ARMSTRONG’S embarrassment was great in getting rid of the generals
whom Madison and Eustis left on his hands. Dearborn was one example of
what he was obliged to endure, but Wilkinson was a worse. According
to Armstrong’s account,[209] New Orleans was not believed to be safe
in Wilkinson’s keeping. The senators from Louisiana, Tennessee, and
Kentucky remonstrated to the President, and the President ordered his
removal. Armstrong and Wilkinson had been companions in arms, and
had served with Gates at Saratoga. For many reasons Armstrong wished
not unnecessarily to mortify Wilkinson, and in conveying to him,
March 10, the abrupt order[210] to proceed with the least possible
delay to the headquarters of Major-General Dearborn at Sackett’s
Harbor, the Secretary of War added, March 12, a friendly letter of
advice:[211]--
“Why should you remain in your land of cypress when patriotism and
ambition equally invite to one where grows the laurel? Again, the
men of the North and East want you; those of the South and West are
less sensible of your merits and less anxious to have you among
them. I speak to you with a frankness due to you and to myself, and
again advise, Come to the North, and come quickly! If our cards be
well played, we may renew the scene of Saratoga.”
The phrase was curious. Saratoga suggested defeated invasion rather
than conquest; the surrender of a British army in the heart of New York
rather than the capture of Montreal. The request for Wilkinson’s aid
was disheartening. No one knew better than Armstrong the feebleness
of Wilkinson’s true character. “The selection of this unprincipled
imbecile was not the blunder of Secretary Armstrong,” said Winfield
Scott long afterward;[212] but the idea that Wilkinson could be
chief-of-staff to Dearborn,--that one weak man could give strength to
another,--was almost as surprising as the selection of Wilkinson to
chief command would have been. Armstrong did not intend that Wilkinson
should command more than a division under Dearborn;[213] but he must
have foreseen that in the event of Dearborn’s illness or incapacity,
Wilkinson would become by seniority general-in-chief.
[Illustration: _REMARKS_
Cedars: _A small Village, a place of business, built pretty
compact, several stone houses: Settlers, Scottish and 9 or 10
French_.
River d l’Isle _The course of this River is S. and E. till within 4
or 5 miles of the St. Lawrence thence it runs almost parallel with
that river to its mouth at the Coteau. It is about 4 rods wide at
its mouth and is shoal. One mile above the confluence the distance
is only ¾ mile between the two rivers: The banks of both are low
and flat._
_There is a settlement of 60 French Families or upwards 4 miles
above Coteau. No road thence to Point Bodet distant 7½ miles._
_The road is excellent from Pt. Bodet to Raisin R._
_McPherson keeps Tavern at Pt. Mouille and a Ferry to Pt. Bodet._
_McGee keeps Tavern at Pt. Bodet and a Ferry down the Lake._
_There is a Ferry from Coteau to Pt. Bodet._
MAP OF THE
RIVER ST. LAWRENCE
AND ADJACENT COUNTRY
From Williamsburg to Montreal.
FROM AN ORIGINAL DRAWING
IN THE
WAR DEPARTMENT.
MILITARY AND TOPOGRAPHICAL ATLAS
BY JOHN MELISH, 1815.
STRUTHERS & CO., ENGR’S, N.Y.
]
Wilkinson at New Orleans received Armstrong’s letter of March 10 only
May 19,[214] and started, June 10, for Washington, where he arrived
July 31, having consumed the greater part of the summer in the journey.
On arriving at Washington, he found that Dearborn had been removed,
and that he was himself by seniority in command of the Ninth Military
District.[215] This result of Dearborn’s removal was incalculably
mischievous, for if its effect on Wilkinson’s vanity was unfortunate,
its influence on the army was fatal. Almost every respectable officer
of the old service regarded Wilkinson with antipathy or contempt.
Armstrong’s ill-fortune obliged him also to place in the position
of next importance Wilkinson’s pronounced enemy, Wade Hampton. A
major-general was required to take command on Lake Champlain, and but
one officer of that rank claimed employment or could be employed; and
Wade Hampton was accordingly ordered to Plattsburg.[216] Of all the
major-generals Hampton was probably the best; but his faults were
serious. Proud and sensitive even for a South Carolinian; irritable,
often harsh, sometimes unjust, but the soul of honor,[217] Hampton
was rendered wholly intractable wherever Wilkinson was concerned, by
the long-standing feud which had made the two generals for years the
heads of hostile sections in the army.[218] Hampton loathed Wilkinson.
At the time of his appointment to command on Lake Champlain he had
no reason to expect that Wilkinson would be his superior; but though
willing and even wishing to serve under Dearborn, he accepted only
on the express understanding that his was a distinct and separate
command,[219] and that his orders were to come directly from the War
Department. Only in case of a combined movement uniting different
armies, was he to yield to the rule of seniority. With that agreement
he left Washington, June 15, and assumed command, July 3, on Lake
Champlain.
