In the strange report of the Secretary of State, responsive to a
resolution moved by me in the Senate, the dependence of Baez upon our
Navy is confessed in various forms. Nobody can read this document
without noting the confession, first from the reluctant Secretary, and
then from his agent.
Referring to the correspondence of Raymond H. Perry, our Commercial
Agent at San Domingo, who signed the treaties, the Secretary presents
a summary, which, though obnoxious to just criticism, is a confession.
According to him, the correspondence “tends to show that the presence
of a United States man-of-war in the port was supposed to have _a
peaceful influence_.”[25] The term “peaceful influence” is the pleonasm
of the Secretary, confessing the maintenance of Baez in his usurpation.
There is no such thing as stealing; “_convey_ the wise it call”; and
so with the Secretary the maintenance of a usurper by our war-ships
is only “a peaceful influence.” A discovery of the Secretary. But in
the levity of his statement the Secretary forgets that a United States
man-of-war has nothing to do within a foreign jurisdiction, and cannot
exert influence there without unlawful intervention.
The Secretary alludes also to the probability of “another revolution,”
of course against Baez, in the event of the failure of the annexion
plot; and here is another confession of the dependence of the usurper
upon our Navy.
But the correspondence of Mr. Perry, as communicated to the Senate,
shows more plainly than the confession of the Secretary how completely
the usurper was maintained in power by the strong arm of the United
States.
The anxiety of the usurper was betrayed at an early day, even while
vaunting the popular enthusiasm for annexion. In a dispatch dated at
San Domingo, January 20, 1870, Mr. Perry thus reports:--
“The Nantasket left this port January 1, 1870, and we have not
heard from her since. She was to go to Puerto Plata [a port of
Dominica] and return _viâ_ Samana Bay [also in Dominica]. _We
need the protection of a man-of-war very much_, but anticipate
her return very soon.”[26]
Why the man-of-war was needed is easily inferred from what is said in
the same dispatch:--
“The President tells me that it is almost impossible to prevent
the people pronouncing for annexation before the proper time.
_He prefers to await the arrival of a United States man-of-war
before their opinion is publicly expressed._”[27]
If the truth were told, the usurper felt that it was almost impossible
to prevent the people from pronouncing for his overthrow, and therefore
he wanted war-ships.