BOOK I

TRANSCRIBER'S NOTE:

Italic text has been marked with _underscores_. Inconsistencies in

hyphenation have not been corrected, punctuation has been silently

corrected. A list of other corrections to the text can be found at the

end of the document. In the book the Latin text is printed on the left

page, and the English translation on the right. Here, the text is split

by sections starting with a roman numeral, and the Latin text is

followed by its English translation. The section numbers that appeared in

the margin are placed between *asterisks*. Sidenotes are placed

between #hashtags# and are placed either above the paragraph they refer

to or inline. Numbers printed in superscript are preceded by a ^.

[Illustration: M. TULLIUS CICERO.

_FROM THE JAMES LOEB COLLECTION._]

CICERO

DE OFFICIIS

WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY

WALTER MILLER

LONDON: WILLIAM HEINEMANN

NEW YORK: THE MACMILLAN CO.

MCMXIII

CONTENTS

Introduction _Page_ ix

Bibliography xiii

Book I 1

Book II 167

Book III 269

Index 405

INTRODUCTION

In the _de Officiis_ we have, save for the latter Philippics, the great

orator's last contribution to literature. The last, sad, troubled years

of his busy life could not be given to his profession; and he turned his

never-resting thoughts to the second love of his student days and made

Greek philosophy a possibility for Roman readers. The senate had been

abolished; the courts had been closed. His occupation was gone; but

Cicero could not surrender himself to idleness. In those days of

distraction (46-43 B.C.) he produced for publication almost as much as

in all his years of active life.

The liberators had been able to remove the tyrant, but they could not

restore the republic. Cicero's own life was in danger from the fury of

mad Antony and he left Rome about the end of March, 44 B.C. He dared not

even stop permanently in any one of his various country estates, but,

wretched, wandered from one of his villas to another nearly all the

summer and autumn through. He would not suffer himself to become a prey

to his overwhelming sorrow at the death of the republic and the final

crushing of the hopes that had risen with Caesar's downfall, but worked

at the highest tension on his philosophical studies.

The Romans were not philosophical. In 161 B.C. the senate passed a

decree excluding all philosophers and teachers of rhetoric from the

city. They had no taste for philosophical speculation, in which the

Greeks were the world's masters. They were intensely, narrowly

practical. And Cicero was thoroughly Roman. As a student in a Greek

university he had had to study philosophy. His mind was broad enough and

his soul great enough to give him a joy in following after the mighty

masters, Socrates, Plato, Zeno, Cleanthes, Aristotle, Theophrastus, and

the rest. But he pursued his study of it, like a Roman, from a

"practical" motive--to promote thereby his power as an orator and to

augment his success and happiness in life. To him the goal of philosophy

was not primarily to know but to do. Its end was to point out the course

of conduct that would lead to success and happiness. The only side of

philosophy, therefore, that could make much appeal to the Roman mind was

ethics; pure science could have little meaning for the practical Roman;

metaphysics might supplement ethics and religion, without which true

happiness was felt to be impossible.

Philosophical study had its place, therefore, and the most important

department of philosophy was ethics. The treatise on Moral Duties has

the very practical purpose of giving a practical discussion of the basic

principles of Moral Duty and practical rules for personal conduct.

As a philosopher, if we may so stretch the term as to include him,

Cicero avows himself an adherent of the New Academy and a disciple of

Carneades. He had tried Epicureanism under Phaedrus and Zeno, Stoicism

under Diodotus and Posidonius; but Philo of Larissa converted him to the

New Academy.

Scepticism declared the attainment of absolute knowledge impossible. But

there is the easily obtainable golden mean of the probable; and that

appealed to the practical Roman. It appealed especially to Cicero; and

the same indecision that had been his bane in political life naturally

led him first to scepticism, then to eclecticism, where his choice is

dictated by his bias for the practical and his scepticism itself

disappears from view. And while Antiochus, the eclectic Academician of

Athens, and Posidonius, the eclectic Stoic of Rhodes, seem to have had

the strongest influence upon him, he draws at his own discretion from

the founts of Stoics, Peripatetics, and Academicians alike; he has only

contempt for the Epicureans, Cynics, and Cyrenaics. But the more he

studied and lived, the more of a Stoic in ethics he became.

The cap-sheaf of Cicero's ethical studies is the treatise on the Moral

Duties. It takes the form of a letter addressed to his son Marcus (see

Index), at this time a youth of twenty-one, pursuing his university

studies in the Peripatetic school of Cratippus in Athens, and sowing for

what promised to be an abundant crop of wild oats. This situation gives

force and definiteness to the practical tendencies of the father's

ethical teachings. And yet, be it observed, that same father is not

without censure for contributing to his son's extravagant and riotous

living by giving him an allowance of nearly £870 a year.

Our Roman makes no pretensions to originality in philosophic thinking.

He is a follower--an expositor--of the Greeks. As the basis of his

discussion of the Moral Duties he takes the Stoic Panaetius of Rhodes

(see Index), Περὶ Καθήκοντος, drawing also from many other sources, but

following him more or less closely in Books I and II; Book III is more

independent and much inferior. He is usually superficial and not always

clear. He translates and paraphrases Greek philosophy, weaving in

illustrations from Roman history and suggestions of Roman mould in a

form intended to make it, if not popular, at least comprehensible, to

the Roman mind. How well he succeeded is evidenced by the comparative

receptivity of Roman soil prepared by Stoic doctrine for the teachings

of Christianity. Indeed, Anthony Trollope labels our author the "Pagan

Christian." "You would fancy sometimes," says Petrarch, "it is not a

Pagan philosopher but a Christian apostle who is speaking." No less an

authority than Frederick the Great has called our book "the best work on

morals that has been or can be written." Cicero himself looked upon it

as his masterpiece.

It has its strength and its weakness--its sane common sense and noble

patriotism, its self-conceit and partisan politics; it has the master's

brilliant style, but it is full of repetitions and rhetorical

flourishes, and it fails often in logical order and power; it rings true

in its moral tone, but it shows in what haste and distraction it was

composed; for it was not written as a contribution to close scientific

thinking; it was written as a means of occupation and diversion.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

The following works are quoted in the critical notes:--

_MSS._ A = _codex Ambrosianus_. Milan. 10th century.

B = _codex Bambergensis_. Hamburg. 10th century.

H = _codex Herbipolitanus_. Würzburg. 10th century.

L = _codex Harleianus_. London. 9th century.

a b = _codices Bernenses_. Bern. 10th century.

c = _codex Bernensis_. Bern. 13th century.

p = _codex Palatinus_. Rome. 12th century.

_Editio Princeps_: The first edition of the _de Officiis_ was from the

press of Sweynheim and Pannartz at the Monastery of Subiaco;

possibly the edition published by Fust and Schöffer at Mainz is

a little older. Both appeared in 1465. The latter was the first

to print the Greek words in Greek type. The _de Officiis_ is,

therefore, the first classical book to be issued from a

printing press, with the possible exception of Lactantius and

Cicero's _de Oratore_ which bear the more exact date of October

30, 1465, and were likewise issued from the Monastery press at

Subiaco.

_Baiter & Kayser_: M. Tullii Ciceronis opera quae supersunt omnia.

Lipsiae, 1860-69.

_Beier_: M. Tullii Ciceronis de Officiis libri tres ... cum

commentariis editi a Carolo Beiero. Lipsiae, 1820.

_Erasmus_: } M. Tullii Ciceronis Officia, diligenter restituta.

_Melanchthon_: } Ejusdem de Amicitia et Senectute dialogi...: cum

annotationibus Erasmi et P. Melanchthonis. Parisiis, 1533.

_Ed._: M. Tullii Ciceronis Scripta quae manserunt omnia recognovit

C. F. W. Müller. Teubner: Lipsiae, 1879. This edition is the

basis of the text of the present volume.

_Ernesti_: M. Tullii Ciceronis opera ex recensione novissima. J. A.

Ernesti; cum eiusdem notis, et clave Ciceroniana. Editio prima

Americana. Bostoniae, 1815-16.

_Facciolati_: M. Tullii Ciceronis de Officiis libri tres, de

Senectute, de Amicitia, de Somnio Scipionis, et Paradoxa.

Accedit Q. fratris commentariolum petitionis. Ex recensione J.

Facciolati. Venetiis, 1747.

_Fleckeisen, Alf._: Kritische Miscellen. Dresden, 1864.

_Gernhard_: M. Tullii Ciceronis de Officiis libri tres. Rec. et

scholiis Iac. Facciolati suisque animadversionibus instruxit

Aug. G. Gernhard. Lipsiae, 1811.

_Graevius_: M. Tullii Ciceronis de Officiis libri tres; ... de

Senectute; ... de Amicitia; Paradoxa; Somnium Scipionis; ex

recensione J. G. Graevii. Amstelodami, 1689.

_Gulielmus_: } M. Tullii Ciceronis opera omnia quae extant ...

_Gruter_: } emendata studio ... J. Gulielmi et J. Gruteri.

Hamburgi, 1618-19.

_Heine, Otto_: M. Tullii Ciceronis de Officiis ad Marcum Filium Libri

tres. 6te Aufl. Berlin, 1885.

_Heusinger_: M. Tullii Ciceronis de Officiis libri tres ... recensuit

adjectisque J. M. Heusingeri e suis annotationibus ... editurus

erat J. F. Heusinger. (Edited by C. Heusinger.) Brunsvigae,

1783.

_Holden_: M. Tullii Ciceronis de Officiis libri tres, with

Introduction, Analysis and Commentary by Herbert Ashton Holden.

7th Edition. Cambridge, 1891. To his full notes the translator

is indebted for many a word and phrase.

_Klotz_: M. Tullii Ciceronis Scripta quae manserunt omnia. Recognovit

Reinholdus Klotz. Lipsiae, 1850-57, 1869-74.

_Lambinus_: M. Tullii Ciceronis opera omnia quae extant, a D. Lambino

... ex codicibus manuscriptis emendata et aucta ... Lutetiae,

1566-84.

_Lange_: M. Tullii Ciceronis de Officiis lib. III. Cato Major vel de

Senectute ... Laelius vel de Amicitia ... Paradoxa Stoicorum

sex, Somnium Scipionis ... opera C. Langii recogniti ...

ejusdem in hosce ... libros annotationes. Cum annotationibus

P. Manutii, etc. Antverpiae, 1568.

_Lund_: De emendandis Ciceronis libris de Officiis observationes

criticae. Scripsit G. F. G. Lund. Kopenhagen, 1848.

_Manutius_: M. Tullii Ciceronis Officiorum libri tres: Cato Maior, vel

de Senectute: Laelius, vel de Amicitia: Paradoxa Stoicorum sex

... additae sunt ... variae lectiones. (Edited by P. Manuzio.)

P. Manutius: Venetiis, 1541.

_Müller, C. F. W._: M. Tullii Ciceronis de Officiis libri III. Für den

Schulgebrauch erklärt. Leipzig, 1882.

_Muretus_: M. Antoni Mureti Scholia in Cic. officia. Mureti opera ed.

Ruhnken. Lugd. Bat., 1879.

_Orelli_: } M. Tullii Ciceronis opera quae supersunt omnia, ac

_Baiter_: } deperditorum fragmenta ... Edidit J. C. Orellius (M.

_Halm_: } Tullii Ciceronis Scholiastae. C. M. Victorinus, Rufinus,

C. Julius Victor, Boethius, Favonius Eulogius, Asconius

Pedianus, Scholia Bobiensia, Scholiasta Gronovianus, Ediderunt

J. C. Orellius et J. G. Baiter. Turici, 1826-38). Ed. 2. Opus

morte Orellii interruptum contin. J. G. Baiterus et C. Halmius,

1845-62.

_Pearce_: M. Ciceronis de Officiis ad Marcum filium libri tres. Notis

illustravit et ... emendavit Z. Pearce. Londini, 1745.

