of such a miraculous nature occurred as that the earth did not revolve
for twenty-four hours together, we should at once reject it, without
any examination of witnesses, or troubling ourselves with any thing of
the kind."
"Unquestionably."
"And if it were said to have occurred twenty years ago we should take
the same course."
"Certainly."
"And so if any such event were said to have occurred eighteen hundred
years ago?"
"Agreed."
"And if such events were said at that day to have occurred eighteen
hundred years previously, we believe, of course, the men of that time
would have been equally entitled to reason in the same way about
them as ourselves; and, in short, that we may fearlessly apply the
same principle to the same epoch."
"Of course"
"And so for two thousand years before that; and, in fact, we must
believe that every thing has always been going on in the same manner,
--the sun always rising and setting, men dying and never rising
and so forth."
"Exactly so, even from the beginning of the creation," said Fellowes.
"The beginning of the creation! My good fellow, I do not understand
you. As we have been going back, we have seen that there is no
period at which the same principle of judgment will not apply, and,
following it fearlessly, I say that we are in all fairness bound
to believe that there never has been a period when the present order
has been different from what it is; in other words, that the
progression has been an eternal one."
"I cannot admit that argument," said Fellowes.
"Then be pleased to provide me with a good answer to it, which will
still leave us at liberty to say, that a miracle (that is, a variation
from the order of nature as determined by our uniform experience, and
by that of the whole circle of our contemporaries) is impossible,
and that we may reject at once any pretension of the kind."
"But I do not admit that the creation of any thing or of all things
is of the nature of a miracle."
Harrington smiled. "I am afraid," said he, "that to common sense,
to fair reasoning, to any philosopher worthy of the name there would
be no difference except in magnitude, between such an event as the
sudden appearance of an animal (say man) for the first time in our
world, or the first appearance of a tree (such a thing never having
been before), and the restoration to life of a dead man. Each is, to
all intents and purposes, a violation of the previous established
series of antecedents and consequents, and comes strictly within
the limits of our definition of a miracle; and a miracle, you know
is impossible. The only difference will be, that the miracle in the
one case will be greater and more astonishing than that in the other."
"But it is impossible, in the face of geologists, to contend that
there have not been many such revolutions in the history of the world
as these. Man himself is of comparatively recent introduction into
our system."
"I cannot help what the geologists affirm. If we are to abide by our
principle, we have no warrant to believe that there have been any such
violations, or infractions, or revolutions of nature's laws in the
world's history. If they contend for the interpolation of events
in the history of the universe, which, by our criterion, are of the
nature of miracles, and we are convinced that miracles are impossible,
we must reject the conclusions of geologists."
"But may we not say, that the great epochs in the history of the universe
are themselves but the manifestation of law?"
"In no other sense, I think, than the advocate of miracles is entitled
to say that the intercalation of miracles in the world's history is also
according to law,--parts, though minute parts, of a universal plan, and
permitted for reasons worthy of the Creator. To both, or neither, is
the same answer open. Your objection is, I think, a mere sophistical
evasion of the difficulty. There is no difference whatever in the
nature of the events, except that the variation from the 'established
series of sequences' is infinitely greater in those portentous revolutions
of the universe to which the geologist points your attention. The
application of our principle (as you affirm with me) will justify us in
at once pronouncing any variation from the 'established series' whether
occurring yesterday, a year ago, a thousand years ago, or a million of
years ago, incredible; it will, in the same manner, justify the men of
any age in saying the same of all previous ages; and I, therefore,
while contending for your principle with you, carry it consistently
out, and affirm that the series of antecedents and consequents (as we
now find it) must be regarded as eternal, because creation would
do what a miracle is supposed to do, and a miracle, you know, is
impossible. You are silent."
"I am not able to retract acquiescence in the principle, and I am as
little inclined to concede the conclusions you would draw from it."
"As you please; only, in the latter case, provide me with an answer.
