MILITARY movements in the Southern department attracted little notice,
but were not the less important. The Southern people entered into
the war in the hope of obtaining the Floridas. President Madison,
like President Jefferson, gave all the support in his power to the
scheme. Throughout the year 1812 United States troops still occupied
Amelia Island and the St. Mary’s River, notwithstanding the refusal of
Congress to authorize the occupation. The President expected Congress
at the session of 1812–1813 to approve the seizure of both Floridas,
and took measures in advance for that purpose.
October 12, 1812, Secretary Eustis wrote to the Governor of Tennessee
calling out fifteen hundred militia for the defence of the “lower
country.” The force was not intended for defence but for conquest; it
was to support the seizure of Mobile, Pensacola, and St. Augustine by
the regular troops. For that object every man in Tennessee was ready
to serve; and of all Tennesseeans, Andrew Jackson was the most ardent.
Governor Blount immediately authorized Jackson, as major-general of
the State militia, to call out two thousand volunteers. The call was
issued November 14; the volunteers collected at Nashville December 10;
and Jan. 7, 1813, the infantry embarked in boats to descend the river,
while the mounted men rode through the Indian country to Natchez.
“I have the pleasure to inform you,” wrote Jackson to Eustis in
departing,[293] “that I am now at the head of two thousand and
seventy volunteers, the choicest of our citizens, who go at the
call of their country to execute the will of the Government; who
have no Constitutional scruples, and if the Government orders, will
rejoice at the opportunity of placing the American eagle on the
ramparts of Mobile, Pensacola, and Fort St. Augustine.”
The Tennessee army reached Natchez, February 15, and went into camp to
wait orders from Washington, which were expected to direct an advance
on Mobile and Pensacola.
While Jackson descended the Mississippi, Monroe, then acting Secretary
of War, wrote, January 13, to Major-General Pinckney,[294] whose
military department included Georgia: “It is intended to place under
your command an adequate force for the reduction of St. Augustine
should it be decided on by Congress, before whom the subject will be
in a few days.” A fortnight later, January 30, Monroe wrote also to
Wilkinson,[295] then commanding at New Orleans: “The subject of taking
possession of West Florida is now before Congress, and will probably
pass. You will be prepared to carry into effect this measure should it
be decided on.”
Neither Madison nor Monroe raised objection to the seizure of territory
belonging to a friendly power; but Congress showed no such readiness
to act. Senator Anderson of Tennessee, as early as Dec. 10, 1812,
moved,[296] in secret session of the Senate, that a committee be
appointed to consider the expediency of authorizing the President
“to occupy and hold the whole or any part of East Florida, including
Amelia Island, and also those parts of West Florida which are not now
in the possession and under the jurisdiction of the United States.”
After much debate the Senate, December 22, adopted the resolution by
eighteen votes to twelve, and the committee, consisting of Anderson,
Samuel Smith, Tait of Georgia, Varnum of Massachusetts, and Goodrich
of Connecticut, reported a bill,[297] January 19, authorizing the
President to occupy both Floridas, and to exercise government there,
“provided ... that the section of country herein designated that is
situated to the eastward of the river Perdido may be the subject of
future negotiation.”
