PITT AS WAR MINISTER (1793-8)
Si vous affaiblissez vos moyens en partageant vos forces, si
vous rompez en Italie l'unité de la pensée militaire, je vous le
dis avec douleur, vous aurez perdu la plus belle occasion
d'imposer des lois à l'Italie.... La guerre est comme le
gouvernement, c'est une affaire de tact.--NAPOLEON, _Letters of
14th May 1796_.
In estimating the services of Pitt as War Minister during the first
phases of the conflict we must remember that the ambition of his life
was to be a Peace Minister. Amidst the exhaustion caused by the American
War, he deemed it essential to ensure the continuous growth of savings
and investments which, under favourable conditions, advance at the rate
of Compound Interest. His success in the time of peace 1783-93, may be
measured by the fact that, despite the waste of war, the rate of
progress was not seriously checked in the years 1793-6. A Scotsman,
MacRitchie, who travelled through England in 1795[411] was surprised to
find the large towns in a most flourishing state; and it is well known
that the exports of cottons largely increased in the last decade of the
century. Seeing that the war became "a contention of purse," the final
triumph of England may be ascribed to the reserve of strength which Pitt
had helped to assure. He did not live on to witness the issue of the
economic struggle brought about by the Continental System of Napoleon.
But a study of the commercial war of the years 1806-13 shows that Pitt's
forethought enabled Britain to foil the persistent efforts of her
mightiest enemy.
Military critics will, however, reply that Pitt's economies in the
earlier period so far weakened her army as to lead to the failures of
the Revolutionary War. There is some force in this contention. A closer
examination, however, will reveal facts that necessarily weaken it.
Firstly, England had never kept up a large army in time of peace.
Dislike of a standing army was almost inconceivably strong; and it is
certain that an attempt by Pitt to maintain an army in excess of the
ordinary peace establishment would have aroused a powerful opposition.
He therefore concentrated his efforts on the navy; and the maritime
triumphs of the war were due in the last resort to his fostering care.
As for the army, he kept it at its normal strength until the spring of
the year 1792, when he decided to effect some reductions. In one sense
this decision is creditable to him. It proves that he neither desired
nor expected a rupture with France. In his view the risks of war were
past. After his surrender to the Empress Catharine in 1791 peace seemed
assured. Further, his decision to reduce the British Army was formed
before the declaration of war by France against Austria (20th April
1792). After the rupture of France with Sardinia and Prussia it appeared
the height of madness for a single disorganized State to enlarge the
circle of its enemies. Consequently, up to the second week of November
1792, Pitt and Grenville were fully justified in expecting the duration
of peace for Great Britain. Here, as at many points in the ensuing
struggle, it was the impossible which happened.
Is Pitt to be blamed for effecting economies which led to a reduction of
taxes and an alleviation of the burdens of the poor? The chief danger of
the years 1791, 1792 came not from the French Jacobins, but from their
British sympathizers; and experience warranted the belief that, with a
lightening of the financial load, the nation would manifest its former
loyalty. On 23rd August 1791 Grenville wrote: "Our only danger is at
home, and for averting that danger, peace and economy are our best
resources."[412] These considerations are political rather than
military. But it is impossible to separate the two spheres. The strength
of the army depends ultimately on the strength of the nation.
It is also well to remember that systematic preparation for war was an
outcome of that struggle. Conscription was a bequest of the French
Revolution. Planned first by Carnot, it was carried out by Dubois Crancé
and others in 1798. But in 1793 the days of large armies had not dawned.
It was usual to maintain small forces of professional soldiers, together
with a more or less inefficient militia. In England methods not unlike
those of the age of Falstaff still held good. War was an adventure, not
a science. In France first it became an intensely national effort. The
Jacobins evoked the popular enthusiasm; the Committee of Public Safety
embodied it in citizen armies; and the science of Carnot and Napoleon
led them to victories which shattered the old-world systems and baffled
the forecasts of Pitt.
