Everything may go well with a liberal-minded man who belongs to the Tory

party while his party is in Opposition. The natural disagreements which

arise upon so many questions between the Government of the day and their

political opponents make a broad platform on which the Democratic Tory

and the old-fashioned Conservative can fight side by side in

combination. When to those disagreements were added the danger of an

Imperial disaster, acutely realised, and the antagonism which Mr.

Gladstone inspired in all who did not worship him, the combination

ripened into comradeship; and out of comradeship was born a sense of

agreement which, after all, was pure illusion. It is not until men who

really differ, try to work together at the business of government that

their worst troubles begin. Even in the short Administration of 1885 the

divergence between Lord Salisbury and Lord Randolph Churchill had been

plain. But the ‘Ministry of Caretakers’ was in a minority. It was in a

sense an Opposition rather than a Government. It had never exercised

power. The disruption of the Liberal party and the decision of the

electors had vitally altered the political situation. The Conservative

party, with their Unionist allies, were now supreme. They had achieved

great power. What would they do with it?

Many of the letters which passed between Lord Randolph and the Prime

Minister during their varied and eventful association have been printed

here. A change, distinct and palpable, is to be noticed in the tone of

their communications after the election of 1886. It is still friendly

and open; Lord Randolph’s letters still preserve their unvarying air of

respect towards a higher officer of State and of deference to an older

and far more experienced man. Yet it is less the correspondence of a

lieutenant with his chief and more like that between separate

authorities. The two men were, in fact, sustained by two different, and

to some extent conflicting, sets of forces, and they stood for different

ideas. Nor were those forces on which Lord Randolph Churchill counted so

inconsiderable as the event might seem to prove. Tory Democracy had

gained repeated victories in the past three years over the more

Conservative element in the party. Lord Salisbury himself, under

pressure, personal and of circumstances, had advanced vastly from his

political position in the early ‘eighties. He had gone as far as

Newport. He had gone as far as Dartford. It did not seem improbable

that, if pressed, he would go still further and that without any serious

damage to party unity the liberalizing process which had already

effected so much in the composition, character and prospects of the Tory

party might continue. The ‘old gang’ was now widely scattered. Some had

retired; some were in the Lords. Others had not been included in the

Government. The Cabinet had been largely formed of men whose speeches

and general views were democratic. The younger and more active elements

in the party were adventurous and progressive. Many of the members

returned by the constituencies, and especially by the boroughs, had

given pledges to the electors at which ‘high and dry’ Tories stood

aghast.

A careful examination of the Conservative majority in the House of

Commons justified the belief that it was neither unfitted nor unwilling

to be the instrument of large constructive reforms. It seemed, moreover,

that the alliance with the Unionist Liberals and Radicals, on which the

existence of the Government depended, would strengthen powerfully the

more Liberal elements in the Conservative ranks and would even require

an increasing measure of Liberal legislation as a condition of support.

Mr. Chamberlain and his immediate followers were also a very important

factor; and Lord Randolph, as the principal link which united them to

Lord Salisbury’s Government, had every reason as well as every

inclination to study their wishes. Looking broadly at the situation

during the autumn of 1886, it was not unreasonable to hope that an era

of domestic reform might be safely and prosperously inaugurated. But, in

any case, Lord Randolph’s own position was perfectly well understood.

His declarations had been clear and full. He had made no secret of his

opinions; and upon finance, upon Local Government, upon Ireland, upon

land and liquor, upon questions connected with property and labour, they

were unmistakably declared. Yet with the full knowledge of his opinions

and every indication which the past could supply that he would fight

sternly for them, the Prime Minister had invited him to undertake the

second post in his Government, and Lord Randolph’s acceptance had been,

with unimportant exceptions, endorsed and even acclaimed by the whole

party. Why should it ever have been supposed that he would have

abandoned forthwith all his liberal views, would have repudiated or

ignored all his pledges of economy and would have settled down to the

adroit manipulation of a Parliamentary majority for strictly

Conservative ends and the elaboration of ingenious excuses for

departmental and administrative scandals. The Prime Minister and the

party must have known--and they did know when Lord Randolph Churchill

was called to lead them in the House of Commons--that he could only lead

them in one direction, and that direction, so far as domestic affairs

were concerned, a Liberal direction.

It is no doubt true that he rated his own power and consequent

responsibility too high. Like many a successful man before him--and some

since--he thought the forces he had directed in the past were resident

in himself, whereas they were to some extent outside himself and

independent. But this error was shared by his colleagues and by the

Prime Minister. They had no idea what he could do, or how hard he could

hit if he were assailed. They remembered his previous withdrawals and

how he had always come back stronger than ever. They saw how often in

the last few years his judgment had proved right and how he had always

won in the end, no matter how slender were his own resources and how

strong the confederacy by which he was opposed. They feared him greatly.

But they were Tory Ministers; and they did not intend, whatever

happened, to be dragged out of their own proper sphere and committed to

large reforms and democratic Budgets. Better far Lord Hartington and the

Whigs! Better even the Grand Old Man!

In all that concerned the management of individuals, Lord Salisbury

excelled. No one was more ready to sacrifice his opinion to get his way.

No one was more skilful in convincing others that they agreed with him,

or more powerful to persuade them to actual agreement. His experience,

his patience, his fame, his subtle and illuminating mind, secured for

him an ascendency in his Cabinet apart altogether from the paramount

authority of First Minister. The Leader of the House of Commons,

triumphant in Parliament, almost supreme in the country, found himself

often almost alone in the Cabinet. The disproportion perplexed and

offended him. He believed that he had got the majority together. He

wanted to see it used well and boldly in correcting abuses, in carrying

great reforms, and moving always onwards. He believed that unless the

Conservative party gave proof of their zeal for popular causes the

constituencies, so painfully won over, would revert to Radicalism, that

the Unionist alliance would collapse and that Mr. Gladstone would return

to power. And he would be held responsible for the disaster!

From the very outset the new Administration was uneasy. Discord stirred

restlessly behind the curtains of Cabinet secrecy. Sir Michael

Hicks-Beach had his own views about Ireland and Irish landlords, and

they differed from those of the Prime Minister. He was, so Lord Randolph

described him to Lord Salisbury in a letter on August 22, ‘afraid of

being forced to administer Ireland too much on a landlord’s rights

basis.’ He had been upset by the Chancellor of the Exchequer’s statement

that any revision of rents by State interposition was altogether

excluded from Conservative policy. He would not agree to the principle

that any permanent guarantee of the judicial rent was conveyed to the

landlord in 1886. Lord Randolph, however, persuaded him that these

questions did not arise seriously for immediate decision.

The autumn Councils were not harmonious, whether upon foreign or

domestic affairs. The proposed changes in Parliamentary procedure, and

especially the question of the Closure, provoked awkward differences,

nearly every prominent member of the House of Commons holding strong

personal opinions based on long personal experience. One Minister felt

unable to be responsible for proposing Closure by a simple majority,

and recommended that the Government should leave the matter as an open

question to the House. Others disputed on the relative merits of a

two-thirds or three-fifths majority. The tangled controversies connected

with the details of English and Irish Local Government proved even more

troublesome. To lighten the ship it was decided to confine the Bill to

county government alone. For a long time it seemed impossible to

reconcile the divergent views of the Prime Minister and the Irish

Secretary, and, as it was intended that Sir Michael should himself take

charge of the Bill, the difficulty was grave. ‘I wish there was no such

thing as Local Government,’ wrote Lord Salisbury pathetically to the

Chancellor of the Exchequer, after an elaborate ‘eirenicon’ which he had

proposed had been abruptly rejected by his colleagues.

Besides these internal differences, the alliance with the

Liberal-Unionist leaders, upon whose goodwill the existence of the

Government depended, required careful and unremitting attention. In

November Lord Hartington, who felt the need of meeting Mr. Gladstone’s

demand for a constructive Irish policy with positive proposals, if the

Liberal and Radical Unionists were to be kept solid against the Home

Rulers, pressed that a Local Government Bill for Ireland should be

promised in the Queen’s Speech. He suggested that this should provide

for the establishment of Irish County and District Councils, with

liberty to two or more to act together for certain specified purposes

affecting their several jurisdictions; but no further. He pointed out

that, as Irish Local Government would necessarily proceed on more

‘Conservative’ lines than English Local Government, the Irish

settlement, if first effected, would afford a safer model for the

English measure. This argument much impressed the Prime Minister; but

Lord Randolph Churchill, who also appreciated its force, objected for

that very reason to giving Irish Local Government precedence over the

English Bill, and he succeeded, by the influence of a friend, in

persuading Lord Hartington to abate his Irish claims. Mr. Chamberlain

also intimated, through Lord Randolph, that while prepared to give the

Government policy a generous consideration, whether on foreign affairs

or on the necessity for Coercion, he could not support anything that he

considered reactionary in Local Government. The principal members of the

Cabinet, including the Prime Minister, Lord Randolph Churchill and Mr.

Smith, then agreed upon an extensive proposal for England, with the

understanding that an Irish Local Government Bill should be promised in

the Queen’s Speech, but introduced _after_ England and Scotland had been

dealt with.

One difficulty was thus removed; but, as the month drew on, continual

divergences arose on questions of domestic policy. The Dartford

programme was indeed, like the Budget--in principle, at least--accepted

formally by Ministers. But their reluctance to embark on such policies

betrayed itself in all sorts of small objections. The survivors of the

‘old gang’ were not inclined to forget the treatment they had received.

The ‘Plan of Campaign’ against the payment of rent, which had been

started in Ireland as the Nationalist reply to the refusal of Home Rule,

was spreading; and the difficulties of the Irish Government, divested of

the exceptional coercive powers of former years, were such that Beach,

on whom Lord Randolph counted greatly, was often obliged by his Irish

duties to be absent from meetings of the Cabinet. The Chancellor of the

Exchequer felt sorely the want of a friend. His delight when, at his

continued request, Lord Salisbury brought Mr. Balfour into the Cabinet

led him (November 17) to send the news to the _Times_ before the Queen’s

consent had been obtained, and a breach of etiquette was narrowly

averted.

