_Eleventh._ That the Constitution should be so amended that the

President and Vice-President shall be elected by a direct vote of the

people.

_Twelfth._ That the question of the reconstruction of the rebellious

States belongs to the people, through their representatives in

Congress, and not to the Executive.

_Thirteenth._ That the confiscation of the lands of the rebels, and

their distribution among the soldiers and actual settlers, is a

measure of justice.

The country was prepared, at the time the Democratic platform was

adopted, to receive its demands relating to the war with some respect,

but the aspect of the contest was speedily changed by Sherman’s capture

of Atlanta and Sheridan’s brilliant victories in the Shenandoah

Valley. General McClellan and his friends appreciated the unfortunate

expression of the convention against the war, that was made very

generally odious among loyal people by the thrilling victories of the

army, and in his letter of acceptance, that he delayed long enough to

give the fullest consideration to the subject, he plainly dissented

from the war plank of the platform. He said: “I could not look in the

face of my gallant comrades of the army and navy who have survived so

many bloody battles and tell them that their labors and the sacrifice

of so many of our slain and wounded brethren had been in vain, that

we had abandoned that Union for which we have so often perilled our

lives;” to which he added: “No peace can be permanent without union.”

While the contest had been fairly doubtful and at times exceedingly

gloomy for Lincoln, the victories of Sherman and Sheridan caused a

sudden tidal wave, that utterly overwhelmed McClellan and left him

the worst defeated candidate of history in any contested election,

receiving only 21 electoral votes to 212 for Lincoln. The following

table gives the popular and electoral vote, with the soldier vote in a

separate table, as cast in the field:

══════════════╤═════════════════════╦═══════════════════

│ POPULAR VOTE. ║ ELECTORAL VOTE.

STATES. ├──────────┬──────────╫────────┬──────────

│ Lincoln. │McClellan.║Lincoln.│McClellan.

──────────────┼──────────┼──────────╫────────┼──────────

Maine │ 72,278 │ 47,736 ║ 7 │ ――

New Hampshire │ 36,595 │ 33,034 ║ 5 │ ――

Vermont │ 42,422 │ 13,325 ║ 5 │ ――

Massachusetts │ 126,742 │ 48,745 ║ 12 │ ――

Rhode Island │ 14,343 │ 8,718 ║ 4 │ ――

Connecticut │ 44,693 │ 42,288 ║ 6 │ ――

New York │ 368,726 │ 361,986 ║ 33 │ ――

New Jersey │ 60,723 │ 68,014 ║ ―― │ 7

Pennsylvania │ 296,389 │ 276,308 ║ 26 │ ――

Delaware │ 8,155 │ 8,767 ║ ―― │ 3

Maryland │ 40,153 │ 32,739 ║ 7 │ ――

Kentucky │ 27,786 │ 64,301 ║ ―― │ 11

West Virginia │ 23,223 │ 10,457 ║ 5 │ ――

Ohio │ 265,154 │ 205,568 ║ 21 │ ――

Indiana │ 150,422 │ 130,233 ║ 13 │ ――

Illinois │ 189,487 │ 158,349 ║ 16 │ ――

Michigan │ 85,352 │ 67,370 ║ 8 │ ――

Iowa │ 87,331 │ 49,260 ║ 8 │ ――

Wisconsin │ 79,564 │ 63,875 ║ 8 │ ――

Minnesota │ 25,060 │ 17,375 ║ 4 │ ――

Kansas │ 14,228 │ 3,871 ║ 3 │ ――

Missouri │ 72,991 │ 31,026 ║ 11 │ ――

Nevada[19] │ 9,826 │ 6,594 ║ 2 │ ――

California │ 62,134 │ 43,841 ║ 5 │ ――

Oregon │ 9,888 │ 8,457 ║ 3 │ ――

├──────────┼──────────╫────────┼──────────

Totals │2,213,665 │1,802,237 ║ 212 │ 21

══════════════╧══════════╧══════════╩════════╧══════════

[19] Nevada chose three electors, one of whom died before election.

═════════════════════╤══════════════════════

│ SOLDIER VOTE.

STATES. ├─────────┬────────────

│ Lincoln.│ McClellan.