Let us briefly survey the conduct of the war by Pitt in its chief stages
up to the year 1798. The first period is from the declaration of war in
February 1793, to the Battle of Fleurus, near the close of June 1794. At
the outset he is alarmed by the irruption of Dumouriez into Holland, and
hastily sends a small British force under the Duke of York, solely for
the defence of Helvoetsluys and its neighbourhood. It answers its
purpose; the French are held up at the Hollandsdiep, while the Austrians
crush their main force at Neerwinden. Thereupon Coburg claims the Duke's
assistance in driving the Republicans from the fortresses of French
Flanders. Pitt and his colleagues give their assent, because the
enterprise seems easy after the defection of Dumouriez, and Dunkirk is a
tempting prize near to hand, but mainly owing to their urgent desire
that Austria shall find her indemnity not in Bavaria, but in the French
border fortresses. Thus, for reasons which are political, rather than
military, the Cabinet embarks an insufficient force on what proves to be
a lengthy and hazardous enterprise. Further, while the British push on,
Prussia holds back; so that the Duke of York virtually takes the place
of the Prussian contingent. Unaware of the duplicity of Berlin, and
trusting that the Allies will soon master the border strongholds, Pitt
and Dundas prepare to harry the coasts of France, and to secure her most
valuable colony, Hayti. These are their chief aims in the war. But,
while preparing maritime expeditions, they also drift into a continental
campaign, from which they find it hard to withdraw.
The efforts put forth at Toulon and in Corsica were the outcome of the
treaties with Austria, Sardinia, and Naples, which required the
appearance of a British fleet off the coasts of France and Italy. While
seeking to strengthen both the Coalition and the Royalists of Provence,
Admiral Hood's force found an unexpected sphere of action at Toulon. In
August 1793 that city admitted the British troops and a Spanish force a
few days later. Thereupon Pitt claimed the help which he had a right to
expect from his Allies. Naples and Sardinia sent contingents deficient
in quality or numbers; and the Court of Vienna, after promising to send
5,000 troops from the Milanese, neglected to do so. Quarrels and
suspicions hampered the defence; but the arrival of the Austrian
contingent would probably have turned the scale. Owing to the length of
time required for despatches from Toulon to reach London, Pitt and his
colleagues did not hear of the remissness of Austria until 22nd
December, that is, five days after the fall of that stronghold. Had they
known it a month earlier, they could have sent thither the large force,
then mustering in the Solent, which on 26th November set sail for the
West Indies.
This seems an unpardonable diffusion of efforts. But Ministers must
already have regretted their readiness to take up the duties incumbent
on Prussia in Flanders; and doubtless they resolved not to play the part
of the willing horse at Toulon. In the early days of every league there
comes a time when an active Power must protest against the shifty ways
which are the curse of Coalitions. Besides, Pitt had to keep in view the
interests of Great Britain. These were, firstly, to guard the Low
Countries against French aggression, and, secondly, to gain an indemnity
for the expenses of the war either in the French West Indies, or in
Corsica. The independence of the Low Countries was a European question.
The maritime conquests concerned England alone. Were Britons to shelve
their own interests for a question of international import? The
statesman who does so will not long hold the reins at Westminster.
Besides, no device for weakening France was deemed more effective than
that of seizing her wealthiest group of colonies. On the other hand,
there was pressing need of armed help for the Royalists of Brittany; and
on this ground we must pronounce the West India enterprise ill timed. A
still worse blunder was the continued inactivity of Moira's force in the
Solent and the Channel Islands. The reports of an intended French
invasion form a wholly inadequate excuse for his inaction. His troops
could have rendered valuable service either in Brittany, Flanders, or at
Toulon. The riddle of their inaction has never been solved. Ultimately
the blame must rest with Pitt, Dundas, and Lord Chatham.[413]
In 1794 Pitt hoped to retrieve the failures of the first campaign and to
wear down the French defence. For this purpose he liberally subsidized
Austria and concluded with Prussia a treaty which, with better
management, might have brought a second highly efficient army into
Flanders. The compacts of that springtide warranted the hope that
340,000 allied troops would advance on the north and north-east
frontiers of France. They were not forthcoming; but, even as it was, the
Imperialists and the Duke of York routed the French levies in Flanders
and seemed about to open the way to Paris. Earl Howe's victory, named
"the glorious first of June," ensured supremacy in the Channel. Brittany
and la Vendée were again aflame. The Union Jack replaced the tricolour
on the strongholds of Corsica and in the most fertile parts of the West
Indies. In April-May 1794 the collapse of the Jacobins seemed imminent.
