PITT AND THE ALLIES (1794-5)
The main object of His Majesty is the keeping together by
influence and weight this great Confederation by which alone the
designs of France can be resisted, and which, if left to itself,
would be too likely to fall to pieces from the jarring interests
of the Powers engaged in it.--GRENVILLE TO MALMESBURY, _21st
April 1794_.
The disgraceful failure of every military operation His Prussian
Majesty has undertaken since the year 1791 has destroyed the
reputation of the Prussian army; and the duplicity and
versatility of his Cabinet put an end to all confidence and good
faith.--MALMESBURY TO GRENVILLE, _20th September 1794_.
As in parliamentary life, so too in the wider spheres of diplomacy and
warfare, a Coalition very rarely holds together under a succession of
sharp blows. This is inherent in the nature of things. A complex or
heterogeneous substance is easily split up by strokes which leave a
homogeneous body intact. Rocks of volcanic origin defy the hammer under
which conglomerates crumble away; and when these last are hurled against
granite or flint, they splinter at once. Well might Shakespeare speak
through the mouth of Ulysses these wise words on the divisions of the
Greeks before Troy:
Look how many Grecian tents do stand
Hollow upon this plain, so many hollow factions.
...
Troy in our weakness stands, not in her strength.[335]
Pitt and his colleagues were under no illusion as to the weakness of the
first Coalition against France. They well knew the incurable jealousies
of the Houses of Hapsburg and Hohenzollern, the utter weakness of the
Holy Roman Empire, the poverty or torpor of Spain, Sardinia, and
Naples, the potent distractions produced by the recent partition of
Poland, and the Machiavellian scheme of the Empress Catharine II to busy
the Central Powers in French affairs so that she might have a free hand
at Warsaw. All this and much more stood revealed to them. But they
grounded their hopes of success on two important considerations; first,
that the finances of France were exhausted; secondly, that the rule of
the Jacobins, fertile in forced loans, forced service, and guillotining,
must speedily collapse. On the subject of French finance there are many
notes in the Pitt Papers, which show that Pitt believed an utter
breakdown to be imminent. Grenville, too, at the close of October 1793,
stated that France had lost at least 200,000 soldiers, while more than
50,000 were in hospital. The repugnance to military service was
universal, and the deficit for the month of August alone was close on
£17,000,000.[336]
Above all, Pitt and Grenville believed the French Government to be
incompetent as well as exasperatingly cruel. In their eyes Jacobins were
sworn foes to all that made government possible. The mistake was
natural. The English Ministers knew little of what was going on in
France, and therefore failed to understand that the desperadoes now in
power at Paris were wielding a centralized despotism, compared with
which that of Louis XIV was child's play. As to the Phoenix-like
survival of French credit, it is inexplicable even to those who have
witnessed the wonders wrought by Thiers in 1870-3. All that can be said
is that the Jacobins killed the goose that laid the golden egg, and yet
the golden eggs were laid. Let him who understands the miracle of
revolutionary finance cast the first stone at Pitt.
The Prime Minister also erred when he believed the French social
structure to be breaking up. Here again the miscalculation was perfectly
natural in an age which regarded kings, nobles, and bishops as the fixed
stars of a universe otherwise diversified only by a dim Milky Way. The
French were the first to dispel these notions. In truth the strength of
the young giant bore witness to the potency of the new and as yet allied
forces--Democracy and Nationality. In 1792 Democracy girded itself
eagerly against the semi-feudal Powers, Austria and Prussia; but the
strength latent in the French people appeared only in the next year
when, on the accession of England, Spain, and the Empire to the
Coalition, plans were discussed of detaching Alsace, Lorraine,
Roussillon, and Flanders.[337] To these sacrilegious schemes the French
patriots opposed the dogma of Rousseau--the indivisibility of the
general will. "Perish 25,000,000 Frenchmen rather than the Republic one
and indivisible." This perfervid, if illogical, exclamation of a
Commissioner of the Convention reveals something of that passion for
unity which now fused together the French nation. Some peoples merge
themselves slowly together under the shelter of kindred beliefs and
institutions. Others again, after feeling their way towards closer
union, finally achieve it in the explosion of war or revolution. The
former case was the happy lot of the British nation; the latter, that of
the French. Pitt, with his essentially English outlook, failed to
perceive that the diverse peoples grouped together under the French
monarchy had now attained to an indissoluble unity under the stress of
the very blows which he and his Allies dealt in Flanders, Alsace, and
Provence.
For by this time the counter-strokes dealt by the Republicans were
telling with fatal effect on their adversaries. The failure of the
Spanish campaign in Roussillon and the irruption of a French force into
Catalonia dashed the spirits of that weak and wavering monarch,
Charles IV; and already whispers were heard that peace with France was
necessary. The disputes with England concerning Nootka Sound and affairs
at Toulon predisposed the King and his people to think with less horror
of the regicides of Paris. As for Sardinia, the childish obscurantism of
the Court of Turin had nursed to quick life a mushroom growth of
Jacobinism. The army defending the Alpine passes was honeycombed with
discontent; and the suspicious conduct of Austria towards her little
ally foreshadowed the divisions and disasters which quickly followed on
the advent of Bonaparte at that theatre of the war.
It was clear that only from London could come the impulse which would
invigorate this anaemic Coalition. Pitt sought to impart such an impulse
in the King's Speech at the opening of the Session of 1794. It had
throughout a defiant ring. The capture of three of the northern
fortresses of France, the gains in the East and West Indies (they
amounted to Pondicherry, Chandernagore, and Tobago, together with
Miquelon and St. Pierre), the blow dealt to her navy at Toulon, and the
impossibility of her continuing the recent prodigious exertions, were in
turn duly emphasized. And on 21st January 1794, when Fox moved an
amendment in favour of peace, the Prime Minister spoke even more
strongly of the madness of coming to terms with the present rulers of
France. Could any statesman not gifted with second sight have spoken
otherwise? At that time the Reign of Terror was approaching its climax.
The Goddess of Reason had lately been enthroned in Notre Dame amidst
ribald songs and dances. The schism between Robespierre and the
atheistical party was beginning to appear; and few persons believed that
France would long bend the knee before the lords of the guillotine,
whose resources were largely derived from the plunder of churches and
banks, forced loans from the wealthy, and a graduated Income Tax
resembling the Spartan proposals of Thomas Paine.
