reassembles at the beginning of February next, the Government are
sanguine that they will be prepared with definite proposals on that
large question. Their object will be, as far as possible, to eliminate
party feelings and to secure for the consideration of the question as
large an amount of Parliamentary co-operation as can be obtained; so
that whatever settlement may be arrived at may not be regarded as a
political triumph of either party, but rather in the nature of a final
and lasting settlement.... The great sign-posts of our policy are
equality, similarity and, if I may use such a word, simultaneity of
treatment, so far as is practicable, in the development of a genuinely
popular system of government in all the four countries which form the
United Kingdom.’ He ended by declaring in simple terms that the verdict
of the constituencies for the maintenance of the Parliamentary Union
must be considered final and irreversible.
Such was the policy which Lord Randolph Churchill was permitted to
declare with the assent of the Prime Minister and of the Cabinet. In
order that there might be no misunderstandings, he took the precaution
of writing out the actual words and submitting them beforehand to the
principal Ministers. It was the policy of his own heart. It is the
policy which, in spite of some lamentable lapses, of many purposeless
and vexatious delays and of more than one incident of prejudice or even
tyranny, has upon the whole, as history records, been carried
laboriously forward by Unionist Administrations during nearly twenty
years and which in the end, whatever problems it has left unsolved, has
notably advanced the social, political and economic stability of the
Irish people.
Lord Randolph Churchill was much praised for his speech. The
Conservatives were in high spirits, and the newspapers next morning
emphasised the favourable impression which had been produced. Yet he
does not seem himself to have been much affected by these tributes; for
on being asked the next day ‘whether it is the intention of the
Government to introduce any changes in the fiscal laws of the country by
placing duties on imported manufactures, by taxing foreign corn, by
countervailing bounties or in any other respect,’ he replied, with an
odd gleam of foresight or of humour: ‘The ways and means for the year
1887-8 which the Government will propose to Parliament, will be
communicated to the House on or about March 31 next by the
person--whoever he may be--who at the time happens to be Chancellor of
the Exchequer.’
[Illustration: _Reproduced by permission of the proprietors of ‘Punch.’_
THE GRAND YOUNG MAN.
SHADE OF ‘DIZZY,’ _loquitor_:
You stand--at your age--where I stood after years
Of waiting on Fortune and working on fools.
Not forty! Unwearied by failures or fears.
To him who can use them are ever the tools,
But there’s an advantage you’ll scarce understand
In having the tools ready shaped to your hand.
_Punch_, August 7, 1886.]
The debate on the Address and its amendments was protracted. It had
opened with much calmness; but as it progressed the smouldering fires of
the great encounter began to sparkle. In this flicker the deep
antagonisms which the election had made permanent between friends and
parties, became visible. Lord Hartington’s speech on the third night was
uncompromising. Standing in the midst of his old colleagues on the Front
Opposition Bench, with much formal courtesy and weighty argument he made
it plain that he would exert his whole strength to sustain the Ministry
in power. He was heard by his party in moody silence, broken from time
to time by Irish interruptions and Tory applause. Mr. Parnell, who moved
next day an amendment of his own, took pains to cast back disdainfully,
as trash unworthy of notice, the material aid to Irish resources which
the Chancellor of the Exchequer had proffered. He spoke of the
‘dishonesty of bolstering up the system of landlord and tenant in
Ireland by the expenditure of large sums of money the repayment of which
is quite uncertain and highly problematic,’ and of the ‘folly of
building harbours of refuge for fishing-boats that do not exist.’ He
derided the proposal to spend three-quarters of a million on the
arterial drainage of the Bann and the Shannon, where nothing less than
ten millions would suffice. Fed by such fuel, an ugly glow grew
gradually in the House.
The sixth day of the debate on the Address was stormy. It began with an
unexpected motion for the adjournment of the House as a protest against
the despatch of Sir Redvers Buller to Kerry. The member who moved it,
Mr. Edward Russell, made an elaborate and indignant speech. He enlarged
on the iniquity of employing a military officer accustomed to dealing
with savage tribes to discharge duties which properly belonged to the
civil magistrate. Lord Randolph dealt with this motion in a summary and
even audacious manner. ‘In the opinion of the honourable gentleman,’
said the Chancellor of the Exchequer, ‘the appointment of Sir Redvers
Buller is a startling innovation in our Constitution, a serious blow to
civil and religious liberty, a wilful invasion of the immutable
principles of justice, and other things of that serious kind. He holds
strong opinions and he prophesies the most alarming results. He declares
that all Kerry will immediately take an active part in the proceedings
of the “Moonlighters” and that all Ireland will very shortly be involved
in a general conflagration. Now, sir, I do not complain of the
honourable member holding these opinions; they are opinions he is
perfectly entitled to hold and to express. What I want the House to do
is to compare the opinions he holds with the course he suggests. What is
the course he proposes? He proposes that the House of Commons should
immediately adjourn. What will be the effect of that course on Sir
Redvers Buller or his appointment? Absolutely none. The House would
adjourn, if they agreed with the honourable member, and, like the
Emperor Titus, might exclaim that they had lost a day; but, before the
House met again, Sir Redvers Buller would be well on his way to Kerry.
‘As to employing military officers in civil positions, had not Mr.
Gladstone after the London riots appointed Sir Charles Warren, an
officer on the active list, liable to be called away at any moment on
military service, not to look after “Moonlighters,” but after the
civilised inhabitants of London?’ He suggested that the motion had been
brought forward to delay the speech which Mr. Chamberlain, who had
obtained the adjournment on the previous night, was known to be about to
deliver. No greater compliment could be paid to a member than that his
opponents should show that they feared what he was going to say. ‘I have
to announce,’ he concluded, ‘that Her Majesty’s Government entirely
decline to take any part in the discussion.’
This was hard hitting, but it succeeded. ‘Lord Randolph Churchill,’ said
the _Times_ the next day, ‘pricked the bubble with a Disraelian
dexterity of touch.’ Angry speeches in reply failed to sustain the
debate. The fate of the motion was never for a moment doubtful, and on a
division it was rejected by a majority of 241 against 146.
The motion for the adjournment being thus brushed aside, the
consideration of Mr. Parnell’s amendment was resumed. The treatment
accorded to Mr. Chamberlain’s speech afforded some foundation for Lord
Randolph’s charge. He was repeatedly interrupted both from above and
below the gangway. Mr. Speaker was invited to notice the smallest
deviation from the strictest relevancy. Cries of fierce derision saluted
him from the Irish benches. The men around him did not conceal their
discontent. And in his turn he struck back with dexterous severity.
Ceremonious language, much ‘right honourable be-friending,’
smoothly-turned sentences, soft, purring accents, ineradicable
antagonism; such was his speech. It was the first of many similar
episodes in this new Parliament. Yet some respect is due to the
forbearance of the Liberal majority. For six weary years the
Liberal-Unionist leaders sat on the Front Opposition Bench. Their
followers held the balance of every division. Their authority sustained
the Conservative Government. Their debating skill was always at hand
when all else failed. They supported Coercion; they justified
Mitchelstown; they even defended the Special Commission; and with
decisive effect. Yet never once, not even at times of sharpest
indignation, were they denied by those who surrounded them their freedom
of debate.
The Government were naturally delighted at this decided support. ‘You
made a splendid speech last night,’ wrote Lord Randolph to Mr.
Chamberlain (August 27). ‘It is curious, but true, that you have more
effect on the Tory party than either Salisbury or myself. Many of them
had great doubts about our policy till you spoke.’
On September 1, Mr. Sexton brought forward an amendment drawing
attention to the Belfast riots, and this, of course, served as a
convenient peg on which to fasten an almost interminable series of
attacks upon Lord Randolph Churchill. At least twenty-five persons had
been actually killed in the streets and many hundreds injured or
arrested. All was attributed to the epigram, ‘Ulster will fight and
Ulster will be right.’ Sir Michael Hicks-Beach was able to make a good
defence. In spite of a long and solemn denunciation from Sir William
Harcourt, the Chancellor of the Exchequer remained silent; but the
debate ran on, full of life and spite, until on September 3 Mr.
Labouchere sought to provoke him by embodying a direct charge in a
special amendment. ‘Surely in vain the net is spread in the sight of any
bird,’ said Lord Randolph piously; ‘and of all the unskilful and clumsy
Parliamentary fowlers of whose manœuvres it has been my lot to be a
witness, I never met a sorrier practitioner than the honourable member.
In the various snares and wits and wiles with which he distinguished
himself in the last Parliament he only succeeded in this--that he made
himself the laughing-stock of the Parliament and of the public; and he
appears to be desirous to add to-night to his already great reputation.’
‘There was not,’ the speaker declared, with some boldness, ‘a shred of a
shadow of a shade, or a shade of a shadow of a shred’ of foundation for
such charges. So the attacks were brushed contemptuously away, and the
Government majority did not fail in the Lobby to endorse their Leader’s
disdain.
On September 3 the Chancellor of the Exchequer moved a resolution
securing precedence for the Committee of Ways and Means and of Supply.
So far as form was concerned, he based himself upon the precedent of
1841. But he ventured further upon an earnest yet restrained appeal to
the House. ‘We have pledged ourselves as a Government to produce at the
meeting of Parliament next year such schemes of legislation as we may be
able to decide upon and mature in the autumn and winter. If the
proceedings of this session were to be greatly protracted and if the
energies of members and Ministers were to be greatly exhausted by them,
it would become very difficult for the Government to summon Parliament
as early next year. I ask no consideration on behalf of the Government,
but in the interests of Parliament and of the country. This motion is
intended to wind up, with as much expedition as is reasonable and
decent, the business of the session, and to allow members to separate in
time for the annual recess. I would not for a moment wish the House to
understand that I am advocating a rapid or slovenly discussion of the
Estimates. I have always protested against that and always shall. I ask
only that the House will concentrate its attention on the Estimates and
proceed without unusual dilatoriness and loss of time. The difficulties
which lie in the future before the Government, are very great indeed. No
one can be more deeply impressed with their magnitude than my colleagues
and myself; and certainly I see no possibility of arriving at anything
like a solution of those difficulties unless the House is prepared to
give a reasonable amount of time during which the Government may take
thought for a future so anxious and grave.’
The effect of this appeal, conjoined as it was with a promise that Mr.
Parnell should have an opportunity for bringing forward his Tenants’
Relief Bill, was to induce the House to consent without a division to
endow the Government with full control over public time. Lord Randolph,
however, thought it proper to write a special letter of explanation to
Lord Hartington, fearing apparently lest the Whig leader should become
suspicious of any compact with the Nationalist party:--
Treasury Chambers, Whitehall, S.W.: September 5, 1886.
Dear Lord Hartington,--You will have observed in the papers that
the Government gave a promise to Parnell to afford him facilities
(_i.e._ a night) for laying his land proposals in the form of a
Bill before Parliament.
Whether this promise was a wise one or not, I will not say. There
were no doubt grave objections to any concession to Parnell of any
sort or kind, but I think if you had been in the House last week
you might have been of opinion that the objections to a course of
stolid resistance on the part of the Government were perhaps
greater.
However this may be I own that I am extremely anxious that (if
possible) when the Bill does come on, the Government may receive
your support in opposing it. Of course the Bill will only be
Parnell’s original amendment to the Address in another form, and
the Government will not give way an inch to him under any
consideration.
But Parnell has undoubtedly hopes, which if they are unsound cannot
be too clearly and speedily demonstrated to be unsound, that he can
make out a case so plausible for the tenants on the score of
inability to pay that he may secure the support or at least the
abstention of the Liberal Unionists; and of course if he were
successful in this the moral strength of the Government would be
seriously diminished, with corresponding disadvantage to other,
greater and more common interests.
I therefore trouble you with these few lines now, though I do not
suppose the discussion on the Bill can arise till next week at the
earliest.
Believe me to be
Very faithfully yours,
RANDOLPH S. CHURCHILL.
A friendly message emboldened the Minister to write more freely of his
difficulties:--
_Lord Randolph Churchill to Lord Hartington._
_Private._
September 13, 1886.