But these early triumphs of the Allies were almost as fatal as their
later disasters. Indeed they were largely the cause of them. Believing
that they had the game in their hands, Prussia and Austria relaxed their
efforts at the very time when France girded herself for a mightier
struggle. Moreover, the emergence of the Polish Question in an acute
phase served once again to distract the German rivals and to weaken
their efforts in the West. Moreover, the Anglo-Prussian Treaty of May
1794 prescribing the valley of the Meuse as the sphere of action of the
62,400 Prussians subsidized by England and Holland was so rigid as to
furnish their generals with good excuses for refusing to march from the
Palatinate across the front of the French columns now pressing forward.
The upshot was that England and the Dutch Republic got nothing in return
for their subsidies, while the Prussians on their side chafed at the
insistent demands from London and The Hague for the exact fulfilment of
the bargain. The situation was annoying for military men; and the
British Government erred in tying them down too stringently to a flank
march, which was fraught with danger after the long delay of Pitt in
ratifying the compact (6th-23rd May); while the postponement in the
payment of the first subsidies gave the Prussians a good excuse for
inaction.[414] His remonstrance to the Prussian envoy in London, at the
close of September 1794, was also unwise. For it exceeded the more
measured protests of Grenville, and furnished the Berlin Court with the
desired excuse for recalling its troops from the Rhine. In short, the
campaign of 1794 failed, not so much because the French were in superior
force at the battles of Turcoing and Fleurus, as because the Allies at
no point worked cordially together. The intrusion of political motives
hampered their generals and turned what ought to have been an
overwhelming triumph into a disgracefully tame retreat.
The disasters at Turcoing and Fleurus open up the second stage of the
war. Realizing more and more the difficulty of defending Holland and
Hanover, Pitt seeks to end that campaign and to concentrate on colonial
enterprises and the war in Brittany and la Vendée. Experience of the
utter weakness of his Administration for purposes of war also leads him
to strengthen it at the time of the union with the Old Whigs. They
demanded that their leader, the Duke of Portland, should take the Home
Office. On Dundas demurring to this, Grenville generously assented to
Pitt's suggestion that he should vacate the Foreign Office (6th July).
Fortunately the Duke declined to take it; and Pitt resolved to make
drastic changes, especially by curtailing the functions of the Secretary
of State for Home Affairs, and creating a War Ministry of Cabinet rank.
Some change was clearly requisite; for of late Dundas had supervised
internal affairs, including those of Ireland, as well as the conduct of
the war; as Treasurer of the Navy he managed its finances, and, as
President of the India Board, he sought to control the affairs of that
Empire. As for the War Office, it was a petty office, controlled by a
nonentity, Sir Charles Yonge, who was soon to be transferred to the
Mint.
In the haphazard allotment of military business to the
Commander-in-Chief, Amherst, to the head clerk of the War Office, Yonge,
and to the overworked pluralist, Dundas, we discern the causes of
disaster. The war with France being unforeseen, Pitt had to put up with
these quaint arrangements; but the reverses in Flanders and the incoming
of the Portland Whigs now enabled him to reduce chaos to order. He
insisted that the Secretary of State for Home Affairs should cease to
direct the course of the war, but consented that colonial business
should fall to his lot. On the other hand he greatly enlarged the
functions of the War Office. His will prevailed. On 7th July Portland
agreed to become Home Secretary, while his supporter, Windham, came into
the re-organized War Office as Secretary at War, Dundas becoming
Secretary of State for War and the Colonies. Despite the obvious need of
specializing and strengthening these Departments, the resistance of
Dundas was not easily overcome. His letter to Pitt on this subject
betrays a curious cloudiness of vision on a subject where clearness is
essential:
Wimbledon, _July 9, 1794_.[415]
... The idea of a War Minister as a separate Department you must
on recollection be sensible cannot exist in this country. The
operations of war are canvassed and adjusted in the Cabinet, and
become the joint act of His Majesty's servants; and the Secy of
State who holds the pen does no more than transmit their
sentiments. I do not mean to say that there is not at all times
in H. M.'s Councils some particular person who has, and ought to
have, a leading and even an overruling ascendency in the conduct
of public affairs; and that ascendency extends to war as it does
to every other subject. Such you are at present as the Minister
of the King. Such your father was as Secretary of State. Such
you would be if you was Secretary of State, and such Mr. Fox
would be if he was Secretary of State and the Duke of Bedford
First Lord of the Treasury. In short it depends, and must ever
depend, on other circumstances than the particular name by which
a person is called; and if you was to have a Secretary of State
for the War Department tomorrow, not a person living would ever
look upon him, or any other person but you, as the War Minister.