In such a case Pitt naturally repeated his statement of the previous
session, that he altogether deprecated a peace with France, unless it
possessed some elements of permanence, and secured due indemnity to
Great Britain. Nay, he declared that he would rather persevere with war,
even in the midst of disasters, than come to terms with the present
rulers of France, who were alike enemies of order and rabid foes of
England. They drove men into battle by fear of the guillotine; they
formed rapine and destruction into a system, and perverted to their
detestable purposes all the talents and ingenuity derived from the
civilization around them. He was careful, however, to correct the
mis-statement of Fox, that the Government was struggling for the
restoration of the French monarchy. While believing that that nation
would live most happily under a King, Pitt denied that a restoration was
the object of the present war. We have already seen that he held this
view in his correspondence with the Austrian Court. The House supported
Ministers by 277 votes to 59.
These declarations, backed by so large a majority, caused great
satisfaction at Vienna, and heartened that Government in the midst of
its many uncertainties. There was every need of encouragement. In that
age, when the great monarchs of the eighteenth century had passed, or
were passing, away, Francis II stood somewhat low among the
mediocrities on whom fell the strokes of destiny. He was a poor replica
of Leopold II. Where the father was supple and adroit, the son was
perversely obstinate or weakly pliable. In place of foresight and
tenacity in the pursuit of essentials, Francis was remarkable for a more
than Hapsburg narrowness of view, and he lacked the toughness which had
not seldom repaired the blunders of that House. Those counsellors swayed
him most who appealed to his family pride, or satisfied his other
dominant feelings, attachment to the old order of things and a pedantic
clinging to established usages. But the weakness of his character soon
became so patent as to excite general distrust, especially as he was
swayed by the wayward impulses of his consort, a daughter of
Ferdinand IV and Maria Carolina of Naples. From her mother she inherited
a hatred of French principles and the bent towards intrigue and
extravagance which wrecked the careers of that Queen and of her sister,
Marie Antoinette. Francis II and his consort longed to stamp out the
French plague; but they lacked the strength of mind and of will that
commands success. Our special envoy at Vienna, Thomas Grenville,
questioned whether the Emperor "had steadiness enough to influence the
Government."
According to the same competent judge, the Chancellor Thugut was the
only efficient Minister, being very laborious in his work, and indeed
"the only man of business about the Court."[338] Yet Thugut was rather a
clever diplomat and ideal head-clerk than a statesman. In forethought he
did not much excel his master. Indeed, his personality and his position
alike condemned him to aim at cheap and easy gains. His features and
figure were mean. Worse still, he was of low birth, a crime in the eyes
of nobles and courtiers who for nearly half a century had seen the
prestige of the Chancery enhanced by the lordly airs and whims of
Kaunitz. Fear of courtly intrigues ever obsessed the mind of Thugut; and
thus, whenever the horizon darkened, this coast-hugging pilot at once
made for the nearest haven. In particular, as the recovery of Belgium in
the year 1793 brought no financial gain, but unending vistas of war, he
sought other means of indemnity, and discovered them in Alsace-Lorraine,
South Poland, and Venice. The first was a concession to the pride of
the House of Hapsburg-Lorraine; but Thugut saw in Venetia and in the
land south of Warsaw the readiest means of indemnifying Austria for the
loss of her Belgic Provinces, which after the defeat of Wattignies
(October 1793) he probably expected and welcomed.
In this orientation of Hapsburg policy Thugut did but follow the impulse
first imparted by Hertzberg at Berlin. As we have seen, Frederick
William II entered on the French war in one of his chivalrous moods,
which passed away amidst the smoke of Valmy. The miseries of the retreat
Rhinewards, and the incursion of the French into the valley of the Main
taught him prudence, while the ease of his conquest of Great Poland
early in the year 1793 assured the victory of statecraft over chivalry.
Morton Eden reported from Berlin that, had the preparations for the
Valmy campaign equalled in thoroughness those for the invasion of
Poland, events must have gone very differently in Champagne. The
circumspection with which the Prussians conducted the siege of Mainz in
the summer of 1793, and the long delays of the autumn, have already been
noticed. The result of it was that at Christmastide of the year 1793
Pichegru and Hoche threw back Wurmser in disastrous rout, and compelled
Brunswick hurriedly to retire to the Rhine.
As always happens between discordant allies after defeats, Berlin and
Vienna indulged in a war of words, amidst which the Coalition would
probably have broken up but for the efforts of British diplomacy. The
Pitt Ministry had despatched to Berlin the ablest of British
diplomatists, Lord Malmesbury, with a view to strengthening the accord
between the three Powers; and the mingled charm and authority of his
presence did much to thwart the petty prejudices and intrigues prevalent
at that capital. He took Brussels and Frankfurt on his way to Berlin,
and his diary shows the listlessness or discontent which had infected
the officers of the British army. Many of them openly brought against
the Duke of York the most outrageous and unfounded charges, and it seems
that about fifty of them went on furlough to England, where they spread
those slanders and played into the hands of the Opposition.[339]
Malmesbury's converse with the Duke and others at Ath convinced him that
the commander-in-chief was striving manfully and generously against a
situation full of difficulty.