The position of this Government must always be most precarious. It
may have a long life; but it is a rickety infant, requiring the
most careful handling. The condition of the House of Commons, the
recklessness and utter lack of all sense of responsibility on the
part of the Opposition, their guerilla character and the want of a
leader who can control, is most alarming. There is no precedent
that I know of in our history of such a combination of ominous
circumstances. I hear you are going to India; and if this means
your absence from the House till March or April, I think it right
to tell you that without your support in Parliament this Government
cannot last. The assaults of an Opposition unrestrained by your
presence will be too desperate for me to sustain. A state of great
confusion will arise; the Government will go, and you will have to
try your hand. I feel awfully alone in the House of Commons, and am
glad to grasp an opportunity of placing things before you as I look
at them.
_Lord Hartington to Lord Randolph Churchill._
_Private._
Brantingham Thorpe, Brough, Yorkshire: September 14, 1886.
My dear Churchill,--I received your letter this morning before
leaving London, and am glad to know so fully your opinions on the
position in the House of Commons. It is quite true that I have some
doubt, which I expressed to Sir M. Hicks-Beach, as to resisting the
whole of Parnell’s Bill. I do not think that you can leave
expediency out of the question in dealing with the rights of Irish
landlords. They have very few friends; and if they are encouraged
to strain their rights, and if disorder could justly be put down to
their account, they would have still fewer.
It is quite clear that the intention is to fight the Nationalist
battle on the question of the land during next winter, and it will
be to Parnell’s advantage that there should be as many evictions as
possible. Your best chance is that he will not succeed in inducing
tenants who can pay to risk eviction. But if landlords evict
wholesale tenants who cannot pay, he may succeed in getting up
another very dangerous agitation. I thought, therefore, that this
was to a great extent a question for the Irish Government, and if
they considered a check on eviction necessary I should have been
inclined to grant it. But, as I understand, they think that the
Courts have already a considerable discretion which may be
sufficient, and undoubtedly any concession to Parnell would do harm
unless the evil of resistance is still greater.
I do not think that I misunderstood your action in giving Parnell a
day for discussion of his Bill, though I do not know the exact
reasons for the decision. But I certainly thought that, while you
were quite right to keep your absolute freedom of action in regard
to the Bill, you were not precluded from accepting any part of it
which the Irish Government might on further consideration think
necessary.
I shall always be very glad to communicate with you on
Parliamentary matters when you think it desirable, and can very
well understand the anxiety and responsibility of your position.
Yours very truly,
HARTINGTON.
The Address was disposed of in the first week of September and the House
plunged at once into Supply. Forthwith obstruction became patent and
flagrant. A select, determined and well-organised band, among whom Mr.
Labouchere was the best known, took charge of national interests. They
did not disdain trifles, however small; nor grudge study, however
laborious. It was the last chance of a minority under the unreformed
procedure. No Supply Rule, automatically fixing limits, regulated the
votes. No Closure aided the Minister. The Committee debated to their
hearts’ content, and on after that till they were sick and weary.
Business crawled forward on its belly in the small hours of the morning.
Any attempt on the part of the Leader of the House to accelerate its
passage was met by alternate motions to report progress and to adjourn.
Lord Randolph was teased with mischievous satisfaction upon all the
former manœuvres of the Fourth Party. It was a severe, if
appropriate, expiation. Nothing but imperturbable temper and physical
endurance availed. The Leader of the House was always in his place. He
listened to all the discussions. He defended every detail of the Civil
Service Estimates himself. On warlike stores, on public accounts, on
salaries in the House of Lords, on secret service and town holdings and
polluted rivers, on poor ratepayers and gold coinage, he was found
suave, adroit, and well informed.
‘The Chancellor of the Exchequer,’ observed the _Times_, not always a
friendly critic (September 17), ‘is making great progress in the art of
so answering questions as to keep the House in a good temper. This he
does sometimes by judicious concessions, sometimes by a sly turn of
humour, sometimes by a touch of good-natured irony.’ Indeed, he used
every Parliamentary art and all the resources of his many-sided
character. Sometimes he coaxed and sometimes he complained. Sometimes he
resisted with vehemence only to make surrender an hour or two later more
valued. Once, as has been shown, he appealed earnestly and with success
to the House. Once he rapped out that the tactics of the obstructionists
were ‘not conceived in the public interest,’ and after an angry debate
made a reconciliation with them and secured incidentally some progress.
He knew the House in all its moods. He humoured it and offended it and
soothed it again with practised deliberation. Yet he always appeared to
be its servant. Ministers and Governments were but the respectful
stewards of the public service. Parliament had rights and authority over
them, to which, however capriciously asserted, they must bow: ‘My own
opinion,’ he said when his attention was roughly drawn to a criticism of
the Public Accounts Committee on some departmental practice, ‘is that
the Comptroller and Auditor-General and the Public Accounts Committee,
acting together, ought to be a superior authority to the Treasury; and
that, if they distinctly lay down a rule as to the expenditure of money,
it is the business of the Treasury to acknowledge that authority as
superior to their own.’ The member, Mr. Arthur O’Connor, who had
complained, was so contented with this soft answer that, after
congratulating the Chancellor of the Exchequer ‘upon the breadth of view
with which he always looks at matters of this kind,’ he withdrew his
motion for the reduction of the vote. Thus, inch by inch, Supply crept
forward.
The Irish members watched Lord Randolph hourly. He and they had
obstructed so often together that both sides knew enough of each other’s
ways not to be deceived by blandishments or manœuvres which would
captivate the innocent spectator. Soured and indignant as they were--not
unnaturally--by the turn of events, in their hearts they nourished a
certain secret sympathy for the conqueror. They enjoyed seeing the game
played scientifically, and they realised how different their new
antagonist was from the prosaic authoritarians who chafe the hearts of
Celtic peoples. At last the Estimates were done. ‘It is due to the
Chancellor of the Exchequer,’ said the _Times_ (September 16), ‘to say
that no Leader of the House of Commons in recent years has met
obstruction, open and disguised, with more exemplary patience.’
The general satisfaction of the Conservative party at Lord Randolph’s
management of the House of Commons found expression in much solicitude
for his health. ‘Don’t worry yourself and get knocked up,’ wrote Mr.
Chamberlain (September 1). ‘I do not believe that the Irish will keep
you sweltering very much longer.’ ‘You really must take more care of
yourself,’ Mr. Balfour insisted. ‘Now that the main business of the
Address is got over, I cannot see why you should spend so much time in
your place in the House.’ And Lord Salisbury on the 14th: ‘I am afraid
your work is getting intolerably hard. Don’t sit up too much.’
‘I am particularly commanded,’ said Lord Iddesleigh, writing from
Balmoral on the 16th, ‘by the Queen to say that Her Majesty was greatly
amused by the contents of your box last night. I suppose you won’t
understand this message without the gloss--there was a sprinkling of
tobacco in it.
‘Her Majesty is very sympathetic over the sufferings of our friends in
the House of Commons. You have indeed a very hard task and it is not
very clear how it is to be lightened.’
Only Mr. Parnell’s Bill remained after the Estimates were passed. Two
days (September 20 and 21) were occupied in its discussion. The Bill was
badly drawn. Mr. Gladstone supported it in principle; but was forced to
object to nearly every detail. Lord Hartington was severe in his
condemnation. The Government declared they would have nothing whatever
to do with it. Mr. Morley alone was fortunate in his advocacy. It was
rejected by 297 to 202. Ministers were much advantaged by having
persuaded their opponents to expose themselves to the perils of
constructive policies.
Lord Randolph Churchill ended the session amid golden opinions.
Congratulations and goodwill flowed in upon him from all sides. He
himself was in high spirits. ‘You must find it very hard work,’ said an
admirer, ‘leading the House and at the same time being at the
Exchequer.’ ‘Not half such hard work as it was getting there,’ was the
droll answer. The party newspapers were loud in their praises. All
doubts about his tact and patience were dispersed, and Conservative
members hurried off to the country feeling that a great man had arisen
among them, and that ‘Elijah’s mantle’ had lighted upon no unworthy
shoulders. The Sovereign wrote him an autograph letter of exceptional
favour:--
Balmoral Castle: September 22, 1886.
Now that the session is just over, the Queen wishes to write and
thank Lord Randolph Churchill for his regular and full and
interesting reports of the debates in the House of Commons, which
must have been most trying.
Lord Randolph has shown much skill and judgment in his leadership
during this exceptional session of Parliament.
[Illustration: Balmoral Castle:
Sept: 22, 1886.
Now that the session is just over the Queen wishes to write and thank
Lord Randolph Churchill for his regular and full and interesting reports
of the debates in the House of Commons, which must have been]
[Illustration: most trying. Lord Randolph has shown much skill and
judgment in his leadership during this exceptional session of
Parliament.]
Difficulties abroad were soon added to the difficulties at home. At the
end of August foreign affairs in Eastern Europe were suddenly plunged
into crisis through the kidnapping of Prince Alexander by Bulgarian
officers under Russian influence, and his consequent abdication. The
Chanceries of Europe throbbed with excitement and apprehension. To
Lord Randolph Churchill the news was specially unwelcome. He did not
concern himself too much about Constantinople, and cared nothing at all
for Turkey. The sentiments which had in 1878 induced him to write to Sir
Charles Dilke, offering, if the Liberals would support him, to move a
vote of censure upon Lord Beaconsfield’s foreign policy, were unaltered.
The freedom and independence of the Slav, Bulgarian and Hellenic peoples
seemed to him still a wise and lofty object; but any sympathies which he
had for stifled or struggling nationalities were strictly controlled.
Great Britain should not shrink from her share in the responsibilities
of Europe; but no duty of isolated intervention lay upon her. He had,
moreover, been deeply impressed by the satisfactory manner in which the
Afghan frontier dispute had been settled. He had become much more
hopeful of a good understanding with Russia than when he had first gone
to the India Office. Above all, he was resolved to offer no wanton
provocation which might lead by Russian reprisals in Asia to the
reopening of a question of such grave importance to the tranquillity of
the Indian Empire.
The proceedings of the Foreign Office seriously disquieted him. As early
as September 4 he wrote to Lord Salisbury: ‘I have just read Lord
Iddesleigh’s telegram to Lascelles, telling him to prevent Alexander
from abdicating and to cause him to appeal to the Great Powers. I think
this is very unfair on Alexander. Iddesleigh knows perfectly well that
the Great Powers won’t move a finger, and he knows we cannot act outside
a most Platonic range. I am afraid of our incurring moral
responsibilities towards the Prince and his people which may lead us on
far without previous calculation.... I do most earnestly trust that we
may not be drifting into strong and marked action in the East of Europe.
It will place us in great peril in the House of Commons, politically and
financially.’ And again on the 6th: ‘Iddesleigh’s last telegram to
Lascelles is really _un peu trop fort_. I do think we ought to have an
immediate Cabinet before such messages are sent. I look at the series
together; the two first were startling, but recognised European concert,
which the last altogether flings aside. W. H. Smith concurs strongly
that the Cabinet ought to meet. Any moment it may leak out at Sofia that
we are taking strong action.... Lord John Manners made a remark to me at
4.30 this afternoon symptomatic of surprise that there had been no
Cabinet. As you know I loathe Cabinets, you will feel that this is
disinterested; but I own to being frightened.’ The Prime Minister
consented to summon his colleagues, adding merely that he and Lord
Iddesleigh were agreed as to the policy, but that the Cabinet could
overrule them if it thought fit. The Cabinet, however, cleared the air
and led to better understandings.
Lord Randolph Churchill to Lord Salisbury.
Treasury Chambers, Whitehall, S.W.: September 15, 1886.
Dear Lord Salisbury,--Another desperate night in the H. of C. You
may imagine how bad was the Irish conduct when Beach’s last words
to me were: ‘I am now all for a strong Clôture.’ ...
M. de Staal has just been to see me. He declaimed against White....
I said that in view of our occupation of Egypt it was necessary
that we should have a representative at Constantinople of character
and resolution. He said the Bulgarians had done something or other
rude to the Emperor’s portrait at Sofia. He spoke of the great
difficulty Russia had in coming to an understanding with Austria on
account of the Hungarians, who thought of nothing but ‘49.’ He
tried to ascertain my views as to our interests in the Balkan
territories; my reply was (speaking only for myself) that our chief
interests were Egypt and India, and that anything which affected
our interests in those countries would necessitate very strong
action on our part. Speaking generally, I said that with Ireland on
our hands, our foreign policy, except under great pressure, would
naturally be pacific. He asked about the position of the
Government. I told him that Gladstone was hopelessly out of it, and
was no longer young enough to get into it again; that his principal
supporters were hopelessly discredited and divided; that Hartington
possessed great balancing influence, but could not look to forming
a Government himself; that whether this particular Government
lasted or no, power was with the Conservative party, whose
political organisation and strength were increasing and improving
every day; that such a fact as London returning forty-three
Conservatives against four Gladstonians ought to have great weight
with him in appreciating the Conservative position.