Many of the lesser members of the Government were Tory Democrats; and

much of the draft legislation that came before the Cabinet was Liberal

in its character. Lord Randolph, however, had to fight single-handed for

every point. A Minister who was called to one of the Cabinets on the

Local Government Bill described to me the pleadings and arguments by

which the Chancellor of the Exchequer strove tirelessly to extend its

scope to the widest limits. ‘We must not overweight the Bill,’ said the

Prime Minister at length. ‘It is a heavy Bill already.’ ‘A heavy Bill!’

repeated Lord Randolph, balancing the draft upon his fingers and letting

it flutter to the ground, while everyone else sat silent. ‘A heavy

Bill!’ He was, in fact, always the devil’s advocate. ‘I am appalled,’

he wrote to the Prime Minister (December 2), ‘at the strength of your

disapproval of poor Long and Onslow’s Allotments Bill. We shall have to

cut it down like anything.’ The concessions which were made to his

insistence, disturbed his colleagues without satisfying him. The

deference which he often showed to high Tory views, was forgotten amid

disagreements so many and grave. When the last word had been said, no

matter what compromise had been reached, this fundamental difference

remained--that he regarded Liberal measures as things good and desirable

in themselves; while many of his colleagues, and certainly his chief,

looked upon them as so many unholy surrenders to the powers of evil.

‘Alas!’ wrote Lord Randolph sadly to the Prime Minister on November 6,

‘I see the Dartford programme crumbling into pieces every day. The Land

Bill is rotten. I am afraid it is an idle schoolboy’s dream to suppose

that Tories can legislate--as I did, stupidly. They can govern and make

war and increase taxation and expenditure _à merveille_, but legislation

is not their province in a democratic constitution.... I certainly have

not the courage and energy to go on struggling against cliques, as poor

Dizzy did all his life....’

Lord Salisbury replied with great care and kindness; but he had little

consolation to afford, and this letter seems to have been his last

attempt:--

November 7, 1886.

My dear Randolph,--I did not get your note of yesterday till I got

to town in the afternoon--and then it was too late to catch you. I

saw Beach, however, and ... led him to tell me what had passed with

Ritchie. It appears that the latter has abandoned the ground plan

which he told me in September he was fully resolved on--namely,

that if owners are to have half the taxation they should have half

the representation too. This, as you remember, was a principle for

which Beach contended vigorously last winter--and which was

generally accepted by the then Cabinet. Beach thinks the

abandonment of it would have specially injurious influences in

Ireland.

For the rest, I fully see all the difficulties of our position. The

Tory party is composed of very varying elements, and there is

merely trouble and vexation of spirit in trying to make them work

together. I think the ‘classes and the dependents of class’ are the

strongest ingredients in our composition, but we have so to conduct

our legislation that we shall give some satisfaction to both

classes and masses. This is specially difficult with the

classes--because all legislation is rather unwelcome to them, as

tending to disturb a state of things with which they are satisfied.

It is evident, therefore, that we must work at less speed and at a

lower temperature than our opponents. Our Bills must be tentative

and cautious, not sweeping and dramatic. But I believe that with

patience, feeling our way as we go, we may get the one element to

concede and the other to forbear. The opposite course is to produce

drastic, symmetrical measures, hitting the ‘classes’ hard, and

consequently dispensing with their support, but trusting to public

meetings and the democratic forces generally to carry you through.

I think such a policy will fail. I do not mean that the ‘classes’

will join issue with you on one of the measures which hits them

hard, and beat you on that. That is not the way they fight. They

will select some other matter on which they can appeal to

prejudice, and on which they think the masses will be indifferent;

and on that they will upset you. My counsel therefore is strongly

against this alternative; and it would be the same if I had no

interest in the matter, and was merely an observer outside the

Ministry advising you. Your _rôle_ should be rather that of a

diplomatist trying to bring the opposed sections of the party

together, and not that of a whip trying to keep the slugs up to the

collar....

Yours very truly,

SALISBURY.

Yet the first session of a Parliament and the first year of an

Administration are the most critical. Men are not really bound together

in a Government until they have made mistakes in common and defended

each other’s failures; and it is possible that, unless definite and

urgent disagreements had arisen, the evil hour might have been long

averted. But Lord Randolph Churchill was not only responsible for the

House of Commons; he was responsible for national finance. And from the

Treasury a second set of questions necessarily involving sharp

differences with his colleagues now began to arrive.

The reader will not fail to recognise how vital a definite economy was

to the character and success of Lord Randolph Churchill’s Budget. The

reduction of the Sinking Fund and of taxation generally could only be

defended in association with a lower expenditure. Circumstances now

within our knowledge seem to show that the Chancellor of the Exchequer’s

margin was larger than he had dared to expect. But so many novel sources

of revenue, tapped for the first time, introduced uncertain factors into

his calculations. His public declarations before the general election

had been unmistakable. He was pledged to the hilt in the cause of

economy, and the actual conditions fortified his sentiments. Even before

the Bradford meeting, the tension was apparent.

_Mr. Smith to Lord Randolph Churchill._

_Confidential._

Greenlands, Henley-on-Thames: October 24.

My dear R. C.,--I shall probably see you in Arlington Street

to-morrow, but I may not have an opportunity of begging you not to

indicate too precisely at Bradford the results you may anticipate

from economies in army administration. I shall do everything I can

in that direction, but I am anxious, as you must be, as to the

aspect of affairs, and I think the policy you are anxious to carry

out is best supported by the organisation of the strength we

possess than by allowing the present unready condition to continue.

As to this I must have a serious talk with you when you come back

from Bradford. I contemplate method, management,

arrangement--rather than large present expenditure; but, unless you

see your way through the difficulties in Turkey and as to Egypt

easily and peaceably, it would be unwise, I think, to announce

reductions in military Budgets which would be interpreted, as the

Paris _Temps_ suggests, as presaging a withdrawal of England from

the positions she has taken up. It may be necessary to take such a

course, but it can only be done after the most grave deliberation:

it almost involves a recognition of the fact that we are no longer

one of the Great Powers.

I prefer to say these things to you alone than to talk of them

before Salisbury. Our diplomacy is no doubt very weak, but this

does not entirely explain our powerlessness in Europe....

Yours very sincerely,

W. H. SMITH.

All through the month of November the annual conflict between the

Treasury and the spending departments was maintained with unusual

vigour and with varying fortune. On the 3rd a Treasury Minute

accelerated the preparation of the estimates:--

Treasury Chambers, Whitehall, S.W.:

November 3, 1886.

In view of the probability of the meeting of Parliament being fixed

for the middle of January, the First Lord of the Treasury and I are

of opinion that the Army and Navy Estimates should be considered by

the Cabinet before Christmas. Will you therefore kindly direct that

the estimates decided upon by the War Office should be ready by the

first days of December? We shall then be well ahead of our work.

‘Do you observe,’ wrote Smith on the 7th, ‘that under pressure our

people in Egypt see their way now to a great reduction of military

expenditure? Only a fortnight ago they were the other way minded.’ And

again on the 20th, when some Treasury probing had touched a tender

spot:--

‘This departmental extravagance is not mine, but my predecessor’s, and

full _private_ notice has been given repeatedly since August. I hope I

may yet save something, but the cake was eaten before I got here. We

will talk about it when we next meet.’

Other departments had to face a not less searching examination, and the

Navy and Colonial Office estimates were the subject of prolonged and

animated correspondence. There was, of course, nothing unhealthy, or

even unusual, in all this. It is the business of the Treasury to canvass

all proposals which involve expenditure and to compel those who bring

them forward to show, not merely that they are necessary and desirable,

but that they are more necessary and more desirable than other necessary

and desirable projects. Without such severe controversial examination of

estimates, the finances of the wealthiest country would soon be in

disorder and the money of the taxpayer squandered irretrievably. But it

may well be believed that, with all the good-will in the world, the

month of November is a stormy period for the Chancellor of the Exchequer

and brings him daily into acute antagonism with his colleagues. In such

circumstances only the closest sympathy and support from the Prime

Minister can sustain him. He is one against many, and must otherwise

submit or resign. But on this occasion, when there should have been the

most intimate alliance, there opened vast and comprehensive differences;

and the Chancellor of the Exchequer became continually more isolated and

from that very cause more combative. The money clauses of the Local

Government Bill--affecting as they did so many settled interests,

interwoven as they were with the whole finance of the year--led to

vexatious and protracted discussions. Behind all loomed the vague yet

formidable shadow of the Budget itself. By the end of the month it was

evident that a crisis was approaching.

‘Salisbury,’ wrote Lord George Hamilton on the 25th, ‘is getting to the

position where he will be pressed no more. If a rupture takes place, it

will damage us almost irretrievably; for he would carry with him a large

portion of the party, and your position would be very much, as you

yourself said, like to that of Sir Robert Peel, who, though he carried

Free Trade, was without a party afterwards. Gladstone cannot live for

long and if we only hold together we shall utterly foil him.

‘I write feelingly, for if we break up, my vocation of peacemaker

between the different sections of the party is gone and I should take up

some other line of work than politics. Things are, I fear, worse than we

thought two days back; however, you will see for yourself and act

accordingly.’

The definite collision took place just before the estimates of the Navy

and Army were finally presented. Lord Randolph Churchill insisted upon

some reduction and made no secret that he would set his official

existence on the issue. Hamilton replied that 50,000_l._ was the utmost

further variation that could be expected at the Admiralty. Smith wrote

as follows:--

_Private._

December 14, 1886.

My dear R. C.,--I am very sorry to say that the first review of my

figures affords no hope whatever of any reductions in W. O.

estimates as compared with 1886-7.

We lose 100,000_l._ of Indian money, and have to meet extra charges

for leap year--Volunteers, Reserve, and other automatic

increases--which are enough to drive one wild, without entering

upon the questions of giving small-arm ammunition and defence.

I shall be able to give you a rough idea of the probable gross

estimate on Thursday or Friday, but it will not be a pleasant one.

Yours very sincerely,

W. H. SMITH.

And again on the 16th, in a remarkable letter showing that he, too, was

prepared to go to extremes:--

_Private._

December 16, 1886.

My dear R. C.,--I have been thinking a good deal over your letter

of yesterday.

I am as much committed to economy as you are, but I cannot be the

head of a great department in times like these and ask for less

than the absolute minimum required for the safety of the country.

I will go into figures with you if you like--but it is out of the

question for you to talk of retiring. If one of us goes, I shall

claim the privilege; and you may rest assured that if a man can be

found to take my place, I shall be delighted to give all the help

in my power to a successor brave enough to assume responsibility

which I am not prepared to bear.

I will speak to you after the Cabinet to-morrow.

Yours very sincerely,

W. H. SMITH.

Bear in mind that in the House--if I am there--I do not ask you to

defend my estimates or to excuse them.

‘You will shortly have to decide,’ wrote Lord Randolph in a

good-humoured letter to the Prime Minister, December 15, ‘whose services

you will retain--those of your War Minister or those of your Chancellor

of Exchequer.

‘Smith informs me of his inability to make reductions in the Army

Estimates; I have informed him of my absolute and unalterable inability

to consent to any Army Estimates which do not show a marked and

considerable reduction.

