STATEMENT.

While I was under trial before the Senate, on articles of impeachment

presented by the Senator from Wisconsin, [Mr. HOWE,] I forbore taking

any part in the debate, even in reply to allegations, asserted to be

of decisive importance, touching my relations with the President and

Secretary of State. All this was trivial enough; but numerous appeals

to me from opposite parts of the country show that good people have

been diverted by these allegations from the question of principle

involved. Without intending in any way to revive the heats of that

debate, I am induced to make a plain statement of facts, so that the

precise character of those relations shall be known. I do this with

unspeakable reluctance, but in the discharge of a public duty where the

claims of patriotism are above even those of self-defence. The Senate

and the country have an interest in knowing the truth of this matter,

and so also has the Republican party, which cannot be indifferent to

pretensions in its name; nor will anything but the completest frankness

be proper for the occasion.

In overcoming this reluctance I am aided by Senators who are determined

to make me speak. The Senator from Wisconsin, [Mr. HOWE,] who appears

as prosecuting officer, after alleging these personal relations as

the _gravamen_ of accusation against me,--making the issue pointedly

on this floor, and actually challenging reply,--not content with the

opportunity of this Chamber, hurried to the public press, where he

repeated the accusation, and now circulates it, as I am told, under

his frank, crediting it in formal terms to the liberal paper in

which it appeared, but without allusion to the editorial refutation

which accompanied it. On still another occasion, appearing still as

prosecuting officer, the same Senator volunteered, out of his own

invention, to denounce me as leaving the Republican party,--and this

he did, with infinite personality of language and manner, in the very

face of my speech to which he was replying, where, in positive words,

I declare that I speak “for the sake of the Republican party,” which I

hope to save from responsibility for wrongful acts, and then, in other

words making the whole assumption of the Senator an impossibility, I

announce, that in speaking for the Republican party it is “because from

the beginning I have been the faithful servant of that party and aspire

to see it strong and triumphant.”[95] In the face of this declared

aspiration, in harmony with my whole life, the Senator delivered his

attack, and, assuming to be nothing less than Pope, launched against

me his bull of excommunication. Then, again playing Pope, he took back

his thunder, with the apology that others thought so, and this alleged

understanding of others he did not hesitate to set above my positive

and contemporaneous language that I aspired to see the Republican party

strong and triumphant. Then came the Senator from Ohio, [Mr. SHERMAN,]

who, taking up his vacation pen, added to the articles of impeachment

by a supplementary allegation, adopted by the Senator under a

misapprehension of facts. Here was another challenge. During all this

time I have been silent. Senators have spoken, and then rushed into

print; but I have said nothing. They have had their own way with regard

to me. It is they who leave me no alternative.

* * * * *

It is alleged that I have no personal relations with the President.

Here the answer is easy. I have precisely the relations which he has

chosen. On reaching Washington in December last, I was assured from

various quarters that the White House was angry with me; and soon

afterward the public journals reported the President as saying to a

Senator, that, if he were not President, he “would call me to account.”

What he meant I never understood, nor would I attribute to him more

than he meant; but that he used the language reported I have no doubt,

from information independent of the newspapers. I repeat that on this

point I have no doubt. The same newspapers reported, also, that a

member of the President’s household, enjoying his peculiar confidence,

taking great part in the San Domingo scheme, had menaced me with

personal violence. I could not believe the story, except on positive,

unequivocal testimony. That the menace was made on the condition of his

not being an Army officer I do not doubt. The member of the household,

when interrogated by my excellent colleague, [Mr. WILSON,] positively

denied the menace; but I am assured, on authority above question, that

he has since acknowledged it, while the President still retains him in

service, and sends him to this Chamber.

