THE BEGINNING OF THE END.
A general excitement amongst the Arabs very naturally followed the
commencement of hostilities between the Emperor of France and the King
of Prussia. The Bey did his utmost to please both parties, and, as might
be expected, succeeded in satisfying neither. The travellers Rohlfs and
Wetstein were denounced by M. De Botmiliau as German emissaries of so
dangerous a description that their daily walks were watched by a
detachment of Tunisian soldiers, and a local _avoué_ caused a copious
interchange of telegrams with Berlin by announcing his intention of
forming a Foreign Legion in Tunis to take service under the Government
of Tours. After an unsuccessful attempt to reach the interior, the
German savants were compelled to leave the country in self-defence, and
the Tunisian Contingent seems to have died a natural death about the
same time. To counterbalance the effect of the news of the disasters of
Sedan and Metz, M. De Botmiliau fell back upon the ancient scare of a
meditated Turkish invasion from Tripoli; notwithstanding which, the Bey
showed an increasing determination to obtain from the Porte the
execution of the vizirial letter of 1864.
A year or two before, the Bey in a weak moment had granted two important
concessions of arable ground to Italian and French subjects. An Italian
agricultural company obtained an estate at Jedeida, while a French
citizen, the Count de Sancy, was put in possession of the fruitful
domain of Sidi Tabet, on the banks of the Medjerdah. Both these kindly
acts on the part of the Bey were destined to entail important results;
the former became the indirect cause of the Bey’s hastening his demand
for the Imperial firman, and the latter has contributed not a little to
the events of 1881. The Italian _concessionnaires_ were hardly installed
at the Jedeida when they put forward claims to exercise such
jurisdiction over the inhabitants as would constitute an _imperium in
imperio_. Some local disputes with the Arabs living on the property
induced them to precipitately retire, and present an elaborate claim for
consequential damages on account of unreaped harvests, unborn herds, and
even unhatched eggs. Signor Pinna pulled down his flag, and Italian
newspapers talked quite as loudly of an expedition and occupation on
behalf of the Societa Commerciale, Industriale ed Agricola, per la
Tunisia in 1871, as the French press did in connection with the Société
Marseillaise exactly ten years later. Mainly through the good offices of
Mr. Wood an arbitration was agreed upon, in which, in spite of many
disadvantages, Muhamed es Sadek came off victorious.
The Bey soon perceived that he was now likely to enter on a new phase of
existence as a political bone of contention between France and Italy,
and a milch-cow for adventurers from both countries in search of
indemnities. No time was therefore to be lost; and in the following
September General Kheir-ed-Din was sent once more to Stamboul to seek
the firman, according to the terms of the agreement arrived at in 1864.
M. De Botmiliau protested, but the Bey observed that the step he had
taken was rendered absolutely necessary by the pressure lately brought
to bear on him by the “friendly Powers.” Kheir-ed-Din returned with the
Sultan’s rescript, which was read on the 18th November 1871 in the
presence of one of the largest and most brilliant assemblies which ever
filled the audience-hall of the Bardo palace.[34]
Meanwhile the Financial Commission was gradually taking shape under the
care of M. Villet. Early in 1873 it became evident that a “palace
intrigue” had been set on foot against the Prime Minister, and that
General Kheir-ed-Din, supported by M. Villet, was endeavouring to
supplant his father-in-law. The investigations of M. Villet as to past
accounts were not supposed to be favourable to Sidi Mustapha, and the
Bey lent a ready ear to the suggestion that his “faithful servant” of
1864 was the main cause of the financial crisis which had so perceptibly
diminished his power and independence. The old man was imprudent enough
to quarrel with the ruling favourite, Mustapha Ben Ismael, and his
granting by a private letter a permission to open an English bank at
last afforded the pretext which had been so long wanted. In order to
gain his object, Kheir-ed-Din went over temporarily to the French party,
and a new and energetic Chargé d’Affaires replaced M. De Botmiliau to
put the plan into execution. On the 16th September M. De Vallat arrived
in Tunis, and on the 3d November General Kheir-ed-Din became Prime
Minister, to fall four years later by the influence of the same persons
who had wrought the ruin of his predecessor.
According to Oriental usage, the fallen Minister was despoiled of his
property, and he probably owed his life to the strong representations of
the Italian Government. An attempt was made to arrest him; but his wife,
the sister of Ahmed Bey, passionately clung to her husband, and
threatened to follow him through the streets with uncovered face and
dishevelled hair if the soldiers took him from her. Even Kheir-ed-Din
shrank from such a scandal as this. No one ever saw Sidi Mustapha after
his disgrace. His jewels and plate (including souvenirs from half the
sovereigns of Europe) were sold by public auction six months later, but
the sum realised was insufficient to pay the debt he was declared to owe
to the Tunisian Treasury. Mustapha is now dead, and lies beside his
royal brother-in-law in the mausoleum of the Beys of Tunis.
