The effectual modifying force at work is not the strangeness nor the

temperamental maladjustment of the new elements of population, but the

conscious realisation of the inadequacy of the tradition on the part of

the more intelligent sections of the American population. That blind

national conceit that would hear no criticism and admit no deficiency

has disappeared. In the last decade such a change has come over the

American mind as sometimes comes over a vigorous and wilful child.

Suddenly it seems to have grown up, to have begun to weigh its powers

and consider its possible deficiencies. There was a time when American

confidence and self-satisfaction seemed impregnable; at the slightest

qualm of doubt America took to violent rhetoric as a drunkard resorts to

drink. Now the indictment I have drawn up harshly, bluntly and

unflatteringly in § 4 would receive the endorsement of American after

American. The falling birth-rate of all the best elements in the State,

the cankering effect of political corruption, the crumbling of

independence and equality before the progressive aggregation of

wealth—he has to face them, he cannot deny them. There has arisen a new

literature, the literature of national self-examination, that seems

destined to modify the American tradition profoundly. To me it seems to

involve the hope and possibility of a conscious collective organisation

of social life.

If ever there was an epoch-marking book it was surely Henry Demarest

Lloyd’s _Wealth Against Commonwealth_. It marks an epoch not so much by

what it says as by what it silently abandons. It was published in 1894,

and it stated in the very clearest terms the incompatibility of the

almost limitless freedom of property set up by the constitution, with

the practical freedom and general happiness of the mass of men. It must

be admitted that Lloyd never followed up the implications of this

repudiation. He made his statements in the language of the tradition he

assailed, and foreshadowed the replacement of chaos by order in quite

chaotic and mystical appeals. Here, for instance, is a typical passage

from “Man, the Social Creator”:

“Property is now a stumbling-block to the people, just as government

has been. Property will not be abolished, but, like government, it

will be democratised.

“The philosophy of self-interest as the social solution was a good

living and working synthesis in the days when civilisation was

advancing its frontiers twenty miles a day across the American

continent, and every man for himself was the best social

mobilisation possible.

“But to-day it is a belated ghost that has overstayed the cock-crow.

These were frontier morals. But this same, everyone for himself,

becomes most immoral when the frontier is abolished and the pioneer

becomes the fellow-citizen, and these frontier morals are most

uneconomic when labour can be divided and the product multiplied.

Most uneconomic, for they make closure the rule of industry, leading

not to wealth, but to that awful waste of wealth which is made

visible to every eye in our unemployed—not hands alone, but land,

machinery, and, most of all, hearts. Those who still practise these

frontier morals are like criminals, who, according to the new

science of penology, are simply reappearances of old types. Their

acquisitiveness, once divine like Mercury’s, is now out of place

except in jail. Because out of place, they are a danger. A sorry day

it is likely to be for those who are found in the way when the new

people rise to rush into each other’s arms, to get together, to stay

together and to live together. The labour movement halts because so

many of its rank and file—and all its leaders—do not see clearly the

golden thread of love on which have been strung together all the

past glories of human association, and which is to serve for the

link of the new Association of Friends who Labour, whose motto is

‘All for all.’”

The establishment of the intricate co-operative commonwealth by a rush

of eighty million flushed and shiny-eyed enthusiasts, in fact, is

Lloyd’s proposal. He will not face, and few Americans to this day will

face, the cold need of a great science of social adjustment and a

disciplined and rightly ordered machinery to turn such enthusiasms to

effect. They seem incurably wedded to gush. However, he did express

clearly enough the opening phase of American disillusionment with the

wild go-as-you-please that had been the conception of life in America

through a vehement, wasteful, expanding century. And he was the

precursor of what is now a bulky and extremely influential literature of

national criticism. A number of writers, literary investigators one may

call them, or sociological men of letters, or magazine publicists—they

are a little difficult to place—has taken up the inquiry into the

condition of civic administration, into economic organisation, into

national politics and racial interaction, with a frank fearlessness and

an absence of windy eloquence that has been to many Europeans a

surprising revelation of the reserve forces of the American mind.