‘George Hamilton has made me a reduction in the Navy Estimates of over

700,000_l._ If these things can be done at the Admiralty, the attitude

of the War Office becomes intolerable. Generally speaking, however, I am

anxious to submit to you to-morrow the draft of a Treasury minute to the

public departments calling their serious attention to their increasing

expenditure and requiring marked and immediate economies.’

Lord Salisbury’s reply indicated clearly the side to which his

sympathies inclined:--

Hatfield: December 15, 1886.

My dear Randolph,--I will be in Downing Street at half-past three.

I have got to go to Windsor at a quarter to five. There was nothing

for it but to consent to the Egyptian expenditure, though it is

very lamentable--all Gladstone’s fault. The Cabinet, happily, not

I, will have to decide the controversy between you and Smith. But

it will be a serious responsibility to refuse the demands of a War

Minister so little imaginative as Smith, especially at such a time.

It is curious that two days ago I was listening here to the most

indignant denunciations of Smith for his economy--from Wolseley. I

am rather surprised at George Hamilton being able to reduce so

much. I hope it is all right.

Ever yours very truly,

SALISBURY.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer, however, showed no signs of yielding

and his colleagues, feeling that the crash was coming, evidently took

counsel with one another and broadened the ground upon which they stood

and might have to fight. The Budget had meanwhile been passed through

the Cabinet. But now doubt and hesitation seemed to have overtaken those

Ministers who were concerned in the Estimates dispute. On the 18th Lord

George Hamilton wrote that he thought the Budget ‘exceedingly well

balanced and comprehensive,’ but on that very account the more likely to

be attacked by the various interests concerned, and he asked for certain

returns as to the incidence of taxation. It is significant that Mr.

Smith wrote a similar letter on the same day, and Lord Salisbury on the

day following:--

_Mr. Smith to Lord Randolph Churchill._

War Office: December 18, 1886.

My dear R. C.,--I think you should send us a printed memorandum of

your Budget proposals, in order that they may be considered

carefully during our short holiday.

They are too large and important to be determined upon after a

conversation across the table. It would not be fair to you nor to

your colleagues, some of whom may not have fully realised all your

proposals.

Yours very sincerely,

W. H. SMITH.

_Lord Salisbury to Lord Randolph Churchill._

Hatfield House, Hatfield, Herts: December 19, 1886.

My dear Randolph,--In the course of discussions on the Local

Government Bill you have two or three times expressed the belief

that the country gentlemen would be consoled for all they might

lose under that Bill by the financial arrangements which were to be

proposed; or, as you expressed it, that ‘the pill would be gilded.’

I think you have overlooked the fact that your local taxation

proposals will relieve the towns more than the rural districts. At

least, I have looked up the figures for Hertfordshire, Suffolk, and

Devonshire, and enclose a statement of them. The result is (if I

rightly understood your proposals) that the ordinary country

gentleman will have an extra burden of ninepence in the

pound--which is gilding of a negative kind.

Ever yours truly,

SALISBURY.

The situation was fast becoming acute. At a dinner on the 18th, when the

Prime Minister was Lord Randolph’s guest, shrewd observers had noticed,

underneath much personal courtesy, an air of harsh political antagonism.

The effect of these letters was decisive. Lord Randolph forwarded the

figures which Lord Salisbury had enclosed to the Treasury and called for

a memorandum in reply. His pencilled comment on the paper is, ‘Lord

Salisbury’s figures are incomprehensible.’ The Treasury answer required

a little time to prepare; but the next day Lord Randolph wrote back:--

Treasury Chambers, Whitehall, S.W.: December 20, 1886.

Dear Lord Salisbury,--I know the country gentlemen, like the

farmers, always think they are being plundered and ruined. The

facts are, however, that whereas the ratepayers used to receive in

gross three millions from the taxes, they would in future under my

scheme receive over five millions. Of course the towns will get the

bulk of the indoor pauper contribution.

Real estate pays succession duty on an average about once in thirty

years. We do not estimate that the change in the succession duty

will add more than a million a year to the present yield of

800,000_l._, and it will take at least twelve years to work up to

this amount. When the succession duties were first voted by

Parliament, they were estimated to produce 2,000,000_l._ I believe

the produce has never exceeded 900,000_l._ The assimilation of the

incidence of death duties on real estate to that which falls upon

personal estate has not of late years been resisted in principle

even by the strictest sect of the Tories.

I enclose you the G.O.M.’s reply to my communication. I hear

rumours that he is contemplating the policy of throwing over the

Home Rulers.

Yours most sincerely,

RANDOLPH S. CHURCHILL.

That same afternoon the Chancellor of the Exchequer was summoned to

Windsor. Travelling thither, he met by chance in the same railway

carriage Lord George Hamilton. Lord Randolph, who was in excellent

spirits, said briskly that he intended to resign that day. Hamilton was

much shocked, and urged patience, delay and so forth. Lord Randolph

remained inscrutably gay. That night the Queen showed him most gracious

favour, and kept him long in conversation. He spoke of many matters of

policy--of the new Procedure rules, of Ireland, even of the prospects of

the coming session--but of his determination not one word escaped him.

It was late when he retired, yet he proceeded forthwith to write his

letter of resignation to Lord Salisbury. Hamilton, who came to press him

once again, was treated with extreme good-humour, and had it all read

out to him before it was despatched:--

Windsor Castle: December 20, 1886.

Dear Lord Salisbury,--The approximate Estimates for the Army and

Navy for next year have been to-day communicated to me by George

Hamilton and Smith. They amount to 31 millions--12½ millions for

the Navy, 18½ millions for the Army. The Navy votes show a

decrease of nearly 500,000_l._, but this is to a great extent

illusory, as there is a large increase in the demand made by the

Admiralty upon the War Office for guns and ammunition. The Army

Estimates thus swollen show an increase of about 300,000_l._ The

total 31 millions for the two Services, which will in all

probability be exceeded, is very greatly in excess of what I can

consent to. I know that on this subject I cannot look for any

sympathy or effective support from you and I am certain that I

shall find no supporters in the Cabinet. I do not want to be

wrangling and quarreling in the Cabinet, and therefore must request

to be allowed to give up my office and retire from the Government.

I am pledged up to the eyes to large reductions of expenditure, and

I cannot change my mind on this matter. If the foreign policy of

this country is conducted with skill and judgment, our present huge

and increasing armaments are quite unnecessary, and the taxation

which they involve perfectly unjustifiable. The War estimates might

be very considerably reduced if the policy of expenditure on the

fortifications and guns and garrisons of military posts, mercantile

ports and coaling stations was abandoned or modified. But of this I

see no chance, and under the circumstances I cannot continue to be

responsible for the finances.

I am sure you will agree that I am right in being perfectly frank

and straightforward on this question, to which I attach the very

utmost importance: and, after all, what I have written is only a

repetition of what I endeavoured to convey to you in conversation

the other day.

Believe me to be

Yours most sincerely,

RANDOLPH S. CHURCHILL.

Early the next morning both Ministers left Windsor and returned to

London. Lord Randolph bought, as was his custom, a number of

newspapers, but found that neither he nor Hamilton had any change. The

train was about to start, and the bookstall keeper, who knew both his

customers by sight, cried: ‘Never mind, my lord--when you come back next

time will do.’ Lord Randolph looked sideways at his companion and said,

with a quaint smile, ‘He little knows I shall never come back.’

It happened that at this time Sir Henry Wolff was at home from his

Egyptian mission, and he and Lord Randolph consorted together daily.

Both went down to the City on Wednesday, the 22nd; for the Chancellor of

the Exchequer had to pay an official visit to the Master of the Mint.

Lord Randolph proposed returning by the Underground Railway, and it was

while they were pacing the platform, waiting for a train, that Wolff

asked some chance question about the Treasury intentions. ‘Upon my

word,’ said Lord Randolph abruptly, ‘I don’t know now whether I am

Chancellor of the Exchequer or not.’ But otherwise he never told a

soul--not Beach, his trusted friend; not Chamberlain, his ally; not his

mother; not even his wife. Lord Salisbury’s answer did not come till

eight o’clock on Wednesday. He had delayed in order to write to his

principal colleagues, sending copies of Lord Randolph’s letter, made

laboriously with his own hand, and perhaps just in order to delay. It is

certain that he did not regard the matter as settled. He wrote to Beach

on the 21st that he was not sure whether Lord Randolph would persist. He

sent no word to the Queen. Yet his answer, when it came, seemed

conclusive. It proposed no compromise; it did not even suggest an

interview; and the expression of regret with which it closed might apply

either to the actual resignation or to the expressed intention to

resign:--

Hatfield House, Hatfield, Herts: December 22, 1886.

My dear Randolph,--I have your letter of the 20th from Windsor. You

tell me, as you told me orally on Thursday, that 31 millions for

the two Services is very greatly in excess of what you can consent

to; that you are pledged up to the eyes to large reductions of

expenditure, and cannot change your mind in the matter; and that,

as you feel certain of receiving no support from me or from the

Cabinet in this view, you must resign your office and withdraw from

the Government. On the other hand, I have a letter from Smith

telling me that he feels bound to adhere to the Estimates which he

showed you on Monday, and that he declines to postpone, as you had

wished him to do, the expenditure which he thinks necessary for the

fortification of coaling stations, military posts and mercantile

ports.

In this unfortunate state of things I have no choice but to express

my full concurrence with the view of Hamilton and Smith, and my

dissent from yours--though I say it, both on personal and public

grounds, with very deep regret. The outlook on the Continent is

very black. It is not too much to say that the chances are in

favour of war at an early date; and when war has once broken out,

we cannot be secure from the danger of being involved in it. The

undefended state of many of our ports and coaling stations is

notorious, and the necessity of protecting them has been urged by a

strong Commission, and has been admitted on both sides in debate.

To refuse to take measures for their protection would be to incur

the gravest possible responsibility. Speaking more generally, I

should hesitate to refuse at this time any supplies which men so

moderate in their demands as Smith and Hamilton declared to be

necessary for the safety of the country.

The issue is so serious that it thrusts aside all personal and

party considerations. But I regret more than I can say the view you

take of it, for no one knows better than you how injurious to the

public interests at this juncture your withdrawal from the

Government may be.

In presence of your very strong and decisive language I can only

again express my very profound regret.

Believe me

Yours very sincerely,

SALISBURY.

Lord Randolph Churchill never doubted the meaning of the answer he had

received, and treated it as a formal acceptance of his resignation. He

concluded, as will appear, that the delay had been due to communications

with the Queen, and that the whole matter was now ended. He sat down at

once and wrote to Lord Salisbury a letter of farewell:--

Carlton Club: December 22, 1886.

Dear Lord Salisbury,--I have to acknowledge the receipt of your

letter of to-day’s date accepting my resignation of the

Chancellorship of the Exchequer.