During this last session, I have opposed the Presidential policy on an

important question,--but always without one word touching motives, or

one suggestion of corruption on his part, although I never doubted that

there were actors in the business who could claim no such immunity. It

now appears that Fabens, who came here as plenipotentiary to press the

scheme, has concessions to such amount that the diplomatist is lost

in the speculator. I always insisted that the President was no party

to any such transaction. I should do injustice to my own feelings,

if I did not here declare my regret that I could not agree with the

President. I tried to think as he did, but I could not. I listened to

the arguments on his side, but in vain. The adverse considerations

multiplied with time and reflection. To those who know the motives

of my life it is superfluous for me to add that I sought simply the

good of my country and Humanity, including especially the good of the

African race, to which our country owes so much.

Already there was anger at the White House when the scheme to buy and

annex half an island in the Caribbean Sea was pressed upon the Senate

in legislative session under the guise of appointing a Commission, and

it became my duty to expose it. Here I was constrained to show how, at

very large expense, the usurper Baez was maintained in power by the

Navy of the United States to enable him to sell his country, while at

the same time the independence of the Black Republic was menaced,--all

of which was in violation of International Law, and of the Constitution

of the United States, which reserves to Congress the power “to declare

war.” What I said was in open debate, where the record will speak for

me. I hand it over to the most careful scrutiny, knowing that the

President can take no just exception to it, unless he insists upon

limiting proper debate, and boldly denies the right of a Senator to

express himself freely on great acts of wrong. Nor will any Republican

Senator admit that the President can impose his own sole will upon the

Republican party. Our party is in itself a Republic with universal

suffrage, and until a measure is adopted by the party no Republican

President can make it a party test.

* * * * *

Much as I am pained in making this statement with regard to the

President, infinitely more painful to me is what I must present with

regard to the Secretary of State. Here again I remark that I am driven

to this explanation. His strange and unnatural conduct toward me, and

his prompting of Senators, who, one after another, have set up my

alleged relations with him as ground of complaint, make it necessary

for me to proceed.

We were sworn as Senators on the same day, as far back as 1851, and

from that distant time were friends until the San Domingo business

intervened. Nothing could exceed our kindly relations in the past. On

the evening of the inauguration of General Grant as President, he was

at my house with Mr. Motley in friendly communion, and all uniting in

aspirations for the new Administration. Little did Mr. Motley or myself

imagine in that social hour that one of our little circle was so soon

to turn upon us both.

Shortly afterward Mr. Fish became Secretary of State, and began his

responsible duties by appealing to me for help. I need not say that I

had pleasure in responding to his call, and that I did what I could

most sincerely and conscientiously to aid him. Of much, from his

arrival down to his alienation on the San Domingo business, I possess

the written record. For some time he showed a sympathy with the scheme

almost as little as my own. But as the President grew in earnestness

the Secretary yielded, until tardily he became its attorney. Repeatedly

he came to my house, pleading for the scheme. Again and again he urged

it, sometimes at my house and sometimes at his own. I was astonished

that he could do so, and expressed my astonishment with the frankness

of old friendship. For apology he announced that he was the President’s

friend, and took office as such. “But,” said I, “you should resign

rather than do this thing.” This I could not refrain from remarking, on

discovery, from dispatches in the State Department, that the usurper

Baez was maintained in power by our Navy. This plain act of wrong

required instant redress; but the Secretary astonished me again by his

insensibility to my appeal for justice. He maintained the President, as

the President maintained Baez. I confess that I was troubled.

