Mr. DULLES. Could I ask one question with regard to Exhibit No. 1023?
This, as I understand it, is the new specifications with regard to
persons with respect to whom you wish to have alert information.
Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.
Mr. DULLES. It is called, "U.S. Secret Service Protective Information
Guidelines." The top of page 2 of this exhibit is a paragraph that
reads, "The interest"--and that is the interest of the suspect, I
assume----
Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.
Mr. DULLES. "The interest must be towards the President, or others
named, or other high Government officials in the nature of a complaint
coupled with an expressed or implied determination to use a means other
than legal or peaceful to satisfy any grievance real or imagined."
I wonder if you could explain that a little more? I ask this question
because I have been studying the previous assassinations a good
deal. And in many of these cases, it seems to me this definition
would not have covered the assassin. That is, there has been in some
cases opposition to government, opposition to people in authority,
but there has been no expressed hatred toward or animus against a
particular President. And I was wondering whether this went too far on
a definition to meet your purposes.
Mr. ROWLEY. This is a beginning, as I indicated to you here. We hope to
improve it. But this is one of the things where we want to include the
Oswald-type individual.
Now, Oswald wrote to the Governor intimating that he would use whatever
means was necessary to obtain the change of his undesirable, or as he
called it, dishonorable discharge. All legal means had been used in
his case, where the Navy Review Board had examined it and came to a
decision.
And this is an example of what we were trying to include in the area of
this type of individual. Now, the other people----
Mr. DULLES. But that was not a threat directed against the President.
That was directed against the Secretary of the Navy.
Mr. ROWLEY. That is right; but then, on the other hand, they transfer
the threats. I am quite sure that the Congressmen here get many
threats, and that sometimes they may not come off. But these people are
obsessed.
You take the individual that attempted the assassination of the late
President Roosevelt in Miami that time. His original purpose was to
shoot President Hoover. But then when he heard Roosevelt was there, he
transferred.
Now, I remember a situation involving a member of Truman's staff, where
a fellow stalked this man at his home. And finally we got into the case
on his request. We satisfied ourselves that he wasn't a real threat to
him--but we picked up the paper a year later and found out he shot at
an assemblyman in Staten Island. So if they make a threat or something
like this, even though it is against the Government as a group, or have
some grievance, they transfer it--particularly, to the President. They
use that father complex, as indicated in the research work that these
different agencies have submitted to us.
Representative FORD. Under these criteria, which you are now following,
Oswald would have been designated? Is that your judgment?
Mr. ROWLEY. That is correct; yes, sir.
Mr. DULLES. I had some questions about that in reading it. That did
not occur to me, because Oswald had never expressed any antagonism
toward the President, as far as I know, up to this time--the President
personally, or even afterward.
Mr. ROWLEY. That is right; but under this criteria he would. Namely, he
had the interest because of the letter he wrote to Governor Connally.
The activity, because he was a defector, and he demonstrated for the
Fair Play for Cuba Committee. The capability, because he traveled, and
he had knowledge of firearms.
Mr. DULLES. Yes; but those do not come, it seems to me, within this
definition. Maybe I interpret it differently than you. The last
interest Oswald showed was directed toward General Walker. It wasn't
against--of course, that wasn't known.
Mr. ROWLEY. No; it wasn't known but the first interest of this type was
the letter to Governor Connally as Secretary of the Navy, in which he
said he would use whatever means he could to correct that discharge,
inferring, of course, that he would apply illegal means if he could.
Representative FORD. If we only had the letter that he wrote to
Governor Connally, and no other information, how would that threat, or
that course of action, become known to the Secret Service?
Mr. ROWLEY. It would not, unless it was furnished by the Navy
Department or Secretary of the Navy's office.
Just like you gentlemen get letters that never come to our attention.
But you might pick up a paper some day and read that this fellow hit
somebody, and he was in to see you or wrote you letters.
Representative FORD. Would this criteria be circulated among the
50 Governors, for example, or their staffs, so that if threats are
received against a Governor, then the Governor's staff in that
particular State would so notify the Secret Service?
Mr. ROWLEY. It could. In this case it would be a help. But they refer
all their complaints to the FBI. Threats of this kind.
Representative FORD. The State?