The bill met opposition from the President’s personal enemies, Giles,
Leib, and Samuel Smith, as well as from the Federalists and some of
the Northern Democrats. January 26, Samuel Smith moved to strike
out the second section, which authorized the seizure of Florida east
of the Perdido; and the Senate, February 2, by a vote of nineteen
to sixteen, adopted Smith’s motion. The vote was sectional. North
and South Carolina, Georgia, Tennessee, and Louisiana supported the
bill; Maryland, Delaware, Pennsylvania, New York, Connecticut, and
Rhode Island opposed it; Virginia, Kentucky, Ohio, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, and Vermont were divided; New Jersey threw one vote in its
favor, the second senator being absent. Had Leib not changed sides the
next day, the whole bill would have been indefinitely postponed; but
the majority rallied, February 5, and by a vote of twenty-one to eleven
authorized the President to seize Florida west of the Perdido, or, in
other words, to occupy Mobile. The House passed the bill in secret
session February 9, and the President signed it February 12.[298]
In refusing to seize East Florida, the Senate greatly disarranged
Madison’s plans. Three days afterward, February 5, Armstrong took
charge of the War Department, and his first orders were sent to Andrew
Jackson directing him to dismiss his force, “the causes of embodying
and marching to New Orleans the corps under your command having ceased
to exist.”[299] Jackson, ignorant that the Administration was not to
blame, and indignant at his curt dismissal, marched his men back to
Tennessee, making himself responsible for their pay and rations. On
learning these circumstances, Armstrong wrote, March 22, a friendly
letter thanking him for the important services his corps would have
rendered “had the Executive policy of occupying the two Floridas been
adopted by the national legislature.”[300]
After the Senate had so persistently refused to support Madison’s
occupation of East Florida, he could hardly maintain longer the illegal
possession he had held during the past year of Amelia Island. February
15, Armstrong wrote to Major-General Pinckney,[301] “The late private
proceedings of Congress have resulted in a decision not to invade
East Florida at present;” but not until March 7, did the secretary
order Pinckney to withdraw the troops from Amelia Island and Spanish
territory.[302]
The troops were accordingly withdrawn from Amelia Island, May 16;
but nothing could restore East Florida to its former repose, and the
anarchy which had been introduced from the United States could never
be mastered except by the power that created it. Perhaps Madison
would have retained possession, as the least of evils, in spite of
the Senate’s vote of February 3, had not another cause, independent
of legislative will, overcome his repugnance to the evacuation. The
Russian offer of mediation arrived while the President was still in
doubt. The occupation of Florida, being an act of war against Spain,
could not fail to excite the anger of England, and in that feeling of
displeasure the Czar must inevitably share. From the moment their cause
against Napoleon was common, Russia, England, and Spain were more than
likely to act together in resistance to any territorial aggression upon
any member of their alliance, the evacuation of East Florida by the
United States evaded a serious diplomatic difficulty; and probably not
by mere coincidence, Armstrong’s order to evacuate Amelia Island was
dated March 7, while Daschkoff’s letter offering the Czar’s mediation
was dated March 8.
The Cabinet was so little united in support of the Executive policy
that Madison and Monroe ordered the seizure of Mobile without
consulting Gallatin, whose persistent hostility to the Florida
intrigues was notorious. When Monroe in April gave to Gallatin and
Bayard the President’s instructions[303] for the peace negotiations,
among the rest he directed them to assert “a right to West Florida
by cession from France, and a claim to East Florida as an indemnity
for spoliations.” On receiving these instructions, Gallatin wrote to
Monroe, May 2, asking,[304]--
“Where is the importance of taking possession of Mobile this
summer? We may do this whenever we please, and is it not better to
delay every operation of minor importance which may have a tendency
to impede our negotiations with Great Britain and Russia? You know
that to take by force any place in possession of another nation,
whatever our claim to that place may be, is war; and you must be
aware that both Russia and Great Britain will feel disposed, if not
to support the pretensions of Spain against us, at least to take
part against the aggressor.”
Monroe quickly replied:[305] “With respect to West Florida, possession
will be taken of it before you get far on your voyage. That is a
question settled.” In fact, possession had been taken of it three weeks
before he wrote, in pursuance of orders sent in February, apparently
without Gallatin’s knowledge. Monroe added views of his own, singularly
opposed to Gallatin’s convictions.
“On the subject of East Florida,” wrote Monroe to Gallatin, May
6,[306] “I think I intimated to you in my last that Colonel
Lear was under the most perfect conviction, on the authority of
information from respectable sources at Cadiz, that the Spanish
regency had sold that and the other province to the British
government, and that it had done so under a belief that we had,
or should soon get, possession of it. My firm belief is that if
we were possessed of both, it would facilitate your negotiations
in favor of impressment and every other object, especially if it
was distinctly seen by the British ministers or minister that,
instead of yielding them or any part of either, we would push our
fortunes in that direction, and in Canada, if they did not hasten
to accommodate.”
Gallatin, on the eve of sailing for Russia, replied with good temper,
expressing opinions contrary to those of the President and Secretary of
State.