At last, some time in June, 1870, a few weeks before the San Domingo

treaty was finally rejected by the Senate, the Secretary came to my

house about nine o’clock in the evening and remained till after the

clock struck midnight, the whole protracted visit being occupied in

earnest and reiterated appeal that I should cease my opposition to

the Presidential scheme; and here he urged that the election which

made General Grant President had been carried by him, and not by

the Republican party, so that his desires were entitled to especial

attention. In his pressure on me he complained that I had opposed

other projects of the President. In reply to my inquiry, he named the

repeal of the Tenure-of-Office Act, and the nomination of Mr. Jones as

Minister to Brussels, both of which the President had much at heart,

and he concluded with the San Domingo treaty. I assured the Secretary

firmly and simply, that, seeing the latter as I did with all its

surroundings, my duty was plain, and that I must continue to oppose it

so long as it appeared to me wrong. He was not satisfied, and renewed

his pressure in various forms, returning to the point again and again

with persevering assiduity that would not be arrested, when at last,

finding me inflexible, he changed his appeal, saying, “Why not go to

London? I offer you the English mission. It is yours.” Of his authority

from the President I know nothing. I speak only of what he said. My

astonishment was heightened by indignation at this too palpable attempt

to take me from my post of duty; but I suppressed the feeling which

rose to the lips, and, reflecting that he was an old friend and in my

own house, answered gently, “We have a Minister there who cannot be

bettered.” Thus already did the mission to London begin to pivot on San

Domingo.

I make this revelation only because it is important to a correct

understanding of the case, and because the conversation from beginning

to end was official in character, relating exclusively to public

business, without suggestion or allusion of a personal nature, and

absolutely without the slightest word on my part leading in the most

remote degree to any such overture, which was unexpected as undesired.

The offer of the Secretary was in no respect a compliment or kindness,

but in the strict line of his endeavor to silence my opposition to the

San Domingo scheme, as is too apparent from the facts, while it was

plain, positive, and unequivocal, making its object and import beyond

question. Had it been merely an inquiry, it were bad enough, under the

circumstances; but it was direct and complete, as by a plenipotentiary.

Shortly afterward, being the day immediately following the rejection of

the San Domingo treaty, Mr. Motley was summarily removed,--according

to present pretence, for an offending not only trivial and formal, but

condoned by time, being a year old: very much as Sir Walter Raleigh,

after being released from the Tower to conduct a distant expedition

as admiral of the fleet, was at his return beheaded on a judgment

of fifteen years’ standing. The Secretary, in conversation and in

correspondence with me, undertook to explain the removal, insisting

for a long time that he was “the friend of Mr. Motley”; but he always

made the matter worse, while the heats of San Domingo entered into the

discussion.

At last, in January, 1871, a formal paper justifying the removal and

signed by the Secretary was laid before the Senate.[96] Glancing

at this document, I found, to my surprise, that its most salient

characteristic was constant vindictiveness toward Mr. Motley, with

effort to wound his feelings; and this was signed by one who had sat

with him at my house in friendly communion and common aspiration on the

evening of the inauguration of General Grant, and had so often insisted

that he was “the friend of Mr. Motley,”--while, as if it was not enough

to insult one Massachusetts citizen in the public service, the same

document, after a succession of flings and sneers, makes a kindred

assault on me; and this is signed by one who so constantly called me

“friend,” and asked me for help. The Senator from Missouri [Mr. SCHURZ]

has already directed attention to this assault, and has expressed his

judgment upon it,--confessing that he “should not have failed to feel

the insult,” and then exclaiming, with just indignation, “When such

things are launched against any member of this body, it becomes the

American Senate to stand by him, and not to attempt to disgrace and to

degrade him because he shows the sensitiveness of a gentleman.”[97] It

is easy to see how this Senator regarded the conduct of the Secretary.

Nor is its true character open to doubt, especially when we consider

the context, and how this full-blown personality naturally flowered out

of the whole document.

Mr. Motley, in his valedictory to the State Department, had alluded to

the rumor that he was removed on account of my opposition to the San

Domingo treaty. The document signed by the Secretary, while mingling

most offensive terms with regard to his “friend” in London, thus turns

upon his “friend” in Washington:--

“It remains only to notice Mr. Motley’s adoption of a rumor

which had its origin in this city in a source bitterly,

personally, and vindictively hostile to the President.

“Mr. Motley says it has been rumored that he was ‘removed from

the post of Minister to England’ on account of the opposition

made by an ‘eminent Senator, who honors me [him] with his

friendship,’ to the San Domingo treaty.

