa familia consul factus est, honori fuisse
accepimus, quod praeclaram aedificasset in Palatio et plenam dignitatis
domum; quae cum vulgo viseretur, suffragata domino, novo homini, ad
consulatum putabatur; hanc Scaurus demolitus accessionem adiunxit
aedibus. Itaque ille in suam domum consulatum primus attulit, hic, summi
et clarissimi viri filius, in domum multiplicatam non repulsam solum
rettulit, sed ignominiam etiam et[135] calamitatem. *139* Ornanda enim
est dignitas domo, non ex domo tota quaerenda, nec domo dominus, sed
domino domus honestanda est, et, ut in ceteris habenda ratio non sua
solum, sed etiam aliorum, sic in domo clari hominis, in quam et hospites
multi recipiendi et admittenda hominum cuiusque modi multitudo,
adhibenda cura est laxitatis; aliter ampla domus dedecori saepe domino
fit,[136] si est in ea solitudo, et maxime, si aliquando alio domino
solita est frequentari. Odiosum est enim, cum a praetereuntibus dicitur:
#Inc. inc. fab., Ribbeck^2, 184-185#
o domus ántiqua, heu[137] quam díspari
domináre domino!
quod quidem his temporibus in multis licet dicere.
*140* Cavendum autem est, praesertim si ipse aedifices, ne extra modum
sumptu et magnificentia prodeas; quo in genere multum mali etiam in
exemplo est. Studiose enim plerique praesertim in hanc partem facta
principum imitantur, ut L. Luculli, summi viri, virtutem quis? at quam
multi villarum magnificentiam imitati! quarum quidem certe est
adhibendus modus ad mediocritatemque[138] revocandus. Eademque
mediocritas ad omnem usum cultumque vitae transferenda est.
Sed haec hactenus.
*141* In omni autem actione suscipienda tria sunt tenenda, primum ut
appetitus rationi pareat, quo nihil est ad officia conservanda
accommodatius, deinde ut animadvertatur, quanta illa res sit, quam
efficere velimus, ut neve maior neve minor cura et opera suscipiatur,
quam causa postulet. Tertium est, ut caveamus, ut ea, quae pertinent ad
liberalem speciem et dignitatem,[139] moderata[140] sint. Modus autem
est optimus decus ipsum tenere, de quo ante diximus, nec progredi
longius. Horum tamen trium praestantissimum est appetitum optemperare
rationi.
[134] _est usus_ L c, Edd.; _et usus_ B H a b.
[135] _et_ L c, Edd.; not in B H b.
[136] _fit_ Bt., Ed.; _sit_ B H a b; _est_ L (corr. ex _sit_
b), Müller, Heine; not in c.
[137] _heu_ Edd.; _et_ MSS.; _ei_ Schenkl.
[138] _mediocritatemque_: _que_ italicized by Ed. but
attested by B H L b c.
[139] _ad liberalem speciem et dignitatem_ B H b, Edd.; _ad
liberalitatem specie et dignitate_ L c p.
[140] _moderata_ L c p, Edd.; _moderanda_ B H a b.
#The proper home.#
*138* XXXIX. But since I am investigating this subject in all its phases
(at least, that is my purpose), I must discuss also what sort of house a
man of rank and station should, in my opinion, have. Its prime object is
serviceableness. To this the plan of the building should be adapted; and
yet careful attention should be paid to its convenience and distinction.
We have heard that Gnaeus Octavius--the first of that family to be
elected consul--distinguished himself by building upon the Palatine an
attractive and imposing house. Everybody went to see it, and it was
thought to have gained votes for the owner, a new man, in his canvass
for the consulship. That house Scaurus demolished, and on its site he
built an addition to his own house. Octavius, then, was the first of his
family to bring the honour of a consulship to his house; Scaurus, though
the son of a very great and illustrious man, brought to the same house,
when enlarged, not only defeat, but disgrace and ruin. *139* The truth
is, a man's dignity may be enhanced by the house he lives in, but not
wholly secured by it; the owner should bring honour to his house, not
the house to its owner. And, as in everything else a man must have
regard not for himself alone but for others also, so in the home of a
distinguished man, in which numerous guests must be entertained and
crowds of every sort of people received, care must be taken to have it
spacious. But if it is not frequented by visitors, if it has an air of
lonesomeness, a spacious palace often becomes a discredit to its owner.
This is sure to be the case if at some other time, when it had a
different owner, it used to be thronged. For it is unpleasant, when
passers-by remark:
"O good old house, alas! how different
The owner who now owneth thee!"