“On the subject of Florida,” Gallatin said,[307] “I have always
differed in opinion with you, and am rejoiced to have it in our
power to announce the evacuation of the province. Let it alone
until you shall, by the introduction of British troops, have a
proof of the supposed cession. In this I do not believe. It can be
nothing more than a permission to occupy it in order to defend it
for Spain. By withdrawing our troops, we withdraw the pretence;
but the impolitic occupancy of Mobile will, I fear, renew our
difficulties. The object is at present of very minor importance,
swelled into consequence by the representations from that quarter,
and which I would not at this moment have attempted, among other
reasons, because it was a Southern one, and will, should it involve
us in a war with Spain, disgust every man north of Washington. You
will pardon the freedom with which, on the eve of parting with you,
I speak on this subject. It is intended as a general caution, which
I think important, because I know and see every day the extent of
geographical feeling, and the necessity of prudence if we mean to
preserve and invigorate the Union.”
No sooner did the Act of February 12 become law than Armstrong wrote,
February 16, to Wilkinson at New Orleans, enclosing a copy of the
Act, and ordering him immediately to take possession of Mobile and the
country as far as the Perdido.[308] Wilkinson, who had for years looked
forward to that step, hastened to obey the instruction. When Gallatin
remonstrated, the measure had been already taken and could not be
recalled.
Since July 9, 1812, Wilkinson had again commanded at New Orleans. No
immediate attack was to be feared, nor could a competent British force
be collected there without warning; but in case such an attack should
be made, Wilkinson had reason to fear the result, for his regular
force consisted of only sixteen hundred effectives, ill equipped
and without defences.[309] The War Department ordered him to depend
on movable ordnance and temporary works rather than on permanent
fortifications;[310] but with his usual disregard of orders he began
the construction or the completion of extensive works at various points
on the river and coast, at a cost which the government could ill afford.
While engaged in this task Wilkinson received, March 14, Armstrong’s
order of February 16 for the invasion of West Florida. When the
government’s orders were agreeable to Wilkinson, they reached him
promptly and were executed with rapidity. Within three weeks he
collected at Pass Christian a force of about six hundred men, supported
by gunboats, and entered the Bay of Mobile on the night of April 10,
while at the same time the garrison at Fort Stoddert descended the
Tensaw River, and cut the communication by land between Mobile and
Pensacola. At that time Mobile Point was undefended. The only Spanish
fortress was Fort Charlotte at Mobile, garrisoned by one hundred and
fifty combatants. Wilkinson summoned the fort to surrender, and the
commandant had no choice but to obey, for the place was untenable and
without supplies. The surrender took place April 15. Wilkinson then
took possession of the country as far as the Perdido, and began the
construction of a fort, to be called Fort Bowyer, on Mobile Point at
the entrance of the Bay, some sixty miles below the town.[311]
This conquest, the only permanent gain of territory made during the
war, being effected without bloodshed, attracted less attention than it
deserved. Wilkinson committed no errors, and won the President’s warm
approval.[312] Wilkinson was greatly pleased by his own success, and
wished to remain at New Orleans to carry out his projected defences;
but Armstrong had written as early as March 10, ordering him to the
Lakes. As so often happened with orders that displeased the general,
Armstrong’s letter, though dated March 10, and doubtless arriving
in New Orleans before April 10, was received by Wilkinson only on
his return, May 19. After another delay of three weeks, he started
northward, and travelled by way of Mobile through the Creek country to
Washington.
Wilkinson’s departure, June 10, and the evacuation of Amelia Island
by General Pinckney May 16, closed the first chapter of the war in
the South. Armstrong wrote to Wilkinson, May 27:[313] “The mission
to Petersburg and the instructions to our envoys will put a barrier
between you and Pensacola for some time to come at least, and
permanently in case of peace.” The sudden stop thus put by the Senate
and the Russian mediation to the campaign against Pensacola and St.
Augustine deranged the plans of Georgia and Tennessee, arrested the
career of Andrew Jackson, and caused the transfer of Wilkinson from New
Orleans to the Lakes. The government expected no other difficulties in
the Southern country, and had no reason to fear them. If new perils
suddenly arose, they were due less to England, Spain, or the United
States than to the chance that gave energy and influence to Tecumthe.
