MUHAMED ES SADEK.
The first act of the newly proclaimed Bey was to assure the British
Consul-General of his desire to maintain intact his political relations
with the Porte, and General Kheir-ed-Din was sent with rich presents to
Stamboul to demand the usual patent of investiture. On the 24th October
Muhamed es Sadek signed his first Convention with France on the subject
of the construction of electric telegraphs throughout the Regency, and
at the same time decided to carry out the plans of his predecessor for
giving the capital a supply of water by the restoration of the Roman
aqueduct to Zaghouán. In November Lord John Russell answered in a
cordial manner the letter of the Bey announcing his accession to the
Queen, but Muhamed es Sadek was greatly disappointed at the
communication not having assumed the character of an autograph letter.
“It is to me,” said the Bey, addressing Mr. Wood, “a matter of unfeigned
regret, that whilst it is from England I expect countenance and support,
I should have to represent that it is alone her sovereign who, by not
condescending to transmit to me her autograph commands, deprives me of
the honour which my ancestors and predecessors have enjoyed till
recently, and which I still continue to enjoy from other sovereigns. I
hope, therefore, that Her Majesty will be pleased to honour me by
continuing a privilege of which my predecessors were so justly proud.”
The Bey, nevertheless, did not fail to submit to Mr. Wood a copy of his
letter to the Sultan, together with a list of the presents forwarded to
Stamboul, and to ask as usual for the good offices of the British
Ambassador. There can be no doubt that Muhamed es Sadek was at first
inclined to fall back once more on the anti-Turkish policy for a short
time followed by Ahmed Bey, but the logical arguments of Mr. Wood soon
induced him to adopt a different course, and General Kheir-ed-Din was
instructed to strengthen as much as possible the existing link between
the Regency and the Ottoman Empire.
In January the Turkish Commissioner arrived, and the investiture was
performed in the most public manner, although the Bey was uniformly
described in the firman as “my Governor-General.” Independently of this
circumstance, which had its signification, the “three tails,” which are
the insignia of a Turkish Pacha of the highest rank, were displayed
together with the Ottoman and Tunisian flags. The ever-watchful eye of
Mr. Wood, however, observed that a regular throne had been introduced
into the audience-chamber, and he hastened to request an explanation of
the political significance of the change. The Bey replied as
follows:—“We never imagined that the mere change of the shape of our
state-chair could give rise to an idea of any change in the present
state of the political affairs existing between us and the other
Governments. We inform you that this chair is a substitute for the chair
which we usually sit upon in our ceremonies, and on which our
predecessors have sat for centuries. The change of shape can be of no
consequence, for its importance consists in the rules on which it rests.
We have not the least scope in the change, and so we inform you.” In
spite of this little incident, there can be no doubt that the
understanding between the Bey and the Porte from this time became one of
the most satisfactory character.
The Bey during the summer of 1860 submitted to Mr. Wood a project for
the elaboration of the constitution already promulgated by Sidi Muhamed.
It was now proposed to form a Chamber or Senate in great part of a
representative character; the Bey was only to act henceforward with the
advice of his Ministers, who in their turn were to be responsible to the
Assembly. The financial administration was to be improved by the
introduction of a budget and civil list, and a court of appeal and
criminal tribunal were to be instituted. In September much excitement
was occasioned in Tunis by the attempt of one Sheref El Hashem (“the
Damascene”) to excite a _jehad_ or religious war against the French from
the Tunisian frontier. El Hashem was one of the heads of the Kaderia
confraternity at Baghdad,[32] but notwithstanding he ran the risk of
deeply offending this all-powerful community, Muhamed es Sadek arrested
him and condemned him to death, in order to faithfully carry out his
obligations towards France. The last words spoken by El Hashem were
these:—“You have sacrificed my life to please your Christian allies, who
will themselves soon avenge my death, _for you will be the last of the
line of Hussein Ben Ali_.” Two weeks later the Bey was received by
Napoleon III. at Algiers. Decorations in brilliants were exchanged
between the host and his guests. Muhamed es Sadek was profuse in his
promises of cordial support to France and French interests, and even Mr.