At Frankfurt, and again at Berlin, Malmesbury found signs that Frederick
William was ashamed at the ignominious issue of the campaign, and
professed a desire to take up the duties which the Duke of Brunswick had
so haltingly fulfilled. The King seemed rather pleased than otherwise at
the Austrian reverses in the north of Alsace, but by no means indisposed
to renew the attack upon France, always provided that England paid him a
sufficient subsidy. He assured the envoy that his _chef-d'oeuvre_, the
Triple Alliance of 1788, was still a reality, but he declared, on the
faith of an honest man, that the state of Prussia's finances would not
enable him to face a third campaign. In point of fact, out of the
reserve fund of 80,000,000 crowns which Frederick the Great had handed
on, only 20,000,000 or perhaps only 14,000,000 remained in the early
days of 1794.[340]
Other difficulties beset the Prussian monarch. Want of work had driven
the weavers of Silesia to a state of frenzy and tumult almost resembling
a _Jacquerie_; and there and elsewhere serfs and peasants talked openly
of casting off the restraints and burdens of Feudalism. In such a case
the veriest autocrat must pause before he commits his country to the
risks of a loan (that of 1792 had exhausted Prussia's credit), or to a
campaign where the losses were certain and the gains doubtful. On this
last topic various schemes had been bandied to and fro between Berlin
and Vienna. The debt of honour certainly bade Frederick William help to
secure to his rival a counterpart to Prussia's acquisitions in Poland;
but, apart from this consideration and the need of stamping out the
French pest in the Rhineland, the politicians of Berlin found few
reasons for prolonging the war. What wonder, then, that they set on foot
intrigues with the regicides of Paris? Marshal Möllendorf, the commander
whom Frederick William substituted for the weary and disgusted Duke of
Brunswick, proved to be a partisan of peace.[341]
Royalist at heart, but beset by advisers and mistresses who fanned his
jealousy of Austria and love of ease, Frederick William wavered under
the whims of the hour or the counsels of the last comer. Malmesbury thus
summed up the question now at issue in his letter to Pitt of 9th January
1794: "Can we do without the King of Prussia or can we not? If we can,
he is not worth the giving of a guinea for. If we cannot, I am afraid we
cannot give too many." Malmesbury saw no means of keeping Frederick
William steady up to the end of the war. Pitt and Grenville, however,
devised the following expedient. They offered the sum of £2,000,000 for
bringing 100,000 Prussians into the field. Of this sum Great Britain
would furnish two fifths (or £800,000), and Austria and Holland each one
fifth, the last fifth being advanced by Prussia herself until she
reimbursed herself from France at the general peace. The device was
suggestive of that of the rustic who tempts his beast of burden onwards
by dangling a choice vegetable before his nose.
Frederick William alone might have been attracted by the offer; but his
advisers haggled long and obstinately over details. Chief among the
objectors was a Councillor of State, Haugwitz, an oily, plausible
creature, whose Gallophil leanings were destined finally to place his
country under the heel of Napoleon and deal a death-blow to Pitt. For
the present, he treated Malmesbury with a moderation and courtesy that
deftly veiled a determined opposition. The British envoy was fully his
match. Finding that Haugwitz ascribed all difficulties and delays to the
Austrian embassy, he advised him to propose the transfer of the
negotiations to The Hague, where these annoyances would cease. Vain and
always prone to take the easiest course, Haugwitz swallowed the bait and
succeeded in carrying a point which was all in Malmesbury's favour,
especially as it saved time in communicating with Downing Street. After
annoying delays they set out on 23rd March; and with the aid of
twenty-two horses at each post traversed the 326 (English) miles to The
Hague in 120 hours during the days, 23rd-30th March, when the campaign
ought to have opened.
The prospects at Vienna were equally gloomy. Morton Eden's reports to
Grenville form an unrelieved jeremiad. Even amidst the alarms caused by
the disasters at Toulon and in the Palatinate, jealousy of Prussia was
the dominant feeling. The utmost efforts of our ambassador failed to
convince Francis II and Thugut of the need of humouring Prussia by
meeting her demand for an additional subsidy and by guaranteeing bread
and forage for the 20,000 men who formed her contingent in the Austrian
service. Into these wearisome quarrels we need not enter, further than
to note that they were envenomed by the acerbity of the Prussian
ambassador at Vienna. The Marquis Lucchesini, born at Lucca in 1752,
early entered the service of Frederick the Great, to whom he acted as
reader. He advanced rapidly under his successor. His commanding
demeanour and vivacity of speech, added to great powers of work, and
acuteness in detecting the foibles of others, made him a formidable
opponent. Further, his marriage with the sister of Bischoffswerder,
until lately the King's favourite adviser, added to his influence,
which, as was natural with a foreigner, inclined towards the attractive
and gainful course. Long afterwards the saviour of Prussia, Baron vom
Stein, classed him among the narrow, selfish, insincere men who had been
the ruin of nations.[342] Certainly he helped to ruin Poland; and now
his conduct at Vienna clogged the efforts of Morton Eden and Malmesbury
to strengthen the Coalition against France. Eden complained that he
behaved as an intriguing subaltern rather than as an ambassador; and
rumour credibly ascribed his tortuous and exasperating conduct to French
gold.
In the midst of his irritation against Prussia and her envoy, Thugut
heard with astonishment the British proposals, presented at Berlin early
in February, to bring 100,000 Prussians into the field. Urgently he
remonstrated with Eden, pointing out that Prussia had played them false
in two campaigns, and would do so again, witness her late contention
that France must not be weakened. On no account, then, must Frederick
William head a compact mass of 100,000 men in the Palatinate. He would
be the arbiter of the situation. He would be between the Austrian army
in Brabant and the Hapsburg States. Nay, he might march into Swabia,
reach the Danube, take boats at Ulm, and, sailing down that stream, have
Vienna at his mercy![343] So pressing were these anxieties that, at the
close of February, Thugut sent a special request to Catharine II to
guarantee the security of Austria's possessions in case Frederick
William withdrew from the Coalition.
Despite the utmost efforts of the British Ministry and its envoys, no
plan of vigorous co-operation could be arranged between the two German
rivals; the sole link connecting them was the clause of the treaty of
1792, whereby Austria, as having been attacked by France, claimed the
help of 20,000 Prussians. Frederick William decided that this force
must remain at Mainz, in order to guard the Empire from a French raid.
He promised 80,000 more troops to Great Britain and Holland, provided
that they were paid for. On one point alone the four Allies came near to
agreement, namely, that the main Prussian army should operate in
Flanders, so as effectively to defend the Dutch territory, secure
conquests in the North of France, and, above all, preclude the quarrels
which must ensue if it acted near the Austrians.[344] Thugut of course
assented, his great aim being to remove the Prussians as far as possible
from Swabia. Disputes on these subjects went on up to the end of March
1794, the time when an advance into French Flanders promised great
results.
The reader will naturally ask--Can this be called a Coalition? A
Coalition implies some power of coalescing. But among the four Powers
there was far more of disunion than union. In fact, England was the sole
link between these wrangling confederates, and that, too, solely by
means of what Carlyle called the cash nexus. Grenville, using a more
homely metaphor, averred that the German princes turned towards England
as an inexhaustible milch-cow. The animal in this case could dictate her
terms; and thus the relations of the three Powers resembled those of a
rich but somewhat exigent employer to grumbling and distrustful
employees. Holland also, in return for her sacrifices in men and money,
demanded from Austria a better frontier on the side of Dutch Flanders
and Maestricht, to which the Viennese Court opposed a quiet but firm
resistance.