Nearly a month afterward Wilkinson arrived in Washington, and reported
at the War Department. By that time Armstrong had lost whatever chance
he previously possessed of drawing the army at Niagara back to a
position on the enemy’s line of supply. Three insuperable difficulties
stood in his way,--the season was too late; the army was too weak; and
the generals were incompetent. Armstrong found his generals the chief
immediate obstacle, and struggled perseveringly and good-humoredly to
overcome it. Wilkinson began, on arriving at Washington, by showing
a fancy for continuing the campaign at Niagara.[220] Armstrong was
obliged to give an emphatic order, dated August 8, that Kingston
should be the primary object of the campaign, but he left Wilkinson at
liberty to go there by almost any route, even by way of Montreal.[221]
Disappointed at the outset by finding Wilkinson slow to accept
responsibility or decided views,[222] he was not better pleased when
the new general began his duties in Military District No. 9.
Wilkinson left Washington August 11, and no sooner did he reach Albany
than he hastened to write, August 16, two letters to General Hampton,
assuming that every movement of that general was directly dependent
on Wilkinson’s orders.[223] Considering the relations between the two
men, these letters warranted the inference that Wilkinson intended
to drive Hampton out of his Military District, and if possible from
the service. Hampton instantly leaped to that conclusion, and wrote
to Armstrong, August 23, offering his resignation in case Wilkinson’s
course was authorized by government.[224] Wilkinson also wrote to
the secretary August 30, substantially avowing his object to be what
Hampton supposed:[225]--
“You have copies of my letters to Major-General Hampton, which I
know he has received, yet I have no answer. The reflection which
naturally occurs is that if I am authorized to command he is bound
to obey; and if he will not respect the obligation, he should be
turned out of the service.”
Armstrong pacified Hampton by promising once more that all his orders
and reports should pass through the Department. Hampton promised to
serve cordially and vigorously through the campaign, but he believed
himself intended for a sacrifice, and declared his intention of
resigning as soon as the campaign was ended.[226] Wilkinson, after
having at Albany provoked this outburst, started for Sackett’s Harbor,
where he arrived August 20.
At Sackett’s Harbor Wilkinson found several general officers. Morgan
Lewis was there in command, Commodore Chauncey was there with his
fleet. Jacob Brown was also present by virtue of his recent appointment
as brigadier-general. The quartermaster-general, Robert Swartwout, a
brother of Burr’s friend who went to New Orleans, was posted there.
Wilkinson summoned these officers to a council of war August 26, which
deliberated on the different plans of campaign proposed to it, and
unanimously decided in favor of one called by Armstrong “No. 3 of the
plans proposed by the government.”[227] As defined in Wilkinson’s
language[228] the scheme was--
“To rendezvous the whole of the troops on the Lake in this
vicinity, and in co-operation with our squadron to make a bold
feint upon Kingston, slip down the St. Lawrence, lock up the enemy
in our rear to starve or surrender, or oblige him to follow us
without artillery, baggage, or provisions, or eventually to lay
down his arms; to sweep the St. Lawrence of armed craft, and in
concert with the division under Major-General Hampton to take
Montreal.”
Orders were given, August 25, for providing river transport for seven
thousand men, forty field-pieces, and twenty heavy guns, to be in
readiness by September 15.[229]
The proposed expedition closely imitated General Amherst’s expedition
against Montreal in 1760, with serious differences of relative
situation. After Wolfe had captured Quebec and hardly twenty-five
hundred French troops remained to defend Montreal, in the month of
July Amherst descended the river from Lake Ontario with more than ten
thousand men, chiefly British veterans, capturing every fortified
position as he went. Wilkinson’s council of war proposed to descend
the river in October or November with seven thousand men, leaving a
hostile fleet and fortresses in their rear, and running past every
fortified position to arrive in the heart of a comparatively well
populated country, held by a force greater than their own, with
Quebec to support it, while Wilkinson would have no certain base of
supplies, reinforcements, or path of escape. Knowledge of Wilkinson’s
favorite Quintus Curtius or of Armstrong’s familiar Jomini was not
required to satisfy any intelligent private, however newly recruited,
that under such circumstances the army would be fortunate to escape
destruction.[230]
Wilkinson next went to Niagara, where he arrived September 4, and where
he found the army in a bad condition, with Boyd still in command,
but restrained by the President’s orders within a strict defensive.
Wilkinson remained nearly a month at Fort George making the necessary
preparations for a movement. He fell ill of fever, but returned October
2 to Sackett’s Harbor, taking with him all the regular troops at
Niagara. At that time Chauncey again controlled the Lake.