And in these times that may be said of many a house![AE]
*140* One must be careful, too, not to go beyond proper bounds in
expense and display, especially if one is building for oneself. For much
mischief is done in this way, if only in the example set. For many
people imitate zealously the foibles of the great, particularly in this
direction: for example, who copies the virtues of Lucius Lucullus,
excellent man that he was? But how many there are who have copied the
magnificence of his villas! Some limit should surely be set to this
tendency and it should be reduced at least to a standard of moderation;
and by that same standard of moderation the comforts and wants of life
generally should be regulated.
But enough on this part of my theme.
#Three rules for the duty of propriety.#
*141* In entering upon any course of action, then, we must hold fast to
three principles: first, that impulse shall obey reason; for there is no
better way than this to secure the observance of duties; second, that we
estimate carefully the importance of the object that we wish to
accomplish, so that neither more nor less care and attention may be
expended upon it than the case requires; the third principle is that we
be careful to observe moderation in all that is essential to the outward
appearance and dignity of a gentleman. Moreover, the best rule for
securing this is strictly to observe that propriety which we have
discussed above, and not to overstep it. Yet of these three principles,
the one of prime importance is to keep impulse subservient to reason.
[AE] Members of Caesar's party were now occupying the houses
that had been the homes of Pompey's friends. Antony, for
example, lived in Pompey's house.
*142* XL. Deinceps de ordine rerum et de opportunitate temporum dicendum
est. Haec autem scientia continentur ea, quam Graeci εὐταξίαν nominant,
non hanc, quam interpretamur modestiam, quo in verbo modus inest, sed
illa est εὐταξία, in qua intellegitur ordinis conservatio. Itaque, ut
eandem nos modestiam appellemus, sic definitur a Stoicis, ut modestia
sit scientia rerum earum, quae agentur aut dicentur, loco suo
collocandarum. Ita videtur eadem vis ordinis et collocationis fore; nam
et ordinem sic definiunt: compositionem rerum aptis et accommodatis
locis; locum autem actionis opportunitatem[141] temporis esse dicunt;
tempus autem actionis opportunum[142] Graece εὐκαιρία, Latine appellatur
occasio. Sic fit, ut modestia haec, quam ita interpretamur, ut dixi,
scientia sit opportunitatis[143] idoneorum ad agendum temporum.
#Ch. VI#
*143* Sed potest eadem esse prudentiae definitio, de qua principio
diximus; hoc autem loco de moderatione et temperantia et harum similibus
virtutibus quaerimus. Itaque, quae erant prudentiae propria, suo loco
dicta sunt; quae autem harum virtutum, de quibus iam diu loquimur, quae
pertinent ad verecundiam et ad eorum approbationem, quibuscum vivimus,
nunc dicenda sunt.
*144* Talis est igitur ordo actionum adhibendus, ut, quem ad modum in
oratione constanti, sic in vita omnia sint apta inter se et
convenientia; turpe enim valdeque vitiosum in re severa convivio
digna[144] aut delicatum aliquem inferre sermonem. Bene Pericles, cum
haberet collegam in praetura Sophoclem poëtam iique de communi officio
convenissent et casu formosus puer praeteriret dixissetque Sophocles: "O
puerum pulchrum, Pericle!" "At enim praetorem, Sophocle, decet non solum
manus, sed etiam oculos abstinentes habere." Atqui[145] hoc idem
Sophocles si in athletarum probatione dixisset, iusta reprehensione
caruisset. Tanta vis est et loci et temporis. Ut, si qui, cum causam sit
acturus, in itinere aut in ambulatione secum ipse meditetur, aut si quid
aliud attentius cogitet, non reprehendatur, at hoc idem si in convivio
faciat, inhumanus videatur inscitia temporis.
*145* Sed ea, quae multum ab humanitate discrepant, ut si qui in foro
cantet, aut si qua est alia magna perversitas, facile apparet nec
magnopere admonitionem et praecepta desiderat; quae autem parva videntur
esse delicta neque a multis intellegi possunt, ab iis[146] est
diligentius declinandum. Ut in fidibus aut tibiis, quamvis paulum
discrepent, tamen id a sciente animadverti solet, sic videndum[147] est
in vita ne forte quid discrepet, vel multo etiam magis, quo maior et
melior actionum quam sonorum concentus est.
[141] _oportunitate(m)_ Ed.
[142] _oportunum_ Ed.
[143] _oportunitatis_ Ed.
[144] _convivio digna_ B H a b, Edd.; _convivio dignum_ c;
_convivii dicta_ L p.
[145] _Atqui_ Müller, Heine; _atque_ MSS., Bt.
[146] _iis_ Edd.; _his_ MSS.
[147] _videndum_ L c, Edd.; _vivendum_ B H a b.
