being united with material things, so as to perceive them in themselves;
but that she perceives them by her union with the substance of God, which,
being spiritual, is therefore purely intelligible, or capable of being the
immediate object of a spirit’s thought. Besides, the Divine essence
contains in it perfections correspondent to each created being; and which
are, for that reason, proper to exhibit or represent them to the mind.
_Phil._ I do not understand how our ideas, which are things altogether
passive and inert(830), can be the essence, or any part (or like any part)
of the essence or substance of God, who is an impassive, indivisible,
pure, active being. Many more difficulties and objections there are which
occur at first view against this hypothesis; but I shall only add, that it
is liable to all the absurdities of the common hypothesis, in making a
created world exist otherwise than in the mind of a Spirit. Beside all
which it hath this peculiar to itself; that it makes that material world
serve to no purpose. And, if it pass for a good argument against other
hypotheses in the sciences, that they suppose Nature, or the Divine
wisdom, to make something in vain, or do that by tedious roundabout
methods which might have been performed in a much more easy and
compendious way, what shall we think of that hypothesis which supposes the
whole world made in vain?
_Hyl._ But what say you? Are not you too of opinion that we see all things
in God? If I mistake not, what you advance comes near it.
_Phil._ [(831)Few men think; yet all have opinions. Hence men’s opinions
are superficial and confused. It is nothing strange that tenets which in
themselves are ever so different, should nevertheless be confounded with
each other, by those who do not consider them attentively. I shall not
therefore be surprised if some men imagine that I run into the enthusiasm
of Malebranche; though in truth I am very remote from it. He builds on the
most abstract general ideas, which I entirely disclaim. He asserts an
absolute external world, which I deny. He maintains that we are deceived
by our senses, and know not the real natures or the true forms and figures
of extended beings; of all which I hold the direct contrary. So that upon
the whole there are no Principles more fundamentally opposite than his and
mine. It must be owned that] I entirely agree with what the holy Scripture
saith, ’That in God we live and move and have our being.’ But that we see
things in His essence, after the manner above set forth, I am far from
believing. Take here in brief my meaning:—It is evident that the things I
perceive are my own ideas, and that no idea can exist unless it be in a
mind: nor is it less plain that these ideas or things by me perceived,
either themselves or their archetypes, exist independently of _my_ mind,
since I know myself not to be their author, it being out of my power to
determine at pleasure what particular ideas I shall be affected with upon
opening my eyes or ears(832): they must therefore exist in some other
Mind, whose Will it is they should be exhibited to me. The things, I say,
immediately perceived are ideas or sensations, call them which you will.
But how can any idea or sensation exist in, or be produced by, anything
but a mind or spirit? This indeed is inconceivable(833). And to assert
that which is inconceivable is to talk nonsense: is it not?
_Hyl._ Without doubt.
_Phil._ But, on the other hand, it is very conceivable that they should
exist in and be produced by a Spirit; since this is no more than I daily
experience in myself(834), inasmuch as I perceive numberless ideas; and,
by an act of my will, can form a great variety of them, and raise them up
in my imagination: though, it must be confessed, these creatures of the
fancy are not altogether so distinct, so strong, vivid, and permanent, as
those perceived by my senses—which latter are called _real things_. From
all which I conclude, _there is a Mind which affects me every moment with
all the sensible impressions I perceive_. And, from the variety, order,
and manner of these, I conclude _the Author of them to be wise, powerful,
and good, beyond comprehension_. Mark it well; I do not say I see things
by perceiving that which represents them in the intelligible Substance of
God. This I do not understand; but I say, the things by me perceived are
known by the understanding, and produced by the will of an infinite
Spirit. And is not all this most plain and evident? Is there any more in
it than what a little observation in our own minds, and that which passeth
in them, not only enables us to conceive, but also obliges us to
acknowledge?
_Hyl._ I think I understand you very clearly; and own proof you give of a
Deity seems no less evident than it is surprising. But, allowing that God
is the supreme and universal Cause of all things, yet, may there not be
still a Third Nature besides Spirits and Ideas? May we not admit a
subordinate and limited cause of our ideas? In a word, may there not for
all that be _Matter_?
