Produced by Paul Murray, Wolfgang Menges and the Online
Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This
file was produced from images generously made available
by The Internet Archive/Canadian Libraries)
Transcriber's Notes:
Italics have been marked with underscores, like '_this_'.
Greek passages have been transcribed, using '+', like '+atê+'.
OE ligature and oe ligature have been changed to 'OE' or 'oe'.
Corrections, as listed in the "ERRATA" paragraph, have been made.
Besides,
Page 4, "disance" changed to "distance" (owing to the long distance,).
Page 16, "circulalation" changed to "circulation" (and many of them
helped on the circulation).
Pages 83 and 167, "Barrère" equalized to "Barère" (according to Index).
Page 104, "imdiately" changed to "immediately" (which was immediately
granted.).
Page 208, "Möllendorff" equalized to "Möllendorf" (according to Index).
Page 325, "brother in-law" changed to "brother-in-law" (Pitt, owing to
news of the death of his brother-in-law,)
Page 399/400, "arewell" changed to "farewell" (just after saying
farewell to Clare at Dublin,).
Page 419, "of couse" changed to "of course" (This proposal of course
implied).
Page 422, "futher" changed to "further" (to make further concessions
to that body.).
Page 451, "symptons" changed to "symptoms" (From these extraordinary
symptoms he augured).
Page 456, Footnote 609, "Soo" changed to "So" (So, too, Tomline said).
Page 496, "convicton" changed to "conviction" (But that he was drifting
to this conviction).
Page 528, "counsellers" changed to "counsellors" (and he and his
counsellors saw far more hope).
[Illustration: WILLIAM PITT, IN LATER LIFE. (From a painting by
Hoppner in the National Portrait Gallery)]
WILLIAM PITT
AND
THE GREAT WAR
BY
J. HOLLAND ROSE, LITT.D.
England and France have held in their hands the fate of the
world, especially that of European civilization. How much harm
we have done one another: how much good we might have done!
--_Napoleon to Colonel Wilks, 20th April 1816._
[Illustration: Publisher's emblem]
LONDON
G. BELL AND SONS, LTD.
1911
CHISWICK PRESS: CHARLES WHITTINGHAM AND CO.
TOOKS COURT, CHANCERY LANE, LONDON.
PREFACE
In the former volume, entitled "William Pitt and National Revival," I
sought to trace the career of Pitt the Younger up to the year 1791.
Until then he was occupied almost entirely with attempts to repair the
evils arising out of the old order of things. Retrenchment and Reform
were his first watchwords; and though in the year 1785 he failed in his
efforts to renovate the life of Parliament and to improve the fiscal
relations with Ireland, yet his domestic policy in the main achieved a
surprising success. Scarcely less eminent, though far less known, were
his services in the sphere of diplomacy. In the year 1783, when he
became First Lord of the Treasury and Chancellor of the Exchequer,
nearly half of the British Empire was torn away, and the remainder
seemed to be at the mercy of the allied Houses of Bourbon. France,
enjoying the alliance of Spain and Austria and the diplomatic wooings of
Catharine II and Frederick the Great, gave the law to Europe.
By the year 1790 all had changed. In 1787 Pitt supported Frederick
William II of Prussia in overthrowing French supremacy in the Dutch
Netherlands; and a year later he framed with those two States an
alliance which not only dictated terms to Austria at the Congress of
Reichenbach but also compelled her to forego her far-reaching schemes on
the lower Danube, and to restore the _status quo_ in Central Europe and
in her Belgian provinces. British policy triumphed over that of Spain in
the Nootka Sound dispute of the year 1790, thereby securing for the
Empire the coast of what is now British Columbia; it also saved Sweden
from a position of acute danger; and Pitt cherished the hope of forming
a league of the smaller States, including the Dutch Republic, Denmark,
Sweden, Poland, and, if possible, Turkey, which, with support from Great
Britain and Prussia, would withstand the almost revolutionary schemes of
the Russian and Austrian Courts.
These larger aims were unattainable. The duplicity of the Court of
Berlin, the triumphs of the Russian arms on the Danube, and changes in
the general diplomatic situation, enabled Catharine II to foil the
efforts of Pitt in 1791. She worked her will on the Turks and not long
after on the Poles; Sweden came to an understanding with her; and
Prussia, slighting the British alliance, drew near to the new Hapsburg
Sovereign, Leopold II. In fact, the events of the French Revolution in
the year 1791 served to focus attention more and more upon Paris; and
monarchs who had thought of little but the conquest or partition of
weaker States now talked of a crusade to restore order at Paris, with
Gustavus III of Sweden as the new Coeur de Lion. This occidentation of
diplomacy became pronounced at the time of the attempted escape of
Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette to the eastern frontier at Midsummer
1791. Their capture at Varennes and their ignominious return to Paris
are in several respects the central event of the French Revolution. The
incident aroused both democrats and royalists to a fury which foredoomed
to failure all attempts at compromise between the old order and the new.
The fierceness of the strife in France incited monarchists in all lands
to importunate demands for the extirpation of "the French plague"; and
hence were set in motion forces which Pitt vainly strove to curb. War
soon broke out in Central Europe. His endeavours to localize it were
fruitless; and thenceforth his chief task was to bring to an honourable
close a conflict which he had not sought. It is therefore fitting that
this study of the latter, less felicitous, but equally glorious part of
his career should begin with a survey of the situation in Great Britain
and on the Continent at the time of the incident at Varennes which
opened a new chapter in the history of Europe.
In the present volume I have sought to narrate faithfully and as fully
as is possible the story of the dispute with France, the chief episodes
of the war, and the varied influences which it exerted upon political
developments in these islands, including the early Radical movement, the
Irish Rebellion of 1798, and other events which brought about the Union
of the British and Irish Parliaments, the break up of the great national
party at Westminster in 1801, and the collapse of the strength of Pitt
early in the course of the struggle with the concentrated might of
Napoleon.
That mighty drama dwarfs the actors. Even the French Emperor could not
sustain the rôle which he aspired to play, and, failing to discern the
signs of the times, was whirled aside by the forces which he claimed to
control. Is it surprising that Pitt, more slightly endowed by nature,
and beset by the many limitations which hampered the advisers of
George III, should have sunk beneath burdens such as no other English
statesman has been called upon to bear? The success or failure of such a
career is, however, to be measured by the final success or failure of
his policy; and in this respect, as I have shown, the victor in the
Great War was not Napoleon but Pitt.
To that high enterprise he consecrated all the powers of his being. His
public life is everything; his private life, unfortunately, counts for
little. The materials for reconstructing it are meagre. I have been able
here and there to throw new light on his friendships, difficulties,
trials, and, in particular, on the love episode of the year 1797. But in
the main the story of the life of Pitt must soar high above the club and
the _salon_ to
... the toppling heights of Duty scaled.
Again I must express my hearty thanks to those who have generously
placed at my disposal new materials of great value, especially to His
Grace the Duke of Portland, the Earl of Harrowby, Earl Stanhope, E. G.
Pretyman, Esq., M.P., and A. M. Broadley, Esq.; also to the Rev. William
Hunt, D.Litt., and Colonel E. M. Lloyd, late R.E., for valuable advice
tendered during the correction of the proofs, and to Mr. Hubert Hall of
H.M. Public Record Office for assistance during my researches there. I
am also indebted to Lord Auckland and to Messrs. Longmans for permission
to reproduce the miniature of the Hon. Miss Eden which appeared in Lord
Ashbourne's "Pitt, Some Chapters of his Life and Times," and to Mr. and
Mrs. Doulton for permission to my daughter to make the sketch of Bowling
Green House, the last residence of Pitt, which is reproduced near the
end of this volume. In the preface to the former volume I expressed my
acknowledgements to recent works bearing on this subject; and I need
only add that numerous new letters of George III, Pitt, Grenville,
Burke, Canning, etc., which could only be referred to here, will be
published in a work entitled "Pitt and Napoleon Miscellanies," including
also essays and notes.
J. H. R.
MARCH 1911.
CONTENTS
CHAP. PAGE
I. ROYALISTS AND RADICALS 1
II. BEFORE THE STORM 29
III. PEACE OR WAR? 57
IV. THE RUPTURE WITH FRANCE 85
V. THE FLEMISH CAMPAIGN (1793) 118
VI. TOULON 143
VII. THE BRITISH JACOBINS 164
VIII. PITT AND THE ALLIES (1794-5) 195
IX. THE WEST INDIES 219
X. SPAIN AND HAYTI 230
XI. THE CAPE OF GOOD HOPE: CORSICA: QUIBERON 250
XII. PITT AS WAR MINISTER (1793-8) 265
XIII. DEARTH AND DISCONTENT 282
XIV. THE YEARS OF STRAIN (1796-7) 299
XV. NATIONAL REVIVAL 321
XVI. THE IRISH REBELLION 339
XVII. THE SECOND COALITION 365
XVIII. THE UNION 389
XIX. THE UNION (CONTINUED) 411
XX. RESIGNATION 431
XXI. PITT AND HIS FRIENDS (1794-1805) 454
XXII. ADDINGTON OR PITT? 483
XXIII. PITT AND NAPOLEON 505
XXIV. THE LAST STRUGGLE 534
EPILOGUE 559
STATISTICS OF THE YEARS 1792-1801 571
INDEX 573
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
TO FACE
PAGE
WILLIAM PITT, IN LATER LIFE. (From a painting by
Hoppner in the National Portrait Gallery) _Frontispiece_
SEAT OF WAR IN FLANDERS. 141
THE SIEGE OF TOULON. (By Emmanuel Toulougeon, Paris) 163
THE HOUSE OF COMMONS IN 1793. (From a painting in
the National Portrait Gallery by K. A. Hickel) 164
THE HON. ELEANOR EDEN. (From a miniature) 300
HENRY DUNDAS, FIRST VISCOUNT MELVILLE. (From a
painting by Sir T. Lawrence) 484
BOWLING GREEN HOUSE, PUTNEY HEATH. (From a
pencil sketch by Elsie H. Rose) 554
ERRATA
Page 180, _ad fin._, _for_ "Hamilton, Rowan" _read_ "Hamilton Rowan."
" 311, line 1, _for_ "formerly" _read_ "brother of."
" 311, line 2, _for_ "Lord Hood" _read_ "Sir Alexander Hood."
" 551, line 11 from end, _for_ "6th" _read_ "4th."
ABBREVIATIONS OF THE TITLES OF THE CHIEF WORKS REFERRED TO IN THIS
VOLUME
ANN. REG. = "Annual Register."
ASHBOURNE = "Pitt: some Chapters of his Life and Times," by the Rt. Hon.
Lord Ashbourne. 1898.
AUCKLAND JOURNALS = "The Journal and Corresp. of William, Lord
Auckland." 4 vols. 1861.
BEAUFORT P. = "MSS. of the Duke of Beaufort," etc. (Hist. MSS. Comm.).
1891.
B.M. ADD. MSS. = Additional Manuscripts of the British Museum.
BUCKINGHAM P. = "Mems. of the Court and Cabinets of George III," by the
Duke of Buckingham. 2 vols. 1853.
CAMPBELL = "Lives of the Lord Chancellors," by Lord Campbell. 8 vols.
1845-69.
CASTLEREAGH CORRESP. = "Mems. and Corresp. of Viscount Castlereagh." 8
vols. 1848-53.
CHEVENING MSS. = Manuscripts of Earl Stanhope, preserved at Chevening.
CUNNINGHAM = "Growth of Eng. Industry and Commerce (Modern Times)," by
Dr. W. Cunningham. 1892.
DROPMORE P. = "The Manuscripts of J. B. Fortescue, Esq., preserved at
Dropmore" (Hist. MSS. Comm.). 7 vols. 1892-1910.
FORTESCUE = "The History of the British Army," by the Hon. J. W.
Fortescue. vol. iv.
HÄUSSER = "Deutsche Geschichte (1786-1804)," by L. Häusser. 4 vols.
1861-3.
HOLLAND = "Memoirs of the Whig Party," by Lord Holland. 2 vols. 1852.
JESSE = "Mems. of the Life and Reign of George III," by J. H. Jesse. 3
vols. 1867.
LECKY = "Hist. of England in the Eighteenth Century," by W. E. H. Lecky.
8 vols. Fifth edit. 1891-1904.
MALMESBURY DIARIES = "Diaries and Corresp. of the First Earl of
Malmesbury." 4 vols. 1844.
PARL. HIST. = "History of the Parliamentary Debates" (after 1804
continued in Hansard).
PELLEW = "Life and Corresp. of the first Viscount Sidmouth," by Rev. C.
Pellew. 3 vols. 1847.
PITT MSS. = Pitt MSS., preserved at H.M. Public Record Office.
PORRITT = "The Unreformed House of Commons," by E. Porritt, 2 vols.
1909.
PRETYMAN MSS. = MSS. of E. G. Pretyman, Esq., M.P., preserved at Orwell
Park.
ROSE G., "DIARIES" = "Diaries and Corresp. of Rt. Hon. G. Rose." 2 vols.
1860.
ROSE, "NAPOLEON" = "Life of Napoleon," by J. H. Rose. 2 vols. 1909.
ROSE, "THIRD COALITION" = "Select Despatches ... relating to the
Formation of the Third Coalition (1804-5)," ed. by J. H. Rose (Royal
Historical Soc., 1904).
RUTLAND P. = "MSS. of the Duke of Rutland" (Hist. MSS. Comm.). 3 vols.
1894.
RUVILLE = "William Pitt, Earl of Chatham," by A. von Ruville (Eng.
transl.). 3 vols. 1907.
SOREL = "L'Europe et la Révolution française," par A. Sorel. Pts. II,
III. 1889, 1897.
STANHOPE = "Life of ... William Pitt," by Earl Stanhope. 4 vols. 3rd
edition. 1867.
SYBEL = "Geschichte der Revolutionzeit (1789-1800)," von H. von Sybel.
Eng. translation. 4 vols. 1867-9.
VIVENOT = "Quellen zur Geschichte der deutschen Kaiserpolitik
OEsterreichs ..." von A. von Vivenot. 1873.
WRAXALL = "Memoirs of Sir N. W. Wraxall" (1772-84), edited by H. B.
Wheatley. 5 vols. 1884.
WILLIAM PITT AND THE GREAT WAR
CHAPTER I
ROYALISTS AND RADICALS[1]
Détruire l'anarchie française, c'est se préparer une gloire
immortelle.--CATHARINE II, 1791.
The pretended Rights of Man, which have made this havoc, cannot
be the rights of the people. For to be a people and to have
these rights are incompatible. The one supposes the presence,
the other the absence, of a state of civil society.--BURKE,
_Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs_.
A constitution is the property of a nation and not of those who
exercise the Government.--T. PAINE, _Rights of Man_, part ii.
In the midst of a maze of events there may sometimes be found one which
serves as a clue, revealing hidden paths, connecting ways which seem far
apart, and leading to a clear issue. Such was the attempted flight of
Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette to the eastern frontier of France at
midsummer 1791, which may be termed the central event of the French
Revolution, at least in its first phases. The aim of joining the armed
bands of _émigrés_ and the forces held in readiness by Austria was so
obvious as to dispel the myth of "a patriot King" misled for a time by
evil counsellors. True, the moderates, from sheer alarm, still sought to
save the monarchy, and for a time with surprising success. But bolder
men, possessed both of insight and humour, perceived the futility of
all such efforts to hold down on the throne the father of his people
lest he should again run away. In this perception the young Republican
party found its genesis and its inspiration. In truth, the attempted
flight of the King was a death-blow to the moderate party, into which
the lamented leader, Mirabeau, had sought to infuse some of his
masterful energy. Thenceforth, the future belonged either to the
Jacobins or to the out and out royalists.
These last saw the horizon brighten in the East. Louis XVI being under
constraint in Paris, their leaders were the French Princes, the Comte de
Provence (afterwards Louis XVIII) and the Comte d'Artois (Charles X).
Around them at Coblentz there clustered angry swarms of French nobles,
gentlemen, and orthodox priests, whose zeal was reckoned by the
earliness of the date at which they had "emigrated." For many months the
agents of these _émigrés_ had vainly urged the Chanceries of the
Continent to a royalist crusade against the French rebels; and it seemed
appropriate that Gustavus III of Sweden should be their only convert.
Now of a sudden their demands appeared, instinct with statecraft; and
courtiers everywhere exclaimed that "the French pest" must be stamped
out. In that thought lay in germ a quarter of a century of war.
Already the Prussian and Austrian Governments had vaguely discussed the
need of a joint intervention in France. In fact this subject formed one
of the pretexts for the missions of the Prussian envoy, Bischoffswerder,
to the Emperor Leopold in February and June 1791.[2] As was shown at the
close of the former volume, "William Pitt and National Revival," neither
Court took the matter seriously, the Eastern Question being then their
chief concern. But the flight to Varennes, which Leopold had helped to
arrange, imposed on him the duty of avenging the ensuing insults to his
sister. He prepared to do so with a degree of caution highly
characteristic of him. He refused to move until he knew the disposition
of the Powers, especially of England. From Padua, where the news of the
capture of Louis at Varennes reached him, he wrote an autograph letter
to George III, dated 6th July, urging him to join in a general demand
for the liberation of the King and Queen of France. He also invited the
monarchs of Europe to launch a Declaration, that they regarded the cause
of Louis as their own, and in the last resort to put down a usurpation
of power which it behoved all Governments to repress.[3]
The reply of George, dated St. James's, 23rd July, bears the imprint of
the cool and cautious personality of Pitt and Grenville, who in this
matter may be counted as one. The King avowed his sympathy with the
French Royal Family and his interest in the present proposals, but
declared that his attitude must depend on his relations to other Powers.
He therefore cherished the hope that the Emperor would consult the
welfare of the whole of Europe by aiding in the work of pacification
between Austria and Turkey now proceeding at Sistova. So soon as those
negotiations were completed, he would instruct his Ministers to consider
the best means of cementing a union between the Allies and the
Emperor.[4]
Leopold must have gnashed his teeth on reading this reply, which beat
him at his own game of _finesse_. He had used the difficulties of
England as a means of escaping from the pledges plighted at the
Conference of Reichenbach in July 1790. Pitt and Grenville retorted by
ironically refusing all help until he fulfilled those pledges. As we
have seen, they succeeded; and the pacification in the East, as also in
Belgium, was the result.
Equally chilling was the conduct of Pitt towards the _émigrés_. The
French Princes at Coblentz had sent over the former French Minister,
Calonne, "to solicit from His Majesty an assurance of his neutrality in
the event ... of an attempt being made by the Emperor and other Powers
in support of the royal party in France." Pitt and Grenville refused to
receive Calonne, and sent to the Comte d'Artois a letter expressing
sympathy with the situation of the King and Queen of France, but
declining to give any promise as to the line of conduct which the
British Government might pursue.[5]
No less vague were the terms in which George III replied to a letter of
the King of Sweden. Gustavus had for some little time been at
Aix-la-Chapelle in the hope of leading a royalist crusade into France as
a sequel to the expected escape of Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette. As
readers of Carlyle will remember, the Swedish noble, Count Fersen,
chivalrously helped their flight towards Metz; and deep was the chagrin
of Gustavus and his squire on hearing the news from Varennes. They
longed to strike at once. But how could they strike while Leopold,
Catharine, and Frederick William declared that everything must depend on
the action of England? The following significant sentence in Fersen's
diary shows the feeling prevalent at Brussels, as elsewhere, respecting
England: "We must know if that Power regards the continuation of anarchy
in France as more advantageous than order."[6] Fersen had imbibed this
notion at Brussels from Count Mercy d'Argenteau, the Austrian Minister,
whose letters often harp on this string. Thus on 7th March 1791 he
writes: "The worst obstacles for the King of France will always come
from England, which wishes to prolong the horrors in France and ruin
her." A little later he avers that the only way to save the French
monarchy is by a civil war, "and England (unless won over) will support
the popular party."[7]
In order to win Pitt over to the cause of neutrality from which he never
intended to swerve, Gustavus and Fersen persuaded an Englishman named
Crawford to proceed to London with letters for George III and Pitt,
dated 22nd July.[8] To the King he described the danger to all
Governments which must ensue if the French revolted with impunity. He
therefore begged to know speedily whether His Majesty would accord full
liberty "to the Princes of Germany and to those, who, owing to the long
distance, can only arrive by sea."[9] Evidently, then, Gustavus feared
lest England might stop the fleet in which he intended to convey Swedish
and Russian troops to the coast of Normandy for a dash at Paris. The
answer of George soothed these fears, and that of Pitt, dated August
1791, was a model of courtly complaisance.
Compared with the shrewd balancings of the Emperor Leopold and the cold
neutrality of Pitt, the policy of Frederick William II of Prussia seemed
for a time to be instinct with generosity. Despite the fears of his
counsellors that a _rapprochement_ to Austria would involve Prussia in
the ruin which the friendship of the Hapsburgs had brought on France,
the King turned eagerly towards Vienna; and on 25th July Kaunitz and
Bischoffswerder signed a preliminary treaty of alliance mutually
guaranteeing their territories, and agreeing to further the aims of the
Emperor respecting France. Frederick William was on fire for the
royalist crusade. He even assured Baron Rolle, the agent of the French
princes, that something would be done in that season.[10] Pitt and
Grenville disapproved the action of Prussia in signing this compact,
impairing as it did the validity of the Anglo-Prussian alliance of the
year 1788; but Frederick William peevishly asserted his right to make
what treaties he thought good, and remarked that he was now quits with
England for the bad turns she had played him.[11] On their side, the
British Ministers, by way of marking their disapproval of the warlike
counsels of Berlin and Vienna, decided not to send an envoy to Pilnitz,
the summer abode of the Elector of Saxony, where a conference was
arranged between Leopold and Frederick William.
As is well known, the Comte d'Artois and Calonne now cherished lofty
hopes of decisive action by all the monarchs against the French rebels.
But Leopold, with his usual caution, repelled alike the solicitations of
Artois and the warlike counsels of Frederick William, the result of
their deliberations being the famous Declaration of Pilnitz (27th
August). In it they expressed the hope that all the sovereigns of Europe
will not refuse to employ, in conjunction with their said
Majesties, the most efficient means in proportion to their
resources, to place the King of France in a position to
establish with the most absolute freedom, the foundations of a
monarchical form of government, which shall at once be in
harmony with the rights of sovereigns and promote the welfare of
the French nation. In that case [_alors et dans ce cas_] their
said Majesties, the Emperor and the King of Prussia, are
resolved to act promptly and in common accord with the forces
necessary to attain the desired common end.
Obviously, the gist of the whole Declaration lay in the words _alors et
dans ce cas_. If they be emphasized, they destroy the force of the
document; for a union of all the monarchs was an impossibility, it being
well known that England would not, and Sardinia, and Naples (probably
also Spain) could not, take up arms. In fact, on that very evening
Leopold wrote to Kaunitz that he had not in the least committed
himself.--"_Alors et dans ce cas_ is with me the law and the prophets.
If England fails us, the case is non-existent." Further, when the Comte
d'Artois, two days later, urged the Emperor to give effect to the
Declaration by ordering his troops to march westwards, he sent a sharp
retort, asserted that he would not go beyond the Declaration, and
forbade the French Princes to do so.[12]
To the good sense and insight of Grenville and Pitt, the Pilnitz
Declaration was one of the _comédies augustes_ of history, as Mallet du
Pan termed it. Grenville saw that Leopold would stay his hand until
England chose to act, meanwhile alleging her neutrality as an excuse for
doing nothing.[13] Thus, the resolve of Catharine to give nothing but
fair words being already surmised, the _émigrés_ found to their
annoyance that Pitt's passivity clogged their efforts--the chief reason
why they shrilly upbraided him for his insular egotism. Certainly his
attitude was far from romantic; but surely, after the sharp lesson which
he had received from the House of Commons in the spring of 1791 during
the dispute with Russia, caution was needful; and he probably discerned
a truth hidden from the _émigrés_, that an invasion of France for the
rescue of the King and Queen would seal their doom and increase the
welter in that unhappy land.
Pitt and Grenville spent the middle of September at Weymouth in
attendance on George III; and we can imagine their satisfaction at the
prospect of universal peace and prosperity. Pitt consoled himself for
the not very creditable end to the Russian negotiation by reflecting
that our revenue was steadily rising. "We are already £178,000 gainers
in this quarter," he wrote to George Rose on 10th August.[14] In fact,
the cyclonic disturbances of the past few years now gave place to a
lull. The Russo-Turkish War had virtually ended; Catharine and Gustavus
were on friendly terms; the ferment in the Hapsburg dominions had died
down, except in Brabant; the Poles were working their new constitution
well; and, but for Jacobin propaganda in Italy and the Rhineland, the
outlook was serene.
At this time, too, there seemed a chance of a reconciliation between
Louis XVI and his people. On 14th September he accepted the new
democratic constitution, a step which filled France with rejoicing and
furnished the desired excuse for Leopold to remain passive. Kaunitz, who
had consistently opposed intervention in France, now asserted that Louis
had voluntarily accepted the constitution. The action of Louis and Marie
Antoinette was in reality forced. Amidst the Queen's expressions of
contempt for the French Princes at Coblentz, the suppressed fire of her
fury against her captors flashes forth in this sentence written to Mercy
d'Argenteau (28th August)--"The only question for us is to lull them to
sleep and inspire them with confidence so as to trick them the better
afterwards."--And again (12th September)--"My God! Must I, with this
blood in my veins, pass my days among such beings as these, and in such
an age as this?" Leopold must have known her real feelings; but he chose
to abide by the official language of Louis, and to advise the Powers to
accept the new situation.[15]
This peaceful turn of affairs sorely troubled the French Princes and
Burke. In August and September 1791 his son Richard was at Coblentz, and
informed his father of the consternation of the _émigrés_ on hearing
that the Emperor declined to draw the sword. Burke himself was equally
agitated, and on or about 24th September had a long interview with Pitt
and Grenville, at the house of the latter. We gather from Burke's
"Letters on the Conduct of our Domestic Parties," that it was the first
time he had met Pitt in private; and the meeting must have been somewhat
awkward. After dining, with Grenville as host, the three men conferred
together till eleven o'clock, discussing the whole situation "very
calmly" (says Burke); but we can fancy the tumult of feelings in the
breast of the old man when he found both Ministers firm as adamant
against intervention in France. "They are certainly right as to their
general inclinations," he wrote to his son, "perfectly so, I have not a
shadow of doubt; but at the same time they are cold and dead as to any
attempt whatsoever to give them effect." The heat of the Irish royalist
failed to kindle a spark of feeling in the two cousins. He found that
their "deadness" proceeded from a rooted distrust of the Emperor
Leopold, and from a conviction that Britain had nothing to fear from
Jacobinical propaganda. Above all they believed that the present was not
the time for action, especially as the imminence of bankruptcy in France
would discredit the new Legislative Assembly, and render an invasion
easier in the near future.
Are we to infer from this that Pitt and his cousin looked forward to a
time when the monarchs could invade France with safety? Such an
inference would be rash. It is more probable that they here found an
excuse for postponing their decision and a means of calming an insistent
visitor. Certainly they impressed Burke with a belief in their sincere
but secret sympathy with the royalist cause. The three men also agreed
in suspecting Leopold, though Burke tried to prove that his treachery
was not premeditated, but sprang from "some complexional inconstancy."
Pitt and Grenville, knowing the doggedness with which the Emperor pushed
towards his goal, amidst many a shift and turn, evidently were not
convinced.
At this time they had special reasons for distrusting Leopold and his
advisers. The Austrian Government had received a letter, dated Dresden,
27th August (the day of the Declaration of Pilnitz), stating that
England promised to remain neutral only on condition that the Emperor
would not withdraw any troops from his Belgic lands, as they were needed
to uphold the arrangements of which she was a guarantee. This
extraordinary statement grew out of a remark of Grenville to the
Austrian Ambassador in London, that, in view of the unrest in the
Netherlands, it might be well not to leave them without troops.[16] The
mis-statement was not only accepted at Vienna, but was forwarded to
various Courts, the final version being that England might attack
Austria if she withdrew her troops from Flanders, and that therefore
Leopold could not draw the sword against France until his army on the
Turkish borders arrived in Swabia. Some were found who believed this odd
_farrago_; but those who watched the calculating balance of Hapsburg
policy saw in it one more excuse for a masterly inactivity.
Still less were our Ministers inclined to unite with Catharine in the
universal royalist league then under discussion at St. Petersburg. The
Czarina having charged her ambassador, Vorontzoff, to find out the
sentiments of Pitt and Grenville on this subject, he replied that
England would persevere in the strict neutrality which she had all along
observed, "and that, with respect to the measures of active intervention
which other Powers might have in contemplation, it was His Majesty's
determination not to take any part either in supporting or in opposing
them." Now Russia, like Austria and Spain, had decided not to act unless
England joined the concert;[17] and this waiting on the action of a
Power which had already declared its resolve to do nothing enables us to
test the sincerity of the continental monarchs. As for the Czarina, her
royalist fervour expended itself in deposing the busts of democrats, in
ordering the French Minister to remain away from Court, and in
condemning any Russian who had dealings with him to be publicly flogged.
Moreover, while thus drilling her own subjects, the quondam friend of
Diderot kept her eyes fixed upon Warsaw. The shrewdest diplomatist of
the age had already divined her aims, which he thus trenchantly summed
up: "The Empress only waits to see Austria and Prussia committed in
France, to overturn everything in Poland."[18] Kaunitz lived on to see
his cynical prophecy fulfilled to the letter.
* * * * *
The reader will have noticed with some surprise the statement of Burke
that Pitt and Grenville had not the slightest fear of the spread of
French principles in England. As we know, Burke vehemently maintained
the contrary, averring that the French plague, unless crushed at Paris,
would infect the world. In his survey of the European States he admitted
that we were less liable to infection than Germany, Holland, and Italy,
owing to the excellence of our constitution; but he feared that our
nearness to France, and our zeal for liberty, would expose us to some
danger. Why he should have cherished these fears is hard to say; for to
him the French Revolution was "a wild attempt to methodize anarchy," "a
foul, impious, monstrous thing, wholly out of the course of moral
nature."[19] Surely if British and French principles were so utterly
different, we were in no more danger of infection from the Jacobins than
of catching swine fever.
This was virtually the view of Pitt and Grenville; for there were no
premonitory symptoms of infection, but much the reverse. Londoners
showed the utmost joy at the first news of the escape of the King and
Queen from Paris, and were equally depressed by the news from Varennes.
As we shall presently see, it was with shouts of "Long live the King,"
"Church and State," "Down with the Dissenters," "No Olivers," "Down with
the Rump," "No false Rights of Man," that the rabble of Birmingham
wrecked and burnt the houses of Dr. Priestley and other prominent
Nonconformists of that town. Only by slow degrees did this loyal
enthusiasm give place to opinions which in course of time came to be
called Radical. It may be well to trace briefly the fluctuations of
public opinion, to which the career of Pitt stands in vital relation.
The growth of discontent in Great Britain may be ascribed to definite
evils in the body politic, and it seems to have arisen only secondarily
from French propaganda. The first question which kindled the fire of
resentment was that of the civic and political disabilities still
imposed on Nonconformists by the Corporation and Test Acts of the reign
of Charles II. Pitt's decision in the session of 1787 to uphold those
Acts ensured the rejection of Beaufoy's motion for their repeal of 176
votes to 98; but undeterred by his defeat, Beaufoy brought the matter
before the House on 8th May 1789, and, despite the opposition of Pitt,
secured 102 votes against 122. The Prime Minister's chief argument was
that if Dissenters were admitted to civic rights they might use their
power to overthrow the Church Establishment.[20] Clearly the opinion of
the House was drifting away from him on that question; and it is a proof
of his growing indifference to questions of Reform that now, four days
after the assembly of the States-General of France at Versailles, he
should have held to views so repugnant to the spirit of the age.
Thenceforth that question could not be debated solely on its own merits.
The attacks made by the French National Assembly on the Church of
France, particularly the confiscation of its tithes and landed property,
soon aroused heated feelings in this country, though on a subject of a
wholly different kind. The result was that, while Dissenters peacefully
agitated for permission to act as citizens, they were represented as
endeavouring to despoil the Church, after the fashion of Talleyrand and
Mirabeau. A work by a Manchester merchant, Thomas Walker, reveals the
influence of this question on the political activities of the time. The
Nonconformists of that town and county hoped to gain a majority in next
session or in the following Parliament, while the High Churchmen, to the
cry of "The Church in Danger," declared the two Acts of Charles II to be
the bulwarks of the constitution.[21] This cry was everywhere taken up,
with the result that in the Parliament elected in 1790 the Tories gained
ground. Consequently, even the able advocacy of Fox on behalf of
religious liberty failed to save Beaufoy's motion from a crushing
defeat. Pitt spoke against the proposal and carried the House with him
by 294 votes to 105. This vote illustrates the baleful influence exerted
by the French Revolution on the cause of Reform in these islands.
A second example soon occurred. Only three days later Flood brought
forward a motion for Parliamentary Reform which the wildest of alarmists
could not call revolutionary. He proposed to add to the House of Commons
one hundred members, elected by the resident householders of the
counties, those areas being far less corrupt than the towns; and he
suggested that, if the total number of members were deemed excessive,
fifty seats in the smallest boroughs might be declared vacant. This
proposal differed but little from that of Pitt in the session of 1785,
which aimed at disfranchising thirty-six decayed boroughs and
apportioning their seventy-two members to the larger counties, as also
to London and Westminster. In a speech which might have been made by
Pitt in pre-Revolution times Flood declared that the events in France
showed the need of a timely repair of outworn institutions.
This was as a red rag to Windham, a prominent recruit from the Whigs,
who now used all the artifices of rhetoric to terrify his hearers. He
besought them in turn not to repair their house in the hurricane season,
not to imitate the valetudinarian of the "Spectator," who read medical
books until he discovered he had every symptom of the gout except the
pain. These fallacious similes captivated the squires; and Pitt himself
complimented the orator on his ingenious arguments. For himself, he
declared his desire of Reform to be as zealous as ever; but he "could
see no utility in any gentleman's bringing forward such a motion as the
present at that moment," and feared that the cause might thereby suffer
disgrace and lose ground. Fox, on the other hand, ridiculed all thought
of panic on account of the French Revolution, but he admitted that the
majority both in Parliament and the nation did not want Reform.
Grenville, Wilberforce, and Burke opposed the motion, while even
Duncombe declined to vote for it at present. It was accordingly
adjourned _sine die_.[22]
Disappointment at the course of these debates served to band
Nonconformists and reformers in a close alliance. Hitherto they had
alike supported Pitt and the royal prerogative, especially at the time
of the Regency struggle. In May 1789, when Pitt opposed the
Nonconformist claims, Dr. Priestley wrote that Fox would regain his
popularity with Dissenters, while Pitt would lose ground.[23] Now, when
the doors of the franchise and of civic privilege were fast barred,
resentment and indignation began to arouse the groups of the
unprivileged left outside. The news that Frenchmen had framed a
Departmental System, in which all privileges had vanished, and all men
were citizens, with equal rights in the making of laws and local
regulations, worked potently in England, furthering the growth of an
institution little known in this country, the political club. As the
Jacobins had adapted the English idea of a club to political uses, so
now the early Radicals re-adapted it to English needs. "The Manchester
Constitutional Society"[24] was founded by Walker and others in October
1790, in order to oppose a "Church and King Club," which High Churchmen
had started in March, after the news of the triumph of their principles
in Parliament. The Manchester reformers struck the key-note of the
coming age by asserting in their programme that in every community the
authority of the governors must be derived from the consent of the
governed, and that the welfare of the people was the true aim of
Government. They further declared that honours and rewards were due only
for services rendered to the State; that all officials, without
exception, were responsible to the people; that "actions only, not
opinions, are the proper objects of civil jurisdictions"; that no law is
fairly made except by a majority of the people; and that the people of
Great Britain were not fully and fairly represented in Parliament.[25]
The Church and King Club, on the contrary, reprobated all change in "one
of the most beautiful systems of government that the combined efforts of
human wisdom has [_sic_] ever yet been able to accomplish." The issue
between the two parties was thus sharply outlined. The Tories of
Manchester gloried in a state of things which shut out about half of
their fellow-citizens from civic rights and their whole community from
any direct share in the making of laws. In their eyes the Church and the
monarchy were in danger if Nonconformists became citizens, and if a
score of Cornish villages yielded up their legislative powers to
Manchester, Leeds, Birmingham, and other hives of industry.
Scotland also began to awake. The torpor of that keen and intellectual
people, under a system of misrepresentation which assigned to them
forty-five members and forty-four to Cornwall, is incomprehensible,
unless we may ascribe it to the waning of all enthusiasm after the
"forty-five" and to the supremacy of material interests so
characteristic of the age. In any case, this political apathy was now to
end; and here, too, as in the case of England, Government applied the
spur.
On 10th May 1791 Sir Gilbert Elliot (afterwards Earl of Minto) brought
forward a motion in Parliament for the repeal of the Test Act, so far as
it concerned Scotland. He voiced a petition of the General Assembly of
the Church of Scotland, and declared that the Presbyterians felt the
grievance of being excluded from civic offices unless they perverted. On
wider grounds also he appealed against this petty form of persecution,
which might make men hypocrites but never sincere converts. Henry Dundas
and his nephew, Robert Dundas (Lord Advocate for Scotland), opposed the
motion, mainly because it would infringe the terms of the Act of Union;
but Henry added the curious argument that, if Scottish Presbyterians
were relieved from the Test Act, then the English Dissenters would have
been "unjustly, harshly, and cruelly used." Pitt avowed himself "not a
violent friend, but a firm and steady friend" of the Test Act, as being
essential to the security of the Church and therefore of the civil
establishment of the country. Accordingly, Elliot's motion was defeated
by 149 votes to 62.[26] It is curious that, a month earlier, the House
had agreed to a Bill granting slightly wider toleration to "Catholic
Dissenters."[27]
While Pitt was thus strengthening the old buttresses of Church and
State, the son of a Quaker had subjected the whole fabric to a battery
of violent rhetoric. It is scarcely too much to call Thomas Paine the
Rousseau of English democracy. For, if his arguments lacked the novelty
of those of the Genevese thinker (and even they were far from original),
they equalled them in effectiveness, and excelled them in
practicability. "The Rights of Man" (Part I) may be termed an insular
version of the "Contrat Social," with this difference, that the English
writer pointed the way to changes which were far from visionary, while
the Genevese seer outlined a polity fit only for a Swiss canton peopled
by philosophers. Paine had had the advantage of close contact with men
and affairs in both hemispheres. Not even Cobbett, his literary
successor, passed through more varied experiences. Born in 1737 at
Thetford in Norfolk, Paine divided his early life between stay-making,
excise work, the vending of tobacco, and a seafaring life. His keen
eyes, lofty brow, prominent nose, proclaimed him a thinker and fighter,
and therefore, in that age, a rebel. What more natural than that he, a
foe to authority and hater of oppression, should go to America to help
on the cause of Washington? There at last he discovered his true
vocation. His broadsides struck home. "Rebellious staymaker, unkempt,"
says Carlyle, "who feels that he, a single needleman, did by his
'Common Sense' pamphlet, free America; that he can, and will free all
this world; perhaps even the other." Tom Paine, indeed, had the rare
gift of voicing tersely and stridently the dumb desires of the masses.
Further, a sojourn in France before and during the early part of the
Revolution enabled him to frame a crushing retort to Burke's
"Reflections." The result was Part I of the "Rights of Man," which he
flung off at the "Angel" in Islington in February 1791.[28]
The general aims of the pamphlet are now as little open to question as
the famous Declaration which he sought to vindicate. Paine trenchantly
attacked Burke's claim that no people, not even our own, had an inherent
right to choose its own ruler, and that the Revolution Settlement of
1688 was binding for ever. Paine, on the contrary, asserted that "every
age and generation must be as free to act for itself _in all cases_ as
the ages and generations that preceded it. The vanity and presumption of
governing beyond the grave is the most ridiculous and insolent of all
tyrannies." Further, on the general question at issue, Paine remarked:
"That men should take up arms, and spend their lives and fortunes, _not_
to maintain their rights, but to maintain they have _not_ rights, is an
entirely new species of discovery and suited to the paradoxical genius
of Mr. Burke." In reply to the noble passage: "The age of chivalry is
gone ...," Paine shrewdly says: "In the rhapsody of his imagination he
has discovered a world of windmills, and his sorrows are that there are
no Quixotes to attack them."
After thus exposing the weak points of the royalist case, Paine
proceeded to defend the mob, firstly, because the aristocratic plots
against the French Revolution were really formidable (a very disputable
thesis), and secondly, because the mob in all old countries is the
outcome of their unfair and brutal system of government. "It is by
distortedly exalting some men," he says, "that others are distortedly
debased, till the whole is out of nature. A vast mass of mankind are
degradedly thrown into the background of the human picture, to bring
forward with greater glare the puppet show of State and aristocracy."
Here was obviously the Junius of democracy, for whom the only effective
answer was the gag and gyve. Indeed, Burke in his "Appeal from the New
to the Old Whigs" suggested that the proper refutation was by means of
"criminal justice."[29]
Pitt's opinions at this time on French and English democracy tend
towards a moderate and reforming royalism--witness his comment on
Burke's "Reflections," that the writer would have done well to extol the
English constitution rather than to attack the French.[30] In this
remark we may detect his preference for construction over destruction,
for the allaying, rather than the exciting, of passion. Nevertheless the
one-sidedness of the English constitution made for unrest. So soon as
one bold voice clearly contrasted those defects with the inspiring
precepts of the French Rights of Man, there was an end to political
apathy. A proof of this was furnished by the number of replies called
forth by Burke's "Reflections." They numbered thirty-eight.[31] Apart
from that of Paine, the "Vindiciae Gallicae" of Sir James Mackintosh
made the most impression, especially the last chapter, wherein he
declared that the conspiracy of the monarchs to crush the liberties of
France would recoil on their own heads.
Fear of the alleged royalist league quickened the sympathy of Britons
with the French reformers; while the sympathy of friends of order with
Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette after the Varennes incident deepened
their apprehension of all change. Thus were called into play all the
feelings which most deeply move mankind--love of our richly storied past
and its embodiment, the English constitution; while on the other hand no
small part of our people harboured resentment against the narrow
franchise and class legislation at home, and felt a growing fear that
the nascent freedom of Frenchmen might expire under the heel of the
military Powers of Central Europe. Accordingly clubs and societies grew
apace, and many of them helped on the circulation of cheap editions of
Paine's pamphlet.
The result of this clash of opinion was seen in the added keenness of
party strife and in the disturbances of 14th July 1791. The occasion of
these last was the celebration by a subscription dinner of the second
anniversary of the fall of the Bastille. Both at Manchester and
Birmingham the announcement of this insular and inoffensive function
aroused strong feelings either of envy or of opposition. The Tories of
Manchester resolved that, if the local Constitutional Club chose to dine
on that day it should be at their peril. The populace was urged to pull
down the hotel on their heads, "as the brains of every man who dined
there would be much improved by being mingled with bricks and mortar."
Thomas Walker's control of the local constables sufficed to thwart this
pleasantry.
But on that day the forces of reaction broke loose at Birmingham. In the
Midland capital political feeling ran as high as at Manchester. The best
known of the reformers was Dr. Priestley, a Unitarian minister, whose
researches in physical science had gained him a world-wide reputation
and a fellowship in the Royal Society. He and many other reformers
proposed to feast in public in honour of the French national festival.
Unfortunately, the annoyance of the loyalists at this proposal was
inflamed by a recent sermon of Priestley on the death of Dr. Price and
by the circulation of a seditious handbill. Dr. Keir, a Churchman who
was to preside at the dinner, did not prove to the satisfaction of all
that this was a trick of the enemy. Public opinion was also excited by
the discovery of the words "This barn to let" chalked on some of the
churches of the town; and charges were bandied to and fro that this was
the work of the Dissenters, or of the most virulent of their opponents.
What is certain is that these _hors d'oeuvres_ endangered the rest of
the _menu_. The dinner-committee, however, struggled manfully with their
difficulties. They had a Churchman in the chair, and Priestley was not
present. The loyalty of the diners also received due scenic warrant in
the work of a local artist. The dining-hall of the hotel was "decorated
with three emblematical pieces of sculpture, mixed with painting in a
new style of composition. The central was a finely executed medallion of
His Majesty, surrounded with a Glory, on each side of which was an
alabaster obelisk, one exhibiting Gallic Liberty breaking the bonds of
Despotism, and the other representing British Liberty in its present
enjoyment." The terms in which the fourteen toasts were proposed
breathed of the same flamboyant loyalty, the only one open to criticism
being the following: "The Prince of Wales! May he have the wisdom to
prefer the glory of being the chief of an entire [_sic_] free people to
that of being only the splendid fountain of corruption."[32]
The dinner passed with only occasional rounds of hissing from the
loyalists outside. But, as the evening wore on and the speeches inside
still continued, the crowd became restive. Stone-throwing began and was
not discouraged by the two magistrates, the Rev. Dr. Spencer and John
Carles, who had now arrived. In fact, the clergyman with an oath praised
a lad who said that Priestley ought to be ducked; Carles also promised
the rabble drink; and when a local humourist asked for permission to
knock the dust out of Priestley's wig, the champions of order burst out
laughing. A witness at the trial averred that he saw an attorney, John
Brook, go among the mob and point towards Priestley's chapel. However
that may be, the rabble moved off thither and speedily wrecked it. His
residence at Fair Hill was next demolished, his library and scientific
instruments being burnt or smashed. This was but the prelude to
organized attacks on the houses of the leading Nonconformists, whether
they had been at the dinner or not. The resulting riots soon involved in
ruin a large part of the town. Prominent Churchmen who sought to end
these disgraceful scenes suffered both in person and property. A word of
remonstrance sufficed to turn into new channels the tide of hatred and
greed; for, as happened in the Gordon riots of 1780, rascality speedily
rushed in to seize the spoils.
The usually dull archives of the Home Office yield proof of the terror
that reigned in the Midland capital. A Mr. Garbett wrote to Dundas on
17th July that the wrecking still went on, that the Nonconformists were
in the utmost dread and misery, and all people looked for help from
outside to stay the pillage. As for himself, though he was not a "marked
man," his hand trembled at the scenes he had witnessed. There can be
little doubt that the magistrates from the first acted with culpable
weakness, as Whitbread proved in the House of Commons, for they did not
enrol special constables until the rioters had got the upper hand.
Dundas, as Home Secretary, seems to have done his duty. The news of the
riot of the 14th reached him at 10 a.m. on the 15th (Friday); and he at
once sent post haste to Nottingham, ordering the immediate despatch of
the 15th Dragoons. By dint of a forced march of fifty-six miles the
horsemen reached Birmingham on the evening of that same day (Sunday);
but two days more elapsed before drunken blackmailers ceased to molest
Hagley, Halesowen, and other villages. Few persons lost their lives,
except about a dozen of the pillagers who lay helpless with drink in the
cellars of houses which their more zealous comrades had given over to
the flames.[33]
The verdict of Grenville was as follows: "I do not admire riots in
favour of Government much more than riots against it." That of his less
cautious brother, the Marquis of Buckingham, is as follows: "I am not
sorry for this _excess, excessive as it has been_." That of Pitt is not
recorded. He did not speak during the debate on this subject on 21st May
1792; but the rejection of Whitbread's motion for an inquiry by 189
votes to 46 implies unanimity on the Ministerial side.[34]
In the winter of 1791-2 various incidents occurred which further excited
public opinion. On 17th February 1792 appeared the second part of
Paine's "Rights of Man." He started from the assumption that the birth
of a democratic State in America would herald the advent of Revolutions
not only in France, but in all lands; and that British and Hessians
would live to bless the day when they were defeated by the soldiers of
Washington. He then proceeded to arraign all Governments of the old
type, and asserted that constitutions ought to be the natural outcome of
the collective activities of the whole people. There was nothing
mysterious about Government, if Courts had not hidden away the patent
fact that it dealt primarily with the making and administering of laws.
We are apt to be impressed by these remarks until we contrast them with
the majestic period wherein Burke depicts human society as a venerable
and mysterious whole bequeathed by the wisdom of our forefathers. An
admirer of Burke cannot but quote the passage in full: "Our political
system is placed in a just correspondence and symmetry with the order of
the world, and with the mode of existence decreed to a permanent body
composed of transitory parts; wherein by the disposition of a
stupendous wisdom, moulding together the great mysterious incorporation
of the human race, the whole, at one time, is never old, or middle-aged,
or young, but in a condition of unchangeable constancy, moves on through
the varied tenour of perpetual decay, fall, renovation and progression.
Thus, by preserving the method of nature in the conduct of the State, in
what we improve we are never wholly new; in what we retain we are never
wholly obsolete."[35]
This is a majestic conception. But, after all, the practical question at
issue is--how much of the old shall we retain and how much must be
discarded? Unfortunately for himself and his cause, Burke was now urging
his countrymen to support two military Powers in their effort to compel
the French people to revert to institutions which were alike obsolete
and detested. Is it surprising that Paine, utterly lacking all sense of
reverence for the past, should brand this conduct as treasonable to the
imperious needs of the present? Viewing monarchy as represented by
Versailles or Carlton House, and aristocracy by the intrigues of
Coblentz and the orgies of Brooks's Club, he gave short shrift to both
forms of Government. Monarchy he pronounced more or less despotic; and
under aristocracy (he says) the interests of the whole body necessarily
suffer; democracy alone secures the rule of the general will; and this
can be thoroughly secured only in a democratic republic. He then attacks
the English constitution as unjust and extravagant, claiming that the
formation of a close alliance between England, France, and America would
enable the expenses of government (Army, Navy, and Civil List inclusive)
to be reduced to a million and a half a year.
With regard to the means of raising revenue, Paine sketched a plan of
progressive taxation on incomes, ranging from 3d. in the pound on
incomes less than £500 to punitive proportions after £10,000 was
reached; while in his Spartan arithmetic great wealth appeared so dire a
misfortune that he rid the possessors of the whole of incomes of £23,000
and upwards. As for Pitt's financial reforms, he laughed them to scorn.
He also accused him of throwing over the fair promises that marked his
early career, of advertising for enemies abroad, while at home he
toadied to the Court. "The defect lies in the system.... Prop it as you
please, it continually sinks into Court government, and ever will."
Finally he urged a limitation of armaments, and prophesied that wars
would cease when nations had their freely elected Conventions. The cynic
will remember with satisfaction that, two months later, began the war
between France and Austria, which developed into the most tremendous
series of wars recorded in history.