Finally, I hinted at an understanding with Russia by which she
should give us real support in Egypt, abandon her pressure upon
Afghanistan, in which case she might settle the Balkan matters as
she would--or, rather, as she _could_!
Yours most sincerely,
RANDOLPH S. CHURCHILL.
A few days later Lord Salisbury was able to retire to his villa near
Dieppe, although the situation still continued critical and obscure. The
Chancellor of the Exchequer, delighted by Lord Salisbury’s proposal to
change the British Agent at Sofia, seems to have made great efforts to
bring his opinions nearer to those of his chief. On the 23rd he reports
an interview with Count Hatzfeldt. ‘I told him that I had been thinking
much over what had passed between us about the East of Europe, and that
I had come to this conclusion as a member of the House of Commons and
from a House of Commons point of view: Any anti-Russian policy which
involved England taking the lead ostensibly on the side of Turkey,
either about Bulgaria or even Constantinople, would probably place the
Unionist party in great peril, might fail to receive the support of the
constituencies, and would be savagely assaulted. An anti-Russian policy,
however, in which Austria took the lead supported by Germany, we could,
I thought, well fall in with, and hold our own easily in the House of
Commons. He said: ‘That is all very well; but what will be wanting, will
be Germany’s support of Austria. Our eyes are riveted on France.’ I
said, if that was really so, of course we could not play; but that it
occurred to me that it was not impossible that if Germany and Austria
took the lead against Russian advance and in defence of Bulgarian
independence, and we followed and joined loyally and thoroughly, I
thought that would seem to entail logically action on our part,
diplomatic or otherwise, against France if she tried to be nasty. He
seemed much interested by this, and I impressed upon him at parting not
to forget that it must be to Germany’s interest that the Unionist party
and the Government should endure and remain strong; that foreign policy
on our part which followed the lead of Germany and Austria would not try
that strength too high, and might be carried far; but that foreign
policy against Russia in the East of Europe which left the initiative to
England would be a policy too dangerous, seeing the other great
interests we had to defend, for us to contemplate. I told him these were
mere House of Commons views, for his own private information for
whatever they were worth, and that he was not to consider them in any
other light.
‘I don’t know whether you will think this expression shows any change of
views from what I have expressed to you recently. I do not think it does
really....’
‘If Russia attacked Constantinople,’ wrote the Prime Minister in a
letter approving generally of this discourse, ‘and all the other Powers
refused to intervene, I am rather disposed to the idea that we should
have to act in the Dardanelles; but I hope the contingency is too
improbable to require us to trouble about it.’ The Chancellor of the
Exchequer replied meekly that he would be quite agreeable to ‘a
piratical seizure of Gallipoli.’ ‘There is,’ he adds, ‘a practical
flavour about such a step which would commend it to the most Radical and
peace-loving House of Commons.’ Lord Salisbury detected a flavour of
levity in this answer.
‘You are naturally sarcastic,’ he wrote on the 28th, ‘on my Dardanelles,
and I hope the matter will not come up in our time. But the possession
by Russia of Constantinople will be an awkward piece of news for the
Minister who receives it. The prestige effect on the Asiatic populations
will be enormous, and I pity the English party that has this item on
their record. They will share the fate of Lord North’s party.
‘At the same time I know the great military objections there are to the
Dardanelles scheme.’
Further activity at the Foreign Office renewed the correspondence. On
the 30th Lord Randolph wrote again urgently to the Prime Minister:--
I have read with the utmost dismay Iddesleigh’s telegram to
Lascelles instructing him to inform the Bulgarian Government that
our Government approve of the reply sent by them to the Russian
Note.
What is the reason for this apparently isolated and certainly most
risky action? I cannot make out that an opinion was ever asked for
directly, which makes such instructions all the more strange. Have
we any right to express approval in so pointed and uncalled for a
manner, without at the same time letting those poor Bulgarians know
that beyond the merest diplomatic action we cannot go? I thought,
when you told me some days ago that Lascelles was to be changed
that that meant a modification of policy. I see no use in changing
the agent in this case, if the policy to which objection has been
taken is to be even more accentuated.
Why cannot Iddesleigh consider the propriety of trying to act at
Sofia in conjunction with the Austrian, German and Italian
Governments, and, if joint action is for the moment impossible,
abstaining from any action at all? We shall never get joint action
while Iddesleigh keeps rushing in where Bismarck fears to tread.
What I would like to see aimed at would be a Second Berlin
Memorandum--this time addressed, not to Turkey, but to Russia, and
England joining in. But all chance of such a document, which would
imply irresistible forces, fades further and further into the
distance.
Our action with Austria means war with Russia. Our action with
Austria and Germany means peace. But I feel sure that our present
niggling, meddling, intriguing, fussy policy is gaining for us the
contempt and dislike of Bismarck every day. I do pray you to
consider these matters. It was supposed that Lord Iddesleigh would
act under your direction. I feel certain that much that he has done
has been done on his own account. After all, it is very fine for
him now; but the day of trial will come when all this has to be
explained and defended in the House of Commons.
Now I have risked your wrath by inflicting this jeremiad upon you,
but it is the last, for I go abroad Sunday and shall know no more
till I return.
‘Like you,’ replied Lord Salisbury from Puys, on October 1, ‘I am not
happy about foreign affairs, but not entirely for the same reason. I do
not wholly take your view about our attitude towards Russia. I consider
the loss of Constantinople would be the ruin of our party and a heavy
blow to the country: and therefore I am anxious to delay by all means
Russia’s advance to that goal. A pacific and economical policy is up to
a certain point very wise: but it is evident that there is a point
beyond which it is not wise either in a patriotic or party sense--and
the question is where we shall draw the line. I draw it at
Constantinople. My belief is that the main strength of the Tory party,
both in the richer and poorer classes, lies in its association with the
honour of the country. It is quite true that if, in order to save that
honour, we have to run into expense, we shall suffer as a party--that is
human nature. But what I contend is, that we shall suffer as a party
more--much more--if the loss of Constantinople stands on our record....
I am therefore rather uneasy about foreign affairs--for I am afraid you
are prepared to give up Constantinople: and foreign Powers will be quick
enough to find that divergence out. On the other hand I sympathise with
you in some uneasiness as to the course of the Foreign Office. Many
things, I fear, are not done--and I am disquieted at the result ... when
I get back to England I may be able to exert a stronger influence.’
_Lord Randolph Churchill to Lord Salisbury._
Treasury Chambers, Whitehall, S.W.: October 3, 1886.
Dear Lord Salisbury,--I was not able to write yesterday and thank
you for your letter, as I had to go down to Dartford.
You must not think that I in any way disagree from what you urge
about Constantinople. It is only that I have a great doubt whether
the particular method and scheme of policy which was carried out at
the time of the Crimean War, and again to a great extent in
1876-78, is the best. I doubt whether the people will support that
method; and it seems to have this enormous disadvantage, that it
enables Austria to lie back.
We can, I think, perfectly defend Constantinople by going in for
the independence of Bulgaria; and we can best obtain that
independence by persuading Austria to take the lead.
But no doubt the proceedings of Lascelles, and the probable
proceedings at Constantinople of Sir W. White, are more in
accordance with the old policy, which I fear is now impracticable,
than with a modification of that policy.
Please do not suspect me of indifference to a matter on which you
feel so strongly. My only business and object are to bring, in the
best way I can, any policy which you wish carried out into favour
with the House of Commons and the constituencies, so far as it may
be possible for me to influence either. You must remember that you
have not spoken on these matters either in the Lords or the
country, and I am only anxious that you should find a _terrain_
well prepared.
I am off to-morrow night and out of reach of everybody till 23rd.
Lord Randolph Churchill’s speech at Dartford (October 2) was probably
the most important of his life. Upwards of twenty thousand Conservatives
were gathered to receive him. Nearly a hundred addresses from all parts
of the country were presented to him by deputations. The town was bright
with flags by day and fireworks by night. Standing upon an improvised
platform among the picturesque glades of Oakfield Park, and backed by
the solid phalanx of Conservative members which Kent had returned to
Parliament, the Chancellor of the Exchequer unfolded to an audience,
variously computed at from twelve to fourteen thousand persons, the
future legislative programme of the Government. He extolled the loyalty
of the Unionist Liberals. He reiterated the declarations upon Ireland
which he had made to the House of Commons. In order that the Unionist
party might legislate, as he described it, upon ascertained facts and
not, like Mr. Gladstone, by intuition, he recounted the appointment of
the four Royal Commissions on Irish Land, on Irish Development, on
Currency and on Departmental Expenditure. He urged a complete reform of
House of Commons procedure, including the institution of the Closure by
a simple majority. He announced that the Government would introduce a
Bill which should provide facilities, through the operation of local
authorities, for the acquisition by the agricultural labourer of
freehold plots and allotments of land. And in this connection he spoke
gratefully of the pioneer work which Mr. Chamberlain and Mr. Jesse
Collings had performed. He held out the promise of an alteration in the
law of tithe, so that payment should, in the first instance, be demanded
of the landlord; and a threat to remodel railway rates so that the home
producer should not be undercut by the foreigner. He mentioned a Land
Bill for making the transfer of land easy and cheap; a broad
reorganisation of Local Government with a new assessment and application
of local taxation; and finally he said: ‘I will not conceal from you
that my own special object, to which I hope to devote whatever energy
and strength or influence I may possess, is to endeavour to attain some
genuine and considerable reduction of public expenditure and consequent
reduction of taxation. I shall be bitterly disappointed if it is not in
my power after one year, or at any rate after two years, to show to the
public that a very honest and a very earnest effort has been made in
that direction.’ Such was the Tory Democratic programme. Nor should it
be supposed that these were the unauthorised views of a single Minister.
All these legislative projects had received the consent of the Cabinet.
Nearly all have since been passed by Conservative Administrations into
law.
Then the speaker turned to foreign affairs, and here he contrived,
without doing violence to his own convictions, to support faithfully and
effectively in its general tenor Lord Salisbury’s policy: but he used
very different arguments from those which Conservative audiences were
accustomed to applaud.
‘We had every reason to hope,’ he said, ‘that the union of Eastern
Roumelia with Bulgaria under the sovereignty of Prince Alexander would
develop a prosperous and independent nation, in the growing strength of
which might ultimately be found a peaceful and true solution of the
Eastern Question. Those hopes have been for the moment to a great extent
dashed. A brutal and cowardly conspiracy, consummated before the young
community had had time to consolidate itself, was successful in
this--that it paralysed the governing authority of the Prince and
deprived Bulgaria of an honoured and trusted leader. The freedom and
independence of Bulgaria, as well as of the kingdoms of Servia and
Roumania, would appear to be seriously compromised. It has been said by
some, and even by persons of authority and influence, that in the issues
which are involved England has no material interest. Such an assertion
would appear to me to be far too loose and general. The sympathy of
England with liberty and with the freedom and independence of
communities and nationalities, is of ancient origin, and has become the
traditional direction of our foreign policy. The policy based on this
strong sympathy is not so purely sentimental as a careless critic might
suppose. It would be more correct, indeed, to describe such a policy as
particular, and, in a sense, as selfish; for the precious liberties
which we enjoy, and the freedom of Europe from tyranny and despotism,
are in reality indissolubly connected. To England Europe owes much of
her modern popular freedom. It was mainly English effort which rescued
Germany and the Netherlands from the despotism of King Philip of Spain,
and after him from that of Louis XIV. of France. It was English effort
which preserved the liberties of Europe from the desolating tyranny of
Napoleon. In our own times our nation has done much, either by direct
intervention or by energetic moral support, to establish upon firm
foundations the freedom of Italy and of Greece.... A generation ago
Germany and Austria were not so sensitive as they are now to the value
of political liberty. Nor did they appreciate to its full extent the
great stability of institutions which political liberty engenders; and
on England devolved the duty--the honourable but dangerous duty--of
setting an example and of leading the way. Those were the days of Lord
Palmerston; but times have changed, and the freedom and the independence
of the Danubian Principalities and of the Balkan nationalities are a
primary and vital object in the policy of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
Those things being so, it may well be that England can honourably and
safely afford to view with satisfaction that Power whose interests are
most directly and vitally concerned, assuming the foremost part in this
great international work. We must, of course, take it for granted, as I
am doing, that the liberty-giving policy of the Treaty of Berlin will be
carefully and watchfully protected. Whatever modification this great
fact may enable us to make in our foreign policy, whatever diminution of
isolated risk or sole responsibility this may enable us to effect, you
may be certain of one thing--that there will be no sudden or violent
departure by Her Majesty’s present Government from those main principles
of foreign policy which I have before alluded to, and which for nearly
three centuries mark in strong, distinct and clear lines the course of
the British Empire among the nations of the world.