[Illustration:
MAP OF THE
Seat of War among the
Creek Indians.
_From the Original Drawing_
IN THE
WAR DEPARTMENT.
PUBLISHED BY JOHN MELISH,
1815.
]
The Southern Indians were more docile and less warlike than the Indians
of the Lakes. The Chickasaws and Choctaws, who occupied the whole
extent of country on the east bank of the Mississippi River from
the Ohio to the Gulf, gave little trouble or anxiety; and even the
great confederacy of Muskogees, or Creeks, who occupied the territory
afterward called the State of Alabama and part of Georgia, fell in some
degree into a mode of life which seemed likely to make them tillers
of the soil. In 1800 the Creeks held, or claimed, about three hundred
miles square from the Tennessee River to the Gulf, and from the middle
of Georgia nearly to the line which afterward marked the State of
Mississippi. The Seminoles, or wild men, of Florida were a branch of
the Muskogees, and the Creek warriors themselves were in the habit of
visiting Pensacola and Mobile, where they expected to receive presents
from the Spanish governor.
Two thirds of the Creek towns were on the Coosa and Tallapoosa rivers
in the heart of Alabama. Their inhabitants were called Upper Creeks.
The Lower Creeks lived in towns on the Chattahooche River, the modern
boundary between Alabama and Georgia. The United States government,
following a different policy in 1799 from that of Jefferson toward
the Northwestern Indians, induced the Creeks to adopt a national
organization for police purposes; it also helped them to introduce
ploughs, to learn cotton-spinning, and to raise crops. The success of
these experiments was not at first great, for the larger number of
Indians saw no advantage in becoming laborers, and preferred sitting
in the squares of the towns, or hunting; but here and there chiefs or
half-breeds had farms, slaves, stock, orchards, and spinning-wheels.
Large as the Creek country was, and wild as it had ever been, it did
not abound in game. A good hunter, passing in any direction through
the three hundred miles of Alabama and Georgia, found difficulty
in obtaining game enough for his support.[314] For that reason the
Seminoles left their old towns and became wild people, as their name
implied, making irregular settlements in Florida, where game and food
were more plenty. The mass of the Creek nation, fixed in the villages
in the interior, clung to their habits of hunting even when obliged to
cultivate the soil, and their semi-civilization rendered them a more
perplexing obstacle to the whites than though they had obstinately
resisted white influence.
Had the Indian problem been left to the people of Georgia and
Tennessee, the Indians would soon have disappeared; but the national
government established under President Washington in 1789 put a sharp
curb on Georgia, and interposed decisively between the Georgians and
the Creeks.[315] President Washington in 1796 appointed Benjamin
Hawkins of North Carolina as Indian agent among the Creeks, and Hawkins
protected and governed them with devotion; but the result of his
friendliness was the same as that of others’ greed. The Indians slowly
lost ground.
The Creeks complained of grievances similar to those of the
Northwestern Indians, and their position was even more helpless.
They had no other outlet than Pensacola and Mobile. Except from the
Spaniards they could expect no aid in case of trouble, and the Spanish
governors of Florida, after the abdication of Carlos IV. in 1807, could
scarcely maintain their own position, much less supply the Creeks with
arms or gunpowder. While the Northwestern Indians could buy at Malden
all the weapons and ammunition they wanted, the Creeks possessed few
firearms, and these in bad condition; nor were they skilful in using
guns.
The United States government prevented the Georgians from compelling
the Indians to sell their lands, but nothing could prevent them from
trespass; and the Indian woods along the frontier were filled with
cattle, horses, and hogs belonging to the whites, while white men
destroyed the game, hunting the deer by firelight, and scaring the
Indian hunters from their hunting-grounds. “Every cane-swamp where they
go to look for a bear--which is part of their support--is near eat out
by the stocks put over by the citizens of Georgia.”[316] This complaint
was made in 1796, and as time went on the Indian hunting-grounds were
more rapidly narrowed. Not only from Georgia but also from Fort
Stoddert, along the course of the Tombigbee River, above Mobile,
intruders pressed into the Creek country. The Indians had no choice but
to sell their lands for annuities, and under this pressure the Creeks,
in 1802 and 1803, were induced to part with the district between the
Oconee and Ocmulgee in the centre of Georgia. They retained their towns
on the Chattahoochee, where Hawkins’s agency was established in the
town of Coweta, on the edge of the Creek country.