Meanwhile the French undertaking at Sidi Tabet had hardly made more
progress than the Italian farm at Jedeida. In consideration of improving
materially “the breed of horses, cows, and sheep” in the Regency of
Tunis, the Bey had given a grant to the Count de Saucy of fourteen
hundred hectares of the most fertile land in his dominions. M. de Sancy
had, according to his own showing, no capital to lay out on the
property, and although his concession was purely personal, he set out
for Paris to find a partner for the Haras of Sidi Tabet. He finally
succeeded in interesting in Tunisian agriculture an American lady, Mrs.
Mary Frances Ronalds, who desired to forget amidst fresh scenery and
pastoral pursuits the annoyances of a lawsuit _en séparation de corps et
de biens_ which had been lately tried in the Parisian courts. Mrs.
Ronalds came to Tunis with her partner, and for a time the firm of
Sancy-Ronalds presided over the destinies of a dairy farm with
considerable success. But Tunis had not long the privilege of deriving a
portion of its supplies from Sidi Tabet. M. De Sancy ceded his rights to
a member of the ex-imperial family of France, and Lieutenant Lucien
Napoleon Theodore Bonaparte-Wyse became a partner in the fresh
association known to the French tribunals as that of Ronalds-Wyse. From
the day that M. Wyse became the guiding spirit of the farm at Sidi
Tabet, everything went wrong. The Tunisians refused to purchase their
butter, eggs, and poultry of any one but Mrs. Ronalds, and before three
months had passed away the partners were almost at open warfare. Their
somewhat unromantic daily correspondence formed a notable feature in the
various _causes célébres_ which ensued. A single specimen is sufficient.
M. WYSE TO MRS. RONALDS.
SIDI TABET, _3d October_ 1872.
MADAM,—I send you a blind sheep which has grown thin, and which you had
better sell, as well as some onions which remained over. John also sends
you five cowhides to dispose of. Please send me a plough and some
knives. Accept my respectful compliments.
L. N. B. WYSE.
M. Wyse becoming dissatisfied with the business, sold a portion of the
stock, whereupon Mrs. Ronalds prosecuted him criminally. M. De Vallat
was stony-hearted enough to throw every possible difficulty in the way
of her demands for justice, and M. Wyse triumphed for a time, and sued
M. De Sancy for selling rights, which he did not possess. His success
was not, however, to be of long duration. Both M. De Sancy and Mrs.
Ronalds had friends in high places, and M. De Vallat was recalled. The
incidents of the agricultural adventures of Mrs. Ronalds and her
partners for a moment seemed to obscure the graver matters at stake, and
for a time even the _prépondérance naturelle_ was forgotten. The Baron
de Billing was appointed to the vacant Consulate-Generalship, and came
to Tunis irrevocably pledged to work out a Sancy-Ronalds policy with
energy and zeal.
M. De Billing joined his post in May 1874. The various judgments
pronounced in the _affaire_ Wyse were made the subject of an appeal to
Aix, and Mrs. Ronalds went thither in person to interest in the woes of
the partnership Sancy-Ronalds the President of the court and the
Cardinal Archbishop. Complete success attended her efforts, and on the
20th August the whole of the decrees issued in favour of M. Wyse were
reversed. The time had now arrived for decided action at Tunis, and the
annihilation of M. Wyse was intrusted to M. Elève-Consul Cassas, who has
since distinguished himself by very nearly involving the Republic in a
war with the Queen of Madagascar. Bonaparte Wyse was arrested and
conducted through the streets to the public prison, and the _raison
sociale_ Sancy-Ronalds reigned supreme. The Baroness de Billing now took
the Tunisian question in hand; Mustapha Ben Ismael was accused of
trespassing on the premises of the Saint Louis Memorial Chapel, and
publicly insulted at a ball given at the French Consulate; and General
Kheir-ed-din received letters of so menacing a character that he was
obliged to refer them to the Duc Decazes. During the short reign of M.
De Billing, M. Musalli was a candidate for employment in the Tunisian
Foreign Office, and his wife became a conspicuous member of the Sancy-
Ronalds party, which waged a deadly warfare against the faction
Bonaparte-Wyse. During the autumn of 1874 M. Oscar Gay arrived at Tunis
with an aggressive scheme in his pocket. While the Baroness de Billing
was giving her attention to the weightier details of Tunisian politics,
her husband and M. Musalli supported the plan for rebuilding Carthage,
and once more utilising the Cothon or harbour of Rome’s ancient rival.