It speaks volumes for the confidence inspired by Pitt and Grenville, and
for the tactful zeal of Malmesbury and Eden, that they induced the
German rivals to make one more effort. The Duke of York also played an
important part in the formation of the plan of campaign; for he it was
who persuaded Colonel Mack to accompany him to London, and there discuss
with Ministers the alternative schemes. The mention of Mack will excite
surprise among those who know of him only by the futile Neapolitan
campaign of 1799, and the frightful disaster of Ulm. In regard to
strategy and the theory of war he displayed much ability; and his
administrative talents and energy as Quarter-Master-General in 1793
should have screened him from the criticism that he discoursed
brilliantly on war in _salons_, and in the council rhetorically
developed specious and elegant plans.[345]
Mack's plan of operations was first submitted to the judgement of the
Archduke Charles, the Prince of Coburg, Count Mercy, the Prince of
Orange, and the Duke of York, at Brussels. Next, he proceeded, along
with Counts Stahremberg and Merveldt to London, and on 13th February
unfolded his plan to Pitt, Grenville, and Dundas. The Duke of York had
preceded him by two days, but was absent from this conference. It became
piquant when Pitt "playfully" remarked to Mack that a great general had
recently arrived at London whose appointment to the command of the
British force in Flanders would doubtless meet with his warm approval.
After a little more fencing, Pitt gave the name of the Marquis
Cornwallis, who had just returned from his Viceroyalty in India. Mack by
no means welcomed the proposal, and made the irreverent remark that the
best General, after fighting elephants in India, would be puzzled by the
French. Pitt thereupon observed that the Duke of York had not the
confidence of the army, to which Mack and Merveldt replied by praising
his character, and decrying his critics as a set of influential but
inexperienced youths.
The matter then dropped, and the Duke was present at the conference on
the morrow. Finally, Austria and England bound themselves to make great
efforts, the latter with at least 40,000 men, either British or German
auxiliaries. The Prussian and Dutch forces were to be increased so as to
bring the grand total to 340,000 men. Of this large number 170,000 were
to operate in Flanders with a view to a march on Paris; 35,000 held the
country along the right bank of the Meuse; 15,000 protected Luxemburg;
65,000 Prussians prolonged the line eastwards to the Rhine, which was
guarded by 55,000 Austrians. Certainly the plan called for a third of a
million of men, if all the frontier strongholds of Flanders were to be
taken before the march to Paris began. In regard to details, Pitt,
Grenville, and Dundas urged that Cornwallis should command the British
and subsidiary forces defending West Flanders--a suggestion which
George III warmly approved, on condition that the Duke of York, serving
with the main body nearer the centre of the long line, had a number of
troops proportionate to his rank and talents.
Thus the effort of Pitt and his colleagues to shelve the Duke of York
was foiled. On another and weightier matter he had his way. Coburg's
conduct had been so languid and unenterprising as to lead to urgent
demands for his recall; and it was understood that the Emperor Francis
would take the command, with Mack as Chief-of-Staff and virtual director
of the campaign. Pitt expressed to Mack his marked preference of this
arrangement to the alternative scheme, the appointment of the Archduke
Charles; for the extreme youth of the Archduke might hinder a good
understanding between him and his subordinate and senior, the Duke of
York. Seeing, then, that Mack declined absolutely to serve under
Coburg,[346] nothing but the presence of the Emperor could end the
friction in Flanders.
But alas for the monarchical cause! At the very time when the Kaiser was
to set out for Brussels, alarming news came from Cracow. The temper of
the Poles, heated by the wrongs and insults of two years, burst forth in
a rising against the Russian and Prussian authorities. Kosciusko, the
last hope of Poland, issued an appeal which nerved his countrymen to
dare the impossible. Rushing to arms, they astonished the world by
exhibiting in the last throes of their long agony a strength which, if
put forth in 1791, might have saved their land from spoliation. Even now
their despairing struggles turned towards Warsaw much of the energy
which should have trended towards Paris; and thus, once again, and not
for the last time, did the foul crimes of 1772 and 1793 avenge
themselves on their perpetrators. The last struggles of Poland helped on
the French Republic to its mighty adolescence. Finally, on 2nd April,
Francis II departed for Brussels. Thugut set out nine days later; and in
the interval, on the plausible pretext that Prussia would seize more
Polish land, he stopped the reinforcements destined for Flanders. He
also urged the Czarina on no account to allow a partition of
Poland.[347]
While the Continental States were thus pulling different ways, British
diplomacy won two notable triumphs at The Hague. By dint of threatening
Haugwitz with the rupture of the whole negotiation, Malmesbury induced
that Minister to countermand the order for the retirement of the
Prussian troops, which had already begun. He thereby saved the Allies in
the Palatinate and Flanders from very serious risks in view of the
gathering masses of the French.[348] Further, on 19th April, he induced
Haugwitz to sign a treaty which promised to revivify the monarchical
cause. Prussia agreed to furnish, by 24th May, 62,400 men, who were to
act conjointly with the British and Dutch forces in Flanders. For this
powerful succour the two Maritime States would pay a subsidy of £50,000
a month, besides the cost of bread and forage, reckoned at £1 12_s._ per
man per month, and £300,000 for initial expenses. As Great Britain and
Holland wholly supported this army, they prescribed the sphere of its
operations, and retained any conquests that it might make. The treaty
was for the year 1794; but its renewal was stipulated in a separate
article. Prussia of course still supplied to Austria the 20,000 men due
by the treaty of 1792.
If Malmesbury had not induced Haugwitz to sign the treaty then, it would
never have been signed at all. Almost alone in the Court of Berlin,
Frederick William desired to continue the struggle. His uncle, Prince
Henry, had always opposed war with France, and long before Valmy, had
prophesied that her untrained but enthusiastic levies would be a match
for any professional army. His influence and that of the Duke of
Brunswick, Lucchesini, and Möllendorf, were still cast against the
western crusade, so that Grenville believed Prussia to be dragging on
the negotiation solely in order to embarrass her Allies by throwing it
up early in the campaign.[349] Moreover, Malmesbury's treaty contained
its own death warrant. A Great Power can ill afford to hire out its
troops to non-military States, unless they lessen the humiliation of
such a proceeding by according the utmost possible freedom. But the
Hague Convention specified that the subsidized Prussian army must
operate where the paymasters directed; and they now decided on removing
it from the Palatinate to the valley of the Meuse near Dinant, or even
further west, provided that Austria could fill up the gap thus left in
the Palatinate.[350] In passing, I may note that this important decision
was due to George III, as appears in Grenville's final instruction to
Malmesbury: "The King's determination is finally taken not to agree to
any plan by which the Prussians would be employed more to the left than
the country of the Meuse."[351] No one who knows the rigour of the
King's resolves can doubt that he was responsible for a determination
fraught with unexpected issues.