All modern wars are a contention of purse, and unless some very
peculiar circumstance occurs to direct the lead into another
channel, the Minister of Finance must be the Minister of War.
Your father for obvious reasons was an exception to the rule.
It is impossible for any person to controvert the position I now
state; and therefore, when you talk of a War Minister, you must
mean a person to superintend the detail of the execution of the
operations which are determined upon. But do you think it
possible to persuade the public that such a separate Department
can be necessary? Yourself, so far as a general superintendence
is necessary, must take that into your own hands. If it was in
the hands of any other, it would lead to a constant wrangling
between him and the various Executive Boards.
The illogicality of this letter would be amusing if it had not been so
disastrous. Because war depends ultimately on money, therefore (said
Dundas) the Chancellor of the Exchequer ought to control its operations
and act virtually as Secretary of State for War. Then why not also as
First Lord of the Admiralty? No sooner is the question formulated than
we see that Dundas is confusing two very different things, namely,
general financial control and the administration of military affairs. In
fact, Dundas still clung to the old customs which allotted to the
Secretaries of State wide and often overlapping duties. He did not see
the need of a specialized and authoritative War Office, though the
triumphs achieved by Carnot and the Committee of Public Safety during
the past twelvemonth might have opened his eyes. Fortunately, Pitt
discerned the necessity of strengthening that Department; and, as we
have seen, he made Dundas and Windham War Ministers, with seats in the
Cabinet. Thus from July 1794 military affairs had a chance of adequate
treatment in that body; and Pitt deserves great credit for remodelling
the Cabinet in a way suited to the exigencies of modern warfare.
Why did he not appoint that experienced soldier, the Marquis Cornwallis,
Secretary of State for War? The answer is that he designed him as
successor to the Duke of York in Flanders. As has already appeared, Pitt
framed this resolve in February 1794, on the return of Cornwallis from
India; and, though rebuffed then, he continued to revolve the matter
until the beginning of the autumn, when the opposition of George III and
of Francis II of Austria prevented the appointment of that experienced
soldier to the supreme command of the Allies. As for the accession of
Windham to the War Department, it seems to have been merely a device to
satisfy the Old Whigs. Probably the question was not even discussed
until 4th July, when the Duke of Portland first named it to Windham. As
it finds no place in the Pitt-Grenville letters until 7th July, we may
infer that Pitt and Dundas accepted Windham with some reluctance as an
ardent partisan of Burke and the _émigrés_. Windham now persistently
urged an expedition to Brittany; and the Quiberon and Yeu enterprises
were largely due to him. Pitt and Dundas, after their experience of the
_émigrés_, had no great hope in these efforts; and after the defection
of Spain they discerned the increasing need of concentrating their
efforts on home defence and operations which safeguarded British
interests in the East and West Indies. To these causes may be ascribed
their decision to withdraw the British force from the island of Yeu. The
indignant letters of Windham to Pitt in 1796-8 show that, after the Yeu
fiasco and the beginning of the peace negotiations with France, his
advice was slighted. His moanings to Mrs. Crewe over the degeneracy of
the age also tell their tale. In October 1796 he merely "drags on" at
the War Office until he sees what turn things will take.
Pitt's determination to ensure efficiency in the services appears from
two incidents of the closing weeks of 1794. He deposed Lord Chatham from
the Admiralty in favour of the far more efficient Lord Spencer; and he
removed the Duke of York from the command in Holland. Another change
remains to be noted, namely, the retirement of the Master General of the
Ordnance. The Duke of Richmond had for some time ceased to attend the
meetings of the Cabinet. During six months Pitt put up with this
peevishness; but on the receipt of alarming news from Holland, he
exerted his authority. On 27th January 1795 he informed Richmond that
his long absence from the Cabinet and his general aloofness would make
his return unpleasant and "embarrassing to public business. This
consideration," he added, "must decide my opinion ... and at this
critical time it seems indispensable to make some such arrangement as
shall substitute some other efficient military aid in so important a
Department."[416] This cutting note produced the desired result.