I feel sure you will believe me when I express my deep and abiding

appreciation of the unvarying kindness which you have shown me, and

of the patience and indulgence with which you have always listened

to the views on various public matters which I have from time to

time submitted to you.

The great question of public expenditure is not so technical or

departmental as might be supposed by a superficial critic. Foreign

policy and free expenditure upon armaments act and react upon one

another. I believe myself to be well informed on the present state

of Europe, nor am I aware that I am blind or careless to the

probabilities of a great conflict between European Powers in the

coming year. A wise foreign policy will extricate England from

Continental struggles and keep her outside of German, Russian,

French or Austrian disputes. I have for some time observed a

tendency in the Government attitude to pursue a different line of

action which I have not been able to modify or check.

This tendency is certain to be accentuated if large estimates are

presented to and voted by Parliament. The possession of a very

sharp sword offers a temptation, which becomes irresistible, to

demonstrate the efficiency of the weapon in a practical manner. I

remember the vulnerable and scattered character of the Empire, the

universality of our commerce, the peaceful tendencies of our

democratic electorate, the hard times, the pressure of competition

and the high taxation now imposed; and with these factors vividly

before me I decline to be a party to encouraging the military and

militant circle of the War Office and Admiralty to join in the high

and desperate stakes which other nations seem to be forced to risk.

Believe me, I pray you, that it is not niggardly cheese-paring or

Treasury crabbedness, but only considerations of high state policy

which compel me to sever ties in many ways most binding and

pleasant.

A careful and continuous examination and study of national finance,

of the startling growth of expenditure, of national taxation

resources and endurance, has brought me to the conclusion from

which nothing can turn me, that it is only the sacrifice of a

Chancellor of the Exchequer upon the altar of thrift and economy

which can rouse the people to take stock of their leaders, their

position and their future.

The character of the domestic legislation which the Government

contemplate in my opinion falls sadly short of what the Parliament

and the country expect and require. The foreign policy which is

being adopted appears to me at once dangerous and methodless; but I

take my stand on expenditure and finance, which involve and

determine all other matters. And reviewing my former public

declarations on this question and having no reason to doubt their

soundness, I take leave of your Government, and especially of

yourself, with profound regret, but without doubt or hesitation.

Yours most sincerely,

RANDOLPH S. CHURCHILL.

After writing this letter he went down to the _Times_ office, imparted

his priceless information to Mr. Buckle, authorised him to make it

public, and so to bed. Lord Salisbury received this second letter at

half-past one in the morning of the 23rd, and realised that the breach

was definite. He posted the news at once to the Queen; but he was

already too late. With the first light of the morning the announcement

appeared in the _Times_.

This action of Lord Randolph Churchill in resigning the office he held

in such a manner and on such an occasion has two aspects--a smaller and

a larger. Both are partly true: neither by itself is comprehensive. The

smaller aspect is that of a proud, sincere, overstrained man conceiving

himself bound to fight certain issues, at whatever cost to

himself--believing at each movement that victory would be won, and drawn

by every movement further into a position from which he could not or

would not retreat. The larger aspect deserves somewhat longer

consideration. The differences between the Chancellor of the Exchequer

and his colleagues were matters of detail and might easily have been

compacted. The difference between the Leader of the House of Commons and

the Prime Minister was fundamental. It must be plain to the reader who

has persevered so far. It glows through the correspondence included in

this chapter. It was a difference of belief, of character, of

aspiration--and by nothing could it ever have been adjusted. There were

many considerations and influences which worked powerfully for their

agreement. In the Union they found a common cause; in Mr. Gladstone they

faced a common antagonist. Lord Randolph’s fiercest invective did not

jar upon the ‘master of flouts and jeers.’ Neither could be insensible

to the personal fascination of the other. Both rejoiced in a wide and

illuminating survey of public affairs; both dwelt much upon the future;

both preserved a cynical disdain of small men seeking paltry ends. But

the gulf which separated the fiery leader of Tory Democracy--with his

bold plans of reform and dreams of change, with his record of storm and

triumph and slender expectations of a long life--from the old-fashioned

Conservative statesman, the head of a High Church and High Tory family,

versed in diplomacy, representative of authority, wary, austere, content

to govern--was a gulf no mutual needs, no common interests, no personal

likings could permanently bridge. They represented conflicting schools

of political philosophy. They stood for ideas mutually incompatible.

Sooner or later the breach must have come; and no doubt the strong

realisation of this underlay the action of the one and the acquiescence

of the other.

I have tried to show that this profound difference found expression on

many specific points. The Cabinet of 1886 had sat together only five

months, yet here already were five important matters of

disagreement:--The policy to be pursued in the East of Europe; the

complexion of the Local Government Bill; the attitude towards the Whigs;

the character of the Budget; and lastly, the direct cause of rupture,

the expenditure upon armaments. Longer association threatened merely a

multiplication and aggravation of divergences. But though patience could

not have ended in agreement, it might have brought disagreement to

another end. And it is from this point of view that Lord Randolph

Churchill’s action requires most careful examination.

The differences upon specific points, regarded singly, were serious; and

together they became vital. But they were differences less of principle

than of degree. No clear and abrupt dividing-line was presented; and the

questions were always of ‘more or less,’ not of ‘yes or no.’ Why should

Lord Randolph Churchill not, then, have kept his offices? Would he not,

by so doing, have had a much better chance of imparting to Conservative

policy the complexion he desired? Much was to be gained by waiting.

Every day his position was becoming more assured. At every stage and

turn of Cabinet discussion he could have laboured to deflect the course

of legislation; and the House of Commons might be guided more easily

than his colleagues. In a hundred small ways he could, without any

breach of confidence, have served the ends he had in view. But his gorge

rose at it. It was almost impossible to him to defend courses of which

he disapproved: and in the position he held every act of the Government

must be constantly and whole-heartedly defended by him. Imagination

might foresee this new Administration, which he more than any man had

called into being, drifting irresistibly towards military ambitions and

European entanglements, ending perhaps at last in war: and in all this

he must be the principal agent--the man who had to make the House of

Commons consent. No--at the very outset a decision must be taken and a

pacific and progressive domestic policy established. Without that

assurance the honours and amenities of power--and no one enjoyed them

more--seemed valueless; and the money--a matter, as we have seen, in

itself from other points of view of much consequence--a thing not to be

considered for a moment.

Of course, he hoped the others would give way--would, at any rate, make

some considerable concession, which would leave him proportionately

strengthened. ‘With respect to Local Government,’ he wrote to Mr.

Chamberlain on the 19th, ‘I pressed Lord Salisbury and Mr. Goschen very

hard to give up the idea of _ex officio_ representation, and’ (a

significant sentence) ‘possibly my arguments may not be altogether

without effect.’ How could they do without him? Who was there to fill

the Treasury? Could Smith make head against Gladstone in Parliament?

Was Lord Salisbury the man to maintain the alliance with the Chamberlain

of 1886? Would Stanhope vindicate the Government in the constituencies?

Balfour was unknown: Beach was ailing: Goschen was ‘very hard to

please’: and the Whigs doubtful and contrary. Beyond all question he was

the most powerful and efficient instrument at the disposal of the Prime

Minister--probably, as it seemed, the only instrument which would be

effective. And since so powerful and necessary, and moreover being

possessed of a complete scheme and temper of political thought largely

accepted among the people, he was bound to put it to the proof whether

he should not exert an influence upon policy compatible with his public

pledges and proportioned to his usefulness to the Government. But still

a more patient man would have waited.

Undoubtedly he expected to prevail. What he asked was in itself a small

thing: ‘Cannot this vote for coaling stations, for instance, stand over

till next year?’--some petty economy; but still an economy, and an

economy in armaments. He knew that if they had wished to meet him, they

could easily have compounded. Reductions greater than would have kept

him, were made after he was gone. And since it was thus revealed that

his colleagues did not wish to act with him, what a prospect of vexation

and disappointment and special pleadings the future unveiled!--unless

the matter could be settled at the very beginning and a peaceful and

progressive policy assured.

It seems, however, very surprising that Lord Randolph Churchill should

at this period have overlooked the anger and jealousy that his sudden

rise to power had excited. In little more than a year two

Administrations had been formed from the Conservative party. In the

making of both of these his influence had been almost supreme; and it

had been an influence which, from the point of view of ordinary

Parliamentary promotion, had been disturbing and even revolutionary. Men

who in quieter tunes would have received office had been disappointed.

Others who had enjoyed what they considered almost prescriptive right,

had been forced out. The former leader of the Conservative party had

been driven from the House of Commons. Mr. Matthews had been raised from

private life to one of the highest posts in the Cabinet. This one,

hitherto unknown, had been jumped up: that one, so long respected, had

been thrust down. Malice proved a stronger motive power than gratitude;

and, although unquestioned success had crowned the struggle, bitterness

and resentment gathered behind the conqueror.

Nor, indeed, do we think he should have counted much upon the good-will

of the plain member. He was often--and seemed to be, more often

still--in things political a hard man, reaping where he had not sown,

severe to exact service and obedience, hasty in judgment, fierce in

combat; and many a black look or impatient word had been remembered

against him by those of whose existence he was perhaps scarcely

conscious. Friends he had in plenty--some of them true ones; but, for

all the personal charm he could exert at will, his manner had added to

his enemies. Venerable Ministers saw a formidable intruder who had

entered the Cabinet by adventurous and unusual paths. Austere

Conservatives shrank from this alarming representative of the New

Democracy. Worthy men thoughtlessly slighted, tiresome people ruthlessly

snubbed, office-seekers whose pretensions had been ignored,

Parliamentary martinets concerned for party discipline, all were held in

check only so long as he was powerful. His position had been won by the

sword, and he must be armed to keep it.

Yet at this moment, when he proposed to try conclusions with all the

strongest forces in the Conservative party, he seems to have taken no

single precaution to safeguard himself. He gave the Cabinet long and

ample notice of his intention. He reiterated his determination at

intervals through the autumn. He knew that Smith and Hamilton took

counsel together: he knew that they had prevailed upon Lord Salisbury;

and that if in the end they should resist stubbornly, their resistance

would not be ill-considered or unprepared. Upon the other hand, he made

no effort to rally his own friends. A third at least of the Government

were men of his own choice. Beach would have made great exertions on his

behalf. But no one was consulted. He was in constant and intimate

intercourse with Chamberlain. Their views at this tune were almost

identical; their relations most cordial. Yet he gave him no knowledge

of the situation, nor dreamed of inviting his support: so

strictly--quixotically even--did he interpret the idea of Cabinet

loyalty.