It is alien to my purpose to recount the ensuing disputes. I can glance
only at the part played by Pitt. At one point his conduct was weak and
dilatory. Early in May, when Malmesbury proceeded to London for the
purpose of securing the ratification of the treaty and the payment of
the first subsidy to Prussia, he encountered most annoying delays. Pitt
and Grenville left him severely alone, probably because they were then
so occupied with the coercion of the English Jacobins as to have no time
for the plans which promised the overthrow of the French Jacobins.
Another topic engaging their attention was the hoped-for coalition with
the Portland Whigs, which shrouded from their gaze the needs of the
European Coalition. However we may explain the fact, it is certain that
during sixteen days (6th to 22nd May) Malmesbury, despite his urgent
entreaties to Grenville, could procure neither instructions as to his
future conduct, nor a promise for the payment of the first Prussian
subsidy. News of a British disaster in Flanders at last quickened the
laggards of Whitehall. On the 23rd Malmesbury gained his heart's desire,
and set out for the Prussian headquarters on the following day.[352]
Meanwhile, owing to this long delay (one of the most discreditable
incidents in the careers of Pitt and Grenville), Prussia took no steps
to carry out the terms of the compact. It so happened that on 24th May
her army in the Palatinate, commanded by Möllendorf, gained a victory
over the French at Kaiserslautern in the Palatinate; but that event set
them the more against Malmesbury's treaty, which implied a march of some
120 miles through difficult country, and across an enemy's front.
Moreover, as has been hinted, reverses had by this time overtaken the
right wing of the Allies, in West Flanders. At the centre, near the
Sambre, the campaign opened with promise, the British cavalry gaining a
brilliant success at Bethencourt. But Carnot, having drawn upon the
French troops in Lorraine and the Palatinate, threw his heaviest columns
at points on the extreme west of the French front, the result being that
at Turcoing the Republicans shattered the isolated corps of the Duke of
York and General Otto (18th May). The successes of the Prussians and of
the Austrian army, on the Sambre, saved the situation for a time. But
the prospects even in that quarter were overclouded by the resolve of
the Emperor Francis to leave his army and return to Vienna. News of the
critical state of affairs in Poland prompted this decision, the results
of which soon appeared in quarrels at headquarters and discouragement in
the rank and file. The Austrian soldiery saw in the withdrawal of the
Kaiser the end of his rule in the Netherlands. They were right. The
counsels of Thugut had now prevailed. South Poland was to be the prize
of the Hapsburgs. The tiresome and distant Netherlands were to be given
up, the pecuniary support of England, however, being assured as far as
possible by a feint of defending them.
Here we have the explanation of the half-hearted effort made by the
Austrians at Fleurus. There was every reason why Coburg, now again the
commander of the main Austrian force, should strike vigorously at the
French force besieging Charleroi. A decisive victory in front of
Charleroi would not only save that place, but would give pause to the
French forces further west, now advancing rapidly towards Ghent.
Accordingly Coburg, advancing as far as Fleurus, hard by the village of
Ligny, attacked the Republicans. He had on the whole the best of the
fight, when the arrival of news of the surrender of Charleroi led him
most tamely to call off his men and fall back. The retirement took place
in discreditably good order, not a single gun being lost (25th June
1794). A bold leader would have beaten the enemy and probably would have
saved Charleroi. With the same excess of prudence Coburg conducted his
retreat, several positions and strongholds being abandoned in craven
fashion.
Meanwhile Pitt and Dundas made great efforts to save West Flanders. In
haste they despatched reinforcements to Ostend; and among the regiments
which landed there on 25th and 26th June was the 33rd, commanded by
Colonel Wellesley. The future Duke of Wellington found the small
garrison of Ostend in a state of panic; and his chief, the Earl of
Moira, deemed it best to meet the French in the open. By great good
fortune Moira, with most of the regiments, reached Bruges, and beyond
that town came into touch with Clerfait's force. Wellesley, taking ship,
sailed round to Antwerp and reached that column by a safer route and
earlier than his chief. His action is characteristic of a judgement that
never erred, a will that never faltered. In this campaign, as he
afterwards said, he learnt how not to make war. But success not seldom
crowns the efforts of him who has the good sense to probe the causes of
failure. Certainly it rarely comes to British commanders save after very
chastening experiences; and Wellesley now took part in what was, for the
Austrians, a fore-ordained retreat. Despite the manly appeals of the
Duke of York, Coburg declined to make a stand on the fateful ridge of
Mount St. Jean; and the name of Waterloo appears in the tepid records of
1794 at the head of a plan for arranging the stages of the retreat (5th
July) which the nervousness of Coburg soon condemned to the limbo of
unfulfilled promises.[353] Is it surprising that, two days later, the
Duke of York declared to him that the British were "betrayed and sold to
the enemy"? Worse still, the garrisons of Valenciennes, Condé, Quesnoy,
and Landrecies, amounting to nearly 11,000 men, were now left to their
fate.
Indirectly Pitt and Dundas were responsible for these disasters. They
weakened the British force in Flanders by sending large drafts to the
West Indies, as will in due course appear. They also allowed Corsica to
be occupied in the spring of 1794, and yet they made little or no use of
that island for expeditions against the Riviera, which the royalist
natives would readily have undertaken under an inspiring leader. They
also relied too much on the Austrians and Prussians, though the former
were known to care little for their Netherlands, apart from the prospect
of gaining the Barrier fortresses of French Flanders in order to further
the Belgic-Bavarian exchange. Above all, as we have seen, Pitt's conduct
towards Prussia was annoyingly halting. Malmesbury's treaty could have
no effect unless it led the Prussians to move at once. The delay of
sixteen days at Whitehall must rank as one of the causes of the failures
just recounted; and though Grenville was technically guilty, Pitt must
be blamed for not ensuring the needful despatch in an all-important
decision. It is curious that he never realized his responsibility.