Hawkins was satisfied with their behavior, and believed the chiefs
to be well disposed. They showed none of the restlessness which
characterized the Northwestern Indians, until Tecumthe conceived
the idea of bringing them into his general league to check the
encroachments of the whites. After Tecumthe’s interview with Governor
Harrison at Vincennes, in July, 1811, he made a long journey through
the Chickasaw and Choctaw country, and arrived among the Creeks in
October, bringing with him a score of Indian warriors. The annual
council of the Creeks was held in that month at the village of
Tuckaubatchee,--an ancient town of the Upper Creeks on the Tallapoosa.
The rumor that Tecumthe would be present brought great numbers of
Indians, even Cherokees and Choctaws, to the place, while Hawkins
attended the council in his character as agent.
Tecumthe and his warriors marched into the centre of the square and
took their places in silence. That night “they danced the dance of the
Indians of the Lakes,” which became thenceforward a political symbol of
their party among the Creeks. Some nights afterward Tecumthe addressed
the council. Versions more or less untrustworthy have been given of the
speech;[317] but the only official allusion to it by a person entitled
to credit seemed to show that it was in substance the address made by
Tecumthe at Vincennes. Hawkins, recalling to the Creek chiefs in 1814
the course of events which had caused their troubles, reminded them
how “Tecumseh, in the square of Tuckaubatchee, ... told the Creeks
not to do any injury to the Americans; to be in peace and friendship
with them; not to steal even a bell from any one of any color. Let the
white people on this continent manage their affairs their own way. Let
the red people manage their affairs their own way.”[318] Hawkins and
the old chiefs would have certainly interfered had Tecumthe incited
the Creeks to war or violence; but according to Hawkins the speech was
a pacific “talk,” delivered by Tecumthe in the name of the British.
Indian tradition preserved another form of Tecumthe’s rhetoric, which
seemed to complete the identity with the Vincennes address. Unable
to express himself in the Muskogee language, Tecumthe used pantomime
familiar to Indians. Holding his war-club with outstretched arm, he
opened first the little finger, then the next and the next, till the
club fell from his hand.
Indian union was unquestionably the chief theme of all Tecumthe’s
public addresses. Whether in private he taught other doctrines must
be matter of surmise; but he certainly brought into the Creek nation
a religious fanaticism of a peculiar and dangerous kind. Prophets
soon appeared, chiefly among the Alabamas, a remnant of an ancient
race, not of Creek blood, but members of the Creek confederacy.[319]
The prophets, with the usual phenomena of hysteria, claimed powers
of magic, and promised to bring earthquakes to destroy an invading
army. They preached the total destruction of everything, animate and
inanimate, that pertained to civilization. As the nation generally was
badly armed, and relied chiefly on their bows, arrows, and war-clubs
for battle,[320] the moral support of magic was needed to give them
confidence.
So secret was the influence of Tecumthe’s friends that no suspicion of
the excitement reached Hawkins even when the war with England began;
and the old chiefs of the nation--known to be devoted to peace and
to the white alliance--were kept in ignorance of all that was done
among the young warriors. The Alabamas, or Coosadas, lived below the
junction of the Coosa and Tallapoosa, on the west bank of the Alabama
River, about eight miles above the modern town of Montgomery; they
were considered by Hawkins the most industrious and best behaved of
all the Creeks, whose fields were the granaries of the upper towns and
furnished supplies even to Mobile. Their town was the last place in
which Hawkins expected to see conspiracy, violence, or fanaticism. The
young men “sang the song of the Indians of the Lakes, and danced the
dance” in secret for eighteen months after Tecumthe’s visit, without
public alarm, and probably would have continued to do so except for an
outbreak committed by some of their nation three hundred miles away.