─────────────────────┼─────────┼────────────

Maine │ 4,174 │ 741

New Hampshire │ 2,066 │ 690

Vermont │ 243 │ 49

Pennsylvania │ 26,712 │ 12,349

Maryland │ 2,800 │ 321

Kentucky │ 1,194 │ 2,823

Ohio │ 41,146 │ 9,757

Michigan │ 9,402 │ 2,959

Iowa │ 15,178 │ 1,364

Wisconsin │ 11,372 │ 2,458

California │ 2,600 │ 237

├─────────┼────────────

Totals │ 116,887 │ 33,748

═════════════════════╧═════════╧════════════

The army vote of Vermont, Kansas, and Minnesota was not received in

time to be taken into the official count, and part of the vote of

Wisconsin was rejected for informality.

The States of Tennessee and Louisiana also held elections and were

carried for Lincoln, but their votes were not necessary to the election

of the Republican ticket, and although Lincoln earnestly desired that

these States should be recognized and the votes counted, Congress, by

joint resolution, that Lincoln signed with great reluctance, declared

that they should not be recognized, and they were omitted in the final

count by Congress.

Pennsylvania was the only Republican State that faltered in the fall

elections of 1864. There was no State ticket to be chosen, and the

Republicans in charge of the campaign assumed that Lincoln would

carry the State without extraordinary efforts, while the friends of

McClellan, a native of the State, with strong individual and social

relations, made exhaustive efforts to give him the victory.

The October election was practically a stand-off, and Lincoln

telegraphed me on the morning after the election to come to Washington.

He was much distressed at the attitude of our State, and apprehensive

that New York, with Horatio Seymour as Governor, one of the ablest

Democrats of the country, might vote for McClellan, as Tammany was

then in the very zenith of its power. I had been Chairman of the State

Committee when Lincoln was elected in 1860, and General Cameron was

my successor in 1864. He was thoroughly competent for the task, but

evidently did not appreciate the perils which confronted him. Lincoln

asked me to join Cameron and devote the intervening month between the

October and November elections to assure a victory. I answered that I

could not make the suggestion to Cameron, as our political relations

were not especially friendly, to which he replied, asking me whether

I would do it if so requested by Cameron. I of course assented, and

the following day I received a letter from Cameron at my home in

Chambersburg, requesting me to join him, where I found Honorable Wayne

MacVeagh, who had been the Republican chairman the year before and who

was then not more friendly to Cameron than myself. We all united in an

earnest effort to win the State, always acting in entire harmony with

Cameron and his committee.

I had private quarters at the Continental, while Cameron’s quarters

were at the Girard, and, as requested, advised Lincoln each day of

the apparent progress of the battle. My reports were not so assuring

as he desired, for the friends of McClellan, inspired by the partial

victory of October, renewed their energies for the November fight.

Postmaster-General Dennison came to see me on a special mission from

Lincoln about two weeks before the election to learn the situation as

precisely as possible, and I had to tell him that I saw but little hope

of carrying the State on the home vote. The army vote would doubtless

be largely for Lincoln and give him the State, but it would be declared

a “bayonet election,” and with such a result in Pennsylvania, and

New York lost, as was possible, while Lincoln’s election could not

be defeated, as the Southern States did not vote, the moral power of

the new administration to prosecute the war and attain peace would

be greatly impaired. My answer to Lincoln was that I would go to

Washington within a few days if it should appear necessary to take

extreme measures to save the State on the home vote.

As the political conditions did not improve, I telegraphed to Lincoln

that I would meet him at nine o’clock in the evening to discuss the

campaign. I found him nervously anxious about Pennsylvania, although

not doubting his re-election. He knew that New York was trembling in

the balance and might be lost, and his fears were fully warranted,

as he had but little over 6000 majority in a million votes. I told

him that I had not confidence in the State being carried by the home

vote, but that it could be done without interfering with the military

operations of the army, as Grant was then besieging Petersburg and

Sheridan had whipped the Confederates clear out of the valley. I

suggested that he should in some way have Grant furlough five thousand

Pennsylvania soldiers home for twenty days, and that Sheridan should do

the same, as that vote cast at home would insure a home majority. He

hesitated about making the request of Grant for reasons which I could

not understand, and I then suggested that General Meade was a soldier

and a gentleman, and that he could safely send an order to him as

Commander of the Army of the Potomac, and that Meade would obey it and

permit the order to be returned.