Speaking at a later date of the campaign of Fleurus, he said that it
turned upon as narrow a point as ever occurred: that England was
unfortunate, but the blame did not rest with her.[354] This probably
refers to the surrender of Charleroi and the retreat from Fleurus. But
Pitt did not understand that the timely advent of part of the Prussian
force on the Meuse, or even its advance into Lorraine, would have
changed the situation; and for their inactivity he was in some measure
responsible.
At times Pitt lived in dreamland. On 15th July, while the Austrians were
quietly withdrawing from Central Belgium, he drew up a Memorandum as to
the course of events. By the close of the year Austria was to bring
100,000 men into Flanders, a close alliance being framed on the basis of
her acquisition of the French border districts (Valenciennes had not yet
surrendered). England was to retain all conquests in the two Indies. The
Prussians were to march towards Flanders, which they obstinately refused
to do. Dutch and other troops were to be engaged by England, the
presumption being that the year 1795 would see the losses of 1794 more
than retrieved. The mistake of 10,000 in adding up the totals of the
troops (78,000 instead of 88,000) enables one to conjecture at what time
of the day this sketch was outlined.[355] One would not take it
seriously had not the Foreign Office soon despatched Earl Spencer and
Mr. Thomas Grenville as special envoys to Vienna to propose very similar
plans, Austria being urged on by the prospect of acquiring the French
Barrier fortresses from Lille to Sedan.[356]
They aroused in Thugut a spirit of greed, not of honourable emulation.
In a private letter to Pitt, dated Vienna 16th August, Spencer warned
him that that Government was "neither possessed of sufficient energy and
vigour, nor sufficiently actuated by the true principles on which the
cause in which we are engaged ought to be conducted" to justify the
demands of Thugut. They included British subsidies for Austria, though
she could well support the war, and the sacrifice of British maritime
conquests at the general peace as a means of ensuring the recovery of
her losses on land. As to Belgium, added Spencer, Thugut looked on it
"as irrecoverably lost and not worth regaining, unless with the addition
of a very strong and extended barrier, composed of fortresses which he
to-day plainly told us he did not think there was the least chance of
taking in the course of the war, but that they must be obtained as
cessions from France at the peace."[357] Thus Thugut expected that, while
the Austrians were ignominiously evacuating the Netherlands, the
British fleet should win French colonies valuable enough to induce
France both to retire from Belgium, and to surrender to Austria her
northern fortresses from Lille to Sedan or Thionville.
The capture of Valenciennes and the slaughter of the _émigrés_ in the
Austrian garrison was the retort of the French to these day-dreams (29th
August). The fall of Robespierre a month earlier, and the enhanced
authority now enjoyed by Carnot enabled the authorities at Paris to
press on the conquest of Belgium with an energy which set at defiance
the boyish miscalculations of Pitt and the wavering plans of the
Hapsburgs.
Towards the close of July Pitt and Grenville saw the need of abating the
rigour of their demands on Prussia. For of what use was it to move
60,000 Prussians more than 100 miles to defend West Flanders when that
province was lost? Malmesbury therefore was empowered to pay the monthly
subsidy of £50,000 on behalf of Great Britain and Holland, provided that
Möllendorf's army attacked the French about Trèves, thus lessening the
pressure on Coburg's left wing. On 27th July he framed such an agreement
with Hardenberg. This statesman was destined to be one of the saviours
of the Prussian State in its darkest days, 1810-12; but now, as always,
his conduct was shifty; and it is questionable whether he, any more than
Haugwitz, dealt honourably with England. It must suffice to say that
Möllendorf made not even a demonstration towards Trèves. His inactivity
was in part due to the withdrawal of several regiments towards Poland,
though Great Britain and Holland still paid for the maintenance of the
full quota on the Rhine.
So flagrant was the breach of faith as to elicit heated protests from
Malmesbury; and Pitt, justly indignant at the use of British money for
what was virtually a partition of Poland, decided to remonstrate with
Jacobi, the Prussian ambassador at London. Summoning him to Downing
Street, at the end of September, he upbraided him with this
dishonourable conduct, declaring that, unless the Prussians moved
forward at once, the British and Dutch subsidy for October would be
withheld. Much as we may sympathize with this indignant outburst, we
must pronounce it unwise. For firstly, Pitt was intruding upon the
sphere of Grenville in making this declaration, which was far more acrid
than the despatches of the Foreign Secretary. Secondly, it was made in
the presence of Dundas, with whom Grenville was already on bad terms. Is
it surprising that the Foreign Secretary wrote sharply to Pitt
protesting against his acting on a line different from that previously
taken at Downing Street? In his despatch of 30th September to Berlin,
Grenville was careful to make the withdrawal of the subsidy strictly
conditional, and his protest was probably less sharp than that which
Pitt addressed to Jacobi.
So annoyed was Grenville at Pitt's interference during his own temporary
absence that he wrote to express his willingness to retire from the
Foreign Office if this would solve the difficulties caused by the
appointment of Earl Fitzwilliam to the Irish Viceroyalty. To that topic
I shall recur in a later chapter on the Irish troubles which now became
acute. Here it must suffice to say that Pitt declined to accept
Grenville's offer, and affairs at Downing Street righted
themselves.[358] But at Berlin the mischief was irremediable. Jacobi, a
born intriguer, and ever hostile to England, represented the words of
Pitt in the worst possible light. Accordingly Frederick William affected
great indignation at the conduct of Pitt, accused him of ending the
alliance, and discovered in his own ruffled feelings the pretext for
giving rein to the dictates of self-interest. He gave orders to end the
campaign on the Rhine; and though Grenville sought to patch matters up,
compromise was clearly impossible between Allies who had lost that
mutual confidence which is the only lasting guarantee of treaties.
At the autumnal equinox of 1794 Pitt was confronted by a far more
serious crisis than at the beginning of the war in February 1793. The
Republicans, after throwing back Clerfait beyond the River Roer, towards
Aix-la-Chapelle, compelled the Duke of York to abandon the natural line
of defence of Holland, the River Waal; and in the early days of October
the British retired behind Bergen-op-zoom and other Dutch fortresses.