#Orderliness--the right thing at the right time.#
*142* XL. Next, then, we must discuss orderliness of conduct and
seasonableness of occasions. These two qualities are embraced in that
science which the Greeks call εὐταξία--not that εὐταξία which we
translate with _moderation_ [_modestia_], derived from _moderate_; but
this is the εὐταξία by which we understand _orderly conduct_. And so, if
we may call it also _moderation_, it is defined by the Stoics as
follows: "Moderation is the science of disposing aright everything that
is done or said." So the essence of orderliness and of right-placing, it
seems, will be the same; for _orderliness_ they define also as "the
arrangement of things in their suitable and appropriate places." By
"place of action," moreover, they mean _seasonableness of circumstance_;
and the _seasonable circumstance_ for an action is called in Greek
εὐκαιρία, in Latin _occasio_ (occasion). So it comes about that in this
sense _moderation_, which we explain as I have indicated, is the
science of doing the right thing at the right time.
*143* A similar definition can be given for prudence, of which I have
spoken in an early chapter. But in this part we are considering
temperance and self-control and related virtues. Accordingly, the
properties which, as we found, are peculiar to prudence, were discussed
in their proper place, while those are to be discussed now which are
peculiar to these virtues of which we have for some time been speaking
and which relate to considerateness and to the approbation of our
fellow-men.
*144* Such orderliness of conduct is, therefore, to be observed, that
everything in the conduct of our life shall balance and harmonize, as in
a finished speech. #Seasonableness of speech.# For it is unbecoming and
highly censurable, when upon a serious theme, to introduce such jests as
are proper at a dinner, or any sort of loose talk. When Pericles was
associated with the poet Sophocles as his colleague in command and they
had met to confer about official business that concerned them both, a
handsome boy chanced to pass and Sophocles said: "Look, Pericles; what a
pretty boy!" How pertinent was Pericles's reply: "Hush, Sophocles, a
general should keep not only his hands but his eyes under control." And
yet, if Sophocles had made this same remark at a trial of athletes, he
would have incurred no just reprimand. So great is the significance of
both place and circumstance. For example, if anyone, while on a journey
or on a walk, should rehearse to himself a case which he is preparing to
conduct in court, or if he should under similar circumstances apply his
closest thought to some other subject, he would not be open to censure;
but if he should do that same thing at a dinner, he would be thought
ill-bred, because he ignored the proprieties of the occasion.
#The little things that count.#
*145* But flagrant breaches of good breeding, like singing in the
streets or any other gross misconduct, are easily apparent and do not
call especially for admonition and instruction. But we must even more
carefully avoid those seemingly trivial faults which pass unnoticed by
the many. However slightly out of tune a harp or flute may be, the fault
is still detected by a connoisseur; so we must be on the watch lest
haply something in our life be out of tune--nay, rather, far greater is
the need for painstaking, inasmuch as harmony of actions is far better
and far more important than harmony of sounds.
*146* XLI. Itaque, ut in fidibus musicorum aures vel minima sentiunt,
sic nos, si acres ac diligentes esse volumus animadversores[que][148]
vitiorum, magna saepe intellegemus ex parvis. Ex oculorum optutu,
superciliorum aut remissione aut contractione, ex maestitia, ex
hilaritate, ex risu, ex locutione, ex reticentia, ex contentione vocis,
ex summissione, ex ceteris similibus facile iudicabimus, quid eorum apte
fiat, quid ab officio naturaque discrepet. Quo in genere non est
incommodum, quale quidque eorum sit, ex aliis iudicare, ut, si quid
dedeceat in illis,[149] vitemus ipsi; fit enim nescio quo modo, ut magis
in aliis cernamus quam in nobismet ipsis, si quid delinquitur. Itaque
facillime corriguntur in discendo, quorum vitia imitantur emendandi
causa magistri.
*147* Nec vero alienum est ad ea eligenda, quae dubitationem afferent,
adhibere doctos homines vel etiam usu peritos et, quid iis de quoque
officii genere placeat, exquirere. Maior enim pars eo fere deferri
solet, quo a natura ipsa deducitur. In quibus videndum est, non modo
quid quisque loquatur, sed etiam quid quisque sentiat atque etiam de qua
causa quisque sentiat. Ut enim pictores et ii, qui signa fabricantur, et
vero etiam poëtae suum quisque opus a vulgo considerari vult, ut, si
quid reprehensum sit a pluribus, id corrigatur, iique et secum et ab
aliis,[150] quid in eo peccatum sit, exquirunt, sic aliorum iudicio
permulta nobis et facienda et non facienda et mutanda et corrigenda
sunt.