The republican and levelling doctrines frankly advocated in Paine's
second pamphlet made a greater sensation than the first part had done;
and Fox, who approved the former production, sternly reprobated the
latter. It is possible that Government sought to stop its publication;
for Chapman, the publisher, to whom Paine first applied, offered him
£1,000 for the manuscript, and yet very soon afterwards declared it to
be too dangerous for him to print.[36] Certainly the work soon quickened
the tone of political thought. Already the London Society for promoting
Constitutional Information, which had died of inanition in 1784, had
come to life again before the close of the year 1791. And at the end of
that year a determined man, Thomas Hardy, a poor shoemaker of
Westminster, set to work to interest his comrades in politics. He
assembled four men at an ale-house, and they agreed to take action. At
their second meeting, on 25th January 1792, they mustered eight strong,
and resolved to start "The London Corresponding Society for the Reform
of Parliamentary Representation." Its finances were scarcely on a par
with its title: they consisted of eightpence, the first weekly
subscription. But the idea proved infectious; and amidst the heat
engendered by Paine's second pamphlet, the number of members rose to
forty-one.[37] The first manifesto of the Society, dated 2nd April,
claimed political liberty as the birthright of man, declared the British
nation to be misrepresented by its Parliament, and, while repudiating
all disorderly methods, demanded a thorough reform of that body.
So far as I have been able to discover, this was the first political
club started by English working-men at that time. But now the men of
Sheffield also organized themselves. Their "Association" began in an
assembly of five or six mechanics, who discussed "the enormous high
price of provisions" and "the waste and lavish [_sic_] of the public
property by placemen, pensioners, luxury and debauchery,--sources of the
grievous burthens under which the nation groans." The practical
character of their lamentations attracted many working men, with the
result that they resolved to reprint and circulate 1,600 copies of
Paine's "Rights of Man" (Part I), at sixpence a copy. On 15th January
1792 they wrote up to the "London Society for Constitutional
Information" to plan co-operation with them.
At first the ideas of the Sheffield Association were somewhat parochial.
But the need of common action all over the Kingdom was taking shape in
several minds, and when Scotland awoke to political activity (as will
appear in Chapter VII) the idea of a General Convention took firm root
and led to remarkable developments. For the present, the chief work of
these clubs was the circulation of Paine's volumes (even in Welsh,
Gaelic, and Erse) at the price of sixpence or even less. They also
distributed "The Catechism of the French Constitution" (of 1791), drawn
up by Christie, a Scot domiciled at Paris, which set forth the beauties
of that child of many hopes. Less objectionable was a pamphlet--"The
Rights of Men and the Duties of Men." For the most part, however, their
literature was acridly republican in tone and of a levelling tendency.
Thus, for the first time since the brief attempt of the Cromwellian
Levellers, the rich and the poor began to group themselves in hostile
camps, at the strident tones of Paine's cry for a graduated Income Tax.
Is it surprising that the sight of the free institutions of France and
of the forced economy of the Court of the Tuileries should lead our
workers to question the utility of the State-paid debaucheries of
Carlton House, and of the whole system of patronage and pensions? Burke
and Pitt had pruned away a few of the worst excrescences; but now they
saw with dismay the whole of the body politic subjected to remorseless
criticism by those whose duty was to toil and not to think or question.
This was a new departure in eighteenth-century England. Hitherto working
men had taken only a fleeting and fitful interest in politics. How
should they do so in days when newspapers were very dear, and their
contents had only the remotest bearing on the life of the masses? The
London mob had bawled and rioted for "Wilkes and Liberty," but mainly
from personal motives and love of horse-play. Now, however, all was
changed; and artisans were willing to sacrifice their time and their
pence to learn and teach a political catechism, and spread the writings
of Paine. Consequently the new Radical Clubs differed widely from the
short-lived County Associations of 1780 which charged a substantial fee
for membership. Moreover, these Associations expired in the years
1783-4, owing to the disgust at Fox's Coalition with Lord North. We are
therefore justified in declaring that English democracy entered on a new
lease of life, and did not, as has been asserted,[38] merely continue
the movement of 1780. The earlier efforts had been wholly insular in
character; they aimed at staying the tide of corruption; their methods
were in the main academic, and certainly never affected the great mass
of the people. Now reformers were moved by a wider enthusiasm for the
rights of humanity, and sought not merely to abolish pocket boroughs and
sinecures, but to level up the poor and level down the wealthy. It was
this aspect of Paine's teaching that excited men to a frenzy of
reprobation or of hope.
A certain continuity of tradition and method is observable in a club,
called The Friends of the People, which was founded at Freemasons'
Tavern in April 1792, with a subscription of five guineas a year. The
members included Cartwright, Erskine, Lord Edward Fitzgerald, Philip
Francis, Charles Grey, Lambton, the Earl of Lauderdale, Mackintosh,
Sheridan, Whitbread, and some sixty others; but Fox refused to join.
Their profession of faith was more moderate than that of Hardy's Club;
it emphasized the need of avoiding innovation and of restoring the
constitution to its original purity.[39] This was in the spirit of the
Associations of 1780; but the new club was far less characteristic of
the times than the clubs of working men described above.
The appearance of Paine's "Rights of Man" (Part II), the founding of
these societies, and the outbreak of war between France and Austria in
April 1792 made a deep impression on Pitt. He opposed a notice of a
motion of Reform for the following session, brought forward by Grey on
30th April. While affirming his continued interest in that subject, Pitt
deprecated its introduction at that time as involving the risk of
anarchy.
My object [he continued] always has been, and is now more
particularly so, to give permanence to that which we actually
enjoy rather than remove subsisting grievances.... I once
thought, and still think, upon the point of the representation
of the Commons, that, if some mode could be adopted by which the
people could have any additional security for a continuance of
the blessings which they now enjoy, it would be an improvement
in the constitution of this country. That was the extent of my
object. Further I never wished to go; and if this can be
obtained without the risk of losing what we have, I should think
it wise to make the experiment. When I say this, it is not
because I believe there is any existing grievance in this
country that is felt at this hour.
At the end of the American War (he continued) when bankruptcy seemed
imminent, he believed Reform to be necessary in order to restore public
confidence and remedy certain notorious grievances. Even then very many
moderate men opposed his efforts as involving danger to the State. How
much more would they deprecate sweeping proposals which rightly aroused
general apprehension? He then censured the action of certain members of
the House in joining an Association (the "Friends of the People") which
was supported by those who aimed at the overthrowing of hereditary
monarchy, titles of nobility, and all ideas of subordination. He would
oppose all proposals for Reform rather than run the risk of changes so
sweeping.--"All, all may be lost by an indiscreet attempt upon the
subject." Clearly, Pitt was about to join the ranks of the alarmists.
But members generally were of his opinion. In vain did Fox, Erskine,
Grey, and Sheridan deprecate the attempt to confuse moderate Reform with
reckless innovation. Burke illogically but effectively dragged in the
French spectre, and Windham declared that the public mind here, as in
other lands, was in such a state that the slightest scratch might
produce a mortal wound.
The gulf between Pitt and the reformers now became impassable. His
speech of 10th May against any relaxation of the penal laws against
Unitarians is a curious blend of bigotry and panic. Eleven days later a
stringent proclamation was issued against all who wrote, printed, and
dispersed "divers wicked and seditious writings." It ordered all
magistrates to search out the authors and abettors of them, and to take
steps for preventing disorder. It also inculcated "a due submission to
the laws, and a just confidence in the integrity and wisdom of
Parliament." Anything less calculated to beget such a confidence than
this proclamation, threatening alike to reformers and levellers, can
scarcely be conceived. On 25th May Grey opposed it in an acrid speech;
he inveighed against Pitt as an apostate, who never kept his word, and
always intended to delude Parliament and people. The sting of the speech
lay, not in these reckless charges, but in the citing of Pitt's opinions
as expressed in a resolution passed at the Thatched House Tavern in May
1782, which declared that without Parliamentary Reform neither the
liberty of the nation nor the permanence of a virtuous administration
was secure. Pitt's reply, however, convinced all those whose minds were
open to conviction. He proved to demonstration that he had never
approved of universal suffrage; yet that was now the goal aimed at by
Paine and the Societies founded on the basis of the Rights of Man. The
speech of Dundas also showed that the writings of Paine, and the
founding of clubs with those ends in view, had led to the present action
of the Cabinet.
Undoubtedly those clubs had behaved in a provocative manner. Apart from
their correspondence with the Jacobins Club (which will be described
later), they advocated aims which then seemed utterly subversive of
order. Thus, early in May 1792, the Sheffield Society declared their
object to be "a radical Reform of the country, as soon as prudence and
discretion would permit, and established on that system which is
consistent with the Rights of Man." Further, the hope is expressed that
not only the neighbouring towns and villages, most of which were forming
similar societies, but also the whole country would be "united in the
same cause, which cannot fail of being the case wherever the most
excellent works of Thomas Paine find reception."[40]
Now, this banding together of societies and clubs pointed the way to the
forming of a National Convention which would truly represent the whole
nation. In judging the action of Pitt and his colleagues at this crisis,
we must remember that they had before them the alarming example of the
Jacobins Club of Paris, which had gained enormous power by its network
of affiliated clubs. This body again was modelled on the various
societies of the Illuminati in Germany, whose organizer, Weishaupt,
summed up his contention in the words: "All their union shall be carried
on by the correspondence and visits of the brethren. If we can gain but
that point, we shall have succeeded in all we want."[41] This is why the
name Corresponding Society stank in the nostrils of all rulers. It
implied a parasitic organization which, if allowed to grow, would
strangle the established Government. Signs were not wanting that this
was the aim of the new Radical Clubs. Thus the delegates of the United
Constitutional Societies who met at Norwich drew up on 24th March 1792
resolutions expressing satisfaction at the rapid growth of those bodies,
already numbering some hundreds, "which by delegates preserve a mutual
intercourse." ... "To Mr. Thomas Paine our thanks are specially due for
his first and second parts of the 'Rights of Man'; and we sincerely wish
that he may live to see his labours crowned with success in the general
diffusion of liberty and happiness among mankind." ... "We ... earnestly
entreat our brethren to increase in their Associations in order to form
one grand and extensive Union of all the friends of liberty."[42] It is
not surprising that this plan of a National Convention of levellers
produced something like a panic among the well-to-do; and it is futile
to assert that men who avowed their belief in the subversive teaching of
Part II of Paine's book were concerned merely with the Reform of
Parliament. They put that object in their public manifestoes; but, like
many of the Chartists of a later date, their ultimate aim was the
redistribution of wealth; and this it was which brought on them the
unflinching opposition of Pitt.
Nevertheless even these considerations do not justify him in opposing
the reformers root and branch. The greatest statesman is he who
distinguishes between the real grievances of a suffering people and the
visionary or dangerous schemes which they beget in ill-balanced brains.
To oppose moderate reformers as well as extremists is both unjust and
unwise. It confounds together the would-be healers and the enemies of
the existing order. Furthermore, an indiscriminate attack tends to close
the ranks in a solid phalanx, and it should be the aim of a tactician
first to seek to loosen those ranks.
Finally, we cannot forget that Pitt had had it in his power to redress
the most obvious of the grievances which kept large masses of his
countrymen outside the pale of political rights and civic privilege.
Those grievances were made known to him temperately in the years 1787,
1789, and 1790; but he refused to amend them, and gradually drifted to
the side of the alarmists and reactionaries. Who is the wiser guide at
such a time? He who sets to work betimes to cure certain ills which are
producing irritation in the body politic? Or he who looks on the
irritation as a sign that nothing should be done? The lessons of history
and the experience of everyday life plead for timely cure and warn
against a nervous postponement. Doubtless Pitt would have found it
difficult to persuade some of his followers to apply the knife in the
session of 1791 or 1792. But in the Parliament elected in 1790 his
position was better assured, his temper more imperious, than in that of
1785, which needed much tactful management. The fact, then, must be
faced that he declined to run the risk of the curative operation, even
at a time when there were no serious symptoms in the patient and little
or no risk for the surgeon.
The reason which he assigned for his refusal claims careful notice. It
was that his earlier proposals (those of 1782-5) had aimed at national
security; while those of the present would tend to insecurity. Possibly
in the month of April 1792 this argument had some validity; though up to
that time all the violence had been on the Tory side. But the plea does
not excuse Pitt for not taking action in the year 1790. That was the
period when the earlier apathy of the nation to Reform was giving way to
interest, and interest had not yet grown into excitement. Still less had
loyalty waned under the repressive measures whereby he now proposed to
give it vigour.
Thus, Pitt missed a great opportunity, perhaps the greatest of his
career. What it means is clear to us, who know that the cause of Reform
passed under a cloud for the space of thirty-eight years. It is of
course unfair to censure him and his friends for lacking a prophetic
vision of the long woes that were to come. Most of the blame lavished
upon him arises from forgetfulness of the fact that he was not a seer
mounted on some political Pisgah, but a pioneer struggling through an
unexplored jungle. Nevertheless, as the duty of a pioneer is not merely
to hew a path, but also to note the lie of the land and the signs of the
weather, we must admit that Pitt did not possess the highest instincts
of his craft. He cannot be ranked with Julius Caesar, Charlemagne,
Alfred the Great, Edward I, or Burleigh, still less with those giants of
his own age, Napoleon and Stein; for these men boldly grappled with the
elements of unrest or disloyalty, and by wise legislation wrought them
into the fabric of the State. Probably the lack of response to his
reforming efforts in the year 1785 ingrained in him the conviction that
Britons would always be loyal if their burdens were lessened and their
comforts increased; and now in 1792 he looked on the remissions of
taxation (described in the following chapter) as a panacea against
discontent. Under normal conditions that would have been the case. It
was not so now, because new ideas were in the air, and these forbade a
bovine acceptance of abundant fodder. In truth, Pitt had not that gift
without which the highest abilities and the most strenuous endeavours
will at novel crises be at fault--a sympathetic insight into the needs
and aspirations of the people. His analytical powers enabled him to
detect the follies of the royalist crusaders; but he lacked those higher
powers of synthesis which alone could discern the nascent strength of
Democracy.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] I am perfectly aware that the term "Radical" (in its first form,
"Radical Reformer") does not appear until a few years later; but I use
it here and in the following chapters because there is no other word
which expresses the same meaning.
[2] See Vivenot, i, 176-81; Beer, "Leopold II, Franz II, und Catharina,"
140 _et seq._; Clapham, "Causes of the War of 1792," ch. iv.
[3] B.M. Add. MSS., 34438; Vivenot, i, 185, 186. "He [the Emperor] was
extremely agitated when he gave me the letter for the King" (Elgin to
Grenville, 7th July, in "Dropmore P.," ii, 126).
[4] B.M. Add. MSS., 34438.
[5] _Ibid._ Grenville to Ewart, 26th July. Calonne for some little time
resided at Wimbledon House. His letters to Pitt show that he met with
frequent rebuffs; but he had one interview with him early in June 1790.
I have found no details of it.
[6] "Diary and Corresp. of Fersen," 121.
[7] Arneth, "Marie Antoinette, Joseph II, und Leopold II," 148, 152.
[8] Mr. Nisbet Bain (_op. cit._, ii, 129) accuses Pitt and his
colleagues of waiving aside a proposed visit of Gustavus III to London,
because "they had no desire to meet face to face a monarch they had
already twice deceived." Mr. Bain must refer to the charges (invented at
St Petersburg) that Pitt had egged Gustavus on to war against Russia,
and then deserted him. In the former volume (chapters xxi-iii) I proved
the falsity of those charges. It would be more correct to say that
Gustavus deserted England.
[9] B.M. Add. MSS., 34438.
[10] Martens, v, 236-9; "F.O.," Prussia, 22. Ewart to Grenville, 4th
August.
[11] On 15th August Prussia renounced her alliance with Turkey (Vivenot,
i, 225).
[12] Sybel, bk. ii, ch. vi; Vivenot, i, 235, 243.
[13] "Dropmore P.," ii, 192.
[14] G. Rose, "Diaries," i, 111.
[15] Arneth, 206, 210; Vivenot, i, 270.
[16] Burke ("Corresp.," iii, 308, 342, 346) shows that Mercy
d'Argenteau, after his brief mission to London, spread the slander. Pitt
and Grenville said nothing decisive to him on this or any other topic.
Kaunitz partly adopted the charge. (See Vivenot, i, 272.)
[17] "F.O.," Russia, 22. Grenville to Whitworth, 27th October, and W. to
G., 14th October 1791.
[18] Larivière, "Cath. II et la Rév. franç.," 88-90, 110-17.
[19] Burke's "Works," iii, 8, 369 (Bohn edit.).
[20] "Parl. Hist.," xxviii, 1-41.
[21] T. Walker, "Review of ... political events in Manchester
(1789-1794)."
[22] T. Walker, "Review of ... political events in Manchester
(1789-1794)," 452-79. I cannot agree with Mr. J. R. le B. Hammond
("Fox," 76) that Pitt now spoke as the avowed enemy of parliamentary
reform. Indeed, he never spoke in that sense, but opposed it as
inopportune.
[23] Rutt, "Mems. of Priestly," ii, 25. As is well known, Burke's
"Reflections on the Fr. Rev.," was in part an answer to Dr. Price's
sermon of 4th November 1789 in the Old Jewry chapel, to the Society for
celebrating the Revolution of 1688.
[24] It was more of a club than the branches of the "Society for
Constitutional Information," which did good work in 1780-4, but expired
in 1784 owing to the disgust of reformers at the Fox-North Coalition--so
Place asserts (B.M. Add. MSS., 27808).
[25] T. Walker, _op. cit._, 18, 19.
[26] "Parl. Hist.," xxix, 488-510.
[27] _Ibid._, 113-9.
[28] M. D. Conway, "Life of T. Paine," i, 284.
[29] Burke's Works, iii, 76 (Bohn edit.).
[30] _Ibid._, iii, 12. So, too, on 30th August 1791 Priestley wrote that
Pitt had shown himself unfavourable to their cause (Rutt, "Life of
Priestley," ii, 145).
[31] Prior, "Life of Burke," 322, who states very incorrectly that not
one of them has survived.
[32] "H. O.," Geo. III (Domestic), 19.
[33] _Ibid._ As late as 9th August a proclamation was posted about
Birmingham: "The friends of the good cause are requested to meet us at
Revolution Place to-morrow night at 11 o'clock in order to fix upon
those persons who are to be the future objects of our malice." Of course
this was but an incitation to plunder. See Massey, iii, 462-6, on the
Birmingham riots.
[34] "Dropmore P.," ii, 133, 136; "Parl. Hist.," xxix, 1464.
[35] Burke "Reflections on the Fr. Rev.," 39 (Mr. Payne's edit.).
[36] Conway, _op. cit._, ii, 330. The printer and publisher were
prosecuted later on, as well as Paine, who fled to France.
[37] "Mem. of T. Hardy," by himself (Lond., 1832).
[38] Leslie Stephen, "The Eng. Utilitarians," i, 121. I fully admit that
the Chartist leaders in 1838 went back to the Westminster programme of
1780. See "The Life and Struggles of William Lovett"; but the spirit and
methods of the new agitation were wholly different. On this topic I feel
compelled to differ from Mr. J. L. le B. Hammond ("Fox," ch. v, _ad
init._). Mr. C. B. R. Kent ("The English Radicals," 156) states the case
correctly.
[39] "Parl. Hist.," xxix, 1303-9.
[40] "Application of Barruel's 'Memoirs of Jacobinism' to the Secret
Societies of Ireland and Great Britain," 32-3.
[41] "Application of Barruel's 'Memoirs of Jacobinism' to the Secret
Societies of Ireland and Great Britain," Introduction, p. x.
[42] "H. O.," Geo. III (Domestic), 20.
CHAPTER II
BEFORE THE STORM
I find it to be a very general notion, at least in the Assembly,
that if France can preserve a neutrality with England, she will
be able to cope with all the rest of Europe united.--GOWER TO
GRENVILLE, _22nd April 1792_.
Indirect evidence as to the intentions of a statesman is often more
convincing than his official assertions. The world always suspects the
latter; and many politicians have found it expedient to adopt the
ironical device practised frequently with success by Bismarck on his
Austrian colleagues at Frankfurt, that of telling the truth. Fortunately
the English party game has nearly always been kept up with sportsmanlike
fair play; and Pitt himself was so scrupulously truthful that we are
rarely in doubt as to his opinions, save when he veiled them by
ministerial reserve. Nevertheless, on the all-important subject of his
attitude towards Revolutionary France, it is satisfactory to have
indirect proofs of his desire to maintain a strict, if not friendly,
neutrality. This proof lies in his handling of the nation's armaments
and finances.
The debate on the Army Estimates on 15th February 1792 is of interest in
more respects than one. The news of the definitive signature of peace
between Russia and Turkey by the Treaty of Jassy, put an end to the last
fears of a resumption of war in the East; and, as the prospects were
equally pacific in the West, the Ministry carried out slight reductions
in the land forces. These were fixed in the year 1785 at seventy-three
regiments of 410 men each, divided into eight companies, with two
companies _en second_. In 1789 the number of companies per regiment was
fixed at ten, without any companies _en second_. Now the Secretary at
War, Sir Charles Yonge, proposed further reductions, which, with those
of 1789, would lessen each regiment by seventy privates, and save the
country the sum of £51,000. No diminution was proposed in the number of
officers; and this gave Fox a handle for an attack. He said that the
natural plan would be to reduce the number of regiments to sixty-four.
Instead of that, the number of seventy regiments was retained, and new
corps were now proposed for the East Indies, one for the West Indies,
and one for Canada, chiefly to be used for pioneer work and clearance of
woods. General Burgoyne and Fox protested against the keeping up of
skeleton regiments, the latter adding the caustic comment that the plan
was "the least in point of saving and the greatest in point of
patronage."[43]
The practices prevalent in that age give colour to the charge. On the
other hand, professional men have defended a system which kept up the
_cadres_ of regiments in time of peace, as providing a body of trained
officers and privates, which in time of war could be filled out by
recruits. Of course it is far inferior to the plan of a reserve of
trained men; but that plan had not yet been hammered out by Scharnhorst,
under the stress of the Napoleonic domination in Prussia. As to the
reduction of seven men per company, now proposed, it may have been due
partly to political reasons. Several reports in the Home Office and War
Office archives prove that discontent was rife among the troops,
especially in the northern districts, on account of insufficient pay and
the progress of Radical propaganda among them. The reduction may have
afforded the means of sifting out the ringleaders.
Retrenchment, if not Reform, was the order of the day. Pitt discerned
the important fact that a recovery in the finance and trade of the
country must be encouraged through a series of years to produce a marked
effect. For then the application of capital to industry, and the
increase in production and revenue can proceed at the rate of compound
interest. Already his hopes, for which he was indebted to the "Wealth of
Nations,"[44] had been largely realized. The Report of the Select
Committee of the House of Commons presented in May 1791 showed the
following growth in the ordinary revenue (exclusive of the Land and Malt
Taxes):
1786 £11,867,055
1787 12,923,134
1788 13,007,642
1789 13,433,068
1790 14,072,978
During those five years the sum of £4,750,000 had been allotted to the
Sinking Fund for the payment of the National Debt; and a further sum of
£674,592, accruing from the interest of stock and expired annuities, had
gone towards the same object--a crushing retort to the taunts of Fox and
Sheridan, that the Sinking Fund was a mere pretence. On the whole the
sum of £5,424,592 had been paid off from the National Debt in five
years. It is therefore not surprising that three per cent. Consols,
which were down at fifty-four when Pitt took office at the end of 1783,
touched ninety in the year 1791. The hopes and fears of the year 1792
find expression in the fact that in March they stood at ninety-seven,
and in December dropped to seventy-four.
For the present Pitt entertained the highest hopes. In his Budget Speech
of 17th February he declared the revenue to be in so flourishing a state
that he could grant relief to the taxpayers. In the year 1791 the
permanent taxes had yielded £14,132,000; and those on land and malt
brought the total up to £16,690,000; but he proposed to take £16,212,000
as the probable revenue for the following year. The expenditure would be
lessened by £104,000 on the navy (2,000 seamen being discharged), and
about £50,000 on the army; £36,000 would also be saved by the
non-renewal of the subsidy for Hessian troops. There were, however,
additions, due to the establishment of the Government of Upper Canada,
and the portions allotted to the Duke of York (on the occasion of his
marriage with a Prussian princess) and the Duke of Clarence. The
expenditure would, therefore, stand at £15,811,000; but, taking the
average of four years, he reckoned the probable surplus at no more than
£401,000. On the other hand, he anticipated no new expenses except for
the fortification of posts in the West Indies and the completion of
forts for the further protection of the home dockyards. On the whole,
then, he reckoned that he had £600,000 to spare; and of this amount he
proposed to allocate £400,000 to the reduction of the National Debt and
the repeal of the extra duty on malt, an impost much disliked by
farmers. He also announced a remission of permanent taxes to the extent
of £200,000, namely, on female servants, carts, and waggons, and that of
three shillings on each house having less than seven windows. These were
burdens that had undoubtedly affected the poor. Further, he hoped to add
the sum of £200,000 every year to the Sinking Fund, and he pointed out
that, at this rate of payment, that fund would amount to £4,000,000 per
annum in the space of fifteen years, after which time the interest might
be applied to the relief of the nation's burdens.
Then, rising high above the level of facts and figures, he ventured on
this remarkable prophecy:
I am not, indeed, presumptuous enough to suppose that, when I
name fifteen years, I am not naming a period in which events may
arise which human foresight cannot reach, and which may baffle
all our conjectures. We must not count with certainty on a
continuance of our present prosperity during such an interval;
but unquestionably there never was a time in the history of this
country, when, from the situation of Europe, we might more
reasonably expect fifteen years of peace than at the present
moment.
Imagination pictures what might possibly have been the outcome of events
if Great Britain and France had continued to exert on one another the
peaceful and mutually beneficent influence which Pitt had sought to
bring about. In that case, we can imagine the reformed French monarchy,
or a Republic of the type longed for by Mme. Roland, permeating the
thought and action of neighbouring States, until the cause of
Parliamentary Reform in England, and the cognate efforts for civic and
religious liberty on the Continent achieved a lasting triumph. That Pitt
cherished these hopes is seen not only in his eloquent words, but in the
efforts which he put forth to open up the world to commerce. The year
1792 ought to be remembered, not only for the outbreak of war and the
horrors of the September massacres at Paris, but also for the attempt to
inaugurate friendly relations with China. Pitt set great store by the
embassy which he at this time sent out to Pekin under the lead of Lord
Macartney. In happier times this enterprise might have served to link
East and West in friendly intercourse; and Europe, weary of barren
strifes, would have known no other rivalries than those of peace.
Alas: this is but a mirage. As it fades away, we discern an arid waste.
War broke out between France and Austria within two months of this
sanguine utterance. It soon embroiled France and England in mortal
strife. All hope of retrenchment and Reform was crushed. The National
Debt rose by leaps and bounds, and the Sinking Fund proved to be a
snare. Taxation became an ever-grinding evil, until the poor, whose lot
Pitt hoped to lighten, looked on him as the harshest of taskmasters,
the puppet of kings, and the paymaster of the Continental Coalition. The
spring of the year 1807 found England burdened beyond endurance, the
Third Coalition stricken to death by the blows of Napoleon, while Pitt
had fourteen months previously succumbed to heart-breaking toils and
woes.
Before adverting to the complications with France which were thenceforth
to absorb his energies, I must refer to some incidents of the session
and summer of the year 1792.
One of the most noteworthy enactments was Fox's Libel Bill. In May 1791
that statesman had proposed to the House of Commons to subject cases of
libel to the award of juries, not of judges. Pitt warmly approved the
measure, maintaining that, far from protecting libellers, it would have
the contrary effect. The Bill passed the Commons on 31st May; but owing
to dilatory and factious procedure in the Lords, it was held over until
the year 1792. Thanks to the noble plea for liberty urged by the
venerable Earl Camden, it passed on 21st May.[45] It is matter of
congratulation that Great Britain gained this new safeguard for freedom
of speech before she encountered the storms of the revolutionary era.
There is little else to chronicle except two occurrences which displayed
the power and the foresight of Pitt. They were the fall of Thurlow and
the endeavour of the Prime Minister to form a working alliance with the
Old Whigs. The former of these events greatly impressed the
contemporaries of Pitt, who likened the ejected Chancellor to Lucifer or
to a Titan blasted by Jove's thunderbolt. In this age we find it
difficult to account for the prestige of Thurlow. His legal learning was
far from profound, his speeches were more ponderous than powerful, and
his attacks were bludgeon blows rather than home thrusts. Of the lighter
graces and social gifts he had scant store. Indeed, his private life
displayed no redeeming feature. Everyone disliked him, but very many
feared him, mainly, perhaps, because of his facility for intrigue, his
power of bullying, and his great influence at Court. As we have seen,
the conciliatory efforts of the monarch had hitherto averted a rupture
between Pitt and Thurlow. But not even the favour of George III could
render the crabbed old Chancellor endurable. His spitefulness had
increased since Pitt's nomination of Pepper Arden to the Mastership of
the Rolls; and he showed his spleen by obstructing Government measures
in the House of Lords. In April 1792 he flouted Pitt's efforts on behalf
of the abolition of the Slave Trade; and on 15th May he ridiculed his
proposal that to every new State loan a Sinking Fund should necessarily
be appended. The Commons had passed this measure; but in the Lords
Thurlow spoke contemptuously of the proposal; and his influence, if not
his arguments, brought the Government majority down to six.
Pitt was furious. Despite a letter from Windsor urging the need of
forbearance in the interests of the public service, he resolved to end
this intolerable situation. Respectfully but firmly he begged the King
to decide between him and Thurlow. The result was a foregone conclusion.
Having to choose between an overbearing Chancellor, and a Prime Minister
whose tact, firmness, and transcendent abilities formed the keystone of
the political fabric, the King instructed Dundas to request Thurlow to
deliver up the Great Seal.[46] For the convenience of public business,
his resignation was deferred to the end of the session, which came at
the middle of June. The Great Seal was then placed in commission until
January 1793 when Lord Loughborough, formerly a follower of the Prince
of Wales and Fox, became Lord Chancellor.
The dismissal of Thurlow is interesting on general as well as
constitutional grounds. It marks an important step in the evolution of
the Cabinet. Thenceforth the will of the Prime Minister was held to be
paramount whenever any one of his colleagues openly and sharply differed
from him. Thus the authority of the Prime Minister became more clearly
defined. Not even the favour of the Sovereign could thenceforth uphold a
Minister who openly opposed and scorned the head of the Cabinet. The
recognition of this fact has undoubtedly conduced to the amenity of
parliamentary life; for etiquette has imposed on Ministers the
observance of outward signs of deference to their chief, and (save a few
times in the breezy careers of Canning and Palmerston) dissensions have
been confined to the council chamber.
As to Thurlow's feelings, they appear in his frank admission to Sir John
Scott, the future Chancellor, Lord Eldon: "I did not think that the King
would have parted with me so easily. As to that other man [Pitt], he
has done to me just what I should have done to him if I could."[47] It
is not often that a plotter shows his hand so clearly; and we must
admire Pitt's discernment no less than his firmness at this crisis.
Would that he had found a more faithful successor. Possibly some
suspicion as to Loughborough's powers of intrigue led Pitt to make
cautious advances to that promising lawyer, Sir John Scott. To his
honour, be it said, Scott at once declared that he must cease to be
Solicitor-General, as he had received much assistance from Thurlow. In
vain did Pitt expostulate with him. At last he persuaded him to consult
Thurlow, who advised him to do nothing so foolish, seeing that Pitt
would be compelled at some future time to confer the Great Seal upon
him. With this parting gleam of insight and kindliness, the morose
figure of Thurlow vanishes.
More than once in the session of 1792 rumours were afloat as to a
reconstruction of the Cabinet. Early in that year, when the debates on
the Russian armament somewhat shook Pitt's position, it was stated that
the King desired to get rid of him. Gillray heard of the story, and
visualized it with his usual skill. He represented the Marquis of
Lansdowne ("Malagrida") as driving at full speed to St. James's Palace,
heralded by the dove of peace, while Fox, Sheridan, etc., hang on behind
and cry out, "Stop; stop; take us in." Pitt and Dundas are seen leaving
the palace. The rumour gains in credibility from a Memorandum of the
Marquis; but it is doubtful whether George ever thought seriously of
giving up Pitt, still less of seeking support from the discredited and
unpopular Lansdowne, whose views on the French Revolution were utterly
opposed to those of the King. Probably the King put questions to him
merely with the view of gratifying his own curiosity and exciting unreal
hopes. Certainly Pitt scoffed at the idea of resignation. On 3rd March
he referred to the rumour, in a letter to the Earl of Westmorland,
merely to dismiss it as ridiculous.[48]
Far more important were the negotiations that began in May-June 1792.
Pitt paved the way for a union with the Old Whigs by consulting the
opinions of the Duke of Portland and other leading Whigs, assembled at
Burlington House, respecting the proclamation against seditious
writings. They suggested a few alterations in his draft and he adopted
them. Fox alone declared against the whole scheme, and afterwards hotly
opposed it in the House of Commons. This step having shown the cleavage
in the Whig party, Dundas and Loughborough sought to effect a union of
the Portland Whigs with the Government. The Duke of Portland strongly
approved of it. Even Fox welcomed the proposal, but only on the
understanding that the Whigs joined the Ministry on fair and even terms,
sharing equally in the patronage. The Duke further suggested that Pitt
should give up the Treasury and allow a neutral man like the Duke of
Leeds to take that office. We can picture the upward tilt of the nose
with which Pitt received this proposal.
Lord Malmesbury, who was present at this discussion of the Whig leaders
on 13th June, himself saw great difficulties in such a plan, as also
from the opposition of the King and the Prince of Wales. On the next day
Loughborough met Pitt at Dundas's house, and reported him to be
favourable to the idea of a coalition. Pitt further said that the King
and the Queen would welcome it, except in so far as it concerned Fox,
whose conduct in Parliament during the last few months had given great
offence. Pitt further declared that he did not remember a single word in
all the disputes with Fox which could prevent him honourably and
consistently acting with him. He added that it might be difficult to
give him the Foreign Office at once, but he could certainly have it in a
few months' time. On 16th June Malmesbury saw Fox at Burlington House,
and found him in an unusually acrid and suspicious mood, from the notion
that the whole affair was a plot of Pitt to break up the Whig party.
Beside which, Fox said that it was idle to expect Pitt to admit the Whig
leaders on an equal footing. Malmesbury, however, maintained that, if
Fox and the Duke were agreed, they would lead the whole of their party
with them, at which remark Fox became silent and embarrassed.
Pitt, on the other hand, was very open to Loughborough, and expressed a
wish to form a strong and united Ministry which could face the
difficulties of the time. The chief obstacle to a coalition, he said,
was Fox's support of French principles, which must preclude his taking
the Foreign Office immediately. The remark is noteworthy as implying
Pitt's expectation that either Fox might tone down his opinions, or the
Revolution might abate its violence. Further, when Loughborough
reminded him of the ardour of his advocacy of the Abolitionist cause, he
replied that some concession must be made on that head, as the King
strongly objected to the way in which it was pushed on by addresses and
petitions, a method which he himself disliked. Further, he freely
admitted that the "national Aristocracy" of the country must have its
due weight and power.[49] These confessions (assuming that Loughborough
reported them correctly) prepare us for the half right turn which now
becomes the trend of Pitt's political career. In order to further the
formation of a truly national party, he was willing, if necessary, to
postpone the cause of the slaves and of Parliamentary Reform until the
advent of calmer times.
At this stage of the discussions, then, Pitt was willing to meet the
Whigs half way. But the chief difficulty lay, not with Fox and his
friends, but with the King. When Pitt mentioned the proposal to him,
there came the characteristic reply: "Anything complimentary to them,
but no power."[50] How was it possible to harmonize this resolve with
that of Fox, that the Whigs must have an equality of power? Grenville
was a further obstacle. How could that stiff and ambitious man give up
the Foreign Office to Fox, whose principles he detested? We hear little
of Grenville in these days, probably because of his marriage to Lady Ann
Pitt, daughter of Lord Camelford. But certainly he would not have
tolerated a half Whig Cabinet.
It is therefore strange that the proposals were ever renewed. Renewed,
however, they were, in the second week of July. Loughborough having
spread the impression that Pitt desired their renewal, Leeds was again
pushed to the front, it being suggested that he might be First Lord of
the Treasury. Finally, on 14th August, the King granted him a private
interview at Windsor, but stated that nothing had been said on the
subject for a long time, and that it had never been seriously
considered, it being impossible for Pitt to give up the Treasury and act
as _Commis_ to the Whig leaders. This statement should have lessened the
Duke's astonishment at hearing from Pitt on 22nd August that there had
been no thought of any change in the Government.[51] This assertion
seems to belie Pitt's reputation for truthfulness. But it is noteworthy
that Grenville scarcely refers to the discussions on this subject,
deeply though it concerned him. Further, Rose, who was in close touch
with Ministers, wrote to Auckland on 13th July that he had heard only
through the newspapers of the "negotiations for a sort of Coalition,"
and that he knew there had been none; that Dundas had conferred with
Loughborough, but there had been no negotiation.[52]
Now the proneness of these two men to scheming and intrigue is well
known; and it seems probable that they so skilfully pulled the wires at
Burlington House as to quicken the appetites of the Whig leaders. Dundas
may have acted with a view to breaking up the Whig party, and
Loughborough in order to bring about a general shuffle of the cards
favourable to himself. Malmesbury and others, whose desires or interests
lay in a union of the Portland Whigs with Pitt, furthered the scheme,
and gave full credence to Loughborough's reports. But we may doubt
whether Pitt took the affair seriously after the crushing declaration of
the King: "Anything complimentary to them, but no power." The last blow
to the scheme was dealt by Pitt in an interview with Loughborough, so we
may infer from the following letter from George III to the former:
Weymouth, _August 20, 1792_.[53]
I cannot but think Mr. Pitt has judged right in seeing Lord
Loughborough, as that will convince him, however [whoever?] were
parties to the proposal brought by the Duke of Leeds, that the
scheme can never succeed: that the Duke of Portland was equally
concerned with the former appeared clearly from his letters....
The King, then, looked on the whole affair as a Whig plot; and Pitt,
whatever his feelings were at first, finally frowned upon the proposal.
Doubtless, in an official sense, there was justification for his remark
to the Duke of Leeds, that the coalition had never been in
contemplation; for the matter seems never to have come before the
Cabinet. But as a statement between man and man it leaves something to
be desired on the score of accuracy. Annoyance at the very exalted
position marked out for the Duke, whose capacity Pitt rated decidedly
low, may have led him to belittle the whole affair; for signs of
constraint and annoyance are obvious in his other answers to his late
colleague. There, then, we must leave this question, involved in
something of mystery.[54] We shall not be far wrong in concluding that
Pitt wished for the formation of a national Ministry, and that the plan
failed, partly from the resolve of Fox never to play second to Pitt; and
still more from the personal way in which the King regarded the
suggestion.
The King meanwhile had marked his sense of the value of Pitt's services
by pressing on him the honourable position of Warden of the Cinque
Ports, with a stipend of £3,000 a year, intimating at the same time that
he would not hear of his declining it (6th August).[55] It is a proof of
the spotless purity of Pitt's reputation that not a single libel or gibe
appeared in the Press on his acceptance of this almost honorary
post.[56]
One brilliant recruit to the Whig ranks was now won over to the national
cause, of which Pitt was seen to be the incarnation. Already at Eton and
Oxford George Canning had shown the versatility of his genius and the
precocious maturity of his eloquence. When his Oxford friend, Jenkinson
(the future Earl of Liverpool) made a sensational _début_ in the House
on the Tory side, Sheridan remarked that the Whigs would soon provide an
antidote in the person of young Canning. Great, then, was their
annoyance when the prodigy showed signs of breaking away from the
society of the Crewes and Sheridan, in order to ally himself with Pitt.
So little is known respecting the youth of Canning that the motives
which prompted his breach with Sheridan are involved in uncertainty. It
is clear, however, from his own confession that, after some discussion
with Orde, he himself made the first offer of allegiance to Pitt in a
letter of 26th July 1792. He then informed the Prime Minister that,
though on terms of friendship with eminent members of the Opposition, he
was "in no way bound to them by any personal or political obligation,"
and was therefore entirely free to choose his own party; that he was
ambitious of being connected with Pitt, but lacked the means to win an
election, and yet refused to be brought in by any individual--a
reference, seemingly, to an offer made to him by the Duke of Portland.
In reply, Pitt proposed an interview at Downing Street on Wednesday,
15th August.[57]
At noon on that day the two men first met. We can picture them as they
faced one another in the formal surroundings of the Prime Minister's
study. Pitt, at this time thirty-three years of age, had lost some of
the slimness of youth, but his figure was bony, angular, and somewhat
awkward. His face was as yet scarcely marked by the slight Bacchic
blotches which told of carouses with Dundas at Wimbledon. Months and
years of triumph (apart from the Russian defeat) had stiffened his
confidence and pride; but the fateful shadow of the French Revolution
must have struck a chill to his being, especially then, on the arrival
of news of the pitiable surrender of Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette, and
the shooting down of the Swiss Guards at the Tuileries. No royalist
could look on the future without inward shuddering; and both these men
were ardent royalists. We know from Canning's confession that it was the
starting of the club, the Friends of the People, in April 1792, which
disgusted him with the forward section of the Whigs; and their
subsequent action completed the breach. Pitt's endeavour to form a
national Administration must have gained a new significance from the
terrible news from Paris. We may be sure, then, that the youth of
twenty-two years gazed with eager interest on the stately form before
him as at the embodiment of political wisdom, purity, and patriotism.
They shook hands. Then for a time they ambled coyly around the subject
at issue, and talked of "France and Jenkinson, and other equally
important concerns." Indeed Pitt seems to have been as nervous and
awkward as the novice. At length he plunged into business. "It is your
wish, I believe, Mr. Canning (and I am sure it is mine), to come in,
etc." On Canning bowing assent, Pitt remarked that it was not easy to
find an inexpensive seat, and commented on his expressed desire not to
tie himself to any borough-owner. Whereupon the young aspirant, with
more pride than tact, threw in the remark that he would not like to be
personally beholden to such an one, for instance, as Lord Lonsdale (who
first brought Pitt into Parliament). The Prime Minister seemed not to
notice the _gaucherie_, and stated that the Treasury had only six seats
at its disposal, but could arrange matters with "proprietors of
burgage-tenures." Thereupon Canning broke in more deftly. In that case,
he said, it must be made clear that he bound himself to follow, not the
borough-owner, but the Prime Minister. Here he more than recovered lost
ground, if indeed he had lost any. Pitt expressed his sense of the
compliment, and said that this could be managed, unless the young member
came to differ absolutely from his patron. Canning then frankly
confessed his inability to follow Pitt in maintaining the Test Act.
Equally frank and cordial was the reply, that he (Pitt) did not claim
exact agreement, especially on "speculative subjects," but only "a
general good disposition towards Government," which might be
strengthened by frequent contact.
Such was the course of this memorable interview. It sealed for ever the
allegiance of the youth to his self-chosen leader. He had prepared
Sheridan, and through him Fox and Bouverie, for this change of front.
The openness, the charm, the self-effacing patriotism of the Minister
thenceforth drew him as by an irresistible magnet. The brilliance and
joviality of Fox and Sheridan counted as nothing against the national
impulse which the master now set in motion and the pupil was destined to
carry to further lengths. There was a natural sympathy between these men
both in aim and temperament. It is a sign of the greatness of Pitt that
from the outset he laid the spell of his genius irrevocably upon
Canning.
* * * * *
Deferring to the next chapter a study of the democratic movement in
Great Britain, we now turn our attention to the relations of Pitt to
France, a topic which thenceforth dominates his life story and the
destinies of mankind.
In the month of January 1792, there arrived in London an envoy charged
with important proposals from the French Government. It was Talleyrand,
ex-bishop of Autun. Pitt had become acquainted with him during his
residence at Rheims in the summer of 1783; but the circumstances of the
case now forbade anything more than passing intercourse with that most
charming of talkers and subtlest of diplomatists. Talleyrand, having
been a member of the first, or Constituent, Assembly, was prevented by
the constitution of September 1791 from holding any office for two
years after that date. Therefore his visit to London was ostensibly on
private affairs. The Duc de Biron was the envoy, and Talleyrand merely
his adviser. He was instructed to seek "to maintain and strengthen the
good understanding which exists between the two Kingdoms."[58]
This was only the official pretext for the mission, the secret aim of
which was to win the friendship, if not the alliance, of England in case
of a Franco-Austrian war. In the early days of January 1792 the
constitutional Ministry, holding office, though not power, at Paris,
seemed to be working for a rupture with the Hapsburgs, partly in order
to please the Jacobins, and partly to escape the ever increasing
difficulties of its position. The earlier causes of dispute do not
concern us here. As we have seen, the Emperor Leopold was far from
desirous of war; but the provocative attitude of the Legislative
Assembly at Paris and the humiliations of his sister, Marie Antoinette,
aroused his resentment; and, early in January, he was heard to say "that
if the French madmen were determined to force him into a war, they
should find that the pacific Leopold knew how to wage it with the
greatest vigour, and would oblige them to pay its expenses in something
more solid than assignats." Our ambassador, Sir Robert Keith, was,
however, convinced that this outburst and the westward march of troops
were but "empty parade."[59]
On the other hand Earl Gower, British ambassador at Paris, reported that
the Ministry, the Assembly, and the Jacobins Club (with the exception of
Robespierre and his clique) desired war.[60] In truth, there seemed
little risk in a struggle with the exhausted Hapsburg States, provided
that they had support neither from Prussia nor from England. De Ségur
therefore set out for Berlin, and Talleyrand for London, to secure the
friendly neutrality or support of those Governments. The latter envoy
was specially suited for his mission, as he carried on the traditions of
Mirabeau, who in the closing months of his life urged the need of an
Anglo-French _entente_.[61]
Talleyrand and Biron reached London on 24th January 1792. Before
reaching the capital they read in the English papers that they had
arrived there, and had been very coldly received by Pitt--a specimen of
the arts by which the French _émigrés_ in London sought to embitter the
relations between the two lands. Talleyrand had the good fortune to
occupy a seat in the Strangers' Gallery at the opening of Parliament
close to two ardent royalists, Cazalès and Lally-Tollendal. What must
have been their feelings on hearing in the King's speech the statement
of his friendly relations to the other Powers and his resolve to reduce
the army and navy?
Already Pitt had seen Talleyrand. He reminded him in a friendly way of
their meeting at Rheims, remarked on the unofficial character of the
ex-bishop's "mission," but expressed his willingness to discuss French
affairs, about which he even showed "curiosity." Grenville afterwards
spoke to the envoy in the same courteous but non-committal manner.
Talleyrand was, however, charmed. He wrote to Delessart, the Foreign
Minister at Paris: "Your best ground is England; ... Believe me the
rumours current in France about the disposition of England towards us
are false."[62] He urged the need of showing a bold front; for "it is
with a fleet that you must speak to England."
Talleyrand throughout showed the sagacity which earned him fame in
diplomacy. He was not depressed by the King's frigid reception of him at
St. James's on 1st February, or by the Queen refusing even to notice
him. Even the escapades of Biron did not dash his hopes. That envoy ran
up debts and bargained about horses _avec un nommé Tattersall, qui tient
dans sa main tous les chevaux d'Angleterre_, until he was arrested for
debt and immured in a "sponging house," whence the appeals of the
ex-bishop failed to rescue him. As Biron had come with an official order
to buy horses with a view to the impending war with Austria, we may
infer that his arrest was the work of some keen-witted _émigré_.
Even this, however, was better than the fortunes of Ségur, who found
himself openly flouted both by King and courtiers at Berlin. For
Frederick William was still bent on a vigorous policy. On 7th February
his Ministers signed with Prince Reuss, the Austrian envoy, a secret
treaty of defensive alliance, mainly for the settlement of French
affairs, but also with a side glance at Poland. The Prussian Ministers
probably hoped for a peaceful but profitable settlement, which would
leave them free for a decisive intervention in the Polish troubles now
coming to a crisis; but Frederick William was in a more warlike mood,
and longed to overthrow the "rebels" in France. Ségur's mission to
Berlin was therefore an utter failure. That of Talleyrand, on the other
hand, achieved its purpose, mainly because Pitt and Grenville never had
any other desire than to remain strictly neutral. It was therefore
superfluous for Talleyrand to hint delicately at the desirability of the
friendship of France for England, in view of the war with Tippoo Sahib
in India, and the increasing ferment in Ireland.[63]
On 1st March Grenville again assured him of the earnest desire of the
British Government to see the end of the troubles in France, and
declared that Pitt and he had been deeply wounded by the oft-repeated
insinuations that they had sought to foment them. All such charges were
absurd; for "a commercial people stands only to gain by the freedom of
all those who surround it." We may reasonably conclude that these were
the words of Pitt; for they recall that noble passage of the "Wealth of
Nations": "A nation that would enrich itself by trade is certainly most
likely to do so when its neighbours are all rich, industrious, and
commercial nations."[64] For the rest, Grenville defied the calumniators
of England to adduce a single proof in support of their slanders, and
requested Talleyrand to remain some time in England for the purpose of
observing public opinion. He warned him, however, that the Cabinet could
not give an answer to his main proposal.
More than this Talleyrand could scarcely expect. He had already divined
the important secret that the Cabinet was divided on this subject, the
King, Thurlow, and Camden being hostile to France, while Pitt,
Grenville, and Dundas were friendly. When Talleyrand ventured to ascribe
those sentiments to Pitt and Grenville, the latter did not deny it, and
he at once echoed the desire expressed by the envoy for the conclusion
of an Anglo-French alliance. That the greater part of the British people
would have welcomed such a compact admits of no doubt. On the walls were
often chalked the words: "No war with the French." Talleyrand advised
the Foreign Minister, Delessart, to send immediately to London a fully
accredited ambassador; for the talk often was: "We have an ambassador at
Paris. Why have not you one here?" Nevertheless, a despatch of Grenville
to Gower, on 9th March, shows that Pitt and he keenly felt the need of
caution. They therefore enjoined complete silence on Gower. In truth,
Grenville's expressions, quoted above, were merely the outcome of the
good will which he and Pitt felt towards France. But these words from
the two powerful Ministers meant safety for France on her coasts,
whatever might betide her on the Meuse and the Rhine.