These were found to be totally unprepared to sustain a siege. The
sluggishness of the Orange party, dominant in Holland since 1787, stood
in marked contrast to the eagerness of the Dutch Patriots to help the
invaders. Consequently in a few weeks the friends of the Stadholder saw
their hopes fade away.
There was but one chance of rescue. The Duke of Brunswick, who so
skilfully led the Prussians to Amsterdam in 1787, might be expected to
impart some courage to the Dutch garrisons and some show of discipline
to the disordered relics of York's and Clerfait's forces now drifting
slowly northwards. His position as a Field-Marshal of the Prussian army
also promised to interest the Court of Berlin in recovering some part,
at least, of the supremacy of the Allies in the Dutch Netherlands. As
the crisis in Holland had served to unite the two great Protestant
Powers, so now it might prevent the dissolution of that salutary
compact. Further, George III, though greatly disliking the substitution
of Cornwallis for the Duke of York, favoured the appointment of the
veteran Brunswick to the supreme command. Family considerations, always
very strong in the King, here concurred with reasons of state. Not only
had Brunswick married the sister of George III; but their daughter, the
Princess Caroline, was now the reluctant choice of the Prince of Wales.
The parents, both at Windsor and at Brunswick welcomed the avowal by the
royal prodigal of the claims of lawful wedlock. The Duchess of Brunswick
fell into raptures at the brilliant prospects thus opened out for her
daughter; and it seemed that both Hymen and Mars, for once working in
unison, conspired to bring from his inglorious retreat at Brunswick the
man whom that age still acclaimed as its war-lord.
Malmesbury therefore proceeded to Brunswick for the double purpose of
arranging the marriage and urging the Duke to take the command of the
allied forces on the Lower Rhine. Overjoyed at leaving the atmosphere of
intrigue at Möllendorf's headquarters, the envoy journeyed into the
northern plain in hopes of assuring the safety of part of Holland. Early
in November Pitt and his colleagues received a refusal from the Duke,
but now they sent through Malmesbury an offer to subsidize a corps of
20,000 or 30,000 Austrians in that quarter. These, along with the
British, Hanoverian, and Hessian troops, when marshalled by Brunswick,
might surely be trusted to stay the French advance. The crisis was
momentous. Brunswick well understood that in reality the fate of North
Germany was at stake; for the French, if masters of the Rhine and Ems
valleys, could easily overrun the northern plain, including his own
duchy. Self-interest, pride in the German name, hatred of French
principles, and, finally, satisfaction at the marriage alliance, bade
the Duke draw his sword before it was too late.
But here again the malign influence of Berlin thwarted the plans of
Pitt. In vain did Malmesbury ply the Duke with arguments and the Duchess
with compliments. On 25th November the Duke informed him that, as a
Prussian Field-Marshal, he was bound to consult Frederick William: and
"the answer he had received was not of a nature which allowed him to
accept of an offer otherwise so highly honourable and flattering to
him." He then handed to the envoy his formal refusal.[359]
Whether the elderly Duke of Brunswick could have withstood the impetuous
onset of the ill-clad, half-starved, but unconquerable peasants now
following the French tricolour in its progress through Holland, who
shall say? The exploits of Pichegru and his levies border on the
miraculous until we remember that half of the Dutch laboured on their
behalf, while the troops of York and Clerfait distrusted or despised
those leaders. This consideration it was that led Pitt to take a step
which he deemed most necessary for the public service as well as for the
reputation of the Duke of York. On Sunday, 25th November, he wrote at
Holwood a very lengthy letter to the King, setting forth most
deferentially the reasons which impelled him and his colleagues to
request the withdrawal of the Duke from Holland.[360] He touched with
equal skill and firmness on the unfortunate feeling prevalent in the
army respecting the Duke of York; and, while eulogizing His Royal
Highness, expressed the conviction of the Cabinet that, in his own
interests as well as those of the country, he should be recalled from a
sphere of action where the difficulties were wellnigh insuperable. Pitt
also suggested to the King the advisability of transferring the British
forces to a more promising sphere, Brittany or la Vendée. The King's
answer evinced considerable irritation, a proof that he saw little but
the personal aspects of the case. Pitt, however, held to his point, and
the Duke was recalled in order to become a little later
commander-in-chief, a position for which he was far better suited than
for a command in the field. At the close of the year Pitt showed his
regard for the public service by requesting from the King leave to
displace his brother, the Earl of Chatham, from the Admiralty, where his
lethargy had several times hindered the naval operations. Lord Spencer
became First Lord, the Earl of Chatham succeeding to Spencer's position
as Lord Privy Seal.
Pitt's magnanimous resolve to brave the royal displeasure rather than
keep a royal prince in a situation for which he was unfit met with
general approval. The times were too serious to admit of pedantic
trifling or unmanly shrinking. In quick succession there arrived news of
the definite refusal of the Duke of Brunswick to come forward, of the
incredible apathy of the Dutch, and of the demoralization of the Allies
in their continued retreat. To add to their misfortunes, nature gripped
that land of waters in a severe frost, so that the Dutch loyalists were
unable, even if they had the hardihood, to let loose the floods against
the invaders. In endless swarms these pressed on from the South,
determined now to realize Dumouriez' dream of conquering Holland in
order to appropriate its resources, pecuniary, naval, and colonial.
Pichegru it was who won immortal fame by this conquest, which in truth
needs not the legendary addition of his cavalry seizing a Dutch squadron
in the Zuyder Zee. A singular incident attended the journey of
Malmesbury with the future Princess of Wales towards Helvoetsluys, on
their way to England. Unaware of the inroads of the French horse, they
had to beat a speedy retirement, which, unfortunately for the Prince of
Wales, placed them out of reach of the raiders. A little later the Duke
and Duchess of Brunswick were fain to pack up their valuables and leave
their capital in haste.
Such was the French conquest of Holland and part of Hanover in the
winter of 1794-5. So speedy was it that Pitt and Dundas took no timely
means to ensure the carrying off the Dutch fleet. As no small part of it
was loyal to the Prince of Orange, who now fled to England, the
oversight is to be censured. Surely Flushing or the Brill could have
been secured. The Cabinet, however, as we shall see later, prepared to
rescue from the general ruin the most valuable of the Dutch colonies,
the Cape of Good Hope, the importance of which, for the safety of India,
Pitt and Dundas rated most highly. Meanwhile, under the command of
Abercromby, Harcourt, Cathcart, and Walmoden, the British and subsidized
German forces fell back towards the River Ems, and thence to the Weser.
