Mr. RANKIN. Would you tell us the gist of the new criteria, and what
the difference is as you conceive it from the old standard?
Mr. ROWLEY. Well, if I may do this. We have sent this criteria to the
intelligence agencies that we think would be of help to us, with a
covering letter in which we say that studies are now underway, "by
which we hope to develop more detailed criteria. Our experience with
the attached guidelines will also be carefully evaluated with a view
towards amendments if required. We will appreciate your cooperation
and suggestions concerning these guidelines, so that the person of the
President will be protected to the best of our combined abilities and
resources."
Another thing today now that we have to concern ourselves with, is that
we get an expanding file of information.
Mr. RANKIN. Has that happened since the assassination?
Mr. ROWLEY. Well yes; we have gotten some 9,000 reports on the members
of the Communist Party from the FBI. At this time we have read and
evaluated and catalogued them and indexed them. There has been a small
percentage that have been to date of interest to us. But this is the
beginning. And except for the indexes, we are more or less current as a
result of that. This is through the long hours and hard work by the new
group that I brought in to develop this department.
Mr. RANKIN. Now, how is the standard described in Exhibit No. 1023
different from the prior standard?
Mr. ROWLEY. Well, we have always had the basic standard. The other
standard was the threat to harm or embarrass the President, however,
this time we added three factors.
Mr. RANKIN. And these are in addition to the threat of harm to the
President?
Mr. ROWLEY. That is correct.
Mr. RANKIN. All right, proceed.
Mr. ROWLEY. The interest of the individual or the organization,
capabilities of the individual or the organization, and the activities
of the individual or organization. The interests of the individual or
organization is the prime factor to be considered in the criteria, but
must be coupled with the capability and activity of the individual or
organization in any determination for referral to the Secret Service.
"The interest must be towards the President, or others named, or other
high Government official in the nature of a complaint, coupled with an
expressed or implied determination to use a means other than legal or
peaceful to satisfy any grievance, real or imagined. After the interest
phase of the criteria is met, then the activity which encompass
previous history, that is, mental instability, history of violence and
the capability of the individual or organization for furthering this
interest will dictate whether the case should be referred to the Secret
Service. In making referrals to the Secret Service, it is requested
that the agency furnish all pertinent background information relating
to each of the three factor criteria."
Mr. RANKIN. Now, is the Secret Service operating under the standard or
criteria described in Exhibit No. 1023 at the present time?
Mr. ROWLEY. At the present time, it is, sir.
Mr. RANKIN. And when did that become effective?
Mr. ROWLEY. That became effective in the last 3 weeks as we developed
and explored and examined the many reports that we were receiving.
Mr. RANKIN. Now, the language that you read into the record, where you
invited comment and suggestions from the various other agencies to whom
you sent communication, what did you mean by that? Is that asking them
for their ideas so that you may further change the criteria?
Mr. ROWLEY. Where we may get in a position later on to break it down
into categories. In other words, if every agency forwards and inundates
us with many reports--say we expand to 3 million, obviously, the whole
intelligence family could not cope with that. You have to get it down
to a workable number. On the other hand, if you try to restrict the
categories too much, then you find yourself in a position that you may
miss another Oswald, and then the utilities of your file are of no
consequence. So you have to try to reach the level in between there
where it is going to be practical for us to react or develop the type
of risks that we think should be covered by our organization in the
protection of the President of the United States.
Mr. RANKIN. Are you doing anything about the use of equipment that
might help you to secure information about any particular locality the
President was going to travel to more readily?
Mr. ROWLEY. In connection with the PRS?
Mr. RANKIN. Yes.
Mr. ROWLEY. Well, we have conferred with the IBM. Can I go off the
record on this?
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
(Discussion off the record.)
The CHAIRMAN. Back on the record.
Mr. RANKIN. Chief Rowley, you have described off the record certain
matters that involve the security of the country and cannot be made
public. But can you tell us whether you have done anything in the past
to try to improve your methods in testimony that can be made public?