*148* Quae vero more agentur institutisque civilibus, de iis nihil est
praecipiendum; illa enim ipsa praecepta sunt, nec quemquam hoc errore
duci oportet, ut, si quid Socrates aut Aristippus contra morem
consuetudinemque civilem fecerint locutive sint, idem sibi arbitretur
licere; magnis illi et divinis bonis hanc licentiam assequebantur.
Cynicorum vero ratio tota est eicienda; est enim inimica verecundiae,
sine qua nihil rectum esse potest, nihil honestum.
*149* Eos autem, quorum vita perspecta in rebus honestis atque magnis
est, bene de re publica sentientes ac bene meritos aut merentes sic
ut[151] aliquo honore aut imperio affectos observare et colere debemus,
tribuere etiam multum senectuti, cedere iis, qui magistratum habebunt,
habere dilectum civis et peregrini in ipsoque peregrino, privatimne an
publice venerit. Ad summam, ne agam de singulis, communem totius generis
hominum conciliationem et consociationem colere, tueri, servare debemus.
[148] _animadversores_ [_que_] Ed.; _animadversoresque_ MSS.;
*_animadversoresque_ Bt.; _animadversores_ Orelli, Müller,
Heine.
[149] _dedeceat_ a c, Edd.; _deceat_ H L b; _non deceat_ B.
_in illis_ a Bt.^1, Ed.; _in illos_ B H b c; _illos_ L, Bt.^2
[150] _et ab aliis_ a, Bt., Ed.; _aliis_ B H b; _et cum
aliis_ c; _et ex aliis_ Unger, Müller.
[151] _sic ut_ L p, Nonius; not in B H b c.
#We correct our faults#
#(1) by observing others,#
*146* XLI. As, therefore, a musical ear detects even the slightest
falsity of tone in a harp, so we, if we wish to be keen and careful
observers of moral faults, shall often draw important conclusions from
trifles. We observe others and from a glance of the eyes, from a
contracting or relaxing of the brows, from an air of sadness, from an
outburst of joy, from a laugh, from speech, from silence, from a raising
or lowering of the voice, and the like, we shall easily judge which of
our actions is proper, and which is out of accord with duty and nature.
And, in the same manner, it is not a bad plan to judge of the nature of
our every action by studying others, that so we may ourselves avoid
anything that is unbecoming in them. For it happens somehow or other
that we detect another's failings more readily than we do our own; and
so in the school-room those pupils learn most easily to do better whose
faults the masters mimic for the sake of correcting them.
#(2) by the criticisms of the wise.#
*147* Nor is it out of place in making a choice between duties involving
a doubt, to consult men of learning or practical wisdom and to ascertain
what their views are on any particular question of duty. For the
majority usually drift as the current of their own natural inclinations
carries them; and in deriving counsel from one of these, we have to see
not only what our adviser says, but also what he thinks, and what his
reasons are for thinking as he does. For, as painters and sculptors and
even poets, too, wish to have their works reviewed by the public, in
order that, if any point is generally criticized, it may be improved;
and as they try to discover both by themselves and with the help of
others what is wrong in their work; so through consulting the judgment
of others we find that there are many things to be done and left undone,
to be altered and improved.
#The laws of the state are rules of duty.#
*148* But no rules need to be given about what is done in accordance
with the established customs and conventions of a community; for these
are in themselves rules; and no one ought to make the mistake of
supposing that, because Socrates or Aristippus did or said something
contrary to the manners and established customs of their city, he has a
right to do the same; it was only by reason of their great and
superhuman virtues that those famous men acquired this special
privilege. But the Cynics' whole system of philosophy must be rejected,
for it is inimical to moral sensibility, and without moral sensibility
nothing can be upright, nothing morally good.
#Special rules.#
*149* It is, furthermore, our duty to honour and reverence those whose
lives are conspicuous for conduct in keeping with their high moral
standards, and who, as true patriots, have rendered or are now rendering
efficient service to their country, just as much as if they were
invested with some civil or military authority; it is our duty also to
show proper respect to old age, to yield precedence to magistrates, to
make a distinction between a fellow-citizen and a foreigner, and, in the
case of the foreigner himself, to discriminate according to whether he
has come in an official or a private capacity. In a word, not to go into
details, it is our duty to respect, defend, and maintain the common
bonds of union and fellowship subsisting between all the members of the
human race.