‘There are Powers in Europe who earnestly and honestly desire to avoid
war and to preserve peace, to content themselves with their possessions
and their frontiers and to concentrate their energies on commercial
progress and on domestic development. There are other Powers who do not
appear to be so fortunately situated, and who, from one cause or
another which it is not necessary to analyse or examine, betray from
time to time a regrettable tendency towards contentious and even
aggressive action. It is the duty of any British Government to exhaust
itself in efforts to maintain the best and the most friendly relations
with all foreign States and to lose no opportunity of offering friendly
and conciliatory counsels for the purpose of mitigating national
rivalries and of peacefully solving international disputes. But should
circumstances arise which, from their grave and dangerous nature, should
force the Government of the Queen to make a choice, it cannot be doubted
that the sympathy--and, if necessary, even the support--of England will
be given to those Powers who seek the peace of Europe and the liberty of
peoples, and in whose favour our timely adhesion would probably, and
without the use of force, decide the issue.’
It would be hard to say whether this speech made more stir at home or
abroad. For more than a week the declarations upon British foreign
policy were the chief theme of the Continental press. And in Berlin,
Vienna and Rome they received a measure of welcome which grew as their
phrasing was more carefully examined. Lord Randolph’s outspoken
condemnation of the Bulgarian kidnapping conspiracy was declared to give
a satisfaction to the moral feelings of Christendom which had been
looked for in vain in the late utterances of European statesmen. The
announcement that Great Britain would take her part in the work of
preserving international peace, and that her influence would be
exerted upon the side of the Central Powers--not for the sake of the old
pro-Turkish policy, but in the name of the liberties of the Balkan
peoples--was accepted with the utmost satisfaction in Berlin. The style
of the declaration created an impression of calm authority; and
‘Palmerston Redivivus’ is an expression which repeatedly appears in the
foreign despatches and articles of that time.
[Illustration: _Reprinted by permission of the proprietors of ‘Punch.’_
‘YOUTH ON THE PROW AND PLEASURE AT THE HELM!’
_Punch_, August 14. 1886.]
At home the Conservative party was too much astonished to give vent
immediately to any effective opinion. The party newspapers generally
applauded the proposals and tone of the speech as ‘temperate,
reasonable, and practical.’ The _Times_ observed that the programme in
its scope and fulness ‘recalled the palmy days of Mr. Gladstone.’ The
Opposition, with evident disgust, denounced the Chancellor of the
Exchequer as ‘an unscrupulous opportunist’ who had stolen the policies
of his Radical opponents and had calmly appropriated their famous motto
of ‘Peace, Retrenchment and Reform.’ It was not until some days had
passed that the perplexed anxiety in Tory circles found expression in
grumblings that the Prime Minister was being effaced by his lieutenant.
But even then no sign could be discerned in any quarter of a wish or
intention to repudiate the policy declared.
From all this buzzing, friendly and unfriendly alike, Lord Randolph fled
secretly and silently. For more than a week he was lost to the public
eye. It was rumoured that he had passed through Paris and Berlin on
October 7; but it was not until the 12th that ‘Mr. Spencer,’ an English
tourist, who with his friend Mr. Trafford had been looking at picture
galleries, museums and theatres at Dresden and Prague, was identified
with the orator of Dartford.
Few things were more remarkable in Lord Randolph Churchill’s brief
career than the quickness with which he acquired a European reputation.
All over the Continent he was already regarded as the future master of
English politics. The tension in the East was unrelieved and the
diplomatic skies were grey and shifting. Here was the second personage
in the British Cabinet, fresh from a most important public statement,
travelling _incognito_ through Germany and Austria. What had he done in
his passage through Berlin? Had he a mission to Bismarck? Had he been to
Varzin or not? From this moment his movements were watched with the most
minute and provoking curiosity and the fullest details were telegraphed
to every capital. The press revived memories of Gambetta’s journey to
Frankfort, and perhaps beyond, two years before his death. We learn from
the foreign intelligence of the _Times_ of October 13 that ‘Mr. Spencer’
and Mr. Trafford, ‘the two travellers whose every step is watched by the
European press,’ have been ‘residing at the Imperial Hotel [Vienna]
since yesterday.’ They had been received by a crowd at the station, and
several persons who had seen Lord Randolph Churchill in England had
‘maintained most positively’ that ‘Mr. Spencer’ was identical with the
Chancellor of the Exchequer. We are told that ‘Mr. Spencer’ looked
somewhat fatigued, and retired to rest after telling the landlord ‘in
emphatic terms’ that he had come to Vienna for nobody, and proposed
without exception to receive no one; that he walked about the town both
in the morning and afternoon, and visited among others the shop of Herr
Weidmann ‘where the most exquisite Vienna leather goods are made’; that
in the evening he had heard Millöcker’s operetta ‘The Vice-Admiral’ at
the Theater an der Wien; and that he was everywhere dogged by
journalists, who gave the public elaborate descriptions of his person,
the shape of his hat and the colour of his coat.
‘I am hopelessly discovered,’ wrote Lord Randolph to his wife (October
12). ‘At the station yesterday I found a whole army of reporters, at
whom I scowled in my most effective manner. Really it is almost
intolerable that one cannot travel about without this publicity. How
absurd the English papers are! Anything equal to the lies of the _Daily
News_ and _Pall Mall_ I never read: that _Pall Mall_ is most
mischievous.... W. H. Smith is here, and we had a long talk last night.
I have got him to go and see Paget--who wanted me to go and dine with
him--and tell him that as I saw no one at Berlin I did not wish to see
anyone here. The reporters have been besieging the hotel this morning,
but I have sent them all away without a word. The weather is fine and
bright, though there is an autumn chill in the air.... This pottering
about Europe _de ville en ville_ suits me down to the ground, if it
were not for the beastly newspapers.’
His holiday was a short one. On his way back through Paris he had an
interview which would certainly have interested those curious folk who
had pried so zealously upon his unguarded leisure:--
_Lord Randolph Churchill to Lord Iddesleigh._
Hôtel Bristol, Paris: October 19, 1886.
Dear Lord Iddesleigh,--This morning Count d’Aunay called upon me. I
think, from what he said, that he had been sent by Freycinet, I
used to know D’Aunay very well when he was in London. I left him to
begin what he had to say, and kept talking about _la pluie et le
beau temps_. At last he rapped it out. He said the Egyptian
Question was going to be ‘re-awakened.’
I asked what question.
He said the reorganisation of the administration, the tribunals,
the customs, the army.
I said I did not see that any of these pressed; that Wolff and
Mukhtar had got to make their report, which would take some time to
consider; that, in the meantime, everything was going on quietly;
that the country was progressing; that the payment of the coupon in
full would be resumed next year; and that I could not conceive what
object there was in raising the Egyptian Question in a critical
manner now.
He said that the French were most desirous to co-operate with
England in the re-establishment of Egypt; that they wished to be
perfect friends with us, but that M. de Freycinet felt that Egypt
was a continual _pierre d’achoppement_, and that there would always
be great difficulties until it was got out of the way; that public
opinion in France was now much agitated on the question; that they
suspected we meant to take Egypt altogether; and that they must
know what we intended to do about retiring.
I replied that it was impossible to reconcile this great desire on
M. de Freycinet’s part for friendship with the tone of the French
Press on the proceedings of French agents at Constantinople; but
that, in any case, of this he might be certain--that these things
did not influence our policy in the least; that we did not intend
to retire from Egypt until a stable Government had been constituted
there, able to maintain itself and to pay its way; and that we
should not ‘budge an inch’ from that resolution _pour quoi que ce
soit, ni pour qui que ce soit_; that the work would take a long
time, perhaps three years, perhaps five years, or perhaps ten
years, or longer; but that till it was done our occupation of Egypt
would continue.
He appeared much pained and upset by this, and argued for a long
time that we could do nothing in Egypt on any question without
French assistance.
I said we were most anxious for French assistance, although up to
now we had managed to rub along without it; but that if there was
to be any understanding for the solution of Egyptian questions
between the two Governments, it must be upon the basis of our
continued occupation of Egypt until certain definite and practical
results were obtained which would be a reward to us for all the
loss of money, men, time and trouble which our occupation had
entailed on us.
He said we ought to fix a date for evacuation; that that would
remove all suspicion of bad faith; that the French were obliged to
press the point on account of their enormous interests and their
numerous colony; that in the time of the ‘condominium’ they had
occupied a perfectly satisfactory position, which they wished to
regain.
I reminded him that they had deliberately abdicated that position
when M. de Freycinet was Minister before; that they had left us all
the trouble and all the danger, and that they must accept the
logical results of that policy; that I saw no good in fixing a
date for evacuation; that I did not think such a step would be
honest, as we might not be able to abide by our pledge; that it was
much better to define the work which had to be done, and to adjourn
all questions of retirement until the completion of the work.
He went on pressing about the date in a curiously imploring manner.
He said that it might be _aussi éloigné que vous voulez_, but that
if we would only fix a date M. de Freycinet _sera parfaitement
satisfait_, that he would work loyally with us, and that all would
go differently.
I then said that this question of the date, to which he evidently
attached so much importance, was a new one to me; that I could not
tell what your opinions were, nor Lord Salisbury’s; that personally
I saw immense and insuperable objections to such a course; that it
would really introduce a new element of uncertainty, and probably
lead to great trouble. In conclusion, I entreated him not to be
under any illusion as to our determination to remain in Egypt and
to pursue our work there steadily; that the present Government,
unlike Mr. Gladstone’s, was very strong in Parliament, and would
not yield to pressure; and that, till the French thoroughly grasped
this fact, they would fail to understand the A B C of the Egyptian
Question.
He said he should tell M. de Freycinet all I had said. He asked me
if I wished to see M. de Freycinet, to which I replied in the
negative.
I thought you would wish to know all this, and I hope you will
approve of what I said. I return to town on Tuesday.
Yours very truly,
RANDOLPH S. CHURCHILL.
‘You seem to have defended the pass well, and the position you hold is a
sound one,’ replied Lord Iddesleigh in a letter which appears to be the
last that passed between them.
Short as his absence from England had been, Lord Randolph found some
difficulties aggravated on his return. The orthodox portions of the
Conservative party had become articulate. Mr. Chaplin was denouncing the
Closure by a simple majority as unconstitutional and improper. The
_Times_ had made up its mind against such a change, which it regarded as
‘irreconcilably at variance with the fundamental principle of freedom of
debate.’ It expressed itself anxious to know what would have been the
opinion of the former leader of the Fourth Party on the proposals of the
new Chancellor of the Exchequer. The ‘Dartford programme,’ as the
principles and measures expounded in Kent had already come to be called,
notwithstanding the full approval which it had previously received from
the Cabinet, had been exposed to various attacks in quarters usually
believed to derive their information from official sources. The Carlton
Club was reported to be vexed and sulky. Everywhere the question was
asked: What would the Chancellor of the Exchequer say to the conference
of Conservative Associations at Bradford? Would he be discovered in
retreat or standing to his guns? Would he enlarge upon the Dartford
programme or would he explain it away?