“Men are apt to attribute the causes of their own failures

or their own misfortunes to others than themselves, and to

claim association or seek a partnership with real or imaginary

greatness with which to divide their sorrows or their mistakes.

There can be no question as to the identity of the eminent

Senator at whose door Mr. Motley is willing to deposit the

cause of his removal. But he is entirely mistaken in seeking

a vicarious cause of his loss in confidence and favor; and

it is unworthy of Mr. Motley’s real merit and ability, and

an injustice to the venerable Senator alluded to, (_to whose

influence and urgency he was originally indebted for his

nomination_,) to attribute to him any share in the cause of his

removal.

“Mr. Motley must know, or, if he does not know it, he stands

alone in his ignorance of the fact, that many Senators opposed

the San Domingo treaty _openly, generously, and with as much

efficiency as did the distinguished Senator to whom he refers,

and have nevertheless continued to enjoy the undiminished

confidence and the friendship of the President_,--than whom no

man living is more tolerant of honest and manly differences of

opinion, is more single or sincere in his desire for the public

welfare, is more disinterested or regardless of what concerns

himself, is more frank and confiding in his own dealings, _is

more sensitive to a betrayal of confidence, or would look

with more scorn and contempt upon one who uses the words and

the assurances of friendship to cover a secret and determined

purpose of hostility_.”[98]

The eulogy of the President here is at least singular, when it is

considered that every dispatch of the Secretary of State is by order of

the President; but it is evident that the writer of this dispatch had

made up his mind to set all rule at defiance. If, beyond paying court

to the President, even at the expense of making him praise himself, the

concluding sentence of this elaborate passage, so full of gall from

beginning to end, had any object, if it were anything but a mountain of

words, it was an open attempt to make an official document the vehicle

of personal insult to me; and this personal insult was signed “HAMILTON

FISH.” As I became aware of it, and found also that it was regarded by

others in the same light, I was distressed and perplexed. I could not

comprehend it. I knew not why the Secretary should step so far out of

his way, in a manner absolutely without precedent, to treat me with

ostentatious indignity,--especially when I thought that for years I had

been his friend, that I had never spoken of him except with kindness,

and that constantly since assuming his present duties he had turned

to me for help. This was more incomprehensible when I considered how

utterly groundless were all his imputations. I have lived in vain, if

such an attempt on me can fail to rebound on its author.

Not lightly would I judge an ancient friend. For a time I said nothing

to anybody of the outrage, hoping that perhaps the Secretary would

open his eyes to the true character of the document he had signed

and volunteer some friendly explanation. Meanwhile a proposition to

resume negotiations was received from England, and the Secretary, it

seems, desired to confer with me on the subject; but there was evident

consciousness on his part that he had done wrong,--for, instead of

coming to me at once, he sent for Mr. Patterson, of the Senate, and,

telling him that he wished to confer with me, added, that he did not

know precisely what were his relations with me and how I should receive

him. Within a brief fortnight I had been in conference with him at the

State Department and had dined at his house, besides about the same

time making a call there. Yet he was in doubt about his relations with

me. Plainly because, since the conference, the dinner, and the call,

the document signed by him had been communicated to the Senate, and

the conscience-struck Secretary did not know how I should take it. Mr.

Patterson asked me what he should report. I replied, that, should the

Secretary come to my house, he would be received as an old friend,

and that at any time I should be at his service for consultation on

public business, but that I could not conceal my deep sense of personal

wrong received from him absolutely without reason or excuse. That

this message was communicated by Mr. Patterson I cannot doubt,--for

the Secretary came to my house, and there was a free conference. How

frankly I spoke on public questions, without one word on other things,

the Secretary knows. He will remember if any inquiry, remark, or

allusion escaped from me, except in reference to public business. The

interview was of business and nothing else.