If you saw now introduced on the earth for the first time a being as
unlike than as man is unlike the other animals,--say with seven
senses, wings on his shoulders, a pair of eyes behind his head as
well as in front of it, and the tail of a peacock, by way of finishing
him off handsomely,--would you not call such a phenomenon a miracle?"
"I think I should," said Fellowes, laughing.
"And if the creature died, leaving no issue, would you continue to
call it so?"
"Yes."
"But if you found that he was the head of a race, as man was, and a
whole nation of such monsters springing from him, then would you say
that this wonderful intrusion into the sphere of our experience was
no miracle, but that it was merely according to law?"
"I should."
"Verily, my dear friend, I am afraid the world will laugh at us for
making such fantastical distinctions. This infraction of 'established
sequences' ceases to be miraculous, if the wonder is perpetuated
and sufficiently multiplied! Meantime, what becomes of the prodigy
during the time in which it is uncertain whether any thing will come
of it or not? You will say, I suppose, (the interpolation in the
'series' of phenomena being just what I have supposed,) that it is
uncertain whether it is to be regarded as miraculous or not, till
we know whether it is to be repealed or not."
"I think I must, if I adhere to the principle I am now defending."
"Very well; only in the mean time you are in the ludicrous position
of facing a phenomenon of which you do not know whether you will call
it a miracle or not,--the contingency, meantime, on which it is to be
decided, not at all, as I contend, affecting the matter; since you
allow that it is the infraction of the previously established order
of sequences, as known to uniform experience, which constitutes a
miracle! If so, I must maintain that the creation of man was, for
the same reasons, of the essence of a miracle. You seem to think
there is no objection to the admission of miracles, provided they are
astounding and numerous enough; or provided they are a long time about,
instead of being instantaneously wrought. I must remind you, that to
the principle of our argument these things are quite immaterial. Whether
the revolution by which the established order of sequences is absolutely
infringed,--the face of the universe or of our globe transformed, or
an entirely new race (as, for example, man) originated,--I say, whether
such change be produced slowly or quickly is of no consequence in the
world to our argument. It is whether or not a series of phenomena
be produced as absolutely transcending the sphere of all experience,
as those events we admit to be impossible, called 'miracles.' That the
introduction of man upon the earth for the first time (for you will not
allow his race eternal), or the origination of a sun, is not at all
to be reckoned as transcending that experience, I cannot understand.
Nor can I understand it a bit better by your saying that it, is in
conformity with the vague something you are pleased to call a law.
It is a safe phrase, however; for as neither you nor any one else
can interpret it, no one can refute you. This law is a most convenient
thing! It repeals, it appears to me, all other laws,--even those of
logic. Perhaps would be better to say that miracles are no miracles
when they are 'lawful' miracles. No! let us keep our principle intact
from all such dangerous admissions as these. In that way only
are we safe."
"Safe do you call it? I see not how, if we carry out this principle
in the way and to the extent you propose, we can reply to the atheist
or to the pantheist, who tells us that the universe is but an
eternal evolution of phenomena in one infinite series, or in an
eternal recurrence of finite cycles."
"And what is that to you or me? How can we help our principle (if we
are to hold it at all) leading to some such conclusion? We are, I
presume, anxious to know the truth. You see that Strauss, who is the
most strenuous assertor of the impossibility of miracles, is also a
pantheist. I know not whether you may not become one yourself."
"Never," said Fellowes, vehemently; "never, I trust, shall I yield
to that 'desolating pantheism' (as worthy Mr. Newman calls it) which
is now so rife."
"I think Mr. Newman's principles ought to guide you thither. You
seem to hold fast by his skirts at present; but I very much doubt
whether you have yet reached the termination of your career. You
have, you must admit, made advances quite as extraordinary before.
"We shall see.--But I suppose you have reached the end of the
objections which your wayward scepticism suggests against a
conclusion which we both admit; or have you any more?"