President Roosevelt, that magnificent reverberator of ideas, that gleam

of wilful humanity, that fantastic first interruption to the succession

of machine-made politicians at the White House, has echoed clearly to

this movement, and made it an integral part of the general intellectual

movement of America.

It is to these first intimations of the need of a “sense of the State”

in America that I would particularly direct the reader’s attention in

this discussion. They are the beginnings of what is quite conceivably a

great and complex reconstructive effort. I admit they are but

beginnings. They may quite possibly wither and perish presently; they

may much more probably be seized upon by adventurers and converted into

a new cant almost as empty and fruitless as the old. The fact remains

that, through this busy and immensely noisy confusion of nearly a

hundred millions of people, these little voices go intimating more and

more clearly the intention to undertake public affairs in a new spirit

and upon new principles, to strengthen the State and the law against

individual enterprise, to have done with those national superstitions

under which hypocrisy and disloyalty and private plunder have sheltered

and prospered for so long.

Just as far as these reform efforts succeed and develop is the

organisation of the United States of America into a great,

self-conscious, civilised nation, unparalleled in the world’s history,

possible; just as far as they fail is failure written over the American

future. The real interest of America for the next century to the student

of civilisation will be the development of these attempts, now in their

infancy, to create and realise out of this racial hotchpotch, this human

chaos, an idea of the collective commonwealth as the datum of reference

for every individual life.

§ 7

I have hinted in the last section that there is a possibility that the

new wave of constructive ideas in American thought may speedily develop

a cant of its own. But even then, a constructive cant is better than a

destructive one. Even the conscious hypocrite has to do something to

justify his pretences, and the mere disappearance from current thought

of the persuasion that organisation is a mistake and discipline

needless, clears the ground of one huge obstacle even if it guarantees

nothing about the consequent building.

But, apart from this, are there more solid and effectual forces behind

this new movement of ideas that makes for organisation in American

medley at the present time?

The speculative writer casting about for such elements lights upon four

sets of possibilities which call for discussion. First, one has to ask:

How far is the American plutocracy likely to be merely a wasteful and

chaotic class, and how far is it likely to become consciously

aristocratic and constructive? Secondly, and in relation to this, what

possibilities of pride and leading are there in the great university

foundations of America? Will they presently begin to tell as a

restraining and directing force upon public thought? Thirdly, will the

growing American Socialist movement, which at present is just as

anarchistic and undisciplined in spirit as everything else in America,

presently perceive the constructive implications of its general

propositions and become statesmanlike and constructive? And, fourthly,

what are the latent possibilities of the American women? Will women as

they become more and more aware of themselves as a class and of the

problem of their sex become a force upon the anarchistic side, a force

favouring race-suicide, or upon the constructive side which plans and

builds and bears the future?

The only possible answer to each one of these questions at present is

guessing and an estimate. But the only way in which a conception of the

American social future may be reached, lies through their discussion.

Let us begin by considering what constructive forces may exist in this

new plutocracy which already so largely sways American economic and

political development. The first impression is one of extravagant and

aimless expenditure, of a class irresponsible and wasteful beyond all

precedent. One gets a Zolaesque picture of that aspect in Mr. Upton

Sinclair’s _Metropolis_, or the fashionable intelligence of the popular

New York Sunday editions, and one finds a good deal of confirmatory

evidence in many incidental aspects of the smart American life of Paris

and the Riviera. The evidence in the notorious Thaw trial, after one has

discounted its theatrical elements, was still a very convincing

demonstration of a rotten and extravagant, because aimless and

functionless, class of rich people. But one has to be careful in this

matter if one is to do justice to the facts. If a thing is made up of

two elements, and one is noisy and glaringly coloured, and the other is

quiet and colourless, the first impression created will be that the

thing is identical with the element that is noisy and glaringly

coloured. One is much less likely to hear of the broad plans and the

quality of the wise, strong and constructive individuals in a class than

of their foolish wives, their spendthrift sons, their mistresses and

their moments of irritation and folly.