On careful reflection, it seemed to me plain, that, while meeting the

Secretary officially, it would not be consistent with self-respect

for me to continue personal relations with one who had put his name

to a document, which, after protracted fury toward another, contained

a studied insult to me, where the fury was intensified rather than

tempered by too obvious premeditation. Public business must not suffer,

but in such a case personal relations naturally cease; and this rule I

have followed since. Is there any Senator who would have done less? Are

there not many who would have done more? I am at a loss to understand

how the Secretary could expect anything beyond those official relations

which I declared my readiness at all times to maintain, and which, even

after his assault on me, he was willing to seek at my own house. To

expect more shows on his part grievous insensibility to the thing he

had done. Whatever one signs he makes his own; and the Secretary, when

he signed this document, adopted a libel upon his friend, and when he

communicated it to the Senate he published the libel. Nothing like it

can be shown in the history of our Government. It stands alone. The

Secretary is alone. Like Jean Paul in German literature, his just title

will be “The Only One.” For years I have known Secretaries of State

and often differed from them, but never before did I receive from one

anything but kindness. Never before did a Secretary of State sign a

document libelling an associate in the public service, and publish it

to the world. Never before did a Secretary of State so entirely set at

defiance every sentiment of friendship. It is impossible to explain

this strange aberration, except from the disturbing influence of San

Domingo. But whatever its origin, its true character is beyond question.

As nothing like this state-paper can be shown in the history of our

Government, so also nothing like it can be shown in the history of

other Governments. Not an instance can be named in any country, where

a personage in corresponding official position has done such a thing.

The American Secretary is alone, not only in his own country, but in

all countries; “none but himself can be his parallel.” Seneca, in the

“Hercules Furens,” has pictured him:--

“Quæris Alcidæ parem?

Nemo est, nisi ipse.”

He is originator and first inventor, with all prerogatives and

responsibilities thereto belonging.

I have mentioned only one sally in this painful document; but the

whole, besides its prevailing offensiveness, shows inconsistency with

actual facts of my own knowledge, which is in entire harmony with the

recklessness toward me, and attests the same spirit throughout. Thus,

we have the positive allegation that the death of Lord Clarendon, June

27, 1870, “_determined the time_ for inviting Mr. Motley to make place

for a successor,”[99] when, in point of fact, some time before his

Lordship’s illness even, the Secretary had invited me to go to London

as Mr. Motley’s successor,--thus showing that the explanation of Lord

Clarendon’s death was an after-thought, when it became important to

divert attention from the obvious dependence of the removal upon the

defeat of the San Domingo treaty.

A kindred inconsistency arrested the attention of the London “Times,”

in its article of January 24, 1871, on the document signed by the

Secretary. Here, according to this journal, the document supplied the

means of correction, since it set forth that on the 25th June, two

days before Lord Clarendon’s death, Mr. Motley’s coming removal was

announced in a London journal. After stating the alleged dependence

of the removal upon the death of Lord Clarendon, the journal, holding

the scales, remarks: “And yet there is at least one circumstance,

appearing, _strange to say_, in Mr. Fish’s own dispatch, which is _not

quite consistent_ with the explanation he sets up of Mr. Motley’s

recall.” Then, after quoting from the document, and mentioning that

its own correspondent at Philadelphia did on the 25th June “send us a

message that Mr. Motley was about to be withdrawn,” the journal mildly

concludes, that, “as this was two days before Lord Clarendon’s death,

which was unforeseen here and could not have been expected in the

States, _it is difficult to connect the resolution to supersede the

late American Minister with the change at our Foreign Office_.” The

difficulty of the “Times” is increased by the earlier incident with

regard to myself.

Not content with making the removal depend upon the death of Lord

Clarendon, when it was heralded abroad not only before the death of

this minister had occurred, but while it was yet unforeseen, the

document seeks to antedate the defeat of the San Domingo treaty, so

as to interpose “weeks and months” between the latter event and the

removal. The language is explicit. “The treaty,” says the document,

“_was admitted_ to be practically dead, and was waiting only the formal

action of the Senate, _for weeks and months_ before the decease of the

illustrious statesman of Great Britain.”[100] Weeks and months! And yet

during the last month, when the treaty “was admitted to be practically

dead,” the Secretary who signed the document passed three hours at my

house, pleading with me to withdraw my opposition, and finally wound up

by tender to me of the English mission, with no other apparent object

than simply to get me out of the way.