On the day when Grenville spoke these words of peace, two events
occurred which portended war. Leopold II died; and an irritating
despatch, which he and Kaunitz had recently sent to Paris, was read out
to the Legislative Assembly. Thereafter a rupture was inevitable.
Francis II, who now ascended the throne of his father, was a shy, proud,
delicate youth of twenty-four years, having only a superficial knowledge
of public affairs, scarcely known to the Ministers, and endowed with a
narrow pedantic nature which was to be the bane of his people. He lacked
alike the sagacity, the foresight, and the suppleness of Leopold.
Further, though his inexperience should have inspired him with a dread
of war for his storm-tossed States, yet that same misfortune subjected
him to the advice of the veteran Chancellor, Kaunitz. That crabbed old
man advised the maintenance of a stiff attitude towards France; and
this, in her present temper, entailed war.
The last despatch from Vienna to Paris contained strongly worded advice
to the French Government and Assembly to adopt a less provocative
attitude, to withdraw its troops from the northern frontier, and, above
all, to rid itself of the factious minority which controlled its
counsels. If Leopold had hoped to intimidate France or to strengthen the
peace-party at Paris, he made the greatest mistake of his reign. The war
party at once gained the ascendancy, decreed the arrest of Delessart for
his tame reply to Vienna, and broke up the constitutional Ministry.
Their successors were mainly Girondins. The most noteworthy are Roland,
who took the Home Office; Clavière, Finance; and Dumouriez, Foreign
Affairs. The last was a man of great energy and resource. A soldier by
training, and with a dash of the adventurer in his nature, he now leapt
to the front, and astonished France by his zeal and activity. He was not
devoid of prudence; for, as appears from Gower's despatch of 30th March,
he persuaded the Assembly to postpone action until an answer arrived to
his last despatch to Vienna. Gower found from conversation with
Dumouriez that a rupture must ensue if a satisfactory reply did not
arrive by 15th April.[65] Four days later, as no answer came, the
Council of Ministers decided on war; and on the next day Louis formally
proposed it to the Assembly, which assented with acclamation.
Secondary causes helped on the rupture. Frederick William encouraged the
young Emperor to draw the sword, and led him to expect Alsace and
Lorraine as his share of the spoil, the duchies of Jülich and Berg
falling to Prussia. Catharine also fanned the crusading zeal at Berlin
and Vienna in the hope of having "more elbow-room," obviously in
Poland.[66] Further, the news from Madrid and Stockholm indisposed the
French Assembly to endure any dictation from Vienna. At the end of
February Floridablanca fell from power at Madrid, and his successor,
Aranda, showed a peaceful front. And, on 16th March Gustavus of Sweden
was assassinated by Anckarström, a tool of the revengeful nobles. This
loss was severely felt. The royalist crusade now had no Tancred, only an
uninspiring Duke of Brunswick.
Though France took the final step of declaring war, it is now known that
Austria had done much to provoke it and nothing to prevent it. The young
Emperor refused to withdraw a word of the provocative despatch; and in
his letter to Thugut at Brussels, he declared he was weary of the state
of things in France and had decided to act and put an end to it; "that
he should march his troops at once, and the French must be amused for
two months until the troops arrived; then, whether the French attacked
him or not, he should attack them."[67] Keith also wrote from Vienna to
Grenville on 2nd May, that the French declaration of war had come in the
nick of time to furnish the Hapsburgs with the opportunity of throwing
the odium of the war upon France.[68] Other proofs might be cited; and
it seems certain that, if France had not thrown down the gauntlet, both
the German Powers would have attacked her in the early summer of 1792.
Pitt and Grenville, looking on at these conflicting schemes, formed the
perfectly correct surmise that both sides were bent on war, and that
little or nothing could be done to avert it.
* * * * *
We must now trace the policy of Pitt somewhat closely. The question at
issue is, whether he favoured the royalist or the democratic cause, and
was responsible for the ensuing friction between England and France,
which culminated in the long and disastrous strifes of 1793-1801.
Dumouriez, as we have seen, threw down the gauntlet to Austria in the
hope of securing the neutrality of Prussia and the friendship of
England. Accordingly he decided to send Talleyrand on a second mission
to London. That skilful diplomat had recently returned to Paris; and the
Foreign Minister drew up, perhaps in concert with him, a Memoir entitled
"Reflections on a Negotiation with England in case of War," which
provided the text for Talleyrand's discourse to Pitt and Grenville. The
gist of it is that Talleyrand must convince the British Government of
the need of a French attack on the Belgic provinces of Austria as the
sole means of safety. For, while offensive in appearance, it is in
reality defensive. France does not intend to keep those provinces; and,
even if her conquest of them brings about the collapse of the
Stadholder's power in Holland, England will do well not to intervene in
favour of the Orange _régime_. For what good can the Island Power gain
by war with France? She may take the French colonies; but that will mean
a tiresome struggle with the revolted negroes in the West Indies.
France, meanwhile, with her new-born strength, will conquer Central
Europe and then throw her energy into her fleet. The better course,
then, for England will be to remain neutral, even if Holland be
revolutionized, and the estuary of the Scheldt be thrown open to all
nations. Or, still better, England may help France to keep in check the
King of Prussia and the Prince of Orange. In that case the two free
Powers will march hand in hand and "become the arbiters of peace or war
for the whole world."
This remarkable pronouncement claims attention for several reasons.
Firstly, it proves that Dumouriez and Talleyrand believed their sole
chance of safety to lie in the conquest of Austria's Belgic provinces,
where a cognate people would receive them with open arms. That is to
say, they desired war with Austria, and they did not dread the prospect
of war with Prussia, provided that England remained neutral and
friendly. Pitt and Grenville were well aware of this from Gower's
despatches. Our ambassador had warned them that France recked little of
a war with the whole of Europe, provided that England held aloof.
Secondly, this fact disposes of the subsequent charge of Fox against
Pitt, that he ought to have sided with France in 1792 and thereby to
have prevented the attack of the German Powers. For, as we have seen, it
was she who took the irrevocable step of declaring war on Austria; and
further, the details given above prove that all that Frenchmen expected
from Pitt was neutrality. By remaining neutral, while the French overran
Belgium, Pitt was favouring the French plans more than any British
statesman had done since the time of James II. Thirdly, we notice in the
closing sentences of these Reflections signs of that extraordinary
self-confidence which led Girondins and Jacobins to face without
flinching even the prospect of war with England.
What was Pitt's conduct at this crisis? He knew enough of the politics
of Berlin and Vienna to see that those Courts would almost certainly
make war on France. He adopted therefore the line of conduct which
prudence and love of peace dictated, a strict neutrality. But he refused
to proclaim it to the world, as it would encourage France to attack
Austria. At the same time Grenville let it be known that Austria must
not be deprived of her Belgic lands, which England had assured to her,
firstly by the Treaty of Utrecht (1713), and quite recently by the
Reichenbach Convention. As Grenville phrased it--"The Pays Bas form the
chain which unites England to the Continent, and the central knot of our
relations to Austria and Russia. It would be broken if they belonged to
France." Talleyrand and Dumouriez knew this perfectly well, and
prudently declared that France had no intention of keeping those lands.
Would that the Jacobins and Napoleon had shown the same wise
self-restraint! It was their resolve to dominate the Netherlands which
brought them into irreconcilable opposition to Pitt and his successors
down to the year 1814.
Statesmanlike though the aims of Dumouriez were, they suffered not a
little in their exposition. Talleyrand, the brain of the policy, was not
its mouthpiece. In the French embassy at Portman Square he figured
merely as adviser to the French ambassador, the _ci-devant_ Marquis de
Chauvelin, a vain and showy young man, devoid of the qualities of
insight, tact, and patience in which the ex-bishop of Autun excelled his
contemporaries. Had this sage counsellor remained in London to the end
of the year, things might have gone very differently. The instructions
issued to Chauvelin contain ideas similar to those outlined above; but
they lay stress on the utility of a French alliance for England, in
order to thwart the aims of a greedy Coalition and to ensure her own
internal tranquillity, which, it is hinted, France can easily ruffle.
Talleyrand is also charged to offer to cede the small but valuable
island, Tobago, which we lost in 1783, provided that the British
Government guaranteed a French loan of £3,000,000 or £4,000,000, to be
raised in London; and he is to suggest that, if the two Powers acted
together, they could revolutionize Spanish America and control the
world.[69]
Our curiosity is aroused as to the reception which Pitt and Grenville
gave to these schemes. It is not certain, however, that Chauvelin and
Talleyrand showed their hand completely; for events told against them
from the outset. Chauvelin bore with him an autograph letter from
Louis XVI to George III, couched in the friendliest terms, and
expressing the hope of closer relations between the two peoples.[70] But
before he could present it to the King at St. James's, it appeared in
the Paris papers. This breach of etiquette created a bad impression; for
it seemed that the letter was merely a bid for an alliance between the
two peoples. It is quite possible that Dumouriez, with his natural
impulsiveness, allowed it to gain currency in order to identify
Louis XVI with French democracy, and that in its turn with public
opinion in England. Further, we now know that Marie Antoinette, in her
resolve to paralyse the policy and the defensive power of France, wrote
at once to Fersen at Brussels that her consort's letter was very far
from speaking his real sentiments.[71] This news, when passed on to
London, must have made it clear that the two envoys represented the
Girondin Ministry, but not the King of France. Then again tidings soon
arrived of the disgraceful flight of the French troops on the Belgian
frontier, the new levies, at sight of the Austrian horse, rushing back
to Lille in wild disorder and there murdering their General, Theobald
Dillon. George III and Grenville wrote of this event in terms of disgust
and contempt.[72] It is therefore not surprising that the reception of
Chauvelin was far from promising; and Talleyrand doubtless felt that
the time was not ripe for discussing an Anglo-French _entente_ for the
control of the world.
In fact, the envoys were received coolly from the outset. The outbreak
of war on the Continent had caused almost a panic in the City. The Funds
dropped sharply, and Pitt ordered an official denial to sinister reports
of a forthcoming raid by the press-gang. A little later he assured a
deputation of merchants that England would hold strictly aloof from the
war. Chauvelin reported these facts to his Government along with the
assurance that the Cabinet had definitely resolved on neutrality. How he
came to know of that decision is a mystery; and it is scarcely less odd
that a copy of his despatch reporting it should be in the Pitt
Papers.[73] On the whole, then, France had good reason to be satisfied
with Pitt. Austria, on the other hand, disliked his conduct. Kaunitz,
with his usual acerbity, gave out that England was secretly hostile to
the House of Hapsburg; and Keith, finding his position increasingly
awkward, begged for his recall.
The first sign of friction between England and France arose out of the
King's proclamation against seditious writings, which we noticed in the
last chapter. Chauvelin complained of some of its phrases, and stated
that France waged war for national safety, not for aggrandizement.
Grenville thereupon loftily remarked that Chauvelin had no right to
express an opinion on a question which concerned solely the King's
Government and Parliament. The British reply irritated by its curt
correctness.
Equally unfortunate were some incidents in the ensuing debates on this
topic. Some members emphasized their loyalty by adverting tartly to the
connections of Thomas Paine and English reformers with the French
Jacobins. On 31st May the Duke of Richmond charged that writer with
being an emissary from abroad, because he had advised the destruction of
the British navy.[74] There is no such passage in the "Rights of Man";
and the Duke must have read with the distorting lens of fear or hatred
the suggestion that, if England, France, and the United States were
allied, a very small navy would be needed, costing not more than half a
million a year.[75] But this incident is typical of the prejudice that
was growing against France. Grenville in the same debate declared that
the Corresponding Societies avowed their connection with foreign clubs
and were engaged in circulating pamphlets. The conclusion was obvious,
that close relations with France must be avoided. As to the feeling of
the Royal Family, it was manifested in an effusively loyal speech by the
Prince of Wales, his first speech at Westminster. In it he marked his
entire severance from Fox on this question.
Grenville's complaisance to the French envoys was perhaps little more
than a blind to mask his contempt for them and their principles. On 19th
June he wrote to Auckland respecting the "ignorance and absurdity of the
French mission," but suggested that the picking a quarrel with France
would only help the English Jacobins to introduce French notions. Even
if this mission were got rid of, some one else might come who might make
even more mischief. These expressions refer to the connections which
Chauvelin and Talleyrand had formed with the Opposition. As Bland Burges
remarked: "Talleyrand is intimate with Paine, Home Tooke, Lord
Lansdowne, and a few more of that stamp, and is generally scouted by
every one else." George III's words were equally contemptuous and marked
his resolve to have as little as possible to do with France.[76] Pitt
did not state his opinions on this topic; but he probably held those of
Grenville.
The prejudices of the King and the resolves of the two chief Ministers
proved fatal to an ardent appeal which came from Paris in the middle of
June. As the attitude of the Court of Berlin became more and more
warlike, Dumouriez put forth one more effort to gain the friendly
mediation of England and thus assure peace with Prussia. Chauvelin,
swallowing his annoyance at Grenville's recent note, pointed out that
Austria was making great efforts to induce Prussia, Holland, and the
lesser German States to join her in the war against liberty. The designs
of the monarchs against Poland were notorious; and it was clear that a
vast conspiracy was being hatched against the free States of the
Continent. Would not England, then, endeavour to stop the formation of
this reactionary league?
The occasion was, indeed, highly important. It is conceivable that, if
British influence had been powerful at Berlin, a spirited declaration
would have had some effect at that Court. Unfortunately our influence
had sunk to zero since the Oczakoff fiasco of 1791. Moreover, the
Prussian Government had by that time decided to break with France. Her
envoys were dismissed from Berlin in the first week of June, and it is
probable that Pitt and Grenville by 18th June knew of the warlike
resolve of the Prussian Government. In any case, after a delay of twenty
days, they sent once more a reply to Chauvelin's request, affirming the
earnest desire of His Majesty to contribute to the restoration of peace,
but re-asserting his decision in favour of unswerving neutrality. On
24th July Prussia declared war against France, and three days later the
Duke of Brunswick issued the famous manifesto to the French people which
thrilled the French people with indignation against the hapless
sovereigns at the Tuileries whom it was designed to protect.[77]
* * * * *
The outbreak of war on the Rhine and Meuse was an event of incalculable
importance. As we have seen, Pitt discouraged the bellicose tendencies
of the _émigrés_ and of the Austrian and Prussian Courts. But the
passions of the time ran too high to admit of the continuance of peace;
and State after State was soon to be drawn into the devouring vortex of
strife. Strange to say the first to suffer from the outbreak of
hostilities was Poland. That Republic entered on a new lease of life in
the spring of the year 1791. The constitution adopted with enthusiasm on
3rd May substituted an hereditary for an elective monarchy, and
otherwise strengthened the fabric of that almost anarchic State. Social
and civic reforms promised also to call its burghers and serfs to a life
of activity or comfort. But the change at once aroused keen dislike at
St. Petersburg and Berlin. Prussian statesmen resented any improvement
in the condition of their nominal ally, and declared that, if Russia
gained a strong position on the Euxine, Prussia and Austria must secure
indemnities at the expense of Poland.
The Czarina soon succeeded in heading them in that direction. After the
signature of the Peace of Jassy with the Turks early in January 1792,
she began openly to encourage the factious efforts of Polish
malcontents. The troubles at Paris also enabled her to engage the Courts
of Vienna and Berlin in a western crusade on which she bestowed her
richest blessing, her own inmost desires meanwhile finding expression in
the following confidential utterance: "I am breaking my head to make the
Cabinets of Vienna and Berlin intervene in the affairs of France. I wish
to see them plunged into some very complicated question in order to have
my own hands free."[78] Though her old opponent, Kaunitz, fathomed her
intentions, she partly succeeded in persuading the Austrian and Prussian
Ministers that their mission clearly was to stamp out Jacobinism at
Paris, while Providence reserved for her the duty of extirpating its
offshoots at Warsaw. In the Viennese Court, where the value of a
regenerated Poland as a buffer State was duly appreciated, there were
some qualms as to the spoliation of that unoffending State; but Prussian
politicians, in their eagerness for the Polish districts, Danzig and
Thorn, harboured few scruples as to betraying the cause of their allies
at Warsaw.
Little by little the outlines of a scheme were sketched between Austria
and Prussia for securing indemnities for the expenses of the war against
France; and it was arranged that Prussia should acquire the coveted
lands on the lower Vistula; also Anspach and Baireuth; Austria was to
effect the long-desired Belgic-Bavarian exchange, besides gaining parts
of Alsace; and it was understood that Russia would annex the Polish
Ukraine and work her will in the rest of Poland. The Polish part of the
scheme was, however, stiffly opposed by Kaunitz; and in the sequel the
old Chancellor ended his long and distinguished career by way of protest
against a change of front which he deemed unwise and disgraceful.[79]
Early in May everything was ready for the restoration of anarchy in
Poland. Catharine ordered her troops to enter its borders; and the
factious Polish nobles whom she had sheltered during the winter returned
to their land and formed a "Confederation" at Targowicz on 14th May for
the purpose of undoing the reforms of 1791. Daniel Hailes, our envoy at
Warsaw, kept Grenville fully informed of this affair. On 16th June he
reported Austria's desertion of Poland, the brutal refusal of the Court
of Berlin to accord help to its ally, the heroic efforts of Kosciusko
and the Polish levies to resist the Russian armies, and the despair of
the patriots of Warsaw, adding the cynical comment that at Warsaw
patriotism was only a cloak for private interest, and that the new
constitution was generally regarded as the death-blow to Polish
independence.[80] Whether he added these words to please Grenville, who
had always discouraged the Polish cause,[81] is not easy to say; but the
statement cannot be reconciled with Hailes's earlier enthusiasm for that
well-meant effort.
On all sides the Polish patriots now found indifference or hostility.
The Elector of Saxony (their King-elect) gave them cold words; and
Catharine demanded the restoration of the old constitution of which she
was a guarantor. King Stanislaus, a prey to deep despondency, saw the
defence collapse on all sides, and at the close of June the Russians
drew near to Warsaw. Many of the Polish reformers fled to Leipzig and
there prepared to appeal to Europe against this forcible suppression of
a truly national constitution.
Amidst these scenes Hailes was replaced by Colonel Gardiner, who
received from Grenville the following instructions, dated 4th August
1792. He informed him that Hailes had last year been charged "to confine
himself to such assurances of His Majesty's good wishes as could be
given without committing H.M. to any particular line of conduct with
respect to any troubles that might arise on the subject [of the Polish
Revolution]. The event has unhappily but too well justified their
reserve; and the present situation is such as to leave little hope that
the tranquillity of that unfortunate land can be restored without its
falling again into the most entire dependence on the power of Russia,
even if no further dismemberment of territory should take place."
Grenville then stated that Prussia's conduct was due to fear of a strong
Government in Poland; but the present alternative (a Russian occupation)
would probably be worse for her. He added these sentences: "No
intervention of the Maritime Powers [England and Holland] could be
serviceable to Poland, at least not without a much greater exertion and
expense than the importance to their separate interests could possibly
justify.... You are to be very careful not to do anything which could
hold out ill-grounded expectations of support from this country."
In these words Grenville passed sentence of death upon Poland. On this
important subject he must have acted with the consent of Pitt; but the
opinion of the latter is unknown. It would seem that after the weak
treatment of the Oczakoff crisis by Parliament, he gave up all hope of
saving either Turkey or Poland. If that was impracticable in the spring
of 1791, how much more so in August 1792, when French affairs claimed
far closer attention? It is worth noticing that several of the Foxites
(not Fox himself, for he was still intent on a Russian alliance),[82]
now revised their opinion about Catharine II and inveighed against her
for trampling on the liberties of Poland. Did they now discover the
folly of their conduct in previously encouraging her?
In despair of help from England, some of the patriots of Warsaw turned
towards France. But this added to their misfortunes. It gave the
schemers of Berlin the longed-for excuse of intervening by force under
the pretext that they must stamp out "the French evil" from States
bordering on their own. On hearing of the advance of three Prussian
columns, Catharine threw her whole weight into Polish affairs.
So closely did the fortunes of Poland intertwine themselves with those
of France. The outbreak of the Franco-Austrian war meant ruin for the
reformers at Warsaw. Had Austria held to her former resolve, to prevent
the triumph of Russia or Prussia in Poland, it is possible that Pitt and
Grenville would have decided to support her. As it was, they maintained
their cautious and timid neutrality. The reports of Hailes were explicit
enough to show that another partition was at hand; but, so far as I can
discover, they lifted not a finger to prevent it. The excess of Pitt's
caution at this crisis enables us to gauge the magnitude of the disaster
to the Polish cause involved by his surrender to the Czarina in the
spring and summer of 1791. By a wonderful display of skill and audacity
she emerged triumphant from all her difficulties, and now, while egging
on the German Powers to war with France, planted her heel on the
liberties of Poland. Her conquest was easy and profitable. The
restoration of order at Paris proved to be fraught with unexpected
dangers, and the German sovereigns scarcely set their hands to the task
before they discovered that they were her dupes. If the French war
worked disaster at Warsaw, the prospect of a partition of Poland
undoubtedly helped to lessen the pressure on France during the campaign
of Valmy. Hope of further spoils in 1794-5 distracted the aims of the
Allies; and Pitt was destined to see the efforts of the monarchical
league in the West weaken and die away under the magnetic influence of
the eastern problem. Well would it have been for him if he could have
upheld Poland in 1791. By so doing he would have removed the cause of
bitter dissensions between the Houses of Romanoff, Hapsburg, and
Hohenzollern. As will appear in due course, Revolutionary France
achieved her marvellous triumphs partly by the prowess of her sons, but
still more owing to the intrigues and feuds which clogged the efforts of
the Allies and baffled the constructive powers of Pitt.
FOOTNOTES:
[43] "Parl. Hist.," xxix, 810-15.
[44] _Ibid._, 834.
[45] "Parl. Hist.," xxix, 551-602, 1404-31.
[46] Stanhope, ii, 148-50, and App., xv.
[47] Twiss, "Life of Lord Eldon," ch. x.
[48] Fitzmaurice, "Shelburne," iii, 500-4; Salomon, "Pitt," 596. The
King later on teased the Duke of Leeds by a more compromising overture.
[49] "Malmesbury Diaries," ii, 454-64.
[50] "Leeds Mem.," 188.
[51] _Ibid._, 194.
[52] "Auckland Journals," ii, 417, 418.
[53] Pitt MSS., 103.
[54] I accept, with some qualification, Mr. Oscar Browning's
explanation, that Lord Loughborough had exaggerated the accounts of his
interviews with Pitt and the Whig leaders. (see "Leeds Mem.," 197,
note).
[55] Stanhope, ii, 160.
[56] "Bland Burges P.," 208.
[57] Stanhope, "Miscellanies," ii, 57-63. Letter of Canning to W.
Sturges Bourne, 3rd September 1792. This interview is not referred to by
Mr. H. W. V. Temperley ("Canning," ch. ii), Mr. Sichel ("Sheridan"),
Captain Bagot ("Canning and his Friends"), or E. Festing ("Frere and his
Friends"). In "Pitt and Napoleon Miscellanies" I shall publish new
letters of Canning. One, dated 15th March 1793, declines an offer of
Portland to bring him into Parliament.
[58] Pallain, "La Mission de Talleyrand à Londres," 41.
[59] Keith's "Mems.," ii, 494. Keith to Grenville, 14th January 1792.
[60] "Gower's Despatches," 142, 143, 145, 149.
[61] Pallain, pp. xv-xviii.
[62] Pallain, 56, 57.
[63] Pallain, 106, 107.
[64] "Wealth of Nations," bk. iv, ch. iii.
[65] "Gower's Despatches," 165, 171.
[66] Sorel, ii, 216.
[67] Fersen, "Diary" (Eng. edit.), 255.
[68] Clapham, "Causes of the War of 1792," 231.
[69] On the Tobago proposal see "Dropmore P.," ii, 260.
[70] Pallain, 215-9. The original is in Pitt MSS., 333.
[71] Fersen, "Diary" (Eng. edit.), 316, 319.
[72] "Dropmore P.," ii, 267. See, too, further details in "Dumouriez and
the Defence of England against Napoleon," by J. H. Rose and A. M.
Broadley.
[73] Pitt MSS., 333. Chauvelin to Dumouriez, 28th April.
[74] "Parl. Hist.," xxix, 1522.
[75] "Rights of Man," pt. ii, ch. v.
[76] "Dropmore P.," ii, 282; "Auckland Journals," ii, 410.
[77] "Ann. Reg." (1792), 178-82, 225-32; Sorel, ii, 445-54; Heidrich,
pt. ii, ch. ii. I fully agree with Dr. Salomon ("Pitt," 537) as to the
sincerity of Pitt's desire for neutrality.
[78] Sybel, ii, 142.
[79] For the discussions between the three Powers on Poland see
Heidrich, 165-219; and Salomon, "Das Politische System des jüngeren Pitt
und die zweite Teilung Polens" (Berlin, 1895).
[80] "F. O.," Poland, 6. Hailes to Grenville, 16th and 27th June 1792.
[81] "Dropmore P.," ii, 142; see, too, ii, 279.
[82] "Mems. of Fox," iii, 18.
CHAPTER III
PEACE OR WAR?
It seems absolutely impossible to hesitate as to supporting our
Ally [Holland] in case of necessity, and the explicit
declaration of our sentiments is the most likely way to prevent
the case occurring.--PITT TO LORD STAFFORD, _13th November
1792_.
One of the first requisites for the study of a period whose outlines are
well known, is to bar out the insidious notion that the course of events
was inevitable. Nine persons out of ten have recourse to that easy but
fallacious way of explaining events. The whole war, they say, or think,
was inevitable. It was fated that the Duke of Brunswick should issue his
threatening manifesto to the Parisians if violence were offered to
Louis XVI; that they should resent the threat, rise in revolt, and
dethrone the King, and thereafter massacre royalists in the prisons. The
innate vigour of the democratic cause further required that the French
should stand their ground at Valmy and win a pitched battle at Jemappes,
that victory leading to an exaltation of soul in which the French
Republicans pushed on their claims in such a way as to bring England
into the field. History, when written in this way, is a symmetrical
mosaic; and the human mind loves patterns.
But events are not neatly chiselled; they do not fall into geometrical
groups, however much the memory, for its own ease, seeks to arrange them
thus. Their edges are jagged; and the slightest jar might have sent them
in different ways. To recur to the events in question: the Duke of
Brunswick objected to issuing the manifesto, and only owing to the
weariness or weakness of old age, yielded to the insistence of the
_émigrés_ at his headquarters: the insurrection at Paris came about
doubtfully and fitfully; the issue on 10th August hung mainly on the
personal bearing of the King; the massacres were the work of an
insignificant minority, which the vast mass regarded with sheer
stupefaction; and even the proclamation of the French Republic by the
National Convention on 21st September was not without many searchings of
heart.[83]
Meanwhile Pitt and Grenville had not the slightest inkling as to the
trend of events. The latter on 13th July 1792 wrote thus to Earl Gower
at Paris: "My speculations are that the first entrance of the foreign
troops [into France] will be followed by negotiations; but how they are
to end, or what possibility there is to establish any form of
government, or any order in France, is far beyond any conjectures I can
form."[84] This uncertainty is illuminating. It shows that Pitt and
Grenville were not farseeing schemers bent on undermining the liberties
of France and Britain by a war on which they had long resolved, but
fallible mortals, unable to see a handbreadth through the turmoil, but
cherishing the hope that somehow all would soon become clear. As to
British policy during the summer of 1792, it may be classed as masterly
inactivity or nervous passivity, according to the standpoint of the
critic. In one case alone did Pitt and Grenville take a step displeasing
to the French Government, namely, by recalling Gower from the embassy at
Paris; and this was due to the fall of the French monarchy on 10th
August, and to the danger attending the residence of a noble in Paris.
Only by a display of firmness did Gower and his secretary, Lindsay,
succeed in obtaining passports from the new Foreign Minister,
Lebrun.[85]
That follower of Dumouriez had as colleagues the former Girondin
Ministers, Clavière, Roland, and Servan. Besides them were Monge (the
physicist) for the Navy, and Danton for Justice, the latter a far from
reassuring choice, as he was known to be largely responsible for the
massacres in the prisons of Paris early in September. Little is known
about the publicist, Lebrun, on whom now rested the duty of negotiating
with England, Spain, Holland, etc. It is one of the astonishing facts of
this time that unknown men leaped to the front at Paris, directed
affairs to momentous issues, and then sank into obscurity or perished.
The Genevese Clavière started assignats and managed revolutionary
finance; Servan controlled the War Office for some months with much
ability, and then fell; Pétion, Santerre, the popular Paris brewer, and
an ex-hawker, Hanriot, were successively rulers of Paris for a brief
space.
But of all the puzzles of this time Lebrun is perhaps the chief. In his
thirtieth year he was Foreign Minister of France, when she broke with
England, Holland, Spain, and the Empire. He is believed by many (_e.g._,
by W. A. Miles, who knew him well) to be largely responsible for those
wars. Yet who was this Lebrun? Before the Revolution he had to leave
France for his advanced opinions, and took refuge at Liége, where Miles
found him toiling for a scanty pittance at journalistic hack-work.
Suffering much at the hands of the Austrians in 1790, he fled back to
Paris, joined the Girondins, wrote for them, made himself useful to
Dumouriez during his tenure of the Foreign Office, and, not long after
his resignation, stepped into his shoes and appropriated his policy. In
order to finish with him here, we may note that he voted for the death
of Louis XVI, and, as President of the Executive Council at that time,
signed the order for the execution. He and other Girondins were driven
from power on 2nd June 1793 (when Hanriot's brazen voice decided the
fate of the Girondins) and he was guillotined on 23rd December of that
year, for the alleged crime of conspiring to place Philippe Egalité on
the throne. Mme. Roland, who helped Lebrun to rise to power, limns his
portrait in these sharp outlines: "He passed for a wise man, because he
showed no kind of _élan_; and for a clever man, because he was a fairly
good clerk; but he possessed neither activity, intellect, nor force of
character." The want of _élan_ seems to be a term relative merely to the
characteristics of the Girondins, who, whatever they lacked, had that
Gallic quality in rich measure.
Chauvelin, the French ambassador in London, is another of these
revolutionary rockets. Only in fiction and the drama does he stand forth
at all clearly to the eye. History knows him not, except that he had
been a marquis, then took up with the Girondins, finally shot up among
the Jacobins and made much noise by his intrigues and despatches. With
all his showiness and vanity he had enough shrewdness to suit his
language at the French embassy in Portman Square to the Jacobin jargon
of the times. After the September massacres the only hope for an
aristocratic envoy was to figure as an irreproachable patriot.
Chauvelin's dealings with the English malcontents therefore became more
and more pronounced; for indeed they served both as a life insurance
and as a means of annoying Pitt and Grenville in return for their
refusal to recognize him as the ambassador of the new Republic.
Londoners in general sided with the Ministry and snubbed the French
envoys. Dumont describes their annoyance, during a visit to Ranelagh, at
being received everywhere with the audible whisper, "Here comes the
French embassy"; whereupon faces were turned away and a wide space was
left around them.[86]
Such, then, were the men on whom largely rested the future of Europe.
Lebrun mistook fussiness for activity. At a time when tact and dignity
prescribed a diminution of the staff at Portman Square, he sent two
almost untried men, Noël and, a little later, Benoît, to help Chauvelin
to mark time. Talleyrand also gained permission to return to London as
_adjoint_ to Chauvelin, which, it appears, was the only safe means of
escaping from Paris. Chauvelin speedily quarrelled with him. But the
doings of the French embassy concern us little for the present, as Pitt
and Grenville paid no attention to the offers, similar to those made in
April, which Lebrun charged his envoys to make for an Anglo-French
alliance. It is not surprising, after the September massacres, that
Ministers should hold sternly aloof from the French envoys; but we may
note that Miles considered their attitude most unwise. He further
remarked that the proud reserve of Grenville was almost offensive.[87]
We made the acquaintance of Miles as British agent at Paris in 1790 and
noted his consequential airs. In 1792 they were full blown.
The opinions of George III and Pitt on the events of that bloody
harvest-time in Paris are very little known. The King's letters from
Weymouth to Pitt in August-September are few and brief. On 16th
September, after the arrival of news of the massacres, he writes to say
that his decision respecting the Prince of Wales's debts is irrevocable.
After that there is a long silence. Pitt's reserve is equally
impenetrable. We know, however, from the letters of Burke that the
conduct of Ministers deeply disappointed him. Writing to Grenville on
19th September he says that the crisis exceeds in gravity any that is
recorded in history; and he adds these curious words: "I know it is the
opinion of His Majesty's Ministers that the new [French] principles may
be encouraged, and even triumph over every interior and exterior
resistance, and may even overturn other States as they have that of
France, without any sort of danger of their extending in their
consequences to this Kingdom."[88] Can we have a clearer testimony to
the calm but rigid resolve with which Pitt and his colleague clung to
neutrality? On the following day (the day of the Battle of Valmy) Pitt
frigidly declined the request of the Austrian and Neapolitan
ambassadors, that the British Government would exclude from its
territories all those who should be guilty of an attack on the French
royal family. On 21st September Grenville issued a guarded statement on
this subject to the _corps diplomatique_; but it was far from meeting
the desires of the royalists.[89]
Reticence is a virtue over-developed in an aristocracy--"that austere
domination," as Burke terms it. The virtue is slow in taking root among
democracies. The early Radical clubs of Great Britain regarded it as
their cherished privilege to state their opinions on foreign affairs
with Athenian loquacity; and the months of October and November 1792,
when we vainly seek to know the inner feelings of Pitt, are enlivened by
resolutions expressing joy at the downfall of tyrants, and fervent
beliefs in the advent of a fraternal millennium, the first fruits of
which were the election of Paine as deputy for Calais to the National
Convention.
In the dealings of nations, as of individuals, feelings often count for
more than interests. This was the case in the last four months of the
year 1792, when the subjects in dispute bulked small in comparison with
the passions and prejudices which magnified and distorted them. The
psychology of the time therefore demands no less attention than its
diplomacy. Its first weeks were darkened by news of the September
massacres. Even now the details of that cowardly crime arouse horror:
and surely no part of Carlyle's epic sinks so low as that in which he
seeks to compare that loathsome butchery with the bloodshed of a
battlefield.[90] No such special pleading was attempted by leaders of
thought of that period. On 10th September Romilly, a friend of human
progress, wrote to Dumont: "How could we ever be so deceived in the
character of the French nation as to think them capable of liberty?...
One might as well think of establishing a republic of tigers in some
forest of Africa." To which the collaborator of Mirabeau replied: "Let
us burn all our books; let us cease to think and dream of the best
system of legislation, since men make so diabolical a use of every truth
and every principle."[91] These feelings were general among Frenchmen.
Buzot stated that the loss of morality, with all its attendant evils,
dated from the September massacres.
It seems strange that the democratic cause made headway in England after
this fell event. Probably its details were but dimly known to the poor,
who were at this time the victims of a bad harvest and severe dearth.
The months of September and October were marked by heavy and persistent
rains. The Marquis of Buckingham on 23rd September wrote at Stowe to his
brother, Lord Grenville, that he was living amidst a vortex of mud,
clay, and water such as was never known before--the result of six weeks
of unsettled weather, which must impair the harvest and increase the
difficulty of maintaining order.[92] Certainly the stars in their
courses fought against the _ancien régime_. The rains which made a
receptive seed-bed for the writings of Paine also hampered the progress
of Brunswick towards the Argonne, crowded his hospitals with invalids,
and in part induced that inglorious retreat. As the storms lasted far
into the autumn, disaffection increased apace.
The results serve to enliven the dull tones of our Home Office archives.
There one reads of bread riots and meal riots so far back as May 1792,
in which stalls are overturned and despoiled; also of more persistent
agitation in the factory towns of the North. Liverpool leads off with a
dock-strike that is with difficulty ended. Then the colliers of Wigan
stop work and seek to persuade all their comrades to follow their
example. Most threatening of all is the situation at Manchester and
Sheffield. There, in addition to disorder among the townsfolk,
disaffection gains ground among the troops sent to keep order. This
again is traceable to the dearness of food, for which the scanty pay of
the trooper by no means suffices. Here, then, is the opportunity for the
apostle of discontent judiciously to offer a cheap edition of the
"Rights of Man," on which fare the troop becomes half-mutinous and sends
in a petition for higher pay. This the perplexed authorities do not
grant, but build barracks, a proceeding eyed askance by publicans and
patriots as the beginning of military rule.[93]
The South of England, too, is beset by fears of a novel kind. After the
overthrow of the French monarchy on 10th August fugitives from France
come fast to the coasts of Kent and Sussex. The flights become thicker
day by day up to the end of that fell month of September. Orthodox
priests, always in disguise, form the bulk of the new arrivals. As many
as 700 of them land at Eastbourne, and strain the hospitality of that
little town. About as many reach Portsmouth and Gosport, to the
perplexity of the authorities. When assured that they are staunch
royalists and not apostles of Revolution, the commander allots shelter
in the barracks at Forton, where for the present they exist on two pence
a day each. Plymouth, which receives fewer of them, frowns on the
newcomers as politically suspect and economically ruinous. The mayor
assures Dundas that, if more priests arrive, or are sent there, they
will be driven away by the townsfolk for fear of dearth of corn. In
Jersey the food question eclipses all others; for 2,000 priests (so it
is said) land there, until all ideas of hospitality are cast to the
winds and the refugees are threatened with expulsion. Only in the vast
obscurantism of London is there safety for these exiles. A subscription
list is started on their behalf; the King offers the royal house at
Winchester for the overplus at Portsmouth: and by degrees the scared
throngs huddle down into the dire poverty and uneasy rest that are to be
their lot for many a year.[94]
Strange adventures befell many of the French nobles in their escape. The
Duc de Liancourt, commanding the troops at Rouen, was fain to flee to
the coast, hire a deckless craft, and conceal himself under faggots. In
that manner he put to sea and finally made the opposite coast at
Hastings. There, still nervous, he made his way to the nearest inn, and,
to proclaim his insularity, called for porter. The beverage was too much
for him, and he retired to his room in a state of unconscious passivity.
On his awaking, the strange surroundings seemed those of a French
lock-up; but as he crept down to make his escape, the mugs caught his
eye; and their brightness convinced him that he was in England. Such
was his story, told to the family at Bury, where Fanny Burney was
staying. Several of the wealthier French refugees settled at Richmond,
and there found Horace Walpole as charmer and friend. But the most
distinguished group was that at Juniper Hall, near Dorking where finally
Mme. de Staël and Talleyrand enlivened the dull days and long drives
with unfailing stores of wit. We shall later on make the acquaintance of
the French _émigrés_ in a more active and bellicose mood.
Such, then, was the mental condition of our folk. Depressed by rain and
dear food, beset by stories of plotters from Paris, or harrowed by the
tales of misery of the French _émigrés_, Britons came to look on France
as a land peopled by demons, who sought to involve other lands in the
ruin to which they had reduced their own. In this state of nervousness
and excitement little was needed to bring about a furious reaction on
behalf of Church and King.
The follies of English democrats helped on this reaction. Whispers went
about of strange and threatening orders of arms at Birmingham. A
correspondent at the midland capital informed Dundas at the end of
September that a Dr. Maxwell, of York, had ordered 20,000 daggers, which
were to be 12 inches in the blade and 5 1/4 inches in the handle. The
informant convinced the manufacturer that he must apprise the Home
Secretary of this order and send him a specimen of the weapon. Probably
it was the same which Burke melodramatically cast down on the floor of
the House of Commons during his speech of 28th December. The dimensions
exactly tally with those named by the biographer of Lord Eldon, who
retained that dagger, though Bland Burges also put in a claim to have
possessed it. The scepticism which one feels about this prodigious order
of daggers, which others give as 3,000, is somewhat lessened by finding
another letter, of 2nd October 1792, addressed to Dundas by James
Maxwell of York, who stated that he highly disapproved of the "French"
opinions of his younger brother (specimens of whose letters he
enclosed), and had just given him £500 so as to dissuade him from going
to Manchester to stir up discontent there.[95] This unbrotherly conduct
condemns the elder Maxwell, but his information to some extent
corroborated that which came from Birmingham. The whole affair may have
been merely a device to frighten Ministers; but report says that Pitt
took it seriously and ascribed to him the singular statement that
Ministers soon might not have a hand to act with or a tongue to speak
with.[96]
Certainly there was a good deal of discontent in the manufacturing
towns, but it is not easy to say whether it resulted more from dear food
or from political reasons. At Stockport a new club styled "The Friends
of universal Peace and the Rights of Man," issued and circulated a
manifesto asserting their right to inquire into political affairs:
It is our labour that supports monarchy, aristocracy, and the
priesthood.... We are not the "swinish multitude" that Mr. Burke
speaks of. A majority of the House of Commons is returned by
less than 6,000 voters; whereas, if the representation were
equal (and we sincerely hope that it shortly will be), nearly
that number will elect every single member. Not one-twentieth
part of the commoners of Great Britain are electors.... We have
a National Debt of more than £270,000,000, and pay £17,000,000 a
year in taxes. More than one fourth of our incomes goes in
taxes.[97]
The Radical clubs also showed a desire to pry into foreign affairs;
witness the following letter from Thomas Hardy to Dr. Adams, Secretary
of the London Society for Constitutional Information:
No. 9 Piccadilly (London), _Sept. 21 1792_.[98]
The London Corresponding Society having taken the resolution of
transmitting to the French National Convention an address ... to
assure that suffering nation that we sympathize with them in
their misfortunes; that we view their exertions with admiration;
that we wish to give them all such contenance [_sic_] and
support as individuals unsupported and oppressed themselves can
afford; and that, should those in power here dare (in violation
of the nation's pledged faith of neutrality and in opposition to
the well-known sentiments of the people at large) to join the
German band of despots united against Liberty, we disclaim all
concurrence therein, and will to a man exert every justifiable
means for counteracting their machinations against the freedom
and happiness of mankind.
I am ordered by the Committee to acquaint the Society for
Constitutional Information therewith, in order to be favoured
with their opinions thereon, and in hopes that, if they approve
the idea and recommend its adoption to the different societies,
the publication of such a respectable number of _real_ names
will greatly check the hostile measures which might otherwise be
put in execution.
On 5th October the Society for Constitutional Information agreed to the
plan, and ordered the drafting of a joint address to the French
Convention. By this time the news of the successful stand of the French
troops against the Allies at Valmy and the subsequent retreat of the
latter greatly encouraged the English democrats; and a more militant
tone appears in their addresses. Thus in that meeting of 5th October a
letter was read from Joel Barlow containing these sentences: "A great
Revolution in the management of the affairs of nations is doubtless soon
to be expected through all Europe; and in the progress of mankind
towards this attainment it is greatly to be desired that the convictions
to be acquired from rational discussion should precede and preclude
those which must result from physical exertion."
Why "precede and preclude"? The two expressions are incompatible. It
seems that some more moderate member must have added the latter word as
a sop to the authorities. In any case the last words of the sentence
were clearly intended as a threat. On 26th October, John Frost being in
the chair, the same Society framed the following resolution:
That the Secretary do procure correct copies of the Manifesto
published by the late General Burgoyne while in America, of the
first Manifesto lately published by the Duke of Brunswick in
France, of the last Royal Proclamation against writings and
meetings in England, and of the Emperor's recent proclamation at
Brussels on the same subject; in order that these four pieces
may be printed fairly together on one sheet of paper, and be
transmitted by this Society to all the associated Societies in
Great Britain.[99]
It was then resolved to publish this resolution in the "Argus," "Morning
Chronicle,"[100] "Star," "Morning Post," "English Chronicle," "World,"
and "Courier." These papers supported the democratic cause. In order to
counteract their influence Pitt and his colleagues about this time
helped to start two newspapers, "The Sun" and "The True Briton," the
advent of which was much resented by Mr. Walter of "The Times," after
his support of the Government.[101] Apparently these papers were of a
more popular type, and heralded the advent of a cheap and sensational
royalism. Sheridan wittily advised that the motto of "The Sun" should
be, not merely the beginning, but the whole of the passage:
Solem quis dicere falsum
Audeat? Ille etiam caecos instare tumultus
Saepe monet, fraudemque, et operta tumescere bella.[102]
The combined address from several patriotic (_i.e._ reform) societies,
arranged for by Thomas Hardy, was not read at the bar of the French
Convention until 7th November. It set forth that the five thousand
signatories indignantly stepped forth to rescue their country from the
opprobrium thrown upon it by the base conduct of the Government. In vain
did Ministers seek to overawe the timid and mislead the credulous: for
Knowledge and Reason were making great strides in England, so that
Britons now looked on Frenchmen only as "citizens of the world, children
of the common Father," not as enemies to be assassinated "at the command
of weak or ambitious Kings, or of corrupt Ministers." Their real enemies
were the destructive aristocracy, "the bane of all the countries of the
earth. You have acted wisely in banishing it from France." They (the
signatories) could not take up arms to help France, because the
Government had pledged the national faith that it would remain neutral.
The Elector of Hanover had joined his troops to those of traitors and
robbers; "but the King of England will do well to remember that England
is not Hanover; should he forget this, we will not forget it.... We
ardently wish a Triple Alliance, not of crowned heads, but of the people
of America, France, and Great Britain will give liberty to Europe and
peace to the world." The address was signed by Margarot and Hardy. It
and other addresses were reported verbatim by our _chargé d'affaires_,
Munro, to the Foreign Office.[103]
The democratic ferment in England speedily aroused a decided opposition.
Macaulay probably does not much exaggerate when he says that out of
twenty well-to-do persons nineteen were ardently loyal and firmly
anti-Jacobin. The month of November saw the formation of an "Ante
[_sic_]-Levelling Society, for supporting the Civil Power in suppressing
Tumults and maintaining the constitutional Government of this Country in
King, Lords, and Commons." Its programme leaves much to be desired in
the matter of style, but nothing in respect to loyalty.[104] The club
was founded by Reeves and others. Hardy notes in his memoirs that it
soon began to do much harm to the Corresponding Society.
Far aloof from this turmoil stands the solitary and inscrutable figure
of Pitt. At this time he was leading, almost with ostentation, the life
of a country gentleman, dividing his time between Holwood and Walmer
Castle. Very few of his letters of this period survive. Writing from
Walmer on 16th October to Grenville, he makes merely a verbal alteration
in an important despatch on which the latter consulted him. Indeed he
left the conduct of foreign affairs to Grenville far more fully than he
had done to the Duke of Leeds. I have found no draft of a despatch
written wholly by Pitt at the time, or indeed at the crisis that
followed. There is, however, a significant phrase in his letter to
Grenville, that, if the French retained Savoy, this would bring about a
new order of things.[105] For the most part Pitt at this time gave
himself up to rest and recreation at Walmer Castle. The charm of the sea
and of the Downs seems to have laid hold on him; for General Smith,
writing to Lord Auckland from Walmer, says that Pitt is soon in love
with the King's present and gladly spends there all the time he can
spare. Lord and Lady Chatham were with him and encouraged his passion
for that retired spot. A little later he had a flying visit from one who
was to become a devoted friend, the brilliant and versatile Earl of
Mornington. Coming over from Ramsgate and lunching at Walmer, he found
that Pitt had so far taken up with country sports as to follow the
hounds in chase of "a basketted hare."
Apart from the bad harvest and the spectre of want which crept over the
country, Pitt found little to alarm him at this time. In preparation for
the opening of Parliament, he distributed to each of his friends six
printed copies of his speech on the abatement of the Spanish armament
taxes, for the purpose of circulation in the country.[106] Clearly he
thought that the proposed economies in the public services would salve
the prevailing discontent. At the close of October the French agent,
Noël, reported to Lebrun that Pitt was not arming, and was still
inclined to hold aloof from French affairs.[107] In fact, so late as 6th
November, Grenville wrote to Auckland that on all grounds
non-intervention in continental affairs is the best policy for Great
Britain.[108]
* * * * *
But now a time drew near when anger was to expel calculation; when the
impulses of the populace flung aside the counsels of statesmen, and the
friends of universal peace helped to loose the dogs of war. This new
phase in the life of Europe opened up when the dense columns of
Dumouriez drove the thin lines of Austria from a strong position at
Jemappes (6th November). Mons opened its gates on the following day; and
the other towns of Belgium speedily followed suit, the French receiving
a hearty welcome everywhere. The conquest of the Belgic Provinces puffed
up the French with boundless pride mingled with contempt for the old
Governments; and these feelings awakened a formidable response in these
islands. The news of the conquest of the Pays Bas by the _sansculottes_,
received with bewilderment and disgust in Piccadilly, aroused wild hopes
among the weavers of Spitalfields. "The activity and insolence of the
French emissaries and their allies in this country have certainly
increased much with Dumouriez's success," so wrote Grenville to Auckland
on 26th November.
In these days we smile at the notion of foreign agents influencing
public opinion; but it seems certain that Chauvelin and his staff made
persistent efforts to fan the embers of discontent into a flame.[109]
Lord Sheffield declared that even the neighbourhood of Sheffield Park,
near Lewes, was thoroughly worked by French emissaries; but it is not
unlikely that landlord nervousness transfigured some wretched refugees,
on their way from the coast, into Jacobinical envoys. Certainly the town
which gave him his title was in a dangerous state. An officer stationed
there describes the joy of the men of Sheffield in celebrating
Dumouriez' victory. They roasted an ox whole, devoured it, and then
formed a procession, 10,000 strong, behind the French tricolour and a
picture which represented Dundas stabbing Liberty and Burke treading
down "the swinish multitude." He states that they were enrolled in
Corresponding Societies, had bought firearms, and were seeking to
corrupt the soldiery.[110]
Derby seems to have been equally fervid, if we may judge by the address
which on 20th November went from its branch of the Society for
Constitutional Information to the French National Convention, couched in
these terms. "It was reserved for the Gallic Republic to break the
accursed knot which has leagued Kings for ages past against the rest of
the world. Reason and Philosophy are making great strides; and precedent
and hereditary notions go fast to decline. By teaching mankind that they
are all equal in rights, you have dedicated a glorious edifice to
Liberty, which must hereafter prove the dungeon of tyrants and the
asylum of the oppressed."[111]
Still more seditious was the action of the London Corresponding Society.