_Stuerenburg_: M. Tullii Ciceronis de Officiis libri III. Recensuit

R. Stuerenburg. Accedit Commentarius. Lipsiae, 1843.

_Unger_: M. Tullii Ciceronis de Officiis libri III. Erklärt v. G. F.

Unger. Leipzig, 1852.

_Victorius, P._: M. Tullii Ciceronis opera, omnium quae hactenus

excusa sunt castigatissima, nunc primum in lucem edita. 4 tom.

Venetiis, 1532-34-36.

_Zumpt_: M. Tullii Ciceronis de Officiis libri tres cum selectis J. M.

et J. F. Heusingerorum suisque notis. Scholarum in usum iterum

edidit Car. Tim. Zumptius. Brunsvigae, 1849.

CICERO DE OFFICIIS

BOOK I

MORAL GOODNESS

LIBER PRIMUS / BOOK I

*1* I. Quamquam te, Marce fili, annum iam audientem Cratippum, idque

Athenis, abundare oportet praeceptis institutisque philosophiae propter

summam et doctoris auctoritatem et urbis, quorum alter te scientia

augere potest, altera exemplis, tamen, ut ipse ad meam utilitatem semper

cum Graecis Latina coniunxi neque id in philosophia solum, sed etiam in

dicendi exercitatione feci, idem tibi censeo faciendum, ut par sis in

utriusque orationis facultate. Quam quidem ad rem nos, ut videmur,

magnum attulimus adiumentum hominibus nostris, ut non modo Graecarum

litterarum rudes, sed etiam docti aliquantum se arbitrentur adeptos et

ad dicendum[1] et ad iudicandum.

*2* Quam ob rem disces tu quidem a principe huius aetatis philosophorum,

et disces, quam diu voles; tam diu autem velle debebis, quoad te,

quantum proficias, non paenitebit; sed tamen nostra legens non multum a

Peripateticis dissidentia, quoniam utrique Socratici et Platonici

volumus esse, de rebus ipsis utere tuo iudicio (nihil enim impedio),

orationem autem Latinam efficies profecto legendis nostris pleniorem.

Nec vero hoc arroganter dictum existimari velim. Nam philosophandi

scientiam concedens multis, quod est oratoris proprium, apte, distincte,

ornate dicere, quoniam in eo studio aetatem consumpsi, si id mihi

assumo, videor id meo iure quodam modo vindicare.

*3* Quam ob rem magnopere te hortor, mi Cicero, ut non solum orationes

meas, sed hos etiam de philosophia libros, qui iam illis fere se[2]

aequarunt, studiose legas; vis enim maior in illis dicendi, sed hoc

quoque colendum est aequabile et temperatum orationis genus. Et id

quidem nemini video Graecorum adhuc contigisse, ut idem utroque in

genere elaboraret[3] sequereturque et illud forense dicendi et hoc

quietum disputandi genus, nisi forte Demetrius Phalereus in hoc numero

haberi potest, disputator subtilis, orator parum vehemens, dulcis tamen,

ut Theophrasti discipulum possis agnoscere. Nos autem quantum in utroque

profecerimus, aliorum sit iudicium, utrumque certe secuti sumus.

*4* Equidem et Platonem existimo, si genus forense dicendi tractare

voluisset, gravissime et copiosissime potuisse dicere, et Demosthenem,

si illa, quae a Platone didicerat, tenuisset et pronuntiare voluisset,

ornate splendideque facere potuisse; eodemque modo de Aristotele et

Isocrate iudico, quorum uterque suo studio delectatus contempsit

alterum.

[1] _dicendum_ Edd.; _discendum_ MSS. (i.e. acquisition of

learning).

[2] _se_ A c, Edd.; not in B H a b p.

[3] _elaboraret_ Lambin., Edd.; laboraret MSS.

#Introduction: the importance of combining Greek and Latin studies.#

*1* I. My dear son Marcus, you have now been studying a full year under

Cratippus, and that too in Athens, and you should be fully equipped with

the practical precepts and the principles of philosophy; so much at

least one might expect from the pre-eminence not only of your teacher

but also of the city; the former is able to enrich you with learning,

the latter to supply you with models. Nevertheless, just as I for my own

improvement have always combined Greek and Latin studies--and I have

done this not only in the study of philosophy but also in the practice

of oratory--so I recommend that you should do the same, so that you may

have equal command of both languages. And it is in this very direction

that I have, if I mistake not, rendered a great service to our

countrymen, so that not only those who are unacquainted with Greek

literature but even the cultured consider that they have gained much

both in oratorical power and in mental training.

#Greek Philosophy and Cicero's own.#

*2* You will, therefore, learn from the foremost of present-day

philosophers, and you will go on learning as long as you wish; and your

wish ought to continue as long as you are not dissatisfied with the

progress you are making. For all that, if you will read my philosophical

books, you will be helped; my philosophy is not very different from that

of the Peripatetics (for both they and I claim to be followers of

Socrates and Plato). As to the conclusions you may reach, I leave that

to your own judgment (for I would put no hindrance in your way), but by

reading my philosophical writings you will be sure to render your

mastery of the Latin language more complete. But I would by no means

have you think that this is said boastfully. For there are many to whom

I yield precedence in knowledge of philosophy; but if I lay claim to the

orator's peculiar ability to speak with propriety, clearness, elegance,

I think my claim is in a measure justified, for I have spent my life in

that profession.

#Philosophy and oratory.#

*3* And therefore, my dear Cicero, I cordially recommend you to read

carefully not only my orations but also these[A] books of mine on

philosophy, which are now about as extensive. For while the orations

exhibit a more vigorous style, yet the unimpassioned, restrained style

of my philosophical productions is also worth cultivating. Moreover, for

the same man to succeed in both departments, both in the forensic style

and in that of calm philosophic discussion has not, I observe, been the

good fortune of any one of the Greeks so far, unless, perhaps, Demetrius

of Phalerum can be reckoned in that number--a clever reasoner, indeed,

and, though rather a spiritless orator, he is yet charming, so that you

can recognize in him the disciple of Theophrastus. But let others judge

how much I have accomplished in each pursuit; I have at least attempted

both.

*4* I believe, of course, that if Plato had been willing to devote

himself to forensic oratory, he could have spoken with the greatest

eloquence and power; and that if Demosthenes had continued the studies

he pursued with Plato and had wished to expound his views, he could have

done so with elegance and brilliancy. I feel the same way about

Aristotle and Isocrates, each of whom, engrossed in his own profession,

undervalued that of the other.

[A] Cicero is alluding to his Republic, Tusculan

Disputations, Theories of the Supreme Good and Evil, The

Nature of the Gods, Academics, Hortensius, his essays on

Friendship (Laelius), Old Age (Cato), Fate, Divination, etc.

(15 in all).

II. Sed cum statuissem scribere ad te aliquid hoc tempore, multa

posthac, ab eo ordiri maxime volui, quod et aetati tuae esset aptissimum

et auctoritati meae. Nam cum multa sint in philosophia et gravia et

utilia accurate copioseque a philosophis disputata, latissime patere

videntur ea, quae de officiis tradita ab illis et praecepta sunt. Nulla

enim vitae pars neque publicis neque privatis neque forensibus neque

domesticis in rebus, neque si tecum agas quid, neque si cum altero

contrahas, vacare officio potest, in eoque et colendo sita vitae est

honestas omnis et neglegendo[4] turpitudo.

*5* Atque haec quidem quaestio communis est omnium philosophorum; quis

est enim, qui nullis officii praeceptis tradendis philosophum se audeat

dicere? Sed sunt non nullae disciplinae, quae propositis bonorum et

malorum finibus officium omne pervertant. Nam qui summum bonum sic

instituit, ut nihil habeat cum virtute coniunctum, idque suis commodis,

non honestate metitur, hic, si sibi ipse consentiat et non interdum

naturae bonitate vincatur neque amicitiam colere possit nec iustitiam

nec liberalitatem; fortis vero dolorem summum malum iudicans aut

temperans voluptatem summum bonum statuens esse certe nullo modo potest.

#de Fin. II, 12 ff.; Tusc. Disp. IV-V; de Off. III, 117#

*6* Quae quamquam ita sunt in promptu, ut res disputatione non egeat,

tamen sunt a nobis alio loco disputata. Hae disciplinae igitur si sibi

consentaneae velint esse, de officio nihil queant dicere, neque ulla

officii praecepta firma, stabilia, coniuncta naturae tradi possunt nisi

aut ab iis, qui solam, aut ab iis, qui maxime honestatem propter se

dicant expetendam. Ita propria est ea praeceptio Stoicorum,

Academicorum, Peripateticorum, quoniam Aristonis, Pyrrhonis, Erilli iam

pridem explosa sententia est; qui tamen haberent ius suum disputandi de

officio, si rerum aliquem dilectum[5] reliquissent, ut ad officii

inventionem aditus esset. Sequemur[6] igitur hoc quidem tempore et hac

in quaestione potissimum Stoicos non ut interpretes, sed, ut solemus, e

fontibus eorum iudicio arbitrioque nostro, quantum quoque modo

videbitur, hauriemus.

*7* Placet igitur, quoniam omnis disputatio de officio futura est, ante

definire, quid sit officium; quod a Panaetio praetermissum esse miror.

Omnis enim, quae [a] ratione[7] suscipitur de aliqua re institutio,

debet a definitione proficisci, ut intellegatur, quid sit id, de quo

disputetur....[8]

[4] _et neglegendo_ A H a b, Edd.; _et in neglegendo_ B c.

[5] _dilectum_ B H a b, Edd.; _delectum_ A c.

[6] _sequemur_ Graevius, Edd.; _sequimur_ MSS.

[7] [_a_] _ratione_ Ed.; _a ratione_ MSS.; _ratione_ Müller.

[8] Cicero's definition must have followed here, something

like _Omne igitur, quod ratione actum est officium

appellamus_ Unger.

#Statement of subject.#

II. But since I have decided to write you a little now (and a great deal

by and by), I wish, if possible, to begin with a matter most suited at

once to your years and to my position. Although philosophy offers many

problems, both important and useful, that have been fully and carefully

discussed by philosophers, those teachings which have been handed down

on the subject of moral duties seem to have the widest practical

application. For no phase of life, whether public or private, whether in

business or in the home, whether one is working on what concerns oneself

alone or dealing with another, can be without its moral duty; on the

discharge of such duties depends all that is morally right, and on their

neglect all that is morally wrong in life.

#The philosophic schools and ethical teaching.#

*5* Moreover, the subject of this inquiry is the common property of all

philosophers; for who would presume to call himself a philosopher, if he

did not inculcate any lessons of duty? But there are some schools that

distort all notions of duty by the theories they propose touching the

supreme good and the supreme evil. For he who posits the supreme good as

having no connection with virtue and measures it not by a moral standard

but by his own interests--if he should be consistent and not rather at

times over-ruled by his better nature, he could value neither friendship

nor justice nor generosity; and brave he surely cannot possibly be that

counts pain the supreme evil, nor temperate he that holds pleasure to be

the supreme good.

#Reasons for choice of subject and authorities.#

*6* Although these truths are so self-evident that the subject does not

call for discussion, still I have discussed it in another connection.

If, therefore, these schools should claim to be consistent, they could

not say anything about duty; and no fixed, invariable, natural rules of

duty can be posited except by those who say that moral goodness is worth

seeking solely or chiefly for its own sake. Accordingly, the teaching of

ethics is the peculiar right of the Stoics, the Academicians, and the

Peripatetics; for the theories of Aristo, Pyrrho, and Erillus have been

long since rejected; and yet they would have the right to discuss duty

if they had left us any power of choosing between things, so that there

might be a way of finding out what duty is. I shall, therefore, at this

time and in this investigation follow chiefly the Stoics, not as a

translator, but, as is my custom, I shall at my own option and

discretion draw from those sources in such measure and in such manner as

shall suit my purpose.