In the making of very rich men there is always a factor of good fortune

and a factor of design and will. One meets rich men at times who seem to

be merely lucky gamblers, who strike one as just the thousandth man in a

myriad of wild plungers, who are, in fact, chance nobodies washed up by

an eddy. Others, again, strike one as exceptionally lucky half-knaves.

But there are others of a growth more deliberate and of an altogether

higher personal quality. One takes such men as Mr. J. D. Rockefeller or

Mr. Pierpont Morgan—the scale of their fortunes makes them public

property—and it is clear that we are dealing with persons on quite a

different level of intellectual power from the British Colonel Norths,

for example, or the South African Joels. In my _Future in America_ I

have taken the former largely at Miss Tarbell’s estimate, and treated

him as a case of acquisitiveness raised in Baptist surroundings. But I

doubt very much if that exhausts the man as he is to-day. Given a man

brought up to saving and “getting on” as if to a religion, a man very

acquisitive and very patient and restrained, and indubitably with great

organising power, and he grows rich beyond the dreams of avarice. And

having done so, there he is. What is he going to do? Every step he takes

up the ascent to riches gives him new perspectives and new points of

view.

It may have appealed to the young Rockefeller, clerk in a Chicago house,

that to be rich was itself a supreme end; in the first flush of the

discovery that he was immensely rich, he may have thanked Heaven as if

for a supreme good, and spoken to a Sunday-school gathering as if he

knew himself for the most favoured of men. But all that happened twenty

years ago or more. One does not keep on in that sort of satisfaction;

one settles down to the new facts. And such men as Mr. Rockefeller and

Mr. Pierpont Morgan do not live in a made and protected world with their

minds trained, tamed and fed and shielded from outside impressions as

royalties do. The thought of the world has washed about them; they have

read and listened to the discussion of themselves for some decades; they

have had sleepless nights of self-examination. To succeed in acquiring

enormous wealth does not solve the problem of life; indeed, it reopens

it in a new form. “What shall I do with myself?” simply recurs again.

You may have decided to devote yourself to getting on, getting wealthy.

Well, you have got it. Now, again, comes the question: “What shall I

do?”

Mr. Pierpont Morgan, I am told, collected works of art. I can understand

that satisfying a rich gentleman of leisure, but not a man who has felt

the sensation of holding great big things in his great big hands. Saul,

going out to seek his father’s asses, found a kingdom—and became very

spiritedly a king, and it seems to me that these big industrial and

financial organisers, whatever in their youth they proposed to do or be,

must many of them come to realise that their organising power is up

against no less a thing than a nation’s future. Napoleon, it is curious

to remember, once wanted to run a lodging-house, and a man may start to

corner oil and end the father of a civilisation.

Now, I am disposed to suspect at times that an inkling of such a

realisation may have come to some of these very rich men. I am inclined

to put it among the possibilities of our time that it may presently

become clearly and definitely the inspiring idea of many of those who

find themselves predominantly rich. I do not see why these active rich

should not develop statesmanship, and I can quite imagine them

developing very considerable statesmanship. Because these men were able

to realise their organising power in the absence of economic

organisation, it does not follow that they will be fanatical for a

continuing looseness and freedom of property. The phase of economic

liberty ends itself, as Marx long ago pointed out. The American business

world becomes more and more a managed world with fewer and fewer wild

possibilities of succeeding. Of all people the big millionaires should

realise this most acutely, and, in fact, there are many signs that they

do. It seems to me that the educational zeal of Mr. Andrew Carnegie and

the university and scientific endowments of Mr. Rockefeller are not

merely showy benefactions; they express a definite feeling of the

present need of constructive organisation in the social scheme. The time

has come to build. There is, I think, good reason for expecting that

statesmanship of the millionaires to become more organised and

scientific and comprehensive in the coming years. It is plausible at

least to maintain that the personal quality of the American plutocracy

has risen in the last three decades, has risen from the quality of a

mere irresponsible wealthy person towards that of a real aristocrat with

a “sense of the State.” That one may reckon the first hopeful

possibility in the American outlook.