*150* XLII. Iam de artificiis et quaestibus, qui liberales habendi, qui
sordidi sint, haec fere accepimus. Primum improbantur ii quaestus, qui
in odia hominum incurrunt, ut portitorum, ut faeneratorum. Illiberales
autem et sordidi quaestus mercennariorum omnium, quorum operae, non
quorum artes emuntur; est enim in illis ipsa merces auctoramentum
servitutis. Sordidi etiam putandi, qui mercantur a mercatoribus, quod
statim vendant; nihil enim proficiant, nisi admodum mentiantur; nec vero
est quicquam turpius vanitate. Opificesque omnes in sordida arte
versantur; nec enim quicquam ingenuum habere potest officina. Minimeque
artes eae probandae, quae ministrae sunt voluptatum:
#Eunuchus II, 2, 26#
Cetárii, lanií, coqui, fartóres, piscatóres,
ut ait Terentius; adde huc, si placet, unguentarios, saltatores totumque
ludum talarium.
*151* Quibus autem artibus aut prudentia maior inest aut non mediocris
utilitas quaeritur, ut medicina, ut architectura, ut doctrina rerum
honestarum, eae sunt iis, quorum ordini conveniunt, honestae. Mercatura
autem, si tenuis est, sordida putanda est; sin magna et copiosa, multa
undique apportans multisque sine vanitate impertiens, non est admodum
vituperanda, atque etiam, si satiata quaestu vel contenta potius, ut
saepe ex alto in portum, ex ipso portu se in agros possessionesque
contulit, videtur iure optimo posse laudari. Omnium autem rerum, ex
quibus aliquid acquiritur, nihil est agri cultura melius, nihil uberius,
nihil dulcius, nihil homine libero[152] dignius; #C.M. XV-XVII# de qua
quoniam in Catone Maiore satis multa diximus, illim[153] assumes, quae
ad hunc locum pertinebunt.
[152] _homine libero_ Edd.; _homine nihil libero_ B H L a b
c.
[153] _illim_ B^1, Edd.; _illum_ H; _illa_ B^2 p; _illinc_ a
b c; _illic_ L.
#Occupations:#
#(1) vulgar,#
*150* XLII. Now in regard to trades and other means of livelihood, which
ones are to be considered becoming to a gentleman and which ones are
vulgar, we have been taught, in general, as follows. First, those means
of livelihood are rejected as undesirable which incur people's ill-will,
as those of tax-gatherers and usurers. Unbecoming to a gentleman, too,
and vulgar are the means of livelihood of all hired workmen whom we pay
for mere manual labour, not for artistic skill; for in their case the
very wages they receive is a pledge of their slavery. Vulgar we must
consider those also who buy from wholesale merchants to retail
immediately; for they would get no profits without a great deal of
downright lying; and verily, there is no action that is meaner than
misrepresentation. And all mechanics are engaged in vulgar trades; for
no workshop can have anything liberal about it. Least respectable of all
are those trades which cater to sensual pleasures:
"Fishmongers, butchers, cooks, and poulterers,
And fishermen,"
as Terence says. Add to these, if you please, the perfumers, dancers,
and the whole _corps de ballet_.[AF]
#(2) liberal.#
*151* But the professions in which either a higher degree of
intelligence is required or from which no small benefit to society is
derived--medicine and architecture, for example, and teaching--these are
proper for those whose social position they become. Trade, if it is on a
small scale, is to be considered vulgar; but if wholesale and on a large
scale, importing large quantities from all parts of the world and
distributing to many without misrepresentation, it is not to be greatly
disparaged. Nay, it even seems to deserve the highest respect, if those
who are engaged in it, satiated, or rather, I should say, satisfied with
the fortunes they have made, make their way from the port to a country
estate, as they have often made it from the sea into port. But of all
the occupations by which gain is secured, none is better than
agriculture, none more profitable, none more delightful, none more
becoming to a freeman. But since I have discussed this quite fully in my
Cato Major, you will find there the material that applies to this point.
[AF] The _ludus talarius_ was a kind of low variety show,
with loose songs and dances and bad music.
*152* XLIII. Sed ab iis partibus, quae sunt honestatis, quem ad modum
officia ducerentur, satis expositum videtur. Eorum autem ipsorum, quae
honesta sunt, potest incidere saepe contentio et comparatio, de duobus
honestis utrum honestius, qui locus a Panaetio est praetermissus. Nam
cum omnis honestas manet a partibus quattuor, quarum una sit
cognitionis, altera communitatis, tertia magnanimitatis, quarta
moderationis, haec in deligendo officio saepe inter se comparentur
necesse est.