"O, plenty; and amongst the rest, I am afraid we must admit--whether
we admit or not your expedient of law--a miracle, or something
indistinguishable from it, as involved in the creation and
preservation of the first man,--since you will have a first man."
"What do you mean?"
"I mean, that supposing the creation of man to be no miracle, because
he entered by law; or that that first fact (which would otherwise be
miraculous) is not such, simply because it is the first of a series
of such facts,--I should like to see whether we have not even then
to deal with a miracle, or a fact as absolutely unique; and which was
not connected with any series of similar facts."
"I think you would find it very hard to prove it."
"Nous verrons. I am sure we shall not disagree as to the fact that man,
however he came into the world, sooner or later, by ordinary or
extraordinary methods, by some lawful wedlock of nature, or by some
miracle which is not 'lawful,' is endowed by nature with various
faculties and susceptibilities."
"Certainly," said Fellowes, laughing; "if you demand my assent to
nothing more than that, I shall easily admit your premises and
deny your conclusion."
"You will also admit, I think, that the process by which man comes
to the use of these faculties, and powers, and so forth, is
very gradual?"
"Assuredly."
"And will you not also admit that the development and command of
these is something very different from the, potentialities themselves,
as my uncle here would call them?--that, for example, we have the
faculty of vision; but that the art of seeing involves a slow
laborious process, acquired not without the concurrent exercise of
other senses: and that the apparatus for walking is perfect even in
an infant; but that the art of walking is, in fact, a wonderful
acquisition: further, that the command given us by these faculties,
as actually exercised, is immensely greater than would be conferred
by each alone. In one word, you will allow that man, when he comes
to the use of his faculties, is, as has been well said, a bundle of
habits, or, as Burke puts it, is a creature who, to a great extent,
has the making of himself."
"I am much at my ease," said Fellowes; "I shall not dispute any
of these premises either."
"And will you not also admit that, as man comes into the world now,
a long time is required for this development; and that during that
time he is absolutely dependent on the care of those who have already
in their turn required similar care?"
"Seeing that we have had fathers and mothers,--as I suppose our
grandfathers and grandmothers also had,--there can be as little doubt
of this as of the preceding points," said Fellowes, rather
condescendingly.
"And that many of the functions which thus task their care are
necessary for our existence, and for any chance of our being able
to develop into men."
"I think so, of course."
"So that, if an infant were exposed on a mountain-side or forest,
you would have no doubt he would perish (unless it pleased some
kind-hearted wolf to suckle him) before he could come to the use of
his faculties, and develop them by exercise."
"I think," said the other, "your premises perfectly innocent; I
shall not contest them."
"A little further." said Harrington, "we may go together; and then,
if I mistake not, you will pause before you go one step further.
This, then, is the normal condition of humanity?"
"Yes."
"Do you think the first man was like us in these respects?"
"I cannot tell."
"I dare engage you cannot,--it is a very natural answer. But he either
was, I suppose, or was not. That, I think, you will grant me." He
assented, though rather reluctantly.
"Pray please yourself," said Harrington; "for it is quite immaterial
to me which alternative you take. If man was in our condition, then,
though the 'lawful miracle' by which he was brought into the world
might have made him a baby of six feet high, he would have been no
more than a baby still. All that was to constitute him a man,--all
those habits by which alone his existence was capable of being
preserved,--and without which he must have perished immediately after
his creation, in which case you and I should have been spared the
necessity of all this discussion on the subject, would have to be
learned; and his existence during that time--and a long time it must
have been, having no teachers and aids, as we have--must have been
preserved by a--miracle. If he were taught by the Creator himself,
then we have the miracle in that direction. If he were not brought
into the world under the same conditions of development as we are,
but with habits ready made,--if, indeed, that be not a contradiction,
--then we have a miracle in that direction; if he had his faculties
preternaturally quickened and expanded, so as to acquire
instantaneously, or possess by instinct, what we acquire by a long
and slow process, and not for many years,--then we have a miracle in
that direction. If you do not like these suppositions, I see but
one other; and that is that; being a baby,--though, as I said, a
baby six feet high,--he had an angel nurse sent down expressly to
attend him, and to push or wheel him about the walls of paradise
in a celestial go-cart. But then I think that in this last
particular we shall hardly say that we have got rid of a miracle,
though it would doubtless be a miracle of a very ludicrous kind. If
you can imagine any other supposition, I shall be glad to hear it."