Few men then alive were more skilled in political tactics, or knew

better how to deal with a crisis. If he had made up his mind to break

with the Government, there were many ways in which the severance might

have been made effective. First, as to time. I have said a more patient

man would have waited; a more unscrupulous man would most certainly have

waited. The power of a Leader of the House of Commons whose chief is in

the House of Lords, always immense, is far greater when Parliament is

sitting. He is the general in the field at the head of the army. The

other waits at home, trying to make what he can of the despatches.

Moreover, the House of Commons, for all its staid and sober qualities,

is sometimes, and was particularly in times like these, an organism of

impulse. A sudden announcement; a brilliant and persuasive speech;

powerful support coming from an unexpected quarter; panic, emotion, or

excitement, and fine majorities may crumble into dust.

He could with perfect ease and candour have postponed the issue; and had

he done so the danger to the Government must have been enormously

increased. He resigned, however, at Christmas-time, when politicians

were scattered far and wide on their holidays, when the temperature was

low, and when three clear weeks intervened before the reconstructed

Government would have to meet Parliament, and before he would have an

opportunity of explanation. It was scarcely possible to have chosen a

season better suited to the interests of his colleagues or more

unpromising to his own.

Then as to the ground of battle. I have tried to show that this

insignificant reduction of a military vote, on which he insisted, was

the peg upon which the tremendous issues of a peaceful domestic

administration as against an ambitious foreign policy supported by

growing armaments depended. But what a bad peg to have chosen! Granted a

divergence not to be compacted between Lord Randolph and the Cabinet,

how many more promising issues presented themselves! Questions of Local

Government, questions of Coercion, questions of taxation, rose thorny

and menacing on every side. Indeed, it is clearly evident that Lord

Randolph neither formed a deliberate plan nor expected to supplant Lord

Salisbury or overthrow the Government; but that, on the contrary, in so

far as he was careful at all, he was more careful of their interest than

of his own.

There is scarcely any more abundant source of error in history than the

natural desire of writers--regardless of the overlapping and inter-play

of memories, principles, prejudices and hopes, and the reaction of

physical conditions--to discover or provide simple explanations for the

actions of their characters. It would be a barren task to set forth the

motives of this affair in a schedule. Yet the main causes

emerge--shadowy perhaps, but unmistakable. Lord Randolph Churchill did

not think of himself as a man, but rather as the responsible trustee

and agent of the Tory Democracy; and this temper, overpowering even the

most attractive personal associations, impelled him by deliberate

steps--yet not without deep despondency--towards a fateful issue: and

all the while a feeling, partly of sombre pride, partly of loyalty,

forbade him to take the necessary and obvious steps to protect himself.

Ambushes, intrigues, cabals, might suit the free-lance of Fourth Party

days; but an official leader of a great party could only state the terms

on which his assistance could be obtained, and, if it were not worth

while to grant them, could only go.

It may no doubt be observed that this was the highest imprudence; that

it agreed very little with much that he had done before, and not at all

with the impression formed in the public mind. If he had put away for a

season his pledges and his pride, both might have been recovered with

interest later on. As it was, he delivered himself, unarmed, unattended,

fettered even, to his enemies; and therefrom ensued not only his own

political ruin, but grave injury to the causes he sustained. Yet it is

noteworthy that he never repented of the course he had taken. Bitterly

as he regretted the consequences, and felt the abuse and

misrepresentation of which he was the object, and the exclusion from the

fascinating and exciting life into which he had been drawn, he was not

wont by word or letter to admit that he was wrong to resign, or assert

that, having again the opportunity, he would do otherwise. He looked

upon the action as the most exalted in his life, and as an event of

which, whatever the results to himself, he might be justly proud. ‘I

had to do it--I could be no longer useful to them.’

It should, indeed, not escape notice that there was among the principal

characters in English politics during this momentous time a high and

disinterested air, very refreshing in contrast with the humiliating

antics of the place-hunters and trinket-seekers who surrounded them, and

more admirable than the selfish ambitions of the statesmen of a sterner

age. Sir Michael Hicks-Beach refuses the Leadership of the House of

Commons, and insists upon serving under a younger man who in his opinion

can better fill the place. Sir Stafford Northcote in the interests of

party union voluntarily effaces himself in a peerage. Lord Salisbury

twice offers to be a member of a Hartington Administration, and Lord

Hartington twice refuses to be the First Minister of the Crown. Sir

Henry James on a matter of principle severs himself from Mr. Gladstone

and refuses the Woolsack. Lastly, Mr. Chamberlain leaves the party of

which he must one day have been the leader, relinquishes the great

office and power he had already obtained, and, confronted at every step

by distrust and pursued at every step by obloquy, sets forth upon his

long, eventful pilgrimage. Among all these indications of the healthy

and generous conditions of English public life, so full of honour for

our race and of vindication for its institutions, the resignation of

Lord Randolph Churchill need not suffer by any impartial comparison.

CHAPTER XVII

THE TURN OF THE TIDE

‘The rising unto place is laborious; ... the standing is slippery,

and the regress is either a downfall or at least an eclipse which

is a melancholy thing.’--BACON.

Lord Randolph Churchill had divested himself by a single short letter of

all that authority which is centred in a political chief and a Minister

of the Crown. The solid array of Conservative members who had stoutly

sustained him, ‘proud to follow a leader who was proud to lead them on’;

the wise and busy secretaries of a great department with their hives of

fact and counsel; hundreds of sharp pens, thousands of friendly voices;

the vast, pervading, persisting machinery of party, all hitherto

obedient in his service, now in a moment fell away. He was only the

representative of a Metropolitan constituency who possessed some skill

in speaking and a small house overlooking Hyde Park. He had cast away

all advantages. He had neglected every preparation. He had chosen bad

ground and the worst time. Moreover, as shall be seen, he had bound

himself hand and foot. Yet such was the personal importance this man had

acquired, so highly were his services valued, so much was his hostility

feared, that for a time the British Government tottered and his place

remained unfilled.

_Mr. Chamberlain to Lord Randolph Churchill._

Highbury, Moor Green, Birmingham: December 23, 1886.

My dear Churchill,--Whew! The cat is among the pigeons with a

vengeance.

My sympathies are entirely with you, and I think you may rely on my

cordial co-operation, if it can be of any value.

I have to speak to-night, and must express my first thoughts on

what is an entirely changed situation.

I wish I was able to communicate with you beforehand, but if you

have any wishes or ideas as to immediate action let me know. If

necessary we will arrange a meeting, and I will run up to London

again.

The Government is doomed, and I suspect we may have to re-form

parties on a new basis. You and I are equally adrift from the old

organisations.

Yours ever,

J. CHAMBERLAIN.

_Mr. Chamberlain to Lord Randolph Churchill._

Highbury, Moor Green, Birmingham: December 26, 1886.

My dear Churchill,--Yours of 24th with its very interesting

enclosures only reached me to-day.

The breach was inevitable. There is much to be said _pro_ and _con_

about the estimates, but you were altogether in a false position.

You had to fight--alone and single-handed--for every point, and

were necessarily condemned to gain on each a partial victory, which

left you with all the responsibility, but without a consistent and

thoroughly defensible policy.

You will have a hard time to go through. Your case will be mine

almost exactly, and I can tell you it is a bitter pilgrimage which

is in prospect. The party tie is the strongest sentiment in this

country--stronger than patriotism or even self-interest. But it

will all come right in the end for both of us.

I assume that you will maintain an independent position, and in

that case you will be a power that your party cannot ignore. The

_Standard_ has a right to be angry, and the Caucuses will denounce

you; but in their hearts they know you are indispensable, and when

they find they cannot bully you into submission they will come to

your terms. Next time, however, that either you or I join a Cabinet

we must be certain of our majority in it.

My speech has fluttered the dovecotes tremendously, and my

correspondence shows that many of the Gladstonians are very

uncomfortable and anxious to come to terms. But I do not believe

that there will be any practical result. Mr. Gladstone does not

give way on the main point--neither will I.

Whenever I come to London I will let you know, and we will have

another talk. Meanwhile you have made the situation intensely

interesting.

With all good wishes,

Yours sincerely,

J. CHAMBERLAIN.

_Mr. Labouchere to Lord Randolph Churchill._

_Private._

10 Queen Anne’s Gate: December 23.

Dear Churchill,--In your own interests think it over. This would

have been all very well if you had not been Leader of the House, or

if you had been Leader for some years. In the former case, you

might have upset your friends and been Leader; in the latter case

you would have become a fetish.

Parties just now do not hang together by principles. They are gangs

greedy of office. You got your lot in--there is a wide difference

between this and aiding in getting them out.

You and Chamberlain seem to me both to make the same mistake. You

ignore the power of the ‘machine.’ It has crushed many an able

man--Horsman, Lowe, Goschen, and Salisbury himself.

Whether Hartington joins or not, he will not be sorry that you have

resigned, and he will be all the more inclined to help the

Government. They only want thirty Unionists to have a good working

majority. The tendency of the Government will be to yield a little

more to him in order to revenge itself on you.

Joe is of no good to you. You have no idea of the feeling of the

Radicals against him. There is a good deal of sentiment in these

things; and just as Gladstone is their Christ, Joe is their

Anti-Christ. They will laugh to scorn his ‘Grand Councils.’ They

are, indeed, absurd. There are only two policies for

Ireland--Coercion, or a domestic legislature, &c. All else is

intrigue. You are not a Radical; on that line Joe will always cut

you out.

I don’t think that the occasion you have selected is a good one.

There is a strong public opinion, even amongst Liberals, for an

expenditure on armaments. It is true that Salisbury may wish to

obtain the money in order eventually to join in some absurd

European war, but this cannot be proved, and the basis of politics

is ‘hand to mouth.’

I should have thought that your game was rather a waiting one.

Sacrifice everything to becoming a fetish; then and only then, you

can do as you like. Hartington must go to the Lords. There is no

such thing in politics as burning boats, until there have been

explanations in the House of Commons. A Conservative Government

must spend, and generally a Liberal Government suffers from not

spending.

I write this--not, as you will perceive, in the interests of my

party, but in your individual interests. Surely when it is a

question of figures, and the figures are not known, there are the

elements of an arrangement.

Yours truly,

H. LABOUCHERE.

Lord Randolph Churchill’s resignation had been received with universal

surprise; but astonishment was swiftly succeeded by anger. His

enemies--and they multiplied rapidly--raised an exultant chorus of ‘I

told you so!’ His friends everywhere found themselves without an answer.

The Unionist Press was unanimous in its censures, and the London clubs

were loud in their abuse. The cohorts of tale-bearers and gossips on the

flanks of a Government were eager to impute the worst and meanest

motives, and his action, already difficult to vindicate, was variously

attributed to temper, to treachery, and to both. The whole strength of

the party organisation was exerted against him. The public was informed

through a thousand channels that he had aimed a deadly blow at the Union

upon an impulse of personal ambition or of personal spite. His rupture

with Lord Salisbury was utter and complete. The Queen was grievously

offended by his premature disclosure to the _Times_; and in the mood

that was abroad he found, like Macaulay before him, that to write on

Windsor Castle paper may sometimes be accounted as a crime. Yet,

although he was thus the object of so much reproach, he was of course

unable to defend himself. He requested permission to publish his letters

of resignation.