_Phil._ How often must I inculcate the same thing? You allow the things
immediately perceived by sense to exist nowhere without the mind; but
there is nothing perceived by sense which is not perceived immediately;
therefore there is nothing sensible that exists without the mind. The
Matter, therefore, which you still insist on is something intelligible, I
suppose; something that may be discovered by reason(835), and not by
sense.
_Hyl._ You are in the right.
_Phil._ Pray let me know what reasoning your belief of Matter is grounded
on; and what this Matter is, in your present sense of it.
_Hyl._ I find myself affected with various ideas whereof I know I am not
the cause; neither are they the cause of themselves, or of one another, or
capable of subsisting by themselves, as being altogether inactive,
fleeting, dependent beings. They have therefore _some_ cause distinct from
me and them: of which I pretend to know no more than that it is _the cause
of my ideas_. And this thing whatever it be, I call Matter.
_Phil._ Tell me, Hylas, hath every one a liberty to change the current
proper signification attached to a common name in any language? For
example, suppose a traveller should tell you that in a certain country men
pass unhurt through the fire; and, upon explaining himself, you found he
meant by the word _fire_ that which others call _water_. Or, if he should
assert that there are trees that walk upon two legs, meaning men by the
term _trees_. Would you think this reasonable?
_Hyl._ No; I should think it very absurd. Common custom is the standard of
propriety in language. And for any man to affect speaking improperly is to
pervert the use of speech, and can never serve to a better purpose than to
protract and multiply disputes where there is no difference in opinion.
_Phil._ And doth not _Matter_, in the common current acceptation of the
word, signify an extended solid moveable, unthinking, inactive Substance?
_Hyl._ It doth.
_Phil._ And, hath it not been made evident that no _such_ substance can
possibly exist(836)? And, though it should be allowed to exist, yet how
can that which is _inactive_ be a _cause_; or that which is _unthinking_
be a _cause of thought_? You may, indeed, if you please, annex to the word
_Matter_ a contrary meaning to what is vulgarly received; and tell me you
understand by it, an unextended, thinking, active being, which is the
cause of our ideas. But what else is this than to play with words, and run
into that very fault you just now condemned with so much reason? I do by
no means find fault with your reasoning, in that you collect _a_ cause
from the _phenomena_: but I deny that _the_ cause deducible by reason can
properly be termed Matter(837).
_Hyl._ There is indeed something in what you say. But I am afraid you do
not thoroughly comprehend my meaning. I would by no means be thought to
deny that God, or an infinite Spirit, is the Supreme Cause of all things.
All I contend for is, that, subordinate to the Supreme Agent, there is a
cause of a limited and inferior nature, which _concurs_ in the production
of our ideas, not by any act of will, or spiritual efficiency, but by that
kind of action which belongs to Matter, viz. _motion_.
_Phil._ I find you are at every turn relapsing into your old exploded
conceit, of a moveable, and consequently an extended, substance, existing
without the mind. What! Have you already forgotten you were convinced; or
are you willing I should repeat what has been said on that head? In truth
this is not fair dealing in you, still to suppose the being of that which
you have so often acknowledged to have no being. But, not to insist
farther on what has been so largely handled, I ask whether all your ideas
are not perfectly passive and inert, including nothing of action in
them(838).
_Hyl._ They are.
_Phil._ And are sensible qualities anything else but ideas?
_Hyl._ How often have I acknowledged that they are not.
_Phil._ But is not _motion_ a sensible quality?
_Hyl._ It is.
_Phil._ Consequently it is no action?
_Hyl._ I agree with you. And indeed it is very plain that when I stir my
finger, it remains passive; but my will which produced the motion is
active.
_Phil._ Now, I desire to know, in the first place, whether, motion being
allowed to be no action, you can conceive any action besides volition:
and, in the second place, whether to say something and conceive nothing be
not to talk nonsense(839): and, lastly, whether, having considered the
premises, you do not perceive that to suppose any efficient or active
Cause of our ideas, other than _Spirit_, is highly absurd and
unreasonable?