A messenger from the War Office went the next morning to Meade,

bearing the order from Lincoln, brought it back with him, and fully

five thousand Pennsylvania soldiers were furloughed to return home. I

said: “How about Sheridan?” Lincoln’s face brightened and with great

enthusiasm he said:

“Oh, Phil; he’s all right.”

The same order went to Sheridan, of which no record was ever kept, and

Sheridan sent five thousand of his veterans home to vote as they shot,

and Lincoln’s majority on the home vote was 5712, to which the army

vote added 14,363, making a total majority in the State of 20,075.

It is not generally known how earnestly Lincoln labored for compensated

emancipation. He made earnest efforts to save the Border States to

the Union by the assurance of compensation for slaves, and even after

all the slave States south of the Potomac and the Ohio had joined the

Confederacy, he adhered to the policy of compensated emancipation until

the day of his death. In August, 1864, when the political situation

presented a very gloomy aspect, I had a long conference with Lincoln

at the White House, and he then introduced the subject of compensated

emancipation.

In that conversation he gave me the first intimation of his purpose to

try and end the war by paying the South $400,000,000 as compensation

for the freedom of the slaves. He had the proposition written out in

his own handwriting, but he well knew that if such a purpose on his

part were made public, it would make his re-election impossible. He

discussed it freely and very earnestly, however, and said that he

regarded compensated emancipation as the only way to restore fellowship

between the States. He did not doubt the ability of the North to

overthrow the military power of the Confederacy, but what he most

feared was that the people of the South, driven to desperation by the

severe sacrifices they had suffered, and the general desolation of

their country, that gave them no hope of regaining prosperity, would

make their armies disband into guerrilla squads and would be implacable

in their resentments against the Government.

In all of the many expressions I heard Lincoln make use of, toward the

close of the war, he always exhibited an earnest desire to do something

that would impressively teach the Southern people that they were not

to be held as conquered subjects of a despotic power, but were to come

back into the Union and enjoy the blessings of a reunited people.

Lincoln believed that in no way could he so widely and profoundly

impress the Southern people with the desire of the Government to

deal with them in generous justice as by paying them $400,000,000 as

compensation for the loss of their slaves. I can never forget the

earnestness with which he spoke of this proposition at a time when he

did not dare breathe it to the public. He said the war was costing

$4,000,000 a day, and that it would certainly last for more than four

months, thus costing the Government more than the whole amount he would

have gladly given as compensation for the freedom of the slaves, not to

calculate the sacrifice of life and destruction of property. He fretted

because he could not convey to the South what he believed should be

done to close the war and enable them to re-establish their homes and

fruitful fields. He believed in his theory of compensated emancipation

until his death, and he abandoned it only a short time before the

surrender of Lee. He would have suggested it to Vice-President

Stephens, of the Confederacy, at their City Point meeting in the

winter of 1865, had not Stephens advised him at the outset that he was

instructed by Jefferson Davis to entertain no proposition that did not

perpetuate the Confederacy, and after his return he wrote a message to

Congress in favor of it, submitted it to his Cabinet, by which it was

nearly or quite unanimously disapproved, and he endorsed upon it the

disapproval of the Cabinet and laid it away.

Lincoln was the most notable combination of sadness and mirth that I

ever met with in any of our public men. His face in repose, under all

circumstances, was one of the saddest I ever beheld. It would brighten

in conversation, and at times would portray a measure of sorrow that

could not be surpassed. He was from his youth much given to melancholy.

While he was known as fond of sports and brimful of humor, a very large

portion of his life was always given to isolation and solitude, when he

gave free latitude to the melancholy tendencies of his mind.

Strange as it may seem, he was always a hopeful man, never pessimistic,

and always inclined when discussing any question to take the bright

side. He was severely conscientious in his convictions and in his

actions. He had faith in the present and greater faith in the future.