And intimately connected with this development of an attitude of public

responsibility in the very rich is the decay on the one hand of the

preposterous idea once prevalent in America that politics is an

unsuitable interest for a “gentleman,” and on the other of the

democratic jealousy of any but poor politicians. In New York they talk

very much of “gentlemen,” and by “gentlemen” they seem to mean a rich

man “in society” with a college education. Nowadays, “gentlemen” seem

more and more disposed towards politics, and less and less towards a

life of business or detached refinement. President Roosevelt, for

example, was one of the pioneers in this new development, this

restoration of virility to the gentlemanly ideal. His career marks the

appearance of a new and better type of man in American politics, the

close of the rule of the idealised nobody.

The prophecy has been made at times that the United States might develop

a Cæsarism, and certainly the position of president might easily become

that of an imperator. No doubt in the event of an acute failure of the

national system such a catastrophe might occur, but the more hopeful and

probable line of development is one in which a conscious and powerful,

if informal, aristocracy will play a large part. It may, indeed, never

have any of the outward forms of an aristocracy or any definite public

recognition. The Americans are as chary of the coronet and the known

aristocratic titles as the Romans were of the word King. Octavius, for

that reason, never called himself king nor Italy a kingdom. He was just

the Cæsar of the Republic, and the Empire had been established for many

years before the Romans fully realised that they had returned to

monarchy.

§ 8

The American universities are closely connected in their development

with the appearance and growing class-consciousness of this aristocracy

of wealth. The fathers of the country certainly did postulate a need of

universities, and in every state Congress set aside public lands to

furnish a university with material resources. Every State possesses a

university, though in many instances these institutions are in the last

degree of feebleness. In the days of sincere democracy the starvation of

government and the dislike of all manifest inequalities involved the

starvation of higher education. Moreover, the entirely artificial nature

of the State boundaries, representing no necessary cleavages and

traversed haphazard by the lines of communication, made some of these

State foundations unnecessary and others inadequate to a convergent

demand. From the very beginning, side by side with the State

universities, were the universities founded by benefactors; and with the

evolution of new centres of population, new and extremely generous

plutocratic endowments appeared. The dominant universities of America

to-day, the treasure houses of intellectual prestige, are almost all of

them of plutocratic origin, and even in the State universities, if new

resources are wanted to found new chairs, to supply funds for research

or publication or what not, it is to the more State-conscious wealthy

and not to the State legislature that the appeal is made almost as a

matter of course. The common voter, the small individualist, has less

constructive imagination—is more individualistic, that is, than the big

individualist.

This great network of universities that is now spread over the States,

interchanging teachers, literature and ideas, and educating not only the

professions but a growing proportion of business leaders and wealthy

people, must necessarily take an important part in the reconstruction of

the American tradition that is now in progress. It is giving a large and

increasing amount of attention to the subjects that bear most directly

upon the peculiar practical problems of statecraft in America, to

psychology, sociology and political science. It is influencing the press

more and more directly by supplying a rising proportion of journalists

and creating an atmosphere of criticism and suggestion. It is keeping

itself on the one hand in touch with the popular literature of public

criticism in those new and curious organs of public thought, the

ten-cent magazines; and on the other it is making a constantly more

solid basis of common understanding upon which the newer generation of

plutocrats may meet. That older sentimental patriotism must be giving

place under its influence to a more definite and effectual conception of

a collective purpose. It is to the moral and intellectual influence of

sustained scientific study in the universities, and a growing increase

of the college-trained element in the population that we must look if we

are to look anywhere for the new progressive methods, for the

substitution of persistent, planned and calculated social development

for the former conditions of systematic neglect and corruption in public

affairs varied by epileptic seizures of “Reform.”