Richmond resigned and Cornwallis took his place at the Ordnance and in
the Cabinet. No change was more beneficial. During the next three years
the Ministry had the advice of the ablest soldier of the generation
preceding that of Wellington. Unfortunately the Cornwallis letters are
so few that his share in the shaping of war policy is unknown; but it is
clear that he helped Ministers finally to override the resolve of the
King to keep the relic of the British force for the defence of
Hanover.[417]
To conclude the survey of these changes, we may note that the Duke of
York, after returning from Holland, became Commander-in-Chief of the
British army, a situation in which he earned general approbation. Thus,
when it is asserted that Pitt altogether lacked his father's power of
discerning military talents, the reply must be that he rendered an
incalculable service by organizing a competent War Ministry, that he
put the right men in the right place, though at the cost of offending
the King, the Duke of York, a powerful nobleman, and his own brother;
and that he quickly noted the transcendent abilities of Moore even when
under censure for acts of disobedience in Corsica. The results attained
by the elder Pitt were far more brilliant; for he came to the front at a
time when the problems were far less difficult and illusory than those
of the Revolutionary Era; but, if the very diverse conditions of their
times be considered, the services of Pitt will not suffer by comparison
even with those of his father.
* * * * *
The torpor of the Dutch in defending their country and the refusal of
the Duke of Brunswick to organize the defence of North Germany virtually
ended the war on that side. In one respect the defection of Prussia in
April 1795 proved beneficial; for she undertook to keep the States of
North and Central Germany entirely neutral. Had George III condescended
at once to place his Electorate under her covering wing, the whole
British and subsidized force might have been withdrawn in the spring of
that year. Pride, however, for some time held him back from that politic
but humiliating step. Consequently several battalions remained in
Hanover for so long a time as to weaken the blow dealt at Paris through
Quiberon. This was highly prejudicial to the Breton movement, which
would have found in the troops detained in Germany the firm nucleus that
was so much needed. Even after the ghastly failure at Quiberon, had the
French _émigré_ corps arrived at Spithead at the end of July instead of
August, the expedition to the Vendéan coast might have ended
differently. It is usual to blame Pitt or Dundas for the delay in those
preparations. But George must be held finally responsible. As to the
Quiberon disaster, it has been proved to result from the hot-headedness
of Puisaye, the criminal carelessness of Hervilly, and the ceaseless
schisms of the Royalists.
With the alliance of the Dutch and French Republics in May 1795, and the
almost open avowal of the French cause by the Court of Madrid in July,
the war entered upon a third phase. Thenceforth the colonial motive was
paramount at Westminster, for Pitt and his colleagues questioned the
wisdom of holding Corsica. On the other hand they sought to safeguard
India by seizing the Cape of Good Hope, and to preserve Hayti from the
inroads of the French, to whom Spain handed over her possession, San
Domingo. Unfortunately the greater the prominence accorded to colonial
affairs, the wider grew the breach with Spain, until in October 1796 the
Court of Madrid declared war. Is Pitt to be blamed for the rupture with
Spain? From the standpoint of Burke and Windham he is open to grave
censure. Surveying the course of events from their royalist minaret,
these prophets ceased not to proclaim the restoration of the Bourbons to
be the sole purpose of the war. Let there be no talk of indemnities. Be
content with crushing Jacobinism and restoring order. Such was their
contention; and much may be said for it.
On the other hand, we must remember that at first England was not a
principal in the contest. It was thrust upon her by the aggressions of
the Jacobins, and perforce she played a subordinate part in continental
campaigns, the prizes of which Austria and Prussia had already marked
out. The reproaches hurled by Burke and Windham were the outcome of
ignorance as to the aims of the powerful Allies, whose co-operation,
illusory though it came to be, was at that time deemed essential to
success. Further, in striking at the French colonies, Pitt followed the
course successfully adopted by England in several wars. But here again
his difficulties were greater than those of Chatham. Indeed, they were
enhanced by the triumphs of Chatham. Where now could he deal the most
telling blow? Not against Canada; for his father had reft that prize.
The French settlements in the East Indies were of small account. It was
in Hayti, Martinique, and Guadeloupe that French commerce could be
ruined. At them, therefore, he struck. But in so doing he reopened the
old disputes with Spain. In vain did he seek to avert bickerings by
suggesting a friendly understanding about Hayti. Godoy was determined to
bicker. And, as the war changed its character, the old Latin affinities
helped that adventurer to undermine the monarchical league and to draw
back Spain to the traditional connection with France.