The conference met at Bradford on October 26. Lord Randolph made three
speeches during the day. At the evening meeting he said he was very
sorry he had made the Dartford speech. ‘If I had not made it at Dartford
three weeks ago, I might have made it here to-night.’ He stood to the
policy then declared in every detail. He welcomed Mr. Jesse Collings as
an ally in the Allotments Bill. He asserted that Closure by a simple
majority was the ‘motor muscle’[56] of any reform in Parliamentary
Procedure. He ridiculed the complaints of the Liberal party. ‘All they
can do apparently is to exclaim with impotent rage, “How unfair! how
shameful! how unprincipled! You have stolen our programme.” Why “their
programme,” I should like to know? Since 1880 they have been in office,
and they did not make an attempt to carry out a single item. They tell
us that the programme I sketched at Dartford is a Radical programme;
that the Tory party have turned their coats and abandoned their
principles and adopted the principles of the Radical party; and
quantities of sentences of that kind and of equal stupidity. All I know
about the programme of policy, foreign and domestic, which I endeavoured
to outline at Dartford three weeks ago is this--that it was a mere
repetition of the programme of Lord Salisbury at Newport in 1885. All I
know about my speech at Dartford which I can say in reply to what I am
told as to its being a total adoption of Radical principles and measures
is this--that it was a mere reiteration and elaboration of the Queen’s
Speech of January last, when Lord Salisbury’s first Government was in
office, and of the speeches of the Ministers who supported the policy
which was contained in that speech.’
These statements were greeted by the loud and continuous acclamations of
an audience of Conservative delegates representing, it was calculated,
fully a million and a half electors.
This determined speech and its thunderous endorsement silenced for the
moment all hostile criticism. Some of Lord Randolph’s colleagues
expressed to him their disapproval of the attacks upon him from within
the Conservative ranks. Others assured him of their agreement. Even the
Lord Chancellor was satisfied. ‘I have just finished reading your speech
at Bradford,’ he wrote (October 27). ‘There is not a word that is not
sound, good Toryism--aye, and old Toryism, too. The truth is that the
enemy have been so long dressing up a lay figure which they have
invested with their notions of what a Tory ought to be, that they do not
recognise the genuine article when they see it.’
It is a pity not to end the story here. Lord Randolph Churchill seems at
this time to have been separated only by a single step from a career of
dazzling prosperity and fame. With a swiftness which in modern
Parliamentary history had been excelled only by the younger Pitt, he had
risen by no man’s leave or monarch’s favour from the station of a
private gentleman to almost the first position under the Crown. Upon the
Continent he was already regarded as the future master of English
politics. His popularity among the people was unsurpassed. He was
steadily gaining the confidence of the Sovereign and the respect and
admiration of the most serious and enlightened men of his day. His
natural gifts were still ripening and his mind expanding. The House of
Commons had responded instinctively to the leadership of ‘a great member
of Parliament.’ Alike in the glare and clatter of the platform and in
the silent diligence of a public department he was found equal to all
the varied tasks which are laid upon an English Minister. If he were
thus armed and equipped at thirty-seven, what would he be at fifty? Who
could have guessed that ruin, utter and irretrievable, was marching
swiftly upon this triumphant figure; that the great party who had
followed his lead so blithely, would in a few brief months turn upon him
in abiding displeasure; and that the Parliament which had assembled to
find him so powerful and to accept his guidance, would watch him creep
away in sadness and alone?
Still, for an interval the sun shone fair. The clouds were parted to the
right and to the left, and there stepped into the centre of the world’s
affairs--amid the acclamations of the multitude and in the hush of
European attention--the Grand Young Man.
CHAPTER XV
THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER
‘Those who live to the future most always appear selfish to those
who live to the present.’--EMERSON.
At the Treasury the appointment of the new Chancellor of the Exchequer
had been received with no little apprehension. Every great department
has an atmosphere and identity of its own. No politician, however
popular in the country or influential in Parliament, can afford to be
indifferent to the opinion formed of him by the Civil Servants through
whom and by whom he works. Concealed from the public eye among the
deeper recesses of Whitehall, seeking no fame, clad with the special
knowledge of life-long study, armed with the secrets of a dozen
Cabinets, the slaves of the Lamp or of the Ring render faithful and
obedient service to whomsoever holds the talisman. Whatever task be set,
wise or foolish, virtuous or evil, as they are commanded, so they do.
Yet their silent judgments of their masters and their projects do not
pass unheeded. Although the spell still works, it loses half its potency
if these spirits are offended or alarmed; and padded walls of
innumerable objections, backed by the masonry of unanswerable argument,
restrain the irreverent or unworthy from the fullest exercise of the
powers they may have won by force or favour.
Over all public departments the department of finance is supreme.
Erected upon the vital springs of national prosperity, wielding the
mysterious power of the purse, the final arbiter in the disputes of
every other office, a good fairy or a perverse devil, as ‘My Lords’ may
choose, to every imaginative Secretary of State, the Treasury occupies
in the polity of the United Kingdom a central and superior position. No
school of thought is so strong or so enduring as that founded on the
great traditions of Gladstonian and Peelite finance. Reckless Ministers
are protected against themselves, violent Ministers are tamed, timid
Ministers are supported and nursed. Few, if any, are insensible to the
influences by which they are surrounded. Streams of detailed knowledge,
logic and experience wash away fiscal and financial heresies; and a
baptism of economic truth inspires the convert not merely with the
principles of a saint but--too often--with the courage of a martyr.
To many who had spent their lives at the Treasury, Lord Randolph’s
arrival was a shock. They regarded him, we are told, as ‘an impossible
man,’ as ‘one whose breath was agitation, and whose life a storm upon
which he rode.’[57] They had instinctively resented the assaults he had
delivered against Mr. Gladstone, ‘the best friend the Civil Service ever
had.’ They remembered that, not long before, Lord Randolph had made
himself the mouthpiece of a harsh attack upon one of their number. He
was known to have expressed privately a candid opinion that they were ‘a
knot of damned Gladstonians.’ Lastly, they had read his Fair Trade
speeches; and, notwithstanding the reputation he had made at the India
Office as a departmental chief, he still appeared in the eyes of
Treasury officials as a Minister who would ride roughshod over their
habits and violate all their most cherished financial canons.
This mood was short-lived. The disquieted officials found a Minister
assiduous and thorough in work and scrupulously patient and quiet in
discussion. He possessed the very rare gift of keeping his mind
exclusively devoted to the subject in hand, and impressed on all those
with whom he worked the idea that the business on which they were
employed was the only one of interest to him. No time spent with the
Chancellor of the Exchequer was ever wasted. No interruption of any sort
was suffered. No one ever left his room after an interview without
having at any rate gained a clear knowledge of his views and intentions.
Around all played an old-fashioned ceremony of manner, oddly mingled
with a sparkle of pure fun, which charmed everybody. In a month the
conquest was complete. Every official worked with enthusiasm in his
service and all their mines of information were laid open to his hand.
It has often been said that Lord Randolph won his popularity among
permanent officials by his subservience to their views. This is by no
means true. If he cast away altogether as vicious and unpractical the
Fair Trade opinions which he had urged, and which commanded so much
support among the Tory democracy, it will also be seen that he was able
to enlist the interest and positive support of his subordinates in
schemes far outside the orthodoxy of the official mind. His stay at the
Treasury was short; but his memory was long respected. He left behind
him golden opinions and dearly treasured reminiscences. He took away
with him friendships which lasted him his life.
‘Our anxiety,’ wrote Lord Welby in 1896, ‘as to our new chief was soon
dispelled. He met us from the outset with perfect frankness, which soon
became cordiality; and I cannot recall a word or a line of his during
his autumn office which I should have wished unspoken or unwritten. Not
that he was an easy or an unexacting chief. He expected subjects to be
laid before him fully, clearly and intelligently; and he was keen to
mark default. He was, in short, a Minister of the type that Civil
Servants appreciate. He ruled as well as reigned. He had a mind, and
made it up; a policy, and enforced it. He was quick in acquiring
information, quick in seizing the real point, quick in understanding
what one wished to convey to him, impatient in small matters and details
and contemptuous if one troubled him with them. Above all, he was
accessible; ready and willing to hear what one had to say, whether it
accorded with his own views or not. Doing business with him was most
interesting. Not being a respecter of persons he criticised freely and
pointedly men and matters.... In “chaff” he was unsurpassed. He was
singularly free from affectation of knowledge he did not possess. Could
one fail to take an interest in a chief “who always showed us sport”?’
Many tales of Lord Randolph in these days have been preserved. We have a
glimpse of his first meeting with a rather dismayed subordinate in the
historical Board Room at the Treasury--the stiff and formal cut of his
frock-coat, the long amber cigarette-holder, so soon produced, the
eternal cigarette, and ‘an old-world courtesy of manner’ which surprised
and disarmed a preconceived dislike. We see him going down to the City
with Sir Edward Hamilton to lunch formally with the Governor and
Directors of the Bank of England and hovering for half an hour outside
in a panic of nervousness which robbed him for the time of his
self-confidence. We see him once, and once only, when the Court of
Exchequer, presided over by its Chancellor, settles the list from which
Sheriffs are selected, in his robes of office--those imposing and
expensive robes which seem to assert the opulence which should result
from thrift, rather than thrift itself. His cynicism was disarming. We
are told how, when the dreadful subject of bimetallism cropped up, he
turned to Sir Arthur Godley and said: ‘I forget. Was I a bimetallist
when I was at the India Office?’ When he received an influential
deputation of sugar-refiners and sugar-planters in protest against the
foreign Sugar Bounties, he created general consternation by inquiring,
with immense gravity, ‘Are the consumers represented upon this
deputation?’ We are even told how he complained to a clerk who put some
figures before him that they were not clear and he could not understand
them. The clerk said that he had done his best, and, pointing them out,
explained that he had reduced them to decimals. ‘Oh,’ said Lord
Randolph, ‘I never could make out what those damned dots meant.’ But
this was surely only to tease.
[Illustration: _Reproduced by permission of the proprietors of ‘Punch.’_
BELLEROPHON JUNIOR.
‘I THINK THIS’LL FETCH ’EM!!’
‘The Chancellor of the Exchequer states to the Board that Her Majesty’s
advisers desire to satisfy themselves that the clerical establishments
of the Civil Service, of the Naval and Military Departments, and also of
the Revenue Departments, are organised generally upon a principle which
secures efficiency without undue cost to the public.’--_Treasury
Minute_, Sept. 14.
_Punch_, September 25, 1886]
From the very commencement of his career at the Treasury Lord Randolph
began the exertions for economy to which he felt himself bound by his
electoral pledges. In his private affairs he was usually extravagant and
often unbusiness-like; but public money seemed to him a sacred trust.
The character and extent of Treasury control over expenditure is very
often misunderstood. It is represented sometimes almost as a statutory
or constitutional power over the other departments. Such an idea is a
complete delusion. The Chancellor of the Exchequer is able to exert his
influence in two ways: first, over administration. In small matters not
connected with policy, the Treasury acts upon a set of well-defined
rules and principles, which the spending departments recognise and
endeavour not to infringe and which are enforced more or less strictly,
according to the relative authority of the Chancellor of the Exchequer
and the other Ministers concerned. Secondly, there is the wide domain of
policy; and in all great matters the control of the Treasury is neither
more nor less than the personal influence of the Chancellor of the
Exchequer upon the Cabinet. Of Lord Randolph’s attempt to assert that
influence the next chapter must give some account; but in the meanwhile
he laboured with industrious severity to effect administrative
economies. On September 14 a Treasury Minute announced the appointment
of a Royal Commission to inquire into the establishment and organisation
of the great spending departments: ‘The Chancellor of the Exchequer
states to the Board that Her Majesty’s advisers desire to satisfy
themselves that the clerical establishments of the Civil Service, of the
Naval and Military Departments and also of the Revenue Department, are
organised generally upon a principle to secure efficiency without undue
cost to the revenue.’ A variety of petty economies were effected by his
personal authority. He discovered, among other things, that Government
specie had to be conveyed in merchant ships, at much expense, because an
old custom entitled naval officers to a high percentage. His indignation
at hearing that Her Majesty’s gold could not be conveyed in Her
Majesty’s ships because of claims by Her Majesty’s officers led to
immediate action, and the practice was reformed forthwith.