The Bey, however, turned a deaf ear to their proposals, and M. Gay was
forced to postpone his projects for a more convenient season.
While the great Ronalds-Wyse controversy had apparently absorbed the
attention of France, and while the peculiar features of the Billing
_régime_ were diverting even the Tunisians, Mr. Wood had not been idle.
An English company had laid down a small railway joining Goletta to
Tunis and the Bardo; an English bank had begun its operations,
notwithstanding the anathema of M. De Vallat and the rest of the _corps
consulaire_, and English capitalists were preparing to light the town of
Tunis with gas. In the meantime the friends of M. Bonaparte-Wyse relaxed
no effort to procure the removal of M. De Billing, and the rescue of
Mrs. Ronalds’ offending partner from his uncomfortable quarters in the
Bey’s common prison. The controversy between the Baroness and the
Tunisian Premier hastened the inevitable end, and the Baron de Billing
was somewhat abruptly recalled.
Early in 1875 M. Théodore Roustan became Consul-General and Chargé
d’Affaires of the French Republic at Tunis. M. Wyse was released to
carry on his appeals in France, and study the projects for the Panama
canal; Mrs. Ronalds left Tunis for ever, and the “improvements in the
Tunisian breed of horses and cattle” at Sidi Tabet were for the moment
forgotten.
For a short time nothing in M. Roustan’s line of action betokened the
coming storm, but already in 1875 his extraordinary intimacy with the
Musalli family was violently attacked in the “Gazette du Midi,” and he
was obliged to retain M. Pelletier, a local legal practitioner, to
answer the exposures contained in that paper by a series of articles in
the “Peuple.” Elias Musalli came to Tunis nearly five and thirty years
ago as a soldier of fortune. He was a Copt by birth, had received a fair
education in one of the Egyptian seminaries, and brought a
recommendation from a high official at Constantinople. He became the
protégé of the Prime Minister Mustapha, and rose to the position of Sub-
Director in the Tunisian Foreign Office. Thirty years ago he married the
Signora Louisa Traverso, an Italian lady, whose universal popularity
materially assisted his progress. During the long administration of M.
Roche and the short interregnum of M. Moulin, General Elias Musalli
played a prominent part in the trials and difficulties of the Tunisian
Government, and he rendered more or less valuable assistance to all the
parties interested in the financial operations of 1863 and 1865. As a
matter of course General Musalli became rich, and after the fashion of
Tunisian grandees built himself a palace. At last, however, there came a
French Chargé d’Affaires “who knew not Joseph,” and General Elias
Musalli fell through the influence of General Kheir-ed-Din, and the
hostility of MM. Villet and Botmiliau. His final dismissal was caused by
an unfortunate mistake. M. Musalli had forgotten the exact amount of the
Bey’s donation to a ball given for the benefit of the European
hospitals, and advantage was taken of a discrepancy between the offering
which was actually put into the collection plate and the sum which the
General had received, to abruptly inform him that his services were no
longer required. MM. Villet and Leblant were unromantic enough to give a
more uncharitable and matter-of-fact version of this untoward accident
during the Roustan-Rochefort trial, but all historians must agree that
its immediate result was to deprive the Bey of the benefit of M.
Musalli’s exertions.
Within a year of M. Roustan’s arrival, M. Musalli again began to climb
the ladder of Tunisian statesmanship, and a new palace soon quickly rose
by the side of the one which had been sold under the pressure of the
calamities of 1870-71.
In May 1866 the Bey transferred a concession he had granted, for a
railway along the Medjerdah valley to a French company styling itself
the Société des Batignolles. For a while the undertaking seemed to hang
fire, but it was suddenly announced that by a law promulgated on the
25th March 1877, the French Government had agreed to guarantee a profit
of six per cent. on the total outlay. So unusual a proceeding naturally
awakened the suspicions of the Bey, and General Rustem was sent to
Constantinople to confer with the Sultan on the political outlook. Then
came strained relations between Russia and Turkey, and the beginning of
the movement now called Panislamism. One of the Senoussia brotherhood
was sent by Abdul Hamid to invite the co-operation of the Sultan of
Morocco, in a general union for the defence of Islam, and a scheme was
propounded for strengthening the position of Tunis by adding Tripoli to
the Regency, and raising the Bey to the position of Khedive.