In 1812 a band of six Indians led by the Little Warrior of Wewocau, a
Creek town on the Coosa, was sent by the nation on a public mission to
the Chickasaws.[321] Instead of delivering their “talks” and returning,
they continued their journey to the northern Lakes and joined Tecumthe
at Malden. They took part in the massacre at the river Raisin, Jan. 22,
1813, and soon afterward began their return, bringing talks from the
Shawanese and British and also a letter from some British officer at
Malden to the Spanish officials at Pensacola, from whom they hoped to
obtain weapons and powder. According to common report, Tecumthe told
the Little Warrior that he was about to aid the British in capturing
Fort Meigs, and as soon as the fort was taken he would come to join the
Creeks.[322] Until then his friends were to increase their party by the
secret means and magic that had proved so successful, but were not to
begin open war.[323]
The Little Warrior and his party, including a warrior from Tuskegee,
a Creek town at the fork of the Coosa and Tallapoosa, after crossing
Indiana in the month of February reached the north bank of the Ohio
River about seven miles above its mouth, where were two cabins occupied
by white families.[324] Unable to resist the temptation to spill blood,
the band murdered the two families with the usual Indian horrors. This
outrage was committed February 9; and the band, crossing the Ohio,
passed southward through the Chickasaw country, avowing the deed and
its motive.[325]
The Little Warrior arrived at home about the middle of March, and
reported that he brought talks from the Shawanese and British. The
old chiefs of the Upper Creeks immediately held a council March 25,
and after listening to the talks, reprimanded the Little Warrior and
ordered him to leave the Council House.[326] On the same day Hawkins
wrote to them from Coweta, demanding delivery of the Little Warrior
and his six companions to answer for the murders they had committed.
On hearing this demand, the old chiefs at Tuckaubatchee under the lead
of the Big Warrior held another council, while the Little Warrior, the
Tuskegee Warrior, and the murderers took to the woods. The old chiefs
in council decided to execute the murderers, and sent out parties to
do it. The Little Warrior was found in the swamp, well armed, but was
decoyed out and killed by treachery; “the first and second man’s gun
snapped at him, but the third man’s gun fired and killed; ... four men
that had on pouches kept them shaking following after him, so that he
could not hear the gun snap; if he had found out that, he would have
wounded a good many with his arrows.”[327]
The Tuskegee warrior and four others were found in a house on the
Hickory Ground at the fork of the rivers. As long as they had
ammunition, they held the attack at a distance, but at last the house
was fired. The Tuskegee Warrior being wounded, was burned in the house,
while his two young brothers were taken out and tomahawked. One warrior
broke away, but was caught and killed; two more were killed elsewhere.
One escaped, and “set out the morning after to kill white people.”
Warriors were sent after him.
“He made battle, firing at the warriors, and was near killing
one; the bullet passed near his ear. He then drew his knife and
tomahawk, defended himself, and the warriors shot three balls
through him. He fell, retained the power of speech till next day,
and died. He said he had been to the Shawanese helping of them, and
had got fat eating white people’s flesh. Every one to the very last
called on the Shawanese general, Tecumseh.”[328]
Such political executions, in the stifled excitement of the moment,
could not but rouse violent emotion throughout the Creek nation. The
old chiefs, having given life for life, felt the stronger for their
assertion of authority; but they knew nothing of the true situation.
For several weeks no open outbreak occurred, but the prophets were more
active than ever. About June 4 the old chiefs at Tuckaubatchee, hearing
that the prophets “kept as usual their fooleries,” sent a runner to the
Alabamas with a message:[329]--
“You are but a few Alabama people. You say that the Great Spirit
visits you frequently; that he comes in the sun and speaks to you;
that the sun comes down just above your heads. Now we want to see
and hear what you say you have seen and heard. Let us have the
same proof you have had, and we will believe what we see and hear.
You have nothing to fear; the people who committed murders have
suffered for their crimes, and there is an end of it.”
The runner who carried this message was one of the warriors who had
aided in killing the seven murderers. The Alabamas instantly put him to
death, and sent his scalp to their friends at the forks of the river.
Then began a general uprising, and every warrior who had aided in
killing the murderers was himself killed or hunted from the Upper Creek
country. The chiefs of Tuckaubatchee with difficulty escaped to the
agency at Coweta, where they were under the protection of Georgia.