A remark by the Comptroller and Auditor-General in one of his reports to
Parliament drew his attention to another abuse. Of old times sums were
issued out of the Civil List to the Secretary of the Treasury for secret
service. No public account was rendered of the money thus expended. In
1783, many evils being alleged, Parliament, under the influence of
Burke, was persuaded to limit this grant to 10,000_l._ a year; and that
amount was yearly issued to the Secretary of the Treasury from 1783 to
1886. This branch of secret service was, of course, political and was
quite distinct from that which is ordinarily known as foreign secret
service. The money was used for the purposes of political organisation
by the party which happened to be in power. Such a custom could not on
any valid ground be defended. Yet for over a century the grant had never
been seriously questioned. It might have been urged that the Liberals
had always profited by this sum during their long period of power and
that many famous men had assumed responsibility for it. Lord Randolph
brushed such wire-puller’s arguments aside. Before he had been in office
a month he introduced a Bill, which passed rapidly through Parliament,
abolishing this payment altogether, and it has never since been renewed.
Until 1886 there had existed an octroi duty on coal coming into the
Metropolis, the proceeds of which were divided between the City and the
Metropolitan Board of Works. The principle of this duty was not
unpleasing to the Conservative party. Its abolition was roundly
denounced by the _Standard_ and in high Tory circles. The Metropolitan
authorities were glad to get money in an easy and painless manner.
Powerful interests objected to a rise in the rates, while the abolition
of a duty upon a necessary of life which affected the poor consumer, did
not elicit much enthusiastic support. Lord Randolph took some time to
make up his mind. He decided that an octroi duty was out of date, that
it was a survival of a financial policy that had been emphatically
condemned. He declined to countenance its renewal. His speech to the
deputation may be read with profit by any who care to see the arguments
against such an octroi put tersely, forcibly and without reserve. His
impressions at the Treasury seem to have stimulated his mind to great
activity and to have aroused in him a keen financial instinct. All sorts
of plans were being moved forward by his agency towards and into the
sphere of political action. He contemplated the purchase of Irish
Railways by the State and their use as an instrument of economic
development and of political and strategic control; and Lord Salisbury
himself seems to have been persuaded by his arguments. He paid the
closest attention to the coinage, and harboured a deadly design against
the half-sovereign--‘that profligate little coin’--which he believed was
an expensive and unnecessary feature of British currency. But there was
one great scheme which overshadowed all the rest.
Parliament had no sooner risen than Lord Randolph turned to the
preparation of his Budget. He knew that the duties of leadership in the
next Session would demand his whole attention and physical strength;
and, in spite of the labours of the memorable year, 1886, he succeeded,
by what Sir Algernon West has described as ‘a performance never
equalled,’ in getting ready and laying before the Cabinet his financial
proposals for the year 1887-8. For nearly twenty years his projects have
been veiled in mystery. The silence of the Treasury has remained
unbroken. The few high officials who were admitted to his confidence and
whose sympathy was enlisted in his plans, have kept their own counsel.
Lord Randolph did not choose in any public speech to reveal what he had
purposed. He is the only Chancellor of the Exchequer who never
introduced a Budget; and in his lifetime rumour alone asserted that he
had ever formed one. The time has now come when the abandoned Budget of
1887-8 may be fully unfolded in the form in which, during November,
1886, it received the provisional assent of Lord Salisbury’s Cabinet.
The reader who has accustomed himself to the giant Budgets of modern
times must turn his mind and contract his fancy to the humbler figures
of a vanished age. The cost of governing the United Kingdom and of
providing for the defence of the Empire during the early ‘eighties
fluctuated between eighty and ninety millions a year. This was in itself
a distinct increase on the estimates of Lord Beaconsfield’s
Administration; and Tory speakers were wont to dwell with genial malice
upon the fact. The various wars which had disturbed Mr. Gladstone’s rule
had left their marks upon the economy of the Army. The money raised by
the Vote of Credit in 1885 had been scattered with a lavish hand, and
prominent men in both parties were concerned to notice some apparent
relaxation in the strictness of Treasury control. Few, indeed, thought
so seriously of the future as Lord Randolph Churchill, and his
prediction that a ‘Hundred-million Budget’ would be an event of the
future was generally regarded as unduly pessimistic. But nevertheless
the times were not unfavourable to retrenchment, and there was a healthy
demand for departmental reform. With estimates standing at under ninety
millions small economies were not disdained. The Ministers of those days
had not learned to expand their view of the public resources. A saving
of a hundred thousand pounds was regarded as a matter of legitimate
congratulation. A reduction of a million was an achievement.
Yet at the same time the narrow scrutiny to which expenditure had been
so long subjected and the habitual reluctance of statesmen to enlarge
its bounds, left no very obvious opportunities to the new Chancellor.
The field had, except for some small patches, been well and thriftily
gleaned. Nor did it seem at first sight that the system of taxation
which had for five years received Mr. Gladstone’s approval would readily
lend itself to striking or sensational treatment.
On the other hand, however, more than one great tendency to change was
apparent. The whole question of the Sinking Fund was ripe for
reconsideration. The remodelling of the death duties thrust itself
before every Chancellor each succeeding year. Above all, the inevitable
and swiftly approaching departure in Local Government, involving as it
did a complete readjustment of national and local finance and the
transference of large responsibilities and resource from Whitehall to
the County and Borough Councils, required a strong and daring mind at
the Treasury.
Certainly Lord Randolph Churchill’s plan did not err on the side of
timidity. He contemplated nothing less than a complete reconstruction of
the revenue. The general rate of expenditure and the whole condition of
the National Debt were examined anew by a searching and audacious eye.
Hardly a single tax was left untouched. The death duties, the house
duties, the stamp duties, the wine duties, were all the subject of
reform. Immense reductions were proposed in existing taxes. Numerous new
taxes were devised. All these changes were not a mere meddlesome and
vexatious shifting of burdens from one shoulder to the other. They were
each and all essential parts in a vast financial revolution.
The first object of the Chancellor of the Exchequer was to effect a
large and substantial reduction in taxation. He desired especially to
diminish those taxes which fell upon the lower middle class. He laboured
to transfer the burdens, so far as possible, from comforts to luxuries
and from necessaries to pleasures. He applied much more closely than his
predecessors that fundamental principle of democratic finance--the
adjusting of taxation to the citizen’s ability to pay. His second object
was to provide a much larger sum of money for the needs of local bodies,
so that the impending measure of Local Government might be wide and real
in its character. His third object was to effect a certain definite
economy in the annual expenditure.
The estimates with which he was confronted amounted to 90,400,000_l._
The income which the existing taxes were expected to yield was
90,000,000_l._ The Chancellor of the Exchequer proposed to augment his
income by extra taxation aggregating 4,500,000_l._--namely, by an
increase in the death duties of 1,400,000_l._, and in the house duties
of 1,500,000_l._; by extra stamps to yield 284,000_l._; and by a wider
application of corporation duty, worth 315,000_l._; by the revival of a
tax on horses to produce 500,000_l._; by an increased tax on wine to
produce 250,000_l._; and by certain minor taxes, to be considered later,
which were estimated to produce 300,000_l._ He proposed to diminish his
expenditure by withholding the 2,600,000_l._ local grants-in-aid, for
which a new provision was to be made; by a reduction in the charge for
the debt of 4,500,000_l._; and by a direct economy of 1,300,000_l._ He
had, therefore, raised his income to 94,500,000_l._, and reduced his
expenses to 82,000,000_l._, thus becoming possessed of a surplus income
over expenditure of 12,500,000_l._ This surplus he intended to
distribute variously. 5,000,000_l._ were to be available for the
purposes of Local Government, in lieu of the old grants-in-aid of
2,600,000_l._ The indirect taxpayer was to be relieved by a reduction of
the tea duties from 6_d._ to 4_d._, costing the revenue 1,400,000_l._;
and by a reduction of 4_d._ in the tobacco tax, costing 500,000_l._ The
income-tax payer received the greatest advantage, for by a remission,
costing no less than 4,870,000_l._, the rate of the income-tax was to be
lowered from 8_d._ in the pound, at which it stood in 1886, to 5_d._ in
1887. These outgoings together aggregated 11,770,000_l._, and the
Treasury was left with a final surplus of 730,000_l._
These proposals require to be more closely examined. The principal
feature of the new taxation was the re-grading and increase of the death
and house duties. The death duties in force in 1886-7 were four in
number--namely: (1) Probate duty upon the _personal_ property passing on
the death of any person, irrespective of destination; (2) the account
duty, imposed since 1881 chiefly as a preventive to evasion of probate
duty, and chargeable in respect of personalty included in voluntary
settlements--death-bed gifts, &c.; (3) the legacy duty, upon benefit
derived by the successor to _personal_ property of the deceased at rates
according to consanguinity; and (4) the succession duty, upon benefit
derived by the successor to settled personalty and to the _real_
property of the deceased, also at rates depending on consanguinity,
chargeable, however, on the life interest and not on the capital value.
Lord Randolph Churchill approached this complicated system of taxation
with the double object of obtaining a larger revenue by a simpler
method. He wanted more money and less machinery, fewer taxes and an
increased return. His early inquiries at Somerset House and the
discussion of the first suggestions which, coming fresh to the subject,
he
[Illustration:
Expenditure
90. 400 000
deduct 2. 600 000 lord grants in
4. 500 000 charge for do
1. 300 000 diminished
-------------
82. 000 000
Surplus income over expenditure
12. 500,000
liquor licenses
remit to local bodies 5. 000 000 other ---
3d. income tax 4. 870 000 [words illegible]
2d. off. tea duties 1. 400 000
4d. --tobacco-- 500 000
-------------
11 770 000]
[Illustration:
Budget (Facsimile).
Income
90. 000 000
add
Extra taxation
1. 400 000 death duties
1. 500 000 House duties
204 000 extra stamps
315 000 Corporation duty
500 000 horses
300 000 Sundries
250 000 wine
-----------------
94 500 000.
12 500 000
11 770 000
-----------
730 000 Surplus income.]
put forward, served to convince him that a higher symmetry and
co-ordination were required. He saw that any scheme which involved four
or five different duties, and which attempted to deal with _personal_
estate by means of a graduated _ad valorem_ tax on the estate as a
whole, and later with _real_ estate by means of consanguinity on
individual benefits, would not bear controversial examination. The death
duties had grown up in a series of successive expedients. They were an
admitted patchwork, but a patchwork to which the House of Commons had
become accustomed. So long as they were left untouched, their anomalies
and entanglements would be tolerated, or even admired; but if they were
to be remodelled, re-graded and, above all, increased, they would have
to stand fire, their whole structure would be criticised, and a new plan
would be damned because it resembled an old plan long respected. The
Chancellor of the Exchequer, therefore, began next to inquire as to the
‘possible effect of a graduated _ad valorem_ tax on _real_ estate
corresponding to the graduated tax on _personal_ estate,’ and his mind
was soon determined in favour of such an assimilation of the death
duties on the two classes of property. The method by which to achieve
this object involved, of course, the whole question of graduation.
Should graduation be regulated by the total mass of property passing by
any one death, whether composed of realty or personalty; or partly of
one and partly of the other; or should it be governed by the total
benefit received by an individual on succession, whether out of realty
or personalty, or both combined? Should the rate of duty depend upon the
total wealth of the testator or upon the respective windfalls of the
heirs? These questions have been long and fiercely debated. The Childers
Budget of the year before had aimed at an equalisation of the death
duties on _real_ and _personal_ property by means of an extension of the
account duty, but it contained no element of graduation. The rate of
duty was to be the same for large properties as for small (except very
small) estates, and was to apply equally to realty as to personalty.
Lord Randolph did not adopt this idea. His scheme was to graduate the
duty according to the value of the individual succession. What the
living man got, not what the dead man left, was to be the unit of
graduation.