Before anything could be definitely settled, the Turco-Russian war
actually broke out. By an extraordinary infatuation Italy joined France
in an attempt to persuade the Bey to cast to the winds the firman of
1871. Even while contradicting a report that Italian troops were being
assembled at Naples with a view to a possible descent on Tunis, the
Italian Consul-General did not conceal from the Bey that unless he was
very prudent, Italy might be compelled to “assert her rights over the
Regency.”
The Grand Vizier at once wrote to demand from the Bey the assistance
guaranteed in the firman of 1871. A Council of State was immediately
convoked in which the Sheikh-el-Islam called on the members to support
Muhamed es Sadek in performing his duty towards the Sultan. A lengthy
debate ensued, and the possibility of a descent on Tunis by the Russian
fleet was pointedly alluded to. It was at last decided to confine the
action of Tunis for the present to a voluntary money contribution. The
circular of the Sultan explaining the motives for the Holy War was read
in all the mosques throughout the Regency on the 2d June, and owing to
the enthusiasm excited by it, nearly two millions of piastres were
collected and sent to Stamboul. M. Roustan now in vain pressed on the
Bey the necessity of proclaiming his neutrality, but his endeavours were
rendered fruitless by the reasoning of Mr. Wood, whose valuable services
in Tunis were rewarded with the Knight Commandership of the Order of St.
Michael and St. George.
Napoleon III. is said in a weak moment to have once offered Tunis to
Italy, and one or two of the Bey’s advisers would have preferred an
Italian Protectorate to the Turkish suzerainty of 1871, but ever since
the fall of the Empire it is clear that no French diplomatist ever
seriously entertained the idea of an Italian partnership in Tunisian
affairs. Some indefinite _pourparlers_ as to an ultimate division of the
spoils, seem to have been quite sufficient to prevent Italy from giving
her cordial support to that consolidation of the relations between Tunis
and Turkey which was so eminently calculated to ward off the final
catastrophe. In the Italian Green Book of 1877 Mazzini thus puts forward
the pretensions of Italy as regards Tunis with praiseworthy
frankness:—“One of our principal paths to progress will be a mission of
civilisation, to be carried out at the first possible opportunity on the
shores of Tunis. Just as Morocco belongs to Spain and Algeria to France,
_so does Tunis, the key of the centre of the Mediterranean_, belong to
Italy. The Roman flag floated on Mount Atlas after the fall of Carthage,
and up to the fifth century we were masters of the country. The French
have now cast their eyes upon it, and they will have it too in a short
time, if we are not up and doing.” Italy was wrong in not joining
England in 1870 to link the fate of Tunis indissolubly with that of
Turkey, and she was doubly wrong when she adopted a policy of militant
provocation towards France, unless indeed she was prepared to resist by
force the invasion of the country. If the words of Mazzini represent in
any way the opinion of Italian statesmen in 1877, concerning Tunis the
action of Italy in the Regency seems almost inexplicable. At all events
there can be little doubt that from about this time the ancient rivalry
of England and France in Tunis gave place to the more animated and
acrimonious competition between France and Italy. The history of the
latest phase of this rivalry is that of the French invasion.
The Sultan was hardly satisfied with the Bey’s pecuniary assistance, and
urgent demands arrived for men and horses. Just at this critical moment
General Kheir-ed-Din was requested “to go to his house to repose
himself, and return when the Bey had further need of his services.” The
real causes of his downfall were the unbending and imperious manner he
had adopted to his colleagues, his habit of telling in plain language
wholesome truths to the Bey, and the silly ambition of the minion
Mustapha Ben Ismael. The Turkish party in the Cabinet accused him of
being too French, and the French themselves denounced him as fanatically
Turkish. The former faction relied on an article in the _Jowaib_ which
described him as preventing the despatch of a contingent to Stamboul,
while M. Roustan never forgot his adventure of 1864 or forgave his
bringing about the firman of 1871. In addition to this the views of M.
Roustan and the Musallis would be best furthered by the vizirial mantle
descending on the shoulders of a fool and a puppet. Kheir-ed-Din was
neither one nor the other; Mustapha Ben Ismael was a combination of
both. It was, however, impossible to promote Mustapha to the post, quite
unfledged as he was in Oriental diplomacy, and General Muhamed
Khaznadar, the Colonel Muhamed of the days of Ahmed Bey, was accordingly
nominated as a stop-gap. Mustapha meanwhile received the appointments of
Minister of Justice and Lord Privy Seal (Sahab Ettaba), and was also
appointed to the Presidency of the Financial Commission.