On 28th November Joel Barlow and John Frost, deputed by that body,
presented an address to the French Convention, congratulating it on the
triumphs of liberty, and assured Frenchmen that innumerable societies
and clubs were springing up in England. "After the example given by
France," they said, "Revolutions will become easy. Reason is about to
make rapid progress; and it would not be extraordinary if in a much less
space of time than can be imagined, the French should send addresses of
congratulation to a National Convention of England." They then informed
the French deputies that 1,000 pairs of shoes had come from the Society
as a gift to the soldiers of liberty, and the gift would be repeated
weekly for the next six weeks. They also presented an address which
ended thus: "Other nations will soon follow your steps in this career of
improvement, and, rising from their lethargy, will arm themselves for
the purpose of claiming the Rights of Man with that all-powerful voice
which man cannot resist." Next came a deputation from the English and
Irish residents in Paris, which assured the French deputies that a
majority of the British people desired to copy their example, and that
the old Governments would soon survive merely as a memory. The three
addresses aroused immense enthusiasm, and a decree was passed for their
printing and circulation.[112]
These ecstatic praises of the Convention sounded oddly, as that body had
just been discussing a petition from several Parisians who had lately
been imprisoned without knowing why or by whom. And the Belfast address
of congratulation on the progress of religious liberty was followed by
the complaints of two members of the Convention that they had been half
drowned at Chartres for a profession of atheism.[113] But undoubtedly
these addresses by British Radicals caused exultation on both sides of
the Channel. Frenchmen believed that our people were about to overthrow
the Cabinet;[114] while the visitors returned home to trumpet forth the
triumphs of Reason and the doom of Tyranny.
Certainly the action of the French Convention seemed to assume the
speedy advent of a Jacobinical millennium. To the eye of faith the
headlong flight of the Austrians from Belgium opened up boundless vistas
of conquest, or rather, of fraternization with liberated serfs.
Consequently the month from 16th November to 15th December witnessed the
issue of four defiantly propagandist decrees. That of 16th November
enjoined on French generals the pursuit of the Austrians on to any
territory where they might find refuge--obviously a threat to the German
and Dutch States near at hand. On the same day the French deputies
decreed freedom of navigation on the estuary of the River Scheldt within
the Dutch territory, which that people had strictly controlled since the
Treaty of Münster (1648). In this connection it is well to remember that
the right of the Dutch to exclude foreigners from that estuary had been
recognized by France in five treaties signed with Great Britain since
the Peace of Utrecht. Further, by the Anglo-Dutch alliance of the year
1788, we had covenanted to uphold the rights of the Dutch in this and
other respects. Thus, the French Republic was taking upon itself to
rescind a well-established right of the Dutch Republic.
There is, however, another side to this question. The law of Nature, as
distinct from the law of nations, forbade the barring of a navigable
river to the commerce of aliens; and in this particular case the
exclusive privileges retained by the Dutch had almost strangled the
trade of Antwerp. Visitors describe the desolate aspect of the quays and
streets in a city which was clearly designed to be one of the great
marts of the world. Of this gospel of Nature, as set forth by Rousseau,
the French were the interpreters; but they would have done well to
appeal to Holland and Great Britain to abrogate this odious privilege,
adding also the assurance, formerly given by Dumouriez, that Belgium
would never become French.
Unfortunately the disinterested character of the crusade for liberty was
now belied by two additional decrees which created the worst possible
impression. On 19th November the French Convention declared its resolve
to "grant fraternity and assistance to all people who wish to recover
their liberty," and further ordered its generals to give effect to this
decree. Eight days later it rescinded the former resolution, that France
would make no conquests, by ordering the incorporation of Savoy in the
French Republic. The priest Grégoire was equal to the task of proving
that this involved no contradiction of the former principle, because the
Savoyards wished to join France and Nature herself had proclaimed the
desirability of union. By the same patriotic logic France could
rightfully absorb all parts of the Continent where Jacobins abounded and
natural frontiers were lacking.
These decrees brought about an entirely new situation. The annexation of
Savoy furnished a practical commentary on the airy proposals announced
on 16th and 19th November; but these alone were sufficient to cause Pitt
and Grenville the deepest concern. On the 27th the latter wrote to
Auckland at The Hague in terms which show his conviction that France
meant to revolutionize the Dutch Republic, and also, if possible, Great
Britain. Respecting the decrees of the 16th and 19th he wrote: "The
whole is a concerted plan to drive us to extremities, with a view of
producing an impression in the interior of the country."[115] That is,
he believed the Convention to be set on forcing England either to
declare war, or to give way disgracefully; and in either case the result
would be an increase of seditious feeling in these islands. This
continued to be his view. For on 4th December, after reading the
seditious addresses of the English societies to the Convention, he wrote
again to Auckland that the French evidently relied on the malcontents
both in England and Holland to paralyse the Governments; and, he added,
"This is above all others a reason for firmness in the present moment,
and for resisting, while the power of resistance is yet in our hands.
For the success of their unfounded claims would not only give rise to
new pretensions, but would give them additional influence."[116] Pitt's
views were the same, though he stated them more firmly and not as an
alarmist. On 9th December he wrote to the Earl of Westmorland, Lord
Lieutenant of Ireland, that the gross disregard of treaties shown of
late by France, her encouragement of the spirit of revolt in all lands,
and her public reception of addresses from English societies, "full of
treasonable sentiments," compelled the Government, though very
reluctantly, to add to the armed forces. He added these words: "I am
clear that the circumstances require vigour and decision both at home
and abroad. And the spirit of the country seems within these last ten
days to have taken so favourable a turn that I think we may look with
great confidence to the event."[117] Thus Pitt and Grenville equally
felt the need of firmness in resisting the French decrees, partly
because of their aggressive and illegal nature, but also because
surrender would inflate the spirits of British malcontents.
Current events served to strengthen this opinion. France had hitherto
won all the points of the game by sheer audacity. Everywhere she had
attacked, and everywhere she had found unexpected weakness. Custine's
army had extorted a forced loan from Frankfurt. Dumouriez was
threatening Aix-la-Chapelle on the east, and the Dutch on the north. The
spirit which animated the French Foreign Office appears in the letter
which Lebrun, its chief, wrote to Dumouriez on 22nd November: "To the
glory of having freed the Belgian Catholics, I hope you will join that
of delivering their Batavian brothers from the yoke of the
Stadholder."[118] There can be no doubt that the general laid his plans
for that purpose, though he also sent pacific overtures to Auckland at
The Hague.[119]
To crown the indignation of royalists, there came the tidings that on
3rd December the French Convention decreed the trial of Louis XVI for
high treason against the nation. The news aroused furious resentment;
but it is noteworthy that Pitt and Grenville rarely, if ever, referred
to this event; and that, before it was known, they had declared the
impossibility of avoiding a rupture with the French Government if it
persisted in adhering to the November decrees. On this question the
final court of appeal is the despatches and letters of our Ministers. An
examination of them discloses the reasons for their firmness. On 13th
November, when the evacuation of Brussels by the Austrians was known,
Ministers assured the Dutch Government that they would oppose a French
invasion of Holland. They charged Auckland to declare that His Majesty
had "no hesitation as to the propriety of his assisting the Dutch
Republic as circumstances might require, against any attempt on the part
of any other Power to invade its dominions or to disturb its
Government." This declaration was to be published in order to discourage
the plots of the Dutch "Patriots," and to warn the French Government and
its general of the danger of a hostile advance. Auckland replied on 16th
November: "It is impossible to convey to Your Lordships an adequate
sense of the impression made by this voluntary declaration of His
Majesty's sentiments and intentions respecting the Republic on the
occasion of the present crisis. The generosity of this measure, which in
a few hours was generally known, and which to-morrow will be circulated
on the Continent in the newspapers of the Republic, is acknowledged by
everyone." The Prince of Orange at once wrote to thank the King for this
proof of his friendship, and added the suggestion that the anchoring of
a British squadron in the Downs would, more than anything else, tend to
"hold in check our enemies."[120]
Pitt and Grenville did not comply with this last request; and the
British declaration itself came just two days too late to give pause to
the National Convention, before it published the decree on the opening
of the Scheldt. Possibly in the days of telegraphs the warning would
have been flashed from The Hague to Paris in time. As it was, both
Powers publicly committed themselves on the same day to opposite courses
of action from which pride or conviction forbade them to recede. So
narrow sometimes is the space that at first divides the paths leading
towards peace and war.
The concern of Pitt and Grenville at the French conquest of Belgium
appears in their instructions to Stratton, our _chargé d'affaires_ at
Vienna, to confer with the Austrian Chancellor, Cobenzl, on the
threatening situation, setting forth the desire of George III to
contribute to the tranquillity of all the States of Europe. In his reply
of 22nd December Cobenzl declared that Austria and Prussia must have
indemnities for their expenses in the war, the restoration of monarchy
at Paris being another essential to a settlement.[121] These statements
were most discouraging: the former pointed to a speedy partition of
Poland; and the forcible restoration of the Bourbons was at this time
wholly repugnant to the feelings of Pitt.
Meanwhile the prospect of war with France had become far more
threatening. The decree of 16th November on the Scheldt, and that of
19th November on helping foreign malcontents, were a direct defiance to
all neighbouring States, and especially to Great Britain and Holland. In
the latter country the Patriots were, as in 1787, actively helped from
Paris, and threatened the existence of the Orange _régime_, of which we
were the guarantors. Moreover, the opening of the Scheldt was a serious
blow to Dutch commerce. Sir James Harris, writing from The Hague in
December 1784, when this very question brought Joseph II to the brink of
war with Holland, quoted the declaration of the Grand Pensionary, that
the Dutch ought to spend their last florin "rather than submit to so
destructive and humiliating a measure as the opening of the
Scheldt."[122] The effusive thanks of the Dutch when the Court of
Versailles opposed the demand of Joseph II, shows that they looked on
the control of that estuary as vital to their interests. This question
was brought to an issue on 23rd November, when French gunboats entered
the Scheldt, and, despite the fire of the Dutch guardship, made their
way up the river in order to assist in the reduction of the citadel of
Antwerp. The senior captain of the gunboats announced that he did this
by order of Dumouriez. On 8th December seven French ships sailed up to
that city, the first since the Treaty of Münster.
The affair of the Scheldt was not the only cause of alarm. The Dutch
authorities managed to get a copy of a secret letter (dated 20th
November) from Dumouriez to Maulde, French envoy at The Hague, in which
he assured him that he would do his best to keep him in that post
(despite the ill will of the Paris Government); for he had much need of
him for certain negotiations. He added these words: "I count on carrying
liberty to the Batavians (Dutch) as I have done to the Belgians; also
that the Revolution will take place in Holland so that things will
return to the state they were in 1788." The Dutch Government gave a copy
of this letter to Auckland, who forwarded it to Grenville on 23rd
November. It reached Whitehall three days later. Curiously enough,
Grenville did not hear of the French decree for the opening of the
Scheldt until 26th November. But on that day he wrote to Auckland a
despatch which shows his conviction that France meant to force us into
war, and that the chief question for Great Britain and Holland now
was--when should hostilities begin? Clearly, then, Grenville, and
probably Pitt, regarded a rupture with France as unavoidable, unless she
revoked the aggressive decrees. Nevertheless they decided to send a
special envoy to Paris, and drew up rough drafts undated and addressed
to some person unnamed, bidding him make careful inquiries into the
state of affairs at that capital.
We cannot wonder that Pitt took a gloomy view of things; for on 24th
November a "moderate" member of the French Convention proposed an
addition to the decree of 19th November (offering help to malcontents in
other States), so as to limit it to nations with which France was at
war. This proposal--obviously designed to soothe the apprehensions of
Pitt--displeased the "patriotic" majority, which disposed of it by
carrying the "previous question." After this the decree of 19th November
could no longer be treated as a meaningless effervescence of Gallic
enthusiasm; and, when taken with the disloyal addresses presented by
certain English clubs on 28th November, its reaffirmation produced the
worst possible impression.
On the 29th, Nagel, the Dutch envoy in London, proffered a formal appeal
for help, in addition to requests which he had made to Grenville a few
days before. He further begged him to order the assembling of a squadron
at the Downs, or at Gravesend, so as to assist the Dutch speedily, if
need arose.[123] Meanwhile our allies (as usually happens with small
States in presence of danger) sought to temporize; and herein, as also
in the caution of Pitt and Grenville, lay the reason why war did not
break out at once. No one can peruse the despatches of our Ministers
without seeing that they considered war inevitable, unless the French
retracted the obnoxious decrees. It is well to notice that at this time
the question of the trial of Louis XVI had not come up for
consideration. The dispute turned solely on the frontier rights of the
Dutch, which Pitt and his colleagues believed to be violated by France,
and which we were in honour bound to vindicate.
On 1st December, then, came the first of those precautionary measures
which not seldom precipitate the conflict they are designed to avert.
The Cabinet issued a royal proclamation, calling out part of the
militia. Ministers took this step partly as a retort to the seditious
addresses of English Radical clubs to the French Convention,[124] partly
in order to repress tumults. There had been rioting in a few towns, and
the reports from Scotland were alarming. On 22nd November Dundas,
writing to Pitt from Melville Castle, N.B., stated that sedition had
spread rapidly of late in Scotland, and he estimated that five regiments
would be needed to hold down Dundee, Perth, and Montrose. He added that
the clergy of the Established Church and their following were loyal, the
others far otherwise.[125]
Still worse was the news from Ireland. Early in 1792 the Dublin
Parliament repealed one or two of the most odious statutes against Roman
Catholics; but later in the year contumeliously rejected their petition
for the franchise. Consequently the mass of Irishmen was ready to join
the Society of United Irishmen, a formidable association founded in
Ulster in 1791 by Wolfe Tone. This able young lawyer, fired with zeal
for the French Revolution, conceived the statesmanlike notion of banding
together both Presbyterians and Catholics in a national movement against
the exclusive and dominant English caste. The conduct of the Dublin
Parliament made his dream a reality. At once the ultra-Protestant
traders of the North clasped hands with the Catholic gentry and peasants
of the Centre and South. This unheard-of union was destined to lead Pitt
on to a legislative experiment which will concern us later. Here we may
notice that the clubs of Irish malcontents proceeded to act on a plan
already mooted in the English societies, that of sending delegates to
form a National Convention in Dublin. The aim was to constitute a body
far more national than the corrupt Protestant clique that sat in
Parliament, and, after overawing that body, to sunder the connection
with England. The precedent set by the Ulster Volunteers in their
meeting at Dungannon in 1782 warranted the hope of an even completer
triumph than was then secured. The correspondence that passed between
Pitt and the Lord-Lieutenant, Westmorland, reveals the concern which
they felt at the news. Pitt advised the early meeting of the Dublin
Parliament, the proposal of concessions sufficient to allay discontent,
and a determined resistance to all attempts at intimidation. He also
suggested the keeping a close watch on the importation of arms, and
levying a Militia if it were practicable.[126] In reply Westmorland
stated (1st December) that the manifesto of a meeting of United Irishmen
in Dublin was most threatening, and that the "French mania" was
spreading everywhere. He added: "Belfast is, as always, noisy and
republican; but not above 200 or 300 Volunteers are there."[127] It
seems probable that the embodying of the Militia in Great Britain was
partly with the view of enabling a few regular regiments to proceed to
Ireland.
While taking these precautionary measures, Pitt and Grenville adopted a
tone far from unfriendly to the French envoy. Earlier in the autumn
Grenville refused to see Chauvelin on the ground that the French
Government which sent him no longer existed. But after some
_pourparlers_ he consented to receive him on 29th November. With his
usual _hauteur_ he prepared to teach the ex-Marquis his place from the
outset. He placed for him a stiff small chair; but the envoy quickly
repelled the slight and vindicated the honour of the Republic by
occupying the largest arm-chair available. After this preliminary
skirmish things went more smoothly; but only the briefest summary of
their conversation can be given here. Chauvelin assured Grenville of the
desire of France to respect the neutrality of the Dutch, though they had
fired on two French vessels entering the Scheldt. The opening of that
river, he said, was a right decreed by Nature, and confirmed to France
by the conquest of Brabant--a point which he pressed Grenville to
concede. He then charged England with unfriendly conduct in other
respects. In reply Grenville said that he welcomed this informal
explanation, but he declined to give any assurance on the Scheldt
affair. If (said he) France and England were not on good terms, it was
not the fault of the latter Power, which had consistently remained
neutral but declined to allow the rights of its Allies to be
violated.[128]
Equally firm, though more affable, was the behaviour of Pitt in an
interview of 2nd December with a Frenchman who was destined to become
Foreign Minister under Napoleon. Maret, the future Duc de Bassano, at
this time made a very informal _début_ on the stage of diplomacy.
Despite many statements to the contrary it is certain that he had no
official position in England. He came here merely in order to look after
the affairs of the Duke of Orleans, especially to bring back his
daughter, who had for some time resided in Suffolk with Mme. de Genlis
and "Pamela." Maret's own words to Miles are decisive on this point: "I
was not a secret agent; I had no authority to treat, nor had I any
mission; and in declaring this to Mr. Pitt and to you I said nothing but
the truth."[129] With characteristic mendacity Lebrun afterwards
informed the Convention that Maret was a secret agent and that Pitt had
requested an interview with him. The interview came about owing to the
exertions of William Smith, M.P., a well-intentioned Whig, who hoped
much from an informal conversation between Pitt and one of the head
clerks of the French Foreign Office. Chauvelin viewed it with jealousy,
it being his aim to represent Maret as an emissary to the British and
Irish malcontents.[130] Pitt, when he granted the interview, cannot have
known of this, or of the design of Lebrun ultimately to foist Maret into
the place of Morgues at the French Embassy. Accordingly he welcomed
Maret cordially. No tactical skirmish about chairs took place, and Maret
afterwards declared that the great Minister behaved affably throughout,
brightening his converse at times by a smile. As the personality of the
two statesmen and the gravity of the crisis invest this interview with
unique interest, Pitt's account of it, which is in the Pretyman MSS.,
must be given almost in full.
He [Maret] expressed his regret at the distant and suspicious
terms on which England and France appeared to stand, his
readiness to give me any _éclaircissement_ he could, and his
belief that the present French Government would be very glad if
means could be found by private agents, with no official
character, to set on foot a friendly explanation.
I told him that, if they were desirous of such an explanation,
it seemed to me much to be wished under the critical
circumstances; as we might by conversing freely learn whether it
was possible to avoid those extremities which we should very
much regret but which seemed from what we saw of the conduct and
designs of France to be fast approaching; and I then mentioned
to him distinctly that the resolution announced respecting the
Scheldt was considered as proof of an intention to proceed to a
rupture with Holland; that a rupture with Holland on this ground
or any other injurious to their rights, must also lead to an
immediate rupture with this country; and that altho' we should
deeply regret the event and were really desirous of preserving,
if possible, the neutrality to which we had hitherto adhered, we
were fully determined, if the case arose, to give our utmost
support to our ally.
His answer was that he hoped nothing of the sort would happen;
that he believed there was no design of proceeding to
hostilities against Holland; and that it was much the wish of
the French Government to be on good terms with this country;
that they wished to _ménager l'Angleterre_, and therefore to
_ménager l'Hollande_; that these were the sentiments of M. le
Brun when he left Paris about 3 weeks ago; that he believed them
to be those of M. Dumouriez; and that, from the despatches of M.
Chauvelin, which he had seen while here, he believed they
continued to be those of the _Conseil Exécutif_; that he thought
a confidential explanation on this subject very desirable; and
would either go to Paris or write to M. le Brun, to state what
had passed in our conversation, and that he was persuaded they
would be disposed to [send?] some other person here to enter
privately into negotiations upon it. He afterwards dropped an
idea that some difficulty might perhaps arise from the _Conseil
Exécutif_ feeling itself pressed by the weight of public opinion
to propose to us to receive some person here in a formal
character. To this I observed that the circumstances would by no
means admit of any formal communication, and that they would
certainly see the necessity of avoiding the difficulties which
must arise from such a proposal, if they were sincere in wishing
an explanation with a view to remove obstacles.
Towards the end of the conversation, on his repeating his belief
that it would be the wish of the French Government to have such
an explanation and to remove, if possible, the grounds of
misunderstanding, I remarked to him that, if this was really
desired, there was another point which must be attended to--that
he must have seen the impression made here by the decree in
France avowing a design of endeavouring to extend their
principles of government by raising disturbances in other
countries; that, while this was professed or attempted, and till
we had full security on this point, no explanation could answer
its purpose, and that such a conduct must be considered as an
act of hostility to neutral nations. He answered that he knew
the impression which this circumstance produced, and had seen
the decree I mentioned with consternation; that he believed it
passed only in a moment of fermentation and went beyond what was
intended; that it could be meant only against nations at war,
and was considered as one way of carrying on war against them;
that he believed it was not conformable to the sentiments of the
_Conseil Exécutif_, and that they might possibly find means to
revise it. To this I said that, whatever were the sentiments of
the _Conseil Exécutif_, the decree, as it stood, might justly be
considered by any neutral nation as an act of hostility. He
concluded by saying that he would immediately send to M. le Brun
an account of what had passed, which he hoped might lead to
happy consequences.
Maret prefaced his report of this interview by assuring Lebrun that Pitt
was decidedly in favour of peace, and in fact dreaded war more than the
Whig aristocrats; but, he added, Lord Hawkesbury and the majority of
Ministers were for war--a somewhat doubtful statement. Maret's
description of the interview is graphic but far from complete. He
reported Pitt's gracious effort to minimize the difficulties of form
arising from the lapse of official relations between France and England.
But (he wrote) the Minister's brow darkened at the mention of the names
of Noël and Chauvelin; and he finally suggested that Maret should be the
accredited French agent at London.[131]
Pitt's account does not name these personal details, and it lays more
stress on the difficulties caused by the French decrees opening the
Scheldt and offering help to malcontents. We must further remember that
Maret's words of warning to his compatriots on the latter subject were
suppressed in the version published at Paris, which therefore gave the
impression that Pitt was not deeply moved by recent events. This
_suppressio veri_ partly accounts for the persistence of the French
deputies in their resolves, which prevented the friendly explanations
undoubtedly desired by Pitt and Maret.
Bad news also came in from The Hague, to the effect that the French were
demanding a passage through the Dutch fortress of Maestricht. These
tidings caused the worst impression. Grenville wrote in reply to
Auckland on 4th December. "The conduct of the French in all their late
proceedings appears to His Majesty's servants to indicate a fixed and
settled design of hostility against this country and the [Dutch]
Republic." Equally threatening were "their almost undisguised attempts
now making to excite insurrection here and in Holland." Consequently His
Majesty had decided to arm in self defence, and he hoped that the Dutch
would firmly repel all attempts derogatory to their neutrality. The King
(he added), while taking these precautionary measures, would not omit
such steps as might lead to friendly explanations with France through
the private agents of that Government; but no ambassador would be
received.[132] Pitt and Grenville set little store by the soothing
explanations of Dumouriez and his friend, Maulde, who had made overtures
to Auckland which met with a guarded but not unfavourable response. On
their renewal, Auckland received them coldly, remarking that the whole
situation was changed by the late violent decrees of the French
Convention. At that time, too, the friendly Maulde was recalled and
replaced by Tainville, "a professed Jacobin with brutal manners and
evident indiscretion,"[133] Thus faded away the last faint hopes in that
quarter.
Equally sombre was the outlook at Paris. The pacific reports sent by
Maret and Maulde from London and The Hague were before the French
Ministers at their meeting on 5th December. They had also the benefit of
a lucid and suggestive _Mémoire_ sent by Talleyrand from London a week
earlier, setting forth the desirability of a friendly understanding
between the two free peoples, who, advancing hand in hand, might give
liberty to backward peoples (especially Spanish America), and draw
thence boundless benefits. It was the plan which Dumouriez and he had
drawn up in the spring of that year. Probably the Executive Council took
no notice of it; for certain papers found in the iron chest at the
Tuileries cast doubts on the purity of Talleyrand's patriotism. Further,
as Pache, Minister at War, hated Dumouriez, personal bias told strongly
against the moderate proposals coming from London and The Hague.
Nevertheless the Executive Council now decided to defer for the present
the invasion of Holland, meanwhile chasing the Austrians beyond the
Rhine, and fortifying Antwerp. The last step was declared not to
infringe the principles of the Republic, "which oppose the spirit of
conquest."
Obviously there was nothing to prevent the same liberal adaptation of
these principles to Belgium as Grégoire had proposed for the welfare of
the Savoyards. A few deputations of the liberated people, asking for
union with France, would enable some equally skilful dialectician to
discover that Belgium was naturally a part of the Republic. For the
present, however, the Belgians sent a deputation to demand unconditional
independence; and it taxed the ingenuity even of Barère, then President
of the Convention, to waive aside that request, with airy phrases as to
the alliance of the two peoples emanating from the hands of Nature
herself (4th December).[134]
Pitt cannot have heard of the French Cabinet's decision of 5th December,
but he must have read of the ambiguous treatment of the Belgians at the
bar of the Convention the day previously. It had long been a maxim at
Whitehall that the Pays Bas must never go to France. To prevent such a
disaster England had poured forth blood and treasure for more than a
century. Pitt's resolve two years before, to maintain Austrian authority
in those provinces, had deeply offended Prussia. Now he and Grenville
turned to the Court of Vienna, and on 7th December made friendly
overtures to Stadion, Austrian ambassador at London.[135] Thus, the
French menace ended the long period of estrangement between Great
Britain and Austria, though, as will duly appear, mutual confidence took
root very slowly.
On 9th December Lebrun sent off an important despatch to Chauvelin. With
respect to the decree of 19th November, it stated that France would
never demean herself by assisting rioters, but would respond to the
"general will" of a people that desired to break its chains. Further,
France could not reverse her decision concerning the Scheldt. She would
not revolutionize Holland, but she expected Great Britain not to
intervene in support of a constitution which the Dutch considered
"vicious and destructive of their interests." Finally, the French
Government could not recognize the guarantees of the Dutch constitution
undertaken by England and Prussia in 1788.[136] On the same day Lebrun
sent a message to Maret, who was still in London, adverting in ironical
terms to the military preparations in England, at which the French would
feel no alarm, and insinuating that the doctrines of liberty were making
rapid progress there. As to negotiations, the only bases on which they
could proceed were the recognition of the Republic, and the refusal of
the French Cabinet to treat except by a fully accredited envoy.
On receipt of this letter on the 14th, Maret at once showed it to Miles,
who urged him to request an immediate interview with the Prime Minister.
This was accorded, and at 8 p.m. of that day, Maret met Pitt again. I
have found no account of this interview. All we know is that it was
short and depressing. Maret had to impart the unwelcome news that all
the communications to the French Government must pass through the hands
of Chauvelin--a personal triumph for that envoy. Pitt on his side
declined to give any answer on the subject of Maret's communication, or
on that of receiving Chauvelin.[137] We can imagine that under that
stiff and cold exterior the Prime Minister concealed deep agitation; for
the determination of the French rigidly to adhere to their decrees, to
force Chauvelin upon the British Government, and to require the
recognition of the French Republic, meant war.
FOOTNOTES:
[83] Aulard, "La Rév. Franç.," 270-2.
[84] "Dropmore P.," ii, 291.
[85] "Bland Burges P.," 207, 211.
[86] Dumont, "Souvenirs"; Bulwer Lytton, "Hist. Characters"
(Talleyrand).
[87] W. A. Miles, "Corresp.," i, 349-51; Sorel, iii, 18-20.
[88] Burke, "Corresp.," iv, 7.
[89] Sorel, iii, 139.
[90] Carlyle, "Fr. Rev.," iii, bk. i, ch. vi.
[91] "Mems. of Romilly," i, 351, 352.
[92] "Dropmore P.," ii, 318.
[93] "H. O.," Geo. III (Domestic), 19, 20.
[94] _Ibid._ In all, 3,772 French refugees landed in September 1792
("Ann. Reg." 39). The first subscription for them realized £1,468. Burke
gave £20.
[95] "H. O.," Geo. III (Domestic), 21; Twiss, "Life of Lord Eldon," i,
218; "Bland Burges P.," 203. Our agent, Munro, on 17th December 1792
reported from Paris: "Dr. Maxwell has at last obtained a company in the
French service, and I understand is soon to leave this to join the army"
(Gower's "Despatches," 260). Mr. Elgar has not been able to trace him
afterwards.
[96] Massey, iv, 45. This was said to be spoken to Bland Burges; but the
papers of the latter (p. 204) contain no reference to it.
[97] "H. O.," Geo. III (Domestic), 21.
[98] _Ibid._
[99] "H. O.," Geo. III (Domestic), 21.
[100] Miles ("Corresp.," 333) states that the editors of the "Argus" and
"Morning Chronicle" were regularly paid by the French Embassy and were
often there.
[101] "Bland Burges P.," 227-9.
[102] Virgil, "Georgics," i, 463-5. "Who would dare call the sun a liar?
In truth, he often warns of the approach of hidden seditions and of the
swellings of treachery and strifes yet unseen."
[103] "F. O.," France, 40.
[104] "H. O.," Geo. III (Domestic), 22.
[105] "Dropmore P.," ii, 322.
[106] "Auckland Journals," ii, 449, 455; "Dropmore P.," ii, 324.
[107] Sorel, iii, 143.
[108] "Auckland Journals," ii, 465.
[109] On 24th November Noël wrote from London to Lebrun: "Tous les
symptômes annoncent que les mouvements révolutionnaires ne peuvent être
éloignés." Quoted by Sorel, iii, 214. See, too, Ernouf's "Maret," p. 84.
[110] "Auckland Journals," ii, 481. Tomline, iii, 458, 459. Burke's
unfortunate phrase in the "Reflections": "Learning will be cast into the
mire and trodden down under the hoofs of a swinish multitude."
[111] B.M. Place MSS., vol. entitled "Libel, Sedition, Treason,
Persecution."
[112] "Moniteur," 29th November 1792.
[113] "Residence in France in 1792-5," by an English Lady, i, 190-2.
[114] Auckland says ("Journals," ii, 473) he has seen Paris bulletins
and letters which counted absolutely on a revolt in England.
[115] "Dropmore P.," ii, 344. Grenville to Auckland, 27th November.
[116] _Ibid._, 351-2.
[117] Salomon, "Pitt," 599.
[118] Rojas, "Miranda dans la Rév. Franç.," 3-4.
[119] "Dropmore P.," ii, 339, 341, 343; "Auckland Journals," ii, 471;
Lecky, vi, 70-4.
[120] "F. O.," Holland, 20.
[121] "F. O.," Austria, 31, 32. See, too, Vivenot, ii, 446, 447.
[122] "Malmesbury Diaries," ii, 89, 90.
[123] "Malmesbury Diaries," ii, 89, 90. This despatch, and the letter of
the Prince of Orange referred to above, correct the statement of Mr.
Browning ("Varennes," etc., 191) and Mr. Hammond ("Fox," 257), that the
Dutch did not call upon us for help. This was asserted by Lord Lansdowne
on 21st December, but his information was unofficial and is refuted by
that given above.
[124] Marsh, "Politics of Great Britain and France," i, 260-2. The
militia were not called out in Surrey, Herts, Berks, and Bucks
("Dropmore P.," ii, 348).
[125] Pretyman MSS.
[126] Pitt to Westmorland, 14th October and 18th November 1792, in
Salomon, "Pitt" (App.); "Dropmore P.," ii, 318, 320-3, 328, 330, 333,
336; "Mems. of Lord Ed. Fitzgerald," 155-60.
[127] Pretyman MSS.
[128] "F. O.," France, 40. For Grenville's account of the interview, see
"Pitt and Napoleon Miscellanies."
[129] Miles, "Correspondence," ii, 46; see, too, Ernouf, "Maret," 89,
95. This corrects the mis-statement of Lecky (vi, 94) on this topic.
[130] Ernouf, "Maret," 90.
[131] "Ann. Reg." (1792), 190-3; Ernouf, "Maret," 94-8.
[132] "F. O.," Holland, 41; B.M. Add. MSS., 34446. Grenville to
Auckland, 4th December.
[133] "F. O.," Holland, 42. Auckland to Grenville, 7th and 8th December
1792. See, too, Miles, "Correspondence," i, 382; Sorel, iii, 224.
[134] Sorel, iii, 204, 224.
[135] Vivenot, ii, 393.
[136] Sorel, iii, 225, 226.
[137] Miles, "Corresp.," i, 388, 389.
CHAPTER IV
THE RUPTURE WITH FRANCE
La guerre aux rois était la conséquence naturelle du procès fait
au roi de France; la propagande conquérante devait être liée au
régicide.--SOREL.
The opening of Parliament on 13th December 1792 took place amidst
circumstances that were depressing to friends of peace. Affairs were
gyrating in a vicious circle. Diplomacy, as we have seen, had come to a
deadlock; but more threatening even than the dispute between Pitt and
Lebrun were the rising passions of the two peoples. The republican
ferment at Paris had worked all the more strongly since 20th November,
the date of the discovery of the iron chest containing proofs of the
anti-national intrigues of the King and Queen. Hence the decree (3rd
December) for the trial of Louis XVI at the bar of the Convention with
its inevitable sequel, the heating of royalist passion in all
neighbouring lands. It is one of the many mishaps of the revolutionary
movement that its enthusiasm finally aroused an opposite enthusiasm, its
fury begot fury, and thus set in a series of cyclones which scarcely
spent their force even at Waterloo.
An essentially philosophic movement at the outset, the French Revolution
was now guided by demagogues and adventurers, whose only hope of keeping
erect lay in constant and convulsive efforts forwards. Worst symptom of
all, its armies already bade fair to play the part of the Praetorians of
the later Roman Empire. Nothing is more singular at this time than the
fear of the troops. Amidst the distress prevalent at Paris, much
apprehension was felt at the return of the armies of Custine and
Dumouriez. In part, of course, this uneasiness arose from a suspicion
that these men, especially the latter, might take up the _rôle_ of Monk
and save Louis. But a member of the French Convention assured Miles that
the disbanding of those tumultuary forces would bring on a social
crisis.
War, [he wrote on 9th December] is to a certain extent
inevitable, not so much for the purpose of opening the Scheldt,
for that is rather a pretext in order to animate the people and
preserve their enthusiasm, but to get rid of 300,000 armed
vagabonds, who can never be allowed to return without evident
risk to the Convention and Executive Council.... It is her
opinion [Madame Roland's] and mine that we cannot make peace
with the Emperor without danger to the Republic, and that it
would be hazardous to recall an army, flushed with victory and
impatient to gather fresh laurels, into the heart of a country
whose commerce and manufactures have lost their activity, and
which would leave the disbanded multitude without resources or
employment.[138]
These words are noteworthy; for they show that prudential or party
motives led some at least of the Girondins, formerly friends of England,
to desire an extension of the war.
In England, too, the war spirit was rising. The traditional loyalty of
the land had been strengthened by the tactful behaviour of George III
since Pitt's accession to power. These feelings warmed to a steady glow
at the time of the King's illness in 1788-9; and now the trial of
Louis XVI, albeit on grounds which Britons could not understand, seemed
an act of contemptible cruelty. To bring Louis from Versailles to Paris,
to load him with indignities at the Tuileries, to stop his despairing
bolt for freedom, to compass his downfall, to attack him in his palace
and massacre his defenders, to depose him, and now to try him for his
life for the crime of helping on his would-be deliverers, appeared to a
nation of sportsmen a series of odious outrages on the laws of fair
play. The action of certain Radical Clubs in sending addresses of
congratulation to the National Convention also aroused deep disgust; and
(as Bland Burges wrote to Auckland on 18th December) Loyal Associations
sprang up on all sides.[139] A typical address was sent by the Dover
Association to Pitt, as Lord Warden, on 19th December, asking for
permission to take arms in defence of King and Constitution against
invaders from without or levellers within.[140] The example was widely
followed; and thus, as usually happens in this land, the puny
preparations of Government were helped on by the eager exertions of the
people.
The revulsion in public opinion early in December was so marked as to
impress even Chauvelin. He warned Lebrun that within a month the English
had so changed as scarcely to be recognizable; but he added: "Pitt seems
to have killed public opinion in England." A conversation which Sheridan
had with him on 7th December ought to have disproved this fable. The
Whig orator sternly reprobated the French decree of 19th November,
offering aid to malcontents, and stated that the Opposition desired
peace with France, but not if she attacked Holland. Nine-tenths of the
people would resent any attempt to interfere with England or her Allies.
This patriotic utterance of Sheridan expressed the feelings of a large
part of the Whig Opposition. Parliament on 13th December showed marked
approval of the King's Speech, which, while affirming his peaceful
intentions, asserted his resolve to strengthen the forces. Lansdowne and
Stanhope struck a few jarring notes; but in the Commons the Opposition
was almost paralysed by a split between the New and Old Whigs. At a
meeting of the party, held on 11th December at Burlington House, the
majority decided to support the Government. Indeed Parliament would
probably have presented a united front but for the action of Lansdowne,
Stanhope, and Fox. Much depended on the conduct of the great orator at
this crisis. A warning uttered by him to French Republicans might have
had the most salutary effect. Unfortunately his conduct was such as to
impair the unity of English sentiment and thereby to encourage the
delusions of the men in power at Paris. In the meeting on 11th December
he asserted that there was no fear of a revolt (in which he was
doubtless correct) and that the calling out of the Militia was a mere
trick, which he would strenuously oppose. He admitted that we must
support the Dutch if they were attacked, and disapproved of the French
decree respecting the Scheldt, but strongly deprecated war on that
account. On the 12th he threw caution to the winds, and stated with an
oath that there was no address that Pitt could frame on which he would
not propose an amendment and divide the House.[141] This is party spirit
run mad; but it was in that spirit that Fox went to the House on the
13th.
There he made one of his finest flights of oratory. None of his speeches
excels it in beauty of diction and matchless energy of thought. Most
forcible was the passage in which he derided the ministerial maxim that
the canon of English laws and liberties was complete; that we might
thenceforth stand still, and call upon a wondering world to admire it as
a model of human perfection. Even more biting were his taunts at
Ministers for seeking to stamp out the discontent which their injustice
and violence had created.
You have gone upon the principles of slavery in all your
proceedings; you neglect in your conduct the foundation of all
legitimate government, the rights of the people; and, setting up
this bugbear, you spread a panic for the very purpose of
sanctifying this infringement, while again the very infringement
engenders the evil which you dread. One extreme naturally leads
to another. Those who dread republicanism fly for shelter to the
Crown. Those who desire Reform and are calumniated are driven by
despair to republicanism. And this is the evil that I dread.
These are the extremes into which these violent agitations hurry
the people, to the decrease of that middle order of men who
shudder as much at republicanism on the one hand as they do at
despotism on the other.[142]
He then taunted Ministers with abandoning Poland and not opposing the
coalition of Austria and Prussia, and asserted that the Cabinet refused
to negotiate with France because she was a Republic, and her Ministers
had not been anointed with the holy oil of Rheims. The weakest part of
the speech was that which dealt with the existing crisis. For of what
use was it to point out where Ministers had gone astray months and years
before, if he did not now mark out for them a practicable course? In
truth, though the prince of debaters, Fox lacked self-restraint, balance
of judgement, and practical sagacity. The sole important issue was the
encouraging of the peace party at Paris, with a view to the revocation
of the aggressive decrees of the Convention. In private, Fox had
admitted that they were wholly indefensible; and yet, in order to snatch
an oratorical triumph, he fired off a diatribe which could not but
stiffen the necks of the French Jacobins. At such a crisis the true
statesman merges the partisan in the patriot and says not a word to
weaken his own Government and hearten its opponents. To this height of
self-denial Fox rarely rose; and the judgement alike of his fellows and
of posterity has pronounced this speech a masterpiece of partisan
invective and of political fatuity.
For how was it possible to recognize the French Republic until it had
withdrawn its threats to existing Governments? Pitt had reason to
believe that a firm protest against the aggressive decrees of November
was the only means of averting an overturn of international law. He took
the proper means of protesting against them, and his protest was
disregarded. In such a case, to recognize a revolutionary Government
which had just proclaimed its sympathy with malcontents and its resolve
to dictate terms to our Dutch allies, would have been a sign of
weakness. There was but one chance of peace, namely, that Parliament
should give so overwhelming a support to Pitt and Grenville as to
convince the tyros at Paris that they had to do, not with a clique, but
a nation. This unanimity the efforts of Fox impaired. Some of his
friends voted with him from a sense of personal regard; but the greater
number passed over to the Government or did not vote. Consequently the
Foxites mustered 50 votes against 290.
Equally inopportune was his motion of 15th December, for sending a
Minister to Paris to treat with that Government. His knowledge of all
that went on at the French Embassy in Portman Square was so exact
(witness his repetition publicly on the 13th of the very words of one of
Lebrun's despatches to Chauvelin),[143] that he must have known of the
informal communications between Pitt and Maret, and of the arrival on
the 14th of despatches from Paris, which negatived the requests of the
Prime Minister. Doubtless it was this last circumstance which curtailed
and weakened Fox's second speech. Grey, Erskine, and Whitbread
vigorously supported the motion; but there was a general feeling that
the despatch of an ambassador to Paris would be a weak acquiescence in
the French claims. The motion was therefore negatived. Pitt was not
present at these first debates, not having yet been re-elected by the
University of Cambridge after his recent acceptance of the Lord
Wardenship of the Cinque Ports. The defence of the Government therefore
devolved chiefly upon Dundas, Windham, and Burke--a significant
conjunction of names. On 16th December Burke for the first time took his
seat on the Treasury Bench.
A national party might now have been formed but for the inaction of the
Duke of Portland. During the meetings at his mansion, Burlington House,
he evinced strong disapproval of the views of Fox; and, as official
leader of the Whigs, he had it in his power to bring nearly the whole of
the party over to the Government side. From this course, which would
have placed country above party, the Duke shrank; and his followers were
left to sort themselves at will. There was a general expectation that
Portland would publicly declare against Fox; but friendship or timidity
held him tongue-tied. Malmesbury sought to waken him from his "trance,"
but in vain.[144] He lay under "the wand of the magician" (Pitt's phrase
for the witchery that Fox exerted), even when so staunch a Whig as Sir
Gilbert Elliot saw that the wizard's enchantments were working infinite
mischief.[145]
Owing to the wrong-headedness of Fox and the timidity of Portland,
Pitt's triumph in the Commons was not decisive enough to tear the veil
away from the eyes of the French Jacobins. Nothing short of unanimity at
Westminster could have worked that miracle. Surely not even that novice
in diplomacy, Lebrun, would have threatened to appeal from the British
Government to the British nation, had he not believed the Government to
be without support.
This delusion appears in the memorable decree of 15th December. The
French Convention thereby asserts its resolve to revolutionize all
countries where its armies are or shall come. It will recognize no
institutions alien to the principles of Liberty, Equality, and
Fraternity. All feudal dues, customs, and privileges are to be annulled,
and the liberated people will meet in primary assemblies to organize an
Administration. Arrangements will be made for defraying the expenses of
the liberating army, and for maintaining it while it remains.[146]
Finally France declares that she will treat as an enemy the people which
refuses to accept Liberty and Equality, and tolerates its prince and
privileged castes. The decree is at once followed by a proclamation
drawn up for the benefit of the subject peoples whom it may concern.
Finally, the Convention decides that the course of rivers must
everywhere be free, and directs its generals to enforce that principle
with respect to the Scheldt.
In view of this stern reiteration of the right to overturn all
Governments that conflict with revolutionary principles, it is
impossible to consider the decree of 19th November, offering assistance
to malcontent peoples, as a meaningless display of emotion. Subsequent
events threw a sinister light on it. The annexation of Savoy on 27th
November was not a convincing proof of altruism; and the refusal of the
Executive Council, on 8th and 9th December, to reconsider its decision
on the Scheldt, marked a firm resolve to carry out French policy in the
Pays Bas, even if it led to war with England. Now there came, as a
damning corollary, the decree of 15th December, which flung defiance at
all Governments of the old type. Like Mohammed, Lebrun stood forth with
the "Contrat Social" in one hand, the sword in the other, and bade the
world take its choice.
For England there could be no doubt. Pitt and Grenville had decided that
the only chance of peace lay in offering a firm front to every act of
aggression. In this they had general support. Fox might choose to
distort facts by declaring that Ministers were about to plunge the
country into war on a matter of form[147] (the refusal to treat
officially with the French Republic); but everyone knew that the first
aggressive action was that of France, directed against the Anglo-Dutch
alliance. The firmness of Ministers gained them support in unexpected
quarters. On 20th December, when they asked for a vote for 25,000
seamen, including 5,000 marines, Sheridan heartily declared that he
would have supported a vote for 40,000 seamen if that number had been
deemed necessary. He also made a suggestion that the British Parliament
or people should appeal to the generous instincts of Frenchmen to spare
the life of Louis XVI. The proposal came somewhat oddly in a debate for
increasing our forces against France; and it brought up Burke in one of
his most acrid moods. Such an appeal, he said, was futile, for Louis was
in the custody of assassins who were both accusers and judges: his death
was inevitable. Sheridan and Fox heartily reprobated this recklessly
vindictive language.
Pitt then pointed out that on 17th August George III had expressed an
earnest desire for the safety of Louis and the Royal Family of France in
terms which were then read out. The same was the desire of every Briton;
and the sentiments now expressed in that House would be heard and noted
at Paris. If any more formal measure were to be adopted, he suggested
the entering a protest in the Journals of the House; but any public
representation, he said, must be couched in terms of indignation which
must tend to defeat its own object. With this method of procedure Fox
and Sheridan expressed their entire concurrence.[148] It is therefore a
malicious falsehood to say that Pitt opposed their suggestion.[149]
Burke certainly did so, and in the worst possible taste; but Pitt
carried it out so far as was deemed desirable. If Sheridan and Fox
wished for a public appeal, it was for them to set it on foot.
I must here notice the vague and misleading statements in Godoy's
Memoirs (written a generation later) that Spain made strenuous efforts
to save the life of Louis XVI and opened "an unlimited credit" at Paris
with the view of bribing members of the Convention to secure his
acquittal. Further, that he, Godoy, secretly approached Pitt in order to
secure his financial aid, which that statesman obstinately refused.[150]
The story does not hang well together; for if Spain had already opened
an unlimited credit at Paris, why did she want pecuniary help from Pitt?
Further, the opening of unlimited credit, presumably with a Parisian
bank, did not consort well with the secret methods which were essential
to the success of the plan.
In order to probe this matter to the bottom, I have examined the British
Foreign Office archives relating to Spain for the months of December and
January. They are detailed and apparently complete. F. J. Jackson, our
_chargé d'affaires_ at Madrid, wrote to Lord Grenville every three or
four days, as the relations of the two States had been far from cordial
owing to friction caused by the cession of Nootka Sound, Captain
Vancouver having been employed to settle the boundaries and fix a
neutral zone between the two Empires. Grenville also wrote three times
to Jackson to express his apprehension that the timidity and poverty of
Spain would cause her to yield to the French Republic in the matter of
some demonstrations on the frontier. But there is no word implying that
Spain requested help from England, either pecuniary or diplomatic, in
order to save Louis. Early in January Charles IV made such an appeal to
the French Convention, but it was treated with contemptuous
indifference. At that time the Courts of London and Madrid were
beginning to draw closer together in order to withstand the demands of
France; but nothing passed between them officially respecting the saving
of Louis. Now, where the life of a King was at stake, any communication
must have been official, and if it were made through the Spanish
ambassador in London, Grenville would certainly have referred to it in
his despatches to Madrid.[151] We may therefore dismiss Godoy's story as
a cruel and baseless slander, due to the spiteful desire of a
discredited politician to drag down a great name nearer to his own
level.
It is also worth noting that Malouet, who was then in close touch with
Grenville on San Domingo affairs, does not mention in his Memoirs any
attempt to involve the Cabinet in a scheme for bribing the
Convention--an action which the French exiles in England and Holland
were perfectly able to carry out themselves had they been so minded. The
only document bearing on this question is a Memorial drawn up on 7th
December by Malouet, Lally-Tollendal, and Gillier, stating their horror
at the King's trial, and their belief that his life might be spared if
George III and the British Government issued a Declaration stating their
lively interest in Louis XVI and his family, their resolve for ever to
refuse an asylum to all regicides, and to cut off all supplies of food
from France if the crime were committed.[152] The Memorial was probably
presented to Lord Grenville; but its inutility, or danger, in the proud
and exacting mood then prevalent at Paris, is obvious. The confidential
reports sent by "M. S." from Paris to Lord Grenville do not refer to any
such overture to the Cabinet.[153]
Lastly, there is the curious fact that the ex-abbé Noël, one of
Chauvelin's "advisers," came to Miles late on 18th December, and
affected much concern at the prospect of the execution of Louis. He then
suggested that Pitt should confer with a M. Talon, residing in Sloane
Street, who had immense resources and stood well with all parties in
France, in order to devise some means for saving the life of that
monarch. When Miles asked Noël how Pitt was to assist in this laudable
project, no answer was forthcoming. We must commend Noël's prudence; for
he had already stated that Talon was under impeachment in France. How a
man accused of treason could help his King, save by secretly using some
of his immense resources to bribe the deputies, is no more apparent to
us than it was to Miles. In fact he detected a snare in this effort to
associate Pitt with a wealthy French exile in what must evidently be
merely an affair of bribery. He therefore declined to bring the matter
before Pitt, whereupon Noël betrayed signs of satisfaction at finding
that the Minister really was neutral on French internal affairs.[154]
This little episode should open the eyes of detractors of Pitt to the
extraordinary difficulty of his position. Of one thing we may be
certain. The readiest way of assuring the doom of the hapless monarch
was to take up some one of the silly or guileful schemes then mooted for
pressing the British Government to take sides in the trial. Pitt's
rigorous neutrality was the best means of helping the advocates of Louis
in their uphill fight with the hostile Convention.
Reverting to events at Westminster, we note that Ministers, on 21st
December, introduced into the Upper House an Aliens Bill for subjecting
to supervision the many thousands of foreigners who had flocked to these
shores. The debates on this measure showed some approach to unanimity,
though Lansdowne and Lauderdale in the Lords, and Fox in the Commons
opposed it as a breach of the hospitable traditions of this land. On the
28th Burke spoke in its support with his usual passion, flinging down a
Birmingham dagger as a sign of the French fraternity now introduced
into these happy islands.[155] After a few alterations in committee, the
Bill passed on the last day of the year.
Meanwhile, on 18th December, Lebrun had sent to the Convention a report
on the negotiations, which was not adapted to soften the passions of the
time, being merely a piece of parliamentary declamation; but, as
declamation rather than reason held sway at Paris, some of its phrases
must be quoted. After citing with approval passages from the recent
speech of Fox, Lebrun referred to the eager interest taken by the
British nation in the triumphs of the French arms. "But," he continued,
"these glorious events have a quite contrary effect upon the English
Minister. In a moment, the dread and jealousy of our victories, the
entreaties of cowardly rebels [the French _émigrés_], the vile intrigues
of hostile Courts, and the secret suspicions that the numerous addresses
from all parts of England excited, determined him to more decisive
military preparations and to an immediate assembling of Parliament."