Then again we have the positive allegation that the President embraced

an opportunity “to prevent any further misapprehension of his views

through Mr. Motley by taking from him the right to discuss further

the ‘Alabama claims’”;[101] whereas the Secretary in a letter to me

at Boston, dated at Washington, October 9, 1869, informs me that the

discussion of the question was withdrawn from London “_because_” (the

Italics are the Secretary’s) “we think, that, when renewed, it can be

carried on here with a better prospect of settlement than where the

late attempt at a convention which resulted so disastrously and was

conducted so strangely was had”; and what the Secretary thus wrote he

repeated in conversation when we met, carefully making the transfer

to Washington depend upon our advantage here from the presence of the

Senate: thus showing that the pretext put forth to wound Mr. Motley was

an after-thought.

Still further, the document signed by the Secretary alleges, by way of

excuse for removing Mr. Motley, the “important public consideration of

having a representative in sympathy with the President’s views”;[102]

whereas, when the Secretary tendered the mission to me, no allusion was

made to “sympathy with the President’s views,” while Mr. Motley, it

appears, was charged with agreeing too much with me: all of which shows

how little this matter had to do with the removal, and how much the San

Domingo business at the time was above any question of conformity on

other things.

In the amiable passage already quoted[103] there is a parenthesis which

breathes the prevailing spirit. By way of aspersion on Mr. Motley and

myself, the country is informed that he was indebted for his nomination

to “influence and urgency” on my part. Of the influence I know nothing;

but I deny positively any “urgency.” I spoke with the President on

this subject once casually on the stairs of the Executive Mansion, and

then again in a formal interview. And here, since the effort of the

Secretary, I shall frankly state what I said and how it was introduced.

I began by remarking, that, with the permission of the President, I

should venture to suggest the expediency of continuing Mr. Marsh in

Italy, Mr. Morris at Constantinople, and Mr. Bancroft at Berlin, as

all these exerted a peculiar influence and did honor to our country.

To this list I proposed to add Dr. Howe in Greece, believing that he,

too, would do honor to our country, and also Mr. Motley in London,

who, I suggested, would have an influence there beyond his official

position. The President said that nobody should be sent to London who

was not “right” on the Claims question, and he kindly explained to me

what he meant by “right.” From this time I had no conversation with

him about Mr. Motley, until after the latter had left for his post,

when the President volunteered to express his great satisfaction in the

appointment. Such was the extent of my “urgency.” Nor was I much in

advance of the Secretary at that time; for he showed me what was called

the “brief” at the State Department for the English mission, with Mr.

Motley’s name at the head of the list.

Other allusions to myself would be cheerfully forgotten, if they were

not made the pretext to assail Mr. Motley, who is held to severe

account for supposed dependence on me. If this were crime, not the

Minister, but the Secretary, should suffer; for it is the Secretary,

and not the Minister, who appealed to me constantly for help, often

desiring me to think for him, and more than once to hold the pen for

him. But, forgetting his own relations with me, the Secretary turns

upon Mr. Motley, who never asked me to think for him or to hold the pen

for him. Other things the Secretary also forgot. He forgot that the

blow he dealt, whether at Mr. Motley or myself, rudely tore the veil

from the past, so far as its testimony might be needed in elucidation

of the truth; that the document he signed was a challenge and

provocation to meet him on the facts without reserve or concealment;

that the wantonness of assault on Mr. Motley was so closely associated

with that on me, that any explanation I might make must be a defence

of him; that, even if duty to the Senate and myself did not require

this explanation, there are other duties not to be disregarded,

among which is duty to the absent, who cannot be permitted to suffer

unjustly,--duty to a much-injured citizen of Massachusetts, who may

properly look to a Senator of his State for protection against official

wrong,--duty also to a public servant insulted beyond precedent, who,

besides writing and speaking most effectively for the Republican party

and for this Administration, has added to the renown of our country by

unsurpassed success in literature, commending him to the gratitude and

good-will of all. These things the Secretary strangely forgot, when he

dealt the blow which tore the veil.