*7* Since, therefore, the whole discussion is to be on the subject of

duty, I should like at the outset to define what duty is, as, to my

surprise, Panaetius has failed to do. For every systematic development

of any subject ought to begin with a definition, so that every one may

understand what the discussion is about.

III. Omnis de officio duplex est quaestio: unum genus est, quod pertinet

ad finem bonorum, alterum, quod positum est in praeceptis, quibus in

omnis partis usus vitae conformari[9] possit. Superioris generis huius

modi sunt exempla: omniane officia perfecta sint, num quod officium

aliud alio maius sit, et quae sunt generis eiusdem. Quorum autem

officiorum praecepta traduntur, ea quamquam pertinent ad finem bonorum,

tamen minus id apparet, quia magis ad institutionem vitae communis

spectare videntur; de quibus est nobis his libris explicandum. Atque

etiam alia divisio est officii.

*8* Nam et medium quoddam officium dicitur et perfectum. Perfectum

officium rectum, opinor, vocemus, quoniam Graeci κατόρθωμα, hoc autem

commune officium καθῆκον vocant.[10] Atque ea sic definiunt, ut, rectum

quod sit, id officium perfectum esse definiant; medium autem officium id

esse dicunt, quod cur factum sit, ratio probabilis reddi possit.

*9* Triplex igitur est, ut Panaetio videtur, consilii capiendi

deliberatio. Nam aut honestumne factu sit an turpe dubitant id, quod in

deliberationem cadit; in quo considerando saepe animi in contrarias

sententias distrahuntur. Tum autem aut anquirunt[11] aut consultant, ad

vitae commoditatem iucunditatemque, ad facultates rerum atque copias, ad

opes, ad potentiam, quibus et se possint iuvare et suos, conducat id

necne, de quo deliberant; quae deliberatio omnis in rationem utilitatis

cadit. Tertium dubitandi genus est, cum pugnare videtur cum honesto id,

quod videtur esse utile; cum enim utilitas ad se rapere, honestas contra

revocare ad se videtur, fit ut distrahatur in deliberando animus

afferatque ancipitem curam cogitandi.

*10* Hac divisione, cum praeterire aliquid maximum vitium in dividendo

sit, duo praetermissa sunt; nec enim solum utrum honestum an turpe sit,

deliberari solet, sed etiam duobus propositis honestis utrum honestius,

itemque duobus propositis utilibus utrum utilius. Ita, quam ille

triplicem putavit esse rationem, in quinque partes distribui debere

reperitur. Primum igitur est de honesto, sed dupliciter, tum pari

ratione de utili, post de comparatione eorum disserendum.

[9] _conformari_ Edd.; _confirmari_ MSS. (i.e. fortified).

[10] _officium_ καθῆκον _vocant_ Pearce, Ed., Heine;

_officium vocant_ MSS., Bt.

[11] _anquirunt_ A B H b; _inquirunt_ a c.

#Classification of duties.#

III. Every treatise on duty has two parts: one, dealing with the

doctrine of the supreme good; the other, with the practical rules by

which daily life in all its bearings may be regulated. The following

questions are illustrative of the first part: whether all duties are

absolute; whether one duty is more important than another; and so on.

But as regards special duties for which positive rules are laid down,

though they are affected by the doctrine of the supreme good, still the

fact is not so obvious, because they seem rather to look to the

regulation of every-day life; and it is these special duties that I

propose to treat at length in the following books.

*8* And yet there is still another classification of duties: we

distinguish between "mean"[B] duty, so-called, and "absolute" duty.

Absolute duty we may, I presume, call "right," for the Greeks call it

κατόρθωμα, while the ordinary duty they call καθῆκον. And the meaning of

those terms they fix thus: whatever is right they define as absolute

duty, but "mean" duty, they say, is duty for the performance of which an

adequate reason may be rendered.

#The threefold classification of Panaetius.#

*9* The consideration necessary to determine conduct is, therefore, as

Panaetius thinks, a threefold one: first, people question whether the

contemplated act is morally right or morally wrong; and in such

deliberation their minds are often led to widely divergent conclusions.

And then they examine and consider the question whether the action

contemplated is or is not conducive to comfort and happiness in life, to

the command of means and wealth, to influence, and to power, by which

they may be able to help themselves and their friends; this whole matter

turns upon a question of expediency. The third type of question arises

when that which seems to be expedient seems to conflict with that which

is morally right; for when expediency seems to be pulling one way, while

moral right seems to be calling back in the opposite direction, the

result is that the mind is distracted in its inquiry and brings to it

the irresolution that is born of deliberation.

#The question is fivefold.#

*10* Although omission is a most serious defect in classification, two

points have been overlooked in the foregoing:[C] for we usually consider

not only whether an action is morally right or morally wrong, but also,

when a choice of two morally right courses is offered, which one is

morally better; and likewise, when a choice of two expedients is

offered, which one is more expedient. Thus the question which Panaetius

thought threefold ought, we find, to be divided into five parts. First,

therefore, we must discuss the moral--and that, under two sub-heads;

secondly, in the same manner, the expedient; and finally, the cases

where they must be weighed against each other.

[B] Cicero's technical terms are difficult because he has to

invent them to translate Greek that is perfectly simple:

_rectum_ is 'right,' i.e. perfect, absolute. Its opposite is

_medium_, 'mean,' i.e. intermediate, falling short of the

'absolute' and occupying a middle ground; common; ordinary.

_honestum_ is 'morally right'; as a noun, 'moral goodness'

(= _honestas_); its opposite is _turpe_, 'morally wrong.'

_honestas_ is 'moral rectitude,'--'moral goodness';

'morality'; its opposite _turpitudo_, 'moral wrong,'

'immorality.'

_honestus_, on the other hand, is always 'honourable'; and

_honores_ are always 'offices of honour.'

[C] For Panaetius was a Stoic, and the Stoics did not admit

that there were any degrees of right or wrong.

*11* IV. Principio generi animantium omni est a natura tributum, ut se,

vitam corpusque tueatur, declinet ea, quae nocitura videantur, omniaque,

quae sint ad vivendum necessaria, anquirat et paret, ut pastum, ut

latibula, ut alia generis eiusdem. Commune item[12] animantium omnium

est coniunctionis adpetitus procreandi causa et cura quaedam eorum, quae

procreata sint[13]; sed inter hominem et beluam hoc maxime interest,

quod haec tantum, quantum sensu movetur, ad id solum, quod adest quodque

praesens est, se accommodat paulum admodum sentiens praeteritum aut

futurum; homo autem, quod rationis est particeps, per quam consequentia

cernit, causas rerum videt earumque praegressus[14] et quasi

antecessiones non ignorat, similitudines comparat rebusque praesentibus

adiungit atque annectit futuras, facile totius vitae cursum videt ad

eamque degendam praeparat res necessarias.

*12* Eademque natura vi rationis hominem conciliat homini et ad

orationis et ad vitae societatem ingeneratque in primis praecipuum

quendam amorem in eos, qui procreati sunt, impellitque, ut hominum

coetus et celebrationes et esse et a se obiri velit ob easque causas

studeat parare ea, quae suppeditent ad cultum et ad victum, nec sibi

soli, sed coniugi, liberis ceterisque, quos caros habeat tuerique

debeat; quae cura exsuscitat etiam animos et maiores ad rem gerendam

facit.

*13* In primisque hominis est propria veri inquisitio atque

investigatio. Itaque cum sumus necessariis negotiis curisque vacui, tum

avemus aliquid videre, audire, addiscere cognitionemque rerum aut

occultarum aut admirabilium ad beate vivendum necessariam ducimus. Ex

quo intellegitur, quod verum, simplex sincerumque sit, id esse naturae

hominis aptissimum. Huic veri videndi cupiditati adiuncta est appetitio

quaedam principatus, ut nemini parere animus bene informatus a natura

velit nisi praecipienti aut docenti aut utilitatis causa iuste et

legitime imperanti; ex quo magnitudo animi existit humanarumque rerum

contemptio.

*14* Nec vero illa parva vis naturae est rationisque, quod unum hoc

animal sentit, quid sit ordo, quid sit, quod deceat, in factis dictisque

qui modus. Itaque eorum ipsorum, quae aspectu sentiuntur, nullum aliud

animal pulchritudinem, venustatem, convenientiam partium sentit; quam

similitudinem natura ratioque ab oculis ad animum transferens multo

etiam magis pulchritudinem, constantiam, ordinem in consiliis factisque

conservandam[15] putat cavetque, ne quid indecore effeminateve faciat,

tum in omnibus et opinionibus et factis ne quid libidinose aut faciat

aut cogitet.

Quibus ex rebus conflatur et efficitur id, quod quaerimus, honestum,

quod etiamsi nobilitatum non sit, tamen honestum sit, quodque vere

dicimus, etiamsi a nullo laudetur, natura esse laudabile.

[12] _item_ Manutius, Edd.; _autem_ MSS.

[13] _procreata sint_ B H a b; _procreata sunt_ A (?), Bt.;

_procreantur_ c.

[14] _praegressus_ A H a b, Edd.; _progressus_ B c.

[15] _conservandam_ MSS.; _conservanda_ codd. aliquot

recentiores, Bt.

#The essential differences between man and the lower animals.#

*11* IV. First of all, Nature has endowed every species of living

creature with the instinct of self-preservation, of avoiding what seems

likely to cause injury to life or limb, and of procuring and providing

everything needful for life--food, shelter, and the like. A common

property of all creatures is also the reproductive instinct (the purpose

of which is the propagation of the species) and also a certain amount of

concern for their offspring. #Instinct and Reason.# But the most marked

difference between man and beast is this: the beast, just as far as it

is moved by the senses and with very little perception of past or

future, adapts itself to that alone which is present at the moment;

while man--because he is endowed with reason, by which he comprehends

the chain of consequences, perceives the causes of things, understands

the relation of cause to effect and of effect to cause, draws analogies,

and connects and associates the present and the future--easily surveys

the course of his whole life and makes the necessary preparations for

its conduct.

#Family ties.#

*12* Nature likewise by the power of reason associates man with man in

the common bonds of speech and life; she implants in him above all, I

may say, a strangely tender love for his offspring. She also prompts

men to meet in companies, to form public assemblies and to take part in

them themselves; and she further dictates, as a consequence of this, the

effort on man's part to provide a store of things that minister to his

comforts and wants--and not for himself alone, but for his wife and

children and the others whom he holds dear and for whom he ought to

provide; and this responsibility also stimulates his courage and makes

it stronger for the active duties of life.

#Search after truth.#

*13* Above all, the search after truth and its eager pursuit are

peculiar to man. And so, when we have leisure from the demands of

business cares, we are eager to see, to hear, to learn something new,

and we esteem a desire to know the secrets or wonders of creation as

indispensable to a happy life. Thus we come to understand that what is

true, simple, and genuine appeals most strongly to a man's nature. To

this passion for discovering truth there is added a hungering, as it

were, for independence, so that a mind well-moulded by Nature is

unwilling to be subject to anybody save one who gives rules of conduct

or is a teacher of truth or who, for the general good, rules according

to justice and law. From this attitude come greatness of soul and a

sense of superiority to worldly conditions.

#Moral sensibility.#

*14* And it is no mean manifestation of Nature and Reason that man is

the only animal that has a feeling for order, for propriety, for

moderation in word and deed. And so no other animal has a sense of

beauty, loveliness, harmony in the visible world; and Nature and Reason,

extending the analogy of this from the world of sense to the world of

spirit, find that beauty, consistency, order are far more to be

maintained in thought and deed, and the same Nature and Reason are

careful to do nothing in an improper or unmanly fashion, and in every

thought and deed to do or think nothing capriciously.