Mustapha is destined to play so important a _rôle_ in the annals of the
French invasion that his history must be no longer neglected. Twenty
years ago, a little boy in a tattered shirt and battered red cap, was
often cuffed for somewhat too obtrusively picking up cigar ends in the
European cafés of Tunis. A benevolent Maltese tavern-keeper gave him a
suit of clothes, and for a few months he got more kicks than _bakhshish_
from his master’s customers. When tired of serving infidel wine-bibbers
he became the apprentice of a barber, and then the servant of one of the
officers of the Turkish Guard. This same little boy is Mustapha Ben
Ismael, ex-Prime Minister of Tunis, Knight Grand Cross of the Legion of
Honour, Grand Cordon of the Crown of Italy, and Grand Cordon of the
Civil Division of the Military Order of Spain. Muhamed es Sadek was the
first to perceive his natural abilities, and transferred him from the
service of the Turkish colonel to his own. Little more need be said of
his career till we find him in 1877 Tunisian Lord Privy Seal, and by
some peculiar fiction sometimes described as the Bey’s “son-in-law” and
at others as his “adopted son.”
A fortnight after Kheir-ed-Din’s downfall a thousand mules and horses
left Goletta on three Turkish transports for the seat of war. I am not
inclined to believe in the charge freely brought against Kheir-ed-Din of
trimming in favour of France when the Turkish cause became almost
desperate, and I think his past history is a sufficient guarantee for
his loyalty to the Bey and the Sultan up to the time of his downfall,
but his going to Paris in October to confer with M. Roustan seemed to be
an ample justification for the Bey’s suspicions. Kheir-ed-Din was now
ready, as subsequent events showed, to do anything to revenge the wrongs
he had received from Muhamed es Sadek and Mustapha Ben Ismael. Meanwhile
fresh requisitions arrived from Constantinople, and 4000 men were
prepared in obedience to the Sultan’s command. The Russian Consul now
became the centre of attraction in Tunis and the object of M. Roustan’s
blandishments. The very existence of M. Nyssen, blind, crippled, and
bed-ridden, was almost forgotten, till one morning in December 1877 he
received instructions to break off diplomatic relations with the Bey. M.
Roustan tried to make the declaration of war as theatrical as possible,
in order to see if at the eleventh hour he could induce Muhamed es Sadek
to break off his connection with the Porte. Another very efficient
instrument of torture was now brought to bear on the already terrified
Bey,—the Havas Agency announced the imminent bombardment of Goletta by
the Russian squadron.
M. Roustan went once more to the Bardo to see the effect of M. Nyssen’s
communication and the Havas menace. He was doomed to disappointment,
Muhamed Sadek would not forsake his suzerain and Caliph. “You say I am
independent,” said he to M. Roustan, “where are your proofs for this
statement? My position has been defined by the firman, but apart from
this I am also bound to take into consideration the sentiments of my
people as followers of the faith of Islam.”
The year 1878 opened with a misfortune. Early in February the French
steamer “Auvergne” was wrecked in the neighbourhood of Tabarca, and
subsequently pillaged by the mountain tribes. Although the Tunisian
Government paid an indemnity of 300,000 francs, M. Saint-Hilaire has
since endeavoured to make the case of the “Auvergne” one of the charges
contained in his indictment against Tunis. No sooner were the French
claims settled than an Italian question arose over the hull of the ill-
fated ship. The Bey was injudicious enough to sell the wreck as she lay
by public auction. Some speculative Italians bought her for a trifle,
and went to Tabarca to effect a salvage. At the sight of some Arabs they
retreated to Tunis, and preferred a consequential claim for damages
against the unfortunate Bey. This second “international complication”
cost the Government another 50,000 francs.
It now became necessary for Mustapha to win his spurs as an ambassador.
He was sent to Rome to congratulate King Humbert on his accession, and
came back with an Italian grand cordon, almost inclined for an Italian
alliance forthwith. In the face of this move on the part of Italy, M.
Roustan redoubled his activity; he first placed before the Bey the draft
of a partly political, partly commercial convention for his
consideration. The matter was kept a profound secret, but I am able to
state its conditions. They were as follows:—
1st. The Bey to declare the Sultan’s firman void.
2d. To transfer the Tunisian public debt to a syndicate of French
capitalists, who would undertake to pay the coupon.
3d. To grant a concession to a French company for the making of a
railway to Bizerta, including the construction of a port and the cession
of a large area of ground.
4th. To define the frontiers of Tunis and Algeria afresh.
5th. To concede the irrigation works at Tebourba to the Société des
Batignolles.
M. Leblant, the French Financial Member of the International Commission,
opposed the commercial portion of the scheme, and was recalled to
France. Notwithstanding this measure the Bey was inexorable. M. Roustan
now resolved to take the management of Mustapha very seriously in hand.