"I acknowledge I can form no supposition on the subject."
"Only remember that, if you could, the theory would still suppose
man's actual preservation and development effected under totally
different conditions from those which have formed the uniform experience
of all his posterity; and so far from any subterfuge of a law stepping
in, it is a single expedient provided for our first parent alone."
"I do not think we are at all in a condition to consider any such
case, about which we cannot know any thing," replied Fellowes.
"Neither do I; but pardon me,--the question I asked does not depend
upon any such knowledge; it is a question which is wholly independent
whether of our ignorance or our knowledge. Granting, as you do, that
man was created, but that it was no miracle, nor any thing analogous
to one (as you say), still either he was created subject to our
conditions of development and preservation, or he was not; if he was
not, then I fear we have in form the miracle we wish to evade; if he
was, then I fear also that there are but the three imaginable modes of
obviating the difficulty which I have so liberally provided; and
supposing there were a thousand. I fear still that they all involve a
departure from the 'uniform course of Nature.'"
"But I do not see," replied Fellowes, "that it is absolutely necessary,
supposing that the first man was thrown upon the green of paradise."
"Or in a forest, or on a moor," said Harrington, "for you know nothing
of paradise."
"Well, then, in a forest, or on a moor;--I say if man were cast out
there, the same helpless being which all his posterity are,--unfortified,
as the lower animals are, by feathers or hair, or by instincts equal to
theirs,--who can affirm that it was beyond the possibilities of
his nature, that he might survive this cruel experiment? crawl, perhaps,
for an indefinite period on all fours, live on berries, and at last--by
very slow degrees doubtless, but still at last--emerge into---"
"The dignity of a savage," cried Harrington, "as the first step towards
something better,--his Creator having beneficently created him something
infinitely worse! Surely, you must be returning to a savage yourself, even
to hint at such a pedigree. But I have done: till those cases of which
certain philosophers have said so much have been authenticated; till you
can produce an instance of a new-born babe, exposed on a mountain-side,
in all the helplessness of his natal hour, and self-preserved,--nay,
two of them,--for you must at least have a pair of these 'babes in the
wood'; and till, moreover, it can be shown that they would have survived
this experiment so as to preserve the characteristics of humanity a
little better than the 'wild boy of Germany,' and were fit to be the
heads of the human family,--I shall at times be strangely tempted
to embrace any theory as infinitely more probable. I cannot think it
was in this way that our first parents made their entree into the
world. I hope not, for the credit of the Creator, as well as for
the happiness of his offspring. Of the moral bearings of such a
brutal theory, I say nothing; but if it can be true, all I can say
is, that I am glad that you and I, my dear Fellowes, are not the
immediate children but so fortunate as to be only the great-great
--great-great-grandchildren of God! You have well called it a 'cruel
experiment'; according to this, the first Father of all thrust forth
his children into the world to be for an indefinite time worse than
the beasts, who were carefully provided against miserable man's
inconveniences! Certainly, I think you may alter the account of man's
creation given in Genesis, to great advantage. Instead of God's saying,
'Let us create man in our image, he must be supposed to have said,
'Let us create man in the image of a BEAST: and in the image of a BEAST
created he him, male and female created he them'; and very imperfect
beasts they must have been, after all. This is that old savage theory
which I had supposed was pretty well abandoned. If the necessity of
denying miracles imposes any necessity of believing that, I fear that
I shall sooner be got to believe a thousand."