Secretary Armstrong also came to Sackett’s Harbor, September 5,
and established the War Department at that remote point for nearly
two months.[231] When Wilkinson arrived, October 2, Armstrong’s
difficulties began. Wilkinson, then fifty-six years old, was broken
by the Lake fever. “He was so much indisposed in mind and body,”
according to Brigadier-General Boyd,[232] “that in any other service
he would have perhaps been superseded in his command.” According to
Wilkinson’s story, he told Secretary Armstrong that he was incapable of
commanding the army, and offered to retire from it; but the secretary
said there was no one to take his place, and he could not be spared.
In private Armstrong was believed to express himself more bluntly,
and Wilkinson was told that the secretary said: “I would feed the
old man with pap sooner than leave him behind.”[233] Wilkinson’s
debility did not prevent him from giving orders, or from becoming
jealous and suspicious of every one, but chiefly of Armstrong.[234]
Whatever was suggested by Armstrong was opposed by Wilkinson. Before
returning to Sackett’s Harbor, October 4, Wilkinson favored an
attack on Kingston.[235] On reaching Sackett’s Harbor, finding that
Armstrong also favored attacking Kingston, Wilkinson argued “against
my own judgment” in favor of passing Kingston and descending upon
Montreal.[236] Ten days afterward Armstrong changed his mind. Yeo had
succeeded in returning to Kingston, bringing reinforcements.
“He will bring with him about fifteen hundred effectives,” wrote
Armstrong;[237] “and thanks to the storm and our snail-like
movements down the Lake, they will be there before we can reach it.
The manœuvre intended is lost, so far as regards Kingston. What we
now do against that place must be done by hard blows, at some risk.”
Accordingly, October 19, Armstrong wrote to Wilkinson a letter advising
abandonment of the attack on Kingston, and an effort at “grasping the
safer and the greater object below.”[238]
“I call it the safer and greater object, because at Montreal you
find the weaker place and the smaller force to encounter; at
Montreal you meet a fresh, unexhausted, efficient reinforcement of
four thousand men; at Montreal you approach your own resources,
and establish between you and them an easy and an expeditious
intercourse; at Montreal you occupy a point which must be gained
in carrying your attacks home to the purposes of the war, and
which, if seized now, will save one campaign; at Montreal you hold
a position which completely severs the enemy’s line of operations,
which shuts up the Ottawa as well as the St. Lawrence against him,
and which while it restrains all below, withers and perishes all
above itself.”
As Armstrong veered toward Montreal Wilkinson turned decidedly toward
Kingston, and wrote the same day to the secretary a letter[239] of
remonstrance, closing by a significant remark:--
“Personal considerations would make me prefer a visit to Montreal
to the attack of Kingston; but before I abandon this attack, which
by my instructions I am ordered to make, it is necessary to my
justification that you should by the authority of the President
direct the operations of the army under my command particularly
against Montreal.”
The hint was strong that Wilkinson believed Armstrong to be trying to
evade responsibility, as Armstrong believed Wilkinson to be trying
to shirk it. Both insinuations were probably well-founded; neither
Armstrong nor Wilkinson expected to capture Kingston, and still
less Montreal. Wilkinson plainly said as much at the time. “I speak
conjecturally,” he wrote; “but should we surmount every obstacle in
descending the river we shall advance upon Montreal ignorant of the
force arrayed against us, and in case of misfortune, having no retreat,
the army must surrender at discretion.” Armstrong’s conduct was more
extraordinary than Wilkinson’s, and could not be believed except on his
own evidence. He not only looked for no capture of Montreal, but before
writing his letter of October 19 to Wilkinson, he had given orders for
preparing winter quarters for the army sixty or eighty miles above
Montreal, and did this without informing Wilkinson. In later years he
wrote:[240]--
“Suspecting early in October, from the lateness of the season,
the inclemency of the weather, and the continued indisposition of
the commanding general, that the campaign then in progress would
terminate as it did,--‘with the disgrace of doing nothing, but
without any material diminution of physical power,’--the Secretary
of War, then at Sackett’s Harbor, hastened to direct Major-General
Hampton to employ a brigade of militia attached to his command, in
constructing as many huts as would be sufficient to cover an army
of ten thousand men during the winter.”
The order dated October 16 and addressed to the
quartermaster-general,[241] prescribed the cantonment of ten thousand
men within the limits of Canada, and plainly indicated the secretary’s
expectation that the army could not reach Montreal. In other ways
Armstrong showed the same belief more openly.
All the available troops on or near Lake Ontario were concentrated at
Sackett’s Harbor about the middle of October, and did not exceed seven
thousand effectives, or eight thousand men.[242] “I calculate on six
thousand combatants,” wrote Wilkinson after starting,[243] “exclusive
of Scott and Randolph, neither of whom will, I fear, be up in season.”