‘I cannot agree,’ replied Lord Salisbury by telegraph. ‘It would be

entirely at variance with the accepted practice, according to which such

explanations should be reserved for Parliament. You clearly cannot do it

without the Queen’s leave.’

‘Obviously,’ rejoined Lord Randolph, ‘the letters have been shown to the

_Standard_.’

‘No,’ was the answer. ‘Your supposition is incorrect; the letters

referred to have not been seen by anyone.’

The Prime Minister was plainly within his rights in his refusal; yet

while Lord Randolph Churchill was prevented by constitutional observance

from publicly anticipating the explanation to be made in Parliament, and

so from making any effective reply to his traducers, that explanation

was being discounted in a dozen informal versions, disparaging sometimes

by lavish falsehood, sometimes by ungenerous truth.

After accepting the resignation of the Chancellor of the Exchequer Lord

Salisbury turned at once to Lord Hartington. He had hitherto, as we have

seen, resisted the introduction of the Whigs into the Ministry; but the

situation was now critical, if not indeed desperate, and he accepted the

necessity. He therefore telegraphed to Lord Hartington, who was in Rome,

and invited his co-operation, offering either to make such Cabinet

arrangements as might suit him and his friends, or to serve under him if

he would himself undertake to form a Government. Above all, he pressed

for his immediate return to England. Lord Hartington responded to these

appeals without alacrity. He tarried in Rome till the night of Sunday

the 26th. Thence he proceeded to Monte Carlo ‘to pick up his letters.’

On the 28th he resumed his journey. It was not until the evening of the

29th that he arrived in London. His deliberation was justified by

events.

The Prime Minister, having collected his Cabinet together from all parts

of the country, met them on Tuesday, December 28, with a statement of

his views upon the situation. ‘Master of tactics,’ as Lord Randolph

called him, he rigidly confined the dispute to the single special

question of the Estimates. The Ministers responsible for the defence of

the Empire demanded a certain sum. The Minister responsible for the

finances had refused that sum. The head of the Government, having to

choose between them, was bound as a patriot to stand by the Empire. In

the face of a vast Imperial issue and of the grave crisis in European

affairs, the ordinary disputations of party politics--and, indeed, all

personal predilections--must stand aside. The coaling stations, on which

the British fleet depended for its world-wide mobility, were at stake.

To defend them or not to defend them--that was the question: and who

would hesitate in his answer, especially when the sum involved was

remarkably small? Such, at least, was the version semi-officially

communicated to the public and faithfully reproduced in every form of

artistic variation by the party press, from the _Times_ newspaper to the

remotest ramifications of the provincial and local journals.

Lord Salisbury also informed his colleagues that he was in communication

with Lord Hartington, and he laid before them the nature of the offers

he had made. The proceedings of the Cabinet were reported to be so

harmonious that the _Times_ and many other Ministerial journals came to

the conclusion that a Coalition with the Whigs was certain, and devoted

many columns of print to preparing the minds of their readers for so

excellent an arrangement. It was not until the next day that it dawned

upon the journalistic world that numerous and influential members of the

Government were very much averse on public grounds--the Empire, and, no

doubt, the European crisis--from that ‘wide reconstruction’ which a

Coalition or a Hartington Administration incidentally, but necessarily,

involved. This reluctance was shared, not without reason, by the

Conservative party generally, and voiced by the large number of members

of Parliament whom the crisis had drawn to the Carlton Club. The

Conservative party, although wanting thirty-five of an absolute majority

in the House of Commons, were nevertheless by far the strongest and most

compact party in the country; and they were by no means ready to

acquiesce in their leader’s disinterested willingness to surrender the

chief place in the Administration and to work on equal terms with a

party which only numbered seventy. By the time that Lord Hartington’s

train reached Charing Cross, on the night of the 29th, a Coalition

Government had become excessively unpopular, and the _Times_ was forced

to admit, with a blush for the frailty of political mankind, ‘that Lord

Salisbury’s foresight and patriotism were a good deal above the level of

the rank and file.’ Lord Randolph Churchill had counted upon Tory

Democracy. It was not Tory Democracy that stopped the Coalition; but

Tadpole and Taper.

[Sidenote: 1887 ÆT. 37]

By December 31 all prospect of a Coalition Ministry had been definitely

abandoned. Lord Hartington’s prudent and dignified delay had alone

prevented him from being placed in a false position. During the whole of

the 30th he consulted his friends and considered the reports which

reached him of the temper of the Conservative party. He had no

difficulty in coming to a decision. Even if the opinion of the Tory

party had been as favourable as it was unfavourable, it was certain that

the Liberal Unionists were not ripe for a Coalition, and that any

attempt to force them forward would lead to their disruption, and

certainly end in a separation from Mr. Chamberlain and his followers.

There was another obstacle--small, but not insignificant. Lord

Hartington’s position at Rossendale was not so secure as to make his

re-election certain. A Coalition was, in fact, so difficult and

undesirable that it could only be attempted in the last resort. And

until Lord Salisbury’s Government had been defeated in the House of

Commons no one could say that all alternatives had been exhausted. Lord

Hartington therefore declined, on January 1, the various propositions

which Lord Salisbury had made to him.

Three courses were now, according to the _Times_, open to the Prime

Minister: ‘To endeavour to induce Mr. Goschen to take the post of

Chancellor of the Exchequer; to come to an understanding with Lord

Randolph Churchill; or to reconstruct the Ministry from the Conservative

ranks.’ All three were strenuously debated throughout the country. The

idea of a reconciliation on some compromise between Lord Randolph

Churchill and Lord Salisbury obtained powerful support. Rumour was

tireless in formulating the terms on which peace might be made--was to

be made. The _Morning Post_, always an ardent and faithful friend to

Lord Randolph Churchill, never ceased to urge reunion with all the

weight of its unimpeachable Toryism. Every movement of the Prime

Minister and his late colleague was watched with cat-like attention. No

one could call at Arlington Street or Connaught Place without the

closest scrutiny; and when it became known that Lord Abergavenny, Lord

Rowton and Sir Henry Wolff had visited both houses, the gossips and

quidnuncs of the clubs thought the dispute as good as settled.

It was pointed out at this time that the circumstances of Lord Randolph

Churchill’s resignation bore a very curious resemblance to those in

which Lord Palmerston had resigned the Home Secretaryship in 1853. Lord

Palmerston had resigned on December 15, ostensibly on certain details of

the Reform Bill. It was asserted that he differed from the Cabinet upon

its policy in Eastern Europe; and this was strenuously denied by the

adherents of the Ministry. Lord Palmerston’s resignation was made public

before he had heard that it had been accepted by the Queen. Inspired

articles attacking Lord Palmerston appeared in the _Times_. Lord Derby,

writing to Lord Malmesbury, observed that Lord Palmerston is ‘much, and

justly, annoyed’ at this. ‘As _his_ lips are sealed, Aberdeen has no

business to speak through the newspapers.’ To cap all this, there were

on both occasions heavy falls of snow, which made communications

difficult and slow. After some days of suspense Lord Palmerston was

prevailed upon to withdraw his resignation and to resume office. Would

the parallel be completed?

Lord Randolph Churchill had so little expected to fail in his conflict

with the Cabinet that he had not clearly thought out how he would stand

in that event. Lord Salisbury’s acceptance of his resignation, without

interview, remonstrance, or offer of compromise, had surprised him; but

he faced the situation calmly. Not to be behindhand in determination, he

had clinched matters by himself publishing the news. He realised at once

how serious were the consequences and how narrowed and difficult his

position had become. He found himself, alone and unprepared, on ground

most unfavourable; yet he did not seek to avoid the issue. He made no

suggestions of reconciliation. Even after the failure of the Hartington

coalition he would lend himself to no overtures. He forbade his friends

to concern themselves in the affair. He rebuked Wolff with unnecessary

violence for an unauthorised attempt, not ill-received by Lord

Salisbury, to make peace: ‘Do you think you can manage me like one of

your Cairene Pashas?’ During the whole fortnight that the Cabinet was in

flux he abstained from the slightest action, covert or overt, which

could aggravate the crisis.

To remodel the Government and to allow the excitement to cool down,

Ministers prorogued Parliament from January 13--the date which Lord

Randolph had fixed--till January 27, and the time when an explanation

could be offered was further delayed. But in face of harsher

misrepresentation and abuse than has been directed against any

politician since, Lord Randolph remained absolutely silent to the

public. He said nothing, he did nothing: and yet there were many close

observers of politics who thought more than once that all would fall

back into his hands, that Lord Salisbury would be forced to invite him

to rejoin upon terms or leave him to form a Government of his own.

To Chamberlain, who had spoken of him in words of warm appreciation a

few days before--saying, among other things, that Lord Randolph

Churchill’s position in the Government had been a guarantee that they

would not pursue a reactionary policy--he wrote with complete candour:--

December 24, 1886.

Your letter just received and your speech gave me equal delight. I

told you that a Ministerial crisis was coming when you dined with

me, but I own I did not think that I should have failed to persuade

Lord S. to take a broad view of the situation. I had no choice but

to go; he had been for weeks prepared for it, and possibly courted

the crash. I did my best for his Government while I was in it, but

I had ceased to be useful.... Their innate Toryism is rampant and

irrepressible.

Party papers seem to think the most awful crime which a modern

politician can commit is to have a spark of principle or a regard

for former pledges.... I feel much in the dark as to the future;

my position is completely _déclassé_. I hear the Carlton would like

to tear me limb from limb; and yet does no blame or responsibility

attach [to Lord S.?] The anxiety of the last two days has made me

very seedy.

His mother had, as usual, a somewhat more hopeful account.

Treasury Chambers, Whitehall: December 28, 1886.

I have as yet no news. Hartington may join. Goschen is to meet him

in Paris to-morrow; it all depends whether he can be re-elected or

not. Wolff is too faithful for description. I am pleased with the

general tone of the Press. I expected it to be much worse. I can’t

bear to leave this room, where I can sit and think and hear

everything quickly. The matter is very critical, but by no means

desperate, and may drag on indefinitely for some days.

I am very well and in very good spirits. Please do not worry about

me or put off your journey.

The pleasant party at Howth, to which he had been looking forward, must

be forsaken.

_Lord Randolph Churchill to Lord Justice FitzGibbon._

Treasury Chambers, Whitehall, S.W.: December 24, 1886.