He had been in early life what is now commonly called an agnostic,

with a strong inclination to atheism, but in his mature years he never

exhibited a trace of it. I have never known any man who had greater

reverence for God than Abraham Lincoln. Throughout his writings,

political and otherwise, will be found multiplied expressions of his

abiding faith in the Great Ruler of nations and individuals.

In a single sentence to be found in Lincoln’s second inaugural address

the country and the world have the most complete portrayal of his

character. When he was inaugurated for a second term as President,

on the 4th of March, 1865, the military power of the Confederacy was

broken, and many in his position would have exhibited the pride of

the victor over the vanquished on such an occasion; but after stating

in the kindest and most temperate language the duty of himself and

of the patriotic people of the country to protect the Union against

dismemberment, he does not utter a word of resentment against the

South. “With malice toward none; with charity for all,” was the brief

and eloquent sentence in which he defined the duty of those who had

then substantially destroyed the power of the Rebellion. That beautiful

expression came from the heart of Abraham Lincoln, and it profoundly

impressed the whole country, then wildly impassioned by the bitterness

of fraternal strife. He knew the resentments which must confront him in

restoring the shattered fragments of the Union, and his supreme desire

was to have the bitterness of the conflict perish when peace came.

No man who has filled the Presidential chair was so vindictively and

malignantly defamed as was Lincoln in the South. The opponents of

the war in the North were guilty of unpardonable assaults upon his

integrity, his ability, and his methods, but the South had no knowledge

of him, as he had filled no important part in national affairs before

his election to the Presidency; and his humble birth in Kentucky, close

by the birthplace of Jefferson Davis, and his exaggerated rudeness of

appearance and manner made the people of the South ready to believe

anything to his discredit. He was proclaimed throughout the Confederacy

as a second Nero; as a bloody and remorseless butcher; as a vulgar

clown who met the sorrows of the nation with ribald jest. Not a single

virtue was conceded to him.

No one could know Lincoln well without seeing some features of his home

life. I have seen him in grave conversation with public men on the most

momentous subjects, when “Tad” Lincoln, his favorite boy, would rush

into the room, bounce on to his father’s lap, throw his arms around his

neck, and play hobby-horse on his foot regardless of all the sacred

affairs of State. There never was a frown from the father, and the

fretting questions of even a great war seemed to perish until “Tad”

had completed his romp. The greatest sorrow of Lincoln’s life shadowed

the altar of his own home, and it was one he had to suffer in silence.

The calamity that befell Mrs. Lincoln after his death was visible to

those who had opportunity to see for themselves at an early period

of his administration. Mrs. Lincoln was mentally unbalanced, but not

sufficiently so to prevent the performance of her social functions, and

her vagaries often led to severe reflections upon the President, at

times even to the extent of charging her with sympathy for the South,

as her brothers were prominent in the Southern army.

I first saw Mrs. Lincoln at Harrisburg on the night that Lincoln made

his midnight journey to Washington, and the greatest difficulty we had

on that occasion was to prevent her from creating a scene that would

have given publicity to the movement. I thought her a fool, and was

so disgusted with her that I never spoke to her afterward, although I

had frequently gone with ladies to her receptions. I wronged her, for

she was then not wholly responsible, and soon after Lincoln’s death

the climax came, leaving her to grope out the remainder of her life in

the starless midnight of insanity. With Lincoln’s many other sorrows,

considering his love of home and family, it may be understood how

keenly he suffered, and how he was clouded by shadows for which the

world could give no relief.

No man ever came in contact with Abraham Lincoln who did not learn to

love, honor, and even reverence him. His ablest political enemies ever

paid the highest tributes, not only to his personal attributes, but to

his masterly ability, and none surpassed Stephen A. Douglas, the ablest

foeman Lincoln ever met, in his appreciation of Lincoln’s qualities.

He had to accept vastly the gravest responsibilities ever put upon

any President of the United States, and I am quite sure that no other

man could have filled Lincoln’s place during the Civil War with equal

safety to the Republic. Had he been vindictive and resentful his fame

would not be without blemish to-day.