The army was divided into four brigades under Generals Boyd, Swartwout,
Jacob Brown, and Covington,--the latter a Maryland man, forty-five
years old, who entered the service in 1809 as lieutenant-colonel
of dragoons. The brigades of Boyd and Covington formed a division
commanded by Major-General Morgan Lewis. The second division was
intended for Major-General Hampton; a reserve under Colonel Macomb, and
a park of artillery under Brigadier-General Moses Porter, completed the
organization.[244]
The men were embarked in bateaux, October 17, at Henderson’s Bay, to
the westward of Sackett’s Harbor. The weather had been excessively
stormy, and continued so. The first resting-point to be reached was
Grenadier Island at the entrance of the St. Lawrence, only sixteen
or eighteen miles from the starting-point; but the bateaux were
dispersed by heavy gales of wind, October 18, 19, and 20, and the last
detachments did not reach Grenadier Island until November 3. “All our
hopes have been nearly blasted,” wrote Wilkinson October 24; but at
length, November 5, the expedition, numbering nearly three hundred
boats, having safely entered the river, began the descent from French
Creek. That day they moved forty miles, and halted about midnight
six miles above Ogdensburg. The next day was consumed in running
the flotilla past Ogdensburg under the fire of the British guns at
Prescott. The boats floated down by night and the troops marched by
land. November 7 the army halted at the White House, about twenty miles
below Ogdensburg. There Wilkinson called a council of war, November 8,
to consider whether the expedition should proceed. Lewis, Boyd, Brown,
and Swartwout voted simply in favor of attacking Montreal. Covington
and Porter were of the opinion “that we proceed from this place under
great danger, ... but ... we know of no other alternative.”[245]
More than any other cause, Armstrong’s conduct warranted Wilkinson
in considering the campaign at an end. If the attack on Montreal was
seriously intended, every motive required Armstrong to join Hampton
at once in advance of Wilkinson’s expedition. No one knew so well as
he the necessity of some authority to interpose between the tempers
and pretensions of these two men in case a joint campaign were to be
attempted, or to enforce co-operation on either side. Good faith toward
Hampton, even more than toward Wilkinson, required that the secretary
who had led them into such a situation should not desert them. Yet
Armstrong, after waiting till Wilkinson was fairly at Grenadier
Island, began to prepare for return to Washington. From the village
of Antwerp, half way between Sackett’s Harbor and Ogdensburg, the
secretary wrote to Wilkinson, October 27, “Should my fever continue I
shall not be able to approach you as I intended.”[246] Three days later
he wrote again from Denmark on the road to Albany,--
“I rejoice that your difficulties are so far surmounted as to
enable you to say with assurance when you will pass Prescott. I
should have met you there; but bad roads, worse weather, and a
considerable degree of illness admonished me against receding
farther from a point where my engagements call me about the 1st
proximo. The resolution of treading back my steps was taken at
Antwerp.”[247]
From Albany Armstrong wrote, November 12, for the last time, “in the
fulness of my faith that you are in Montreal,”[248] that he had sent
orders to Hampton to effect a junction with the river expedition. Such
letters and orders, whatever Armstrong meant by them, were certain to
impress both Wilkinson and Hampton with a conviction that the secretary
intended to throw upon them the whole responsibility for the failure of
an expedition which he as well as they knew to be hopeless.
Doubtless a vigorous general might still have found means if not to
take Montreal, at least to compel the British to evacuate Upper Canada;
but Wilkinson was naturally a weak man, and during the descent of the
river he was excessively ill, never able to make a great exertion.
Every day his difficulties increased. Hardly had his flotilla begun
its descent, when a number of British gunboats commanded by Captain
Mulcaster, the most energetic officer in the British naval service
on the Lake, slipping through Chauncey’s blockade, appeared in
Wilkinson’s rear, and caused him much annoyance. Eight hundred British
rank-and-file from Kingston and Prescott were with Mulcaster, and at
every narrow pass of the river, musketry and artillery began to open
on Wilkinson from the British bank. Progress became slow. November 7,
Macomb was landed on the north bank with twelve hundred men to clear
away these obstructions.[249] The day and night of November 8 were
consumed at the White House in passing troops across the river. Brown’s
brigade was landed on the north shore to reinforce Macomb. The boats
were delayed to keep pace with Brown’s march on shore, and made but
eleven miles November 9, and the next day, November 10, fell down only
to the Long Saut, a continuous rapid eight miles in length. The enemy
pressed close, and while Brown marched in advance to clear the bank
along the rapid, Boyd was ordered to take all the other troops and
protect the rear.