_Hyl._ I give up the point entirely. But, though Matter may not be a
cause, yet what hinders its being an _instrument_, subservient to the
supreme Agent in the production of our ideas?
_Phil._ An instrument say you; pray what may be the figure, springs,
wheels, and motions, of that instrument?
_Hyl._ Those I pretend to determine nothing of, both the substance and its
qualities being entirely unknown to me.
_Phil._ What? You are then of opinion it is made up of unknown parts, that
it hath unknown motions, and an unknown shape?
_Hyl._ I do not believe that it hath any figure or motion at all, being
already convinced, that no sensible qualities can exist in an unperceiving
substance.
_Phil._ But what notion is it possible to frame of an instrument void of
all sensible qualities, even extension itself?
_Hyl._ I do not pretend to have any notion of it.
_Phil._ And what reason have you to think this unknown, this inconceivable
Somewhat doth exist? Is it that you imagine God cannot act as well without
it; or that you find by experience the use of some such thing, when you
form ideas in your own mind?
_Hyl._ You are always teasing me for reasons of my belief. Pray what
reasons have you not to believe it?
_Phil._ It is to me a sufficient reason not to believe the existence of
anything, if I see no reason for believing it. But, not to insist on
reasons for believing, you will not so much as let me know _what it is_
you would have me believe; since you say you have no manner of notion of
it. After all, let me entreat you to consider whether it be like a
philosopher, or even like a man of common sense, to pretend to believe you
know not what, and you know not why.
_Hyl._ Hold, Philonous. When I tell you Matter is an _instrument_, I do
not mean altogether nothing. It is true I know not the particular kind of
instrument; but, however, I have some notion of _instrument in general_,
which I apply to it.
_Phil._ But what if it should prove that there is something, even in the
most general notion of _instrument_, as taken in a distinct sense from
_cause_, which makes the use of it inconsistent with the Divine
attributes?
_Hyl._ Make that appear and I shall give up the point.
_Phil._ What mean you by the general nature or notion of _instrument_?
_Hyl._ That which is common to all particular instruments composeth the
general notion.
_Phil._ Is it not common to all instruments, that they are applied to the
doing those things only which cannot be performed by the mere act of our
wills? Thus, for instance, I never use an instrument to move my finger,
because it is done by a volition. But I should use one if I were to remove
part of a rock, or tear up a tree by the roots. Are you of the same mind?
Or, can you shew any example where an instrument is made use of in
producing an effect _immediately_ depending on the will of the agent?
_Hyl._ I own I cannot.
_Phil._ How therefore can you suppose that an All-perfect Spirit, on whose
Will all things have an absolute and immediate dependence, should need an
instrument in his operations, or, not needing it, make use of it? Thus it
seems to me that you are obliged to own the use of a lifeless inactive
instrument to be incompatible with the infinite perfection of God; that
is, by your own confession, to give up the point.
_Hyl._ It doth not readily occur what I can answer you.
_Phil._ But, methinks you should be ready to own the truth, when it has
been fairly proved to you. We indeed, who are beings of finite powers, are
forced to make use of instruments. And the use of an instrument sheweth
the agent to be limited by rules of another’s prescription, and that he
cannot obtain his end but in such a way, and by such conditions. Whence it
seems a clear consequence, that the supreme unlimited Agent useth no tool
or instrument at all. The will of an Omnipotent Spirit is no sooner
exerted than executed, without the application of means; which, if they
are employed by inferior agents, it is not upon account of any real
efficacy that is in them, or necessary aptitude to produce any effect, but
merely in compliance with the laws of nature, or those conditions
prescribed to them by the First Cause, who is Himself above all limitation
or prescription whatsoever(840).
_Hyl._ I will no longer maintain that Matter is an instrument. However, I
would not be understood to give up its existence neither; since,
notwithstanding what hath been said, it may still be an _occasion_(841).