The Bey was asked to send a mission to Paris to felicitate the Marshal
President. As King Humbert had been already congratulated by Mustapha,
there was no reasonable grounds for refusal. A decoration of the Abd-el-
Aman in diamonds was prepared for Marshal MacMahon, and two ordinary
Nichan grand cordons for M. Waddington and General Chanzy. General
Musalli was attached to Mustapha’s suite, and took with him a
recommendation for the cross of officer of the Legion of Honour on his
own account. During his stay in Paris several very important matters
were discussed. The extension of the Compagnie des Batignolles line to
the frontier was agreed upon, and it is believed that Mustapha received
either French naturalisation, or an order entitling him to protection.
He returned to Tunis wearing the grand cross of the Legion of Honour.
The proud distinction of conferring upon him the grand cordon was
reserved for M. Saint-Hilaire.
Then came the Berlin Congress, and the conversations of Lord Salisbury
about Tunis.
The despatches interchanged between M. Waddington and Lord Salisbury are
too well known even to need being quoted from. M. De Blovitz, the Paris
correspondent of the “Times,” who was in Berlin at the time, gives the
following account of the circumstances under which the now historical
fiat of “Take Carthage” went forth from the lips of Prince Bismarck. “It
is hard to say,” writes M. De Blovitz, “how France came to be convinced
that at the Berlin Congress, Prince Bismarck invited M. Waddington to
take Tunis. Probably it was the result of words which were passed from
mouth to mouth, and got exaggerated at every repetition. What the Prince
said was merely one of the sallies he sometimes indulges in, and to
which he himself attaches no importance. He himself told me, ‘On first
seeing Lord Beaconsfield, I said to him, You ought to have an
understanding with Russia instead of thwarting her. You might leave her
free at Constantinople, and yourselves take Egypt, which would
compensate you for your complaisance. France would not be so vexed as
may be imagined, and, in any case, Tunis or Syria might be given her as
an equivalent!’ I took this at the time and still take it for a jest,
but the Prince had previously spoken in the same strain to Lord
Salisbury and M. Waddington. The former made no answer, because Prince
Bismarck was then in the dark as to the Cyprus convention, while M.
Waddington answered, what he afterwards publicly repeated, that France
had no design on Tunis, but could not allow any other European Power to
instal itself there, and thus imperil her Algerian possessions.
Thereupon came the news of the Cyprus convention, on which the French
press began attacking M. Waddington, asserting that the English
occupation of Cyprus was a rebuff for French diplomacy. The Italian
papers were still more excited, and blamed Count Corti for not returning
from the congress with some island in his pocket. This was the starting-
point of the Tunis question in Italy, and of conversations, not only
between Lord Salisbury and M. Waddington, but between M. Waddington and
Count Corti. M. Waddington declared throughout that France had no design
of annexing Tunis, but would not tolerate any European neighbour there.”
Just before the congress met, M. Roustan received information that there
was a probability of Germany making an effort to secure Bizerta. He
immediately suggested to both his English and Italian colleagues the
necessity of urgently requesting their respective Governments to adopt a
joint action against Teuton aggression. During the sittings at Berlin,
however, he received a letter detailing or purporting to detail the
“Take Carthage” conversations. Within an hour he was at the Bardo
detailing the last performance of “_la perfide Albion_” to the
affrighted Bey. Mr. Wood was hurriedly sent for, and at once
communicated the current report to the English Foreign Office. In a
short time a reply was received denying categorically that any offer of
Tunis to France had been made by England at Berlin. The contents of the
despatch, together with a pro-Turkish speech of Lord Beaconsfield, were
published in the Tunisian Government Gazette, and this prudent step
alone prevented the Bey accepting one or more of M. Roustan’s proposals.
That Lord Salisbury meant to include the total absorption of this
country when he spoke of the legitimate extension of French interests,
can hardly be asserted even by his enemies, but that any deviation at
all was ever made from the prudent policy so ably carried out by Sir
Thomas Reade and Sir R. Wood must always be a subject of regret.
On the 28th July 1878, Mustapha Ben Ismael became Prime Minister. In the
following month Signor Mussi arrived at Tunis on a political mission of
considerable importance. His former visits to the Regency were paid in
the capacity of agent to a certain Count Vandoni, who had preferred an
enormous and preposterous claim against the Tunisian Government for
services rendered as the Bey’s consul at Geneva. This consideration
alone should have prevented the choice of Signor Mussi to treat on
matters of a diplomatic character. Without even feeling his way, Signor
Mussi at once communicated to Mustapha his ideas both about French
aggression and the best method of checking it, and the whole of his
conversation was, as a matter of course, transmitted by telegraph to the
Quai d’Orsay the same evening. He then asked for the cession to Italy of
Bizerta, which was at once refused. Next day he submitted a plan for
constituting Bizerta a free port under the joint guarantee of the three
Powers. He also enjoined both the Bey and his Minister to make no kind
of concession in France relating to M. De Sancy’s demands, which were
again becoming troublesome. Having almost thrown down the gauntlet to
France, Signor Mussi returned to Italy. A month later the ex-Prime
Minister Kheir-ed-Din was summoned to Stamboul.