The flotilla stopped on the night of November 10 near a farm called
Chrystler’s on the British bank; and the next morning, November 11,
at half-past ten o’clock Brown having announced that all was clear
below, Wilkinson was about to order the flotilla to run the rapids when
General Boyd sent word that the enemy in the rear were advancing in
column. Wilkinson was on his boat, unable to leave his bed;[250] Morgan
Lewis was in no better condition; and Boyd was left to fight a battle
as he best could. Boyd never had the confidence of the army; Brown was
said to have threatened to resign rather than serve under him,[251] and
Winfield Scott, who was that day with Macomb and Brown in the advance,
described[252] Boyd as amiable and respectable in a subordinate
position, but “vacillating and imbecile beyond all endurance as a chief
under high responsibilities.”
The opportunity to capture or destroy Mulcaster and his eight hundred
men was brilliant, and warranted Wilkinson in turning back his whole
force to accomplish it. Boyd actually employed three brigades, and
made an obstinate but not united or well-supported attempt to crush
the enemy. Colonel Ripley with the Twenty-first regiment drove in the
British skirmishers, and at half-past two o’clock the battle became
general. At half-past four, after a stubborn engagement, General
Covington was killed; his brigade gave way, and the whole American line
fell back, beaten and almost routed.
This defeat was the least creditable of the disasters suffered by
American arms during the war. No excuse or palliation was ever offered
for it.[253] The American army consisted wholly of regulars, and all
the generals belonged to the regular service. Wilkinson could hardly
have had less than three thousand men with him, after allowing for
his detachments, and was alone to blame if he had not more. Boyd,
according to his own account, had more than twelve hundred men and two
field-pieces under his immediate command on shore.[254] The reserve,
under Colonel Upham of the Eleventh regiment, contained six hundred
rank-and-file,[255] with four field-pieces. Wilkinson’s official report
admitted that eighteen hundred rank-and-file were engaged; Colonel
Walbach, his adjutant-general, admitted two thousand,[256] while
Swartwout thought that twenty-one hundred were in action. The American
force was certainly not less than two thousand, with six field-pieces.
The British force officially reported by Lieutenant-Colonel Morrison
of the Eighty-ninth regiment, who was in command, consisted of eight
hundred rank-and-file, and thirty Indians. The rank-and-file consisted
of three hundred and forty-two men of the Forty-ninth regiment, about
as many more of the Eighty-ninth, and some Canadian troops. They had
three six-pound field-pieces, and were supported on their right flank
by gunboats.[257]
On the American side the battle was ill fought both by the generals
and by the men. Wilkinson and Morgan Lewis, the two major-generals,
who were ill on their boats, never gave an order. Boyd, who
commanded, brought his troops into action by detachments, and the
men, on meeting unexpected resistance, broke and fled. The defeat
was bloody as well as mortifying. Wilkinson reported one hundred and
two killed, and two hundred and thirty-seven wounded, but strangely
reported no missing,[258] although the British occupied the field of
battle, and claimed upward of one hundred prisoners.[259] Morrison
reported twenty-two killed, one hundred and forty-eight wounded, and
twelve missing. The American loss was twice that of the British,
and Wilkinson’s reports were so little to be trusted that the loss
might well have been greater than he represented it. The story had no
redeeming incident.
If three brigades, numbering two thousand men, were beaten at
Chrystler’s farm by eight hundred British and Canadians, the chance
that Wilkinson could capture Montreal, even with ten thousand men, was
small. The conduct of the army showed its want of self-confidence. Late
as it was, in the dusk of the evening Boyd hastened to escape across
the river. “The troops being much exhausted,” reported Wilkinson,[260]
“it was considered most convenient that they should embark, and that
the dragoons with the artillery should proceed by land. The embarkation
took place without the smallest molestation from the enemy, and the
flotilla made a harbor near the head of the Saut on the opposite
shore.” In truth, neither Wilkinson nor his adjutant gave the order
of embarkation,[261] nor was Boyd willing to admit it as his.[262]
Apparently the army by common consent embarked without orders.
Early the next morning, November 12, the flotilla ran the rapids and
rejoined Brown and Macomb near Cornwall, where Wilkinson learned that
General Hampton had taken the responsibility of putting an end to an
undertaking which had not yet entered upon its serious difficulties.
Four months had passed since Hampton took command on Lake Champlain.
When he first reached Burlington, July 3, neither men nor material
were ready, nor was even a naval force present to cover his weakness.
While he was camped at Burlington, a British fleet, with about a
thousand regulars, entered the Lake from the Isle aux Noix and the
Richelieu River, and plundered the American magazines at Plattsburg,
July 31, sweeping the Lake clear of American shipping.[263] Neither
Hampton’s army nor McDonough’s small fleet ventured to offer
resistance. Six weeks afterward, in the middle of September, Hampton
had but about four thousand men, in bad condition and poor discipline.