Lebrun then accused Pitt of seeking to stir up public opinion against
France, and of exciting, "by the most corrupt means, distrusts, doubts,
and disorders." A still more extraordinary charge followed, namely, that
Pitt and Grenville, while refusing to acknowledge the French diplomatic
agents, had "requested to see them confidentially, to hold
communications with them, and to grant them secret conferences."[156]
Lebrun then referred in contemptuous terms to the British naval
preparations, and stated that he had firmly maintained the decree
respecting the Scheldt. He then affirmed the reasonableness of the
decree of 19th November; and scouted the notion that France harboured
designs against Holland. In answer to this last he had said in effect:
"That it was much to be wished that the British Ministry had never
meddled more with the internal government of that Republic than we
ourselves wish to meddle." Finally, if these disputes led to a rupture,
"the war will be only the war of the British Minister against us; and we
will not fail to make a solemn appeal to the English nation." ... "In
short, we will leave it to the English nation to judge between us, and
the issue of this contest may lead to consequences which he [Pitt] did
not expect."
In the sordid annals of party strife this report of Lebrun holds a high
place. In order to furbish up the dulled prestige of the Gironde he
sought to excite national animosity, and to revive the former hatred of
the name of Pitt. What could be more criminal than to sneer at the
smallness of England's naval preparations? What more false than to
charge Pitt and Grenville with secretly begging for interviews with
agents whom outwardly they scorned? It is by acts like these that
nations are set by the ears; and generally they are at one another's
throats before the lie can be exposed. Lebrun's report was received with
loud applause. No one questioned the accuracy of its details; and these
blind followers of a blind guide unanimously voted that it should be
printed and widely circulated. On 20th December Lebrun sent a copy of it
to Chauvelin, along with instructions which lost none of their emphasis
in the note drawn up at Portman Square. He forwarded another copy of the
report to Noël, with this significant explanation: "This document will
keep you in touch with the ideas of this country and will show you that
I scarcely have this affair in my hands any longer."[157]
This admission is illuminating. The trial of Louis XVI had, as the men
of the Mountain foresaw, placed the Girondin Ministry and its followers
in a most embarrassing position. Many of them inclined to mercy or to
compromises which found little favour with the populace. Accordingly,
the procedure at the trial, as also the final verdict, turned largely on
the desperate efforts of the Jacobins to discredit their rivals, who
sought by all means to keep their foothold in the revolutionary torrent.
One of the most obvious devices was to represent the Executive Council
as the champion of ultra-democratic ideas as against envious and
reactionary England. If this notion gained currency, Lebrun and his
colleagues might hope still to ride on the crest of the wave.
Historical students will remember another occasion when a tottering
Ministry sought to keep pace with public opinion at Paris. The Duc de
Gramont on 12th July 1870 instructed the French ambassador, Benedetti,
to insist on obtaining from King William of Prussia an immediate answer
to a demand that was certain to arouse angry feelings; and he sent to
Benedetti the explanation that public opinion was _outflanking_ the
Ministry, and that "the effervescence of spirits is such that we do not
know whether we shall succeed in mastering it." Thus, twice within
eighty years France was hurried towards the brink of the precipice
because her Foreign Minister could not control an effervescence of
spirits which he himself had helped to excite.
Lebrun's missives of 20th December bore fruit seven days later in
Chauvelin's despatch to Grenville. As this document has often been
printed, only a brief summary need be given here. The French envoy
insisted that the conduct of France towards England had throughout been
correct and conciliatory; but the Executive Council had long observed
with concern the unfriendliness of the British Ministers, and now
pressed its envoy to demand definitely whether they held the position of
a neutral or an enemy. The only possible cause of enmity could be a
misinterpretation of the decree of 19th November, which obviously
applied merely to peoples that demanded the fraternal aid of Frenchmen.
As France wished to respect the independence of England and her allies,
she would not attack the Dutch. The opening of the Scheldt, however, was
a question decided irrevocably by reason and justice, besides being a
matter of small moment; and the British Ministers could not venture to
make it a cause of war. If they did, they would not be supported by the
British people. Chauvelin then demanded an official reply, and expressed
the hope that the British Cabinet would not engage in a war for which it
alone would be responsible and to which the people would not accord its
support.[158]
What Pitt and Grenville thought of Chauvelin's last effort on behalf of
peace will best appear in Grenville's despatch of 28th December to
Auckland at The Hague:
The tone and language of Chauvelin's note of the 27th appear
calculated to accelerate a rupture, and the same conclusion
seems to follow from the circumstance of M. Maret's having
informed Mr. Pitt that it was not intended by the _Conseil
Exécutif_ to charge any private agent with any commission of the
nature which he had himself suggested in his first conference. I
have some reason to believe that it is now intended to bring
forward immediately in Holland the same question of receiving
formal and official communication from the _Conseil Exécutif_. I
trust that the answer will be conformable to opinions
entertained here; and, with the view of avoiding as far as
possible, any difference, however slight, in the expression of
our sentiments, I shall lose no time in sending to Your
Excellency the copy of the answer to M. Chauvelin when it is
settled.
I cannot conclude this dispatch without again urging Your
Excellency to press in the strongest manner possible upon the
Dutch Ministers the necessity of immediately bringing forward
their whole force. It is evident that the present intentions of
France are those of aggression. Whichever of the Allies is first
attacked, there can be no doubt under the present circumstances,
but that they must make common cause in order to render the
calamity of war short, if it is unavoidable. And if the state of
the preparations of the Republic is found inadequate to the
emergency, the attack will certainly be first made there where
least resistance is expected. Every circumstance therefore, of
interest and dignity require [_sic_] that no exertion of which
the Republic can be made capable, should be spared at such a
moment as the present.[159]
Evidently Grenville looked on Chauvelin's note as an ultimatum; and it
is noteworthy that Pitt on 28th December refused to see Chauvelin. Our
Dutch Allies, however, were by no means ready. The separate Admiralties
of the Dutch Provinces had not enough men to equip, still less to man,
their ships; and almost their only defence lay in a British squadron
which set sail for Flushing on or about 29th December.[160]
For the present, then, Pitt and Grenville contented themselves with
sending a stiff rejoinder to Chauvelin's note. Grenville reminded him
that he had no official character in this country since the fall of the
French monarchy, and that the sinister meaning of the decree of 19th
November, as shown in the public reception given at Paris to the
promoters of sedition in this country, was in no wise cleared away by
his recent declaration, which still claimed the right to encourage
disloyalty. With regard to the Scheldt question, Grenville declared
again that it was of the highest importance both in point of fact and of
principle; of fact, because the action of France pre-supposed her
sovereignty of the Low Countries; of principle, because, if passed over,
it would give her the right to abrogate treaties at her will. The desire
of England to preserve strict neutrality in French affairs was
universally acknowledged, and he (Chauvelin) had not urged a single
circumstance in disproof of it. But, England (continued Grenville) "will
never see with indifference that France shall make herself, either
directly or indirectly, sovereign of the Low Countries, or general
arbitress of the rights and liberties of Europe. If France is really
desirous of maintaining friendship and peace with England, she must show
herself disposed to renounce her views of aggression and aggrandisement,
and to confine herself within her own territory, without insulting other
Governments, without disturbing their tranquillity, without violating
their rights."[161]
This stern rebuke to the flippant claim of the French Ministers to
settle the affairs of neighbouring States in accord with their own
principles has often been ascribed to Pitt himself. This is doubtful. I
can find no proof that he intervened directly in the affairs of the
Foreign Office after the accession of Grenville, as he had done in the
days of the Duke of Leeds. Perhaps the austere personality of Grenville
forbade any intervention; or it may be that the two cousins were in so
complete an agreement on principles that Pitt left all details to the
Foreign Minister. Certain it is that he himself remained almost passive
at this time; and all the acts were the acts of Grenville. It was well
known that the two men were in close touch. "I consider his lordship the
same as Mr. Pitt," wrote Miles to Aust.[162]
More important is the question--What were the aims of the British
Government for the settlement of Europe? Fortunately, we are able to
answer this without a shadow of doubt. For on 29th December Grenville
sent off a despatch to Whitworth at St. Petersburg referring to an
effusive offer of alliance from Catharine II. Through Vorontzoff, her
envoy at London, she expressed her admiration of the generous conduct of
George III, and her earnest desire to help him in restoring order to
Europe by means of a concert of the Powers, which might be formed at
London. At the same time she found means to instruct her partisans in
the British Parliament to relax their efforts against the Ministry.[163]
Pitt and Grenville were not dazzled by these proposals. The latter
generously declared to Auckland that he did not believe the Opposition
to be influenced by unpatriotic motives; and he doubted the sincerity of
Catharine's offer.[164] Nevertheless, in view of the imminence of a
French attack on Holland, Grenville decided to encourage the Czarina to
form a league of the Powers; but the instructions which he sent on 29th
December to Whitworth set forth aims very different from hers. He
suggested that the Powers not yet at war should invite the French people
to accept the following terms:
The withdrawing of their arms within the limits of the French
territory: the abandoning their conquests; the rescinding any
acts injurious to the sovereignty or rights of any other
nations; and the giving, in some public and unequivocal manner,
a pledge of their intention no longer to foment troubles and to
excite disturbances against their own Governments. In return for
these stipulations the different Powers of Europe who should be
parties to this measure might engage to abandon all measures or
views of hostility against France or interference in their
internal affairs, and to maintain a correspondence or
intercourse of amity with the existing powers in that country
with whom such a treaty may be concluded. [If, however, France
refuses to give these pledges, then the Powers will take] active
measures to obtain the ends in view, and it may be considered
whether, in such a case, they might not reasonably look to some
indemnity for the expenses and hazards to which they would
necessarily be exposed.[165]
From this remarkable pronouncement it appears that Pitt and Grenville
harboured no hostility to the French Republic as such, provided that it
acted on the principles which it professed up to the end of October
1792. The ensuing acts of aggression and propagandism they unflinchingly
opposed, but in the hope that the combined remonstrances of all the
Powers would induce the French leaders to withdraw their untenable
claims. Above all, the British Cabinet did not refuse eventually to
recognize the new state of things at Paris, a point of view very far
removed from the flaming royalism of Catharine II and Burke. Whether a
concert of the Powers could have been formed on these moderate terms is
very doubtful. What is certain is that Pitt and Grenville saw in it the
chief hope of peace, and that they did not desire to force royalty on
reluctant France. For them the war, if it came, was not a war of
opinion--Monarchy _versus_ Republic. It was a struggle to preserve the
Balance of Power, which in all ages our statesmen had seen to be
incompatible with the sovereignty of France in the Low Countries. That
danger averted, they were content to let France settle her own affairs,
if she behaved with the like tolerance towards her neighbours.
Unhappily, these pacific and enlightened views were not accompanied by
conciliatory manners. It was the bane of Pitt, and still more of
Grenville, that their innate reserve often cooled their friends and
heated their opponents.[166] In the case of so vain and touchy a man as
Chauvelin a little affability would have gone a long way; and this was
especially desirable, as he had enough support at Paris to thwart the
attempt to replace him by some envoy less disliked at St. James's.
Nevertheless, they persisted in their resolve not to recognize him
officially; and the Executive Council made it a point of honour to force
him on the British Court. Personal questions therefore told against a
peaceful settlement. Even at the end of the year 1792 it was not wholly
impossible, provided that the questions in dispute were treated with
open-mindedness and a desire to understand the point of view of the
opponent.
Undoubtedly it was for the French Government to take the first steps
towards reconciliation by retracting or toning down the decrees of 16th
and 19th November and 15th December, which had brought about the crisis.
Further, the Convention ought to have seen through and thwarted the
attempt of Lebrun to regain popularity by insulting Pitt in the report
of 18th December. Had that body been less intent on the party manoeuvres
centring in the trial of Louis XVI, it would assuredly not have
furthered the insidious designs of that Minister. It might have offered
to recall Chauvelin, and to substitute Maret, a man known to be a
_persona grata_ to Pitt. Finally, in view of the large concourse of
Frenchmen now in London, reckoned at 15,000, the Executive Council would
have done well to say nothing about the passing of the Aliens Bill,
obviously a precautionary measure called for by the emergency.[167]
The French Ministers took exactly the contrary course. On 30th December
they decided that Chauvelin should demand the withdrawal of that
measure, as contrary to the treaty of 1786; failing this, France would
declare that compact at an end. They also began to prepare for an
invasion of England, on a plan which came before them on 28th December;
and on the last day of the year, Monge, Minister for the Navy, issued a
circular letter to Friends of Liberty and Equality in the seaports. It
contained passages to the following effect:
The English Government is arming, and the King of Spain,
encouraged by this, is preparing to attack us. These two
tyrannical Powers, after persecuting the patriots on their own
territories, think no doubt that they will be able to influence
the judgment to be pronounced on the traitor, Louis. They hope
to frighten us; but no! a people which has made itself free, a
people which has driven out of the bosom of France, and as far
as the distant borders of the Rhine, the terrible army of the
Prussians and Austrians--the people of France will not suffer
laws to be dictated to them by any tyrant. The King and his
Parliament mean to make war upon us. Will the English
republicans suffer it? Already these free men show their
discontent and the repugnance which they have to bear arms
against their brothers, the French. Well! We will fly to their
succour. We will make a descent in the island. We will lodge
there 50,000 caps of Liberty. We will plant there the sacred
tree, and we will stretch out our arms to our republican
brethren. The tyranny of their Government will soon be
destroyed.
What did the famous mathematician think of this effusion in the heyday
of the Empire, when he became Count of Pelusium with a Westphalian
estate bringing in 200,000 francs a year? A collection of the frank
confessions of the _ci-devant_ Jacobins would form an entertaining
volume.
Not the least piquant of them would be the criticisms of a Breton
captain, Kersaint, on the bellicose speech which he launched at the
Convention on 1st January 1793. Admitting that Pitt really wanted peace,
while Fox only desired to abase his rival, he averred that the Prime
Minister would try to arrest France in her rapid career of land conquest
either by a naval war or by an armed mediation. War, said Kersaint, must
result, were it only from the perplexities of Pitt and the hatred of
George III for the French Republic. France, then, must threaten to free
the Scottish and Irish nations which England had so long oppressed. The
Republic could appeal with telling effect to the English sailors not to
fight against the champions of the Rights of Man. Further, France need
not fear the British Empire; for it is vulnerable in every sea, on all
the continental markets, while France stands four-square, rooted in her
fertile soil. Let them, then, attack the sources of British wealth which
are easily assailable. "The credit of England rests upon fictitious
wealth, the real riches of that people are scattered everywhere....
Asia, Portugal and Spain are the best markets for English products....
We must attack Lisbon and the Brazils, and carry an auxiliary army to
Tippoo Sultan." As for Spain (continued Kersaint) she could be paralysed
by the revolutionizing of Spanish America--the suggestion of Miranda to
Dumouriez. In fact, Frenchmen need not fear war with all Governments.
Open enmity was better than neutrality. This war would "regulate the
destiny of nations and found the liberty of the world." Accordingly he
proposed to offer to England either war or an alliance; to equip thirty
sail of the line and twenty-four frigates; and to form a Committee of
General Defence. The Convention assented to this last and referred the
other questions to it.
Thus opened the terrible year, 1793. The circular letter of Monge and
the speech of Kersaint furnished the weather-gauge for the future. In
them we detect the mental exaltation, the boundless daring, the
overwrought conviction of their neighbours' weakness, which were to
carry Frenchmen up to bewildering heights of glory and overwhelm them in
final disaster. We behold in awful perspective the conquest of Holland,
Italy, and Central Europe, the Irish Rebellion, the Egyptian Expedition,
the war on British commerce, culminating in the Continental System, with
its ensuing campaigns in Spain and Russia, and the downfall of Napoleon.
All this and more can be seen dimly, as in a crystal globe, in that
fateful phrase of Kersaint--"The credit of England rests upon fictitious
wealth."
* * * * *
Turning to the last details that preceded the declaration of war, we
notice that on 7th January Chauvelin, acting on the order of Lebrun,
sent in a sharp protest against the Aliens Bill as an infraction of
Pitt's Treaty of Commerce of 1786. On one count Chauvelin certainly had
a right to complain; for, strange to say, the Act was put in operation
against Talleyrand, nominally his adviser, and the champion of the
Anglo-French _entente_. The ex-Bishop of Autun penned an eloquent
protest, which apparently had some effect, for he was not expelled until
March 1794.[168] Far more incisive was Chauvelin's complaint. We can
imagine his feelings when Grenville curtly declined to receive it.[169]
At the same time Grenville refused to discuss or explain the stoppage of
certain cargoes of grain destined for French ports. His private
correspondence with Auckland shows that this measure was due to the fear
that the French would store the corn for the use of the army that was
threatening Holland. That motive of course could not be disclosed to
Chauvelin; and Grenville declined to explain it at all until the
resolutions arrived at in Paris were clearly set forth.
On Sunday, 13th January, Chauvelin received from Lebrun a long despatch,
drawn up in less provoking terms than the last. He sought an informal
interview with Grenville, which was immediately granted. Grenville's
hitherto unpublished account of the interview may be quoted in full, as
it enables us to see the _nuances_ of the situation:
_Jan. 13, 1793._[170]
M. Chauvelin as soon as he came into my room began by stating
that he was desirous of explaining that all his steps subsequent
to the date of my letter of Dec. 31 had been taken in
consequence of positive instructions from the _Conseil
Exécutif_, given before they had received that letter. That they
had seen in that letter one thing which had been satisfactory to
them, notwithstanding the other things of which they might
complain--this was the assurance which enabled them to reject
the idea entertained by some persons in France of its being the
intention of the Government here to declare war at all events.
Under this assurance they had authorized him to give to their
answer a form which was not liable to the exceptions which had
before been taken. He then gave me the despatch from M. Le Brun.
When I had read it I told him only that the circumstances were
too critical for me to say anything as to its contents except to
refer him to the answer which I should be [_sic_] to give to it.
He then said that there was one other point which he was
desirous of mentioning. That one of the difficulties of the
present situation of the two Countries was the want of a proper
channel of communication. That he himself, from having no access
to the King's Ministers, was frequently unable to give accounts
of their real views and intentions. That he was therefore to
desire the permission to see me often _sous la même forme_ that
he had now come [_sic_].
I told him that this was a point on which I was unwilling to
take upon myself personally to give him an answer; but that he
should have one; and in order to avoid mistakes I repeated to
him the phrase, that his request was to see me _sous la même
forme_. He said "yes," and that this was conceived to be a means
of arriving sooner at the object of his being allowed to
present to the King the _lettres de créance_ with which he was
charged. As he did not express this quite distinctly, I asked
him again whether I understood him right; that his present
request was only to communicate under the form in which he now
came. He again assented to this, but in doing it threw out that
he had _almost_ had direct orders from the _Conseil Exécutif_ to
apply for permission to present his letters. He however
expressly assented to my statement that the other was at present
his only request.
Nothing else material passed, except justifications of himself
from the imputation of treating on public business with some
persons in this country with whom he had connections of private
friendship and intercourse, and complaints of the manner in
which he was treated in the newspapers. To neither of these
points I said anything.[171]
It is not surprising that Grenville asked for time to consult his
colleagues (probably also the King) before returning an answer to
Lebrun's missive; for, though unobjectionable in form, it re-affirmed
the French claims and justified all the proceedings of that Government.
Lebrun accused the Pitt Cabinet of raising difficulties of form and of
discovering hostile intentions where none existed. While repudiating the
notion of annexing Belgium, he firmly adhered to the Scheldt decree.
France, he declared, would respond to all appeals which emanated from
the general will of a nation, and he even asserted that she could treat
only with a Government which "is deemed the organ of the general will of
the nation governed." If her efforts for peace failed, she would fight
England with regret but without fear.[172]
In effect, then, this despatch held out no hope of a reconciliation.
There came with it, however, a long and rambling letter from Maret to
Miles, which was intended partly to threaten, partly to cajole the
Ministry. In its more dulcet passages the hope was set forth that the
Scheldt affair could be settled, and even that Chauvelin might be
replaced by the estimable Barthélemy. Miles, highly elated, hurried to
the Foreign Office on that momentous Sunday, 13th January, and found
that a Cabinet meeting was proceeding. Pitt came out and cordially
received Maret's note. He returned to the Cabinet meeting (at which,
strange to say, Burke was present) but came out again "furious,
freighted with the bile of the whole Cabinet," and forbade Miles to have
any dealings with the French Executive Council.[173]
How are we to explain this change from affability to anger? The
impressionable Miles believed that in that hour Pitt capitulated to
Burke and became a man of war. The reader who takes the trouble to
compare Lebrun's note with that of Maret will probably come to another
conclusion, namely, that the latter seems very like a device to throw
the British Ministry off its guard. The terms of the two notes are
widely divergent; and, in such a case, Pitt naturally accepted that of
Lebrun and scouted that of Maret, as of a busybody or an intriguer.
Grenville objected to this double-dealing;[174] and probably the
presence of Burke at the Cabinet meeting sharpened the demand for its
cessation.
Another explanation of Pitt's fury is possible. Grenville and he may
have received news of the warlike preparations going on in the French
seaports and on the Dutch borders. I have found no proof of this; but it
is certain that by this time they must have had before them the
inflammatory appeal of Monge to French and English Jacobins as well as
the boastful tirade of Kersaint to the Convention. Having these proofs
of the warlike ardour of the French and of their reliance on British
reformers, how could Pitt and Grenville look on the philanthropic
professions of Maret as anything but a snare, and Miles as his dupe?
Miles had ever been officious. Clearly the time had come to stop his
fussy advances to an unofficial agent, which Lebrun might once more
ascribe to Pitt's secret fear of France.
It would be interesting to discover how far Pitt and Grenville were at
this time aware of the secret designs of the French Executive Council.
On this topic I have found no definite evidence. It is very unlikely
that on 13th January they knew of the aggressive plans which the
Executive Council had formed three days before. But it is certain that
such plans were set on foot on 10th January. On that day the Executive
Council drew up secret orders for Generals Dumouriez and Miranda. The
former was then at Paris concerting plans for the next campaign, not
for the purpose of saving Louis XVI, as he afterwards stated. Whether he
fanned the warlike ardour of the Executive Council will perhaps never be
known. But undoubtedly on 10th January the Executive Council bade him
order his lieutenant, Miranda, to prepare for the invasion of Dutch
Flanders and Walcheren within twelve days. Furnaces were to be supplied
to the French gun-vessels in the Scheldt so as to beat off the frigates,
whether English or Dutch is not stated.[175]
Why did not Miranda carry out this plan? Merely because he had neither
stores nor food[176]--a fact which justifies the British Government in
placing an embargo on the corn intended for France. Undoubtedly if he
had had supplies, Miranda would have seized the lands at the mouth of
the Scheldt, and cut off the retreat of the Stadholder to his place of
refuge, Walcheren. It will further be observed that these orders were
given at Paris three days after the despatch of Lebrun's and Maret's
notes to London. The design apparently was to amuse England until a
deadly blow could be struck at the Dutch. Auckland, writing on the 11th
at The Hague, expressed to Grenville the hope that war might be avoided,
or, if that were impossible, that the rupture should be postponed until
the Austrians and Prussians had re-crossed the Rhine. The preparations
of the Dutch were going on with the usual slowness.[177] Evidently the
French Government counted on their traditional inertia and on the
malcontents in Great Britain and Ireland. The private letters of Maret,
that _soi-disant_ friend of peace, breathe full assurance of
victory.[178]
Grenville of course sent no answer to the last missive of Maret; but to
Lebrun he replied, on 18th January, that his explanations were wholly
unsatisfactory, as they maintained the right of the Executive Council to
annul treaties at will. Until satisfaction were granted for the
aggressions on His Majesty's ally, he would continue to take all
measures needful for their common safety. The terms of this reply were
doubtless due to the last news received from Paris. On 12th January the
arch-intriguer, Brissot, had fired off at the Convention a warlike
harangue in which he depicted the British Ministry as helpless in the
midst of a discontented populace and without a friend in the world.
France could therefore easily arouse Ireland and Scotland to revolt,
besides carrying liberty to India.[179] On the following day the
Convention ordered the equipment of 30 sail-of-the-line and 20 frigates,
and the construction of 25 sail-of-the-line and 20 frigates.
On his side Chauvelin saw the rupture to be imminent. In forwarding
Grenville's despatch to Lebrun on the 19th he described his situation in
London as intolerable, and added that no alternative but war was left.
His assistant, Reinhard, ended a letter of that day to Miles with the
words "_M. Chauvelin leaves_." That resolve must have been strengthened
by Grenville's haughty note of the 20th, stating that no special means
could be taken to protect his couriers and that he must rank "among the
general mass of foreigners resident in England." On the same day
Grenville informed Sir James Murray, who had gone on a special mission
to the Prussian headquarters, that war was likely to break out, as
France "insists on terms entirely inconsistent with the Government of
this country and His Majesty's dignity and honour." His Majesty is
strenuously making preparations and hopes to concert plans with Prussia
and Austria.[180]
Such was the state of affairs on 21st January, when Louis XVI laid his
head on the block in the Place de la Révolution. The news of this
tragedy reached London late in the afternoon of the 23rd; and the horror
which it aroused led to a demand at the Haymarket that the farce should
be put off. On the advice of the Cabinet George III now intervened. At a
Court held on the morrow at the Queen's House (on the site of Buckingham
Palace) an order was issued that Chauvelin, as the envoy deputed by
Louis XVI, should leave the country on or before 1st February. But on or
before 25th January, that is, before the news of this mandate can have
reached Paris, Lebrun had decided to recall the French mission from
London. On 25th January he wrote to Monsieur Greenville [_sic_] stating
that, as his plenipotentiary, Chauvelin, had orders to return to Paris,
Maret would proceed to London to look after the papers at the French
Embassy. This statement merits attention; for it shows that Chauvelin's
departure was hastened only a day or two by the King's command;[181]
and further it refutes the oft-repeated assertion that Maret came
charged with offers of peace to which Pitt and Grenville paid no heed.
It will be well to examine this latter question somewhat closely. In
order to understand the situation at Paris, we must remember that
Dumouriez was at that time hesitating between an attack on Holland and a
pacific mission to England. On 23rd January, while at Paris, he wrote
two very significant letters, one to Miranda, the other to Auckland. In
the former he states: "The Executive Council ... has thought of sending
me as special ambassador to England to make that country decide
definitely for peace or war. Consequently _an order has been given for
our ambassador, Chauvelin, to return_. To-morrow they will send a secret
agent [Maret], very well known to Mr. Pitt and Mr. Fox, to ask the two
parties (that is to say the whole nation) for a safe-conduct for me and
an assurance that I shall be welcome. As I have to ask for _yes_ or
_no_, like Cato at Carthage, this mission will not last more than eight
days." Pending the reply to the first question (says Dumouriez) he will
set out for Dunkirk, Bruges, and Antwerp. His second letter, of the same
date, is to Auckland at The Hague, stating that he knows him to be
desirous of peace, as he himself is. Can they not have an interview on
the Dutch frontier, near Antwerp, where he will be on 30th January?[182]
Now it is clear from Grenville's and Auckland's correspondence that
Ministers paid some heed to the offer of Dumouriez. Nothing came of it
owing to the arrival of news of the French declaration of war; but the
proposal was at least considered.[183] There is not a line to show that
Pitt and Grenville took Maret's so-called "mission" at all seriously.
For, in the first place, he had no powers, no authority to do anything
more than collect the papers of the embassy. He himself gave out to
Miles that he came on a "pacific mission," but he carefully refrained
from telling even him what it was.[184] His biographer, Ernouf, has
invested his journey to London with some importance by declaring that on
22nd January he (Maret) drew up and sent off a "despatch" to Chauvelin,
stating that the French Executive Council desired peace, and that he was
coming as _chargé d'affaires_ to the French Embassy in London. This
missive (whether signed by Lebrun is not stated) met Chauvelin on his
way from London to Dover; but it produced no change whatever in his
plans. He proceeded on his way to Paris, passing Maret in the night near
Abbeville. To assign much importance to his "despatch" is to overrate
both his errand and his position at Paris. Maret was only one of the
head clerks at the French Foreign Office and had no right to sign
official despatches. If he really was charged by Lebrun to tender the
olive-branch, why was not that despatch sent to London in a form and
manner which would procure credence and have some effect? Again, if
Maret came to restore peace, why did he not at once produce his powers?
The question was infinitely important and undeniably urgent. Instead of
taking decisive action, as any well-wisher of mankind must have done at
so awful a crisis, he declined to enter into particulars, and, on the
plea that Chauvelin was ordered to Paris (which he himself knew before
he left that city) waited for further instructions--which never came.
Finally he confessed to Miles that he came to prepare the way for
Dumouriez and to discover whether that general would be assured of
personal safety if he came to England.
Parturiunt montes, nascetur ridiculus mus.
Such must have been the thought of Miles, when he heard this singular
admission. For what trust could be placed in Dumouriez, whose conquest
of Belgium--the source of the present difficulties--had by no means
sated his desire for its natural sequel, the conquest of Holland? That
Maret had credentials of some kind may be admitted; for he showed them
to Miles and claimed to be _chargé d'affaires_; but, as Miles found his
powers to be "extremely limited,"[185] we may doubt whether they
extended beyond the collection and transport of the archives of Portman
Square. If he had any authority to treat with our Government, it is
curious that he refrained from doing so merely on the ground of
Chauvelin's departure. "Apprehensive that this event might derange what
had been agreed upon, he despatched a messenger with a letter to Lebrun
stating that _under the present circumstances, he should not think
himself authorized to communicate with the British Ministers without
fresh instructions_."[186]
Notwithstanding the urgency of the case, he received not a line, not
even a newspaper, from Paris during his stay in London. In fact, the
_soi-disant "chargé d'affaires"_ of France knew so little of the real
state of affairs that he assured Miles of the desire of his countrymen
to give up Nice, Mainz, Worms, the Rhineland, the Scheldt, and the Low
Countries[187]--at the very time (31st January) when Danton carried
unanimously a decree annexing the Low Countries to the French Republic.
The explanation of the silence of Maret and the ambiguous conduct of
Dumouriez may be found in the Memoirs of the latter. He states that a
proposal came up in the French Executive Council at Paris on 22nd
January to send him to London; but it was negatived by three votes to
two. Nevertheless, he arranged with the minority (Lebrun and Garat) that
he should go to Antwerp and have _pourparlers_ with Auckland preparatory
to a mission to England, while Maret returned to London to pave the way
for him.[188] The scheme was a private venture, proposed by Dumouriez,
and favoured only by the minority of the Council. In such a case neither
Dumouriez nor Maret could be invested with official functions; and it
was only a last despairing effort for peace that led Maret to pose as a
_chargé d'affaires_ and write to Paris for "fresh instructions." This
praiseworthy device did not altogether impose even on Miles, who clearly
was puzzled by the air of mystery that his friend assumed.
In view of the facts now set forth, can we blame Pitt and Grenville for
declining to treat with Maret? He brought with him no proof that he had
any other function than that of taking over the archives of the French
embassy. Grenville stated to Auckland that Maret's presence caused much
dabbling in the funds, and that his presence was most undesirable if
Dumouriez really intended to treat for peace. Pitt afterwards assured
the House of Commons that Maret had not made the smallest communication
to Ministers.[189] Evidently they looked on him as an unofficial
emissary, to which level Chauvelin had persistently endeavoured to
degrade him.
Finally, on 4th February, Grenville ordered Maret to leave the country.
By this time news had arrived from Paris that France had laid an embargo
on British ships in her ports; and this portended more serious news. By
that time the die was cast. On 31st January Danton carried the
Convention with him in a fiery speech, crowned with that gigantic
phrase--"Let us fling down to the Kings the head of a King as gage of
battle"; then, in defiance of the well-known facts of the case, he urged
the deputies to decree an act of political union with the Belgians, who
were already one at heart with them. On the following day the Convention
confirmed this aggressive action by unanimously decreeing war against
Great Britain and Holland. By so doing the deputies of France merely
endorsed the decision formed by the Executive Council on 10th January.
* * * * *
The outbreak of war between France and England is an event so fraught
with momentous issues to Pitt, to the two Powers, and to the whole
world, that I have striven to set forth as fully as possible every
incident, every misunderstanding, every collision of interests or
feelings, that brought it to pass. No episode in the development of the
nations of Europe is so tragic as this. That two peoples should, within
the space of nine months, abjure their friendly relations and furiously
grapple in a life and death struggle over questions of secondary
importance leads the dazed beholder at first to grope after the old
Greek idea of +atê+ or Nemesis. In reality the case does not call for
supernatural agency. The story is pitiably human, if the student will
but master its complex details. It may be well to close our study with a
few general observations, though they almost necessarily involve the
risk of over-statement.
Firstly, the position of absolute neutrality which Pitt took up from the
beginning of the troubles in France was extremely difficult to maintain
amidst the rising passions of the year 1792. The Franco-Austrian war
soon led to a situation in which the future conduct of the neutral
aroused far more suspicion, and scarcely less hatred, than that of the
enemy himself. When brains reeled with rage against tyrants; when cheeks
flushed at the thought of the woes of Marie Antoinette, correct
neutrality seemed inhuman. In an age that vibrated to the appeals of
Madame Roland and Burke, cold passivity aroused doubt or contempt. Yet
it is certain that Pitt and Grenville clung to that position, even when
its difficulties increased tenfold with the fall of the monarchy and the
September massacres. Lebrun, on coming into office after the former of
those events, was careful to inform his countrymen that the withdrawal
of the British ambassador was not an unfriendly act, and that England
was making no preparations for war. Later on he chose to represent
Pitt's conduct as persistently unfriendly; but his earlier words prove
the contrary.
Again, was it practicable (as Fox claimed) for Pitt to forbid Austria
and Prussia to coalesce against France? Probably it was not possible,
without bringing Russia and Sweden into the field on the royalist side.
In the excited state of men's minds, an act so annoying as that of armed
mediation would have widened the circle of war; and, as we have seen, it
was the belief of Pitt and Grenville, in August-September 1792, that the
continental war might probably end from the inability of the combatants
to continue it. No one at that time foresaw the easy conquest of Savoy
and the Low Countries by the French troops. In one of the few references
to foreign affairs in Pitt's letters of the month following, we find him
stating that if France conquers and keeps Savoy, a new situation will
arise.[190] But he remained passive while the French drove the Sardinian
troops from Savoy; and his whole conduct at this time moved Burke to
indignation, if not despair. So late as 6th November Grenville expressed
to Auckland his firm belief in the policy of strict neutrality.[191]
What was it, then, that blighted these hopes? The answer must be that
the French victory of Jemappes (6th November) and the phenomenally easy
conquest of the Austrian Netherlands speedily brought about a new and
most threatening situation. It has been usual to say, with Goethe, that
Valmy was the birth of a new age. Far more truly may we say so of
Jemappes and its immediate results. That decisive triumph and the
welcome accorded by the liberated Belgians opened up vistas of
beneficent triumph that set the brain of France in a whirl. Hence the
decrees of 16th November-15th December, which tear to pieces the old
diplomacy, and apply to astonished Europe the gospel of Rousseau. In
place of musty treaties there will be Social Contracts; instead of
States there will be nations that will speak straight to one another's
heart. They do speak: English Radical Clubs speak to the heart of
France, the Convention; and Grégoire, President of that body, makes
answer that if the rulers of England threaten the delegates and their
comrades, Frenchmen will cross the Straits and fly to their help--"Come,
generous Britons," he cries, "let us all confederate for the welfare of
Humanity."[192] In the new age, then, political life will be a series of
_tableaux_ from the gospel of Rousseau. To the true believer there can
be no compromise. Relics of old-world customs, such as the closing of
the Scheldt by the Dutch, must vanish. Here, as elsewhere, Nature will
infallibly guide men aright.
It was the application of these principles to our ally, the Dutch
Republic, which Pitt refused to accept, especially as their corollary
made for the aggrandisement of France. In his eyes international law
imposed stringent obligations, which no one State, or nation, had the
right to revoke. Old world theories of life, when rudely assailed at
Paris, moved their champions to an enthusiasm scarcely less keen than
that of the Jacobins. Britons who fraternized with the new hierophants
were counted traitors to their King. Moreover, by a most unfortunate
coincidence, the British Government publicly announced its resolve to
support the Dutch Republic on the very day when the French Convention
passed the first of its subversive decrees. Thus, national pride came
sharply into conflict. Neither side could give way without seeming to
betray alike its principles and its honour.
Personal questions played a baneful part in embittering the feud. Pitt
and Grenville shrouded themselves in their insular and innate austerity.
They judged the English Radical clubs too harshly; they ascribed to
those who congratulated the Convention on 28th November treasonable
aims which can scarcely have arisen in England when the addresses were
drawn up. Apart from frothy republican talk, which should have been
treated with quiet contempt, those congratulations contained no sign of
consciousness that France was about to challenge us to conflict. We may
admit that Frost and Barlow showed great tactlessness in presenting
those addresses when friction between the two nations had already begun;
for the incident, besides stiffening the necks of Frenchmen, gave the
Reform movement an appearance of disloyalty to England which worked
infinite harm. Nevertheless, on reviewing these questions, we see that
Pitt treated the foolish ebullitions of youth as though they implied
malice.
Surely, too, he, and still more Grenville, were unwise in placing
Chauvelin under a political and social ban, which naturally led him to
consort with the bitterest enemies of Government in order to annoy
Ministers here and please his employers at Paris. A touchy and sensitive
nature like Chauvelin's is usually open to the soothing influences of
flattery. Grenville, however, drove him to open enmity, which finally
wreaked its revenge;[193] for it was Chauvelin's report on the readiness
of Britons to revolt which finally decided the Convention to declare war
on 1st February. We may also inquire why the Court of St. James's did
not make clear the course of conduct which it proposed to take in the
future respecting France.[194] As outlined in the despatch of 29th
December to Whitworth, it formed the basis of a practicable compromise.
If it could be stated confidentially to Russia, Austria, and Prussia,
why not to France? Probably the objections of George III to the faintest
sign of recognition of the French Republic[195] account for the fact
that these enlightened intentions remained, down to the year 1800,
secret except to those Powers. But statesmen err when they bury their
good intentions in the secrecy of archives and allow public opinion to
sympathize with the enemy. Here was Pitt's most serious blunder. At the
outset of the struggle, and throughout its course, he scorned those
tactful arts and melodramatic ways which win over waverers and inspire
the fainthearted. Here he showed himself not a son of Chatham, but a
Grenville. The results of this frigidity were disastrous. All Frenchmen
and many Britons believed that he went out of his way to assail a
peaceful Republic in order to crush liberty abroad and at home. History
has exposed the falseness of the slander; but a statesman ought not to
owe his vindication to research in archives. He needs whole-hearted
support in the present more than justification by students.
In this respect Pitt showed less of worldly wisdom than the journalists
and barristers who leaped to power at Paris. Their chief source of
strength lay in skilful appeals to popular passion. In reality their
case was untenable before any calm and judicial tribunal. But the France
of that age was anything but calm and judicial. It lived on enthusiasm
and sensation; and the Girondins and Jacobins fed it almost to
repletion. Unfortunately Danton, the only man who combined strength with
some insight into statecraft, was away in Belgium while the crisis
developed; and the conduct of affairs rested mainly with Lebrun and his
envoy Chauvelin. It is only fair to remember that they were thirty and
twenty-seven years of age respectively, and had had just four months and
eight months of official experience. In such a case pity must blend with
censure. The frightful loss of experienced men and the giddy preference
for new-comers were among the most fatal characteristics of the
revolutionary movement. Needing natures that were able, yet
self-restrained, bold, but cautiously bold, it now found as leaders
calculating fanatics like Robespierre, headstrong orators and
wire-pullers like the Girondin leaders, or lucky journalists like
Lebrun. To play to the gallery was his first instinct; and the tottering
fortunes of the Gironde made it almost a necessity. Hence his refusal
and that of his colleagues to draw back a hair's breadth from the
unjustifiable position which they had taken up. Behind them loomed the
September massacres, fatal to two Foreign Ministers of France; before
them shone the splendours of a liberating crusade. We can scarcely blame
men so ardent, so hard pressed.
But there are some rules of the game which even the most irresponsible
of Ministers must observe. Here both Chauvelin and Lebrun went fatally
astray. Chauvelin's _pique_ at the interview which Pitt had with Maret
on 2nd December led him flagrantly to misrepresent that incident, and
Lebrun, as we have seen, reported it to the Convention in such a way as
to impute to Pitt a discreditable and cowardly intrigue. This is the
climax of malice. An envoy and a Minister who scatter such insinuations
are the most reckless of firebrands. By this conduct both Lebrun and
Chauvelin inflamed the passions of their countrymen. In truth, it was
passion, not policy, that made the war. The charges which they brought
against England were of secondary importance--her demand for the
revocation of the decrees concerning the Scheldt and the encouragement
offered to malcontents, together with her stoppage of corn ships lading
for France, and her Aliens Bill. Such were the pretexts for the recall
of Chauvelin, which, as we have seen, was decided at Paris before the
Court of St. James's determined to dismiss him.
Another fact comes out clearly from a survey of the evidence given
above, namely, that the execution of Louis XVI was in no sense the cause
of the war. The question turned essentially on the conduct of France
towards our Dutch Allies. Before Louis was put on his trial Pitt and
Grenville had decided that the French must retract their aggressive
decree against Holland, backed up as it was by a claim to support
malcontents in any land. Failing this, war would have ensued, even if
Louis had not been condemned to death. The tragedy of 21st January made
no difference to the issue; for, as we have seen, the French Government
by 10th January decided to push on its plans against the Dutch Republic.
It is also impossible to attach any importance to the vague offers of
Dumouriez and Maret, at which Lebrun connived probably so as to be able
to say, without committing himself in the least, that he had done all he
could for peace.
We may therefore conclude that the wealth and defencelessness of the
Dutch Netherlands lured on the enthusiasts and intriguers of Paris to an
enterprise the terrible results of which were unsuspected by them.
Nothing is more remarkable than the full assurance of victory which
breathes in the letters of Dumouriez, the despatches of Lebrun, and the
speeches of the French deputies. Experienced statesmen were soon to
stand aghast at the triumph of the Republican arms; but it fell short of
the hopes of the French politicians. In this boundless self-confidence,
sublime were it not so disastrous, is to be found the chief cause of war
in 1793.
FOOTNOTES:
[138] Miles, "Corresp.," i, 385-7.
[139] B.M. Add. MSS., 34446.
[140] Pitt MSS., 245. Published in "Napoleon and the Invasion of
England," by H. E. Wheeler and A. M. Broadley, ii, App.
[141] "Malmesbury Diaries," ii, 475.
[142] "Parl. Hist.," xxx, 19-21.
[143] Miles ("Corresp.," i, 391), who also asserts that Sheridan echoed
words used by the French agent, Noël.
[144] "Malmesbury Diaries," ii, 478-81.
[145] "Life and Letters of Earl Minto," ii, 82.
[146] Chuquet, "Jemappes," 196-7, shows that the urgent needs of the
army in Belgium were the _raison d'être_ of the decree.
[147] "Dropmore P.," ii, 359-62; "Parl. Hist.," xxx, 126.
[148] "Parl. Hist.," xxx, 137-46.
[149] "Méms. tirés des Papiers d'un homme d'Etat," ii, 100. This false
assertion was adopted by Malouet ("Méms.," ii, 201), whence it has been
copied largely, without examination of the debate itself.
[150] Godoy, "Mems.," i, ch. vi.
[151] "F. O.," Spain, 25, 26.
[152] "F. O.," France, 40.
[153] "F. O.," France, 40, 41.
[154] Miles, "Corresp.," i, 398-400. Unfortunately, Lord Acton ("Lects.
on the French Rev.," 253) accepted the stories against Pitt. He states
that Danton secretly offered to save Louis for £40,000; that Lansdowne,
Sheridan, and Fox urged Pitt to interpose; and that Pitt informed Maret
that he did not do so because the execution of Louis would ruin the
Whigs. I must reply that Lord Fitzmaurice assures me there is no sign
that the first Lord Lansdowne urged Pitt to bribe the Convention, though
in the debate of 21st December 1792 he suggested the sending an
ambassador to Paris to improve the relations of the two lands, and
assuage the hostility to Louis. Further, Danton could scarcely have made
that offer; for he left Paris for Belgium on 1st December, and did not
return till 14th January, after which he was engrossed in the last
illness of his wife. Danton's name was dragged into the affair probably
by mistake for Dannon (see Belloc, "Danton," 200). Lastly, as Maret left
London on 19th December, and did not return until 30th January, he did
not see Pitt at the crucial time of the trial. And would Pitt have made
so damaging a remark to a Frenchman? Is it not obviously a Whig slander?
[155] "Parl. Hist.," xxx, 189. See ch. iii of this work.
[156] See ch. iii for a refutation of this.
[157] Sorel, iii, 241. So, too, Gouverneur Morris, then in Paris,
thought the French Ministers, despite their bluster, wished to avoid war
"if the people will let them." (Quoted by Lecky, vi, 114.)
[158] "Parl. Hist.," xxx, 250-3; "Ann. Reg." (1793), 114-16.
[159] B.M. Add. MSS., 34446.
[160] _Ibid._, and "Dropmore P.," ii, 361.
[161] "Parl. Hist.," xxx, 253-6; "Ann. Reg." (1793), 116-9.
[162] Miles, "Corresp.," i, 351.
[163] "Dropmore P.," ii, 363.
[164] B.M. Add. MSS., 34446.
[165] B.M. Add. MSS., 34446. Grenville to Whitworth, 29th December.
[166] Miles, "Corresp.," i, 441.
[167] _Ibid._, i, 439.
[168] I published it in the "Eng. Hist. Rev." for April 1906; see, too,
Fitzmaurice, "Shelburne," iii, 515. Bulwer Lytton, "Hist. Characters"
(Talleyrand), wrongly states that he was at once expelled.
[169] "Ann. Reg.," 122-5; "Parl Hist.," xxx, 259-61; Miles, "Corresp.,"
ii, 4.
[170] "F. O.," France, 41.
[171] Whether Chauvelin was guilty of any worse offence than
entertaining at his house the editors of Opposition newspapers (Miles,
"Corresp.," i, 440) is not proven. Maret admitted to Miles that some
scoundrels were sowing sedition in England; but he added the not very
comforting assurance that, in that case, they would cease to be
Frenchmen. Miles evidently believed those intrigues to be the work of
French emissaries, (_Ibid._, 450, 451).
[172] "Parl. Hist.," xxx, 262-6; "Ann. Reg.," 119-22.
[173] Miles, "Corresp.," ii, 28-36, 42. See, too, Sorel, iii, 258, on
Maret's letter.
[174] "Dropmore P.," ii, 366; but see Miles, "Corresp.," ii, 43, 44.
[175] "Corresp. du Gén. Miranda avec le Gén. Dumouriez ... depuis
janvier 1793," 3-8. See "Dropmore P.," ii, 371, on Dumouriez' plan.
[176] _Ibid._, 8.
[177] "Dropmore P.," ii, 365.
[178] Miles, ii, 36.
[179] "Gower's Despatches," 278.
[180] B.M. Add. MSS., 34447.
[181] "F. O.," France, 41. The order to Chauvelin must have been given
earlier, probably on 22nd January, as will be seen by Dumouriez' letter
to Miranda soon to be quoted. George III's order of 24th January
(endorsed by Pitt) for Chauvelin's expulsion cannot have the importance
which Mr. J. L. le B. Hammond ("Fox," 262-3) assigns to it. See "Pitt
and Napoleon Miscellanies" for Lebrun's letter to Grenville.
[182] Published in "Dumouriez, etc.," 159, 160, by J. H. Rose and A. M.
Broadley, from B.M. Add. MSS., 34447.
[183] Lecky, vi, 119-22.
[184] Miles, "Corresp.," ii, 55.
[185] Miles, "Conduct of France towards Great Britain," 108; "Corresp.,"
ii, 62.
[186] Miles, "Conduct of France towards Great Britain," 108.
[187] Miles, "Corresp.," ii, 62.
[188] Dumouriez, "Méms.," ii, 128-31 (edit. of 1794).
[189] "Parl. Hist.," xxx, 350. Fox admitted (p. 371) that Maret did not
think himself authorized to negotiate. See, too, Bland Burges in
"Auckland Journals," ii, 493. I cannot agree with Mr. Oscar Browning
("Varennes, etc.," 198), and Mr. J. L. le B. Hammond ("Fox," 258) as to
the importance of Maret's "mission." Lecky (vi, 126) also overrates it,
in my judgement.
[190] "Dropmore P.," ii, 322.
[191] "Auckland Journals," ii, 465.
[192] "Moniteur," 29th November 1792.
[193] Maret stated that "M. Chauvelin had shamefully deceived the
Executive Council, and that nothing but misrepresentations and
falsehoods had marked his despatches since he lost all hope of remaining
in this country" (Miles, "Corresp.," ii, 62).
[194] Wilberforce urged this ("Life," ii, 13).
[195] "Dropmore P.," ii, 339, 351, 378.
CHAPTER V
THE FLEMISH CAMPAIGN (1793)
The war is not only unavoidable, but, under the circumstances of
the case, absolutely necessary to the existence of Great Britain
and Europe.--PITT, _Speech of 11th March, 1793_.
In this chapter and the following, dealing with phases of the Great War,
the narrative may seem at times to diverge far from the life of Pitt.
But, in truth, his career now depended upon the issue of this gigantic
strife. Therefore an account merely of his domestic concerns, of the
debates at Westminster, or even of British and Irish affairs, would be a
one-sided and superficial sketch. For in reality his destiny, together
with that of Great Britain and of Europe at large, turned upon the
events that unfolded themselves in Flanders and the Rhineland, at Toulon
and Quiberon, in Hayti, Corsica, and Egypt. As these in their turn were
potently influenced by the policy pursued at Paris, Vienna, Berlin, and
Madrid, we must take a survey, wide but minute, sometimes to all
appearance diffuse, yet in reality vitally related to the main theme. In
order to simplify the narrative, I have sought to disentangle the
strands of war policy and to follow them severally, connecting them,
however, in the chapter entitled "Pitt as War Minister," which will sum
up the results of these studies on the period 1793-8.
If proof be needed that Pitt entered upon the French war with regret, it
may be found in the fact that on 5th February he and Grenville empowered
Auckland to discuss the pacific overtures of Dumouriez. Grenville, it is
true, saw in this move merely a device to gain time;[196] and we may
detect in the British reply the sanguine nature of the Prime Minister.