The crime of the Minister was dependence on me: so says the

state-paper. A simple narrative will show who is the criminal. My

early relations with the Secretary have already appeared, and how he

began by asking me for help, practising constantly on this appeal.

A few details will be enough. At once on his arrival to assume his

new duties, he asked my counsel about appointing Mr. Bancroft Davis

Assistant Secretary of State, and I advised the appointment,--without

sufficient knowledge, I am inclined to believe now. Then followed

the questions with Spain growing out of Cuba, which were the subject

of constant conference, where he sought me repeatedly and kindly

listened to my opinions. Then came the instructions for the English

mission, known as the dispatch of May 15, 1869. At each stage of

these instructions I was in the counsels of the Secretary. Following

my suggestion, he authorized me to invite Mr. Motley in his name to

prepare the “memoir” or essay on our claims, which, notwithstanding its

entirely confidential character, he drags before the world, for purpose

of assault, in a manner clearly unjustifiable. Then, as the dispatch

was preparing, he asked my help especially in that part relating to

the concession of belligerent rights. I have here the first draught of

this important passage in pencil and in my own handwriting, varying

in no essential respect from that adopted. Here will be found the

distinction on which I have always insisted,--that, while other powers

conceded belligerent rights to our Rebels, it was in England only that

the concession was supplemented by acts causing direct damage to the

United States. Not long afterward, in August, 1869, when the British

storm had subsided, I advised that the discussion should be renewed

by an elaborate communication, setting forth our case in length and

breadth, but without any estimate of damages,--throwing upon England

the opportunity, if not the duty, of making some practical proposition.

Adopting this recommendation, the Secretary invited me to write the

dispatch. I thought it better that it should be done by another, and

I named for this purpose an accomplished gentleman whom I knew to be

familiar with the question, and he wrote the dispatch. This paper,

bearing date September 25, 1869, is unquestionably the ablest in the

history of the present Administration, unless we except the last

dispatch of Mr. Motley.

In a letter dated at Washington, October 15, 1869, and addressed to me

at Boston, the Secretary describes this paper in the following terms:--

“The dispatch to Motley (which I learn by a telegram from him

has been received) is a calm, _full_ review of our entire

case, making no demand, no valuation of damages, but I believe

covering all the ground and all the points that have been made

on our side. I hope that it will meet your views. I _think_ it

will. It leaves the question with Great Britain to determine

when any negotiations are to be renewed.”

The Secretary was right in his description. It was a “_full_ review of

our entire case,” “covering all the ground and all the points”; and it

did meet my views, as the Secretary thought it would, especially where

it arraigned so strongly that fatal concession of belligerent rights

on the ocean, which in any faithful presentment of the national cause

will always be the first stage of _evidence_,--since, without this

precipitate and voluntary act, the Common Law of England was a positive

protection against the equipment of a corsair ship, or even the supply

of a blockade-runner for unacknowledged rebels. The conformity of this

dispatch with my views was recognized by others besides the Secretary.

It is well known that Lord Clarendon did not hesitate in familiar

conversation to speak of it as “Mr. Sumner’s speech over again”; while

another English personage said that “it out-Sumnered Sumner.” And yet,

with his name signed to this dispatch, written at my suggestion, and in

entire conformity with my views, as admitted by him and recognized by

the English Government, the Secretary taunts Mr. Motley for supposed

harmony with me on this very question. This taunt is still more

unnatural when it is known that this dispatch is in similar conformity

with the “memoir” of Mr. Motley, and was evidently written with

knowledge of that admirable document, where the case of our country is

stated with perfect mastery. But the story does not end here.