You see my Irish hopes are shattered. I mean the Howth hopes. I

have nothing to do but to keep very quiet for the moment, and

pleasure is out of the question.

I hope you do not blame me hastily. It was certain to come, and

delay produced danger.

I should like to tell you all about it; it is too long to write.

I feel rather seedy, as the anxiety has wearied me awfully; so do

not write more.

Treasury Chambers, Whitehall, S.W.: December 26, 1886.

I cannot manage Howth this year, though you must know what a

disappointment to me it is not to join you. But I should be a

wet-blanket altogether, and, moreover, I could not stand the

‘Tutissimus.’[60] He would drive me wild with his airs of moral

triumph and success.

What a time we are having! Lord S. has committed a capital blunder

in again prostrating himself before Hartington. Why did he not set

his back to the wall and go on, _coûte que coûte_? Still, you must

not think I have any illusions about myself. In inflicting on the

old gang this final fatal blow, I have mortally wounded myself. But

the work is practically done; the Tory Party will be turned into a

Liberal Party, and in that transformation may yet produce a

powerful governing force. If not, G.O.M., Labby, anarchy, &c., are

triumphant.

Interesting times, my dear FitzGibbon! I wonder what old Ball says.

So far as the political world was concerned, he contented himself with

writing a private letter to Mr. Akers-Douglas for the assurance of his

political friends and for the information of Conservative members of

Parliament who might inquire. It is remarkable that this letter has

never yet been published:--

Treasury Chambers, Whitehall, S.W.: New Year’s Day, 1887.

My dear Douglas,--Having noticed in the newspapers this morning a

variety of mischievous nonsense taking the form of statements as to

my reasons for quitting the Government, my views as to what would

be necessary to secure my return to the Government, and suggestions

as to terms of reconciliation, I think it proper in the public

interest, and as much for purposes of future record as for any

other more immediate object, to lay before you my views on the

position.

The primary object of all government at the present moment is to

maintain the Union, to maintain it not for a session or for a

Parliament, but for our time. The maintenance of the Union is, to

my mind, in no way a question of men, but entirely a question of

measures and administration. Mr. Gladstone has identified the

Liberal party with the policy of Repeal; he has behind him

Scotland, Wales and Ireland, and no inconsiderable portion of

England. In the event of the Conservative Government and party

pursuing in the coming session a policy, foreign and domestic,

which for one reason or another becomes unpopular with, and is

discredited in the eyes of, that great portion of the English

electorate which, after a tremendous struggle, has been kept true

to the principle of the Union, the inevitable result will be that

at the next election Mr. Gladstone and the Liberal party will

return to power, pledged to immediate Repeal, and in a position to

give immediate effect to their pledge.

The composition of the present Parliament renders it a matter of no

insuperable difficulty to carry on the government of the Queen for

a session or two, or even longer, _tant bien que mal_; but such a

proceeding, so limited and so narrow in its view, would be, to my

mind, the most fallacious and dangerous of statesmanship. From the

time when I joined the Government I have never taken my eyes off

the next General Election. My one desire has been that Lord

Salisbury should be in a position to go boldly to the country at

any moment, confident of popular support. To this end every word of

advice on any subject which I have ever offered him has been

directed, and it was only when it was forced upon me that these

views did not practically commend themselves either to him or his

colleagues that I took the grave and serious step of releasing

myself from all responsibility for a policy which in two or three

years would, as far as human judgment may be exercised in such a

matter, have led straight to Repeal.

A foreign policy which may at any moment involve this country in a

European war; a domestic policy which would be marked by stagnation

rather than progress; free expenditure, necessitating continued

high taxation, when combined with the defence of the Union, would

without doubt weigh down and crush out of all popular life that

great and vital Imperial principle. Not only so, but a policy of

which the above were the main characteristics not only involved so

insignificant a person as myself in a marked violation of pledges

given to the public, but also to all intents and purposes the

entire Conservative party in the House of Commons. From 1880 to

1885 every Conservative speaker on every public platform has

proclaimed, with every variety of style and paraphrase, that the

Liberal party have been false to their traditions, and that ‘Peace,

Retrenchment and Reform’ could only be practically given effect to

by the Tories. Nor can it be doubted that this persistent iteration

of a political position which, so far as the Liberals were

concerned, could be demonstrated by facts, produced an immense

effect upon the masses in the great English towns. Should, however,

the results of a year or two of Tory government show that the

accusations against the Tory party so constantly made by the

Liberals--namely, that the Tory party are the war party, that they

are the extravagant party, that they are the do-nothing and

obstructive party--can be demonstrated by actual facts and events,

it seems certain that the great town electorate, which we have had

so much trouble in winning, will sway back violently to the Liberal

party, their earlier love, and that the disaster of 1880 will be

repeated on a larger scale and with more deadly effect.

To avert such a disaster there is nothing I would not do, nothing I

would not sacrifice; but if the catastrophe must come, I will not

that anyone shall be able to say that any large portion of

responsibility rested upon me.

It was if possible by a desperate effort (so profoundly was I

convinced of the magnitude of the peril into which the Tory

Government and party were drifting by looking too much to tiding

over the difficulties of the moment, and not at all to the next

General Election) to rouse my friends to a sense of the position

that I resigned my office and incurred with much equanimity the

tornado of slander, obloquy and every variety of misrepresentation

that friends, and possibly even colleagues, have let loose upon me.

I seek for no re-entry into the present Government; I decline to

commence any undignified or unworthy bargaining and huckstering as

to the terms of reconciliation; but this I say--that if by any

coalition, fusion or reconstruction a Government is formed which by

its composition and its policy will be an earnest and a guarantee

to the country that a period of peaceful progressive administration

has in reality set in, I would serve that Government with the

utmost loyalty in any capacity, however humble, either as a member

or a follower, only too glad that by any sacrifice or any action of

mine I might possibly have averted danger to the State.

Furthermore, this I add: that whatever course the Prime Minister

may take at this moment, he need not for one moment fear the

smallest opposition, direct or indirect, from me, in Parliament or

in the country. I shall make no further attempt to defend my

action, lest by any such attempt I might, even by one iota,

increase the difficulties which surround him; but, recognising to

the full my great fallibility of judgment, I shall watch silently

and sadly the progress of events.

Believe me to be

Very sincerely yours,

RANDOLPH S. CHURCHILL.

Mr. Chamberlain’s comment was characteristic:--

Highbury, Moor Green, Birmingham: January 3, 1887.

My dear Churchill,--I return your very interesting Memorandum. If I

had been you I do not think I should have added the last paragraph.

When a man says that in no case will he return a blow, he is very

likely to be cuffed.

However, I dare say Lord Salisbury will not take you too literally

at your word, and will avoid any extreme test of your most

Christian disposition.

I heard before I left that Goschen was likely to join. He will

certainly carry no one else with him, but he may be able to commit

Hartington to a more unqualified support than he would otherwise

have given to a purely Tory Government.

I understood that one cause of his hesitation was his fear that you

would be actively hostile, if he took your place. Probably he has

since been reassured by a sight of your letter to Akers-Douglas.

I do not know yet whether anything will come of negotiations

between the Gladstonians and the Radical Unionists. I never felt

less like ‘a surrender’ in my life, and Labouchere and his crew may

put what interpretation they like on the matter, but they will not

be able to show that I have advanced one iota from the position of

my telegram to the Unionist meeting, extended as it was by my

speech in Birmingham.

The future is still obscure to me, but the game is exceedingly

interesting at this moment.

Yours sincerely,

J. CHAMBERLAIN.

Another explanation was not neglected:--

_Lord Randolph Churchill to Sir Henry Ponsonby._

2 Connaught Place, W.: January 13, 1887.

Dear Sir Henry Ponsonby,--I saw His Royal Highness the Prince of

Wales to-day, and from an observation which he made I learnt for

the first time on authority that the publication of the news of my

resignation took place before the matter had been made the subject

of official communication to Her Majesty, and that in so far as my

action was responsible for such publicity the Queen had cause for

displeasure with me.

I am much grieved at this news, and anxious to place on record the

facts bearing upon the matter as they are known to me. On Thursday,

December 18, I had a long conversation with Lord Salisbury, in

which I intimated to him that the expenditure proposed for the

Army and Navy was considerably higher than what I could be

responsible for in view of my reiterated public pledges as to the

necessity for and possibility of retrenchment. On Monday, the 20th,

I had a long conversation with the Secretary of State for War, and

a written communication from the First Lord of the Admiralty which

confirmed me in the views which I had communicated to Lord

Salisbury on the previous Thursday.

On Monday, the 20th, in the evening, I wrote from Windsor to Lord

Salisbury intimating my desire to withdraw from the Government.

It would have been a source of immense relief to me if I had been

able to acquaint Her Majesty with what was passing when I had the

honour of dining at Windsor, but my great want of experience of

official life led me to believe that had I initiated so grave a

matter in the conversation which Her Majesty was graciously pleased

to hold with me I should have been guilty of a most unusual breach

of etiquette and of Ministerial practice and decorum: all the more

as no opening presented itself for bringing up the subject, though

in truth my mind was entirely absorbed by it.

Lord Salisbury received my letter early Tuesday morning, the 21st,

and no answer from him reached me till eight o’clock on Wednesday

evening--a considerable interval, remembering the proximity of

Hatfield either to Windsor or London. Lord Salisbury’s answer was

of a most definite character, accepting my resignation; and bearing

in mind the interval which had elapsed, I made perfectly certain

that the fullest communications on the subject had passed between

Her Majesty and Lord Salisbury, and that Lord Salisbury’s answer

was written with Her Majesty’s knowledge. In fact, it never crossed

my mind that the reverse could be the case, and I thought myself

justified in no longer making any secret of the fact that I no

longer had the honour of belonging to the Government. If I erred in

this, it was from ignorance and from misunderstanding, and not the

least from design and I would be intensely distressed if it might

be supposed that by any action of mine I had been wanting in that

profound respect to Her Majesty which it is the high and grateful

duty of all to render, and which Her Majesty’s most gracious

treatment of myself on several occasions doubly and trebly imposed

upon me.

Perhaps indeed I am doing wrong in making you this communication.

If so, I trust to your kindness to inform me on the subject before

making any use of this letter.

Believe me to be

Yours very truly,

RANDOLPH S. CHURCHILL.

The reply was frigid:--

_Sir Henry Ponsonby to Lord Randolph Churchill._

Osborne: January 15, 1887.

Dear Lord Randolph,--The Queen has read your letter relating to the

announcement of your resignation before it had been accepted by Her

Majesty; and commands me to thank you for your explanation.

Yours very truly,

HENRY PONSONBY.