If, for example, by the death of A., X. took 2,000_l._ _personalty_ and
3,000_l._ _realty_, Lord Randolph would have combined the two, and have
applied the rate (say, 3 per cent.) levied on a succession of 5,000_l._
If by the same death Y. took 20,000_l._ _personalty_ and 30,000_l._
_realty_, Lord Randolph would have applied the rate (say, 6 per cent.)
for a succession of 50,000_l._; and so on, always graduating the rate
according to any one person’s succession; so that the successor to a
small benefit would pay a low rate of duty, and the successor to a large
benefit a high rate of duty. In short, Lord Randolph was for a graduated
succession duty instead of a graduated estate duty. The Finance Act of
1894 has asserted and established the opposite principle. Sir William
Harcourt looked simply at what a dead man left or liberated, and on the
aggregate of that amount the graduation now in force depends. Thus it
may very well happen, and often does happen, that a successor to a small
benefit--perhaps a succession worth no more than 500_l._--pays the
highest rate (8 per cent.) of estate duty; because his succession is
part of an aggregate estate worth one million. The principle which
governs the Finance Act of 1894 was laid very plainly before Lord
Randolph in 1886. But he rejected it in favour of the graduation on the
individual succession, saying, after one long discussion at Somerset
House, ‘My instinct tells me that it is wrong.’ It is curious that his
instinct, whether right or wrong on the technical question, anticipated
the principal objections which Mr. Balfour and Mr. Chamberlain urged
against Sir William Harcourt’s Bill, and indicated the line of principle
to which the whole Conservative party was subsequently committed.
This choice being made, the Chancellor of the Exchequer turned his
attention to the principle of consanguinity. Why should graduation be
regulated by kinship? Does not kinship find its adequate expression in
the dispositions made by the testator? Does not the testator naturally
select his wife and children as the objects of his bounty in preference
to relations of remoter degree? Why should the State complicate its
affairs by recognising the principle of consanguinity in a taxing
statute? Lord Randolph Churchill therefore proposed to discard the
principle of consanguinity altogether. All existing duties on
properties of whatever kind, passing by death after a given date, and in
dispositions taking effect after that date, were to be swept away. Real
property was to be placed on the same footing as personalty, and
chargeable no longer on life interest, but on capital value. The one
graduated succession duty, graduated on amount of benefit received and
not depending at all upon consanguinity, was to replace them all. The
old probate, account, legacy, inventory (Scotland) and succession duties
were to be left to work themselves out by lapse of time, that process
being accelerated by a liberal system of discounts.
It is, perhaps, of some interest to contrast this scheme with that which
now holds the field. We now enjoy a duty called ‘estate duty’; an extra
duty, levied in certain circumstances on settled property, called
‘settlement estate duty’; and, finally, the legacy and succession
duties, depending on the consanguinity existing between the donor and
the donee. We now assert the vicious principle of taxing property
instead of persons. We try to tax the dead instead of the living. The
State refuses to consider for purposes of graduation anything so
personal as the sacrifice of the heirs, and bases itself on the mass of
the inheritance. Conjoined with this in utter contradiction we have a
cumbrous and elaborate recognition of such a purely personal and private
principle as consanguinity.
Lord Randolph would have replaced these four or five duties of great
complexity by one intelligible tax. He would have substituted one Act
of Parliament for thirty or forty. He would have secured a far greater
flexibility in case further increases of direct taxation were necessary.
A vast simplification of the accounts required would have notably
diminished the expenses of lawyers, valuers, accountants and actuaries,
now attendant on the payment of death duties. The just complaint of the
small inheritor from a great estate would have been prevented; and for
various illogical or contradictory methods the one simple principle
would have been erected, that taxation should be proportioned to ability
to pay and to benefit received. The increase which Lord Randolph
contemplated in the death duties would have been unpopular with the
Conservative party. He was informed that the estate of nearly every
member of the House of Lords would have been prejudicially affected
thereby. But, in view of what befell in 1894, it is clear that wealthy
people would not have been in the long run the losers by an early
settlement.
The tax upon inhabited houses was respectably ancient in its origin. It
had been first imposed in 1696, and had continued at various rates till
1834. Repealed in 1834, it was reimposed in 1851 by Sir Charles Wood on
the abandonment of the duty on windows, and at the rate of 6_d._ for
shops, beer-houses and farmhouses, and 9_d._ for dwelling-houses (those
under 20_l._ annual value being exempt), it yielded in the financial
year 1885-6 1,867,377_l._ to the revenue. Lord Randolph proposed to
repeal the existing Act, thus cutting away the many important
exemptions it contained, and by a new Act to restore the house duty to
what it formerly was--namely, a tax on all houses inhabited either by
day or night. He intended to revert to the old principle of graduation,
to the old definition of an inhabited house and to the old lowest limit
of taxable value. The new Act would further have repealed the provision
in the law under which only one acre was to be included with the house
for purposes of valuation--excepting the case of agricultural lands
attached to farmhouses. Mills and warehouses used for storing goods were
to be exempt; but it was provided that any person on the register of
voters in respect of the occupation of a tenement should be liable to
assessment for that tenement or part of a building; including even all
who were entitled to vote under the service franchise as occupiers of
apartments in Militia or other barracks. The scale of duty was lower for
shops than for private houses, and progressed rapidly as the value
increased. Value under 20_l._: shops, 3_d._; cottages, 4_d._ Value over
20_l._ and under 50_l._: shops, 6_d._; private houses, 9_d._ Value over
50_l._ and under 150_l._: shops, 1_s._; private houses, 1_s._ 6_d._
Value over 150_l._ and under 300_l._: shops, 2_s._; private houses,
3_s._ Value 300_l._ and upwards: shops, 2_s._ 6_d._; private houses,
3_s._ 6_d._ This new tax was estimated to produce, on existing
valuations, an additional revenue in the first year of 1,500,000_l._,
and, what was of even more importance (having regard to future Budgets),
was estimated to rise to 2,380,000_l._ in the second and subsequent
years.
Under the heading of ‘extra stamps’ the Chancellor of the Exchequer
proposed: (1) An alteration in the scale of duty upon patent medicines.
The scale then in force under an Act of George III., and continued to
this day, presses rather heavily on the 1_d._ and 2_d._ boxes, &c., of
medicines sold in poor neighbourhoods. Lord Randolph’s new scale would
have afforded relief to these small parcels, and have more than recouped
itself on the larger and more costly.[58]
The yield of the old duty had been steadily increasing in later years.
In 1869-70 it had produced 72,000_l._; in 1879-80, 135,000_l._; in
1885-6, 178,000_l._ It was estimated that Lord Randolph’s duty would
produce an increase of between 50,000_l._ and 70,000_l._ in the first
year (not, of course, complete) and of 100,000_l._ in the second year.
But the yield of the future would have been much richer. The old scale
of duty still in force produced in 1904-5 not less than 331,000_l._ Had
Lord Randolph’s scale been in force the extra revenue would probably by
now have exceeded 250,000_l._ a year.
The Chancellor of the Exchequer also proposed: (2) A 2_s._ per cent.
stamp duty on the share capital of joint-stock companies. He estimated
this to produce 100,000_l._ yearly, and 58,000_l._ in the year 1887-8.
This plan was adopted by Mr. Goschen in 1888. The results exceeded
expectation, and the tax yielded in the first year 158,000_l._ In 1899
the duty was increased to 5_s._ on share capital, and extended at
half-scale to loan capital. The yield for 1904-5 was 388,000_l._ from
share capital and 73,000_l._ from loan capital.
(3) A group of proposals comprising an extension of receipt duty to sums
between 10_s._ and 2_l._; the repeal of certain exemptions, such as a
receipt written upon a bill of exchange, or upon a duly stamped
instrument, acknowledging receipt of consideration money therein
expressed; a duty on tickets of admission to places of amusement (French
plan) and upon certain documents in the nature of vouchers, e.g. those
given to persons making purchases at stores and other large trading
establishments; a duty on certificates of proprietorship of shares, and
upon letters of application for stock; and an assimilation of the duty
on transfers of debenture and ordinary stock. This last has been since
effected. The others, with all that may be urged in their behalf, must
stand upon their mere recital. This group of revised duties was
estimated to produce an additional 150,000_l._ a year, and the whole of
the alterations in the stamp duties would have yielded 284,000_l._ in
the first year and above 400,000_l._ in the next.
A yearly tax of 5 per cent. was imposed in 1885-6 on the income of
corporations as an equivalent for the death duties, which they escape.
The yield in the first year was 34,000_l._ Municipal corporations were,
however, exempted, although they paid income-tax on their realised
property. By repealing this exemption Lord Randolph Churchill would have
considerably increased the yield of the duty. Taking the accounts of ten
municipal corporations of mixed sizes and importance, it was found that
the average income derived from rentals, waterworks, gasworks, tolls,
&c., exclusive of interest on investments, was 38,000_l._ Assuming there
were 275 corporations--an assumption which left an ample margin--the
gross income assessable would have been 10,450,000_l._, yielding a
revenue of 522,000_l._ From this, however, a large deduction had to be
made for interest paid on loans raised on the security of the property
apart from the rates, leaving as the result of the tax a net addition to
the revenue of 315,000_l._
The Chancellor of the Exchequer proposed also to revive the tax upon
horses and the special tax on racehorses which had been abandoned by Sir
Stafford Northcote in 1874, from which a sum of 500,000_l._ would accrue
to the State. In 1888, when Mr. Goschen endeavoured to re-introduce this
duty, no serious objection was raised by the House of Commons. Strong
opposition was, however, excited by the wheel and van tax which he
suggested at the same time. In the hope of carrying the unpopular tax by
linking it with one more favoured, Mr. Goschen declared that the two
taxes must stand or fall together.
But the House was not to be cajoled. Both projects were withdrawn, and
the transfer which has since taken place of all analogous duties to
local authorities, seems permanently to have interfered with any attempt
to secure this convenient source of revenue for Imperial purposes.
Two other classes of proposed extra taxation remain to be considered. If
every one of the 70,000,000 cartridges which were used each season had a
1_d._ revenue stamp pasted over the shot end, the national resources
would be enriched by 280,000_l._[59] in a complete year. The sportsman
whose unerring aim never required a second barrel, except for another
bird, would in poetic justice enjoy a comparative immunity. But while
his unskilful companion blazed away he might remember that at each
discharge the stamp blown to pieces by the explosion would carry its
tribute to the public treasury. Besides this, mainly with a view to
putting a stop to their reckless use by boys and others, pistols were to
be taxed 1_l._ a year and pistol-dealers 20_l._ a year; and brokers,
whose responsible functions seemed to deserve some recognition from the
State, were to be duly licensed at 5_l._ a year. By these sundries
300,000_l._ would be secured immediately, and about 400,000_l._ in a
complete year. The augmentation of the wine duties by various devices,
falling chiefly upon the higher quality wines, so as to yield an
additional quarter of a million, raised the total of the new taxation to
4,500,000_l._ in the first year, with a considerable natural growth in
prospect.
Of the steps by which Lord Randolph designed to diminish his expenditure
only one need be considered here; for the transference of the
2,600,000_l._ grants-in-aid to another and larger fund is a matter
chiefly of book-keeping, and the definite economy of 1,300,000_l._ which
he regarded as so important belongs to another part of the story. But
the proposal to reduce the Sinking Fund by no less than 4,500,000_l._ is
startling enough to compel attention.
The condition of the National Debt was in 1886 peculiar. When Sir
Stafford Northcote, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, in 1875 reorganised
the service of the debt, he had, in order to make ‘steady and continuous
efforts for its reduction,’ assigned a fixed annual sum of
28,000,000_l._, covering both interest and Sinking Fund, and payable,
unless Parliament should in the meantime otherwise determine, as long as
any debt remained outstanding. On March 31, 1875, the National Debt
amounted to 769,000,000_l._; and if Sir Stafford Northcote’s scheme as
it stood on the statute book had remained unaltered, if no war or other
disturbing element had intervened, this debt, without any addition to
the yearly charge of 28,000,000_l._, would have been entirely paid off
about the year 1930. This was the arrangement which Lord Randolph now
proposed to revise, and it therefore requires closer examination. The
full charge of 28,000,000_l._ came into operation in 1877-8. It was
divided between interest and Sinking Fund. At the outset the proportion
assignable to interest and management was between 23,000,000_l._ and
24,000,000_l._, and the proportion assignable to Sinking Fund between
4,000,000_l._ and 5,000,000_l._; but this proportion steadily changed by
the automatic working of the scheme. Year by year as the debt capital
was reduced by the amount of successive Sinking Funds, that part of the
28,000,000_l._ required for interest diminished, and that part available
for Sinking Fund proportionately increased. According to the moderate
computations of Sir Stafford Northcote when presenting his scheme to the
House, 230,000,000_l._ of the debt would have been paid off by the
present year--1904-5. In that case the capital of the debt would now
stand at about 540,000,000_l._, the interest proportion of the
28,000,000_l._ would amount to sixteen and a half millions, and the
Sinking Fund proportion to about eleven and a half millions. Thus the
scheme, which in the beginning imposed a charge on the taxpayer
equivalent to 2½_d._ in the 1_l._ for the purposes of a Sinking Fund,
automatically progressed until that burden would have become equivalent
to 5_d._ in the 1_l._ at the present time, and rising further to 1_s._
or more in the 1_l._ before it reached its consummation. While already
himself attaining a high degree of financial virtue, Sir Stafford
Northcote indicated to his successors a standard three and four and five
times as exalted.