On the communication of this dispatch to the British Government, Mr.

Thornton was instructed to ascertain what would be accepted by our

Government, when the Secretary, under date of Washington, November

6, 1869, reported to me this application, and then, after expressing

unwillingness to act on it until he “could have an opportunity of

consulting” me, he wrote, “When will you be here? Will you either note

what you think will be sufficient to meet the views of the Senate and

of the country, or _will you formulate such proposition_?” After this

responsible commission, the letter winds up with the earnest request,

“Let me hear from you _as soon as you can_,” (the Italics are the

Secretary’s,) “and I should like to confer with you at the earliest

convenient time.” On my arrival at Washington, the Secretary came to my

house at once, and we conferred freely. San Domingo had not yet sent

its shadow into his soul.

It is easily seen that here was constant and reiterated appeal to me,

especially on our negotiations with England; and yet, in the face of

this testimony, where he is the unimpeachable witness, the Secretary is

pleased to make Mr. Motley’s supposed relations with me the occasion of

insult to him, while, as if this were not enough, he crowns his work

with personal assault on me,--all of which, whether as regards Mr.

Motley or me, is beyond comprehension.

How little Mr. Motley merited anything but respect and courtesy from

the Secretary is attested by all who know his eminent position in

London, and the service he rendered to his country. Already the London

press, usually slow to praise Americans when strenuous for their

country, has furnished its voluntary testimony. The “Daily News” of

August 16, 1870, spoke of the insulted Minister in these terms:--

“We are violating no confidence in saying that all the hopes

and promises of Mr. Motley’s official residence in England

have been amply fulfilled, and that the announcement of his

unexpected and unexplained recall was received with extreme

astonishment and unfeigned regret. The vacancy he leaves

cannot possibly be filled by a Minister more sensitive to the

honor of his Government, more attentive to the interests of

his country, and more capable of uniting the most rigorous

performance of his public duties with the high-bred courtesy

and the conciliatory tact and temper that make those duties

easy and successful. Mr. Motley’s successor will find his

mission wonderfully facilitated by the firmness and discretion

that have presided over the conduct of American affairs in this

country during too brief a term, too suddenly and unaccountably

concluded.”

The London press had not the key to this extraordinary transaction.

It knew not the potency of the San Domingo spell, nor its strange

influence over the Secretary, even breeding insensibility to

instinctive amenities, and awakening peculiar unfriendliness to Mr.

Motley, so amply certified afterward in an official document under

his own hand,--all of which burst forth with more than the tropical

luxuriance of the much-coveted island.

* * * * *

I cannot disguise the sorrow with which I offer this explanation.

In self-defence and for the sake of truth do I now speak. I have

cultivated forbearance, and hoped from the bottom of my heart

that I might do so to the end. But beyond the call of the public

press has been the defiant challenge of Senators, and also the

consideration sometimes presented by friends, that my silence might

be misinterpreted. Tardily and most reluctantly I make this record,

believing it more a duty to the Senate than to myself, but a plain

duty, to be performed in all simplicity without reserve. Having nothing

to conceal, and willing always to be judged by the truth, I court the

fullest inquiry, and shrink from no conclusion founded on an accurate

knowledge of the case.

If this narration enables any one to see in clearer light the injustice

done to Mr. Motley, then have I performed a further duty too long

postponed; nor will it be doubted by any honest nature, that, since the

assault of the Secretary, he was entitled to that vindication which

is found in a statement of facts within my own knowledge. Anything

short of this would be a license to the Secretary in his new style of

state-paper, which, for the sake of the public service and of good-will

among men, must be required to stand alone, in the isolation which

becomes its abnormal character. Plainly without precedent in the past,

it must be without chance of repetition in the future.

Here I stop. My present duty is performed when I set forth the simple

facts, exhibiting those personal relations which have been drawn in

question, without touching the questions of principle behind.

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