The Lower Creek towns did not join the outbreak; but of the Upper
Creek towns twenty-nine declared for war, and only five for peace. At
least two thousand warriors were believed to have taken the war-club
by August 1, and got the name of Red Clubs, or Red Sticks, for that
reason. Everywhere they destroyed farms, stock, and all objects of
white civilization, and killed or drove away their opponents.[330]
With all this the Spaniards had nothing to do. The outbreak was caused
by the Indian War in the Northwest, and immediately by the incompetence
of General Winchester and by the massacre at the river Raisin. The
Creeks were totally unprepared for war, except so far as they trusted
to magic; they had neither guns, powder, nor balls. For that reason
they turned to the Spaniards, who could alone supply them. When the
Little Warrior was put to death, the British letter which he carried
from Malden for the Spanish officials at Pensacola came into the
charge of another Creek warrior, Peter McQueen, a half-breed. In July,
McQueen, with a large party of warriors started for Pensacola, with the
letter and four hundred dollars, to get powder.[331] On arriving there
they saw the Spanish governor, who treated them civilly, and in fear
of violence gave them, according to McQueen’s account,[332] “a small
bag of powder each for ten towns, and five bullets to each man.” With
this supply, which the governor represented as a friendly present for
hunting purposes, they were obliged to content themselves, and started
on their return journey.
News that McQueen’s party was at Pensacola instantly reached the
American settlements above Mobile, where the inhabitants were already
taking refuge in stockades.[333] A large number of Americans, without
military organization, under several leaders, one of whom was a
half-breed named Dixon Bailey, started July 26 to intercept McQueen,
and succeeded in surprising the Indians July 27 at a place called
Burnt Corn, about eighty miles north of Pensacola. The whites at first
routed the Indians, and captured the pack-mules with the ammunition;
but the Indians quickly rallied, and in their turn routed the whites,
with a loss of two killed and fifteen wounded,--although they failed to
recover the greater part of the pack-animals. With the small amount of
powder left to him, McQueen then returned to his people.
Angry at the attack and eager to revenge the death of his warriors,
McQueen summoned the warriors of thirteen towns, some eight hundred
in number, and about August 20 started in search of his enemies.
The Creek war differed from that on the Lakes in being partly a war
of half-breeds. McQueen’s strongest ally was William Weatherford, a
half-breed, well known throughout the country as a man of property and
ability, as nearly civilized as Indian blood permitted, and equally at
home among Indians and whites. McQueen and Weatherford were bitterly
hostile to the half-breeds Bailey and Beasley, who were engaged in
the affair of Burnt Corn.[334] Both Beasley and Bailey were at a
stockade called Fort Mims, some thirty-five miles above Mobile, on
the eastern side of the Alabama River, where about five hundred and
fifty persons were collected,--a motley crowd of whites, half-breeds,
Indians, and negroes, old and young, women and children, protected
only by a picket wall, pierced by five hundred loop-holes three and a
half feet from the ground, and two rude gates.[335] Beasley commanded,
and wrote, August 80, that he could “maintain the post against any
number of Indians.”[336] To Fort Mims the Creek warriors turned, for
the reason that Beasley and Bailey were there, and they arrived in the
neighborhood, August 29, without giving alarm. Twice, negroes tending
cattle outside rushed back to the fort reporting that painted warriors
were hovering about; but the horsemen when sent out discovered no sign
of an enemy, and Beasley tied up and flogged the second negro for
giving a false alarm.
At noon, August 30, when the drum beat for dinner no patrols were out,
the gates were open, and sand had drifted against that on the eastern
side so that it could not quickly be closed. Suddenly a swarm of
Indians raising the warwhoop rushed toward the fort. Beasley had time
to reach the gate, but could not close it, and was tomahawked on the
spot. The Indians got possession of the loop-holes outside, and of one
inclosure. The whites, under Dixon Bailey, held the inner inclosure and
fought with desperation; but at last the Indians succeeded in setting
fire to the house in the centre, and the fire spread to the whole
stockade. The Indians then effected an entrance, and massacred most
of the inmates. Fifteen persons escaped, and among these was Dixon
Bailey mortally wounded. Most of the negroes were spared to be slaves.
Two hundred and fifty scalps became trophies of the Creek warriors,--a
number such as had been seldom taken by Indians from the white people
on a single day.