III

The good American is, as a rule, pretty hard upon roguery, but he

atones for his austerity by an amiable toleration of rogues. His

only requirement is that he must personally know the rogues. We all

“denounce” thieves loudly enough if we have not the honor of their

acquaintance. If we have, why, that is different—unless they have

the actual odor of the slum or the prison about them. We may know

them guilty, but we meet them, shake hands with them, drink with them

and, if they happen to be wealthy, or otherwise great, invite them

to our houses, and deem it an honor to frequent theirs. We do not

“approve their methods”—let that be understood; and thereby they are

sufficiently punished. The notion that a knave cares a pin what is

thought of his ways by one who is civil and friendly to himself appears

to have been invented by a humorist. On the vaudeville stage of Mars it

would probably have made his fortune.

I know men standing high in journalism who to-day will “expose”

and bitterly “denounce” a certain rascality and to-morrow will be

hobnobbing with the rascals whom they have named. I know legislators

of renown who habitually raise their voices against the dishonest

schemes of some “trust magnate,” and are habitually seen in familiar

conversation with him. Indubitably these be hypocrites all. Between the

head and the heart of a man of this objectionable kind is a wall of

adamant, and neither knows what the other is doing.

If social recognition were denied to rogues they would be fewer by

many. Some would only the more diligently cover their tracks along the

devious paths of unrighteousness, but others would do so much violence

to their consciences as to renounce the disadvantages of rascality for

those of an honest life. An unworthy person dreads nothing so much as

the withholding of an honest hand, the slow, inevitable stroke of an

ignoring eye.

We have rich rogues because we have “respectable” persons who are not

ashamed to take them by the hand, to be seen with them, to say that

they know them. In such it is treachery to censure them; to cry out

when robbed by them is to turn state’s evidence.

One may smile upon a rascal (most of us do so many times a day) if

one does not know him to be a rascal, and has not said he is; but

knowing him to be, or having said he is, to smile upon him is to be a

hypocrite—just a plain hypocrite or a sycophantic hypocrite, according

to the station in life of the rascal smiled upon. There are more

plain hypocrites than sycophantic ones, for there are more rascals

of no consequence than rich and distinguished ones, though they get

fewer smiles each. The American people will be plundered as long as

the American character is what it is; as long as it is tolerant of

successful knaves; as long as American ingenuity draws an imaginary

distinction between a man’s public character and his private—his

commercial and his personal. In brief, the American people will be

plundered as long as they deserve to be plundered. No human law can

stop it, none ought to stop it, for that would abrogate a higher and

more salutary law: “As ye sow ye shall reap.”

In a sermon by the Rev. Dr. Parkhurst is the passage following:

“The story of all our Lord’s dealings with sinners leaves upon the mind

the invariable impression, if only the story be read sympathetically

and earnestly, that He always felt kindly towards the transgressor,

but could have no tenderness of regard toward the transgression. There

is no safe and successful dealing with sin of any kind save as that

distinction is appreciated and made a continual factor in our feelings

and efforts.”

If Dr. Parkhurst will read his New Testament more understandingly he

will observe that Christ’s kindly feeling to transgressors was not

to be counted on by sinners of every kind, and it was not always in

evidence; for example, when he flogged the moneychangers out of the

temple. Nor is Dr. Parkhurst himself any too amiably disposed toward

the children of darkness. It was not by mild words and gentle means

that he hurled the mighty from their seats and exalted them of low

degree. Such revolutions as he set afoot are not made with spiritual

rosewater; there must be the contagion of a noble indignation fueled

with harder wood than abstractions. The people can not be mustered and

incited to action by the spectacle of a man fighting something that

does not fight back. It was men that Dr. Parkhurst was trouncing—not

their crimes—not Crime. He may fancy himself “dowered with the hate of

hate, the scorn of scorn,” but in reality he does not hate hate but

hates the hateful, and scorns, not scorn but the scornworthy.

It is singular with what tenacity this amusing though mischievous

superstition keeps its hold upon the human mind—this grave, _bona fide_

personification of abstractions and the funny delusion that it is

possible to hate or love them. Sin is not a thing; there is no existing

object corresponding to any of the mere counter-words that are properly

named abstract nouns. One can no more hate sin or love virtue than

one can hate a vacuum (which Nature—itself imaginary—was once by the

scientists of the period solemnly held to do) or love one of the three

dimensions. We may think that while loving a sinner we hate the sin,

but that is not so; if anything is hated it is other sinners of the

same kind, who are not quite so close to us.

The French have a saying to the effect that to know all is to pardon

all; and doubtless with an omniscient insight into the causes of

character we should find the field of moral responsibility pretty

thickly strewn with extenuating circumstances very suitable indeed

for consideration by a god who has had a hand in besetting “with

pitfall and with gin” the road we are to “wander in.” But I submit

that universal forgiveness would hardly do as a working principle.

Even those who are most apt and facile with the incident of the woman

taken in adultery commonly cherish a secret respect for the doctrine of

eternal damnation; and some of them are known to pin their faith to the

penal code of their state. Moreover, there is some reason to believe

that the sinning woman, being “taken,” was penitent—they usually are

when found out.

“But,” says Citizen Goodheart, who thinks with difficulty, “shall I

throw over my friend when he is ‘in trouble’?” Yes, when convinced that

he deserves to be in trouble; throw him all the harder and the further

because he is your friend. In addition to his particular offense

against society he has disgraced _you_. If there are to be lenity and

charity let them go to the criminal who has foreborne to involve you

in his shame. It were a pretty state of affairs if an undetected scamp,

fearing exposure, could make you a co-defendant by so easy a precaution

as securing your acquaintance and regard. Don’t throw the first stone,

of course, but when convinced that your friend is a proper target,

heave away with a right hearty good-will, and let the stone be of

serviceable weight and delivered with a good aim.

I care nothing for principles—they are lumber and rubbish. What

concerns our happiness and welfare, as affectable by our fellowmen, is

conduct. “Principles, not men,” is a rogue’s cry; rascality’s counsel

to stupidity, the noise of the duper duping on his dupe. He shouts

it most loudly and with the keenest sense of its advantage who most

desires inattention to his own conduct, or to that forecast of it,

his character. As to sin, that has an abundance of expounders and is

already universally known to be wicked. What more can be said against

it, and why go on repeating that? The thing is a trifle wordworn,

whereas the sinner cometh up as a flower every day, fresh, ingenuous

and inviting. Sin is not at all dangerous to society; what does all the

mischief is the sinner. Crime has no arms to thrust into the public

treasury and the private; no hands with which to cut a throat; no

tongue to wreck a reputation withal. I would no more attack it than I

would attack an isosceles triangle, or Hume’s “phantasm floating in a

void.” My chosen enemy must be something that has a skin for my switch,

a head for my cudgel—something that can smart and ache. I have no

quarrel with abstractions; so far as I know they are all good citizens.

The Collected Works of Ambrose Bierce, Volume 11 Antepenultimata · 第 52 / 92 题