_Phil._ How many shapes is your Matter to take? Or, how often must it be
proved not to exist, before you are content to part with it? But, to say
no more of this (though by all the laws of disputation I may justly blame
you for so frequently changing the signification of the principal term)—I
would fain know what you mean by affirming that matter is an occasion,
having already denied it to be a cause. And, when you have shewn in what
sense you understand _occasion_, pray, in the next place, be pleased to
shew me what reason induceth you to believe there is such an occasion of
our ideas?
_Hyl._ As to the first point: by _occasion_ I mean an inactive unthinking
being, at the presence whereof God excites ideas in our minds.
_Phil._ And what may be the nature of that inactive unthinking being?
_Hyl._ I know nothing of its nature.
_Phil._ Proceed then to the second point, and assign some reason why we
should allow an existence to this inactive, unthinking, unknown thing.
_Hyl._ When we see ideas produced in our minds, after an orderly and
constant manner, it is natural to think they have some fixed and regular
occasions, at the presence of which they are excited.
_Phil._ You acknowledge then God alone to be the cause of our ideas, and
that He causes them at the presence of those occasions.
_Hyl._ That is my opinion.
_Phil._ Those things which you say are present to God, without doubt He
perceives.
_Hyl._ Certainly; otherwise they could not be to Him an occasion of
acting.
_Phil._ Not to insist now on your making sense of this hypothesis, or
answering all the puzzling questions and difficulties it is liable to: I
only ask whether the order and regularity observable in the series of our
ideas, or the course of nature, be not sufficiently accounted for by the
wisdom and power of God; and whether it doth not derogate from those
attributes, to suppose He is influenced, directed, or put in mind, when
and what He is to act, by an unthinking substance? And, lastly, whether,
in case I granted all you contend for, it would make anything to your
purpose; it not being easy to conceive how the external or absolute
existence of an unthinking substance, distinct from its being perceived,
can be inferred from my allowing that there are certain things perceived
by the mind of God, which are to Him the occasion of producing ideas in
us?
_Hyl._ I am perfectly at a loss what to think, this notion of _occasion_
seeming now altogether as groundless as the rest.
_Phil._ Do you not at length perceive that in all these different
acceptations of _Matter_, you have been only supposing you know not what,
for no manner of reason, and to no kind of use?
_Hyl._ I freely own myself less fond of my notions since they have been so
accurately examined. But still, methinks, I have some confused perception
that there is such a thing as _Matter_.
_Phil._ Either you perceive the being of Matter immediately or mediately.
If immediately, pray inform me by which of the senses you perceive it. If
mediately, let me know by what reasoning it is inferred from those things
which you perceive immediately. So much for the perception. Then for the
Matter itself, I ask whether it is object, _substratum_, cause,
instrument, or occasion? You have already pleaded for each of these,
shifting your notions, and making Matter to appear sometimes in one shape,
then in another. And what you have offered hath been disapproved and
rejected by yourself. If you have anything new to advance I would gladly
hear it.
_Hyl._ I think I have already offered all I had to say on those heads. I
am at a loss what more to urge.
_Phil._ And yet you are loath to part with your old prejudice. But, to
make you quit it more easily, I desire that, beside what has been hitherto
suggested, you will farther consider whether, upon supposition that Matter
exists, you can possibly conceive how you should be affected by it. Or,
supposing it did not exist, whether it be not evident you might for all
that be affected with the same ideas you now are, and consequently have
the very same reasons to believe its existence that you now can have(842).
_Hyl._ I acknowledge it is possible we might perceive all things just as
we do now, though there was no Matter in the world; neither can I
conceive, if there be Matter, how it should produce any idea in our minds.
And, I do farther grant you have entirely satisfied me that it is
impossible there should be such a thing as Matter in any of the foregoing
acceptations. But still I cannot help supposing that there is _Matter_ in
some sense or other. _What that is_ I do not indeed pretend to determine.