Mr. ROWLEY. Well, I have tried to secure in the appropriations funds to
enable us to procure the equipment and personnel that we thought would
be necessary.
With the approval of the Congress, we were able 2 years ago to secure
funds to enable us, in our check forgeries program, to try to adapt the
characteristics of handwriting to an ADP processing program. We are
hopeful this will work out. And we have used the Bureau of Standards to
assist us in this program. We have prints out and have programmed part
of the operation.
Now, it was my thought that if we succeeded in that area, we could also
apply it to PRS. So we are working quite hard on this other area. And I
knew the need would be eventually for us to get into the PRS stage on
the electronic machine situation.
Mr. RANKIN. Now, did you know that we had asked Mr. Bouck when he
testified if he could inform us at a later date about people who were
in institutions or otherwise might be dangerous, and with regard to
whom you asked that the Secret Service be notified, so that they could
make adequate protection for the President?
Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.
Mr. RANKIN. Do you know how many such cases you now have?
Mr. ROWLEY. Approximately a thousand.
Mr. RANKIN. Would you tell the Commission what your practice was for
the Secret Service concerning the route of the motorcade at the time
of the assassination--that is, whether you made inspection of adjacent
buildings?
Mr. ROWLEY. At that time, and prior to that time, except for the
inaugurations in Washington, and other parades, involving the visit of
foreign dignitaries in Washington, in which the President would ride
in the motorcade with the head of state, where we had ample time to
make these surveys, we had never conducted on trips out of Washington
surveys of this nature. I have here a statement of the conditions that
prevailed in Dallas as well as other areas--if I may read this.
Mr. RANKIN. Yes.
Mr. ROWLEY. "Except for inauguration or other parades involving
foreign dignitaries accompanied by the President in Washington, it
has not been the practice of the Secret Service to make surveys or
checks of buildings along the route of a Presidential motorcade. For
the inauguration and certain other parades in Washington where the
traditional route is known to the public long in advance of the event,
buildings along the route can be checked by teams of law enforcement
officers, and armed guards are posted along the route as appropriate.
But on out-of-town trips where the route is decided on and made public
only a few days in advance, buildings are not checked either by Secret
Service agents or by any other law enforcement officers at the request
of the Secret Service. With the number of men available to the Secret
Service and the time available, surveys of hundreds of buildings and
thousands of windows is not practical.
"In Dallas the route selected necessarily involved passing through
the principal downtown section between tall buildings. While certain
streets thought to be too narrow could be avoided and other choices
made, it was not practical to select a route where the President could
not be seen from roofs or windows of buildings. At the two places in
Dallas where the President would remain for a period of time, Love
Field and the Trade Mart, arrangements were made for building and
roof security by posting police officers where appropriate. Similar
arrangements for a motorcade of 10 miles, including many blocks of
tall commercial buildings, is not practical. Nor is it practical to
prevent people from entering such buildings or to limit access in every
building to those employed or having business there. Even if it were
possible with a vastly larger force of security officers to do so, many
observers have felt that such a procedure would not be consistent with
the nature and purpose of the motorcade to let the people see their
President and to welcome him to their city.
"In accordance with its regular procedures, no survey or other check
was made by the Secret Service, or by any other law enforcement agency
at its request, of the Texas School Book Depository Building or those
employed there prior to the time the President was shot."
Mr. RANKIN. Chief Rowley, I will ask you not to describe any procedure,
because of security considerations, but I would like to have you tell
on the record, as I think it is proper, whether there has been a change
in this regard in the procedures of the Secret Service?
Mr. ROWLEY. There has been a change in this regard.
Mr. RANKIN. I will not make an inquiry about that, unless the
Commission wishes to go into it off the record.
Representative FORD. Is it my understanding that the Commission has
such documents that we could analyze ourselves as to these changes?
Mr. RANKIN. I don't think we have any report of this.
Representative BOGGS. Why can't we get it off the record?
The CHAIRMAN. All right.
(Discussion off the record.)
The CHAIRMAN. Back on the record.