The Spanish declaration of war in October 1796 opens the fourth phase of
the struggle. Thenceforth England stood on the defensive in Europe in
order to guard and strengthen her Colonial Empire. She abandoned Corsica
and Elba; she withdrew her fleet from the Mediterranean so that Ireland
might be screened from attack. Pitt's views also underwent a change.
Foreseeing the collapse of Austria, he sought to assure peace with
France and Spain by conquering enough territory oversea to
counterbalance the triumphs of Bonaparte and Moreau in Italy and the
Rhineland. If he could not restore the Balance of Power on the
Continent, he strove to safeguard British interests at all essential
points. Failing to save Holland from the Jacobins' grip, he conquered
and held the Cape. This was the bent of his policy during the peace
overtures of the year 1796. He struggled on reluctantly with the war,
opposing as inopportune the motions of Fox, Grey, or Wilberforce for
peace, but ever hoping that France would be compelled by the pressure of
bankruptcy to come to terms and surrender some of her continental
conquests on consideration of recovering her colonies. Wilberforce heard
him declare that he could almost calculate the time when her resources
would be exhausted. On the philanthropist repeating this at a dinner
party, one of his guests, de Lageard, wittily remarked: "I should like
to know who was Chancellor of the Exchequer to Attila."[418] This remark
shore asunder Pitt's financial arguments and reveals the weak point of
his policy. He conducted the war as if it were a Seven Years' War. It
was a Revolutionary War; and at this very time a greater than Attila was
at hand. Bonaparte was preparing to use the spoils of Italy for the
extension of the arena of strife. Nelson, then seeking to intercept the
supplies of Bonaparte's army in the Riviera, foresaw the danger and thus
graphically summarized it: "Italy is the gold mine; and if once entered,
is without means of resistance." As by a flash we see in this remark and
in that of de Lageard the miscalculation which was to ruin the life work
of Pitt and almost ruin his country.
Despite the opposition of the King and Grenville to the negotiations for
peace, Pitt held firm; and early in 1796 advances were made through
Wickham, our enterprising envoy in Switzerland. They were foredoomed to
failure; on 26th March the Directory declared its resolve to listen to
no proposals involving the surrender of any of the lands incorporated in
France by the terms of the constitution of 1795. This implied that she
would retain the Rhine boundary, along with Savoy, Nice, and Avignon.
Grenville received the news with satisfaction, remarking to Wickham that
the Directory had acted clumsily and "in fact played our game better
than we could have hoped."[419] The effect on public opinion was even
better when it appeared that France expected England to surrender her
colonial conquests. That France should gain enormously on land while the
British acquisitions oversea were surrendered, was so monstrous a claim
as to arouse the temper of the nation. Even Fox admitted that if France
retained her conquests in Europe, England must keep those gained at sea.
As Pitt pointed out in his speech of 10th May 1796, the French demands
blighted all hope of peace; and we must struggle on, "waiting for the
return of reason in our deluded enemy."
Pitt regarded the French conquest of Italy as counterbalanced by the
triumph of Jervis and Nelson at Cape St. Vincent in February 1797; and
he therefore refused to consider the cession of Gibraltar to Spain.
Wholeheartedly he sought for peace in that year. But it was to be peace
with honour. In fact, Great Britain fared better after 1796 than before.
As Allies fell away or joined the enemy, her real strength began to
appear. The reasons for the paradox are not far to seek. Open enemies
are less dangerous than false friends. Further, the complexities of the
war, resulting from the conflicting aims of the Allies, vanished.
England therefore could act in the way in which Pitt would all along
have preferred her to act, namely, against the enemy's colonies. In
Europe her attitude was defensive; and for a time in the summer and
autumn of 1796 fears of invasion were rife. Accordingly the
Quarter-Master-General, Sir David Dundas, drew up a scheme of coast
defence, especially for the district between Pegwell Bay and Pevensey
Bay; he also devised measures for "driving" the country in front of the
enemy. In November of that year he recommended the construction of
batteries or entrenchments at Shooter's Hill, Blackheath, on the hills
near Lee, Lewisham, Sydenham, Norwood, Streatham, Merton, and
Wandsworth. The failure of Hoche's attempt at Bantry Bay and the victory
off Cape St. Vincent somewhat assuaged these fears; but, owing to the
alarming state of Ireland, England remained on the defensive through the
years 1797-8, until Bonaparte's Egyptian expedition enabled her to
strike a crushing blow at the chief colonial enterprise of her
antagonist. That adventure, together with the aggressions of France at
Rome and in Switzerland, aroused the anger or fear of Russia, Austria,
and Naples, and thereby led up to the war of the Second Coalition.