*153* Placet igitur aptiora esse naturae ea officia, quae ex
communitate, quam ea, quae ex cognitione ducantur, idque hoc argumento
confirmari potest, quod, si contigerit ea vita sapienti, ut omnium rerum
affluentibus copiis [quamvis] omnia,[154] quae cognitione digna sint,
summo otio secum ipse consideret et contempletur, tamen, si solitudo
tanta sit, ut hominem videre non possit, excedat e vita. Princepsque
omnium virtutum illa sapientia, quam σοφίαν Graeci vocant--prudentiam
enim, quam Graeci φρόνησιν dicunt, aliam quandam intellegimus, quae est
rerum expetendarum fugiendarumque scientia; illa autem sapientia, quam
principem dixi, rerum est divinarum et humanarum scientia, in qua
continetur deorum et hominum communitas et societas inter ipsos; ea si
maxima est, ut est certe, necesse est, quod a communitate ducatur
officium, id esse maximum. Etenim cognitio contemplatioque naturae manca
quodam modo atque inchoata sit, si nulla actio rerum consequatur. Ea
autem actio in hominum commodis tuendis maxime cernitur; pertinet igitur
ad societatem generis humani; ergo haec cognitioni anteponenda est.
*154* Atque id optimus quisque re ipsa[155] ostendit et iudicat. Quis
enim est tam cupidus in perspicienda cognoscendaque rerum natura, ut, si
ei tractanti contemplantique res cognitione dignissimas subito sit
allatum periculum discrimenque patriae, cui subvenire opitularique
possit, non illa omnia relinquat atque abiciat, etiamsi dinumerare se
stellas aut metiri mundi magnitudinem posse arbitretur? atque hoc idem
in parentis, in amici re aut periculo fecerit.
*155* Quibus rebus intellegitur studiis officiisque scientiae
praeponenda esse officia iustitiae, quae pertinent ad hominum
utilitatem,[156] qua nihil homini esse debet antiquius.
[154] _copiis_ [_quamvis_] _omnia_, Ed.; _copiis quamvis omnia_
MSS.; _copiis omnia_ Lambinus, Bt., Müller, Heine.
[155] _re ipsa_ B H a b, Bt., Ed.; _re ab se_ L c (i.e.
_reapse_ Orelli, Müller, Heine); _ab ipsa re_ p.
[156] _utilitatem_ B H a b; _caritatem_ L c p (affection).
#Comparative estimate of duties.#
*152* XLIII. Now, I think I have explained fully enough how moral duties
are derived from the four divisions of moral rectitude. But between
those very actions which are morally right, a conflict and comparison
may frequently arise, as to which of two moral actions is morally
better--a point overlooked by Panaetius. For, since all moral rectitude
springs from four sources (one of which is prudence; the second, social
instinct; the third, courage; the fourth, temperance) it is often
necessary in deciding a question of duty that these virtues be weighed
against one another.
#Justice _vs._ Wisdom.#
*153* My view, therefore, is that those duties are closer to nature
which depend upon the social instinct than those which depend upon
knowledge; and this view can be confirmed by the following argument: (1)
suppose that a wise man should be vouchsafed such a life that, with an
abundance of everything pouring in upon him, he might in perfect peace
study and ponder over everything that is worth knowing, still, if the
solitude were so complete that he could never see a human being, he
would die. And then, the foremost of all virtues is wisdom--what the
Greeks call σοφία; for by prudence, which they call φρόνησις, we
understand something else, namely, the practical knowledge of things to
be sought for and of things to be avoided. (2) Again, that wisdom which
I have given the foremost place is the knowledge of things human and
divine, which is concerned also with the bonds of union between gods and
men and the relations of man to man. If wisdom is the most important of
the virtues, as it certainly is, it necessarily follows that that duty
which is connected with the social obligation is the most important
duty.[AG] And (3) service is better than mere theoretical knowledge, for
the study and knowledge of the universe would somehow be lame and
defective, were no practical results to follow. Such results, moreover,
are best seen in the safe-guarding of human interests. It is essential,
then, to human society; and it should, therefore, be ranked above
speculative knowledge.
*154* Upon this all the best men agree, as they prove by their conduct.
For who is so absorbed in the investigation and study of creation, but
that, even though he were working and pondering over tasks never so much
worth mastering and even though he thought he could number the stars and
measure the length and breadth of the universe, he would drop all those
problems and cast them aside, if word were suddenly brought to him of
some critical peril to his country, which he could relieve or repel? And
he would do the same to further the interests of parent or friend or to
save him from danger.
*155* From all this we conclude that the duties prescribed by justice
must be given precedence over the pursuit of knowledge and the duties
imposed by it; for the former concern the welfare of our fellow-men; and
nothing ought to be more sacred in men's eyes than that.
[AG] Cicero is guilty of a curious fallacy. If it follows
from his premises, (1) some one virtue is the highest virtue,
and (2) the duties derived from the highest virtue are the
highest duties, and if (3) wisdom is the highest virtue, then
it can only follow that the duties derived from wisdom are
the highest duties. But Cicero throws in a fourth premise
that the "bonds of union between gods and men and the
relations of man to man" are derived from wisdom, and
therewith sidetracks wisdom and gives the duties derived from
the social instinct the place from which wisdom has been
shunted.