Wood was reluctantly obliged to report that “the influence of France is
now in the ascendant.” Some of the remarks of the Emperor were not
forgotten by the Bey, and especially an assertion, two or three times
repeated, that the Turkish Empire was soon destined to inevitable
dissolution. Soon after his return he requested Mr. Wood to come to see
him at the Bardo.
After repeating what the Emperor had said about Turkey, the Bey
remarked, “You see that I am forced to conciliate my formidable
neighbour by all the means in my power. Any two common Arabs on the
frontiers have the power to bring about a serious misunderstanding
between us; but had my country been separated from Algeria by the sea,
my conduct and my policy would have been very different.” On the 15th
November the Bey handed personally to Mr. Wood a copy of the amended
constitution he was about to promulgate for transmission to the Queen.
“We trust,” he observed, “your august sovereign will appreciate the
difficulties and obstacles attending the transition from an old to a
totally new form of government. At the wish of England, my cousin Ahmed
abolished slavery, and it is at her suggestion, expressed through you,
that we now grant liberty and freedom to our subjects. Can Tunis give
further proof of her trust in England?”
On the 23d April 1861 the Bey in person opened both the Legislative
Assembly and the Supreme Court. The city was illuminated at night, and
public rejoicings took place on an extensive scale. On the following day
the Bey attended the first sitting of the Legislative Assembly in the
Dar-el-Bey or city palace, and delivered a spirited speech from the
throne, concluding with these words:—“I have honestly endeavoured to
remove all pretext for complaint against my administration, and it now
remains for you to promote by your enactments the well-being of the
inhabitants of this country. I call upon God and this assembly to
witness my words, and I pray Him to lend you His aid in putting my
measures into execution.” Upon this the gaudily painted council-room
resounded with the cries of “May God grant a long life to our prince!”
Shortly after this Prince Louis Napoleon and the Princess Clothilde
visited Tunis, and were, together with the Bey and his Prime Minister,
present at the inauguration of the newly built French consular
residence. Although a shower of foreign decorations (the grand crosses
of Holland, Belgium, Denmark and Norway amongst the number) was the
immediate consequence of the constitution, the new Chamber, and more
especially the new courts, became increasingly unpopular, and a
tumultuous mob even invaded the precincts of the Bardo. The offenders
were subsequently pardoned, but the conviction gained ground that
serious troubles were at hand.
During the following year the Bey resolved to send a special envoy to
congratulate the Sultan Abd el Aziz on his accession to the imperial
throne. In May 1862 the first local loan, which was afterwards to be the
cause of so much mischief, was contracted, and about the same time some
of the Algerian tribes led by Spahis in the French service attacked the
Tunisian clan Boughanem on the Tunisian side of the frontier. This
greatly irritated the Bey, and he received very favourably a proposal by
Mr. Wood to enter into a convention permitting British subjects to hold
real property in the country. During the autumn the Khamírs rose in
rebellion against the Bey owing to the imposition of an extraordinary
poll-tax. In spite of the natural difficulties which the dense forests
of their country present, the heir-apparent in a short time succeeded in
restoring order. It was just at this juncture that a timely visit of the
Prince of Wales and the Crown Prince and Princess of Prussia created a
very happy impression on the Bey’s mind as regarded his relations with
England, and very formal assurances were given him that as long as he
followed the policy he had already adopted he might always count on the
friendly offices of Great Britain. Two months later the present King of
Italy arrived in Tunis, and during the festivities which ensued somewhat
surprised his suite by investing the Bey with the insignia of the
Annunziata. Victor Emmanuel some months afterwards confirmed by patent
the spontaneous nomination made by his son. The pecuniary embarrassments
of the Bey soon passed beyond the reach of local loans, and in May 1863,
after long negotiations, he borrowed £1,400,000 from Messrs. Oppenheim
and Erlanger for fifteen years at the interest of twelve per cent. From
this date began the long series of financial difficulties which have not
a little contributed to the virtual absorption of the Regency.