It is from these elements that is forged and fashioned that moral

goodness which is the subject of this inquiry--something that, even

though it be not generally ennobled, is still worthy of all honour[D];

and by its own nature, we correctly maintain, it merits praise, even

though it be praised by none.

[D] Cicero plays on the double meaning of _honestum_: (1)

'moral goodness,' and (2) 'honourable,' 'distinguished,' etc.

#Phaedr., 250 D#

*15* V. Formam quidem ipsam, Marce fili, et tamquam faciem honesti

vides, "quae si oculis cerneretur, mirabiles amores," ut ait Plato,

"excitaret sapientiae." Sed omne, quod est honestum, id quattuor partium

oritur ex aliqua: aut enim in perspicientia veri sollertiaque versatur

aut in hominum societate tuenda tribuendoque suum cuique et rerum

contractarum fide aut in animi excelsi atque invicti magnitudine ac

robore aut in omnium, quae fiunt quaeque dicuntur, ordine et modo, in

quo inest modestia et temperantia.

*(15)* Quae quattuor quamquam inter se colligata atque implicata sunt,

tamen ex singulis certa officiorum genera nascuntur, velut ex ea parte,

quae prima discripta[16] est, in qua sapientiam et prudentiam ponimus,

inest indagatio atque inventio veri, eiusque virtutis hoc munus est

proprium. *16* Ut enim quisque maxime perspicit, quid in re quaque

verissimum sit, quique acutissime et celerrime potest et videre et

explicare rationem, is prudentissimus et sapientissimus rite haberi

solet. Quocirca huic quasi materia, quam tractet et in qua versetur,

subiecta est veritas.

*17* Reliquis autem tribus virtutibus necessitates propositae sunt ad

eas res parandas tuendasque, quibus actio vitae continetur, ut et

societas hominum coniunctioque servetur et animi excellentia

magnitudoque cum in augendis opibus utilitatibusque et sibi et suis

comparandis, tum multo magis in his ipsis despiciendis eluceat. Ordo

autem[17] et constantia et moderatio et ea, quae sunt his similia,

versantur in eo genere, ad quod est adhibenda actio quaedam, non solum

mentis agitatio. Iis enim rebus, quae tractantur in vita, modum quendam

et ordinem adhibentes honestatem et decus conservabimus.

[16] _discripta_ Heine; _descripta_ MSS., Bt.

[17] _autem_ MSS., Müller, Heine; _item_ Pearce, Ed., Bt.

*15* V. You see here, Marcus, my son, the very form and as it were the

face of Moral Goodness; "and if," as Plato says, "it could be seen with

the physical eye, it would awaken a marvellous love of wisdom." #The

four Cardinal Virtues.# But all that is morally right rises from some

one of four sources: it is concerned either (1) with the full perception

and intelligent development of the true; or (2) with the conservation of

organized society, with rendering to every man his due, and with the

faithful discharge of obligations assumed; or (3) with the greatness and

strength of a noble and invincible spirit; or (4) with the orderliness

and moderation of everything that is said and done, wherein consist

temperance and self-control.

#Their several provinces.#

*(15)* Although these four are connected and interwoven, still it is in

each one considered singly that certain definite kinds of moral duties

have their origin: in that category, for instance, which was designated

first in our division and in which we place wisdom and prudence, belong

the search after truth and its discovery; and this is the peculiar

province of that virtue. *16* For the more clearly anyone observes the

most essential truth in any given case and the more quickly and

accurately he can see and explain the reasons for it, the more

understanding and wise he is generally esteemed, and justly so. So,

then, it is truth that is, as it were, the stuff with which this virtue

has to deal and on which it employs itself.

*17* Before the three remaining virtues, on the other hand, is set the

task of providing and maintaining those things on which the practical

business of life depends, so that the relations of man to man in human

society may be conserved, and that largeness and nobility of soul may be

revealed not only in increasing one's resources and acquiring advantages

for one's self and one's family but far more in rising superior to these

very things. But orderly behaviour and consistency of demeanour and

self-control and the like have their sphere in that department of things

in which a certain amount of physical exertion, and not mental activity

merely, is required. For if we bring a certain amount of propriety and

order into the transactions of daily life, we shall be conserving moral

rectitude and moral dignity.

*18* VI. Ex quattuor autem locis, in quos honesti naturam vimque

divisimus, primus ille, qui in veri cognitione consistit, maxime naturam

attingit humanam. Omnes enim trahimur et ducimur ad cognitionis et

scientiae cupiditatem, in qua excellere pulchrum putamus, labi autem,

errare, nescire, decipi et malum et turpe ducimus.[18] In hoc genere et

naturali et honesto duo vitia vitanda sunt, unum, ne incognita pro

cognitis habeamus iisque temere assentiamur; quod vitium effugere qui

volet (omnes autem velle debent), adhibebit ad considerandas res et

tempus et diligentiam. *19* Alterum est vitium, quod quidam nimis magnum

studium multamque operam in res obscuras atque difficiles conferunt

easdemque non necessarias.

Quibus vitiis declinatis quod in rebus honestis et cognitione dignis

operae curaeque ponetur, id iure laudabitur, ut in astrologia C.

Sulpicium audivimus, in geometria Sex. Pompeium ipsi cognovimus, multos

in dialecticis, plures in iure civili, quae omnes artes in veri

investigatione versantur; cuius studio a rebus gerendis abduci contra

officium est. Virtutis enim laus omnis in actione consistit; a qua tamen

fit intermissio saepe multique dantur ad studia reditus; tum agitatio

mentis, quae numquam acquiescit, potest nos in studiis cognitionis[19]

etiam sine opera nostra continere. Omnis autem cogitatio motusque animi

aut in consiliis capiendis de rebus honestis et pertinentibus ad bene

beateque vivendum aut in studiis scientiae cognitionisque versabitur.

Ac de primo quidem officii fonte diximus.

[18] _ducimus_ c, Edd.; _dicimus_ A B H a b.

[19] _cognitionis_ A, Bt., Müller, Heine; _cogitationis_ BH

a b c (error caused by _cogitatio_ in next line).

#A. Wisdom.#

*18* VI. Now, of the four divisions which we have made of the essential

idea of moral goodness, the first, consisting in the knowledge of truth,

touches human nature most closely. For we are all attracted and drawn to

a zeal for learning and knowing; and we think it glorious to excel

therein, while we count it base and immoral to fall into error, to

wander from the truth, to be ignorant, to be led astray. In this

pursuit, which is both natural and morally right, two errors are to be

avoided: first, we must not treat the unknown as known and too readily

accept it; and he who wishes to avoid this error (as all should do)

will devote both time and attention to the weighing of evidence. *19*

The other error is that some people devote too much industry and too

deep study to matters that are obscure and difficult and useless as

well.

If these errors are successfully avoided, all the labour and pains

expended upon problems that are morally right and worth the solving will

be fully rewarded. Such a worker in the field of astronomy, for example,

was Gaius Sulpicius, of whom we have heard; in mathematics, Sextus

Pompey, whom I have known personally; in dialectics, many; in civil law,

still more. All these professions are occupied with the search after

truth; but to be drawn by study away from active life is contrary to

moral duty. For the whole glory of virtue is in activity; activity,

however, may often be interrupted, and many opportunities for returning

to study are opened. Besides, the working of the mind, which is never at

rest, can keep us busy in the pursuit of knowledge even without

conscious effort on our part. Moreover, all our thought and mental

activity will be devoted either to planning for things that are morally

right and that conduce to a good and happy life, or to the pursuits of

science and learning.

With this we close the discussion of the first source of duty.

*20* VII. De tribus autem reliquis latissime patet ea ratio, qua

societas hominum inter ipsos et vitae quasi communitas continetur; cuius

partes duae,[20] iustitia, in qua virtutis est splendor maximus, ex qua

viri boni nominantur, et huic coniuncta beneficentia, quam eandem vel

benignitatem vel liberalitatem appellari licet.

Sed iustitiae primum munus est, ut ne cui quis noceat nisi lacessitus

iniuria, deinde ut communibus pro communibus utatur, privatis ut suis.

*21* Sunt autem privata nulla natura, sed aut vetere occupatione, ut qui

quondam in vacua venerunt, aut victoria, ut qui bello potiti sunt, aut

lege, pactione, condicione, sorte; ex quo fit, ut ager Arpinas

Arpinatium dicatur, Tusculanus Tusculanorum; similisque est privatarum

possessionum discriptio.[21] Ex quo, quia suum cuiusque fit eorum, quae

natura fuerant communia, quod cuique obtigit, id quisque teneat; e

quo[22] si quis sibi appetet, violabit ius humanae societatis.

#Ep. IX, ad Archytam, 358 A#

*22* Sed quoniam, ut praeclare scriptum est a Platone, non nobis solum

nati sumus ortusque nostri partem patria vindicat, partem amici, atque,

ut placet Stoicis, quae in terris gignantur, ad usum hominum omnia

creari, homines autem hominum causa esse generatos, ut ipsi inter se

aliis alii prodesse possent, in hoc naturam debemus ducem sequi,

communes utilitates in medium afferre mutatione officiorum, dando

accipiendo, tum artibus, tum opera, tum facultatibus devincire hominum

inter homines societatem.

*23* Fundamentum autem est iustitiae fides, id est dictorum

conventorumque constantia et veritas. Ex quo, quamquam hoc videbitur

fortasse cuipiam durius, tamen audeamus imitari Stoicos, qui studiose

exquirunt, unde verba sint ducta, credamusque, quia fiat, quod dictum

est, appellatam fidem.

Sed iniustitiae genera duo sunt, unum eorum, qui inferunt, alterum

eorum, qui ab iis, quibus infertur, si possunt, non propulsant iniuriam.

Nam qui iniuste impetum in quempiam facit aut ira aut aliqua

perturbatione incitatus, is quasi manus afferre videtur socio; qui autem

non defendit nec obsistit, si potest, iniuriae, tam est in vitio, quam

si parentes aut amicos aut patriam deserat. *24* Atque illae quidem

iniuriae, quae nocendi causa de industria inferuntur, saepe a metu

proficiscuntur, cum is, qui nocere alteri cogitat, timet ne, nisi id

fecerit, ipse aliquo afficiatur incommodo. Maximam autem partem ad

iniuriam faciendam aggrediuntur, ut adipiscantur ea, quae concupiverunt;

in quo vitio latissime patet avaritia.

[20] _partes duae_ BH b; _partes duae sunt_ c, Bt., Heine.

[21] _discriptio_ B, Edd.; _descriptio_ A H a b c.

[22] _e quo_ A^1 H a b c, Müller; _eo_ B, _de quo_ Bt.

(suppl.), Heine.

#B. Justice.#

*20* VII. Of the three remaining divisions, the most extensive in its

application is the principle by which society and what we may call its

"common bonds" are maintained. Of this again there are two

divisions--justice, in which is the crowning glory of the virtues and on

the basis of which men are called "good men"; and, close akin to

justice, charity, which may also be called kindness or generosity.

The first office of justice is to keep one man from doing harm to

another, unless provoked by wrong; and the next is to lead men to use

common possessions for the common interests, private property for their

own.

#Public _vs._ private interests.#

*21* There is, however, no such thing as private ownership established

by nature, but property becomes private either through long occupancy

(as in the case of those who long ago settled in unoccupied territory)

or through conquest (as in the case of those who took it in war) or by

due process of law, bargain, or purchase, or by allotment. On this

principle the lands of Arpinum are said to belong to the Arpinates, the

Tusculan lands to the Tusculans; and similar is the assignment of

private property. Therefore, inasmuch as in each case some of those

things which by nature had been common property became the property of

individuals, each one should retain possession of that which has fallen

to his lot; and if anyone appropriates to himself anything beyond that,

he will be violating the laws of human society.