Cicero could not refrain from introducing a bit of
theoretical speculation that has no value for his practical
position--it actually prejudices it and confuses the reader.
XLIV. Atque illi, quorum studia vitaque omnis in rerum cognitione
versata est, tamen ab augendis hominum utilitatibus et commodis non
recesserunt: nam et erudiverunt multos, quo meliores cives utilioresque
rebus suis publicis essent, ut Thebanum Epaminondam Lysis Pythagoreus,
Syracosium Dionem Plato multique multos, nosque ipsi, quicquid ad rem
publicam attulimus, si modo aliquid attulimus, a doctoribus atque
doctrina instructi ad eam et ornati accessimus. *156* Neque solum vivi
atque praesentes studiosos discendi erudiunt atque docent, sed hoc idem
etiam post mortem monumentis litterarum assequuntur. Nec enim locus
ullus est praetermissus ab iis, qui ad leges, qui ad mores, qui ad
disciplinam rei publicae pertineret, ut otium suum ad nostrum negotium
contulisse videantur. Ita illi ipsi doctrinae studiis et sapientiae
dediti ad hominum utilitatem suam prudentiam intellegentiamque
potissimum conferunt; ob eamque etiam causam eloqui copiose, modo
prudenter, melius est quam vel acutissime sine eloquentia cogitare, quod
cogitatio in se ipsa vertitur, eloquentia complectitur eos, quibuscum
communitate iuncti sumus.
*157* Atque ut apium examina non fingendorum favorum causa congregantur,
sed, cum congregabilia natura sint, fingunt favos, sic homines, ac multo
etiam magis, natura congregati adhibent agendi cogitandique[157]
sollertiam. Itaque, nisi ea virtus, quae constat ex hominibus tuendis,
id est ex societate generis humani, attingat cognitionem rerum, solivaga
cognitio et ieiuna videatur, itemque magnitudo animi remota
communitate[158] coniunctioneque humana feritas sit quaedam et
immanitas. Ita fit, ut vincat cognitionis studium consociatio hominum
atque communitas.
#Plato, Rep. II, 369 B; Arist., Pol. I, 1253 A#
*158* Nec verum est, quod dicitur a quibusdam, propter necessitatem
vitae, quod ea, quae natura desideraret, consequi sine aliis atque
efficere non possemus, idcirco initam esse cum hominibus communitatem et
societatem; quodsi omnia nobis, quae ad victum cultumque pertinent,
quasi virgula divina, ut aiunt, suppeditarentur, tum optimo quisque
ingenio negotiis omnibus omissis totum se in cognitione et scientia
collocaret. Non est ita; nam et solitudinem fugeret et socium studii
quaereret, tum docere tum discere vellet, tum audire tum dicere. Ergo
omne officium, quod ad coniunctionem hominum et ad societatem tuendam
valet, anteponendum est illi officio, quod cognitione et scientia
continetur.
[157] _cogitandique_ L c p, Edd.; _congregandique_ B H a b.
[158] _communitate_ p (per compendium), Bt.^2, Müller, Heine;
_comitate_ A B H L a b c.
#Wisdom in the service of Justice.#
XLIV. And yet scholars, whose whole life and interests have been devoted
to the pursuit of knowledge, have not, after all, failed to contribute
to the advantages and blessings of mankind. For they have trained many
to be better citizens and to render larger service to their country. So,
for example, the Pythagorean Lysis taught Epaminondas of Thebes; Plato,
Dion of Syracuse; and many, many others. As for me myself, whatever
service I have rendered to my country--if, indeed, I have rendered
any--I came to my task trained and equipped for it by my teachers and
what they taught me. *156* And not only while present in the flesh do
they teach and train those who are desirous of learning, but by the
written memorials of their learning they continue the same service after
they are dead. For they have overlooked no point that has a bearing
upon laws, customs, or political science; in fact, they seem to have
devoted their retirement to the benefit of us who are engaged in public
business. The principal thing done, therefore, by those very devotees of
the pursuits of learning and science is to apply their own practical
wisdom and insight to the service of humanity. And for that reason also
much speaking (if only it contain wisdom) is better than speculation
never so profound without speech; for mere speculation is self-centred,
while speech extends its benefits to those with whom we are united by
the bonds of society.
*157* And again, as swarms of bees do not gather for the sake of making
honeycomb but make the honeycomb because they are gregarious by nature,
so human beings--and to a much higher degree--exercise their skill
together in action and thought because they are naturally gregarious.