But his hopes ended on 8th February, when news arrived of the
declaration of war by the French Convention against Great Britain and
Holland. Thereupon Pitt entered into the struggle without a shadow of
doubt.[197] For him it was always a struggle to prevent the domination
of the Netherlands by France; and we may note, as a sign of the
continuity of that policy, that on it largely depended the rupture with
Napoleon in 1803. Pitt summed up the object of the war in the word
"security." In his view, as in that of his successor, Castlereagh,
national security was wholly incompatible with the possession of
Holland, or even the Belgic Provinces, by France.
In taking this practical view of the crisis Pitt differed sharply from
George III and Burke. They looked on the struggle as one for the
restoration of monarchy. The King on 9th February wrote to Grenville
that he hoped the war would be the "means of restoring some degree of
order to that unprincipled country," and Burke flung into an unquotable
phrase his anger that the war should turn on the question of the
Scheldt.[198] For the present the aggressive conduct of France welded
together these two wings of the royalist party; but events were soon to
reveal the fundamental difference of view. Indeed, it coloured all their
opinions about the struggle. Wilberforce reports Pitt as saying that the
war would be a short war, and certainly ended in one or two campaigns.
"No, Sir," retorted Burke, "it will be a long war and a dangerous war,
but it must be undertaken."[199] In his eyes the struggle was one
between two irreconcilable principles--democracy and monarchy. Certainly
the effort to force 25,000,000 Frenchmen back into the well-worn grooves
was stupendous. Further, the great Irishman, with the idealism and
chivalry which invest his nature with so much charm, urged the Allies to
abjure all thought of indemnifying themselves at the expense of France,
and to declare their sole aim to be the destruction of anarchy and the
restoration of monarchy, a course of action which would range on their
side a large number of Frenchmen and avert all risk of identifying that
nation with the regicide Republic. The new letters of Burke suggest the
advantages of such a declaration and most justly censure the Allies for
avowing their intention of taking land from France. The old man saw
clearly that by so doing they banded Frenchmen together for a national
effort. In the following pages the thoughtful reader will notice the
disastrous effects of this blunder. Here Burke stood on strong ground;
and Pitt was far from guiltless.
On the general question, however, whether the war should be for the
restoration of monarchy or the attainment of security, Pitt's position
is unassailable. For the mere suspicion that the Allies intended to
impose Louis XVII on France condemned monarchy in the eyes of patriotic
Frenchmen. Only amidst the exhaustion following on the Napoleonic wars
could an intensely patriotic people accept a king at the sword's point.
In the first glow of democratic ardour absolute destruction seemed
preferable to so craven a surrender. While, then, we join Burke in
censuring the procedure of the Allies, we must pronounce his advice
fatal to the cause which he wished to commend. Further, his was a
counsel of perfection to Austria, England, and the Dutch Republic.
Deeming themselves attacked by France, they were determined to gain
security from the reckless schemes of aggrandizing philanthropy now in
favour at Paris; and, viewing the matter impartially, we must admit that
they were right. The French having been the aggressors, the three States
justly demanded security at that weak point in the European system, the
Flemish border. Further, as Pitt limited his aims to the expulsion of
the French from the Low Countries, he might reasonably hope for a speedy
peace, the task which he set before himself being far smaller than that
of forcing a king back on the French nation.[200] Ultimately the
stiffneckedness of Napoleon brought all the Powers to the latter
solution; but no one in 1793 could foresee the monstrous claim for "the
natural frontiers"--the Rhine, Alps, Pyrenees, and Ocean--which
prolonged the struggle to the year 1814.
Pitt's optimism will appear not unnatural, if we review the general
situation early in the year 1793. The political atmosphere was
disturbed by two cyclones, one in the west, the other in the east, of
Europe. That which centred in the French Revolution seemed to have
reached its maximum intensity; and skilled observers augured from the
execution of Louis XVI a relapse into savage but almost helpless
anarchy. The recent successes of the French in the Rhineland and Brabant
were rightly ascribed to the supineness of Prussia and Austria; and
already the armies of Custine and Dumouriez were in sore straits. The
plunder of the liberated peoples by the troops and by commissioners sent
to carry out the decrees of fraternity had led to sharp reprisals all
along the straggling front from Mainz to Bruges; and now Danton's decree
of 31st January, annexing the Belgic provinces to France, exasperated
that people.
Further, the men in power at Paris had as yet shown no organizing
capacity. The administration of the War Department by "papa" Pache had
been a masterpiece of imbecile knavery which infuriated Dumouriez and
his half-starving troops. We have heard much of the blunders of British
Ministers in this war; but even at their worst they never sank to the
depths revealed in the correspondence of Dumouriez with Pache. In truth,
both Powers began the war very badly; but France repaired her faults far
more quickly, chiefly because the young democracy soon came to award the
guillotine for incompetent conduct over which the nepotism of Whitehall
spread a decent cloak. The discovery by the Jacobins of the law of the
survival of the fittest served to array the military genius of France
against Court favourites or the dull products of the system of
seniority.
For the present, the misery of the French troops, the immense extent of
their lines, and the singular ingratitude of the liberated peoples,
promised a speedy reversal of the campaign of 1792. For the re-conquest
of Belgium, the Allies now had ready on or near the Rhine 55,000
Austrians under the Duke of Coburg. On their right were 11,000
Prussians, under Frederick of Brunswick-Oels, and 13,000 Hanoverians,
destined for Guelderland. These last were to be paid by the Maritime
Powers. In reserve were 33,000 Prussians, under Hohenlohe-Kirchberg. For
the invasion of Eastern France, Frederick William of Prussia marshalled,
near Frankfurt, a force of 42,000 of his own troops, together with
14,000 other Germans. Further south was General Wurmser with 24,000
Austrians. And this was not all. The Holy Roman Empire promised a force
of 120,000, whenever its Translucencies, Bishops, Abbesses, and Knights
could muster them; and further east there loomed the hosts of Russia. If
these forces had been used straightforwardly, France must have been
overborne.[201]
But the half of them were not used at all. Before the campaign opened,
the eastern cyclone drew to itself the energies which ostensibly were
directed against France. Just one week before the execution of
Louis XVI, five Prussian columns crossed the borders of Poland. This act
aroused a furious outcry, especially as Frederick William preluded it by
a manifesto hypocritically dwelling upon the danger of allowing
Jacobinism to take root in Poland. Fears of Prussian and Muscovite
rapacity had induced Pitt and Grenville to seek disclaimers of partition
at Berlin and St. Petersburg. Assurances enough were forthcoming. On
29th January 1793 Markoff sought to convince Whitworth that no partition
was intended.[202] But in view of the entire passivity of Pitt on the
Polish Question since his surrender to Catharine in 1791 the two Powers
laid their plans for the act of robbery which took place a few months
later.[203]
In this they had the rather doubtful acquiescence of Austria, provided
that they furthered the Belgic-Bavarian exchange so long favoured at
Vienna and resisted at Berlin. As we have seen, Pitt strongly opposed
the exchange; but, early in February 1793, Grenville and he heard that
the Emperor Francis II hoped to facilitate the transference of the
Elector of Bavaria from Munich to Brussels by adding Lille and
Valenciennes to his new dominion.[204] These tidings led them to adopt a
decision which was largely to influence the course of the war. They
resolved to commit Austria deeply to war with France by favouring the
acquisition of Lille and Valenciennes by the Hapsburgs provided that
they retained Belgium. This, however, was far from the wishes of that
Court, which longed for parts of Alsace and Lorraine, and viewed Belgium
merely as a sop to be flung to the Elector of Bavaria.[205]
Was there ever a more singular game of cross-purposes? Austria pursued
the war with France chiefly with the object of gaining Bavaria and parts
of Eastern France, Belgium (with Lille and Valenciennes) being allotted
to the Elector uprooted at Munich. Prussia and Russia promised to abet
this scheme as a set-off to their prospective plunder of Poland; but,
obviously, after securing their booty in the summer of 1793, they had no
interest in aggrandizing the House of Hapsburg. Further, England entered
on the Flemish campaign with motives widely different from those of
Austria. Pitt and Grenville sought to plant her more firmly at Brussels
by girdling her with the fortresses of French Flanders; but she sought
to recover Belgium only to fling it to the Elector. Finally neither
Russia nor the German Powers cared an iota about the security of
Holland. Their eyes were fixed on Warsaw or Munich. In truth, despite
all their protestations as to the need of re-establishing the French
monarchy, they were mainly bent on continuing the territorial scrambles
of former years. The two aims were utterly incompatible.
In comparison with the motives prompting the actions of States, treaties
are of secondary importance. Nevertheless (to finish with these
wearisome details) we may note that on 25th March Grenville and
Vorontzoff signed at Downing Street a treaty of alliance whereby Russia
promised, firstly, to use her forces, along with those of England,
against France; secondly, to prevent neutrals from helping France
indirectly (a clause which involved the lapse of the principles of the
Armed Neutrality), and thirdly, to grant to England a favourable
commercial treaty.[206] Agreement with Prussia and Austria was more
difficult, but at last, on 14th July and 30th August, compacts were
signed with them for military aid in return for subsidies; and in the
spring and summer of 1793 Grenville arranged similar conventions with
Sardinia, Hesse-Cassel, Spain, and Naples. In this haphazard manner did
these States agree to war against France. Their aims being as diverse as
their methods were disjointed, the term "First Coalition" applied to
this league is almost a misnomer.
Before describing the first campaign of the war it will be well briefly
to survey the armed forces of the Crown and the organization for war.
Firstly, we must remember that Pitt had devoted great attention to the
navy and to the fortification of Portsmouth and Plymouth. Despite the
hostile vote of the House of Commons in 1785, he had succeeded in
finding money enough to enable the Duke of Richmond to place those
dockyard towns beyond reach of a _coup de main_; and to Pitt may be
ascribed the unquestioned superiority of Britain at sea. Of the 113
sail-of-the-line then available, about 90 could soon be placed in
commission, that is, so soon as the press-gang provided the larger part
of the _personnel_.
The state of the army was far less satisfactory. Never, in all
probability, since the ignominious times of Charles II, had it been in
so weak a condition relatively to the Continental Powers. In the Budget
of 1792 Pitt asked merely for 17,013 men as guards and garrisons in
these islands; and he reduced even that scanty force to 13,701 men for
the next six months. The regiments were in some cases little more than
skeletons, but with a fairly full complement of officers. Nominally the
army consisted of eighty-one battalions; but of these the West Indies
claimed as many as nineteen. India needed nine; and on the whole only
twenty-eight line regiments, together with the Guards and the cavalry,
remained for the defence of Great Britain and Ireland. Efforts were made
in December 1792 to bring in recruits, but with little effect. The
defence of London, the dockyard towns, and other important posts,
depended of course partly on the militia; 19,000 of that useful force
were embodied early in February. But as the authorities forbore to
compel men to serve in person, there was a rush for substitutes, which
naturally told against recruiting for the Line.[207] Volunteer
Associations were also relied on for local defence, and for overawing
the malcontent or disorderly elements in the populace. The safety of the
coasts and therefore of the capital rested primarily with the navy; and
for England the war promised to be almost entirely a naval war.
Equally chaotic was the administration for war. Some time in February
1793 Dundas sent to Pitt a Memorandum respecting a new arrangement of
offices which had been mooted in the Cabinet. The need of some change
may be judged by the fact that Dundas was Secretary for Home Affairs
(down to July 1794), First Commissioner for India (that is, virtually,
Secretary for India), and Treasurer of the Navy, besides drawing glory
and profit from his airy duties of Groom of the Stole. What changes had
been proposed does not appear; but Dundas expressed himself as follows:
"First: That I should remain precisely as I am while the war continues,
provided the arrangement takes place respecting the Groom of the Stole
to Lord Chatham, together with all the consequent changes in other
offices. This in my judgment is by much the best for the public service,
and ought to supersede all other individual wishes." Failing this
patriotic arrangement, Dundas requested that he should have the first
claim for the Privy Seal for Scotland, provided that Lord Chatham did
not take the Stole. He (Dundas) would give up the latter but retain his
office at the India Board and the Navy. Or, thirdly, if he received the
Privy Seal for Scotland, he would give up his other offices except that
at the India Board. This last plan would involve a large reduction of
income, but he preferred it to the others except the two previously
named.[208]
Nevertheless no change of any importance took place. Dundas continued to
be a portly pluralist, utterly unable to overtake the work of three
important offices, with the conduct of the war often superadded; and
Chatham remained at the Admiralty until the close of 1794, to the
annoyance of all champions of efficiency. In the course of that year
Pitt urged the need of strengthening both the Admiralty and War
Departments; but, as we shall see, Dundas strongly objected to the
creation of a Secretary of State for War, because his duties would
overlap those of the other Departments, and important decisions must be
formed by the Cabinet as a whole.[209] I shall touch on this question
more fully in Chapter XII, but mention it here as a sign of the mental
cloudiness which led British Ministers for the first eighteen months of
the war to plod along with the most haphazard arrangements known even to
that age. The contrast between the boyish irresponsibility of military
management in England and the terrible concentration of power in the
hands of Carnot at Paris, after July 1793, goes far to explain the
disasters to the Union Jack after the first few months of the war.
The triumph of the French Republic and its transformation into a
military Empire cannot be understood until we probe the inner weakness
of the First Coalition and realize the unpreparedness of Great Britain.
Moreover, as the Allies believed that France would speedily succumb,
the allocation of the spoil claimed their attention more than
preparations for the hunt. The unexpected vigour of the French might
have undeceived them. While Coburg was leisurely preparing to drive the
levies of Dumouriez from the district between Verviers and
Aix-la-Chapelle, the latter laid his plans for a dash into the almost
unprotected Dutch Netherlands, where he hoped to find precious spoils
and valuable munitions of war.[210] Breaking up therefore from Antwerp
on 16th February, the Republicans quickly advanced towards the estuary
known as the Hollandsdiep, while two other columns marched on Breda and
Bergen-op-Zoom. As Dumouriez had foreseen, the torpor of the
Stadholder's forces was as marked as the eagerness of the Dutch Patriots
to welcome the invaders. Breda fell on 26th February; but he failed to
cross the Hollandsdiep, for there the Sea Power intervened.
On 15th February Auckland begged that the Duke of York might be sent
over with a few battalions. The Ministry at once answered the appeal. On
20th February seven battalions of the British Guards were paraded at
Whitehall; the Duke of York announced that the first three would go to
Holland, and asked for volunteers from the other four. The whole line
stepped forward. Huddled on to small transports, the little force
reached the Dutch estuaries in time to thwart the efforts of Dumouriez.
Their arrival heartened the defenders of the Hollandsdiep, and held the
French at bay. Meanwhile Coburg had bestirred himself, and, marching on
Miranda's vanguard on the River Roer, threw it back in utter rout.
Dumouriez, falling back hastily to succour his lieutenant, encountered
the Austrian force at Neerwinden, where the unsteadiness of the
Republican levies enabled Coburg and his brilliant lieutenant, the
Archduke Charles, to win a decisive triumph (18th March). A great part
of the French levies melted away. The Belgians rose against the
retreating bands; and in a few days that land was lost to France. The
failure of Dumouriez to turn his army against the Convention, and his
flight to the Austrian outposts, need not be described here.[211]
Suffice it to say that the northern frontier of France lay open to
attack. An advance in force in the month of April or May might have
ended the war.
But, as we have seen, the Allies were too jealous and too distrustful to
act with the necessary vigour. Austria refused to recognize the Prussian
scheme for the Partition of Poland; and the North German Power
retaliated by withholding its contingent from the support of
Coburg.[212] That commander, finding himself duped by the Prussians,
pressed the British and Dutch Governments to send him succour. To this
he had some claim; for it was the Austrian victory at Neerwinden which
saved Holland from the French; and the best method of protecting that
land was to capture the northern fortresses of France. The Dutch army
numbered on paper 50,000 men; 13,500 Hanoverians were marching towards
Guelderland; 8,000 Hessians were entering the British service. In such a
case it would have been disgraceful not to assist Coburg in completing
his triumph. Thus, as often happens with British expeditions, the scope
of the Duke of York's operations now greatly widened. His original
instructions of 23rd February ordered him not to move more than
twenty-four hours away from Helvoetsluys. On 19th March, as the danger
lessened, the War Office gave him leave to advance, moving on the right
of Coburg's army towards Antwerp and Ghent.[213]
The news of Neerwinden led George III to adopt even more vigorous
measures. True, he disliked Coburg's pressing demand for help, seeing
that no treaty of alliance was formed; but he permitted the forward move
on Ghent, and formulated a still bolder scheme, that the British,
Hanoverians, and Dutch should advance to besiege Dunkirk; for the
capture of that place would enable a siege-train to be brought easily to
the Austrians for the leaguer of Lille and Valenciennes.[214] To
Grenville he expressed the hope that these measures would speedily end
the war.[215]
The letter is important as showing the great influence of the King on
military affairs. It must be remembered that Pitt, Grenville, and Dundas
(the three leading members of the Cabinet) had no knowledge of these
questions, while that shadowy personage, Sir George Yonge, Secretary at
War, had no seat in the Cabinet. A more unsatisfactory state of things
cannot be conceived. It tended to subject questions of military policy
to that influential trio, which in its turn was swayed by the will of
the King. According to constitutional custom, the Cabinet was
collectively responsible for questions of war policy; but it is
difficult to say how far Ministers were individually responsible. Pitt
and Grenville certainly influenced the decisions arrived at; Dundas drew
up and signed the chief military despatches; but the wishes of
George III had great weight.
[Illustration: SEAT OF WAR IN FLANDERS.]
In fact, questions of war policy turned largely on motives other than
military. The resolve of the King and his Ministers to share in the
invasion of France sprang not only from feelings of military honour,
but also from the exigencies of diplomacy. By the middle of March it was
clear that Russia and Prussia would acquire unexpectedly extensive
tracts of Polish land. Francis II vented his spleen at this rebuff on
his Chancellor, Philip Cobenzl, who was virtually disgraced, while a
clever but unprincipled schemer, Thugut, took his place.[216] Another
unwelcome surprise was in store. The Emperor had hoped to find in the
Belgic-Bavarian exchange "compensation" for the presumedly moderate
gains of his rivals in Poland. But to this plan, as we have seen,
George III and his Ministers stoutly demurred; and Grenville held out
the prospect of the acquisition of Lille and Valenciennes in order once
more to lay that disquieting spectre. As it also alarmed some of the
German princes, whose help was needed against France, the Court of
Vienna saw this vision fade away until Thugut hit upon the design of
conquering Alsace, and finding there the means of effecting the
longed-for exchange. Pitt and Grenville, however, clung to the policy of
rooting Austria firmly at Brussels, with Lille and Valenciennes as her
outworks, and this involved the effort of winning those two fortresses
for the Hapsburgs. Thugut suggested that, if Austria could not secure
French Flanders, she must find compensation elsewhere; and he declined
to satisfy Eden's curiosity on this threatening word.[217] It therefore
behoved us to strengthen Austria's stroke at French Flanders, especially
as she now acquiesced in the British contention, that the Allies should
neither interfere with the form of Government in France nor recognize
the Comte de Provence as Regent.[218]
The British Government, however, moved forward its troops into Flanders
reluctantly, firstly, because it wanted to use them in the West
Indies,[219] and also discerned the preference of Frederick William for
a Polish to a Flemish campaign. That monarch and his generals left the
Austrians to bear the brunt of everything on the banks of the Rhine, and
also in Brabant. His manner of setting about the siege of Mainz was a
masterpiece of politic delay, in which amorous dalliance played its
part.[220] When complaints came from his Allies, he hotly retorted that
Coburg had sent him only 5,000 troops from the northern army instead of
the 15,000 that were promised. The Austrians replied with no less warmth
that Coburg needed those 10,000 men because he had had no succour from
the Prussian force supporting him. The result was that the Duke of
York's corps was thrust into the part which the Prussian contingent
ought to have taken. Accordingly Pitt and some of his colleagues deemed
it preferable, now that Holland was safe, to withdraw the British troops
with a view to a series of expeditions against the coasts and colonies
of France. This problem called for a clear and decided solution. Nowhere
do we so much lament the secrecy of Cabinet discussions as on these
questions--should the meagre forces of Britain be used on maritime
expeditions (their normal function in war), or form a petty division in
the crusade of two great Military Powers; or, worst of all, should they
be parcelled out in both kinds of warfare?
All that we know is that George III, on 29th March, strongly advocated
the siege of Dunkirk, in the hope that the capture of that seaport would
assist the Austrians in reducing the fortresses of French Flanders, and
thus put an end to the war. On the other hand, the Duke of Richmond
counselled the withdrawal of the British force for use against the
coasts and colonies of France; and his two letters to Pitt, dated
Goodwood, 3rd and 5th April, show that Pitt inclined to that opinion.
The question was important in view of a forthcoming conference of the
allied commanders and envoys at Antwerp. The letters are too long for
quotation. In that of 3rd April the duke declares that Ministers must
soon decide whether to persevere in Flanders or in maritime expeditions.
"To attempt both is to do neither well." For himself, he would much
prefer to attack Cherbourg, Brest, l'Orient, Rochefort, Nantes and
Bordeaux; but he fears that the ardour of the Duke of York will lead him
into an extensive campaign in Flanders.
In the second and longer letter, Richmond warns Pitt that, if he prefers
to attack the ports and colonies of France (especially the West Indies),
he ought at once to warn the envoys of the Allies at Antwerp (who were
about to discuss the plan of campaign), that we could not long afford
succour to them, and trusted that after six weeks they could do without
it, or, at least, would need it only to a very slight extent. If, he
continues, Coburg and the Prussians demur to this, we must reply that
England was at first no party to the war, and entered into it only for
the defence of the Dutch; that participation in a continental campaign
is so unpopular and ruinous, that we may be compelled to desist from it;
that by means of naval expeditions we can help the common cause steadily
and effectively; and that we are in no position to act on the Continent
because "our army, cavalry and infantry, consists almost wholly of
recruits, no part of which (men or horses) have been raised two months,
and the greater part of which are at this moment only raising." Further,
if we clearly warn the Allies of our resolve to withdraw our troops,
they cannot complain of it. Pitt should therefore instruct Lord Auckland
to give clear expression to these ideas. Coburg will then probably argue
as to the extreme importance of clinching the successes already won, and
will therefore urge the Duke of York to besiege Dunkirk, Graveline, and
St. Omer, with a view to drawing him on finally towards Paris. But any
such proceeding is to be resisted. The German Powers will dismember
France; but we, having little military weight, shall probably gain next
to nothing. Far more advantageous will be our action elsewhere, _e.g._,
in the seizure of Cherbourg, Toulon, etc. Richmond ends by requesting of
Pitt the favour of an interview.[221]
Either the interview did not take place, or the duke's arguments failed
to lower the sanguine spirits of the Prime Minister to the level of
prudence. All the letters of Pitt at that time exude confidence from
every line. He hopes that Dumouriez will succeed in overthrowing the
regicides at Paris. The backwardness of the Prussians in supporting
Coburg does not deter him from ordering to Flanders all the available
British and mercenary troops, in order to besiege Dunkirk, and otherwise
help the Imperialists. As if this is not enough, on or just before 1st
April he treats with Malouet, the French envoy from Hayti, for the
transfer of that colony to the British Crown; he writes hopefully of
finding a force large enough to make an attempt on the French coast; and
a little later Grenville mentions a Mediterranean campaign. The King,
too, in referring to a recent offer of peace from Paris, writes that the
bounds of "that dangerous and faithless nation" must be greatly
circumscribed before such a proposal can be entertained.[222]
Thus France is to be attacked in Flanders, on the north or north-west
coast, on the Mediterranean coast and in Corsica, as well as the West
Indies, by an army which musters scarcely 20,000 effectives. In this
confidence, which wells forth into five distinct schemes, is to be found
the cause for the Jacobin triumphs which shattered the First Coalition.
Austria and Prussia were equally puffed up with unreal hopes. At the
conference at Antwerp in the second week of April occurred the first of
the many blunders which helped to rally Frenchmen around the tricolour.
Coburg's promise, in a recent proclamation to Dumouriez and the French
nation, that the Allies would not make conquests at the expense of
France, was warmly disavowed at the first sitting. Accordingly, a few
days later, Coburg issued a second proclamation, announcing the end of
the armistice and omitting all reference to his disinterested views. The
change of tone speedily convinced the French people of the imminence of
schemes of partition. This it was, quite as much as Jacobin fanaticism,
which banded Frenchmen enthusiastically in the defence of the Republic.
Patriotism strengthened the enthusiasm for liberty, and nerved
twenty-five million Frenchmen with a resolve to fling back the
sacrilegious invaders.
About this time the French Government sent pacific proposals to London,
which met with no very encouraging reception, Pitt and Grenville
probably regarding them as a means of sowing discord among the Allies,
of worming out their plans, or of gaining time for the French
preparations. It is indeed difficult to believe that they had any other
object. After the defection of Dumouriez and his Staff, France was in a
desperate state, and her rulers naturally sought to gain a brief
respite. Grenville therefore replied that if France really desired to
end the war which she had forced upon England, definite proposals might
be sent to the British headquarters in the Netherlands.[223] None was
sent.
Meanwhile, the jealousies of the German Powers, the delay of Austria in
coming to terms with England, and the refusal of Coburg to define his
plan of campaign, paralysed the actions of the Allies and saved France.
As for the British force, it was too weak to act independently; and yet
the pride of George III forbade its fusion in Coburg's army.[224] By the
third week of April the Duke of York had with him 4,200 British
infantry, 2,300 horsemen, besides 13,000 Hanoverians (clamorous for more
pay), and 15,000 Dutch troops of poor quality and doubtful fidelity;
8,000 hired Hessians had not yet arrived.[225] Yet the King and his
Ministers persisted in hoping for the conquest of French Flanders. The
War Office despatch of 16th April specified as the chief aim of the war
the re-conquest of the Low Countries by Austria, "with such extended and
safe frontier as may secure the tranquillity and independence of
Holland." But Pitt and his colleagues, far from concentrating on
Flanders, continued to toy with expeditions to Brittany, Provence,
Corsica, and the West Indies.
At first they pressed Coburg to consent to the deviation of the British
force towards Dunkirk; and only on his urgent protest was that
ex-centric move given up until Valenciennes should have fallen. The
Austrian contention was undoubtedly right, as the British Government
grudgingly admitted. The Duke of York's force therefore moved along with
that of Coburg towards that fortress and showed great gallantry in
compelling the French to evacuate the supporting camp of Famars (23rd
May). Early in June the siege of Valenciennes began in earnest. A
British officer described the defence of the French as "obstinate but
not spirited." They made no sorties, and Custine's army of 40,000 men,
which should have sought to raise the siege, did not attack, probably
owing to the unsteadiness and apathy of his troops.[226] This lack of
energy cost him his life; for on 10th July he was ordered back to Paris
and soon went to the guillotine.
At that time the Jacobins were in a state of mind in which fury and
despair struggled for the mastery. The outlook was as gloomy as before
Valmy in September 1792. Bad news poured in from all sides. The
Girondins, after the collapse of their power on 2nd June, appealed to
the Departments, and two thirds of France seemed about to support them
against the tyranny of the capital. Had not the Jacobins developed an
organizing power immeasurably superior to that of the moderates, the
royalists, and the Allies, the rule of that desperate minority must
speedily have been swept away. On 12th July the Parisian Government
declared itself at war with the moderates, who now had the upper hand at
Lyons and in neighbouring districts. On that same day Condé (a small
fortress north of Valenciennes) opened its gates. On 22nd July Mainz
surrendered to the King of Prussia; and six days later the Austrian and
British standards were hoisted on the ramparts of Valenciennes.
This event raised to its climax the fury of the Jacobins; and on 9th
August the Convention passed with acclamation a decree declaring Pitt to
be an enemy of the human race. This singular manifestation of Gallic
effervescence came about in the following way. The Committee of Public
Safety having presented a report on the scarcity of corn and bread, the
Convention was electrified by the doleful recital. In the ensuing debate
stories are told of men disguised as women who practise insidious
devices among the _queues_ at the bakers' shops. At once the Convention
decrees that men acting thus while in disguise shall be deemed worthy of
death. A deputy named Garnier then suggests that as this is clearly a
device of the infamous Pitt to increase disorder, it shall be declared
lawful to murder him. Couthon, for once speaking the language of
moderation, objects to this proposal as unworthy of the Republic, and
moves that Pitt be declared an enemy of the human race. This is at once
approved as worthy of the humanity and dignity of the Convention. The
decree, then, was obviously a device for shelving the stupid and
bloodthirsty motion of Garnier. The whole discussion may be compared
with Pitt's declaration to the House of Commons on 12th February 1793,
that the war, though undoubtedly provoked by France, would never be
waged by England for motives of vengeance, but merely for the attainment
of security.
Why at this time the name of Pitt should have driven the Parisian
legislators half frantic is not easy to see. Up to that time the
exploits of the small British force at Famars and Valenciennes had been
no more than creditable; and it was not till the end of the month that
the news of the entry of Admiral Hood's fleet into Toulon threw Paris
into a frenzy. The decree of 9th August therefore has merely a
psychological interest. When tyrants thundered at the gates of the
Republic, France needed some names the mere sound of which sufficed to
drive her sons to arms. In 1792 it was Brunswick or Condé. When they
ceased to be effective, the populace found others first in Coburg and
finally in Pitt. Other names waxed and waned; but that of the son of
Chatham stood fixed in a dull haze of hatred. Thus, by a singular irony,
the very man who in 1786 had branded with folly those Englishmen who
declared France to be our natural enemy, was now by her banned as the
enemy of the human race. And such he remains for the great majority of
Frenchmen. The hasty and fortuitous phrase of Couthon, which was
designed to save him from the assassin's knife, will doubtless be the
permanent catchword, irremovable by research and explanation.
The ravings of the French Convention would soon have ended, had not a
great organizer now appeared. On 17th August 1793 Carnot entered the
Committee of Public Safety, and thenceforth wielded its limitless powers
for purposes of national defence. He was an officer of engineers, and
had eagerly studied the principles of strategy. Throwing himself with
ardour into the Revolution, he became a member of the National Assembly,
and now was charged with the supervision of the War Department. At the
War Committee he had the help of officers scarcely less able. Among them
Mallet du Pan, in an interesting survey of French administrators, names
D'Arçon as largely contributing to the French triumphs at Dunkirk and
Maubeuge. He calls him a soul on fire and full of resource.[227] But the
brain and will of this Committee was Carnot. His application to work for
some twelve or fourteen hours a day, his hold on masses of details, and
his burning patriotism, enabled him to inflame, control, and energize
Frenchmen until they became a nation in arms. Moreover, Carnot had the
invaluable gift of selecting the best commanders. True, the Frenchman
was not hampered by a monarch who regarded the army as his own, nor by
clogging claims of seniority. The "organizer of victory" had before him
a clear field and no favour.
The most urgent danger for the Republic soon proved to be not in
Flanders, but in Brittany and la Vendée. There _la petite noblesse_ and
the peasantry still lived on friendly terms. They were alike shocked by
the expulsion of the orthodox priests and the murder of the King.
Summoned by the Republic to arms in the spring of 1793, they rushed to
arms against her. In la Vendée, the densely wooded district south of
the lower Loire, everything favoured the defence. The hardy peasants
were ably led by that born leader of men, the chivalrous Marquis de
Larochejaquelein, who had inspired the men of his neighbourhood with the
words: "If I advance, follow me; if I retreat, slay me; if I fall,
avenge me." With him was his cousin, Lescure, not less brave, but of a
cooler and more calculating temper. The ardently Catholic peasantry of
the west furnished as leaders a carter, Cathelineau, of rare ability and
generosity of character, and Stofflet, a gamekeeper, of stern and
vindictive stamp. Nerved by fanatical hatred against the atheists and
regicides of Paris, these levies of the west proved more than a match
for all the National Guards, whole columns of whom they lured into the
depths of the Bocage and cut down to the last man. As Victor Hugo has
finely said: "It was a war of the town against the forest." At first the
forest-dwellers threatened to overrun the towns. On 11th June they took
Saumur, a town on the Loire, after a desperate fight, and sought to open
communication with the coast and the British fleet by seizing Nantes.
This attempt, however, failed; and it is generally admitted that they
erred in not marching on Paris after their first successes. After
gaining a sure base of operations, they should have strained every nerve
in order to strike at the heart. And if distance and lack of supplies
and equipment shortened their reach, they might at least have carried
the war into the rich central provinces, on which the capital subsisted.
But the mistake of these poor peasants was venial when compared with
those of the Allies. On the capture of Mainz, Condé, and Valenciennes,
the Prussian, Austrian, and British commanders did not enforce an
unconditional surrender, but offered to allow the garrisons to march out
with the honours of war on condition of not serving against them for a
year. A better example of shirking present problems at the cost of
enhanced difficulties in the future cannot be imagined. By this
improvident lenity the Allies enabled the regicides to hurl fully 25,000
trained troops against the royalists of the West and deal them terrible
blows. In September and October the Republicans gained considerable
successes, especially at Cholet. Soon the Vendéan War became little more
than a guerilla strife, which Pitt fed by means of arms and stores, but
not in the energetic manner desired by Burke and Windham.
These ardent royalists constantly pressed him to help the men of Poitou
and Brittany, but had to deplore the wearisome delays which then clogged
all military and naval operations. Most bitterly did Burke write to
Windham, early in November 1793, that Ministers were so eager in seeking
to win indemnities from France that they had hardened the national
resistance of that nation, and meanwhile had not sent a single shipload
of stores to the brave men of Poitou. Of course it was less easy than
Burke imagined to get stores across a sea not yet fully commanded by the
British fleet, and through inlets and harbours closely watched by the
enemy. But the inaction of a force entrusted to the Earl of Moira for
the support of the French royalists is certainly discreditable to him
and to Ministers. Among them the Duke of Richmond, Master of Ordnance,
distinguished himself by his incapacity and his ridiculous orders.
Another obvious misfit was Lord Chatham at the Admiralty. But how can we
explain the inactivity of four regiments in the Channel Islands all the
summer? Surely they could have seized St. Malo or the Quiberon
Peninsula.[228] Such a diversion would have been highly effective. For
the Bretons and Vendéans, when supplied with arms, could have marched
eastwards and roused the royalists of Normandy, Maine, and Touraine.
With so potent a foe near to Paris, must not the regicides have been
overborne by Coburg in Flanders? Everything tends to show that the
Republicans feared the royalists of the West more than the Austrians in
the North. But, as will appear in a later chapter, Pitt and Dundas
decided to throw their strength into the West Indies. On 26th November
1793, Sir John Jervis sailed for that deadly bourne with 7,000 troops.
Events were soon to reveal the seriousness of this mistake. It was far
more important to strike at Paris through Brittany than to occupy even
the richest of the French West Indies. For a triumphant advance of the
Bretons and Vendéans must not only have lessened the material resources
of the Republic but also have deprived its defenders of one of their
chief advantages. Hitherto the Republicans had been better massed
together, while their assailants were spread over wide spaces. It is a
well-known principle in war that an army operating on an inner arc, or
what are termed interior lines, has a great advantage over forces spread
over the outer circumference. The Allies then held the Pyrenees, the
Maritime Alps, the Rhine, and most of Flanders, Brittany, and parts of
the South. The defenders, possessing the central provinces, could mass
their units far more quickly and choose the point on that outer curve
against which they would aim their blow.
This principle was thoroughly understood by Carnot. Near the centre of
the circle he massed the levies that were to save the Republic, and,
confiding them to zealots who were resolved to conquer or die, he soon
had on foot armies which, however contemptible as units, were formidable
from their weight and their enthusiasm. As in mechanics the mass
multiplied by the speed gives the effective force, so in the campaign of
1793 the _levée en masse_ multiplied by enthusiasm and impelled by the
brain power of Carnot begot a momentum which, when brought to bear on
light, scattered, and almost stationary bodies, proved to be
irresistible. For while Carnot trusted to concentration, the Allies
either sank into inertia, or made ex-centric movements which ultimately
played into their opponents' hands. The Prussians, after taking Mainz,
did little more than rest on their laurels, their only move being
towards Luxemburg. Coburg was inclined to follow their example on the
ground that an advance to Paris would unite all the French parties
against him, while the siege of the remaining fortresses in the North
would allow anarchy to run riot at the centre.[229] The argument is a
good example of political _finesse_ applied to a military problem, with
disastrous results. Coburg therefore set about the siege of Quesnoy.
Certainly he could urge in excuse that the British Government now
insisted on the resumption of its favourite plan, the capture of that
nest of privateers, Dunkirk. On receipt of the news of the surrender of
Valenciennes, an order was sent to the Duke of York to begin the siege
of that once important stronghold, and capture it for Great Britain,
though it might be allowed finally to fall to the Emperor as one of his
new Barrier fortresses, provided that we gained indemnities in other
parts of the world. French and German historians, with their usual bias
against Great Britain, have assumed that she had resolved to keep
Dunkirk. The contrary is proved by the despatches of Dundas to Murray,
and by a letter of Sir Gilbert Elliot whom Pitt appointed commissioner
to regulate affairs at Dunkirk. Writing to Lady Elliot on 10th
September Sir Gilbert says: "No further conquests are to be made in that
quarter in the name of Great Britain, nor is it intended to retain
Dunkirk after the peace."[230] A speedy capture of Dunkirk was evidently
expected, for the same despatch ordered that the Hessian corps, some
8,000 strong, then with the Duke, must be held in readiness to depart to
some other destination.[231] This referred either to the expedition in
the Mediterranean (soon to be noticed) or to another, also in course of
preparation, against Brittany. The Duke of York disapproved of the
divergence towards Dunkirk, and the withdrawal of troops from his
command.[232]
We here touch upon the weak side of Pitt's war policy. His aims at first
had been merely to defend England from invasion, and to use the fleet
and as many troops as could well be spared, to threaten various points
along the coast of France and to capture her colonies. From these
comparatively simple aims he had been drawn aside into a continental
campaign, owing to the desirability of re-establishing Austria firmly in
the Pays Bas. That is to say, a political aim drew him away from the
simple and effective plan of a maritime and colonial war. Or rather it
would be more correct to say that he tried to carry on a limited
continental campaign as well as the coast expeditions which promised to
paralyse the activities of large numbers of Frenchmen.
Accordingly, Pitt and his colleagues, instead of concentrating their
activities on Flanders, prepared also to harass the coasts and colonies
of France, and to withdraw part of the Duke of York's force for service
in the Mediterranean or the West Indies. Instructions to this effect
annoyed both the duke and Coburg. Most reluctantly did the latter
consent to the divergence of the British towards Dunkirk; but, as he had
already decided to spend the rest of the campaign in reducing the border
fortresses, the division of forces had none of those appalling results
which Alison and others have detected. The duke's corps, then, turned
off to the right, and, after gaining some successes over bodies of the
French, set about the siege of Dunkirk. If his siege train had arrived
in time, the town would probably soon have surrendered. But now Carnot
was able to utilize some of the forces raised in the _levée en masse_.
By the beginning of September the French relieving army amounted to
45,000 men under General Houchard; while the Hessians and Hanoverians
covering the siege operations did not exceed 9,000 men. These made a
most obstinate and skilful defence in the village of Bambeke, and
thereafter at Hondschoote; but the inequality of force was too great;
and they were outflanked and driven back towards Furnes and Nieuport
with the loss of 2,600 men (6th to 8th September). The garrison also
attacked the besiegers and received much assistance from French gunboats
moored near the shore. It was an unfortunate circumstance that a storm
on 1st September had compelled a British frigate and a sloop to leave
their moorings. Even so, the duke's force beat back their assailants
into the town. But the defeat of the covering army at Hondschoote placed
it between the French, the walls of Dunkirk, and the sea. Only by a
speedy retreat could he save his men; and at midnight he drew off,
leaving behind 32 siege guns and large quantities of stores.[233]
At once there arose an outcry against our naval and transport
authorities for not sending a squadron to cover the right flank of the
Duke of York opposite Dunkirk. Elliot reports that the duke violently
censured Richmond, head of the Ordnance Department, and Chatham, First
Lord of the Admiralty, the latter of whom was universally allowed to be
incompetent. Elliot adds: "I have seen Dundas and Pitt since the bad
news. Dundas seems much dismayed. Pitt tried to carry it off
better."[234] Certainly the delay in sending ships and stores was
discreditable to all concerned. But the decisive action was that of
Hondschoote, six miles distant from the coast, and that reverse was due
to the inability of Coburg to spare the reinforcements which Murray
pressed him to send. On its side the French Government was ill satisfied
with the success at Hondschoote. Censuring Houchard for not pressing his
advantage to the utmost and capturing the duke's whole army, it replaced
him by his young and energetic subaltern, an ex-draper named Jourdan,
who was destined to become one of Napoleon's marshals, while Houchard
speedily went to the guillotine. By these drastic methods France found
leaders who could conquer. For them the inspiring thought was--victory
or the guillotine.
The news of the failure at Dunkirk shattered Pitt's hope of a speedy end
to the war. That he faced the prospect of a second campaign with his
usual buoyancy appears from some notes which bear the date 16th
September [1793] and are headed: "Force to be employed in Flanders, or
on the coast of France in the Channel and the Ocean." He proposes to
increase 9 regiments at home to 800 men apiece, to raise 8 new
regiments; and these, along with Guards and troops from Ireland would
number at least 20,000. He also hoped that at least 20,000 more
Austrians and about 25,000 Bavarians would be available for Flanders,
raising the total force in that quarter to 175,000 men.[235] These
roseate views are apt to provoke derision; but we must remember that not
until the close of the year 1793 did the Republic put forth her full
strength and beat back her enemies at all points.
It would be tedious to follow in detail the rest of Coburg's operations
in Flanders. Early in September he took Quesnoy, and then drew together
his forces for the capture of the intrenched camp at Maubeuge. In this
he seemed about to succeed, when Jourdan's relieving force of 60,000
men, handled by Carnot, drove the Austrians back at Wattignies with much
loss, and thus saved the garrison at Maubeuge, now in dire straits. On
that day, 16th October, the head of Marie Antoinette fell at Paris.
As for the Duke of York's army, after remaining in a sorry plight near
Ostend, it moved forward to Quesnoy to prolong Coburg's right; but the
retreat of the main body involved his retirement towards Ostend, near
which town he routed some detachments of French. For a time the Allies
gained a few advantages and recovered lost ground. But the Republicans
more than made up for occasional losses by pouring troops into Flanders;
and, moving under cover of their fortresses, they often dealt heavy
blows. In quality the Austrians and British far surpassed the raw levies
of France; but these, having the advantage in number and position, could
take the offensive along a wide ill-defended front. Wherever Coburg and
the Duke of York attacked, they gained an advantage, soon to be lost in
face of the gathering masses of the enemy. As Coburg pointed out, France
sent forth another horde to take the place of one which perished or
melted away; and the Allies rarely had the chance of taking the
offensive. By this last statement he passed sentence against himself. An
able commander, even with inferior forces, will mass them so as to
strike with effect. Pitt and Grenville continually pressed him to form
some plan of action in conjunction with the Duke of York; but to this he
as persistently demurred.[236] Is it surprising that Pitt demanded the
removal of Coburg?
The Rhenish campaign, in which Austria took more interest, also
languished owing to the sluggishness of the Duke of Brunswick. This, in
its turn, resulted from political reasons. Frederick William, in spite
of his treaty obligations to England, refused to move forward until she
guaranteed his late gains in Poland and made further advances of money.
Then, too, he felt no interest in Austria's proposed acquisition of
parts of Alsace and Lorraine. Pitt and Grenville despatched Lord
Yarmouth to the King's headquarters to make a formal protest against the
proposed withdrawal of the Prussian army. Finally, Frederick William
gave the order to advance, but too late to gain the results which prompt
and vigorous co-operation with the Austrians should have achieved.[237]
In short, the course of events in 1793 affords the classic example of
the collapse of vast and imposing efforts owing to division of interests
and the intrusion of jealousies and intrigues. Pitt and Grenville did
their best to keep the Coalition united and active; but a Power which
granted only limited help could not impart that unity of design without
which great enterprises come to naught.
FOOTNOTES:
[196] "Dropmore P.," ii, 377.
[197] "Parl. Hist.," xxx, 565.
[198] "Dropmore P.," ii, 378; Prior, "Burke," 368.
[199] "Life of Wilberforce," ii, 11. Note the statement of George Rose
to Auckland (8th February, 1793): "Our revenue goes on gloriously. The
year ending 5th January shows £300,000 more than the year preceding....
We may suffer in some respects; but we must crush the miscreants"(B.M.
Add. MSS., 34448).
[200] "F. O.," Austria, 32 (Stratton to Grenville, 22nd December, 1792).
Cobenzl, Austrian Chancellor, assured Stratton that Francis II would
require from France "l'établissement d'une constitution quelconque
fondée sur les bases les plus essentiels du gouvernement monarchique."
In view of these considerations I cannot endorse Lecky's censure (vi,
134) on Pitt's "blindness" as to the character of the war.
[201] Sir James Murray, our envoy at Frankfurt, was assured on 1st
February that 138,419 Austrians were ready for the campaign.
[202] B.M. Add. MSS., 34448.
[203] See Martens, v, 530-5, for the Russo-Prussian treaty of 13th July
1793.
[204] Murray to Grenville, 19th January 1793; see "Pitt and Napoleon
Miscellanies," which also contain the new letters of Burke referred to
above.
[205] Vivenot, ii, 498-506.
[206] Martens, v, 438-42.
[207] Hon. J. W. Fortescue, "Hist. of the British Army," iv, 77-83.
[208] Pretyman MSS.
[209] Chevening MSS.
[210] Murray reported to Grenville on 10th and 18th February that the
Allies at Frankfurt were disturbed by news of the negotiation with
Dumouriez. See too, Vivenot, ii, 489.
[211] "Dropmore P.," ii, 377-81; "Dumouriez," by J. H. Rose and A. M.
Broadley, 162-75.
[212] "F. O.," Austria, 32, Morton Eden to Grenville, 30th March.
[213] "War Office" 6, (7); 23rd February, to Duke of York; B.M. Add. MSS
34448, Grenville to Auckland, 23rd February; Calvert, "Campaigns in
Flanders and Holland," chs. i, ii.
[214] This letter (for which see "Pitt and Napoleon Miscellanies")
corrects Mr. Fortescue's statement (iv, 125) that Ministers alone were
responsible for the Dunkirk scheme. George III was morally responsible
for it.
[215] "Dropmore P.," ii, 387.
[216] "F. O.," Austria, 33, Eden to Grenville, 27th and 28th March, 10th
April; Vivenot, ii, 541; Häusser, i, 483.
[217] _Ibid._, Eden to Grenville, 15th April. This probably refers to
Alsace; but it may possibly hint at a partition of Venice which had been
mooted at Vienna before. A slice of Piedmont was also desired (Eden to
Grenville, 8th June).
[218] _Ibid._, Eden to Grenville, 30th March.
[219] The West India expedition was again and again deferred in favour
of that to la Vendée or Toulon (Vivenot, iii, 383).
[220] Sybel, iii, 38-40; Häusser, i, 488, 489.
[221] Pretyman MSS. I have published the letter of 5th April 1793 almost
in full in the "Eng. Hist. Rev." for April 1910.
[222] "Dropmore P.," ii, 388-93, 399.
[223] "F. O.," France, 42. I cannot agree with Sorel (iii, 405) in
taking the French overtures seriously.
[224] "W. O.," 6 (10), Dundas to Murray (now secretary to the Duke of
York).
[225] Calvert, 80.
[226] Calvert, ch. iii; Fortescue, iv, 111.
[227] "Dropmore P.," iii, 493.
[228] "Dropmore P.," ii, 436.
[229] Sybel, iii, 136, 137.
[230] "Mems. of Sir G. Elliot (Earl of Minto)," ii, 159.
[231] "W. O.," 6 (10), 1st August, to Sir J. Murray, which corrects the
statement in Sybel (iii, 140), that England meant to keep Dunkirk.
[232] "Malmesbury Diaries," iii, 18.
[233] Calvert, 119-21.
[234] "Mems. of Sir G. Elliot," ii, 160.
[235] Pitt MSS., 196.
[236] Vivenot, iii, 352, 353.
[237] _Ibid._, 320, 321, 339, 379, 380; "Dropmore P.," ii, 470, 536. In
the last passage Yarmouth accuses the King of Prussia of deliberately
thwarting the action of the Austrian army under Wurmser.
CHAPTER VI
TOULON
Delay leads impotent and snail-paced beggary:
Then fiery expedition be my wing,
Jove's Mercury, and herald for a King.
--SHAKESPEARE, _King Richard III_, act iv, sc. 3.
The enterprise destined to develop into the occupation of Toulon arose
out of the negotiations for alliance with Austria, Sardinia, and Naples.
By the first of these England pledged herself to send a considerable
fleet into the Mediterranean, as an effective help to the military
operations then going on in the Maritime Alps and the Genoese Riviera.
Indeed, the Court of Vienna made this almost a _sine quâ non_ of its
alliance. On its side the British Government gained assurances of
military aid from Sardinia and Naples, the former of those States
agreeing to furnish 20,000 troops in return for the annual subsidy of
£200,000.
Here, then, were the foundations of a Mediterranean policy on which Pitt
and his colleagues began to build in the years 1793-4, with the singular
and unforeseen results at Toulon and in Corsica. Everything favoured
some such design. The French marine was enfeebled by mutiny, and, as the
spring of 1793 merged into summer, there came ominous signs of revolt in
the South against the Jacobin faction supreme at Paris. Accordingly
Grenville urged the Hapsburg Court, in return for British help in
Flanders, to assist an expedition of the Allies to the coast of
Provence. The conduct of the Austrian Chancellor, Thugut, was
characteristic. Far from strengthening the Imperial forces in Italy, he
prepared to withdraw some of them for the Rhenish campaign, now that a
British fleet spread its covering wings over the Kingdom of
Sardinia.[238]
Nevertheless the British Ministers persevered with their scheme; but
whether they at first aimed at Corsica or Toulon is uncertain.[239]
Certain it is that Pitt on 19th July proposed to detach three line
regiments from the Duke of York's force in Flanders and send them to the
Mediterranean along with one brigade of the Hessian corps and a body of
Würtembergers. He pointed out that the naval superiority of Hood and the
Spanish fleet in that sea would enable us to strike a telling blow at
Provence if we were helped by Sardinians, Neapolitans, and Austrians
from the Milanese. He admitted the strength of the arguments in favour
of our land forces acting together on one point; but he added: "What I
now mention seems to offer a fair chance of doing something material in
the South [of France], and, if we distress the enemy on more sides than
one, while their internal distraction continues, it seems hardly
possible that they can long oppose any effectual resistance."[240]
Pitt wrote thus at the time when Mainz and Valenciennes were on the
point of surrender, and the Bretons, together with nearly the whole of
the South of France, were in open revolt against the regicide Republic.