"Well," said Fellowes, who seemed ashamed of this theory, but knew
not how to abandon it; "I cannot believe there have been any miracles,
and, what is more, I will not."
"That is perhaps the best reason you have given yet," said Harrington.
"The Will is indeed your only irresistible logician. You are one
degree, at all events, better off than I, for I can hardly say either
that I believe, or that I do not believe, in miracles."
"And yet," continued Harrington, after a pause, "two or three other
strange consequences seem to follow from that seemingly undeniable
principle on which we base the conclusion that there neither has
been nor can be any such thing as a miracle: in other words, a
departure from the established series of sequences which, as tested
by our own experience and by that of other men, we are convinced is
stable. Will you see with me whether there is any fair mode of
escaping from them? I should be very glad if I could do so."
"What are they?"
"Why, first, I am afraid it must be said, that we must entirely
justify a man in the condition of the Eastern prince mentioned by Hume,
who could not be induced to believe that there was such a thing as ice.
I am afraid that he was quite in the right; and yet we know that in fact
he was wrong."
"You are not, then, satisfied with Hume's own solution?"
"So far from it, that I cannot see, upon the principles on which we
refuse to believe miracles, that it is even intelligible. We agree,
do we not, that, from the experience we have (and, so far as we can
ascertain, from every body else's) of the uniform course of events,
of the established order of sequences, we are to reject any assertion
of a violation of those sequences; as, for example, of a man's coming
into the world in any preternatural manner, or, when he has once gone
out of it, coming into it again; and that we are entitled to do
this without any examination of the witnesses to any such fact,
merely on the strength of the principles aforesaid?"
"I admit that we have agreed to this."
"Now was not the assertion that in a certain quarter of the world
water became solid as stone, could be cut into pieces, and be put
into one's pockets, contrary, in a similar manner, to all the phenomena
which the said prince had witnessed, and also to the uniform experience
of all about him from his earliest years?"
"It certainly was."
"He was right, then, in rejecting the fact; that is, he was right in
rejecting the possibility of such an occurrence," said Harrington.
"But did we not ourselves say, with Hume, that, as we see that there
is not an absolute uniformity in the phenomena of nature, but that
they are varied within certain limits in different climates and
countries, so it does not become us to say that a phenomenon, though
somewhat variable, is a violation of the usual order of sequences?"
"We did; but we also agreed, I think, that those variations were to
be within invariable limits, as tested by the whole of our experience;
we did not include within those variations what is diametrically
contrary (as in the present case) to all our own experience and
that of every body about us. If it is to extend to such variations,
what do we say but this,--that the order of nature is uniform and
invariable, except where--it is the reverse? and, as it seems it
sometimes is so, see what comes of the admission. A man asserts the
reality of a miracle which you reject at once as simply impossible, as
contrary to your experience and that of every one whose experience
you can test. It will be easy for him to say, and upon Hume's evasion
he will say, that it was performed, for aught you know, under conditions
so totally different from those which ordinarily obtain in relation
to the same order of events, that you are no adequate judge as to
whether it was possible or not. He acknowledges that a miracle is a
very rare occurrence; that it is performed for special ends; is strictly
limited to time and place, like those phenomena the Indian prince was
asked to believe; and that your experience cannot embrace it, nor
is warranted in pronouncing upon it. I really fear that, if our
incredulous prince is to be condemned, our principle will be ruined. I
am anxious for his safe deliverance, I assure you."
"Still I cannot see that we can deny that phenomena may be manifested,
in virtue of the laws of nature, totally different from those which we
have ever seen or heard of."
"What! so different that the phenomena in question shall be a total
departure from that order of nature of which alone we and all about
us are cognizant; in fact, all but the one man, who tells us the
strange thing, we being at the same time totally incapable of testing
his experience?"
"Yes," said Fellowes; "I must grant it."