Mr. ROWLEY. The Governors do in most cases. So that the FBI under this
system would bring it to our attention.
Mr. DULLES. I would think, Mr. Rowley, this might be subject to
misinterpretation as being rather narrower than you suggest.
Mr. ROWLEY. Well, this is something--actually, we have to develop
something, and we have to, if you will, have a crash program; we are
working constantly to develop the categories and breakdowns as I
indicated earlier.
(At this point, Senator Cooper entered the hearing room.)
Mr. RANKIN. Chief Rowley, did you supply to us the statements of the
Secret Service agents who were informed about the assassination in
Dallas? You gave us written statements, did you?
Mr. ROWLEY. Yes.
Mr. RANKIN. I hand you Commission Exhibit No. 1024, and ask you if that
is the letter of transmittal, together with the attached statements
that you have just described from the various agents about the events
at Dallas.
Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.
(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 1024 for
identification.)
(At this point, Mr. Dulles withdrew from the hearing room.)
Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Chairman, I offer in evidence Commission Exhibit No.
1024.
The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted.
(The document heretofore marked for identification as Commission
Exhibit No. 1024, was received in evidence.)
Mr. RANKIN. I would like to inform the Commission that these are copies
of the statements you already have in connection with the Secret
Service report, but we wanted to make it part of the record.
The CHAIRMAN. Very well.
Mr. RANKIN. Chief, did you write me a letter for the Commission on
April 22, in which you enclosed the statements of five of your agents
in regard to President Kennedy's views about agents riding on the back
of the car?
Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.
Mr. RANKIN. I will hand you Commission Exhibit No. 1025, and ask you if
that is your transmittal letter with the statements attached.
(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 1025 for
identification.)
Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Chairman, I offer in evidence Commission Exhibit No.
1025.
The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted.
(The document heretofore marked for identification as Commission
Exhibit No. 1025, was received in evidence.)
Mr. RANKIN. Chief Rowley, I should like to have you state for the
record, for the Commission, whether the action of President Kennedy in
making these statements was understood by you or properly could have
been understood by the agents as relieving them of any responsibility
about the protection of the President.
Mr. ROWLEY. No; I would not so construe that, Mr. Rankin. The agents
would respond regardless of what the President said if the situation
indicated a potential danger. The facilities were available to them.
They had the rear steps, they would be there as a part of the screen.
And immediately in the event of any emergency they would have used them.
Mr. RANKIN. Do you know why there was no one riding on the rear step at
the time of the assassination?
Mr. ROWLEY. From normal practice, based on my own experience over the
years, I know that the agent in charge in the front or any experienced
agent, who is either on the right front or the left front of the
followup car, without being told, will react immediately. If he
determines there is a situation here, there is a big crowd, and so
forth, he will immediately leave that followup car.
Now, the running board on the followup car has an important place in
the setup. It is a much better place to be than on the rear step if you
see a situation, and you want to move fast. Suppose someone is coming
toward the President's car--you would be surprised how fast you are
propelled by jumping off that car, and you are in motion fast, where
you can either tackle somebody, or block him or anything like that. So
this is an important part. You cannot do that from the rear step of the
President's car.
Now, when the agents are in a heavy crowd, as we have been abroad, in
places where we had to run, say, for 10 miles alongside the car, agents
could stand on the rear steps and screen the President. In addition,
there would be agents on the side, protecting him on his right side.
The crowd is surging close to him, you are bouncing off the car, and
the people, trying to ward them off from touching the President.
After a period of time you are weary. But with the aid of this step,
you can be replaced by the agent there, and he takes your place until
you revive yourself, and you are acting as a screen.
Now, if the thing gets too sticky, you put the agent right in the back
seat, which I have done many times with past Presidents.
When you come out of a big crowd like that, and the crowd is sparse,
and it doesn't look like there is a potential danger, you return to the
followup car to be ready for any emergency in the event somebody darts
across.
In this instance, when the Presidential car was coming toward the
freeway and the people were sparse, the men at some point came back to
this car. This is one of the automatic operations, if you will, that
the agents respond to. So it wasn't until the first shot was fired
that, as I said earlier, Hill had the opportunity to scan from his left
to his right, that he saw the President--the action of the President.
Then he responded immediately. That is why he got up to the President's
car.