* * * * *
Amidst the conflict of aims which distracted the Allies in the First
Coalition, Pitt's foresight was not seldom at fault. But only those who
have weighed the importance of the diplomatic issues at stake, and have
noted their warping influence on military affairs, have the right to
accuse him of blindness and presumption. The problem before him was of
unexampled complexity, and its solution could be effected only by a
succession of experiments. That he put forth too many efforts at one
time may be granted; and yet in each case, if the details are fully
known, the reasons for making the attempt seem adequate. Did not Chatham
fail in most of the expeditions which he sent against the coasts of
France? Even those who censure Pitt for his blunders in the war will
admit that the inspiring influence of his personality and patriotism
nerved the nation and Parliament for the struggle. True, the Opposition
indulged in petty nagging and in ingeniously unpatriotic tactics; but
they only served to throw up in bold relief the consistent and
courageous conduct of the Prime Minister. It was an easy task to refute
the peevish efforts of Fox to justify the French Jacobins alike before
the war, throughout its course, and in their rejection of the British
overtures for peace. But in every encounter Pitt won more than a
personal triumph. He proved that the war was forced upon us; that on our
side it was a defensive effort; and that despite the perverse conduct of
Prussia and Spain, England had won notable gains oversea and might
expect an advantageous peace, provided only that the nation persevered.
One question remains. Why did not Pitt call the nation to arms? The
reasons for his caution are doubtless to be found in the ingrained
conservatism of the English character, and in the political ferment
which marked the years 1794-5. The mere proposal to merge Line, Militia,
and Volunteers in one national array would have seemed mere madness. For
the populace had recently been protesting against the facilities given
to the loyal to arm and drill themselves. It was rumoured that, by way
of retort, the men of Sheffield, Southwark, and Norwich secretly
mustered for practice with pikes. In such circumstances, conscription
might well spell Revolution. Here was the weak place in Pitt's armour.
By parting company with the reformers, he had embittered no small
section of his countrymen. In 1794, as we have seen, he was considered a
reactionary and an oppressor. He therefore could not appeal to the
nation, as Carnot did in France. Even his Bill of March 1794 for
increasing the Militia by an extension of the old custom of the ballot
or the drawing of lots produced some discontent. A similar proposal,
passed a year earlier by the Dublin Parliament for raising 16,000
additional Militiamen in Ireland, led to widespread rioting, especially
in Ulster. Not until 1797 did the Scottish Militia Act ensure the
adoption of similar methods by Scotland, though regiments of Fencibles
were raised in the meantime.
The preparations for national defence continued to proceed in these
parochial ways. Pitt's authority at Westminster was at no time more
firmly founded than at the time of the meeting of the new Parliament in
the autumn of 1796. Yet the piecemeal methods went on as before. He
proposed to raise by means of the ballot a levy of 15,000 men in order
to recruit the navy and the Line regiments; and he further asked for a
levy of 60,000 men as a Supplementary Militia, one tenth being embodied
by turns so as not to withdraw from work too many hands at one time. Nor
was this all. For the purpose of strengthening the irregular cavalry, he
proposed that every person who kept ten horses should be required to
furnish one horseman and a horse for such a corps, and those who owned
more than ten horses were to subscribe a proportionate sum towards its
maintenance. He also required gamekeepers and those who took out
licenses to shoot either to serve on horseback or to find a substitute.
In all he expected to raise 20,000 horsemen by these means.
The attitude of the House was on the whole highly favourable to these
proposals. Fox accused Ministers of raising an invasion scare in order
to compass their own nefarious designs; but Pitt's first proposals
passed without a division; that on the cavalry by 140 votes to 30.
Nevertheless, Pitt did nothing towards securing cohesion in these
diverse forces, except by a provision which obliged Volunteers to enrol
in the Supplementary Militia, to take the oath as such, and to train by
turns for twenty days at a time in any part of the country, instead of
training once or twice a week in their own towns. This must have been
beneficial where it was carried out; but, as the Militia was controlled
by the Home Office, it is doubtful whether enough energy was thrown into
the scheme to ensure success.