*22* But since, as Plato has admirably expressed it, we are not born for

ourselves alone, but our country claims a share of our being, and our

friends a share; and since, as the Stoics hold, everything that the

earth produces is created for man's use; and as men, too, are born for

the sake of men, that they may be able mutually to help one another; in

this direction we ought to follow Nature as our guide, to contribute to

the general good by an interchange of acts of kindness, by giving and

receiving, and thus by our skill, our industry, and our talents to

cement human society more closely together, man to man.

#Good faith.#

*23* The foundation of justice, moreover, is good faith--that is, truth

and fidelity to promises and agreements. And therefore we may follow the

Stoics, who diligently investigate the etymology of words; and we may

accept their statement that "good faith" is so called because what is

promised is "made good," although some may find this derivation[E]

rather far-fetched.

#Injustice: active and passive.#

There are, on the other hand, two kinds of injustice--the one, on the

part of those who inflict wrong, the other on the part of those who,

when they can, do not shield from wrong those upon whom it is being

inflicted. For he who, under the influence of anger or some other

passion, wrongfully assaults another seems, as it were, to be laying

violent hands upon a comrade; but he who does not prevent or oppose

wrong, if he can, is just as guilty of wrong as if he deserted his

parents or his friends or his country. *24* Then, too, those very wrongs

which people try to inflict on purpose to injure are often the result of

fear: that is, he who premeditates injuring another is afraid that, if

he does not do so, he may himself be made to suffer some hurt. But for

the most part, people are led to wrong-doing in order to secure some

personal end; in this vice, avarice is generally the controlling motive.

[E] Of course, 'good faith' and 'made good' have just as

little etymological connection as _fiat_ and _fidem_.

*25* VIII. Expetuntur autem divitiae cum ad usus vitae necessarios, tum

ad perfruendas voluptates. In quibus autem maior est animus, in iis

pecuniae cupiditas spectat ad opes et ad gratificandi facultatem, ut

nuper M. Crassus negabat ullam satis magnam pecuniam esse ei, qui in re

publica princeps vellet esse, cuius fructibus exercitum alere non

posset. Delectant etiam magnifici apparatus vitaeque cultus cum

elegantia et copia; quibus rebus effectum est, ut infinita pecuniae

cupiditas esset. Nec vero rei familiaris amplificatio nemini nocens

vituperanda est, sed fugienda semper iniuria est.

*26* Maxime autem adducuntur plerique, ut eos iustitiae capiat oblivio,

cum in imperiorum, honorum, gloriae cupiditatem inciderunt.[23] Quod

enim est apud Ennium:

#Fab. inc. (Thyestes?) Vahlen^2, 404#

Núlla sancta sócietas

Néc fides regni ést,

id latius patet. Nam quicquid eius modi est, in quo non possint plures

excellere, in eo fit plerumque tanta contentio, ut difficillimum sit

servare "sanctam societatem." Declaravit id modo temeritas C. Caesaris,

qui omnia iura divina et humana pervertit propter eum, quem sibi ipse

opinionis errore finxerat, principatum. Est autem in hoc genere

molestum, quod in maximis animis splendidissimisque ingeniis plerumque

exsistunt honoris, imperii, potentiae, gloriae cupiditates. Quo magis

cavendum est, ne quid in eo genere peccetur.

*27* Sed in omni iniustitia permultum interest, utrum perturbatione

aliqua animi, quae plerumque brevis est et ad tempus, an consulto et

cogitata[24] fiat iniuria. Leviora enim sunt ea, quae repentino aliquo

motu accidunt, quam ea, quae meditata et praeparata inferuntur.

Ac de inferenda quidem iniuria satis dictum est.

[23] _inciderunt_ A B H L a b; _inciderint_ c.

[24] _cogitata_ A B H a b p, Edd.; _cogitatu_ c, _cogitato_

alii, Madvig (ad De Fin. p. 696).

*25* VIII. Again, men seek riches partly to supply the needs of life,

partly to secure the enjoyment of pleasure. #The dangers of ambition.#

With those who cherish higher ambitions, the desire for wealth is

entertained with a view to power and influence and the means of

bestowing favours; Marcus Crassus, for example, not long since declared

that no amount of wealth was enough for the man who aspired to be the

foremost citizen of the state, unless with the income from it he could

maintain an army. Fine establishments and the comforts of life in

elegance and abundance also afford pleasure, and the desire to secure it

gives rise to the insatiable thirst for wealth. Still, I do not mean to

find fault with the accumulation of property, provided it hurts nobody,

but unjust acquisition of it is always to be avoided.

*26* The great majority of people, however, when they fall a prey to

ambition for either military or civil authority, are carried away by it

so completely that they quite lose sight of the claims of justice. For

Ennius says:

"There is no fellowship inviolate,

No faith is kept, when kingship is concerned;"

and the truth of his words has an uncommonly wide application. For

whenever a situation is of such a nature that not more than one can hold

pre-eminence in it, competition for it usually becomes so keen that it

is an extremely difficult matter to maintain a "fellowship inviolate."

#Caesar.# We saw this proved but now in the effrontery of Gaius Caesar,

who, to gain that sovereign power which by a depraved imagination he had

conceived in his fancy, trod underfoot all laws of gods and men. But the

trouble about this matter is that it is in the greatest souls and in the

most brilliant geniuses that we usually find ambitions for civil and

military authority, for power, and for glory, springing up; and

therefore we must be the more heedful not to go wrong in that direction.

#The motives to wrong.#

*27* But in any case of injustice it makes a vast deal of difference

whether the wrong is done as a result of some impulse of passion, which

is usually brief and transient, or whether it is committed wilfully and

with premeditation; for offences that come through some sudden impulse

are less culpable than those committed designedly and with malice

aforethought.

But enough has been said on the subject of inflicting injury.

*28* IX. Praetermittendae autem defensionis deserendique officii plures

solent esse causae; nam aut inimicitias aut laborem aut sumptus

suscipere nolunt aut etiam neglegentia, pigritia, inertia aut suis

studiis quibusdam occupationibusve sic impediuntur, ut eos, quos tutari

debeant, desertos esse patiantur. #Rep. VI, 485 ff. VII, 520 D# Itaque

videndum est, ne non satis sit id, quod apud Platonem est in philosophos

dictum, quod in veri investigatione versentur quodque ea, quae plerique

vehementer expetant,[25] de quibus inter se digladiari soleant,

contemnant et pro nihilo putent, propterea iustos esse. Nam alterum

[iustitiae genus] assequuntur,[26] ut[27] inferenda ne cui noceant

iniuria, in alterum incidunt[28]; discendi enim studio impediti, quos

tueri debent, deserunt. #Rep. I, 347 C# Itaque eos ne ad rem publicam

quidem accessuros putat nisi coactos. Aequius autem erat id voluntate

fieri; nam hoc ipsum ita iustum est, quod recte fit, si est voluntarium.

*29* Sunt etiam, qui aut studio rei familiaris tuendae aut odio quodam

hominum suum se negotium agere dicant nec facere cuiquam videantur

iniuriam. Qui altero genere iniustitiae vacant, in alterum incurrunt;

deserunt enim vitae societatem, quia nihil conferunt in eam studii,

nihil operae, nihil facultatum.

Quando igitur duobus generibus iniustitiae propositis adiunximus causas

utriusque generis easque res ante constituimus, quibus iustitia

contineretur, facile, quod cuiusque temporis officium sit, poterimus,

nisi nosmet ipsos valde amabimus, iudicare; *30* est enim difficilis

cura rerum alienarum. #Heaut. Tim. 77# Quamquam Terentianus ille Chremes

"humani nihil a se alienum putat"; sed tamen, quia magis ea percipimus

atque sentimus, quae nobis ipsis aut prospera aut adversa eveniunt, quam

illa, quae ceteris, quae quasi longo intervallo interiecto videmus,

aliter de illis ac de nobis iudicamus. Quocirca bene praecipiunt, qui

vetant quicquam agere, quod dubites aequum sit an iniquum. Aequitas enim

lucet ipsa per se, dubitatio cogitationem significat iniuriae.

[25] _expetant_ A B a b; _expectant_ H; _exspectant_ c.

[26] _alterum iustitiae genus assequuntur_ MSS.; _alterum

assequuntur_ Pearce, J. M. Heusinger, et al.; _alterum genus

assequuntur_ Beier.

[27] _ut_ Halm; _in_ MSS.; om. Bt.

[28] _in alterum incidunt_ A B H a b; _in altero delinqunt_

c, Bt. (_delinquunt_, i.e. they offend in the other

direction).

#Motives to passive injustice;#

*28* IX. The motives for failure to prevent injury and so for slighting

duty are likely to be various: people either are reluctant to incur

enmity or trouble or expense; #a. Preoccupation.# or through

indifference, indolence, or incompetence, or through some preoccupation

or self-interest they are so absorbed that they suffer those to be

neglected whom it is their duty to protect. And so there is reason to

fear that what Plato declares of the philosophers may be inadequate,

when he says that they are just because they are busied with the pursuit

of truth and because they despise and count as naught that which most

men eagerly seek and for which they are prone to do battle against each

other to the death. For they secure one sort of justice, to be sure, in

that they do no positive wrong to anyone, but they fall into the

opposite injustice; for hampered by their pursuit of learning they leave

to their fate those whom they ought to defend. And so, Plato thinks,

they will not even assume their civic duties except under compulsion.

But in fact it were better that they should assume them of their own

accord; for an action intrinsically right is just only on condition that

it is voluntary.

#b. Self-interest.#

*29* There are some also who, either from zeal in attending to their own

business or through some sort of aversion to their fellow-men, claim

that they are occupied solely with their own affairs, without seeming to

themselves to be doing anyone any injury. But while they steer clear of

the one kind of injustice, they fall into the other: they are traitors

to social life, for they contribute to it none of their interest, none

of their effort, none of their means.

#Rules of duty required by Justice.#

Now since we have set forth the two kinds of injustice and assigned the

motives that lead to each, and since we have previously established the

principles by which justice is constituted, we shall be in a position

easily to decide what our duty on each occasion is, unless we are

extremely self-centred; *30* for indeed it is not an easy matter to be

really concerned with other people's affairs; and yet in Terence's play,

we know, Chremes "thinks that nothing that concerns man is foreign to

him." Nevertheless, when things turn out for our own good or ill, we

realize it more fully and feel it more deeply than when the same things

happen to others and we see them only, as it were, in the far distance;

and for this reason we judge their case differently from our own. It is,

therefore, an excellent rule that they give who bid us not to do a

thing, when there is a doubt whether it be right or wrong; for

righteousness shines with a brilliance of its own, but doubt is a sign

that we are thinking of a possible wrong.

*31* X. Sed incidunt saepe tempora, cum ea, quae maxime videntur digna

esse iusto homine eoque, quem virum bonum dicimus, commutantur fiuntque

contraria, ut reddere depositum, facere promissum; quaeque pertinent ad

veritatem et ad fidem, ea migrare interdum et non servare fit iustum.

#Ch. VII# Referri enim decet ad ea, quae posui principio, fundamenta

iustitiae, primum ut ne cui noceatur, deinde ut communi utilitati

serviatur. Ea cum tempore commutantur, commutatur officium et non semper

est idem. *32* Potest enim accidere promissum aliquod et conventum, ut

id effici sit inutile vel ei, cui promissum sit, vel ei, qui promiserit.