Wilkinson, though unable to begin his own movement, was earnest that
Hampton should advance on Montreal.[264] Apparently in order to assist
Wilkinson’s plans, Hampton moved his force, September 19, to the Canada
line. Finding that a drought had caused want of water on the direct
road to Montreal, Hampton decided to march his army westward to the
Chateaugay River, forty or fifty miles, and established himself there,
September 26, in a position equally threatening to Montreal and to the
British line of communication up the St. Lawrence. Armstrong approved
the movement,[265] and Hampton remained three weeks at Chateaugay,
building roads and opening lines of communication while waiting for
Wilkinson to move.
October 16 Armstrong ordered Hampton, in view of Wilkinson’s probable
descent of the river, to “approach the mouth of the Chateaugay, or
other point which shall better favor our junction, and hold the enemy
in check.”[266] Hampton instantly obeyed, and moved down the Chateaugay
to a point about fifteen miles from its mouth. There he established
his army, October 22, and employed the next two days in completing his
road, and getting up his artillery and stores.
Hampton’s movements annoyed the British authorities at Montreal. Even
while he was still within American territory, before he advanced from
Chateaugay Four Corners, Sir George Prevost reported, October 8, to his
government,[267]--
“The position of Major-General Hampton at the Four Corners on the
Chateaugay River, and which he continued to occupy, either with the
whole or a part of his force, from the latest information I have
been able to obtain from thence, is highly judicious,--as at the
same time that he threatens Montreal and obliges me to concentrate
a considerable body of troops in this vicinity to protect it, he
has it in his power to molest the communication with the Upper
Province, and impede the progress of the supplies required there
for the Navy and Army.”
If this was the case, October 8, when Hampton was still at Chateaugay,
fifty miles from its mouth, the annoyance must have been much greater
when he advanced, October 21, to Spear’s, within ten miles of the St.
Lawrence on his left, and fifteen from the mouth of the Chateaugay.
Hampton accomplished more than was expected. He held a position equally
well adapted to threaten Montreal, to disturb British communication
with Upper Canada, and to succor Wilkinson.
That Hampton, with only four thousand men, should do more than this,
could not fairly be required. The defences of Montreal were such as
required ten times his force to overcome. The regular troops defending
Montreal were not stationed in the town itself, which was sufficiently
protected by a broad river and rapids. They were chiefly at Chambly,
St. John’s, Isle aux Noix, or other points on the Richelieu River,
guarding the most dangerous line of approach from Lake Champlain; or
they were at Coteau du Lac on the St. Lawrence about twenty miles
northwest of Hampton’s position. According to the general weekly return
of British forces serving in the Montreal District under command
of Major-General Sir R. H. Sheaffe, Sept. 15, 1813, the aggregate
rank-and-file present for duty was five thousand seven hundred and
fifty-two. At Montreal were none but sick, with the general staff.
At Chambly were nearly thirteen hundred effectives; at St. John’s
nearly eight hundred; at Isle aux Noix about nine hundred. Excluding
the garrison at Prescott, and including the force at Coteau du Lac,
Major-General Sheaffe commanded just five thousand effectives.[268]
Besides the enrolled troops, Prevost could muster a considerable number
of sailors and marines for the defence of Montreal; and his resources
in artillery, boats, fortifications, and supplies of all sorts were
ample. In addition to the embodied troops, Prevost could count upon
the militia, a force almost as good as regulars for the defence of
a forest-clad country where axes were as effective as musketry in
stopping an invading army. In Prevost’s letter to Bathurst of October
8, announcing Hampton’s invasion, the governor-general said:--
“Measures had been in the mean time taken by Major-General Sir
Roger Sheaffe commanding in this district, to resist the advance
of the enemy by moving the whole of the troops under his command
nearer to the frontier line, and by calling out about three
thousand of the sedentary militia. I thought it necessary to
increase this latter force to nearly eight thousand by embodying
the whole of the sedentary militia upon the frontier, this being in
addition to the six battalions of incorporated militia amounting to
five thousand men; and it is with peculiar satisfaction I have to
report to your Lordship that his Majesty’s Canadian subjects have a
second time answered the call to arms in defence of their country
with a zeal and alacrity beyond all praise.”
Thus the most moderate estimate of the British force about Montreal
gave at least fifteen thousand rank-and-file under arms.[269] Besides
this large array of men, Prevost was amply protected by natural
defences. If Hampton had reached the St. Lawrence at Caughnawaga, he
would still have been obliged to cross the St. Lawrence, more than
two miles wide, under the fire of British batteries and gunboats.
Hampton had no transports. Prevost had bateaux and vessels of every
description, armed and unarmed, above and below the rapids, besides two
river steamers constantly plying to Quebec.
Hampton’s command consisted of four thousand infantry new to service,
two hundred dragoons, and artillery.[270] With such a force, his chance
of suffering a fatal reverse was much greater than that of his reaching
the St. Lawrence. His position at the Chateaugay was not less perilous
than that of Harrison on the Maumee, and far more so than that which
cost Dearborn so many disasters at Niagara.