Equally characteristic of his sanguine temperament is his Memorandum of
23rd August 1793 as to the allied forces which ought to be available for
service against France in June 1794, namely, 30,000 in Flanders, while
50,000 marched thence on Paris; 50,000 to attack Brest, and as many more
to attack Toulon.[241]
It so chanced that on that very day the ardour of the Provençaux brought
about a very different situation. The arrival of Hood's fleet encouraged
the moderates to send two Commissioners, representing the two coast
Departments, to seek help from the British fleet. Thereupon on his
flagship, the "Victory," Hood drew up a public Declaration that, if the
ships-of-war in Toulon and Marseilles were unrigged and the French Royal
standard hoisted, he would take those cities under his protection,
respect private property and, on the conclusion of peace, restore the
warships to the French monarchy. He then sent to a Spanish squadron,
under Langara, cruising off the coast of Roussillon, with a request for
help. That officer soon had the promise of 2,000 Spanish troops, to be
detached from the army invading that province. The Jacobin forces under
Carteaux having crushed the moderates in Marseilles, Hood made for
Toulon, though as yet the Spanish ships were not in sight. He cast
anchor in the outer roadstead on 27th August, and landed 1,500 men near
Fort Lamalgue, east of the town. In the afternoon fifteen Spanish ships
arrived, and on the next day landed 1,000 men. On the 28th Hood also
issued a proclamation to the effect that he would hold Toulon in trust
only for Louis XVII until peace should be restored to France.[242] To
this the Toulonese assented; the opposition of some of their sailors and
troops soon collapsed; and a detachment of Carteaux' force was easily
dislodged from a strong position near Ollioules, north-west of the town
(31st August). Toulon therefore seemed a sure gain for the royalist
cause.
Yet Pitt and his colleagues were careful not to identify themselves with
that cause. Hood, having implied in his Toulon proclamation that one of
the objects of Great Britain was the restoration of the French monarchy,
Ministers warned him that "the true ground of the war was to repel an
unjust and unprovoked aggression against His Majesty, and his Allies,
and the rest of Europe, which had been evidently threatened and
endangered by the conduct of France." True, in the course of the
struggle England had supported the French Royalists, and might find it
prudent, especially in view of the events at Toulon, to assist in
restoring monarchy. "But," adds Lord Chatham, "it is to be considered as
arising out of the circumstances and founded on the considerations which
I have stated, and not as making part of the object for which His
Majesty originally took up arms."[243] This gentle rebuke to Hood (an
impetuous and opinionated officer), clearly shows the attitude of the
Cabinet towards that problem. For Great Britain the re-establishment of
monarchy was not an affair of principle, but solely of expediency. It is
also noteworthy that the inhabitants of Toulon retained the tricolour
flag, thus signifying their adhesion to constitutional royalism as
established in 1791.
The fortunes of the Republic now appeared desperate; and the Allies
would certainly have triumphed had they put forth a tithe of the energy
developed by the Jacobins at Paris. With ordinarily good management on
the part of Austria, Sardinia, and Naples, Toulon might have become the
centre of a great royalist movement in the South. That was certainly the
expectation of Pitt; and Langara, the Spanish admiral at Toulon,
expressed to his Government the hope that the war would soon end with
honour.[244]
No one at first realized the difficulties of the enterprise. The
ramparts of Toulon were extensive; and the outlying forts, from Lamalgue
on the east to Mount Faron on the north, and the works on the west and
south-west, spread over a circumference of fully fifteen miles. Then
again the French royalist committee in Toulon was somewhat suspicious of
the Allies. In truth a blight seemed to settle on the royalist cause
when it handed over to foreigners one of the cherished citadels of
France. Loyalty to Louis XVII now spelt treason to the nation. The
crisis is interesting because it set sharply against one another the
principles of monarchy and nationality; and the sequel proved that the
national idea, though still far from mature even in France, had more
potency than royalism. A keen-sighted observer had very forcibly warned
the Marseillais against delivering their city into the hands of the
Spaniards, a crime which must ruin their efforts. Such was the judgement
of Bonaparte in that curious pamphlet "Le Souper de Beaucaire."
Other invisible agencies, those of time and space, told against the
Allies. Despatches sent by Hood were at least eleven days in reaching
their destination, and often far longer. Consequently, the plans framed
at home were always belated. The first tidings (received on 7th
September) found the Cabinet half committed to another enterprise, that
in the West Indies, which Pitt very reluctantly postponed owing to the
drain of troops to Flanders and Toulon. A further disadvantage was that
disputes between the British and Spanish commanders at Toulon were known
at Whitehall long after they had come to a head; and the final reports
of the sore straits of the garrison led to the despatch to Cork of
orders for the sailing of reinforcements five days after the evacuation
began at Toulon.
In these brisk and giddy-paced times it is difficult to realize the
difficulties which then beset British commanders warring in the
Mediterranean against an enemy who could send news to Paris in three
days. Now the telegraph has annihilated space; but then, as in the
campaigns of Francis I against Charles V, the compactness of France and
her central position told enormously in her favour. The defence of
Toulon was practicable, provided that adequate reinforcements arrived in
time. As will soon appear, Pitt urged the despatch of strong
reinforcements from Ireland; and, but for delays due to the want of
transports, things might have gone very differently at Toulon. He also
expected Austria to send succours if only as a means of protecting her
Italian possessions. In truth, if the Hapsburgs had discerned the signs
of the times, they would have taken steps to defend the Milanese at
Toulon. They were destined to rue their folly.
Further, on 14th September, despite bad news from Dunkirk, Dundas issued
orders that 4,000 Hessians, serving under the Duke of York, must be
withdrawn in order to strengthen the garrison at Toulon, their place
being taken by others hired at Cassel. On 28th September Dundas added
that the artillery sent for Dunkirk would be withdrawn from Flanders as
it was urgently needed at Toulon. Thus these two expeditions competed
together, and produced a dislocation of plans and ordering of troops to
and fro, which told against success in either quarter. By 27th October
Ministers definitely decided that Toulon, or la Vendée, was a better
fulcrum for their scanty forces than Flanders.[245] Even so, with all
these dislocations of the Flemish plans, Pitt and Dundas relied too much
upon Austria; and all too late found out that she was a broken reed. The
Sardinians, also, lacking due support from the Court of Vienna, were
afraid to denude their borders and therefore sent an inadequate
contingent, despite the fact that they had promised to place 20,000
troops at the disposal of England free from all expense.
Far different was the procedure of the French. Carnot determined to
retake Lyons and Toulon, even if the efforts against Spain and Sardinia
had to be relaxed. Further, on the 16th of September there arrived at
the Republican army west of Toulon the incarnation of warlike energy and
skill. At the bidding of the Commissioners of the Convention, Napoleon
Bonaparte had come from the arsenal at Marseilles to assist the few
artillerymen then before Toulon. On the 17th he was placed in command
of their insignificant siege artillery, and forthwith from the slopes
two miles west of the town he opened fire on the nearest ships. It is
incorrect to claim for him the origination of the plan of sinking the
fleet by a fire from the height behind l'Eguilette; for three days
earlier the Commissioners of the Convention had written that they would
secure a position whence the allied fleet could be sunk by red-hot
cannon-balls; and there was no point but the high ground behind Fort
l'Eguilette which dominated both the inner and the outer harbours.[246]
But it may freely be granted that Bonaparte clinched the arguments in
favour of this course and brought to bear on it that masterful energy
which assures triumph. It was the first occasion on which he crossed the
path of Pitt; and here, as always, he had the advantage of a central
position, and of wielding a compact and homogeneous force against
discordant Allies.
The worst difficulty confronting the defenders of Toulon remains to be
noted. There the Sea Power is at the mercy of the Land Power. To attempt
to defend that city at the head of its land-locked harbour, dominated by
promontories, was to court disaster unless the fleet had an army to
protect it. In such a case a fleet is a source of danger rather than of
safety. Its true function is to act where it can, either directly or
indirectly, command the land. It operates with most effect against low
and exposed coasts. St. Jean d'Acre affords, perhaps, the best example
of a town at the mercy of a fleet. Portsmouth, Sydney, Brest, and Toulon
cannot be held by an enemy unless he brings forces sufficient to hold
the neighbouring heights. In occupying Toulon, the Sea Power was
virtually putting its head into the lion's jaw. Only by degrees did the
authorities at home understand this all-important fact. For some time it
was veiled from Pitt; and, as we shall see, the Austrian Chancellor,
Thugut, never did understand it. To those who were on the spot, the need
of occupying the promontory behind l'Eguilette was apparent; and on 21st
September Lord Mulgrave and Rear-Admiral Gravina led a force to seize
the very height on which Bonaparte's will had already fastened. The
Allies crowned it with a temporary work dignified by the name of Fort
Mulgrave. The fortunes of Toulon turned on the possession of all the
heights commanding the harbour, but especially of this one.
[Illustration: THE SIEGE OF TOULON, 1793, from "L'Histoire de
France depuis la Révolution de 1789," by Emmanuel Toulougeon,
Paris, An. XII. [1803]. A. Fort Mulgrave. A'. Promontory of
L'Eguillette. 1 and 2. Batteries. 3. Battery "Hommes sans Peur."
The black and shaded rectangles are the Republican and Allied
positions respectively.]
Even before the arrival of Bonaparte the difficulties of defence were
very great. A British naval officer wrote on the 14th to Lord St.
Helens, British ambassador at Madrid, that the situation of the little
garrison was very critical owing to daily attacks from the 5,000 French
at Ollioules and the same number on the eastern side. The Allies, he
added, could not wholly trust the French royalists serving with them,
and they were glad to send away on four French sail-of-the-line some
6,000 French sailors who had bargained to be landed on the Biscay coast.
Having only 1,570 British and 3,460 Spaniards, they could scarcely man
the ramparts and forts, several of which, especially those on Mount
Faron, were not nearly ready. The houses of the town were far too near
to the ramparts; but the Allies dared not demolish them until
reinforcements arrived. Fortunately the Spanish Admiral, Gravina, was
alert, intelligent, and trustworthy; and Piedmontese were known to be
advancing over the Maritime Alps into the county of Nice. Part of Hood's
fleet was engaged in intercepting the supplies and stores destined for
the Republicans.[247]
The letter brings out vividly the perils of the garrison, which must
have evacuated Toulon had not reinforcements speedily arrived. On 26th
September Hood wrote that the Allies were kept in perpetual alarm by the
French batteries, which must be kept under at all risks, until more
troops arrived.[248] Fortunately the foresight of Pitt and Grenville had
provided the means of backing up operations in the Mediterranean. Apart
from the treaty with Sardinia, there was a compact with Naples, whereby
that Court promised a force of 6,000 men and 12 warships, the naval
expenses being borne by England.[249] By 5th October 1,350 Sardinian
and 4,000 Neapolitan troops arrived, thus enabling the garrison to hold
up against the ever increasing forces of the Republicans. On the other
hand, the fall of Lyons on 9th October set free large numbers who were
available for service at Toulon. Consequently the troops and seamen of
the Allies were persistently overworked, so that Hood was constrained to
hire 1,500 Maltese seamen, to take the place of those serving the
batteries. At first only 750 British troops could be spared from
Gibraltar; but by the end of October, when further help was at hand, the
allied forces (rank and file) stood as follows:
British 2,114
French Royalists 1,542
Spaniards 6,840
Neapolitans 4,832
Sardinians 1,584
------
16,912
------
So exacting was the service, and so unhealthy the season (it cost
Bonaparte a sharp attack of malarial fever), that the number fit for
duty did not exceed 12,000.
It is interesting to compare these figures with the estimate of Pitt
which is in the Pitt MSS. (No. 196).
_September 16._
Force which it is supposed may be collected at Toulon by the end
of October or early in November:
Rank and File.
British Marines 1,500
" flank companies from Gibraltar 600
" " " " Ireland 2,000[250]
" Two battalions from Flanders (to be replaced by
detachments from the Guards) 1,200
" Cavalry from Ireland 900
Hessians from Flanders (to be replaced by the additional
corps ordered) 5,000
Spanish (suppose) 3,000
Neapolitan 6,000
Sardinian 9,000
Austrian 5,000
------
Total 33,200
[_sic_--really 34,200.]
This Force may be estimated (allowing for some deduction) at
30,000 men. To this may possibly be added some Force from
Corsica, and probably early in the spring, an additional body of
11,000 Sardinians, perhaps also of 10,000 Austrians, and some
troops of Baden from hence. Possibly also a body of Swiss, and
in the course of the next summer (if the expedition to the West
Indies is successful) about 4,000 or 5,000 British on their
return from the Islands. If 10,000, or 12,000, Swiss can be
secured, it seems not unreasonable to expect that, by the
beginning of next year, there may be an army in the South of
France of near 60,000 men.
Pitt, then, regarded Toulon as the base of operations in the South of
France so extensive as to deal a decisive blow at the Republic. The
scheme was surely due to the influence of Bacchus rather than of Mars.
For how was it possible to spare 6,200 men from the Duke of York's
force, then hard pressed after its retreat from Dunkirk? The estimate of
the Sardinian contingent was based on the treaty obligations of that
Power rather than on probable performance; while that for the Spaniards
is strangely beneath the mark. How boyishly hopeful also to suppose that
the British forces destined for the future conquest of Corsica could
spare a contingent for service in Provence in the spring of 1794, and
that the nervous little Court of Turin would send an _additional_ body
of 11,000 men far into France. Thus early in Pitt's strategic
combinations we can detect the vitiating flaw. He did not know men, and
therefore he did not know Cabinets. He believed them to be acting
according to his own high standard of public duty and magnanimous
endeavour. Consequently he never allowed for the calculating meanness
which shifted the burdens on to other shoulders.
The one factor on which he had a right to count was the despatch of a
respectable force of Austrians from the Milanese by way of Genoa. The
Austrian Governor of Milan promised to send 5,000 men; but not a man
ever stirred.[251] Hood did not hear this disappointing news till 24th
November.[252] He at once sent off to London an urgent request for
succour; and orders were given _on 23rd December_ (the day after the
arrival of the news) for three regiments to sail from Cork for his
relief. Thus it came about that 12,000 Allies were left unsupported at
Toulon to bear the brunt of attacks of some 40,000 Frenchmen now
directed by a genius. O'Hara, who took over the command on his arrival
on 27th October, at once gave a verdict consonant with his pessimistic
character. Hood wrote on the morrow to Dundas: "General O'Hara has just
been with me and alarmed me much. He says our posts are not tenable and
that we are in a dangerous situation for lack of troops that can be
relied upon. And, what is very unpleasant, is the conduct of the
Spaniards, who are striving for power here." On 11th November O'Hara
reported that, in the absence of engineer officers, the forts had been
injudiciously constructed; that their garrisons began to suffer from
exposure to the bleak weather; that the broken and wooded country
greatly favoured the advance of the enemy, and hampered all efforts to
dislodge him; that the Spaniards and Sardinians had no artillery, tools,
or camp equipments; and that the only means of securing Toulon was to
have an army capable of taking the field.[253] Hood and he therefore
counted the hours for the arrival of 5,000 Austrians from Genoa, and of
troops from England.
The difficulties of the Allies were enhanced by the disputes which soon
arose between the British and Spaniards as to the command of the
garrison. The tactful Gravina having been badly wounded in driving the
French from Mount Faron, Langara put in a claim that his successor
should be commander-in-chief of the allied forces (23rd October). To
this Hood stoutly demurred, on the ground that he received Toulon in
trust before the Spaniards appeared; and, though it was true that the
Spanish troops outnumbered the British, yet the command of the
Neapolitan and Sardinian contingents belonged of right to the
subsidizing Power. He therefore claimed the supreme command for General
O'Hara. This matter caused much annoyance at Madrid, where that rankling
sore, Nootka Sound, was still kept open by the all-powerful Minister,
Alcudia. Hood's testiness increased the friction at Toulon. The
Spaniards were justified in claiming equality at that fortress; for only
by their arrival did the position become tenable; and the joint
proclamations of Hood and Langara formed a tacit admission of that
equality. But Pitt early resolved to take a firm stand on this subject.
On 17th October, in discussing the instructions for Sir Gilbert Elliot,
the British Commissioner designated for Toulon, he declared that we must
appoint him governor of that town in consequence of its surrender to
us.[254]
Pitt kept up this stiff attitude, and on 30th November stated to St.
Helens that, as Toulon surrendered to Hood alone (Langara having
declined to share in the original enterprise) England must appoint the
commander-in-chief, especially as she could not transfer to a Spaniard
the command of her subsidized Allies. The despatch concluded thus: "His
Majesty has in no case any view upon that place different from that
which has been avowed in his name--that at the conclusion of peace that
port should be restored to the crown of France and that in the interval
it should serve in His Majesty's hands as a means of carrying on the war
and as a pledge of indemnity to him and his Allies, including the Crown
of Spain, whose claim to indemnity His Majesty has so distinctly
avowed."[255]
These words were added because the French Royalists and the Spaniards
asserted that England's high-handed conduct at Toulon arose from her
resolve to make of it a second Gibraltar. The insinuation struck home
then, and has been widely repeated.[256] But, on the first receipt of
the news of the gain of Toulon, Grenville declared explicitly to the
Austrian Court "that whatever indemnification is to be acquired by this
country must be looked for in the foreign settlements and colonies of
France."[257] As we shall see in later chapters, Corsica and the French
West Indies were the acquisitions aimed at by the Pitt Ministry.
Some colour was given to this charge by the refusal of the British
Government to allow the Comte de Provence, the _soi-disant_ Regent of
France, to proceed to Toulon. Grenville even instructed Francis Drake,
our envoy at Genoa, to prevent him embarking at that port. At first
sight this conduct seems indefensible, especially as the Court of Madrid
favoured the Prince's scheme. It must be remembered, however, that the
British Government had consistently refused to acknowledge the Prince as
Regent, and was now exceedingly annoyed with him for announcing his
resolve to go to Toulon, without first applying for permission to
George III.[258] This violation of etiquette prejudiced his case from
the outset. Further, the Royalists of Toulon had declared for
Louis XVII, and a majority of them throughout France opposed the claim
of "Monsieur" to the Regency. The constitution of 1791 gave him no such
right on his own initiative; and, as Toulon stood for that constitution,
not for the "pure" royalism which he now championed, his arrival would
place the garrison "at the discretion of wild and hot-headed emigrants
and expose them to the reproaches and discontents of the Regent's
Court."[259] Besides, what could the Regent of France do in Toulon, a
town closely besieged and in danger of being taken? His dignity and
influence would be far better maintained by remaining at large than by
proceeding thither.[260]
Finally, the two princes had given no assurance or promise that they
would recognize the claims of the Allies to indemnities from France for
the expenses of the war.[261] On this last matter the _émigrés_ were
beginning to raise shrill protests at London; and it was certainly wise
to come to some understanding with the princes on this point before
they were put in possession of Provence. Pitt and Grenville were not
made of the same stuff as the Ministers in power in 1815, who demanded
no return for the sacrifices of blood and treasure in the Waterloo
campaign. None the less, it is certain that Pitt and his cousin had no
thought of keeping either Dunkirk or Toulon, save as a pledge for the
acquisition of some of the French West Indies and Corsica.[262] This was
hinted at plainly in the British Declaration issued at Toulon on 20th
November:
That altho' at the conclusion of peace, we shall think ourselves
entitled to stipulate such terms as may afford just security to
ourselves and our Allies, and a reasonable indemnification for
the risks and expenses of a war in which, without any
provocation on our part, we have been compelled to engage, yet
that, for our part our views of indemnification can only have
relation to places not on the Continent of Europe.
After this explicit statement, there ought to have been no bickerings
about British aggrandisement at Toulon. Some of the hot-heads in that
town (echoed by Fox later on at Westminster) chose to consider the
Declaration as an infraction of Hood's promise that he would hold Toulon
merely in trust for Louis XVII. The difference, however was not vital.
Pitt and Grenville intended to hold Toulon merely as a pledge that the
British claims to an indemnity elsewhere would be satisfied. Spain had
most cause for annoyance with the Declaration, inasmuch as she, though
having a superior number of troops in that town, was neither allowed to
consider it as a pledge for her future indemnities, nor to share in its
government. It was confided to three Commissioners--Sir Gilbert Elliot,
Hood, and O'Hara, Elliot being virtually Governor.
In one other matter the Courts of St. James and of Madrid were at
variance. The latter urged the need of speedily removing the French
warships from Toulon to a Spanish port, or of making preparations for
burning them. Whereas Pitt, who regarded Toulon, not as a windfall, but
as a base of operations for a campaign in Provence, maintained that such
conduct must blight their prospects. With phenomenal stupidity, Langara
allowed his secret instructions on this topic to leak out, thereby
rousing the rage of the Toulonese and the contempt of his British
colleagues. The Duke of Alcudia (better known as Godoy) expressed
sincere regret for this _bêtise_. But the mischief was done. The French
royalists thenceforth figured as traitors who had let in a band of
thieves intent only on the seizure of the French warships.
As if this were not enough, Hood quarrelled with our military officers,
with results highly exasperating to our land forces.[263] These last did
not shine during the siege. True, in the sortie of 29th November they
captured a battery recently erected north of Malbosquet; but, their
eagerness exceeding their discipline, they rushed on, despite orders to
remain in the battery, like a pack of hounds after a fox (wrote
Hood);[264] whereupon the French rushed upon them, driving them back
with heavy loss. O'Hara, while striving to retrieve the day, was wounded
and captured. His mantle of gloom devolved upon Major-General David
Dundas, a desponding officer, who had recently requested leave to return
on furlough on the ground of ill health and inability to cope with the
work. This general's letters to his ever confident relative, Henry
Dundas, at Whitehall, were always in a minor key. In his eyes the
Spanish troops were "everything that is bad"; half of the Toulonese were
hostile to the Allies; and the latter were heavily handicapped by having
to defend their own fleets. There was some truth in this; but the
whining tone of the letters, due to ill health, drew from the Minister a
stinging retort, to the effect that the occupation of Toulon had taken
Ministers wholly by surprise; that they had done their best to comply
with the new demands for troops, and expected their general not to look
at his own difficulties alone, but to remember those of the enemy and
endeavour to beat him.[265]
This was the spirit in which Hood faced the problem. Even at the close
of November, when all hope of the arrival of the 5,000 Austrians was
past, he refused to listen to David Dundas's advice for the evacuation
of Toulon; and surely this pertinacity was consonant with the traditions
of the British navy, and of the army in its better days; but out of
this question arose a feud between army and navy which developed in
Corsica with disastrous results. Ministers strove to send all the
succour available. But they did not hear until 22nd December that the
5,000 Austrians were being withheld. Henry Dundas's letter of the 28th
also breathes deep concern at the news that Sir R. Boyd had not
forwarded from Gibraltar the reinforcements ordered thence. Further, it
appears from an official estimate drawn up at Whitehall on 18th
December, that the troops already at or ordered to Toulon were believed
to be as follows: British, 2,828; Spanish, 4,147; Sardinians, 2,162;
Neapolitans, 8,600. Dundas also included the 1,100 British troops
ordered from Gibraltar (where at that time there was no chance of an
attack), and 2,361 men under directions to sail from Cork, but which
could not stir owing to the non-arrival of the transports.[266] The
resulting total of 21,198 is, of course, merely a sign of Henry Dundas's
optimism. But obviously Ministers were unaware of the acute crisis at
Toulon at the time of its surrender. In the age of telegraphy, that
disaster would have been averted. The delays of the Austrians, and the
muddles at Gibraltar and Cork, would have been known betimes.
Strange to say, there was at that time lying at anchor at Spithead a
force under Lord Moira's command, destined for Brittany, but held back
for various causes, which would probably have turned the balance at
Toulon, had Ministers known of the dire need of reinforcements. It is
mortifying to read the letters of Pitt and the Marquis of Buckingham
early in December, complaining that Moira's force is strangely
inactive.[267] Still more startling is it to read the hurried order of
23rd December (six days after the loss of Toulon), that the 40th
regiment, then unexpectedly detained at Cork, though detached for
service with Lord Moira, should set sail at once for the French
stronghold along with the other regiments also detained at Cork.[268]
What might not have happened, had those troops set sail for Toulon
before the close of November?
Hero-worshippers will probably maintain that, even if Toulon had been
held harmoniously by all the troops which the imagination of Pitt and
Dundas conjured up, nevertheless the genius and daring of the little
Corsican would have prevailed. This view is tenable; but the prosaic
mind, which notes the venturesome extension of Bonaparte's batteries in
November-December, until they presented their right flanks to the cliffs
and their rear to the open sea, though at too high a level to be
cannonaded, will probably conclude that, if Hood and Langara had had a
force of 20,000 men, they could have driven the French from those works.
As it was, the Allies, not having enough men, stood on the defensive all
along their very extensive front, and were overpowered at Fort Mulgrave,
which was some miles away from the city. Its garrison of 700 men
(British, Spanish, and a few Neapolitans) was assailed in the stormy
night of 16th-17th December by 7,000 of the best of the Republican
troops. The ensuing conflict will best be understood from the hitherto
unpublished account given by the commander-in-chief. After describing
the heavy cannonade from three French batteries against Fort Mulgrave,
he continues thus:
H.M.S. "Victory," Hières Bay, _Dec. 21, 1793_.[269]
... The works suffered much. The number of men killed and
wounded was considerable. The weather was rainy and the
consequent fatigue great. At 2 a.m. of the 17th, the enemy, who
had every advantage in assembling and suddenly advancing,
attacked the fort in great force. Although no part of this
temporary post was such as could well resist determined troops,
yet for a considerable time it was defended; but, on the enemy
entering on the Spanish side, the British quarter, commanded by
Captain Conolly of the 18th regiment, could not be much longer
maintained, notwithstanding several gallant efforts were made
for that purpose. It was therefore at last carried, and the
remains of the garrison of 700 men retired towards the shore of
Balaguier, under the protection of the other posts established
on those heights, and which continued to be faintly attacked by
the enemy. As this position of Balaguier was a most essential
one for the preservation of the harbour, and as we had no
communication with it but by water, 2,200 men had been placed
there for some time past. On the night preceding the attack, 300
more men had been sent over, and on the morning of the 17th, 400
were embarked still further to support it.
When the firing at Balaguier ceased, we remained in anxious
suspense as to the event, till a little before daylight, when a
new scene opened by an attack on all our posts on Mt. Pharon.
The enemy were repulsed on the east side, where was our
principal force of about 700 men, commanded by a most
distinguished officer, the Piedmontese Colonel, de Jermagnan,
whose loss we deeply lament; but on the back of the
mountain--near 1,800 feet high, steep, rocky, deemed almost
inaccessible, and which we had laboured much to make so--they
found means once more to penetrate between our posts, which
occupied an extent of above two miles, guarded by about 450 men;
and in a very short space of time we saw that with great numbers
they crowned all that side of the mountain which overlooks the
town.
In this despatch David Dundas proclaimed his own incompetence. For some
time it had been obvious that the Republicans were about to attack Fort
Mulgrave, which everybody knew to be essential to the defence of the
fleet. Yet he took no steps to strengthen this "temporary post" so that
it might resist a determined attack. He also entrusted one half of the
battery to the Spaniards whom he had declared to be "everything that is
bad." On his own showing, as many as 2,500 allied troops were near at
hand on the Balaguier or Eguilette heights to act as supports, before
Bonaparte's attack began; and 400 more were sent thither soon
afterwards. A spirited attack by those troops on the victors at Fort
Mulgrave on its blind side might have retrieved the day; but a panic
seized part of the supports, whom Sidney Smith describes as rushing like
swine towards the sea though the enemy was only in a condition to attack
"faintly." Hood was furious at this spiritless acceptance of defeat; and
in his despatch to Whitehall censured the troops for not making a timely
effort;[270] but as David Dundas had all along opined that the place was
untenable, he decided to hold a council of war. It registered the wishes
of the desponding chief. The officers decided that it was impossible
either to retake the two positions lost, or to establish a post on the
outer, or Cepet, peninsula, capable of protecting the roadstead from the
cross fires which the French would pour in from the Balaguier and Cape
Brun promontories.
During the next three days the evacuation took place amidst scenes of
misery for the royalist refugees that baffle the imagination. As many as
14,877 were crowded on board the British ships, together with some 8,000
troops. At the same time Captains Sidney Smith, Hare, and Edge, with a
picked body of men burnt or otherwise damaged 27 French warships left in
the harbour, while 18 were brought away by the Allies. Eleven of the
twenty-seven were not seriously injured by the fire, and they afterwards
flew the tricolour. But the loss of 34 warships and nearly all the masts
and other valuable stores was a blow from which the French navy did not
recover until Bonaparte before his Egyptian expedition breathed his own
matchless vigour into the administration. In ships and stores, then,
France suffered far more heavily than the Allies. Their losses elude the
inquiries of the statistician. They consisted in the utter discredit of
the royalist cause throughout France, the resentment that ever follows
on clumsy or disloyal co-operation, and the revelation of the hollowness
of the imposing fabric of the First Coalition. In the south of France
four nations failed to hold a single fortress which her own sons had
placed in their power.
The Nemesis which waits upon weakness and vacillation has rarely
appeared in more mocking guise than at the close of the year 1793. About
the time when Toulon surrendered, the Austrian Government finally came
to the determination to despatch thither the 5,000 men which it had
formerly promised to send. Grenville received this news from Eden in the
first days of 1794, shortly after the surrender of the fortress was
known. Thereupon he penned these bitter words: "If the first promise had
been fulfilled agreeably to the expectation which His Majesty was
justified in forming, the assistance of such a body of disciplined
troops would have sufficed to ensure the defence of that important post;
and the injury which the common cause has sustained on this occasion can
be ascribed only to the tardiness and indecision which so strongly
characterize the Austrian Government."[271] Most tactfully he bade Eden
refrain from reproaches on this occasion and to use it merely as an
argument for throwing greater vigour into the next campaign.
Events pointed the moral far more strongly than Eden could do. As by a
lightning flash, the purblind politicians of Vienna could now discern
the storm-wrack drifting upon them. The weakness of the Piedmontese
army, their own unpreparedness in the Milanese, the friendliness of
Genoa to France, and the Jacobinical ferment in all parts of Italy,
portended a speedy irruption of the Republicans into an almost
defenceless land where they were sure of a welcome from the now awakened
populace. So long as Toulon held out, Piedmont and Milan were safe.
Now, the slackness of Austria enabled her future destroyer to place his
foot on the first rung of the ladder of fame, and prompted those mighty
plans for the conquest of the Italian States which were to ensure her
overthrow and his supremacy.
Well might Eden dwell on the consternation prevalent at Vienna early in
1794. For, along with news of the loss of Toulon, tidings of defeat and
retreat came from the Rhineland. Able and vigorous young generals, Hoche
and Pichegru, had beaten back Austrians and Prussians from the hills
around Wörth and Weissenburg; so that the Allies fell back with heavy
losses towards the Rhine. Thus, on the whole, the efforts of Austria,
Great Britain, Prussia, Holland, and some of the smaller German States
had availed merely to capture four fortresses, Mainz, Condé,
Valenciennes, and Quesnoy. It is not surprising that public opinion in
England, even in loyal circles, became clamorous against the conduct of
the war.[272]
Not the least of the misfortunes attending the Toulon episode was that
the logic of events, and also the growing savagery of the Reign of
Terror, edged Pitt away from his standpoint of complete neutrality as to
the future government of France. How could the ally of the Toulonese
Royalists profess indifference on that topic? On 5th October he wrote as
follows to Grenville respecting the powers to be granted to Sir Gilbert
Elliot at Toulon:
I do not see that we can go on secure grounds if we treat with
any separate districts or bodies of men [in France] who stop
short of some declaration in favour of monarchy: nor do I see
any way so likely to unite considerable numbers in one vigorous
effort as by specifying monarchy as the only system in the
re-establishment of which we are disposed to concur. This idea
by no means precludes us from treating with any other form of
regular Government, if, in the end, any other should be solidly
established; but it holds out monarchy as the only one from
which we expect any good, and in favour of which we are disposed
to enter into concert.[273]
These words are remarkable. Clearly, in Pitt's view of things,
"security" for England and Holland was the paramount aim; but he was
beginning to feel that the Republican groups which scrambled to power at
Paris over the headless trunks of their enemies, could offer no
adequate security. When the Revolution began to solidify, as it seemed
about to do in 1795-7, he was willing to treat with its chiefs; but
already he was feeling the horns of the dilemma, which may be described
in words adapted from Talleyrand's famous _mot_ of the year 1814:
"Either the Bourbons or the Republic: everything else is an intrigue."
The Toulon episode, more than anything else, bound France to the
regicide cause, and Pitt, albeit unwillingly, to the irreconcilable
Royalists. Thus the event which brought Bonaparte to the front,
shattered the aim of the Prime Minister to effect merely the restoration
of the Balance of Power.
FOOTNOTES:
[238] "F. O.," Austria, 33, Grenville to Eden, 11th June; Eden to
Grenville, 26th June.
[239] "Dropmore P.," ii, 392, 399, 407, 412. Spain hoped to find her
"indemnity" in Corsica. See too Fortescue, iv, 116, 117.
[240] See "Eng. Hist. Rev." for October 1909, p. 748.
[241] Pitt MSS., 196.
[242] "H. O.," Adm. Medit., 1793.
[243] _Ibid._
[244] "F. O.," Spain, 28. St. Helens to Grenville, 4th and 11th
September.
[245] "W. O.," 6 (10). See Fortescue (iv, pt. i, chs. vi, vii) for
criticisms of these measures.
[246] The arguments of Mr. Spenser Wilkinson in "Owens College Essays,"
do not convince me that Napoleon alone devised that plan. Chuquet's
conclusion ("Toulon," 176), "Bonaparte partageait l'avis des
représentants," seems to me thoroughly sound. So, too, Cottin, "Toulon
et les Anglais," ch. xi.
[247] "F. O.," Spain, 28.
[248] "H. O." (Adm. Medit., 1793). Nevertheless Hood sent off a small
squadron to offer help to Paoli in Corsica, but with very disappointing
results. On 7th October he writes: "Paoli is a composition of art and
deceipt [_sic_]." He also dwells on the hostile conduct of Genoa and
Tuscany.
[249] Martens, v, 473-83. In "H. O.," Secrs. of State, 4, is a despatch
of General Acton of 30th October 1793 to Sir W. Hamilton, stating that
when transports reach Naples, they will take off 1,200 more troops for
Toulon, making a total of 6,300. But ships and supplies of food were
wanting. The troops must be commanded by a Neapolitan, Marshal
Fortiquerri, whom Hood had censured for incompetence!
[250] On 15th September Pitt wrote to the Earl of Westmorland, Viceroy
of Ireland, asking him to send the flank companies (the best men) of the
regiments then in Ireland. Westmorland agreed on 18th September, but
said they could not sail in less than three weeks. As the crisis at
Toulon deepened, Pitt, about the middle of November, begged the Lord
Lieutenant to send the 35th, 41st, and 42nd regiments from Ireland to
Toulon. On 20th November Westmorland agreed (though pointing out the
danger of an Irish rising). On the 30th he said the two latter regiments
were ready to sail from Cork whenever the transports should arrive; but
the delays in the arrival and sailing of transports had always been
serious--a prophetic remark (Pitt MSS., 331).
[251] "Dropmore P.," ii, 471. Thugut took no interest whatever in Toulon
(see Vivenot, iii, 324, 327, 362, 363). Other proofs follow (pp. 381,
384) of the pressing demands which Grenville, also Mr. Trevor at Turin,
made for the fulfilment of the Emperor's promise. Some difficulties
supervened as to the provisioning of the 5,000 Austrian troops on the
march and the place of embarkation; but these were far from insuperable.
Clearly the operating cause was Thugut's conviction that there was at
Toulon a number of troops "excédant ce que toute place quelconque peut
exiger pour sa défense" (_ibid._, 385).
[252] "H. O." (Adm. Medit, 1793), Hood to Dundas, 24th November.
[253] _Ibid._ O'Hara to Hood. This reached London on 8th December; but,
as we have seen, Ministers up to 22nd December continued to rely on the
arrival of the Austrians as providing a sufficient reinforcement.
[254] "Dropmore P.," ii, 447; "Mems. of Sir G. Elliot," ii, 190, _et
seq._
[255] "F. O.," Spain, 28.
[256] Even by M. Cottin in his works, "Toulon et les Anglais,"
"L'Angleterre et les Princes."
[257] "F. O.," Austria, 34. Grenville to Eden, 7th September. So in his
letter of 4th October to Pitt he refers to "such other towns or
districts [in S. France] as may become objects of indemnity." See, too,
"Dropmore P.," ii, 412, 438; Vivenot, iii, 326.
[258] "Dropmore P.," iii, 487.
[259] "H. O.," 455, _ad fin._
[260] "Malmesbury Diaries," iii, 33.
[261] "F. O.," Spain, 28. Grenville to St. Helens, 22nd October 1793.
Cottin omits this despatch, which is essential to the understanding of
British policy. See for further details C. J. Fox, "Bonaparte at the
Siege of Toulon," bk. ii, ch. ii.
[262] "F. O.," Spain, 28. On 30th November Grenville instructed St.
Helens to express regret that Spain seemed to retract her wish,
previously expressed, that Corsica should go to England; and also to
advise that Spain should take her indemnity from France on the Pyrenean
frontier.
[263] Fortescue, iv, 172.
[264] "H. O.," Adm. Medit., 1793.
[265] "H. O.," Mil., 455. Fortescue (iv, 175) vehemently censures Henry
Dundas, but I think without sufficient ground. The letters of David
Dundas called for reproof. See Mr. Oscar Browning's "Youth of Napoleon"
(App. iv).
[266] Pitt MSS., 331; "H. O.," Mil., 455.
[267] "Dropmore P.," ii, 476, 477; "Mems. of Sir G. Elliot," ii, 198.
[268] Admiralty. Out Letters, xiii.
[269] "H. O.," Mil., 455.
[270] "H. O.," Adm. Medit., 1794.
[271] "F. O.," Austria, 36. Grenville to Eden, 3rd January 1794.
[272] Pellew, "Sidmouth," i, 112.
[273] "Dropmore P.," ii, 438.
CHAPTER VII
THE BRITISH JACOBINS
The much better way doubtless will be, in this wavering
condition of our affairs, to defer the changing or
circumscribing of our Senate more than may be done with ease
till the Commonwealth be thoroughly settled in peace and
safety.--MILTON, _A Free Commonwealth_.
But cease, ye fleecing Senators
Your country to undo,
Or know, we British _sans-culottes_
Hereafter may fleece you.
THELWALL, _A Shearing Song_.
The outbreak of hostilities often tends to embitter the strife of
parties. Those who oppose war find abundant cause for criticism in the
conduct of Ministers, who in their turn perforce adopt measures alien to
the traditions of Westminster. A system founded on compromise cannot
suddenly take on the ways of a military State; and efforts in this
direction generally produce more friction than activity. At such times
John Bull, flurried and angry, short-sighted but opinionated, bewildered
but dogged as ever, is a sight to move the gods to laughter and his
counsellors to despair.
The events of the session of 1793 illustrate my meaning. In view of the
notorious sympathy of the Radical Clubs with France, Pitt proposed a
Bill against Traitorous Correspondence with the enemy. Both he and Burke
proved that the measure, far from being an insidious attack on the
liberties of the subject, merely aimed at enforcing "the police of war."
Nevertheless, it passed only by a majority of one--a warning to the
Ministry not to proceed further in that doubtful course (9th April
1793). Pitt had the full support of the House in opposing Grey's motion
for Parliamentary Reform, which was thrown out by 282 votes to 41. The
war spirit also appeared in a sharp rebuff given to Wilberforce and the
Abolitionists on 14th May. The institution of a Board of Agriculture
(which Hussey, Sheridan, and Fox opposed as a piece of jobbery) and the
renewal of the Charter of the East India Company were the chief
practical results of that session. But the barrenness of the session,
the passing of the Traitorous Correspondence Bill, and the hardships
connected with the balloting for the militia stirred the Radical Clubs
to redoubled energy; so that home affairs for two or three years centred
in their propaganda and in Pitt's repressive efforts. The development of
a keen political consciousness in the masses is a subject of so much
interest that I may be pardoned for dwelling on it somewhat fully, with
the aid of new materials drawn from the Home Office Archives.
[Illustration: THE HOUSE OF COMMONS IN 1793. (From a painting in
the National Gallery by K. A. Hickel)]
There we see the causes of unrest. Hunger, hatred of the militia laws,
chafing against restraints entailed by the war, all conduce to
discontent. The newly awakened Caliban is also a prey to suspicion. He
hates foreigners. Yet, either as refugees or prisoners, they swarm along
the south coast (there were for a time 5,000 prisoners in Winchester).
Fishermen are tempted to help in their escape, and a mariner of Emsworth
is arraigned for treason on this count. Even so far west as Bodmin the
prisoners are numerous and threatening. They convince many of the
townsfolk that England would be better off as a Republic; and two
patriotic ladies in fear and horror inform Lord Mount Edgcumbe
anonymously that Frenchmen cut a mark round the neck of King George on
all coins. The vicar of Ringmer, near Lewes, reports that the smugglers
of the Sussex coast carry on a regular intercourse with France. In the
Isle of Wight even the French royalists, who are there awaiting the
despatch of Lord Moira's long-deferred expedition to Brittany, figure as
murderous Jacobins. In Bath, too, the mayor, Mr. Harington, is troubled
by the influx of Gallic artists and dancing-masters, especially as they
mix in all the "routs," and dare even there to whisper treason against
King George. Another report comes that a French usher in a large school
near London--was it Harrow?--has converted several of the boys to
republicanism. Clearly, these are cases for the Aliens Act.
Even Britons, untainted by Gallic connections, are suspect. At
Billingsgate a soldier swears that he was set upon at night because he
wore the uniform of "a d----d tyrant"; and other evidence proves that
the service was unpopular for political reasons as well as the poor pay.
Farmers are plied by emissaries of the clubs as they come in to market.
Complaints come to Dundas that farmers and shippers on the coasts of
Lancashire and Cumberland sell corn to "the natural enemy."
The discontent takes colour from its surroundings. At Pocklington in
Yorkshire the villagers threaten to burn the magistrates in their houses
in revenge for the conviction of poachers. The rowdies of Olney in
Bucks. (formerly a sore trial to Cowper and John Newton) terrorize the
neighbourhood. Everywhere the high price of corn produces irritation.
The tinworkers of North Cornwall march in force to Padstow to prevent
the exportation of corn from that little harbour; otherwise they are
law-abiding, though a magistrate warns Dundas that local malcontents are
setting them against the Government. Multiply these typical cases a
thousand fold, and it will be seen that the old rural system is strained
to breaking point. The amenities of the rule of the squires are now paid
back, and that, too, at a time when England needs one mind, one heart,
one soul. At and near Sheffield serious riots break out owing to the
enclosures of common-fields and wastes, the houses of the agricultural
"reformers" being burnt or wrecked. On the whole, however, I have found
fewer references to enclosures than might be expected.[274]
As generally happens in times of excitement, the towns are the first to
voice the dumb or muttering hatreds of the villages. Parisians led the
Revolution in France, though its causes lay thickest and deepest in the
rural districts. Not until Paris "stormed" its castle did the villagers
attack theirs. So, too, in the muffled repetition of the revolutionary
music which England sounds forth, the towns buzz, while the country
supplies but a dull ground-tone. Dearness of food and scarcity of work
were the chief causes of discontent. The spokesmen for the Spitalfields
weavers, who number 14,000, sent up a temperate petition setting forth
their distress; but, as is often the case in London, their thoughts
turned not to politics, but to practical means of cure. They stated that
the trade in velvets, brocades, and rich silks would be absolutely
ruined unless steps were taken to revive the fashion in these fabrics.
In Liverpool there were far other grievances. There, as in all seaports,
the tyranny of the press-gang was sharply resented; and, early in
November 1793, the populace clamoured for the election of a
"liberty-loving mayor," Mr. Tarleton, who promised to keep the
press-gang out of the town.[275]
In general the malcontents urged their case most pointedly in towns and
villages, where branches of the Radical Societies had taken root. These
Societies or clubs continued to grow in number and influence through the
year 1793, the typical club being now concerned, not with faro, but with
the "Rights of Man." Some of the Reform Clubs sought to moderate the
Gallicizing zeal of the extreme wing. Thus, the "Friends of the People,"
whose subscription of two and a half guineas was some guarantee for
moderation, formally expressed their disapproval of Paine's works and
all Republican agencies--a futile declaration; for his "Rights of Man"
was the very life-blood of the new clubs. Working men had shown little
or no interest in the earlier motions for Reform. The Associations of
the years 1780-5 had lapsed; and it was clearly the joint influence of
the French Revolution and Paine's productions which led to the
remarkable awakening of the year 1792.
Besides the London Corresponding Society, started (as we saw in
Chapter III) by Thomas Hardy early in that year, there was another
formidable organization, the Society for Constitutional Information,
founded in London at the close of 1791. It, too, was concerned with much
more than the Reform of Parliament; for on 18th May 1792 it recommended
the publication in a cheap form of Paine's "Rights of Man"; and on 21st
November it appointed a Committee for Foreign Correspondence. A little
later were adopted some of the phrases used in the French Convention,
and St. André, Roland, and Barère were admitted to membership. It does
not appear that either this Society, or Hardy's, corresponded with
France after the declaration of war; for the Parliamentary Committee of
Secrecy, charged in 1794 to report on seditious proceedings would, if it
were possible, have fastened on so compromising an act. Its members
belonged to a higher class than those of Hardy's Society; for they
included Romney the painter, Holcroft the dramatist, Horne Tooke, the
humorous _littérateur_, and Thelwall, the ablest lecturer of the
day.[276] That these men had advanced far beyond the standpoint of the
Whiggish "Friends of the People," appears from a letter from one of the
Norwich Radical Clubs to the London Corresponding Society:
The Friends of the People mean only a partial Reform, because
they leave out words expressing the Duke of Richmond's plan and
talk only of a Reform; while the Manchester people seem to
intimate, by addressing Mr. Paine, as though they were intent
upon Republican principles only. Now, to come closer to the main
question, it is only desired to know whether the generality of
the Societies mean to rest satisfied with the Duke of Richmond's
plan only, or whether it is their private design to rip up
monarchy by the roots and place democracy in its stead.[277]
These Societies seem to have put forth no definite programme. Their
defenders claimed that they adhered to the Westminster programme of
1780, championed by Fox and the Duke of Richmond. But Fox strongly
disapproved of their aims, and even refused to present their petition
for annual parliaments and universal suffrage.[278] In truth, the
actions of these bodies belied their words. They largely devoted their
funds and their energies to the circulation in a cheap form of the works
of Paine, 200,000 copies being sold in 1793,[279] and still more in the
following year. The Societies also adopted methods of organization
similar to those of the French Jacobins Club, and advocated the assembly
of a representative Convention. Every sixteen members of the London
Corresponding Society could form a division; and the divisions, by the
process of swarming-off, rapidly extended the organization. They also
sent delegates who conferred on matters of importance, either locally or
at headquarters; and the head delegation finally claimed to represent
very large numbers in London and affiliated centres. In the conduct of
details Spartan self-restraint was everywhere manifest. Members were
urged to be brief in their remarks and business-like in their methods.
Officials must give a solemn promise not to skulk, or make off, owing to
persecution; and members were warned that noisy declamation was not a
proof of zeal but might be a cloak for treachery. Above the chairman's
seat was suspended a card with the words--"Beware of Orators." One
would like to have witnessed the proceedings of these dully earnest men.
Both in the provinces and in London, reformers of the old type sought to
curb the more dangerous of these developments, especially correspondence
with the Jacobins' Club at Paris. Thus, the Manchester Constitutional
Society having published its address of congratulation to that body,
together with the reply of Carras, a member, George Lloyd, entered a
formal protest in these terms: "We are not a Republican Society; but
from such connection and correspondence we shall involve ourselves in
the imputation of Republicanism." He added that their aim was solely the
Reform of Parliament, and with that foreigners had no concern
whatever.[280] Nevertheless the Society kept up its foreign
correspondence, and received addresses from Jacobin Clubs in France.
Another threatening symptom was the attempt to excite discontent among
the soldiery. There being then very few barracks, the men were quartered
on the public houses; and several petitions were sent to Whitehall by
publicans (sometimes even by Corporations), pointing out the many
inconveniences of this custom. Thus in the autumn of 1793 the publicans
of Winchester complained that they had had to lodge as many as 5,000 men
during their passage through that city, besides the Bucks. regiment
stationed there, and they begged that barracks might be built. The
authorities paid the more heed to these petitions because local
malcontents "got at" the soldiery in the taverns, and brought home to
them their grievances, namely, poor pay, insufficient allowance for food
at its enhanced prices, and the severities of discipline exercised by
"effeminate puppies" drawn from aristocratic circles. In particular they
circulated a pamphlet--"The Soldiers' Friend: or Considerations on the
late pretended Augmentation of the Subsistence of the Private
Soldiers"--pointing out the close connection between the officers and
"the ruling faction," which "ever must exist while we suffer ourselves
to be governed by a faction."
When the war with France unexpectedly lengthened out, the Ministry
decided to erect new barracks, accommodating 34,000 men, at a total
expense of about £1,400,000. In the debate of 8th April 1796, Fox and
General Smith savagely assailed this proceeding as fatal to English
liberty. "Good God!" exclaimed Smith, "is every town to be made a
citadel and every village converted into a garrison?" Windham had little
difficulty in showing that the old barracks were in general badly
situated, and not adapted for cavalry. Buildings for the use of 5,400
horsemen were now erected; and on the whole question he asserted that
the men would live more cheaply, and would contract less vicious habits
than when lodged in inns. Above all, they would be removed from the
sedition-mongers, who now plied them with doctrines destructive alike of
loyalty and military discipline. Windham then quoted a phrase from
Molière's "Médecin malgré lui": "If I cannot make him dumb, I will make
you deaf."[281] The inference was that the inability of the Cabinet to
silence malcontents involved the expenditure of £1,400,000 partly in
order to stop the ears of the soldiery.