#Justice more valuable than Wisdom and Fortitude.# And so, if that
virtue [Justice] which centres in the safeguarding of human interests,
that is, in the maintenance of human society, were not to accompany the
pursuit of knowledge, that knowledge would seem isolated and barren of
results. In the same way, courage [Fortitude], if unrestrained by the
uniting bonds of society, would be but a sort of brutality and savagery.
Hence it follows that the claims of human society and the bonds that
unite men together take precedence of the pursuit of speculative
knowledge.
*158* And it is not true, as certain people maintain, that the bonds of
union in human society were instituted in order to provide for the needs
of daily life; for, they say, without the aid of others we could not
secure for ourselves or supply to others the things that nature
requires; but if all that is essential to our wants and comfort were
supplied by some magic wand, as in the stories, then every man of
first-rate ability could drop all other responsibility and devote
himself exclusively to learning and study. Not at all. For he would seek
to escape from his loneliness and to find some one to share his studies;
he would wish to teach, as well as to learn; to hear, as well as to
speak. Every duty, therefore, that tends effectively to maintain and
safeguard human society should be given the preference over that duty
which arises from speculation and science alone.
*159* XLV. Illud forsitan quaerendum sit, num haec communitas, quae
maxime est apta naturae, sit etiam moderationi modestiaeque semper
anteponenda. Non placet; sunt enim quaedam partim ita foeda, partim ita
flagitiosa, ut ea ne conservandae quidem patriae causa sapiens facturus
sit. Ea Posidonius collegit permulta, sed ita taetra quaedam, ita
obscena, ut dictu quoque videantur turpia. Haec igitur non suscipiet rei
publicae causa, ne res publica quidem pro se suscipi volet. Sed hoc[159]
commodius se res habet, quod non potest accidere tempus, ut intersit rei
publicae quicquam illorum facere sapientem.
*160* Quare hoc quidem effectum sit, in officiis deligendis id[160]
genus officiorum excellere, quod teneatur hominum societate. [Etenim
cognitionem prudentiamque sequetur considerata actio; ita fit, ut agere
considerate pluris sit quam cogitare prudenter.][161]
Atque haec quidem hactenus. Patefactus enim locus est ipse, ut non
difficile sit in exquirendo officio, quid cuique sit praeponendum,
videre. In ipsa autem communitate sunt gradus officiorum, ex quibus,
quid cuique praestet, intellegi possit, ut prima dis immortalibus,
secunda patriae, tertia parentibus, deinceps gradatim reliquis
debeantur.
*161* Quibus ex rebus breviter disputatis intellegi potest non solum id
homines solere dubitare, honestumne an turpe sit, sed etiam duobus
propositis honestis utrum honestius sit. Hic locus a Panaetio est, ut
supra dixi, praetermissus. Sed iam ad reliqua pergamus.
[159] _hoc_ L c p, Edd.; _haec_ B H a b.
[160] _id_ a, Edd.; _ut_ b; _hoc_ B H L c p.
[161] _Etenim ... prudenter_ bracketed by Unger.
#Justice _vs._ Temperance.#
*159* XLV. The following question should, perhaps, be asked: whether
this social instinct, which is the deepest feeling in our nature, is
always to have precedence over temperance and moderation also. I think
not. For there are some acts either so repulsive or so wicked, that a
wise man would not commit them, even to save his country. Posidonius has
made a large collection of them; but some of them are so shocking, so
indecent, that it seems immoral even to mention them. The wise man,
therefore, will not think of doing any such thing for the sake of his
country; no more will his country consent to have it done for her. But
the problem is the more easily disposed of because the occasion cannot
arise when it could be to the state's interest to have the wise man do
any of those things.
#Order of precedence of duties.#
*160* This, then, may be regarded as settled: in choosing between
conflicting duties, that class takes precedence which is demanded by the
interests of human society. [And this is the natural sequence; for
discreet action will presuppose learning and practical wisdom; it
follows, therefore, that discreet action is of more value than wise (but
inactive) speculation.]
So much must suffice for this topic. For, in its essence, it has been
made so clear, that in determining a question of duty it is not
difficult to see which duty is to be preferred to any other. Moreover,
even in the social relations themselves there are gradations of duty so
well defined that it can easily be seen which duty takes precedence of
any other: our first duty is to the immortal gods; our second, to
country; our third, to parents; and so on, in a descending scale, to the
rest.
*161* From this brief discussion, then, it can be understood that people
are often in doubt not only whether an action is morally right or wrong,
but also, when a choice is offered between two moral actions, which one
is morally better. This point, as I remarked above, has been overlooked
by Panaetius. But let us now pass on to what remains.
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