#e.g. Eur. Hipp. 1315-1319# Nam si, ut in fabulis est, Neptunus, quod

Theseo promiserat, non fecisset, Theseus Hippolyto filio non esset

orbatus; ex tribus enim optatis, ut scribitur, hoc erat tertium, quod de

Hippolyti interitu iratus optavit; quo impetrato in maximos luctus

incidit. Nec promissa igitur servanda sunt ea, quae sint iis, quibus

promiseris, inutilia, nec, si plus tibi ea noceant quam illi prosint,

cui[29] promiseris, contra officium est maius anteponi minori; ut, si

constitueris cuipiam te advocatum in rem praesentem esse venturum atque

interim graviter aegrotare filius coeperit, non sit contra officium non

facere, quod dixeris, magisque ille, cui promissum sit, ab officio

discedat, si se destitutum queratur. Iam illis promissis standum non

esse quis non videt, quae coactus quis metu, quae deceptus dolo

promiserit? quae quidem pleraque iure praetorio liberantur, non nulla

legibus.

*33* Exsistunt etiam saepe iniuriae calumnia quadam et nimis callida,

sed malitiosa iuris interpretatione. Ex quo illud "Summum ius summa

iniuria" factum est iam tritum sermone proverbium. Quo in genere etiam

in re publica multa peccantur, ut ille, qui, cum triginta dierum essent

cum hoste indutiae factae, noctu populabatur agros, quod dierum essent

pactae, non noctium indutiae. Ne noster quidem probandus, si verum est

Q. Fabium Labeonem seu quem alium (nihil enim habeo praeter auditum)

arbitrum Nolanis et Neapolitanis de finibus a senatu datum, cum ad locum

venisset, cum utrisque separatim locutum, ne cupide quid agerent, ne

appetenter, atque ut regredi quam progredi mallent. Id cum utrique

fecissent, aliquantum agri in medio relictum est. Itaque illorum finis

sic, ut ipsi dixerant, terminavit; in medio relictum quod erat, populo

Romano adiudicavit. Decipere hoc quidem est, non iudicare. Quocirca in

omni est re fugienda talis sollertia.

[29] _cui_ B a, Edd.; _cui quod_ H b; _cui quid_ A c.

#Change of duty in change of circumstances.#

*31* X. But occasions often arise, when those duties which seem most

becoming to the just man and to the "good man," as we call him, undergo

a change and take on a contrary aspect. It may, for example, not be a

duty to restore a trust or to fulfil a promise, and it may become right

and proper sometimes to evade and not to observe what truth and honour

would usually demand. For we may well be guided by those fundamental

principles of justice which I laid down at the outset: first, that no

harm be done to anyone; second, that the common interests be conserved.

When these are modified under changed circumstances, moral duty also

undergoes a change, and it does not always remain the same. *32*

#Non-fulfilment of promises.# For a given promise or agreement may turn

out in such a way that its performance will prove detrimental either to

the one to whom the promise has been made or to the one who has made it.

If, for example, Neptune, in the drama, had not carried out his promise

to Theseus, Theseus would not have lost his son Hippolytus; for, as the

story runs, of the three wishes[F] that Neptune had promised to grant

him the third was this: in a fit of anger he prayed for the death of

Hippolytus, and the granting of this prayer plunged him into unspeakable

grief. Promises are, therefore, not to be kept, if the keeping of them

is to prove harmful to those to whom you have made them; and, if the

fulfilment of a promise should do more harm to you than good to him to

whom you have made it, it is no violation of moral duty to give the

greater good precedence over the lesser good. For example, if you have

made an appointment with anyone to appear as his advocate in court, and

if in the meantime your son should fall dangerously ill, it would be no

breach of your moral duty to fail in what you agreed to do; nay, rather,

he to whom your promise was given would have a false conception of duty,

if he should complain that he had been deserted in his time of need.

Further than this, who fails to see that those promises are not binding

which are extorted by intimidation or which we make when misled by

false pretences? Such obligations are annulled in most cases by the

praetor's edict in equity,[G] in some cases by the laws.

#Chicanery.#

*33* Injustice often arises also through chicanery, that is, through an

over-subtle and even fraudulent construction of the law. This it is that

gave rise to the now familiar saw, "More law, less justice." Through

such interpretation also a great deal of wrong is committed in

transactions between state and state; thus, when a truce had been made

with the enemy for thirty days, a famous general[H] went to ravaging

their fields by night, because, he said, the truce stipulated "days,"

not nights. Not even our own countryman's action is to be commended, if

what is told of Quintus Fabius Labeo is true--or whoever it was (for I

have no authority but hearsay): appointed by the Senate to arbitrate a

boundary dispute between Nola and Naples, he took up the case and

interviewed both parties separately, asking them not to proceed in a

covetous or grasping spirit, but to make some concession rather than

claim some accession. When each party had agreed to this, there was a

considerable strip of territory left between them. And so he set the

boundary of each city as each had severally agreed; and the tract in

between he awarded to the Roman People. Now that is swindling, not

arbitration. And therefore such sharp practice is under all

circumstances to be avoided.

[F] The three wishes were: (1) safe return from Hades; (2)

escape from the Labyrinth; (3) the death of Hippolytus.

[G] Each praetor, at his inauguration, announced publicly the

principles and policies that should guide him in the

administration of his office. These were the source of the

_Ius Praetorium_, which explained and supplemented the common

law (_Ius Civile_) and even modified its ancient rigour so as

to conform with a more advanced public sentiment, and form a

most valuable part of the body of Roman Law.

[H] This story is told of Cleomenes, King of Sparta (520-491

B.C.), in the war with Argos. (Plutarch, Apophth. Lacon. 223

A.)

XI. Sunt autem quaedam officia etiam adversus eos servanda, a quibus

iniuriam acceperis. Est enim ulciscendi et puniendi modus; atque haud

scio an satis sit eum, qui lacessierit, iniuriae suae paenitere, ut et

ipse ne quid tale posthac et ceteri sint ad iniuriam tardiores.

*34* Atque in re publica maxime conservanda sunt iura belli. Nam cum

sint duo genera decertandi, unum per disceptationem, alterum per vim,

cumque illud proprium sit hominis, hoc beluarum, confugiendum est ad

posterius, si uti non licet superiore. *35* Quare suscipienda quidem

bella sunt ob eam causam, ut sine iniuria in pace vivatur, parta autem

victoria conservandi ii, qui non crudeles in bello, non immanes fuerunt,

ut maiores nostri Tusculanos, Aequos, Volscos, Sabinos, Hernicos in

civitatem etiam acceperunt, at Carthaginem et Numantiam funditus

sustulerunt; nollem Corinthum, sed credo aliquid secutos, opportunitatem

loci maxime, ne posset aliquando ad bellum faciendum locus ipse

adhortari. Mea quidem sententia paci, quae nihil habitura sit

insidiarum, semper est consulendum. In quo si mihi esset optemperatum,

si non optimam, at aliquam rem publicam, quae nunc nulla est, haberemus.

Et cum iis, quos vi deviceris, consulendum est, tum ii, qui armis

positis ad imperatorum fidem confugient, quamvis murum aries

percusserit, recipiendi. In quo tantopere apud nostros iustitia culta

est, ut ii, qui civitates aut nationes devictas bello in fidem

recepissent, earum patroni essent more maiorum.

*36* Ac belli quidem aequitas sanctissime fetiali populi Romani iure

perscripta est. Ex quo intellegi potest nullum bellum esse iustum, nisi

quod aut rebus repetitis geratur aut denuntiatum ante sit et indictum.

[Popilius imperator tenebat provinciam, in cuius exercitu Catonis filius

tiro militabat. Cum autem Popilio videretur unam dimittere legionem,

Catonis quoque filium, qui in eadem legione militabat, dimisit. Sed cum

amore pugnandi in exercitu remansisset, Cato ad Popilium scripsit, ut,

si eum patitur[30] in exercitu remanere, secundo eum obliget militiae

sacramento, quia priore amisso iure cum hostibus pugnare non poterat.

*37* Adeo summa erat observatio in bello movendo.][31] M. quidem Catonis

senis est epistula ad M. filium, in qua scribit se audisse eum missum

factum esse a consule, cum in Macedonia bello Persico miles esset. Monet

igitur, ut caveat, ne proelium ineat; negat enim ius esse, qui miles non

sit, cum hoste pugnare.

[30] _patitur_ A B H a b; _patiatur_ c.

[31] _Popilius ... movendo_ bracketed by Madvig, Edd.;

_Popilius ... poterat_ bracketed by Unger.

#Our duty to those who have wronged us.#

XI. Again, there are certain duties that we owe even to those who have

wronged us. For there is a limit to retribution and to punishment; or

rather, I am inclined to think, it is sufficient that the aggressor

should be brought to repent of his wrong-doing, in order that he may

not repeat the offence and that others may be deterred from doing wrong.

*34* Then, too, in the case of a state in its external relations, the

rights of war must be strictly observed. For since there are two ways of

settling a dispute: first, by discussion; second, by physical force; and

since the former is characteristic of man, the latter of the brute, we

must resort to force only in case we may not avail ourselves of

discussion. *35* #Excuse for war.# The only excuse, therefore, for going

to war is that we may live in peace unharmed; and when the victory is

won, we should spare those who have not been blood-thirsty and barbarous

in their warfare. #Justice toward the vanquished.# For instance, our

forefathers actually admitted to full rights of citizenship the

Tusculans, Aequians, Volscians, Sabines, and Hernicians, but they razed

Carthage and Numantia to the ground. I wish they had not destroyed

Corinth; but I believe they had some special reason for what they

did--its convenient situation, probably--and feared that its very

location might some day furnish a temptation to renew the war. In my

opinion, at least, we should always strive to secure a peace that shall

not admit of guile. And if my advice had been heeded on this point, we

should still have at least some sort of constitutional government, if

not the best in the world, whereas, as it is, we have none at all.

Not only must we show consideration for those whom we have conquered by

force of arms but we must also ensure protection to those who lay down

their arms and throw themselves upon the mercy of our generals, even

though the battering-ram has hammered at their walls. And among our

countrymen justice has been observed so conscientiously in this

direction, that those who have given promise of protection to states or

nations subdued in war become, after the custom of our forefathers, the

patrons of those states.

#The humanity of Rome's laws of war.#

*36* As for war, humane laws touching it are drawn up in the fetial code

of the Roman People under all the guarantees of religion; and from this

it may be gathered that no war is just, unless it is entered upon after

an official demand for satisfaction has been submitted or warning has

been given and a formal declaration made. Popilius was general in

command of a province. In his army Cato's son was serving on his first

campaign. When Popilius decided to disband one of his legions, he

discharged also young Cato who was serving in that same legion. But when

the young man out of love for the service stayed on in the field, his

father wrote to Popilius to say that if he let him stay in the army, he

should swear him into service with a new oath of allegiance, for in view

of the voidance of his former oath he could not legally fight the foe.

So extremely scrupulous was the observance of the laws in regard to the

conduct of war. *37* There is extant, too, a letter of the elder Marcus

Cato to his son Marcus, in which he writes that he has heard that the

youth has been discharged by the consul,[I] when he was serving in

Macedonia in the war with Perseus. He warns him, therefore, to be

careful not to go into battle; for, he says, the man who is not legally

a soldier has no right to be fighting the foe.

[I] Lucius Aemilius Paulus (B.C. 168).

XII. Equidem etiam illud animadverto, quod, qui proprio nomine

perduellis esset, is hostis vocaretur, lenitate verbi rei tristitiam

mitigatam. Hostis enim apud maiores nostros is dicebatur, quem nunc

peregrinum dicimus. Indicant duodecim tabulae: AUT STATUS DIES CUM

HOSTE, itemque: ADVERSUS HOSTEM AETERNA AUCTORITAS. Quid ad hanc

mansuetudinem addi potest, eum, quicum bellum geras, tam molli nomine

appellare? Quamquam id nomen durius effecit[32] iam vetustas; a

peregrino enim recessit et proprie in eo, qui arma contra ferret,

remansit.