_Phil._ I do not expect you should define exactly the nature of that
unknown being. Only be pleased to tell me whether it is a Substance; and
if so, whether you can suppose a Substance without accidents; or, in case
you suppose it to have accidents or qualities, I desire you will let me
know what those qualities are, at least what is meant by Matter’s
supporting them?
_Hyl._ We have already argued on those points. I have no more to say to
them. But, to prevent any farther questions, let me tell you I at present
understand by _Matter_ neither substance nor accident, thinking nor
extended being, neither cause, instrument, nor occasion, but Something
entirely unknown, distinct from all these(843).
_Phil._ It seems then you include in your present notion of Matter nothing
but the general abstract idea of _entity_.
_Hyl._ Nothing else; save only that I superadd to this general idea the
negation of all those particular things, qualities, or ideas, that I
perceive, imagine, or in anywise apprehend.
_Phil._ Pray where do you suppose this unknown Matter to exist?
_Hyl._ Oh Philonous! now you think you have entangled me; for, if I say it
exists in place, then you will infer that it exists in the mind, since it
is agreed that place or extension exists only in the mind. But I am not
ashamed to own my ignorance. I know not where it exists; only I am sure it
exists not in place. There is a negative answer for you. And you must
expect no other to all the questions you put for the future about Matter.
_Phil._ Since you will not tell me where it exists, be pleased to inform
me after what manner you suppose it to exist, or what you mean by its
_existence_?
_Hyl._ It neither thinks nor acts, neither perceives nor is perceived.
_Phil._ But what is there positive in your abstracted notion of its
existence?
_Hyl._ Upon a nice observation, I do not find I have any positive notion
or meaning at all. I tell you again, I am not ashamed to own my ignorance.
I know not what is meant by its _existence_, or how it exists.
_Phil._ Continue, good Hylas, to act the same ingenuous part, and tell me
sincerely whether you can frame a distinct idea of Entity in general,
prescinded from and exclusive of all thinking and corporeal beings(844),
all particular things whatsoever.
_Hyl._ Hold, let me think a little——I profess, Philonous, I do not find
that I can. At first glance, methought I had some dilute and airy notion
of Pure Entity in abstract; but, upon closer attention, it hath quite
vanished out of sight. The more I think on it, the more am I confirmed in
my prudent resolution of giving none but negative answers, and not
pretending to the least degree of any positive knowledge or conception of
Matter, its _where_, its _how_, its _entity_, or anything belonging to it.
_Phil._ When, therefore, you speak of the existence of Matter, you have
not any notion in your mind?
_Hyl._ None at all.
_Phil._ Pray tell me if the case stands not thus:—At first, from a belief
of material substance, you would have it that the immediate objects
existed without the mind; then that they are archetypes; then causes; next
instruments; then occasions: lastly, _something in general_, which being
interpreted proves _nothing_. So Matter comes to nothing. What think you,
Hylas, is not this a fair summary of your whole proceeding?
_Hyl._ Be that as it will, yet I still insist upon it, that _our_ not
being able to conceive a thing is no argument against its existence.
_Phil._ That from a cause, effect, operation, sign, or other circumstance,
there may reasonably be inferred the existence of a thing not immediately
perceived; and that it were absurd for any man to argue against the
existence of that thing, from his having no direct and positive notion of
it, I freely own. But, where there is nothing of all this; where neither
reason nor revelation induces us to believe the existence of a thing;
where we have not even a relative notion of it; where an abstraction is
made from perceiving and being perceived, from Spirit and idea: lastly,
where there is not so much as the most inadequate or faint idea pretended
to—I will not indeed thence conclude against the reality of any notion, or
existence of anything; but my inference shall be, that you mean nothing at
all; that you employ words to no manner of purpose, without any design or
signification whatsoever. And I leave it to you to consider how mere
jargon should be treated.
_Hyl._ To deal frankly with you, Philonous, your arguments seem in
themselves unanswerable; but they have not so great an effect on me as to
produce that entire conviction, that hearty acquiescence, which attends
demonstration(845). I find myself still relapsing into an obscure surmise
of I know not what, _matter_.