Lord Bacon, in his pregnant aphorisms upon sedition, does not venture on
a definition of that indefinable term. Where, indeed, shall one draw the
line between justifiable discontent and the inciting of men to lawless
and violent acts? We shall notice presently the claim of a Scottish
judge that an agitator may have good and upright intentions, and yet, if
his words and acts lead to general discontent, he is guilty of sedition
and perhaps of high treason. At the other extreme of thought stands the
born malcontent. He is generally an idealist, having a keen sense of the
miseries of mankind and very imperfect notions as to the difficulty of
peacefully and permanently ending them. In times of political excitement
the statesman has to deal with large bands of zealots nerved by these
irreconcilable principles. It was the misfortune of Pitt that he sought
to hold together a nation rent asunder by the doctrines of Burke and
Paine. Compromise was out of the question; and yet a British statesman
cannot govern unless the majority of the people is ready for compromise.
His position becomes untenable if, while upholding the throne, he
infuriates all friends of progress; if, when he seeks to remove abuses,
he is dubbed a traitor to King, Church, and Constitution. And yet, to
abandon his post because of these difficulties is not only cowardly, but
also an act of disloyalty alike to King and people.
As the political thermometer rose towards fever point through the years
1792-3, Government kept closer watch upon the political Societies; but
for a long time Pitt took no action against them. It seems probable
that, if they had confined themselves to their professed programme (that
of the Westminster Reformers of 1780) he would have remained passive. He
did not prosecute those which in November 1792 congratulated the French
Convention on the triumph of its arms in Belgium and the advent of a
Gallic millennium. What, then, were the developments which met with his
stern opposition?
But, firstly, we must ask the question, Why did not Pitt, in view of the
unswerving loyalty of the great majority of Britons, rely on the good
sense and weight of that mass to overbear the Jacobinical minority? It
is much to be regretted that he did not take that more intelligent and
more courageous course. But the events of the French Revolution seemed
to show the need of early taking decided measures against a resolute and
desperate group. At half a dozen crises in the years 1789-92 firm action
would have crushed the anarchic forces in Paris, Lyons, and Marseilles;
but, for lack of a strong guiding hand, those forces broke loose, with
results which all genuine friends of liberty have ever since deplored.
It is perfectly certain that, if Mirabeau had had a free hand, he would
have used coercive measures by the side of which those of Pitt's
so-called "Reign of Terror" would have been but as a pop-gun to a
cannon. Besides, to taunt Pitt with falseness to his principles of the
years 1782-5 is to ignore the patent facts that he advocated very
moderate changes in the representation. The Reform movement virtually
collapsed in 1785. That which now borrowed its watchwords was in the
main a Republican and levelling agency. The creed of the Radicals of
1793 was summed up, not in the academic programme of the Friends of the
People, the lineal heir to the earlier Associations, but in Part II of
Paine's "Rights of Man."
Here, surely, are the reasons for Pitt's repressive policy. He entered
on it regretfully, but he felt no sense of inconsistency in his change
of attitude towards Reform. The times had wholly changed; and that
movement changed with them. As Macaulay has well pointed out, Pitt never
declared that, under no circumstances, would he favour a moderate Reform
of Parliament. But he did declare that in his view Reform was at present
highly perilous; and he resolutely set himself to the task of coercing
those men and those agencies who advocated it in dangerous forms and by
lawless methods.
The first prosecution that need be noticed here was directed against
Paine for the seditious utterances in the "Rights of Man," particularly
in Part II. The Attorney-General made out a formidable indictment,
whereupon Paine, then a member of the French National Convention,
informed him that the prosecution might as well be directed against the
man in the moon, and that the liberties of the people of England were in
reality on their trial. After this impertinence the sentence went
against Paine by default, and that, too, despite a skilful speech by
Erskine (December 1792). The aim of Government of course was to warn
those who were circulating Paine's works that their conduct was
seditious and that they did so at their peril.
The Home Office Archives show that in very many cases the warning was
disregarded, and several prosecutions ensued, with varying results.
Still more frequent were the cases of cursing the King, sometimes in
obscene terms. To these we need pay no heed. Frequently the offence was
committed in taverns by democrats in a state of mental exaltation. To
this exciting cause we may probably ascribe the folly of John Frost, the
attorney with whom Pitt had some dealings during the Reform agitation of
1782. He was now charged with exclaiming excitedly: "I am for equality";
and, when challenged as to the meaning of his words, he added: "There
ought to be no Kings." In this connection it should be remembered that
Frost and Barlow had on 28th November 1792 presented to the French
National Convention the most mischievous of all the addresses sent by
Radical Clubs to that body. It ended with the statement that other
nations would soon imitate France (that is by overthrowing the monarchy)
and would "arm themselves for the purpose of claiming the Rights of
Man."[282] This piece of bravado must have told against Frost at the
trial; for it proved that amidst his potations at the tavern he spoke
his real mind. Erskine did his best to defend Frost by quoting Pitt's
letters to him of May 1782, on the subject of Reform.[283] The device
was clever; but obviously Pitt's association with Frost for strictly
constitutional purposes in 1782 could not excuse the seditious language
of the latter under wholly different conditions eleven years later.
Frost was condemned to six months' imprisonment in Newgate and was
struck off the roll of attorneys.[284] Other noteworthy trials ensued,
notably that of the "Morning Chronicle" newspaper, which ended in an
acquittal; but it will be well now to turn to the important developments
taking place north of the Tweed.
* * * * *
Scotland had now thrown off the trance under which she had lain since
1745; and her chief towns bade fair to outbid London, Leeds, Sheffield,
and Norwich as centres of democratic activity. There was every reason
why she should awake. She had very little influence in Parliament. She
returned 45 members as against Cornwall's 44; while the total number of
persons entitled to vote for the fifteen representatives of the Scottish
burghs was 1,303,[285] a number smaller than that of the electors of the
city of Westminster. This singular system was defended chiefly on the
ground of the turbulence of the national character. Even in 1831 a
Scottish member declared that Scots could never assemble without drawing
blood; and one of their champions, Lord Cockburn, made the quaint
admission: "The Scots are bad mobbers. They are too serious at it. They
never joke, and they throw stones." It did not occur to that generation
that the cure for this bloodthirsty seriousness was frequent public
meetings, not no meetings at all. That a high-spirited people should so
long have remained in political childhood seems incredible, until we
remember that a borough election like that of Westminster was absolutely
unknown in the whole course of Scottish history. Further, it was
notorious that the 45 Scottish members were the most obedient group of
placemen in the House of Commons; and their docility had increased under
the bountiful sway of Henry Dundas, whose control of patronage sufficed
to keep the Caledonian squad close to heel.
This political apathy was now to end. The men of Edinburgh, Glasgow, and
Dundee began to discuss the "Rights of Man," and to follow the lead
given by the London Corresponding Society. Thus, on 3rd October 1792,
Lieutenant-Colonel William Dalrymple presided over the first meeting of
"The Associated Friends of the Constitution and of the People," held at
Glasgow. Resolutions were passed in favour of an equal representation of
the people in Parliament, shorter Parliaments, and co-operation with
"the Friends of the People" in London. The entrance and annual
subscriptions were fixed at sixpence and one shilling. Thomas Muir of
Huntershill, an able young advocate, was appointed Vice-President. Other
Societies were soon formed, and on 11th December there assembled at
Edinburgh a General Convention of Delegates from the Societies of the
Friends of the People throughout Scotland. Its proceedings were orderly,
beginning and ending with prayer. Resolutions were passed deprecating
violence whether in language or action; and the presence either of Lord
Daer or Colonel Dalrymple in the chair showed that some, at least, of
the gentry were for Reform. This was exceptional. A little later the
gentlemen of several towns and counties asserted their loyalty in
flamboyant petitions; and the farmers of Dalkeith district at their
meeting added to their loyal toasts the following: "May we have no fox
in our fold or greys (wild oats) in our corn."[286] Sir Kenneth
Mackenzie on 3rd January 1793 informed William Pulteney that in the
North the towns were thoroughly loyal, with the exception of Perth and
Dundee, where certain ministers and writers led the people astray.[287]
Nevertheless, the authorities, notably the Lord Advocate, Robert Dundas,
took alarm; and on 2nd January 1793 Thomas Muir was brought before the
deputy-sheriff of Midlothian. Muir was a man of highly interesting
personality. The son of a Glasgow tradesman, he had shown marked
abilities at school and at the University, whence, owing to his advanced
opinions, he was forced to migrate to Edinburgh. There, in his
twenty-seventh year, he soon became a leader of the Scottish Reformers,
his sincerity, eloquence, and enthusiasm everywhere arousing keen
interest. Had his good sense been equal to his abilities, he might have
gone far; but events soon showed him to be tactless and headstrong. He
went far beyond the rest of the delegates assembled at Edinburgh,
namely, in bringing forward, despite the reluctance of the Convention,
an Address from the Society of United Irishmen in Dublin. Their conduct
much alarmed the authorities at Dublin Castle, who adopted stringent
precautions. Muir should therefore have seen, what his colleagues did
see, that any plan of co-operation was certain to irritate Government.
Nevertheless he persisted in bringing before the Convention the Irish
Address, which strongly pointed out the need of common action in the
struggle for Reform and urged both peoples to persevere "until we have
planted the flag of freedom on the summit, and are at once victorious
and secure." Further, the authorities accused Muir of circulating
Paine's writings and other pamphlets, including "A Dialogue between the
Governors and the Governed," which contained such sentences as these:
"The law is the general will--a new order." "Nations cannot revolt;
tyrants are the only rebels." "We will live without tyrants, without
impostors (priests)."[288] The writings were probably seditious in their
tendency;[289] but the evidence that he circulated them was of the
flimsiest character.[290]
Unfortunately, Muir left the country, though in no clandestine manner,
while legal proceedings were pending. After a short stay in London he
proceeded to Paris, in order (as he said at his trial) to try to
persuade the French democrats to spare the life of Louis XVI. The
credibility of this statement is lessened by the fact that he arrived in
Paris only the evening before the King's execution and remained there
long after that tragedy.[291] A letter from a Scot in Paris, James
Smith, to a friend in Glasgow, which the postal authorities opened,
stated that the writer met Muir in a _café_ of the Palais Royal; that
Muir did not hear of his indictment till the evening of 8th February,
and would return to face his trial, though he was loth to leave France,
as he had made "valuable and dear connections." "Mr. Christie advised
me," adds the writer, "to make some little proficiency in the language
before I begin to think of beginning to do anything."[292] Now, as a
clique of Britons in Paris had not long before drunk the toast of "The
coming Convention of Great Britain and Ireland," Government naturally
connected the efforts of Muir with this republican propaganda. His next
doings increased this suspicion. He left France on an American ship
which landed him at Belfast; he stayed there a few days, and landed at
Stranraer on 31st July, only to be arrested, along with his books and
papers, and sent to Edinburgh.
The ensuing trial, held on 30th and 31st August, aroused intense
interest, owing to the eloquence of Muir and the unscrupulous zeal of
the Scottish authorities in ensuring his conviction. They packed the
jury with men who belonged to a loyal Association; and it is said that
the Lord Justice Clerk, McQueen of Braxfield, welcomed one of them with
the words: "Come awa', Maister Horner, come awa', and help us to hang
ane of thae daamed scoondrels." The trial itself bristled with
irregularities; and Muir, who rejected the proffered help of Erskine and
conducted his own defence, fastened on them so effectively, that at the
conclusion of his final speech the Court resounded with applause. All
was in vain. The jury found him guilty, whereupon the Court of
Justiciary pronounced sentence of transportation for fourteen
years.[293]
Admiration of the virtues and courage of Muir must not blind us to the
fact that his conduct had been most provocative. His visit to Paris, on
the scarcely credible pretext that he went thither to save the King's
life, his connection with the United Irishmen, and his stay in Belfast,
told against him. Robert Dundas, in informing his uncle, Henry Dundas,
of his arrest, added: "I have little doubt that, tho' he avows his
intention of coming home to have been a view to stand trial, [that] he
is an emissary from France or the disaffected in Ireland."[294] The Scot
who first advocated common action with the Irish malcontents should have
paid good heed to his steps. Muir did not do so. Accordingly, though the
direct evidence at the trial told in his favour, the circumstantial
evidence weighed heavily against him.[295] At such a time men's actions
count for more than their words. It was the visit to Paris and the
dealings with the United Irishmen, far more than biassed witnesses and
the bullying of Braxfield, which led to the condemnation of this
talented youth. For his arrest occurred at the time when terror was the
order of the day at Paris, and when the issue of an inflammatory address
at Dundee spread panic in official circles.
Before adverting to this matter, we may note that Muir settled down by
no means unhappily at Sydney, and bought a farm which he named
Huntershill, after his birthplace. It is now a suburb of Sydney. A
letter from the infant settlement, published in the "Gentleman's
Magazine" of March 1797, describes him and the other Scottish
"martyrs"--Skirving, Margarot, and Gerrald--as treated indulgently by
the authorities, who allotted to them convicts to till their lands.
Shortly afterwards Muir escaped, and, after exciting experiences, in
which he was wounded, made his way to France. In Paris, early in 1798,
he published some articles on the United Irishmen, which Wolfe Tone and
other Irish patriots deemed most harmful to their cause. They therefore
remonstrated with him, but received the reply that he knew Ireland as
well as they did, and had the confidence of the United Irishmen as much
as they had. Wolfe Tone says of him: "Of all the vain obstinate
blockheads that ever I met I never saw his equal."[296] Fortunately for
his associates, Muir retired into the provinces and died in the year
1799.
Dundee played a leading part in the democratic agitation. Its
population, consisting largely of poor weavers, suffered severely in the
year 1793 from dearness of food and scarcity of fuel. On this mass of
needy operatives the doctrines of Paine fell like a spark on tinder.
Dundee became the chief focus of discontent in Scotland. A Tree of
Liberty was planted in Belmont Grounds; bread riots were of frequent
occurrence; and Dundas was burnt in effigy. In the Home Office Archives
is a statement that a local tradesman named Wyllie generously supplied
the waistcoat and breeches: "they was of satin."[297] In July 1793 there
appeared an "Address to the People," dated "Berean Meeting House,
Dundee," which painted the Government in the darkest colours, and
contained these assertions: "You are plunged into war by a wicked
Ministry and a compliant Parliament, who seem careless and unconcerned
for your interest, the end and design of which is almost too horrid to
relate, the destruction of a whole people merely because they will be
free.... Your treasure is wasting fast: the blood of your brethren is
pouring out, and all this to form chains for a free people and
eventually to rivet them on yourselves." On 1st August 1793 a
Government agent found the MS. from which this placard was printed in
the house of a liquor-seller in Edinburgh. It was in the writing of a
minister, Palmer: so were two letters referring to it.[298] Robert
Dundas therefore sent to have Palmer arrested. In mentioning this fact
to Henry Dundas, he added that Palmer was "the most dangerous rebel in
Scotland." It transpired in the course of the trial that the address was
originally written by a weaver named Mealmaker, and that Palmer re-wrote
it, toning down some expressions which he thought too strong. Mealmaker
was a witness at the trial, but was not allowed directly to incriminate
himself. The authorities preferred to strike at Palmer, a man of parts,
educated at Eton and Cambridge, who latterly had officiated as Unitarian
Minister at Montrose and Dundee. Doubtless these facts as well as his
association with the Scottish Friends of Liberty brought on him a
sentence of five years' transportation.[299]
If the authorities hoped to crush the Scottish movement by these
severities they were disappointed; for it throve on them. A spy, "J.
B.," who regularly supplied Robert Dundas with reports about the
Edinburgh club, wrote on 14th September 1793 that the sentence on Palmer
had given new life to the Association; for, after a time of decline in
the early summer, more than 200 now attended its meetings. On 28th
October he stated that nearly all the Scottish clubs had revived.
Dunlop, Lord Provost of Glasgow, also declared that discontent made
progress every day; that the soldiery were corrupted, and that there was
an urgent need of barracks.[300] Indignation also ran high at London.
Evan Nepean wrote to Robert Dundas: "There is a devil of a stir here
about Muir and Palmer." Braxfield's address to the jury was thus
parodied in the "Morning Chronicle" of 4th March 1794:
I am bound by the law, while I sit in this place,
To say in plain terms what I think of this case.
My opinion is this, and you're bound to pursue it,
The defendants are guilty, and I'll make them rue it.
Nevertheless, as another Convention had met at Edinburgh, Robert Dundas
wrote to his uncle on 2nd November 1793 strongly deprecating any
mitigation of the sentences. It was therefore in vain that the Earl of
Lauderdale, Grey, and Sheridan interviewed the Home Secretary and
pointed out that the offence of "leasing-making," or verbal sedition,
was punishable in Scots law only with banishment, not with forcible
detention at the Antipodes.[301] Henry Dundas informed his nephew on
16th November that he would refer the whole question back to the Court
of Justiciary, and if it defended the verdict "scientifically" and in
full detail, he would "carry the sentence into execution and meet the
clamour in Parliament without any kind of dismay."[302] Braxfield and
his colleagues defended their conduct in an exhaustive treatise on
"leasing-making," which the curious may read in the Home Office
Archives.
What was the attitude of Pitt towards these events? Ultimately he was
responsible for these unjust and vindictive sentences; and it is a poor
excuse to urge that he gave Dundas a free hand in Scottish affairs.
Still, it is unquestionable that the initiative lay with the two
Dundases. If any Englishman exerted influence on the sentences it was
the Lord Chancellor, Loughborough.[303] He treated with contempt the
motion of Earl Stanhope on 31st January 1794 for an examination into the
case of Muir, when the Earl found himself in the position which he so
much coveted--a minority of one. On the cases of Muir and Palmer coming
before the Commons (10th March), Pitt upheld the Scottish Court of
Justiciary in what was perhaps the worst speech of his whole career. He
defended even the careful selection of jurymen hostile to Muir on the
curious plea that though they were declared loyalists, yet they might be
impartial as jurymen. He further denied that there had been any
miscarriage of justice, or that the sentence on the "daring delinquents"
needed revision. And these excuses for biassed and vindictive sentences
were urged after Fox had uttered a noble and manly plea for justice, not
for mercy. Grey bitterly declared that Muir was to be sent for fourteen
years to Sydney for the offence of pleading for Reform, which Pitt and
the Duke of Richmond advocated twelve years before. They sat in the
King's Cabinet: Muir was sent to herd with felons. This taunt flew wide
of the mark. Pitt in his motions for Reform had always made it clear
that, while desirous of "a moderate and substantial Reform," he utterly
repudiated universal suffrage. If those were his views in 1782-5, how
could he accept the Radical programme now that it included the absurd
demand for annual Parliaments? None the less Pitt was answerable for the
action of the Home Minister in referring the sentences back to the
judges who inflicted them--a course of conduct at once cowardly and
farcical. Pitt's speech also proves him to have known of the
irregularities that disgraced the trials. But he, a lawyer, condoned
them and applauded the harsh and vindictive sentences. In short, he
acted as an alarmist, not as a dispenser of justice.
It is easy for us now to descant on the virtues of moderation. But how
many men would have held on an even course when the guillotine worked
its fell work in France, when the Goddess of Reason was enthroned in
Notre Dame, and when Jacobinism seemed about to sweep over the
Continent? Here, as at so many points, France proved to be the worst foe
to ordered liberty. Robespierre and Hébert were the men who assured the
doom of Muir and Palmer. A trivial incident will suffice to illustrate
the alarm of Englishmen at the assembly of a British Convention. In
December 1793 Drane, the mayor of Reading, reported to his neighbour
Addington (Speaker of the House of Commons) that the "infamous Tom
Paine" and a member of the French Convention had been overheard
conversing in French in a public-house. Their talk turned on a proposed
visit to the British Convention then sitting in Edinburgh. At once
Addington sent for a warrant from the Home Office, while the mayor urged
his informant to hunt the miscreants down. The machinery of the law was
set in motion. A search was instituted; the warrant came down from
Whitehall; and not until the sum of fourteen guineas had gone to the
informant for his patriotic exertions did the authorities discover that
they had been hoaxed.[304]
The Edinburgh Convention, consisting of delegates of forty-five Reform
Societies, seems to have pursued dully decorous methods until 6th
November, when citizens Hamilton Rowan and Simon Butler came to
represent Ireland; Joseph Gerrald and Maurice Margarot were the
delegates from the London Corresponding Society; and Sinclair and York
from the Society for Constitutional Information which met at the Crown
and Anchor. A Convention of English Societies assembled at London about
the same time, and deputed the four delegates to join the Edinburgh body
and form a British Convention.[305] Accordingly, on 19th November, it
took the title, "British Convention of Delegates of the People,
associated to obtain Universal Suffrage and Annual Parliaments." The
statement of Margarot, that the London police sought to prevent his
journey to Edinburgh, should have been a warning to members to measure
their words well. Unfortunately, Margarot, a vain hot-headed fellow, at
once began to boast of the importance of the Radical Societies; though
fluctuating in number, they were numerous in London; there were thirty
of them in Norwich; and in the Sheffield district their members numbered
50,000. "If," he added, "we could get a Convention of England and
Scotland called, we might represent six or seven hundred thousand males,
which is a majority of all the adults of the Kingdom; and the Ministry
would not dare to refuse our rights."[306] Butler then declared that
Belfast was in a state of veiled rebellion; Gerrald, the ablest and best
educated of the delegates, also scoffed at the old party system, and
said, "party is ever a bird of prey, and the people their banquet." On
19th November a delegate from Sheffield, M. C. Brown, moved that the
next British Convention should meet near the borders of England and
Scotland. Thereupon Gerrald proposed that York should be chosen, despite
its ecclesiastical surroundings; for (said he), "as the Saviour of the
world was often found in the company of sinners, let us go there for the
same gracious purpose, to convert to repentance."[307]
All this was but the prelude to more serious work. On 26th-28th November
the Convention declared it to be the duty of citizens to resist any law,
similar to that lately passed in Dublin, for preventing the assembly of
a Convention in Great Britain; and the delegates resolved to prepare to
summon a Convention if the following emergencies should arise--an
invasion, the landing of Hanoverian troops, the passing of a Convention
Act, or the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act. These defiant
resolutions were proposed by Sinclair; and, as he afterwards became a
Government informer, they were probably intended to lure the Convention
away from its proper business into seditious ways. However that may be,
the delegates solemnly assented to these resolutions.
Scotsmen will notice alike with pride and indignation that the delegates
of the Societies north of the Tweed adhered to their main purpose,
Parliamentary Reform, until, under the lead of the men of London,
Sheffield, and Dublin, debates became almost Parisian in vehemence. As
reported in the "Edinburgh Gazetteer" of 3rd December, they gave Robert
Dundas the wished-for handle of attack. Then and there he decided to
disperse the Convention, so he informed Henry Dundas in the following
letter of 6th December: "Last Tuesday's '[Edinburgh] Gazetteer,'
containing a further account of the proceedings of the Convention
appeared to the Solicitor and me so strong that we agreed to take notice
of them. The proper warrants were accordingly made, and early yesterday
morning put in execution against Margarot, Gerrald, Callender, Skirving,
and one or two others, and with such effect that we have secured all
their Minutes and papers. Their conduct has excited universal
detestation."[308] The expulsion took place quite peaceably. The Lord
Provost informed the delegates that it was not their meeting, but their
publications, that led him to intervene. The Chairman, Paterson,
thereupon "skulked off"; but Brown, the Sheffield delegate, took the
chair, and declared that he would not quit it save under compulsion. The
Lord Provost and constables then pulled him down; and the meeting was
adjourned. Events ran the same course on the morrow, save that the
chairman, Gerrald, was allowed to wind up the proceedings with prayer
before he was pulled down. Thus ended the first British Convention.
The natural sequel was a trial of the leaders, Sinclair, Margarot,
Gerrald, and Skirving. Sinclair turned informer, whereupon his
indictment was allowed to lapse. The others were charged with attending
the meetings of the Convention which, "under the pretence of procuring a
Reform of Parliament, were evidently of a dangerous and destructive
tendency," modelled on those of the French Convention and with the like
aims in view. The charge was held to be proven, and they were severally
sentenced to transportation for fourteen years. The cases aroused keen
interest, in part owing to the novel claims put forward by the
prosecutor and endorsed by the Judges. The Lord Advocate argued that
these men, in claiming to represent a majority of the people, were in
reality planning a revolt; and Lord Justice Clerk finally declared that
the crime of sedition consisted "in endeavouring to create a
dissatisfaction in the country, which nobody can tell where it will end.
It will very naturally end in overt rebellion; if it has that tendency,
though not in the mind of the parties at the time, yet, if they have
been guilty of poisoning the minds of the lieges, I apprehend that that
will constitute the crime of sedition to all intents and purposes."[309]
To find a parallel to this monstrous claim, that sedition may be
unintentional and may consist in some action which the Government judges
by its results, one would have to hark back to the days of Judge
Jeffreys, whom indeed McQueen of Braxfield resembled in ferocity,
cunning, and effrontery. The insolence of Margarot at the bar to some
extent excused the chief judge for the exhibition of the same conduct on
the bench. But in the case of Gerrald, an English gentleman of refined
character and faultless demeanour, the brutalities of Braxfield aroused
universal loathing. In one respect Gerrald committed an imprudence. He
appeared in the dock, not in a wig, but displaying a shock of
dishevelled hair, a sign of French and republican sympathies which
seemed a defiance to the Court. Nevertheless, his speech in his own
defence moved to its depths the mind of a young poet who had tramped all
the way from Glasgow in the bleak March weather in order to hear the
trial. At the end of the speech young Campbell turned to his neighbour,
a humble tradesman, and said: "By heavens, Sir, that is a great man"; to
which there came the reply: "Yes, Sir, he is not only a great man
himself, but he makes every other man feel great who listens to him."
In truth, the Scottish trials were a moral defeat for Pitt and his
colleagues. Sympathy with the prisoners and detestation of the judges
aroused a general outcry, which became furious when Braxfield declared
that he had no idea that his sentence of transportation involved
servitude and hard labour.[310] The assertion implies an incredible
ignorance in the man who had packed the juries and sought to get his
victims hanged. It may be regarded as a cunning and cowardly attempt to
shift part of the odium on to the Government. Certainly the prestige of
the Cabinet now fell to zero. Ministers were held responsible for
Braxfield's wanton vagaries, and were accused of luring English
democrats into the meshes of the Scottish law. This last charge is
absurd. As we have seen, the London police sought to stop Margarot,
Sinclair, and Gerrald from going to Edinburgh. It was their presence and
that of the Irishmen which gave to the Convention almost a national
character, and placed it in rivalry to Parliament. Their speeches were
by far the most provocative. Finally, as the letter quoted above shows,
the initiative in arresting the delegates was taken by Robert Dundas and
the Scottish Solicitor-General. On 11th December Henry Dundas wrote to
his nephew: "You get great credit here [London] for your attack on the
Convention."[311]
Far different was the comment of the London Corresponding Society. On
20th January 1794 that body convened a great meeting which passed
protests against the war, the expulsion of the British Convention, and
the arrest of delegates. It also resolved that the general committee
should sit permanently throughout the ensuing session. Further, that if
the Government attacked the liberties of the people in the ways
described above, the committee should call "a General Convention of the
People for taking such measures under their consideration."[312] Equally
threatening were the resolutions of the Constitutional Society of
London.[313] Pitt resolved to take up the gauntlet flung down by these
two powerful Societies. On 24th February 1794 Eaton, a publisher of
Newgate Street, was tried for publishing in his periodical pamphlet,
"Politics for the People: or Hogs-wash," a little parable with which
that witty lecturer, Thelwall, had delighted a debating society. He told
how a gamecock, resplendent with ermine-spotted breast, and crown or
cockscomb, lorded it greedily over all the fowls of the farmyard.[314]
The parallel to George III was sufficiently close to agitate the
official mind; but the jury gave an open verdict, which implied that the
King was not hinted at.
The next prosecution, that of Thomas Walker, of Manchester, and six
others broke down in a way highly discreditable to the authorities.
Walker's services to the cause of Reform had, as we have seen, been
conspicuous alike in energy and moderation, and his enemies in the
Church and King Club made great exertions in order to procure a
conviction. The archives of the Home Office throw a sinister light on
their methods. A magistrate of Manchester, the Rev. John Griffith,
informed the Home Secretary that Booth, a man who was imprisoned in June
1793 for seditious practices, made a declaration against Thomas Walker
and McCullum, members of the local Constitutional Society. According to
Booth, McCullum had said: "Petitioning Parliament be d----d. You may as
well petition the devil to reform himself. The only way is for each
Society to send a number of delegates to a certain place, and there
declare themselves the Representatives of the People and support
themselves as such." Thomas Walker had also said that each member must
have a musket, for they would soon want them.[315] But it transpired in
the trial of Walker, McCullum, and others that Griffith had let Booth
see that he wanted to incriminate Walker. He not only offered Booth his
pardon for such evidence, but left him alone with Dunn, a malicious
perjurer, the falsity of whose charges against Walker was convincingly
demonstrated.[316] The case proves how far an unscrupulous magistrate
could succeed in getting charges trumped up against an innocent man who
opposed him in politics. Doubtless in other cases personal spite, or the
desire of a reward, led to the offer of false charges; and the student
who peruses the Home Office archives needs to remember the Greek
caution, +memnêsth' apistein+, as much as if he were perusing French
Memoirs.
It is therefore with much doubt that one reads the declaration of a
Sheffield magistrate, in May 1794, that there was in that town "a most
horrid conspiracy against State and Church under the pretence of
Reform." A vast number of pikes and spears had been made and "cats" to
throw in the road to lame the horses. 2nd July was fixed for the
storming of the barracks and town. "It is a mercy the plot is
discovered. I am to be all night in the search." More detailed is the
deposition of a magistrate of Sheffield, James Wilkinson, that a
democrat named Widdison had made several pikes and sold twelve to Gales,
a well-known Jacobinical printer. Further, that a witness, William
Green, swore that a man named Jackson had employed him and others to
make spear-heads; they made twelve dozen or more in two days, and the
heads were sent to the lodgings of Hill and Jackson. Wilkinson wrote for
instructions how to deal with these men; also for a warrant to arrest
Gales. On 20th May Dundas sent down warrants for the arrest of Gales, W.
Carnage, H. Yorke (_alias_ Redhead), W. Broomhead, R. Moody, and T.
Humphreys; he also issued a warrant against Williams, a gun-engraver, of
the Tower, in London.[317]
In Birmingham, as we have seen, the two magistrates, Carles and Spencer,
were out and out loyalists; and, as they wrote to Dundas on 23rd May
1794 that there was not enough evidence to warrant a search for arms, we
may infer that the Midland capital caused the authorities less concern
than rebellious Sheffield. But even at Birmingham, with its traditions
of exuberant loyalty, there were grounds for concern. John Brook, the
mayor, informed Dundas that there were many malcontents in the
neighbourhood, especially at Dudley.
Turning to the East, we find signs that Norwich seethed with discontent.
From that city had come the first suggestion of a General Convention of
the People. On 5th March 1793 one of the thirty Societies of Norwich
wrote up to the London Corresponding Society advocating that step, which
Hardy and his colleagues approved "so soon as the great body of the
people shall be courageous and virtuous enough to join us in the
attempt." I have found no proof that either at Norwich or in London
these Societies used illegal methods. The seditious placards posted up
at Norwich may have been the work of some fanatic or of an _agent
provocateur_. But it is very doubtful whether the holding of a People's
Convention in the manner proposed was not an act of defiance to
Parliament, and therefore seditious. Individual members certainly came
within the ban of the law. Thus, Dundas received tidings that two
members of Hardy's Society, named Stone and Meakins, were circulating
seditious writings in Essex. When arrested they had with them one or
two military books, copies of the revolutionary song, _Ça ira_, and
similar papers;[318] but this fact does not incriminate the Society at
large. In fact, the reports as to the purchase of arms and secret
drillings are not very convincing. To take a few instances: information
was sent to the Home Office that a man named Kitchen had sixty pikes in
his house in George Street, near York Buildings; also that men were
drilled secretly at the house of Spence, a seller of seditious pamphlets
in the Little Turnstile, Holborn, and at that of Shelmerdine, a small
tradesman of Southwark; the arms in the last case were bought from
Williams, of the Tower, with a sum of £10 contributed by "a desperate
tailor of China Walk, Lambeth."[319] Did patriotism or private spite or
greed of money incite these reports? Drawings of pikes and spear-heads
also diversified the report of the Secret Committee of the Lords
appointed to investigate seditious proceedings, and probably convinced
lovers of realism that plots actually existed.
More alarming in reality were the preparations for a General Convention
of the People. The authorities knew that plans were actually on foot for
sending delegates to form such a body. On 27th March 1794 the London
Corresponding Society consulted the sister club on this question; and in
due course delegates from the two Societies passed resolutions in favour
of the scheme. Hardy thereupon sent a printed letter round to similar
bodies, probably early in the month of April 1794. It ran thus:
Notwithstanding the unparalleled audacity of a corrupt and
overbearing faction which at present tramples on the rights and
liberties of our people, our meetings cannot, in England, be
interrupted without the previous adoption of a Convention
Bill[320]--a measure it is our duty to anticipate.... Let us
then form another British Convention. We have a central
situation in our view, which we believe would be most convenient
for the whole island, but which we forbear to mention ... till
we have the answers of the Societies with which we are in
correspondence. Let us have your answer, then, by the 20th at
farthest, earlier if possible, whether you approve of the
measure and how many delegates you can send, with the number
also, if possible, of your Societies.
PS. We have appointed a Secret Committee on this. Will you do
the same?[321]
In order to further the scheme, the London Corresponding Society held a
meeting on 14th April at Chalk Farm, when an ardent appeal was read from
Hardy to resist the encroachments on liberty recently made by "apostate
reformers"--a fling at Pitt. "Are they alone," he asked, "to judge of
the fit time for Reform?" The meeting then thanked Earl Stanhope for his
manly and successful opposition to the attempt to bring Hanoverian and
Hessian troops into England; it also condemned the late rapid advances
of despotism and the arming one part of the people against the other.
Finally it declared that in cases of necessity the safety of the people
was the only law. We may here note that a few Hanoverian and Hessian
battalions had been landed in Hampshire, as a temporary measure,
previous to their transference to other ships. This occasioned some
clamour at Westminster, Grey, Fox, Sheridan and others claiming that the
liberties of England were in the direst danger. Pitt refused to accept a
Bill of Indemnity for his action, and the House supported him by a great
majority.[322]
The other reference at the Chalk Farm meeting was to the proposal to
sanction the subscriptions to the Volunteer forces now being raised in
various counties.[323] At the outset this noble movement had in view the
defence of the constitution no less than of the land; and this doubtless
accounts for the fact that Coke, Mingay, and other Norfolk Whigs
struggled desperately and successfully to break up a county meeting held
at Norwich for this purpose on 12th April, shouting down even so able a
speaker as Windham. In general, however, these meetings were an immense
success. That at Aylesbury realized £5,851 for a county corps; and one
at Epsom, for Surrey, brought in nearly double as much.[324] Most
noteworthy of all these meetings was one of 19th April 1794 at
Birmingham, where loyal sentiments crystalized in a rhetorical jewel of
rare lustre. The "Loyal True Blues" of Birmingham, in view of the
threats of the French "to insult the chalky cliffs of Albion and to
plant in this island their accursed tree of liberty, more baneful in its
effects than the poisonous tree of Java which desolates the country and
corrupts the winds of heaven," resolved to quit the field of argument
and to take arms as a Military Association. For nothing could be so
effective as "the decided and awful plan of the whole Nation rising in a
mass of Volunteers, determined to dispute every inch of ground with
their daring aggressors and to spill the last drop of their blood in
defence of their religion and their laws." They beg Edward Carver to
command them; they will choose their uniform, will arrange themselves as
grenadiers and light infantry; and, "to preserve the _coup d'oeil_, the
whole corps will be arranged with the strictest attention to the height
of the members."[325] Possibly the Royalists of Birmingham may have
known of the hint conveyed in Hardy's letter, that the National
Convention should assemble in some convenient centre, a phrase which
seemed to point to their town, which, indeed, the Chartists chose for
that purpose in 1839.
In view of the fervent loyalty manifested on all sides, Ministers might
surely have trusted to the majority to control the restless minority.
Auckland expressed the general opinion when he said that the country in
the proportion of ten to one was sound and loyal.[326] As the majority
was armed, while the malcontents had but small stores of pikes, there
was little cause for fear, though in the minority were some desperate
men. In particular, Richard Davison, a prominent member of the Sheffield
Constitutional Society, recommended the clubs of London and Norwich to
buy consignments of pikes in order to resist the "newly-armed minions of
the bare-faced aristocracy of the present Administration"; and it
afterwards appeared that he could sell them at twenty pence each.[327]
This letter was sent off on 24th April, 1794, seventeen days after the
holding of a mass meeting on Castle Hill, Sheffield, at which the
chairman, Henry Yorke (_alias_ Redhead), declared that, when the sun of
Reason shone in its fullest meridian, the people would turn out the 558
gentlemen from Westminster. The meeting resolved that, as the people
ought to demand universal suffrage as a right, and not petition for it
as a favour, they would never again petition the House of Commons on
this subject.[328] Contemptuous epithets were now constantly hurled at
Parliament. On 2nd May, that genial toper, Horne Tooke, of Wimbledon,
declared at a dinner of the Constitutional Society in London that
Parliament was a scoundrel sink of corruption, and that the scoundrel
Opposition joined the scoundrel Government in order to destroy the
rights of Englishmen. In order to add weight to his epithets he called
the company to witness to his complete sobriety.[329]
Pitt and his colleagues now decided to strike at the leaders who were
planning a British Convention. Of these the most formidable was the
Secretary of the London Corresponding Society. Accordingly, early on
12th May, some Bow Street officers made their way into Hardy's shop, No.
9, Piccadilly, arrested him, seized his papers, ransacking the room
where Mrs. Hardy was in bed. The shock to her nerves was such as to
bring on premature child-birth with fatal results. On the same day a
royal message came to Parliament announcing that the efforts of certain
Societies to summon a Convention in defiance of Parliament had led him
to order the seizure of their books and papers. Those of the
Corresponding and Constitutional Societies were brought, sealed up, to
the House of Commons on the morrow, whereupon Pitt moved for the
appointment of a secret committee to examine them. He himself, Dundas,
and nineteen other members soon drew up the Report. When presented on
16th May, it contained a statement of all the threatening symptoms of
the time, and so far ignored the legal efforts of those Societies as to
form a very alarming diagnosis.[330]
The fears of Ministers were further aroused by the contents of a letter
from the Rev. Jeremiah Joyce (tutor of Earl Stanhope's son) to Horne
Tooke, which the Post Office had seized. It announced the arrest of
citizen Hardy, and ended thus: "Query: is it possible to get ready by
Thursday?"[331] Some effort of the imagination was needed to figure the
Silenus of the literary world as a plotter against the lives of
Ministers. But they now decided to arrest him and the Reverend Jeremiah,
as well as Bonney, Richter, and Kyd, also members of the Constitutional
Society, besides Camage and one or two other democrats of Sheffield.
Davison, the would-be seller of pikes, had fled betimes.
These were the circumstances which induced Pitt to propose the
suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act (16th May). The Report of the Secret
Committee having been read, he proceeded to exaggerate the import of the
more threatening parts of the evidence, and to convince the House that
these Societies, which had congratulated the French Convention, and
still aped its methods, were plotting to set up an authority openly
hostile to Parliament. With all the force of his oratory he pictured the
state of things that must ensue--"an enormous torrent of insurrection,
which would sweep away all the barriers of government, law and religion,
and leave our country a naked waste for usurped authority to range in,
uncontrolled and unresisted." Despite the warning of Fox that the remedy
now proposed was worse than the evil which it sought to avert; despite
the pleas of Grey and Sheridan against indecent haste in hurrying on
this arbitrary measure, it was forced through every stage in the Commons
at that single sitting; finally, at half-past three in the morning, the
numbers of the Whig protestors sank to 13, while the Ministerialists
still mustered 108 strong.[332]
This collapse of the Opposition was due to a sharp cleavage in its ranks
on the vital issues now at stake. As has already appeared, Pitt had
consulted the Duke of Portland and his immediate followers on subjects
affecting public order. Some of the Old Whigs, notably Windham, served
on the Committee of Secrecy; and the evidence there forthcoming led them
to propose a general support of Government both in its war policy and
the maintenance of order. Those eager Royalists, Burke and Windham, took
the lead in proposing an alliance with the Ministry. The question arose
whether the Old Whigs should support from outside or actually coalesce
with the Ministry, taking their fair share of power. Burke strongly
advised the latter course as the only means of assuring continued and
strenuous support. This opened a sluice gate of correspondence,
resulting in important changes in the Cabinet. I shall refer to this
matter later, merely noting here that the Duke of Portland took over
from Dundas the Home Office, which was thenceforth limited to British
and Irish affairs, Dundas becoming Secretary of State for War, and
Windham Secretary at War. The changes were most opportune; for they
strengthened the administrative machine and served to build up a
national party strong enough to cope with the growing difficulties of
the time. Thenceforth there was no danger of the overthrow of the
Ministry. Further, the panic pervading all parts of England in May 1794
was soon allayed by the news of Howe's victory, termed "the glorious
First of June"; while in July the fall of Robespierre caused a general
sense of relief. In view of these events, Pitt would have done well to
relax his efforts against the British Jacobins. He held on his way and
encountered sharp rebuffs. The trial of Hardy and others in October
dragged on to a great length; and, after hearing an enormous mass of
evidence (some of which proved the possession of arms by democrats) the
jury returned a verdict of Not Guilty. This result, due to the masterly
defence by Erskine and Gibbs, aroused a tumult of joy in the vast crowd
outside such as London had rarely seen. Hardy afterwards asserted that,
in case of a conviction, Government had decided to arrest about 800 more
persons.[333] This is mere hearsay; but it has been fastened upon by
those who seek to father upon Pitt the design of reviving the days of
Strafford and "Thorough." A fortnight previously Watt, once a government
informer, was convicted at Edinburgh of a treasonable plot to set the
city on fire, sack the banks, and attack the castle. Before he went to
execution he confessed his guilt.[334]
This was the only conviction obtained by Government. The trial of Horne
Tooke ran a course unfavourable to Ministers, the evidence for the
prosecution being flimsy in the extreme. Pitt himself was called to the
witness-box, and when closely cross-questioned by Erskine as to his
former connection with the Reform cause, admitted that he was present at
a meeting at the Duke of Richmond's residence, at which delegates from
county Reform Associations were present. The admission exposed him to
the charge of inconsistency in the eyes of those who looked only at the
surface of things. In reality, those who met at the Duke of Richmond's
house had nothing in common with the democratic clubs which proposed to
override the will of Parliament by a National Convention. Yet, as the
superficial view gains a ready assent, the fame of Pitt now underwent
an eclipse. Never again did he hear the whole-hearted acclaim which
greeted him in the years 1784-90. The roar of delight which went up at
the news of the acquittal of Horne Tooke was a sign of the advent of a
new era, in whose aspirations Pitt had no part.
The prosecutions against Bonney, Joyce, Kyd, and Holcroft were now
dropped. The charge against Thelwall was pressed home, but resulted in
another defeat for Government. Thus, except in the case of Watt, no
proof was forthcoming of treasonable designs, though the apprehension of
Davison of Sheffield might perhaps have led to discoveries of that
nature. In the main, then, Pitt and his colleagues failed to justify the
harsh measure of suspending the Habeas Corpus Act; and the failure of
the State prosecutions led to a marked increase of the membership and
activity of the London Corresponding Society, with results which will
appear later.
Nevertheless, Pitt's conduct is far from indefensible with regard to the
main point at issue, the meeting of a National Convention. In view of
the projects of some of the wilder spirits at London, Sheffield,
Norwich, and Edinburgh, it is presumptuous to charge him with
causelessly seeking to bring about a "Reign of Terror." He was face to
face with developments which might easily have become dangerous; and,
with the example of Paris before him, he not unnaturally took what he
thought to be the safer course, that of stopping them at the outset.
Indeed, we may question whether Fox, had he been in power, would have
allowed the assembling of a National Convention, pledged to press upon
Parliament measures which he reprobated.
It is when we come to details that Pitt is open to the charge of acting
with undue severity. Considering the proved loyalty of the great mass of
the people, what need was there to inaugurate a system of arbitrary
arrests? After all, England was not France. Here no systematic assault
had been made on the institutions in Church and State. The constitution
had suffered dilapidation, but it was storm-proof, and the garrison was
strongly entrenched. Moreover, the democrats for the most part urged
their case without any of the appeals to violence which wrought havoc in
France. There the mob delighted to hurry a suspect to _la lanterne_ and
to parade heads on pikes. Here the mass meeting at Chalk Farm, or on
Castle Hill, Sheffield, ended with loss neither of life nor of
property. So far as I have found, not one life was taken by the people
in the course of this agitation--a fact which speaks volumes for their
religious sense, their self-restraint even amidst deep poverty, and, in
general, their obedience to law even when they deemed it oppressive. The
hero of the year 1794 is not William Pitt, but the British nation.
FOOTNOTES:
[274] See "The Complaints of the Poor People of England," by G. Dyer,
B.A. (late of Emmanuel College, Camb., 1793).
[275] "H. O.," Geo. III (Domestic), 27, 28.
[276] E. Smith, "The English Jacobins," 111-3; C. Cestre, "John
Thelwall," ch. ii.
[277] "Report of the Committee of Secrecy," May 1794. The Duke of
Richmond's plan was the Westminster programme of 1780, which became the
"six points" of the Charter of 1838.
[278] See Fox's letter of 2nd May 1793 to Hardy in "State Trials," xxiv,
791.
[279] M. Conway, "Life of T. Paine," i, 346.
[280] In the Place MSS. (Brit. Mus.), vol. entitled "Libel, Sedition,
Treason, Persecution"--a valuable collection.
[281] "Parl. Hist.," xxxii, 929-44.
[282] "Collection of Addresses ... to the National Convention of France"
(Debrett, 1793), 14.
[283] "Speeches of Lord Erskine," 293.
[284] "State Trials," xxii, 471-522.
[285] Porritt, ii, 128.
[286] "H. O.," Scotland, 7.
[287] _Ibid._
[288] "State Trials," xxiii, 118-26.
[289] I differ here from Lord Cockburn, "Examination of the Trials for
Sedition in Scotland," i, 147.
[290] _Ibid._, i, 162-5; "State Trials," xxiii, 146-8, 160.
[291] P. Mackenzie, "Life of Muir," does not state the reason for Muir's
visit to Paris.
[292] "H. O.," Scotland, 8. Dunlop, Lord Provost of Glasgow, sent it to
Robert Dundas on 12th March 1793. For this William Christie, who
translated the French Constitution of 1791 into English, see Alger,
"Englishmen in the French Revolution," 78, 98.
[293] See Campbell, "Lives of the Lord Chancellors," vii, 273, note, and
viii, 143-5, for criticisms on the judges: also Cockburn, _op. cit._, i,
147-80; "Life of Romilly," i, 23.
[294] "H. O.," Scotland, 8. Letter of 2nd August 1793. Dundas further
stated that Muir had several Irish handbills on him.
[295] Curiously enough, Lord Cockburn paid no heed to this in his
otherwise able examination of the case.
[296] T. Wolfe Tone, "Autobiography," ii, 285.
[297] "H. O.," Scotland, 7.
[298] "H. O.," Scotland, 8. W. Scot to R. Dundas, 1st August.
[299] See the "Narrative of the Sufferings of T. F. Palmer and W.
Skirving" (1794), and "Monthly Mag.," xvii, 83-5, for Palmer's
adventures. He died of dysentery in 1799.
[300] "H. O.," Scotland, 9.
[301] Their Memorial to Henry Dundas is in "H. O.," Geo. III (Domestic),
27. They did not claim that he was innocent, merely that the punishment
was excessive and unjust.
[302] "Arniston Mems.," 240.
[303] Campbell, _op. cit._, viii, 145, 147.
[304] "H. O.," Geo. III (Domestic), 27.
[305] For the instructions see E. Smith, "The Story of the English
Jacobins," 87.
[306] "State Trials," xxiii, 414.
[307] J. Gerrald had published a pamphlet, "A Convention the only Means
of saving us from Ruin" (1793). It is in the British Museum.
[308] "H. O.," Scotland, 9.
[309] "State Trials," xxiii, 766.
[310] "Auckland Journals," iii, 205.
[311] "Arniston Mems.," 242.
[312] E. Smith, "The Eng. Jacobins," 93-7.
[313] See "Report of the Committee of Secrecy" (17th May 1794).
[314] C. Cestre, "John Thelwall," 77.
[315] "H. O.," Geo. III (Domestic), 30.
[316] "State Trials," xxiii, 1055-1166. For technical reasons this
statement of Booth could not be given at Walker's trial. Besides
Walker's Constitutional Society, there were two others, the Reformation
and Patriotic Societies, founded in March and April 1792.
[317] See E. Smith, "The Eng. Jacobins," ch. vi, for the meetings at
Sheffield and the part played by Yorke.
[318] "H. O.," Geo. III (Domestic), 31.
[319] _Ibid._, 27, 29. Spence purveyed "Pigs' Meat," while Eaton sold
"Hogs' Wash." The titles are a take-off of Burke's phrase "the swinish
multitude."
[320] _I.e._, similar to the one passed in Dublin against a People's
Convention.
[321] "Report of the Parl. Comm. of Secrecy" (17th May 1794).
[322] "Parl. Hist.," xxx, 1363-91; xxxi, 1-27.
[323] _Ibid._, xxxi, 97-121.
[324] "Morning Chronicle" for April 1794.
[325] "H. O.," Geo. III (Domestic), 30.
[326] "Auckland Journals," iii, 213.
[327] "State Trials," xxiv, 588, 600, 601.
[328] "State Trials," xxiv, 626.
[329] E. Smith, "Eng. Jacobins," 116.
[330] "Parl. Hist.," xxxi, 475-97.
[331] "Life of Horne Tooke," ii, 119. It was afterwards absurdly said
that Dundas, Horne Tooke's neighbour at Wimbledon, had had the letter
filched from his house. Both of them lived on the west side of the
"green."
[332] "Parl. Hist.," xxxi, 497-505.
[333] "Life of T. Hardy," 42; "State Trials," xxiv, 717, 729, 762, etc.
The evidence fills 1,207 pages.
[334] _Ibid._, 1-200.