*38* Cum vero de imperio decertatur belloque quaeritur gloria, causas

omnino subesse tamen oportet easdem, quas dixi paulo ante iustas causas

esse bellorum. Sed ea bella, quibus imperii proposita gloria est, minus

acerbe gerenda sunt. Ut enim cum civi aliter contendimus, si[33] est

inimicus, aliter, si competitor (cum altero certamen honoris et

dignitatis est, cum altero capitis et famae), sic cum Celtiberis, cum

Cimbris bellum ut cum inimicis gerebatur, uter esset, non uter

imperaret, cum Latinis, Sabinis, Samnitibus, Poenis, Pyrrho de imperio

dimicabatur. Poeni foedifragi, crudelis Hannibal, reliqui iustiores.

Pyrrhi quidem de captivis reddendis illa praeclara:

#Ennius, Ann. VI, Vahlen^2, xii, 194-201#

Nec mi aurum posco nec mi pretium dederitis,

Nec[34] cauponantes bellum, sed belligerantes

Ferro, non auro vitam cernamus utrique.

Vosne velit an me regnare era, quidve ferat Fors,

Virtute experiamur. Et hoc simul accipe dictum:

Quorum virtuti[35] belli fortuna pepercit,

Eorundem libertati me parcere certum est.

Dono, ducite, doque volentibus cum magnis dis.

Regalis sane et digna Aeacidarum genere sententia.

[32] _effecit_ Edd.; _efficit_ MSS.

[33] _cum cive_ [Edd.: _civi_] _aliter contendimus si_ L,

Anemoecius, Edd.; _cum civiliter contendimus aliter si_ A B H

a b c.

[34] _Nec_ A B H b c; _Non_ L p, Bt., Heine.

[35] _virtuti_ A B^2 L c, Edd.; _virtute_ B^1 H b; _virtutei_

Vahlen.

XII. This also I observe--that he who would properly have been called "a

fighting enemy" (_perduellis_) was called "a guest" (_hostis_), thus

relieving the ugliness of the fact by a softened expression; for "enemy"

(_hostis_) meant to our ancestors what we now call "stranger"

(_peregrinus_). This is proved by the usage in the Twelve Tables: "Or a

day fixed for trial with a stranger" (_hostis_). And again: "Right of

ownership is inalienable for ever in dealings with a stranger"

(_hostis_). What can exceed such charity, when he with whom one is at

war is called by so gentle a name? And yet long lapse of time has given

that word a harsher meaning: for it has lost its signification of

"stranger" and has taken on the technical connotation of "an enemy under

arms."

#Justice in war.#

*38* But when a war is fought out for supremacy and when glory is the

object of war, it must still not fail to start from the same motives

which I said a moment ago were the only righteous grounds for going to

war. But those wars which have glory for their end must be carried on

with less bitterness. For we contend, for example, with a fellow-citizen

in one way, if he is a personal enemy, in another, if he is a rival:

with the rival it is a struggle for office and position, with the enemy

for life and honour. So with the Celtiberians and the Cimbrians we

fought as with deadly enemies, not to determine which should be supreme,

but which should survive; but with the Latins, Sabines, Samnites,

Carthaginians, and Pyrrhus we fought for supremacy. The Carthaginians

violated treaties; Hannibal was cruel; the others were more merciful.

From Pyrrhus we have this famous speech on the exchange of prisoners:

"Gold will I none, nor price shall ye give; for I ask none;

Come, let us not be chaff'rers of war, but warriors embattled.

Nay; let us venture our lives, and the sword, not gold, weigh the

outcome.

Make we the trial by valour in arms and see if Dame Fortune

Wills it that ye shall prevail or I, or what be her judgment.

Hear thou, too, this word, good Fabricius: whose valour soever

Spared hath been by the fortune of war--their freedom I grant them.

Such my resolve. I give and present them to you, my brave Romans;

Take them back to their homes; the great gods' blessings attend

you."

A right kingly sentiment this and worthy a scion of the Aeacidae.

*39* XIII. Atque etiam si quid singuli temporibus adducti hosti

promiserunt, est in eo ipso fides conservanda, ut primo Punico bello

Regulus captus a Poenis cum de captivis commutandis Romam missus esset

iurassetque se rediturum, primum, ut venit, captivos reddendos in senatu

non censuit, deinde, cum retineretur a propinquis et ab amicis, ad

supplicium redire maluit quam fidem hosti datam fallere.

*40* [Secundo autem Punico bello post Cannensem pugnam quos decem

Hannibal Romam astrictos misit iure iurando se redituros esse, nisi de

redimendis iis, qui capti erant, impetrassent, eos omnes censores, quoad

quisque eorum vixit, qui peierassent, in aerariis reliquerunt nec minus

illum, qui iuris iurandi fraude culpam invenerat. Cum enim Hannibalis

permissu exisset de castris, rediit paulo post, quod se oblitum nescio

quid diceret; deinde egressus e castris iure iurando se solutum putabat,

et erat verbis, re non erat. Semper autem in fide quid senseris, non

quid dixeris, cogitandum.

Maximum autem exemplum est iustitiae in hostem a maioribus nostris

constitutum, cum a Pyrrho perfuga senatui est pollicitus se venenum regi

daturum et eum necaturum, senatus et C. Fabricius perfugam Pyrrho

dedidit. Ita ne hostis quidem et potentis et bellum ultro inferentis

interitum cum scelere approbavit.][36]

*41* Ac de bellicis quidem officiis satis dictum est.

Meminerimus autem etiam adversus infimos iustitiam esse servandam. Est

autem infima condicio et fortuna servorum, quibus non male praecipiunt

qui ita iubent uti, ut mercennariis: operam exigendam, iusta praebenda.

Cum autem duobus modis, id est aut vi aut fraude, fiat iniuria, fraus

quasi vulpeculae, vis leonis videtur; utrumque homine alienissimum, sed

fraus odio digna maiore. Totius autem iniustitiae nulla capitalior quam

eorum, qui tum, cum maxime fallunt, id agunt, ut viri boni esse

videantur.

De iustitia satis dictum.

[36] _Secundo ... re non erat_ om. L c; _Secundo ...

approbavit_ om. A B H a b p, Edd.

#Fidelity to a promise:#

*39* XIII. Again, if under stress of circumstances individuals have made

any promise to the enemy, they are bound to keep their word even then.

#(1) Regulus.# For instance, in the First Punic War, when Regulus was

taken prisoner by the Carthaginians, he was sent to Rome on parole to

negotiate an exchange of prisoners; he came and, in the first place, it

was he that made the motion in the senate that the prisoners should not

be restored; and in the second place, when his relatives and friends

would have kept him back, he chose to return to a death by torture

rather than prove false to his promise, though given to an enemy.

#(2) Hannibal's envoys.#

*40* And again in the Second Punic War, after the Battle of Cannae,

Hannibal sent to Rome ten Roman captives bound by an oath to return to

him, if they did not succeed in ransoming his prisoners; and as long as

any one of them lived, the censors kept them all degraded and

disfranchised, because they were guilty of perjury in not returning.

And they punished in like manner the one who had incurred guilt by an

evasion of his oath: with Hannibal's permission this man left the camp

and returned a little later on the pretext that he had forgotten

something or other; and then, when he left the camp the second time, he

claimed that he was released from the obligation of his oath; and so he

was, according to the letter of it, but not according to the spirit. In

the matter of a promise one must always consider the meaning and not the

mere words.

Our forefathers have given us another striking example of justice toward

an enemy: when a deserter from Pyrrhus promised the senate to administer

poison to the king and thus work his death, the senate and Gaius

Fabricius delivered the deserter up to Pyrrhus. Thus they stamped with

their disapproval the treacherous murder even of an enemy who was at

once powerful, unprovoked, aggressive, and successful.

*41* With this I will close my discussion of the duties connected with

war.

#Justice toward slaves.#

But let us remember that we must have regard for justice even towards

the humblest. Now the humblest station and the poorest fortune are those

of slaves; and they give us no bad rule who bid us treat our slaves as

we should our employees: they must be required to work; they must be

given their dues.

#Injustice of hypocrisy.#

While wrong may be done, then, in either of two ways, that is, by force

or by fraud, both are bestial: fraud seems to belong to the cunning fox,

force to the lion; both are wholly unworthy of man, but fraud is the

more contemptible. But of all forms of injustice, none is more flagrant

than that of the hypocrite who, at the very moment when he is most

false, makes it his business to appear virtuous.

This must conclude our discussion of justice.

#Ch. VII#

*42* XIV. Deinceps, ut erat propositum, de beneficentia ac de

liberalitate dicatur, qua quidem nihil est naturae hominis

accommodatius, sed habet multas cautiones. Videndum est enim, primum ne

obsit benignitas et iis ipsis, quibus benigne videbitur fieri, et

ceteris, deinde ne maior benignitas sit quam facultates, tum ut pro

dignitate cuique tribuatur; id enim est iustitiae fundamentum, ad quam

haec referenda sunt omnia. Nam et qui gratificantur cuipiam, quod obsit

illi, cui prodesse velle videantur, non benefici neque liberales, sed

perniciosi assentatores iudicandi sunt, et qui aliis nocent, ut in alios

liberales sint, in eadem sunt iniustitia, ut si in suam rem aliena

convertant.

*43* Sunt autem multi, et quidem cupidi splendoris et gloriae, qui

eripiunt aliis, quod aliis largiantur, iique arbitrantur se beneficos in

suos amicos visum iri, si locupletent eos quacumque ratione. Id autem

tantum abest ab[37] officio, ut nihil magis officio possit esse

contrarium. Videndum est igitur, ut ea liberalitate utamur, quae prosit

amicis, noceat nemini. Quare L. Sullae, C. Caesaris pecuniarum

translatio a iustis dominis ad alienos non debet liberalis videri; nihil

est enim liberale, quod non idem iustum.

*44* Alter locus erat cautionis, ne benignitas maior esset quam

facultates, quod, qui benigniores volunt esse, quam res patitur, primum

in eo peccant, quod iniuriosi sunt in proximos; quas enim copias his[38]

et suppeditari aequius est et relinqui, eas transferunt ad alienos.

Inest autem in tali liberalitate cupiditas plerumque rapiendi et

auferendi per iniuriam, ut ad largiendum suppetant copiae. Videre etiam

licet plerosque non tam natura liberales quam quadam gloria ductos, ut

benefici videantur, facere multa, quae proficisci ab ostentatione magis

quam a voluntate videantur. Talis autem simulatio vanitati est

coniunctior quam aut liberalitati aut honestati.

*45* Tertium est propositum, ut in beneficentia dilectus esset

dignitatis; in quo et mores eius erunt spectandi in quem beneficium

conferetur, et animus erga nos et communitas ac societas vitae et ad

nostras utilitates officia ante collata; quae ut concurrant omnia,

optabile est; si minus, plures causae maioresque ponderis plus habebunt.

[37] _ab_ c, Edd.; not in A B H L b.

[38] _his_ H a, Edd.; _iis_ A B b; _eis_ L c.

#Justice and generosity.#

*42* XIV. Next in order, as outlined above, let us speak of kindness and

generosity. Nothing appeals more to the best in human nature than this,

but it calls for the exercise of caution in many particulars: we must,

in the first place, see to it that our act of kindness shall not prove

an injury either to the object of our beneficence or to others; in the

second place, that it shall not be beyond our means; and finally, that

it shall be proportioned to the worthiness of the recipient; for this is

the corner-stone of justice; and by the standard of justice all acts of

kindness must be measured. For those who confer a harmful favour upon

some one whom they seemingly wish to help are to be accounted not

generous benefactors but dangerous sycophants; and likewise those who

injure one man, in order to be generous to another, are guilty of the

same injustice as if they diverted to their own accounts the property of

their neighbours.