What was to me the most beautiful tribute I have ever heard paid to

him came from the lips of Jefferson Davis, when I visited him at his

home in Mississippi some ten years after the war. He never tired of

discussing the character and the actions of Lincoln, and asked me many

questions about his personal qualities. After he had heard all that

could be given in the brief time that I had, he said with a degree of

mingled earnestness and pathos that few could have equalled:

“Next to the destruction of the Confederacy, the death of Abraham

Lincoln was the darkest day the South has ever known.”

THE GRANT-SEYMOUR CONTEST

1868

To the casual reader of our political history, the election and

re-election of Grant to the Presidency immediately after the close of

the war would seem to be a result at once logical and inevitable; but

there are few of the present day who have any knowledge of the many

obstacles which confronted Grant in his transfer from the highest

military to the highest civil duties of the nation.

It is noted that Grant, the Great Captain of the Age, was elected

and re-elected by large majorities; that General Hayes, another

soldier of national fame, succeeded him; that General Garfield, a

soldier-statesman, succeeded Hayes, defeating Hancock, the most

brilliant Democratic soldier of the war, by only a few thousands on

the popular vote; that Blaine, the first civilian candidate of the

party, was the first Republican to suffer defeat after the political

revolution of 1860; that General Harrison, another honored soldier,

was successful as the Republican candidate in 1888, and that Major

McKinley, now Chief Magistrate of the Republic, carried his musket as

a private in the flame of battle, and came out of the war an officer

promoted for gallantry. With such a line of military Presidents, the

natural assumption of the student of our political history would be

that General Grant’s election came about because none could question

its fitness.

There were very serious obstacles to Grant’s nomination for the

Presidency by the Republicans in 1868. First, he was not a Republican

and never had been. He had never voted a Republican ticket, and he

never cast a Republican ballot until after he had been eight years a

Republican President. His last vote before he re-entered the army was

cast for a radical pro-slavery Democrat, and he did not even sympathize

with Stephen A. Douglas in 1860, although he lived in Illinois,

the home of the great Democratic leader of that day. Second, he was

resolutely averse to being a candidate for the Presidency. He was

General of the Army, with freedom to retire without diminution of pay;

he had no political training, and felt himself unfitted for a political

career. He was honest and apparently fixed in his purpose not to become

a candidate. These objections at first appeared to be insuperable

obstacles to Grant’s nomination, but he was human, and had he declined

the Presidency when it was apparently within his reach, he would have

stood as the only man in the history of the Republic who had refused

its crown.

[Illustration: U. S. GRANT]

The Democrats were in a hopeless condition, and they at once began

a systematic movement to make him their candidate. This alarmed the

Republicans, and they made equally earnest and methodical efforts to

make him their leader. It is doubtful upon which side General Grant

would have fallen had it not been for the early estrangement between

President Johnson and himself. Johnson made repeated attempts to

overslaugh him either directly or indirectly. He ordered Grant to

Mexico to get him out of the country, but Grant refused to go, and he

afterward made an earnest effort to supersede Grant by calling General

Thomas to the command of the army, but Thomas stubbornly refused to

consider the call. As the Republicans were then in bitter warfare

against Johnson, Grant logically found sympathy in Republican circles,

and finally, with visible reluctance, he agreed to become the candidate

of the Republicans. Had he been nominated by the Democrats he would

have been elected, but his administration would have greatly conserved

and liberalized the Democratic teachings of that day. His final assent

to become the Republican candidate for President was obtained by the

late Colonel Forney.

The assassination of Lincoln and the succession of Vice-President

Johnson to the Presidency repeated the political history of Tyler and

Fillmore in a radical change of the policy of the Government. Johnson

started under a cloud in his career as Vice-President. On the day of

his inauguration he appeared in the Senate visibly intoxicated, and

delivered a maudlin harangue so disgraceful that a correct report was

never permitted to be given to the public. The report of that address

as severely modified by the omission of the most offensive expressions

was highly discreditable. He was immediately hurried away to the

country residence of the elder Francis P. Blair, and there remained

most of the time until more than a month later, when Lincoln was

assassinated. He never attempted to resume his place in the Senate as

presiding officer, although he was frequently in Washington and was

there on the night of the assassination.

Our Presidents and how we make them · 第 19 / 44 段