These arrangements are miserably inadequate in comparison with the
_levée en masse_ of Carnot, which baffled the calculations of foreign
statesmen, flung back the armies of the Coalition, and opened up the
path of glory for Bonaparte. Here the popular armament did not become in
any sense national until after the renewal of war in 1803. The
possibilities open to England, even in that trying year 1795, were set
forth by Major Cartwright in a suggestive pamphlet--"The Commonwealth in
Danger." After pointing out that, having been deserted by Prussia and
Spain, we must now depend on ourselves alone, he depicted the contrast
between England and France. The French Republic, relying on the
populace, had more than a million of men under arms. Great Britain was
"a disarmed, defenceless, unprepared people, scarcely more capable of
resisting a torrent of French invaders than the herds and flocks of
Smithfield." How, then, could the danger be averted? Solely (he replied)
by trusting the people and by reviving the ancient laws which compelled
householders to bear arms. But this implied the concession of the
franchise. Be bold, he said. Make the Kingdom a Commonwealth and the
nation will be saved. He continued in these noteworthy words: "The enemy
is at the gates, and we must be friends or perish. Adversity is a school
of the sublime virtues. Necessity is an eloquent reconciler of
differences.... By saying to Britain--Be an armed nation, she secures
her defence and seals her freedom. A million of armed men, supporting
the State with their purse, and defending it with their lives, will know
that none have so great a stake as themselves in the Government....
Arming the people and reforming Parliament are inseparable."
At first sight this seems mere rhetoric, but on reflection it will
appear the path of prudence. By the talisman of trust in the people
France conjured up those armed hosts which overthrew old Europe. At the
stamp of Napoleon's heel a new Europe arose, wherein the most potent
defiance came from the peoples which drew upon their inmost reserves of
strength. That these consist in men, not in money, is clear from the
course of the struggle against the great Emperor. Spain, Russia, and
Prussia adopted truly national systems of defence, and quickly forged to
the front. Britain and Austria clung to their old systems, and, thanks
to Wellington's genius and Metternich's diplomacy, they survived. But
they did not play the decisive part which they might have done if
George III and Pitt, Francis II and Thugut, had early determined to
trust and arm their peoples. Unfortunately for England, she underwent no
military disaster; and therefore Pitt was fain to plod along in the old
paths and use the nation's wealth, not its manhood. He organized it
piecemeal, on a class basis, instead of embattling it as a whole. In the
main his failure to realize the possibilities of the situation arose
from his abandonment of those invigorating principles which nerved him
to the achievements of the earlier and better part of his career. It is
conceivable that, had he retained the idealism of his youth and
discovered a British Scharnhorst, Waterloo might have been fought in
1796 and won solely by British troops.
FOOTNOTES:
[411] "Diary of a Tour through Great Britain in 1795," by W. MacRitchie
(1897).
[412] "Dropmore P.," ii, 172.
[413] In "H. O.," Geo. III (Domestic), 27, are Dundas's instructions to
Moira, dated 20th November 1793, appointing him Major-General in an
expedition to Guernsey, with Admiral MacBride, taking with him a Hessian
corps as soon as it arrives. He is to seize St. Malo or any place near
it suitable for helping the Royalists and harassing the enemy. If he
deems success doubtful, he is to await reinforcements. The aim is to
help the cause of Louis XVII and lead to a general pacification.
[414] "Malmesbury Diaries," iii, 96-8.
[415] Chevening MSS.
[416] Pretyman MSS.
[417] "Cornwallis Corresp.," ii, 289.
[418] "Life of Wilberforce," ii, 92.
[419] Sorel, v, 41; "Wickham Corresp.," i, 269-74, 343. Some
mis-statements of Sorel may be noted here. On pp. 39, 40 of vol. v he
states that Pitt was intent on acquiring Malta and Egypt (though he was
then in doubt whether to retain Corsica): also that, after the insult to
George III in London on 29th October 1795, Pitt proposed a loan of
£18,000,000 and new taxes, which Parliament refused. The facts are that
Pitt asked for that loan on 7th December 1796, and it was subscribed in
twenty-two hours. On the same day Parliament voted the new taxes.