#Generosity must be#

#(1) hurtful to no one,#

*43* Now, there are many--and especially those who are ambitious for

eminence and glory--who rob one to enrich another; and they expect to be

thought generous towards their friends, if they put them in the way of

getting rich, no matter by what means. Such conduct, however, is so

remote from moral duty that nothing can be more completely opposed to

duty. We must, therefore, take care to indulge only in such liberality

as will help our friends and hurt no one. The conveyance of property by

Lucius Sulla and Gaius Caesar from its rightful owners to the hands of

strangers should, for that reason, not be regarded as generosity; for

nothing is generous, if it is not at the same time just.

#(2) within our means,#

*44* The second point for the exercise of caution was that our

beneficence should not exceed our means; for those who wish to be more

open-handed than their circumstances permit are guilty of two faults:

first, they do wrong to their next of kin; for they transfer to

strangers property which would more justly be placed at their service or

bequeathed to them. And second, such generosity too often engenders a

passion for plundering and misappropriating property, in order to supply

the means for making large gifts. We may also observe that a great many

people do many things that seem to be inspired more by a spirit of

ostentation than by heart-felt kindness; for such people are not really

generous but are rather influenced by a sort of ambition to make a show

of being open-handed. Such a pose is nearer akin to hypocrisy than to

generosity or moral goodness.

#(3) according to merit.#

*45* The third rule laid down was that in acts of kindness we should

weigh with discrimination the worthiness of the object of our

benevolence; we should take into consideration his moral character, his

attitude toward us, the intimacy of his relations to us, and our common

social ties, as well as the services he has hitherto rendered in our

interest. It is to be desired that all these considerations should be

combined in the same person; if they are not, then the more numerous and

the more important considerations must have the greater weight.

*46* XV. Quoniam autem vivitur non cum perfectis hominibus planeque

sapientibus, sed cum iis, in quibus praeclare agitur si sunt simulacra

virtutis, etiam hoc intellegendum puto, neminem omnino esse neglegendum,

in quo aliqua significatio virtutis appareat, colendum autem esse ita

quemque maxime, ut quisque maxime virtutibus his lenioribus erit

ornatus, modestia, temperantia, hac ipsa, de qua multa iam dicta sunt,

iustitia. Nam fortis animus et magnus in homine non perfecto nec

sapiente[39] ferventior plerumque est, illae virtutes bonum virum

videntur potius attingere.

Atque haec in moribus.

*47* De benivolentia autem, quam quisque habeat erga nos, primum illud

est in officio, ut ei plurimum tribuamus, a quo plurimum diligamur,[40]

sed benivolentiam non adulescentulorum more ardore quodam amoris, sed

stabilitate potius et constantia iudicemus. Sin erunt merita, ut non

ineunda, sed referenda sit gratia, maior quaedam cura adhibenda est;

nullum enim officium referenda gratia magis necessarium est.

#Op. 349-351#

*48* Quodsi ea, quae utenda acceperis, maiore mensura, si modo possis,

iubet reddere Hesiodus, quidnam beneficio provocati facere debemus? an

imitari agros fertiles, qui multo plus efferunt quam acceperunt? Etenim

si in eos, quos speramus nobis profuturos, non dubitamus officia

conferre, quales in eos esse debemus, qui iam profuerunt? Nam cum duo

genera liberalitatis sint, unum dandi beneficii, alterum reddendi, demus

necne, in nostra potestate est, non reddere viro bono non licet,

modo[41] id facere possit sine iniuria.

*49* Acceptorum autem beneficiorum sunt dilectus habendi, nec dubium,

quin maximo cuique plurimum debeatur. In quo tamen in primis, quo

quisque animo, studio, benivolentia facerit, ponderandum est. Multi enim

faciunt multa temeritate quadam sine iudicio vel morbo in omnes vel

repentino quodam quasi vento impetu animi incitati; quae beneficia aeque

magna non sunt habenda atque ea, quae iudicio, considerate constanterque

delata sunt.

Sed in collocando beneficio et in referenda gratia, si cetera paria

sunt, hoc maxime officii est, ut quisque maxime opis indigeat, ita ei

potissimum opitulari; quod contra fit a plerisque; a quo enim plurimum

sperant,[42] etiamsi ille iis non eget, tamen ei potissimum inserviunt.

[39] _sapiente_ MSS.; _sapienti_ Wesenberg, Bt.

[40] _diligamur_ A B^2 H L b c; _diligimur_ B^1, Bt^1.

[41] _modo_ A H L b c; _si modo_ B.

[42] _sperant_ Marg. A, Edd.; _spectant_ A b (_spernant_

Marg. b).

*46* XV. Now, the men we live with are not perfect and ideally wise,

but men who do very well, if there be found in them but the semblance of

virtue. I therefore think that this is to be taken for granted, that no

one should be entirely neglected who shows any trace of virtue; but

the more a man is endowed with these finer virtues--temperance,

self-control, and that very justice about which so much has already been

said--the more he deserves to be favoured. I do not mention fortitude,

for a courageous spirit in a man who has not attained perfection and

ideal wisdom is generally too impetuous; it is those other virtues that

seem more particularly to mark the good man.

So much in regard to the character of the object of our beneficence.

#Motives to generosity:#

#(1) love,#

*47* But as to the affection which anyone may have for us, it is the

first demand of duty that we do most for him who loves us most; but we

should measure affection, not like youngsters, by the ardour of its

passion, but rather by its strength and constancy. #(2) requital,# But

if there shall be obligations already incurred, so that kindness is not

to begin with us, but to be requited, still greater diligence, it seems,

is called for; for no duty is more imperative than that of proving one's

gratitude.

*48* But if, as Hesiod bids, one is to repay with interest, if possible,

what one has borrowed in time of need, what, pray, ought we to do when

challenged by an unsought kindness? Shall we not imitate the fruitful

fields, which return more than they receive? For if we do not hesitate

to confer favours upon those who we hope will be of help to us, how

ought we to deal with those who have already helped us? For generosity

is of two kinds: doing a kindness and requiting one. Whether we do the

kindness or not is optional; but to fail to requite one is not allowable

to a good man, provided he can make the requital without violating the

rights of others.

*49* Furthermore, we must make some discrimination between favours

received; for, as a matter of course, the greater the favour, the

greater is the obligation. But in deciding this we must above all give

due weight to the spirit, the devotion, the affection, that prompted the

favour. For many people often do favours impulsively for everybody

without discrimination, prompted by a morbid sort of benevolence or by a

sudden impulse of the heart, shifting as the wind. Such acts of

generosity are not to be so highly esteemed as those which are performed

with judgment, deliberation, and mature consideration.

But in bestowing a kindness, as well as in making a requital, the first

rule of duty requires us--other things being equal--to lend assistance

preferably to people in proportion to their individual need. #(3)

self-interest,# Most people adopt the contrary course: they put

themselves most eagerly at the service of the one from whom they hope to

receive the greatest favours, even though he has no need of their help.

*50* XVI. Optime autem societas hominum coniunctioque servabitur, si, ut

quisque erit coniunctissimus, ita in eum benignitatis plurimum

conferetur.

Sed, quae naturae principia sint communitatis et societatis humanae,

repetendum videtur altius; est enim primum, quod cernitur in universi

generis humani societate. Eius autem vinculum est ratio et oratio, quae

docendo, discendo, communicando, disceptando, iudicando conciliat inter

se homines coniungitque naturali quadam societate; neque ulla re longius

absumus a natura ferarum, in quibus inesse fortitudinem saepe dicimus,

ut in equis, in leonibus, iustitiam, aequitatem, bonitatem non dicimus;

sunt enim rationis et orationis expertes.

*51* Ac latissime quidem patens hominibus inter ipsos, omnibus inter

omnes societas haec est; in qua omnium rerum, quas ad communem hominum

usum natura genuit, est servanda communitas, ut, quae discripta[43] sunt

legibus et iure civili, haec ita teneantur, ut sit constitutum legibus

ipsis,[44] cetera sic observentur, ut in Graecorum proverbio est,

amicorum esse communia omnia. Omnium[45] autem communia hominum videntur

ea, quae sunt generis eius, quod ab Ennio positum in una re transferri

in permultas potest:

#(Telephus?) Vahlen^2, Fab. Inc. 398#

Homó, qui erranti cómiter monstrát viam,

Quasi lúmen de suo lúmine accendát, facit.

Nihiló minus ipsi lúcet,[46] cum illi accénderit.

Una ex re satis praecipit, ut, quicquid sine detrimento commodari

possit, id tribuatur vel ignoto; *52* ex quo sunt illa communia: non

prohibere aqua profluente, pati ab igne ignem capere, si qui velit,

consilium fidele deliberanti dare, quae sunt iis utilia, qui accipiunt,

danti non molesta. Quare et his utendum est et semper aliquid ad

communem utilitatem afferendum. Sed quoniam copiae parvae singulorum

sunt, eorum autem, qui his egeant, infinita est multitudo, vulgaris

liberalitas referenda est ad illum Ennii finem: "Nihilo minus ipsi

lucet," ut facultas sit, qua in nostros simus liberales.

[43] _discripta_ H b, Edd.; _descripta_ A B L a c.

[44] _legibus ipsis_ Gulielmus, Edd.; _e_ (_ex_ c) _quibus

ipsis_ MSS.

[45] _Omnium_ Zumpt, Edd.; _omnia_ MSS.

[46] _ipsi lucet_ Edd.; _ipsi luceat_ A B H b c; _ipsi ut

luceat_ a.

#(4) relationship.#

*50* XVI. The interests of society, however, and its common bonds will

be best conserved, if kindness be shown to each individual in proportion

to the closeness of his relationship.

#The principles of human society.#

But it seems we must trace back to their ultimate sources the principles

of fellowship and society that nature has established among men. The

first principle is that which is found in the connection subsisting

between all the members of the human race; and that bond of connection

is reason and speech, which by the processes of teaching and learning,

of communicating, discussing, and reasoning associate men together and

unite them in a sort of natural fraternity. In no other particular are

we farther removed from the nature of beasts; for we admit that they may

have courage (horses and lions, for example); but we do not admit that

they have justice, equity, and goodness; for they are not endowed with

reason or speech.

*51* This, then, is the most comprehensive bond that unites together men

as men and all to all; and under it the common right to all things that

nature has produced for the common use of man is to be maintained, with

the understanding that, while everything assigned as private property by

the statutes and by civil law shall be so held as prescribed by those

same laws, everything else shall be regarded in the light indicated by

the Greek proverb: "Amongst friends all things in common."[J]

Furthermore, we find the common property of all men in things of the

sort defined by Ennius; and though restricted by him to one instance,

the principle may be applied very generally:

"Who kindly sets a wand'rer on his way

Does e'en as if he lit another's lamp by his:

No less shines his, when he his friend's hath lit."

In this example he effectively teaches us all to bestow even upon a

stranger what it costs us nothing to give. *52* On this principle we

have the following maxims:

"Deny no one the water that flows by;" "Let anyone who will take fire

from our fire;" "Honest counsel give to one who is in doubt;"

for such acts are useful to the recipient and cause the giver no loss.

We should, therefore, adopt these principles and always be contributing

something to the common weal. But since the resources of individuals are

limited and the number of the needy is infinite, this spirit of

universal liberality must be regulated according to that test of

Ennius--"No less shines his"--in order that we may continue to have the

means for being generous to our friends.

[J] κοινὰ τὰ (τῶν) φίλων (Plato, Phaedr. 279 C; Aristotle,

Eth. VIII, 11).

*53* XVII. Gradus autem plures sunt societatis hominum. Ut enim ab illa

infinita discedatur, propior[47] est eiusdem gentis, nationis, linguae,

qua maxime homines coniunguntur; interius etiam est eiusdem esse

civitatis; multa enim sunt civibus inter se communia, forum, fana,

porticus, viae, leges, iura, iudicia, suffragia, consuetudines praeterea

et familiaritates multisque cum multis res rationesque contractae.