M. Ferdinand de Lesseps came to Tunis early in November 1878, charged
with the especial mission of converting Muhamed Sadek to the dogma of an
Inland Sea. Failure with M. de Lesseps is almost impossible, but he
found both the Bey and Mustapha unexpectedly intractable. All his
eloquent descriptions of a regenerated Central Africa and an increased
rainfall consequent on evaporation, were wholly lost on his incredulous
hearers. “Your Inland Sea,” said the Bey, “may make your Algeria more
secure, but it will cut off my richest province, the date-yielding
Djerid. Dates never thrive in the neighbourhood of salt water, and your
sea would ruin every palm grove in my country. I can never give my
consent to so dangerous an experiment.” M. Lesseps told M. Roustan that
his careful education of Mustapha had been thrown away, and went back to
France greatly disappointed.
About a month later Signor Licurgo Maccio arrived in the Regency to join
his post as Italian Agent and Consul-General. He came, as M. Roustan
fairly enough describes it, “with the sound of trumpets and the pomp of
war.” Immediately after the gunboat which brought him had anchored off
Goletta, a number of mysterious-looking cases were landed and
transmitted to Tunis. Next day came Signor Maccio and with him forty
marines. As soon as they reached the Italian consulate the boxes were
opened, and each man took out his carbine. A double file of soldiers was
then improvised, a band played, and Signor Maccio entered his future
residence with military honours. The consequences of this almost
incredible act of folly can easily be imagined. The militant M. Roustan
recognised in this display a militant Signor Maccio, and went as fast as
his carriage could carry him to induce the Bey to enter a formal protest
against Italian aggression. An immediate estrangement between the two
_consuls de combat_ was only avoided by the happy mediation of Sir
Richard Wood, by whose advice the Bey contented himself with sending a
friendly message to Signor Maccio requesting him “not to do it again.”
About this time a change seemed to come over the Prime Minister
Mustapha, and he showed unmistakable indications of restiveness in the
matter of French pretensions. I have never been able to entirely fathom
the motives for his new line of conduct, but I believe it was to be
attributed partly to the strong personal feeling of the Bey, which he
dared not offend, partly to the influence of the partisans of the
Panislamite movement at the court, and partly to an affront which he
received from M. Roustan.
The year 1878 was not destined to pass away without its _casus belli_
and _ultimatum_. The hero of the next episode in Tunisian history was
the Count de Sancy, of the now almost-forgotten firm of Sancy-Ronalds.
To console the count for the troubles which attended his first effort
“to improve the breed of Tunisian horses and cattle,” M. Roustan in July
1877 induced the Bey to grant him another concession of land, on which
he agreed to keep a certain quantity of stock. The rights he acquired
were declared to be purely personal, and he was exempted from the
payment of all the usual taxes and duties. To avoid all future disputes
the Tunisian Government inserted the following clauses in its decree,
viz.:—1st, “That the grant was to be forfeited _ipso facto_, if, on the
1st July 1878, the number of animals agreed on were not forthcoming; 2d,
That the estates so conceded were to be considered as Tunisian property,
subject to Tunisian law, and to be treated as still forming part of the
Beylical domains.”
In February M. De Sancy wrote a letter to the Prime Minister, in which
he stated that he had been unable to fulfil his engagements, “on account
of the interrupted communication with Europe consequent on the Russo-
Turkish war,” and because the Bey had not put him in possession of the
whole land stipulated for. The first excuse was absurd, the second
untrue, and both contradictory. M. De Sancy received a civil answer
declining to accept his pleas, and in July a commission went to Sidi
Tabet to ascertain the real state of things in accordance with the terms
of the concession. Even M. De Sancy himself signed the _procès-verbal_
attesting his own failure to carry out the conditions he had agreed
upon. The Bey then published a decree, in which he declared the grant at
an end. A long correspondence next ensued, during which M. Roustan made
several appeals _ad misericordiam_, and finally the Government
determined to expropriate M. De Sancy, according to the local law he had
agreed to abide by. A notice to quit, sent to the French Consulate-
General, was treated with contemptuous silence, and the agents of the
_concessionnaire_ were found to have leased out portions of the estate
in defiance of the conditions of the original donation. The Bey wrote to
M. Roustan saying he intended to take possession, and he received an
answer asserting that the land was French property, and that if any one
ventured upon it “he would find a French janissary on the border.” A
reply was sent couched in the most conciliatory terms, declaring that if
any opposition was offered the persons sent to take possession would at
once withdraw, and confine their action to a platonic protestation.