It was about this time, when many from whom he might have expected

service were falling away, that Lord Randolph received the sympathy and

support of an able man with whom during the next four years he was to be

associated, and from whom he was ultimately destined to part in very

gloomy circumstances. Mr. Louis Jennings, the Conservative member for

Stockport and a full-blooded Fair Trader, looked upon ‘Tory Democracy’

as a living political faith. He was a man of strong character and

extensive information who had reached the House of Commons late in life,

after a varied career. He had travelled widely, and had taken an active

part in the politics of other countries than his own. As the editor of

the _Times of India_ he had been largely concerned in the agitation

which had led to the suppression of the Juggernaut ceremonial. With the

_New York Times_ as his weapon he had broken up, by a prolonged and

pitiless audit of their accounts, the Tammany Ring in 1871; and, after a

struggle in which his life was said to be in danger, he had hunted the

notorious ‘Boss’ Tweed to the gaol in which he died. Taught alike by

experience and study, a man of action and a writer, Mr. Jennings was

well fitted to become an effective political force, and, as the editor

of the Croker papers, he did not lack recognition in the world of

letters. He now made himself known to Lord Randolph Churchill in a style

which expresses the sincerity of his feelings and reveals the

slenderness of their acquaintance:--

73 Elm Park Gardens, S.W.: December 31, 1886.

My Lord,--At a time when all the busybodies and nobodies in the

country are thrusting advice upon you I am very reluctant to appear

to join the throng. I hope, however, you will permit me to assure

you that I have tried to keep my own constituency from committing

the gross injustice of condemning a man before he is heard. For my

own part, it will take a great deal to convince me that in the

great sacrifices you have made, and the grave responsibilities you

have incurred, you have not been actuated by a high sense of duty

and by the purest and best motives. If this be so--as I feel sure

it is--there will be a reaction against all this wild clamour, and

the people will do you justice.

I am, my Lord,

Yours very truly,

L. J. JENNINGS.

Lord Hartington’s determination having been made public, Lord Salisbury

next turned to Mr. Goschen. Mr. Goschen’s position was different and

distinct from that of Lord Hartington. He was not tied to any particular

constituency, and in respect of a seat could avail himself of the large

resources of the Conservative party. He had for several years been out

of tune with the Liberal policy and, more than any other Whig, he had

been alarmed and estranged by the growing influence of Radicalism. He

had not joined the Government of 1880, and he was free alike from

responsibility for its failures and resentment towards its assailants.

Lord Hartington was the leader of a party with the obligations and

restrictions of leadership. Mr. Goschen was eminent, but detached.

Moreover, his high financial authority would strengthen the Government

at the very point where it had been most seriously weakened. He was now

invited to go to the Treasury, and it was generally believed that,

whatever temporary arrangements were made, the leadership in the Commons

would soon devolve upon him.

Mr. Goschen nevertheless showed some hesitation in joining the

Government. To participate in a regular Coalition in company with

political friends wore a different complexion from entering the Cabinet

of the opposite political party alone. He desired most strongly to

preserve his relations with Lord Hartington and his character as a

Liberal; and even when reassured on these points he stipulated that two

other Whigs should be included in the Cabinet to give him countenance

and support. Places were thereupon offered to Lord Northbrook and Lord

Lansdowne. But at this the Conservative party, so far as it was

represented by the Carlton Club, again showed such disapproval that

these peers felt it their duty to decline office, and in the end Mr.

Goschen was fain to join without them. For the rest, Mr. Smith became

First Lord of the Treasury, with the leadership of the House of Commons;

Stanhope took the War Office and Sir Henry Holland the Colonies; while

Lord Salisbury himself assumed, none too soon, the direction of foreign

affairs.

Mr. Goschen’s acceptance of office definitely put an end to the Cabinet

crisis. ‘The new Chancellor of the Exchequer,’ observed the _Times_

tartly, ‘will take Lord Randolph Churchill’s place in more senses than

one.’ The Government was completely reconstituted, and no expectation of

overtures or reconciliation could be entertained. It has in consequence

often been represented that this appointment was to Lord Randolph a

contingency utterly unforeseen. The saying, so often attributed to him,

‘I forgot Goschen,’ is interpreted as a key to deep designs. In an

elaborate calculation he had overlooked a vital factor. In the moment of

success he was ruined by an inexplicable neglect. The evidence upon

these pages does not sustain this view. He marshalled no forces against

the Prime Minister. With an imprudence born of repeated success, he

prepared no combination, either of circumstances or men, to support his

demands. He went into battle without allies or armour. He set his

unaided personal power--as he had often done before--to back his

opinions, and awaited the issue with an easy mind. He had not, of

course, considered Mr. Goschen’s financial reputation in connection with

a vacancy at the Exchequer; but, so far from forgetting Mr. Goschen

himself, he was constantly solicitous for him. A Coalition with all or

any of the Whigs had been for three years his consistent and persistent

aim. After the election of 1885 he was willing to resign, that Mr.

Goschen might join the Administration. In his memorandum written before

the first meeting of Parliament in 1886 he again strongly pressed upon

Lord Salisbury that places should be offered to the Whigs, including Mr.

Goschen. In November he was concerned that Mr. Goschen should be elected

to Parliament and urged Lord Salisbury to put him forward for a seat

which might soon be vacant. And lastly, on December 18, two days before

his letter of resignation, when the dispute in the Cabinet was at its

height, both Lord Salisbury and Mr. Goschen were his guests at a dinner

the avowed object of which was to bring them together. However decisive,

however disastrous to Lord Randolph the inclusion of Mr. Goschen in the

Government at this time may have been, it was no surprise; for he had

always been its advocate. It was not fatal to his schemes; for there

were no schemes.

_Lord Randolph Churchill to Lord Dunraven._

2 Connaught Place, W.: January 12, 1887.

My dear Dunraven,--I consider honestly that you are quite as good a

judge as to what the political position requires from moderate

progressive politicians as I am. You have seen all the

correspondence between me and Lord Salisbury, as well as my letter

to Akers-Douglas, about which last Lord S. says it makes the breach

unbridgeable. Therefore my explanation, when it comes, will add

little or nothing to your knowledge.

With respect to persons like ----, ----, &c., whom I look upon as my

friends, I have been most careful to check any tendency to follow

my example, for resignation might be fatal to their political

career, on which they depend almost for social existence, and I was

most fearful of any responsibility attaching to me for having led

them to extinction.

With you I feel in a different position. You have a social and

political position of your own, which the holding of a minor office

in the Government by no means enhances, and which the loss of such

an office would by no means affect.

Tory Democracy may be a bad name, but it represents to you and me

and many more certain distinct political principles which you and I

hold very strongly. That those principles are in the utmost peril

just now there can be no doubt. We know what Lord Salisbury is, and

we know what Goschen is, and we know that our views are regarded by

both with unrelenting distrust and aversion.

On the whole, I think you are in a position to try a bold course;

and you must not undervalue your strength in the country, where you

are well known, followed by many, and greatly regarded by all.

However, let us talk it over this afternoon at the Carlton.

Yours ever,

RANDOLPH S. C.

Eventually Lord Dunraven decided to resign the office which he held, of

Under-Secretary for the Colonies; but his partnership with Lord

Randolph Churchill proved in the end more noticeable at Newmarket than

at Westminster.

Perhaps some day it may be possible to publish in a complete form the

letters, some of which have been quoted in these pages, which passed

between Lord Salisbury and Lord Randolph Churchill during their eventful

association. Although the period scarcely extended above two years, the

correspondence would attain considerable dimensions. Yet the reader

would be wise to persevere: for when we consider the easy yet forceful

pens employed; the profound and secret knowledge of political movements

and forces at work which both possessed; the importance, range and

fascinating variety of subjects; the changing relationships and

antagonisms of the writers; above all, the free and candid style of

their intercourse--whether in regard to men or things--one cannot

imagine any compilation which would more truthfully illuminate the dark

and stormy history of those times. All that, however, is a matter for

the future. Such as it had been, the correspondence was now to close,

for hardly any communication--and that only of a formal nature--was

desired on either side in the years which followed. Nevertheless, its

conclusion was not unworthy.

Lord Iddesleigh had been apparently forgotten in the reconstruction of

the Cabinet. In the strife and excitement of these harsh days this

unwarlike figure had dropped out of men’s minds. Lord Salisbury’s

assumption of the Foreign Office necessarily displaced him; and he was,

perhaps not unreasonably, offended to read the first news of it in the

daily papers of January 12. It was said by the wags that ‘Randolph had

driven him from the House of Commons in his rise, and from the Cabinet

in his fall.’ Tragedy, never very far behind the curtain, came forward

swiftly on the heels of this. That same afternoon Lord Iddesleigh called

upon Lord Salisbury at Downing Street, and, being overtaken in the

anteroom by the heart disease from which he had so long been afflicted,

he expired in the presence of the Prime Minister.

The disputes between Lord Randolph Churchill and Sir Stafford Northcote

have been very fully recorded in this story; and I fear their harsh

features cannot truthfully be softened or smoothed away. They must be

judged as a whole and in relation to the circumstances of the time. Here

is the last word upon them:--

_Lord Randolph Churchill to Lord Salisbury._

2 Connaught Place, W.: January 13, 1887.

Dear Lord Salisbury,--Although a great and wide political

difference has separated me from you officially, I cannot refrain

(even possibly at the risk of being misunderstood) from writing you

a line to express how greatly I grieve for the shock you must have

experienced owing to the melancholy occurrence of yesterday

afternoon. It seems very hard on you that this grave event should

have come now to add its own weight to the many other troubles and

worries which circumstances purely political have occasioned.

I felt much the old Lord’s death, for he had for years past gone

through much bother, disappointment, and probably vexation, nor

can I conveniently repress the reflection _quorum pars magna fui_.

But this I can say from my own knowledge, consisting of the

recollection of many facts and conversations, that never in public

life did any man have a truer friend and colleague than Lord

Iddesleigh had in you; and certainly if rewards, honours and the

praise of men are sources of satisfaction, Lord Iddesleigh enjoyed

them in a fuller measure than any other contemporary, and that he

did so I consider to be mainly owing to the unwavering loyalty with

which you invariably supported him, checked all depreciation, and

stimulated constant recognition of his public services.

I like to place this on record, though possibly it may be deemed

somewhat presumptuous, for it has been my fortune in the last two

or three years to see as much almost perhaps as anyone into the

inner and more concealed working of our party life.

Believe me to be, with much sympathy,

Yours most sincerely,

RANDOLPH S. CHURCHILL.

_Lord Salisbury to Lord Randolph Churchill._

Hatfield House, Hatfield, Herts: January 14, 1887.

My dear Randolph,--I am very grateful for the kind sympathy

expressed in your letter of yesterday, and very much touched by it.

Your testimony to my bearing towards our old friend in the past is

thoughtful and generous.