§ 9

A third influence that may also contribute very materially to the

reconstruction of the American tradition is the Socialist movement. It

is true that so far American Socialism has very largely taken an

Anarchistic form, has been, in fact, little more than a revolutionary

movement of the wages-earning class against the property owner. It has

already been pointed out that it derives not from contemporary English

Socialism, but from the Marxist social democracy of the continent of

Europe, and has not even so much of the constructive spirit as has been

developed by the English Socialists of the Fabian and Labour Party group

or by the newer German evolutionary Socialists. Nevertheless, whenever

Socialism is intelligently met by discussion or whenever it draws near

to practicable realisation, it becomes, by virtue of its inherent

implications, a constructive force, and there is no reason to suppose

that it will not be intelligently met on the whole and in the long run

in America. The alternative to a developing Socialism among the

labouring masses in America is that revolutionary Anarchism from which

it is slowly but definitely marking itself off. In America we have to

remember that we are dealing with a huge population of people who are

for the most part, and more and more evidently destined under the

present system of free industrial competition, to be either very small

traders, small farmers on the verge of debt, or wages-earners for all

their lives. They are going to lead limited lives and worried lives—and

they know it. Nearly everyone can read and discuss now, the process of

concentrating property and the steady fixation of conditions that were

once fluid and adventurous goes on in the daylight visibly to everyone.

And it has to be borne in mind also that these people are so far under

the sway of the American tradition that each thinks himself as good as

any man and as much entitled to the fullness of life. Whatever social

tradition their fathers had, whatever ideas of a place to be filled

humbly and seriously and duties to be done, have been left behind in

Europe. No Church dominates the scenery of this new land, and offers in

authoritative and convincing tones consolations hereafter for lives

obscurely but faithfully lived. Whatever else happens in this national

future, upon one point the patriotic American may feel assured, and that

is of an immense general discontent in the working class and of a

powerful movement in search of a general betterment. The practical forms

and effects of that movement will depend almost entirely upon the

average standard of life among the workers and their general education.

Sweated and ill-organised foreigners, such as one finds in New Jersey

living under conditions of great misery, will be fierce, impatient and

altogether dangerous. They will be acutely exasperated by every picture

of plutocratic luxury in their newspaper, they will readily resort to

destructive violence. The Western miner, the Western agriculturist,

worried beyond endurance between the money-lender and railway

combinations, will be almost equally prone to savage methods of

expression. _The Appeal to Reason_, for example, to which I have made

earlier reference in this chapter, is furious to wreck the present

capitalistic system, but it is far too angry and impatient for that

satisfaction to produce any clear suggestion of what shall replace it.

To call this discontent of the seething underside of the American system

Socialism is a misnomer. Were there no Socialism there would be just as

much of this discontent, just the same insurgent force and desire for

violence, taking some other title and far more destructive methods. This

discontent is a part of the same planless confusion that gives on the

other side the wanton irresponsible extravagances of the smart people of

New York. But Socialism alone, of all the forms of expression adopted by

the losers in the economic struggle, contains constructive possibilities

and leads its adherents towards that ideal of an organised State,

planned and developed, from which these terrible social stresses may be

eliminated, which is also the ideal to which sociology and the thoughts

of every constructive-minded and foreseeing man in any position of life

tend to-day. In the Socialist hypothesis of collective ownership and

administration as the social basis, there is the germ of a “sense of the

State” that may ultimately develop into comprehensive conceptions of

social order, conceptions upon which enlightened millionaires and

unenlightened workers may meet at last in generous and patriotic

co-operation.

Social Forces in England and America · 第 21 / 24 段