Accordingly on the 9th December, a deputation, composed of the Austrian
Consul, General Bacouch, M. Quéillé, the French Member of the Financial
Commission, General Arbi Zaruck, and Mr. Santillana, the Bey’s
interpreter, started on the bootless errand of asserting the Bey’s
rights. When they reached the hedge forming the boundary of the
property, a French _cavass_ or guard sprang out from behind it and
shouted in a loud voice, “This land belongs to France.” The Tunisian
_posse comitatus_ hastily retired, and assuaged their wounded feelings
by an eloquent protest. The telegraph was then set to work, and the
Bey’s wanton trespass on the private domicile of a French citizen was in
a few hours announced throughout the length and breadth of France. On
the 7th January 1879, M. Sumaripa, M. Roustan’s interpreter, appeared at
the Bardo and placed an ultimatum in the hands of the Prime Minister. It
ran thus:—“Unless the following conditions are accepted, the Chargé
d’Affaires of France is determined to break off diplomatic relations
with the Bey of Tunis: 1st, An inquiry to be ordered forthwith into the
claims of M. De Sancy; 2d, The Prime Minister _in uniform_ to appear at
the French Consulate-General, and publicly apologise for the insult
offered to France; 3d, The functionaries who carried out the Bey’s
instructions to be immediately dismissed from his service.” For a time
the Bey hesitated as to what course he should take. His telegrams to
Paris miscarried or were delayed, a French squadron as usual appeared
opportunely at Goletta, and the “friendly powers” would or could do
nothing but give advice. The Bey surrendered at discretion; Mustapha
next morning asked pardon in the presence of a gaping crowd at the
French Consulate-General, and M. Roustan announced that M. Waddington
would be satisfied with the dismissal of the only English subject in the
Bey’s service, Mr. Santillana. A committee of three Frenchmen and two
Tunisians was appointed to fully investigate the effects of the Turkish
war on M. De Sancy’s philanthropic attempts “to improve the breed of
Tunisian horses and cattle.” What they reported never transpired, but in
the result M. De Sancy’s grant was fully confirmed. Next year he
transferred all his rights to the well-known French company called the
_Société Marseillaise_, which has now kindly undertaken “to improve the
Tunisian breed of horses and cattle,” and pays or should pay M. De Sancy
a very satisfactory annuity. When the Italians tried to treat the
Jedeida as Italian soil in 1870, the French were loud in their
professions of horror at such an uncalled-for aggression, but when Sidi
Tabet, by a fiction of M. Roustan’s, became a French property in 1878,
it was regarded as the legitimate development of a perfectly justifiable
preponderating influence!
The year 1879, which opened with the Sancy incident, saw in April the
inauguration of the French railway into the interior. M. Oscar Gay de
Tunis returned to the Regency in May to prosecute, under M. Roustan’s
auspices, his project for a new Carthage. Since he first unfolded his
idea to M. De Billing in 1874, he had rendered it more attractive by
making a cathedral, in memory of the African martyrs, one of its salient
features. The Musallis did their best to help M. Gay, but the Bey had
had quite enough of the St. Louis Chapel on the Byrsa to induce him to
set his face against the plan. M. Roustan, however, had no difficulty in
procuring him substantial consolation for his disappointment. The Bey
invested M. Gay with the grand cordon of the Nichan, and gave him a
present of 25,000 francs besides. With praiseworthy frankness M. Gay has
himself published the history of a portion at least of this princely
gift. As a mark of his gratitude, M. Gay left a certain sum with General
Musalli for his wife. The General again forgot to deliver it, and Madame
Musalli was foolish enough to complain in writing to M. Gay. This letter
formed one of the exhibits in the Roustan-Rochefort case.
In April Sir Richard Wood quitted Tunis. He was at least spared the pain
of seeing the untoward end of all his labours. The memory of his work in
the Regency yet lives, and his diplomatic successes will not easily be
forgotten. It is the fashion now to speak of such men as Sir Richard
Wood as belonging to the old school, and as being behind the age. It may
be true, but it is also an undeniable fact, that during the fifty years
Sir Thomas Reade and Sir Richard Wood represented Great Britain in
Tunis, the name of England was honoured and esteemed from one end of the
country to the other.