Mr. RANKIN. Has it ever been the practice of the Secret Service to have
an agent ride all of the time on the back step?
Mr. ROWLEY. No; it hasn't. Because there are times when you pick up
your speed, for instance on a freeway. And when you pick up your speed,
it is the most difficult thing on a step maybe 10 to 12 inches wide,
and a grip, to stand up. And you would not be a very good screen going
that fast, because you would have to bend down. That has happened to
me, because I have been caught on it.
Now, I was in Costa Rica and worked the followup car. Whenever I was
on a trip abroad, I would work the followup car to see how the agents
work, and work myself, because it wasn't what you might refer to as a
routine trip.
But the followup car conked out. The crowds were surging around the
President's car. We had two men next to the President's car. I left the
followup car immediately, from my experience, and jumped on the step,
to the right rear of the President, and held onto the handgrip, and
was there. And then when the man came back, I relieved him and took my
position on the side--until, for a distance of a mile or two, until
such time as the followup car got underway, and the other people came
up. But you had to stay with the President under those circumstances.
So those are the different things that occur in a given situation.
The CHAIRMAN. Chief, as I understand this, President Kennedy did not
give any general instructions to the agents never to ride on his car.
It was only in specific circumstances where for one reason or another
he did not want them on there at that particular time.
Mr. ROWLEY. No President will tell the Secret Service what they can or
cannot do.
(At this point, Representative Boggs withdrew from the hearing room.)
Mr. ROWLEY. Sometimes it might be as a political man or individual he
might think this might not look good in a given situation. But that
does not mean per se that he doesn't want you on there. And I don't
think anyone with commonsense interprets it as such.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
Mr. ROWLEY. I think there are certain things that you have to allow the
man who is operating as a politician, and not as head of state. I mean
this makes a difference in your operation.
Mr. RANKIN. Chief Rowley, did you give us a report of the activities in
protecting the President at and around Parkland Hospital?
Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.
Mr. RANKIN. And is that Commission Exhibit No. 1026?
Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.
(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 1026 for
identification.)
Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Chairman, I offer in evidence Commission Exhibit No.
1026.
The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted.
(The document heretofore marked for identification as Commission
Exhibit No. 1026, was received in evidence.)
Mr. RANKIN. Do you have any additions or corrections you care to make
in that exhibit?
Mr. ROWLEY. No, sir.
Mr. RANKIN. Chief Rowley, did you give us a report about protective
activity subsequent to Dallas on behalf of the Secret Service?
Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.
Mr. RANKIN. I will hand you Commission Exhibit No. 1027 and ask you if
that is the report that you have just referred to.
(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 1027 for
identification.)
Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.
Mr. RANKIN. Chief Rowley, I ask you, are there any problems with regard
to Commission Exhibit No. 1027 concerning security, and whether that
should be--that document should be made public? You just take your time
if you want to glance over it.
Mr. ROWLEY. No; as I read it, it is general enough, sir, that it can be
included.
(At this point, Mr. Dulles entered the hearing room.)
Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Chairman, I offer in evidence Commission Exhibit No.
1027.
The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted.
(The document heretofore marked for identification as Commission
Exhibit No. 1027, was received in evidence.)
(At this point, Representative Boggs entered the hearing room.)
Mr. RANKIN. Are there any of the various answers that you give in the
answers to the questions attached to Commission Exhibit No. 1027 that
you care to elaborate on at this time?
I am not asking you or urging you to do it, because I assume that you
answered them with care at the time. I just wanted to give you that
opportunity.
Mr. ROWLEY. No; not at this time.
Mr. DULLES. May I ask a question there?
You consider that the criteria as now furnished by you to the FBI and
other investigative agencies would cover a case like Oswald's?
Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.
Mr. DULLES. You think they would?
Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.
Mr. DULLES. You think they understand that?
Mr. ROWLEY. Well, as we stated in the covering letter when we sent this
out--we haven't gotten any reaction--we asked for their cooperation and
suggestions in connection with such guidelines.
Mr. DULLES. Defectors are not specifically covered, are they, by your
criteria?
Mr. ROWLEY. Well, they are given to us now. We are being furnished the
names of defectors, and they are being investigated, so that their
background and history will be furnished to us, and we will be in a
position now to determine whether they represent a risk or not.