The British force in Hampton’s immediate front consisted at first of
only three hundred militia, who could make no resistance, and retired
as Hampton advanced. When Hampton made his movement to Spear’s,
Lieutenant-Colonel de Salaberry in his front commanded about eight
hundred men, and immediately entrenched himself and obstructed the
road with abattis.[271] Hampton felt the necessity of dislodging
Salaberry, who might at any moment be reinforced; and accordingly,
in the night of October 25, sent a strong force to flank Salaberry’s
position, while he should himself attack it in front.
The flanking party failed to find its way, and the attack in front
was not pressed.[272] The American loss did not exceed fifty men.
The British loss was reported as twenty-five. Sir George Prevost and
his officers were greatly pleased by their success;[273] but Prevost
did not attempt to molest Hampton, who fell back by slow marches to
Chateaugay, where he waited to hear from the Government. The British
generals at Montreal showed little energy in thus allowing Hampton to
escape; and the timidity of their attitude before Hampton’s little army
was the best proof of the incompetence alleged against Prevost by many
of his contemporaries.
Hampton’s retreat was due more to the conduct of Armstrong than to the
check at Spear’s or to the movements of Prevost. At the moment when he
moved against Salaberry, October 25, a messenger arrived from Sackett’s
Harbor, bringing instructions from the quartermaster-general for
building huts for ten thousand men for winter quarters. These orders
naturally roused Hampton’s suspicions that no serious movement against
Montreal was intended.
“The papers sunk my hopes,” he wrote to Armstrong, November 1,[274]
“and raised serious doubts of receiving that efficacious support
that had been anticipated. I would have recalled the column,
but it was in motion, and the darkness of the night rendered it
impracticable.”
In a separate letter of the same date[275] which Hampton sent to
Armstrong by Colonel King, assuming that the campaign was at an end,
he carried out his declared purpose of resigning. “Events,” he said,
“have had no tendency to change my opinion of the destiny intended for
me, nor my determination to retire from a service where I can neither
feel security nor expect honor. The campaign I consider substantially
at an end.” The implication that Armstrong meant to sacrifice him was
certainly disrespectful, and deserved punishment; but when Colonel
King, bearing these letters, arrived in the neighborhood of Ogdensburg,
he found that Armstrong had already done what Hampton reproached him
for intending to do. He had retired to Albany, “suspecting ... that the
campaign ... would terminate as it did.”
A week afterward, November 8, Hampton received a letter from
Wilkinson, written from Ogdensburg, asking him to forward supplies and
march his troops to some point of junction on the river below St.
Regis.[276] Hampton replied from Chateaugay that he had no supplies
to forward; and as, under such circumstances, his army could not
throw itself on Wilkinson’s scanty means, he should fall back on
Plattsburg, and attempt to act against the enemy on some other road
to be indicated.[277] Wilkinson received the letter on his arrival at
Cornwall, November 12, the day after his defeat at Chrystler’s farm;
and with extraordinary energy moved the whole expedition the next day
to French Mills, six or seven miles up the Salmon River, within the
United States lines, where it went into winter quarters.
Armstrong and Wilkinson made common cause in throwing upon Hampton
the blame of failure. Wilkinson at first ordered Hampton under
arrest, but after reflection decided to throw the responsibility upon
Armstrong.[278] The secretary declined to accept it, but consented
after some delay to accept Hampton’s resignation when renewed in
March, 1814. Wilkinson declared that Hampton’s conduct had blasted his
dawning hopes and the honor of the army.[279] Armstrong sneered at
Wilkinson for seizing the pretext for abandoning his campaign.[280]
Both the generals believed that Armstrong had deliberately led them
into an impossible undertaking, and deserted them, in order to shift
the blame of failure from himself.[281] Hampton behaved with dignity,
and allowed his opinion to be seen only in his contemptuous silence;
nor did Armstrong publicly blame Hampton’s conduct until Hampton was
dead. The only happy result of the campaign was to remove all the older
generals--Wilkinson, Hampton, and Morgan Lewis--from active service.
The bloodless failure of an enterprise which might have ended in
extreme disaster was not the whole cost of Armstrong’s and Wilkinson’s
friendship and quarrels. In November nearly all the regular forces,
both British and American, had been drawn toward the St. Lawrence. Even
Harrison and his troops, who reached Buffalo October 24, were sent to
Sackett’s Harbor, November 16, to protect the navy. Not a regiment of
the United States army was to be seen between Sackett’s Harbor and
Detroit. The village of Niagara and Fort George on the British side
were held by a few hundred volunteers commanded by Brigadier-General
McClure of the New York militia. As long as Wilkinson and Hampton
threatened Montreal, Niagara was safe, and needed no further attention.