Each generation, almost each decade, claims its right to revise its
standards; and as the rate of human improvement was less rapid than the
growth of Sir Stafford Northcote’s Sinking Fund, it had in 1886 become
clear that the public would not acquiesce in the logical result of the
1875 scheme, or regard as a sacred obligation the exact fulfilment of a
plan which, snowball fashion, rolled on with ever-accumulating weight
and ended by requiring the exaction from the taxpayer during a small
number of years of an amount in repayment of debt which sound reasoning
could not justify. Already the scheme itself had yielded to the pressure
of a passing emergency. Mr. Childers had suspended the Sinking Fund in
great part during the Egyptian War and the Russian panic of 1885-6; Sir
William Harcourt had permitted a smaller suspension in 1886-7. Indeed,
Sir Stafford Northcote seems to have felt that his scheme could not be
maintained in its fulness to the end, and that when the Sinking Fund had
risen to a certain figure, the taxpayer of the day would claim to share
with it the benefit resulting from the progressive diminution in the
interest of the debt. If, then, it were conceded that the Northcote
Sinking Fund could not be maintained in its entirety till 1930, the
revision of the scheme became simply a question of the manner, the
measure and the tune.
These considerations were strengthened by another set of arguments. In
1887 the funded debt amounted to 637,000,000_l._ A large part of this
debt--probably 150,000,000_l._--was held by public departments; another
large part was held by banks, insurance companies and by trustees. It
was computed later by skilled authorities that the holdings on this
account were not less than 200,000,000_l._ As these holdings were
practically not offered on the market for sale, the field for purchases
of stock was comparatively narrow. If a large amount of Sinking Fund
were applied to purchases of stock in this narrow field, the prices of
Consols would be quickly and unnaturally inflated. This condition was
actually reached in later years, when the public credit was so esteemed
that the State enjoyed the privilege of paying 113_l._ to redeem 100_l._
of its own debt.
Lord Randolph decided that the time had come for a revision of the
Northcote scheme. He found himself possessed of a lever capable of
exerting on one occasion--and on one occasion only--a giant’s power. He
was anxious that it should be made the instrument of great and
substantial reform, and not wasted gradually for the sake of convenience
or popularity. For the purposes, therefore, of effecting a reduction and
a general readjustment of taxation and as an integral part of his Budget
scheme, Lord Randolph proposed to reduce the total immediate charge of
the debt from 28,878,000_l._ to 24,417,000_l._, thus effecting a saving
of 4,461,000_l._, or, roughly, four and a half millions. The Northcote
Sinking Fund would thus have been reduced by two-thirds to 2,160,000_l._
The reduction of such a great weapon of financial reserve as the Sinking
Fund has proved in tunes of warlike emergency was practically replaced
by the gain in expansive power supplied by an income-tax as low as
5_d._ The positive economy on naval and military estimates clears the
Chancellor of the Exchequer from any charge of laxity or indulgence. His
judgment on the main question of revision was ratified within two years
by the high and severe financial authority of Lord Goschen, and was
further confirmed eleven years later by Sir Michael Hicks-Beach. The
former reduced the fixed charge from 28,000,000_l._ to 25,000,000_l._;
the latter reduced it again from 25,000,000_l._ to 23,000,000_l._, at
which figure it stood when the South African War broke out. But these
reductions, aggregating 5,000,000_l._ a year, were enforced, the one for
the purpose merely of affording a petty relief to the taxpayer of the
year, and the other to find ways and means for the growing expenditure
of a Government, and not, as Lord Randolph had designed, for the sake of
a large and harmonious reform.
By these methods, however they may be regarded, the Chancellor of the
Exchequer would have become possessed of a surplus of noble proportions.
And the distribution of the 12,500,000_l._ which he had secured is the
coping-stone of the whole financial scheme. Tea and tobacco are familiar
friends to the students of Budgets. Year after year their fortunes
fluctuate in sympathy with those of the nation. In the year 1886-7 tea
was taxed 6_d._ in the pound and yielded 4,514,874_l._ A reduction of
2_d._ upon tea is a generous boon to every poor household. The tiny
packet is a farthing cheaper. The careful spoonfuls may be more freely
bestowed; and the relief is gratefully acknowledged by an immediate
increase in consumption. Lord Randolph had estimated that his reduction
would cost the revenue 1,400,000_l._; but this seems to have been an
over-estimate, for when Mr. Goschen four years later was able to make
this desirable change the loss to the revenue was only 1,100,000_l._,
owing to the greater indulgence of the people.
Who is there, of those who pay it, that will not look back with envy
from these days of 1_s._ income tax, almost as a permanent charge in
times of peace, to times when a tax of 8_d._ was regarded as abnormally
high; when one Chancellor of the Exchequer was resolved to reduce it to
5_d._, and when his successor (Mr. Goschen) declared that, except for
purposes of war, 6_d._ was a proper limit? Of all Lord Randolph’s
proposals none, it may be safely said, would have been greeted with more
general approval than his intended reduction of the income-tax from
8_d._ to 5_d._ At that time incomes below 150_l._ a year were exempt,
but incomes of 150_l_. and less than 400_l._ were allowed an abatement
of 120_l._ Incomes of and above 400_l._ a year had to pay on the full
amount. Official statistics have always been silent as to the total
number of income tax payers, it being apparently impossible to frame a
trustworthy estimate. It is nevertheless probable that the bulk of
persons who are called upon to pay this impost are included in the
150_l._-400_l._ class. It was to this considerable class, composed
mainly of persons emerging into an independence they have earned for
themselves, and rising by their own industry from the level of
exemption to that of income-tax-paying means, that Lord Randolph’s
sympathies were directed. The small householder, pinched by having to
pay in the early days of January the landlord’s tax under Schedule A,
which he cannot recover till he pays his rent at the end of March; the
petty tradesman or struggling professional man who defends a precarious
respectability by a systematic thrift too often unknown to the burly
wage-earner; these are the special beneficiaries from such a reduction,
and they share in a peculiar degree in the general expansion of comfort
and energy which must follow when five millions of money are surrendered
by the State and left to fructify in the pockets of the people.
The largest claim upon the surplus was in respect of Local Government.
Lord Randolph proposed to assign the revenue received from a large
number of Excise licence duties to the various local authorities about
to be established. As it was undesirable to saddle the new-born
authorities with the difficulty and expense of collecting many duties
for which they possessed no adequate machinery, he arranged that a large
number were still to be collected by the State, and the proceeds, less
the cost of collection, were to be afterwards transferred. Dogs, guns,
game, carriages, servants, armorial bearings, auctioneers, hawkers,
patent medicine vendors, plate dealers, refreshment houses, pawnbrokers,
tobacco and sweets dealers, beer, wine and spirit dealers, and the new
tax on horses, aggregating in all 2,700,000_l._, were to be thus for
the time being reserved. But all licences which the local bodies could
collect without any additional cost or trouble were to be handed over at
once. 1,544,000_l._ worth of liquor licences fell into this latter
class. They were to be granted, as heretofore, only on the production of
a magisterial consent, and nothing was simpler than to make the paying
of the duty and the obtaining of the consent simultaneous. Lord
Randolph’s schemes on this point travelled beyond both the Budget and
the Local Government Bill, and embraced local option in the drink
traffic. He believed that the liquor laws ought to be intimately
connected with Local Government. He wished to entrust local authorities
with very large powers to regulate the sale of liquor in their
districts; and he thought that if the revenue which arose from liquor
licences was made an important source of revenue for the local
authority, a salutary check would be provided against hasty or fanatical
action, leading perhaps upon a popular impulse to total prohibition, and
upon the rebound to an unrestricted sale. ‘When you are legislating,’ he
said a year later at Sunderland (October 27, 1887), ‘about subjects
which interest human beings, it is just as well not to leave altogether
out of account human nature.’ The transfer by different methods of these
sources of revenue, together with the contribution of 800,000_l._ in aid
of the indoor poor, provided the round sum of 5,000,000_l._ as the
foundation upon which Local Government was to be erected.
The preparation of such a Budget required an extraordinary exertion.
Scheme after scheme was formulated, only to break down in discussion and
to be dismissed. Many days--wrested by an effort from other pressing
occupations--were consumed in study and reflection. But at length all
was in order and the plan was in detail settled and complete. In every
respect--in the definite economy, in the reduction in the expenditure on
armaments, in the increase in the proportion of direct taxation, in the
immense diminution of public burdens, in the enormous simplification of
the death duties and the introduction of a logical system of graduation,
in the ample provision for the needs of Local Government--it was a
democratic Budget. Yet it was cunningly contrived. The importance and
cohesion of the scheme would have secured it a momentum of its own.
Objections upon detail could at every point have been answered by
general principles. The low income-tax balanced the diminished Sinking
Fund. The economies in public charges justified the remissions of
taxation. The tremendous appeal to the middle classes of a 5_d._
income-tax would have provided the driving power needed from within the
Conservative party. Nevertheless, it was in a grave and nervous mood
that the young Chancellor introduced it to the Cabinet in the early days
of December. He spoke long and earnestly. He exerted all his power of
luminous and attractive exposition. The whole proposal was unfolded. His
colleagues seemed for the moment fascinated. Objections and doubts were
silenced together. No one cared to assail in detail a scheme all parts
of which hung so closely together and which, in the mass, displayed such
novel and spacious outlines. Even Lord Iddesleigh, the creator of the
threatened Sinking Fund, consented to its dissolution for the sake of
the integrity of the scheme. Lord Randolph had come prepared for an
uncertain and protracted battle. He seemed to have won the victory at a
single charge.
His friends at the Treasury waited anxiously for his return. Startled as
they had been by some of his views, foreign to their traditions as was
his treatment of the debt, they had been drawn into the momentum of what
was, after all, a great design. They were prompt to offer their
congratulations upon the Cabinet acquiescence. But Lord Randolph was far
from confident. The silence of his colleagues oppressed him. ‘They said
nothing,’ he told Lord Welby, ‘nothing at all; but you should have seen
their faces!’ He proceeded to give instructions for checking every
figure and recasting every calculation from the beginning, as if he
apprehended some tardy attack, against which preparations should be
made. This arranged, as was his habit he pushed the whole matter from
his mind. ‘There,’ he said grandly to Sir Algernon West later in the
day, ‘are the materials of our Budget. They are unpolished gems; put the
facets on them as well as you can; but do not speak to me on the subject
again until the end of the financial year.’
CHAPTER XVI
RESIGNATION
Happy the man, and happy he alone,
He who can call to-day his own--
He who, secure within, can say:
‘To-morrow do thy worst, for I have lived to-day.
Come fair or foul, or rain, or shine,
The joys I have possessed, in spite of fate, are mine.
Not Heaven itself over the past hath power;
But what has been has been, and I have had my hour.’
_Lines from Dryden copied out by Lord Randolph
Churchill about 1891._
On the morning of December 23 all who took an interest in politics--and
in those days these were a very great number--were startled to read in
the _Times_ newspaper that Lord Randolph Churchill had resigned the
offices of Chancellor of the Exchequer and Leader of the House of
Commons and had retired altogether from the Government. As the news was
telegraphed abroad, it became everywhere the chief subject of rumour and
discussion, and Cabinet Ministers--dispersed on their holidays--hurried
back to London to find out the truth of the matter and to prepare for
the changes that must follow. To the political world the event came as a
complete surprise. No important issue had arisen in foreign or domestic
affairs; no great question likely to lead to such a breach was before
the country; there had been hardly a whisper of Cabinet dissension. But
if the reader has followed this account with any considerable measure of
agreement or sympathy, he will see in this resignation no inexplicable
mystery, no deep-laid intrigue, no explosion of temper; but the logical
and inevitable consequence of all that had gone before.