Pitt, as we have seen, desired to recall the British regiments for
service in the West of France. But various considerations told against
this plan; and, as will appear later, the King obstinately opposed the
withdrawal of the British cavalry from the confines of his beloved
Electorate until the autumn of 1795. In April of that year the infantry,
now reduced to some 6,000 effectives by the rigours of winter, embarked
at Bremen.
Thus ended an expedition unprecedentedly fatal to the British arms. The
causes of the disaster are not far to seek. The campaigns of 1793-4 were
undertaken heedlessly, in reliance upon the strength of a Coalition
which proved to have no strength, and upon the weakness of the French
Republic which proved to be unconquerably strong. The Allies were
powerful enough to goad France to fury, too weak to crush its
transports. Their ill-concealed threats of partition bound France to the
cause of the Jacobins, which otherwise she would have abjured in horror.
Thus the would-be invaders drove France in upon herself, compelled her
to organize her strength to the utmost; and that strength, when
marshalled by Carnot, was destined to shatter the Coalition and overrun
neighbouring lands. She then learnt the fatal secret that she could
conquer Europe.
In a later chapter I propose to survey Pitt's conduct as War Minister.
Here I need only point out that his mistakes resulted mainly from his
unquenchable hopefulness. A singular proof of this admirable but
dangerous quality is seen in his effort during the months of February
and March 1795 to frame one more plan of co-operation with the Court of
Berlin, which had so cynically deceived him. To this proposal Grenville
offered unflinching opposition, coupled with a conditional threat to
resign. Pitt persuaded him to defer action until the troubles in Ireland
were less acute. But the King finally agreed with Pitt, and Grenville
was on the point of retiring when news arrived of the defection of
Prussia.[361] For some time she had been deep in negotiations with
France, which had the approval of Möllendorf and the officers of her
Rhenish army.[362] The upshot of it all was a treaty, which Hardenberg
signed with the French envoy at Basle on 5th April 1795. By this
discreditable bargain Frederick William of Prussia enabled France to
work her will on the lands west of the Rhine, on condition of his
acquiring a general ascendancy over North and Central Germany, which now
became neutral in the strife. Austria and the South German States
remained at war with France for two years longer, by which time the
tottering Germanic System fell beneath the sword of Napoleon Bonaparte.
Prussia's bargain with France marks a reversion to her traditional
policy, which viewed that Power as the friend and Austria as the enemy.
It undid the life-work of Prince Kaunitz, now nearing his end at Vienna,
and left the Hapsburg States enfeebled. True, they had a profitable
share in the third and last Partition of Poland, which soon ensued; but
this scarcely made good the loss in prestige due to the undisputed
hegemony of Prussia in the greater part of Germany. The House of
Hohenzollern, impelled by men like Lucchesini, Haugwitz, and Hardenberg,
took the easy and profitable course and plumed itself on over-reaching
its secular rival at Vienna. In reality it sealed the doom not only of
the truly conservative policy of Pitt, but of the European fabric.
Prussia it was which enabled the Jacobins to triumph and to extend their
sway over neighbouring lands. The example of Berlin tempted Spain three
months later to sign degrading terms of peace with France, and thus to
rob England of her gains in Hayti and Corsica. Thanks to Prussia and
Spain, France could enter upon that career of conquest in Italy which
assured the rise of Napoleon Bonaparte and the temporary ruin of
Austria. The mistakes of Pitt were great; but, after all, they might
have been retrieved were it not for the torpor of the Viennese Court and
the treachery of Prussia.
FOOTNOTES:
[335] "Troilus and Cressida," act i, sc. 3.
[336] "Dropmore P.," ii, 452.
[337] Thugut in the autumn of 1793 sketched a scheme for annexing the
north of France from the Somme to Sedan.
[338] "Dropmore P.," ii, 628. So, too, Morton Eden wrote to Grenville on
1st January 1793: "The steadfastness of the Emperor does not equal his
moral rectitude" ("F. O.," Austria, 32).
[339] "Dropmore P.," ii, 491; "Malmesbury Diaries," iii, 17-19, 69.
[340] "Dropmore P.," ii, 494; "Malmesbury Diaries," iii, 31, _et seq._
[341] "Malmesbury Diaries," iii, 50; Sorel, iv, 17.
[342] Seeley, "Stein," i, 65.
[343] "F. O.," Austria, 36. Eden to Grenville, 15th and 27th February.
[344] "Malmesbury Diaries," iii, 81, 82.
[345] Sorel, iv, 13.
[346] Vivenot, iii, 89-96; "Dropmore P.," ii, 505-7.
[347] "F. O.," Austria, 36, Eden to Grenville, 31st March, 9th April.
See, too, Vivenot, iii, 172, for proofs that Kosciusko sought to delay
the rising, and looked to Vienna for help against Russia and Prussia.
[348] "Malmesbury Diaries," iii, 85, 89.
[349] "Dropmore P.," ii, 516.
[350] "F. O.," Prussia, 33. Grenville to Malmesbury, 21st April.
[351] _Ibid._, Same to same, 23rd May.
[352] "Malmesbury Diaries," iii, 96.
[353] "W. O.," I, 169. See an admirable article in the "United Service
Mag." (Aug. 1897), by Colonel E. M. Lloyd, founded on the papers of
General Sir James Craig, Adjutant-General of the Duke of York.
[354] "Parl. Hist.," xxxii, 1132.
[355] "Dropmore P.," ii, 599.
[356] "F. O.," Austria, 38. Despatch of 19th July.
[357] Pitt MSS., 180. See, too, "Dropmore P.," ii, 617-20, 626.
[358] See "Pitt and Napoleon Miscellanies" for Grenville's letters. Pitt
was the guest of Grenville at Dropmore at the end of November 1794
("Buckingham P.," ii, 319).
[359] "F. O.," Prussia, 35. Malmesbury to Grenville, 25th November 1794.
[360] See "Pitt and Napoleon Miscellanies" for this letter.
[361] "Dropmore P.," iii, 26-30, 50, 57.
[362] Ranke, "Hardenberg," i, 258; "Paget P.," i, 95, _et seq._