After November 13, when Wilkinson and Hampton withdrew from Canada,
while the American army forgot its enemy in the bitterness of its own
personal feuds, the British generals naturally thought of recovering
their lost posts on the Niagara River. McClure, who occupied Fort
George and the small town of Newark under its guns, saw his garrison
constantly diminishing. Volunteers refused to serve longer on any
conditions.[282] The War Department ordered no reinforcements,
although ten or twelve thousand soldiers were lying idle at French
Mills and Plattsburg. December 10 McClure had about sixty men of the
Twenty-fourth infantry, and some forty volunteers, at Fort George,
while the number of United States troops present for duty at Fort
George, Fort Niagara, Niagara village, Black Rock, and Buffalo, to
protect the people and the magazines, amounted to four companies, or
three hundred and twenty-four men.
As early as October 4, Armstrong authorized McClure to warn the
inhabitants of Newark that their town might suffer destruction in case
the defence of Fort George should render such a measure proper.[283]
No other orders were given, but Wilkinson repeatedly advised that Fort
George should be evacuated,[284] and Armstrong did nothing to protect
it, further than to issue a requisition from Albany, November 25, upon
the Governor of New York for one thousand militia.[285]
The British, though not rapid in their movements, were not so slow as
the Americans. Early in December Lieutenant-General Gordon Drummond
came from Kingston to York, and from York to the head of the Lake where
the British had maintained themselves since losing the Niagara posts
in May. Meanwhile General Vincent had sent Colonel Murray with five
hundred men to retake Fort George. McClure at Fort George, December
10, hearing that Murray had approached within ten miles, evacuated the
post and crossed the river to Fort Niagara; but before doing so he
burned the town of Newark and as much as he could of Queenston, turning
the inhabitants, in extreme cold, into the open air. He alleged as
his motive the wish to deprive the enemy of winter quarters;[286] yet
he did not destroy the tents or military barracks,[287] and he acted
without authority, for Armstrong Had authorized him to burn Newark only
in case he meant to defend Fort George.
“The enemy is much exasperated, and will make a descent on this
frontier if possible,” wrote McClure from the village of Niagara,
December 13; “but I shall watch them close with my handful of men
until a reinforcement of militia and volunteers arrives.... I am
not a little apprehensive that the enemy will take advantage of
the exposed condition of Buffalo and our shipping there. My whole
effective force on this extensive frontier does not exceed two
hundred and fifty men.”
Five days passed, and still no reinforcements arrived, and no regular
troops were even ordered to start for Niagara. “I apprehended an
attack,” wrote McClure;[288] and he retired thirty miles to Buffalo,
“with a view of providing for the defence.” On the night of December
18 Colonel Murray, with five hundred and fifty regular rank-and-file,
crossed the river from Fort George unperceived; surprised the sentinels
on the glacis and at the gates of Fort Niagara; rushed through the main
gate; and, with a loss of eight men killed and wounded, captured the
fortress with some three hundred and fifty prisoners.
Nothing could be said on the American side in defence or excuse
of this disgrace. From Armstrong at the War Department to Captain
Leonard who commanded the fort, every one concerned in the transaction
deserved whatever punishment the law or army regulations could
inflict. The unfortunate people of Niagara and Buffalo were victims
to official misconduct. The British, thinking themselves released
from ordinary rules of war by the burning of Newark and Queenston,
showed unusual ferocity. In the assault on Fort Niagara they killed
sixty-seven Americans, all by the bayonet, while they wounded only
eleven. Immediately afterward they “let loose”[289] their auxiliary
Indians on Lewiston and the country around. On the night of December
29, Lieutenant-General Drummond sent a force of fifteen hundred men
including Indians[290] across the river above the falls, and driving
away the militia, burned Black Rock and Buffalo with all their public
stores and three small war-schooners.[291]
These acts of retaliation were justified by Sir George Prevost in a
long proclamation[292] dated Jan. 12, 1814, which promised that he
would not “pursue further a system of warfare so revolting to his own
feelings and so little congenial to the British character unless the
future measures of the enemy should compel him again to resort to
it.” The Americans themselves bore Drummond’s excessive severity with
less complaint than usual. They partly suspected that the destruction
effected on the Thames, at York and at Newark, by American troops,
though unauthorized by orders, had warranted some retaliation; but they
felt more strongly that their anger should properly be vented on their
own government and themselves, who had allowed a handful of British
troops to capture a strong fortress and to ravage thirty miles of
frontier, after repeated warning, without losing two hundred men on
either side, while thousands of regular troops were idle elsewhere, and
the neighborhood ought without an effort to have supplied five thousand
militia.
Fort Niagara, which thus fell into British hands, remained, like
Mackinaw, in the enemy’s possession until the peace.