During the summer the Bey had occasion to complain of three specific
raids on his subjects committed by Algerian tribesmen. “These
incursions,” remarked Mr. Wood, “are unfortunately becoming more
frequent, and now generally lead to remonstrances and misunderstandings
between the French authorities and the Bey’s Government. In the last
aggression reported, it is, to say the least, singular that the French
troops at Tebessa did not interfere to prevent the attack.” The Bey at
last signed the convention allowing British subjects to hold landed
property in the country. This diplomatic success was hardly of less
importance than the abolition of slavery and the constitution itself,
and the more so as no similar concession had ever yet been before
granted in any Moslem country.
The year 1864 was ushered in by a revolution of the Arab tribes. In
order to pay the interest due to Messrs. Oppenheim and Erlanger the
poll-tax payable by every Tunisian subject was raised from 36 to 72
piastres, and the attempt to levy this wholly exorbitant demand
terminated by a serious revolt. Beja was besieged, Matar fell into the
hands of the insurgents, and the Governor of Kef, proceeding to join his
post, was killed by the warlike tribe of the Boughanem. M. De Beauval,
who had succeeded M. Roche as French Chargé d’Affaires, within a few
hours of the news of the outbreak reaching Tunis, went to the Bey and
_demanded in the name of the Emperor the abrogation of the
constitution_. “Your Organic Laws,” he said, “are wholly and solely the
cause of the present discontent. The Arabs are tired of your regular
tribunals and prefer your summary justice; and if you do not choose to
go back to it, they will make you.” The Bey curtly declined. The Emperor
at Algiers had received an emblazoned copy of the Tunisian code, and had
highly complimented its author. Muhamed es Sadek could not as yet
understand the inexpediency of a too liberal and constitutional state
existing on the frontiers of the dominions of the Algerian Bureaux
Arabes. As usual, he took refuge from his perplexity in an interview
with Mr. Wood. Meanwhile the disaffection spread southwards. Sfax and
Susa were threatened, and the Bey at last realised the fact that he was
almost defenceless. While he was elaborating his constitution and
receiving foreign grand crosses, the remains of his cousin Ahmed’s force
had dwindled down to a few regiments of tattered soldiers, who were more
able to knit stockings than face the hardy tribesmen of the interior. It
was under these circumstances decided that the Tunisian commander-in-
chief should treat with the rebels. Meanwhile M. De Beauval sought an
interview with the Bey, and said that the British convention must be
also annulled as a second cause of offence. The Bey declined even to
discuss such a proposal, whereupon M. De Beauval rejoined “that he had
become English and would repent of it.” He went on to say that the
Regency was really under the protection, not of France, but of the
French Consulate-General, and that he demanded the dismissal of the
Vizier Mustapha and General Kheir-ed-Din as the supporters and promoters
of Anglo-Turkish views and interests.
The negotiations with the revolted tribes took a favourable turn, and
the obnoxious tax was repealed by proclamation. Meanwhile several
British ships of war arrived as well as a French squadron. M. De Beauval
at once repaired to the palace, accompanied by the Admiral, some
officers of his staff, and Colonel Campenon, formerly military
instructor in the Tunisian army. The French Chargé d’Affaires renewed
his demand for the abrogation of the Organic Laws and the dismissal of
his Minister. The Bey absolutely rejected the former request, but
observed that “as he had made a constitution to please England and
France, he had no objection to unmake it, provided the two Governments
were agreed on the subject.” Colonel Campenon then violently denounced
the Prime Minister, and said that “while he had been heaping up riches
the country had grown too poor to maintain the standing army necessary
for its defence.” So warm an altercation then ensued that the Bey and
Sidi Mustapha were obliged to leave the room.
The Italian fleet now hastened to join the English and French vessels.
Although no hostile movement was made by the tribes in the interior, the
rebels sacked Sfax on the 30th April, and obliged the European colonists
to take refuge in the ships lying off the town. Their wrath seems to
have been particularly directed against the Government farmers and
monopolists, and their houses and stores were pillaged “even to the
nails.” It was agreed that if disorders occurred at Tunis the marines of
the English, French, and Italian ships should proceed thither by boat to
assist the male inhabitants in constructing barricades and defending the
European quarter. The critical situation of the whole country did not
deter M. De Beauval from continuing his endeavours to still further
embarrass the Bey. He put his various demands in the form of an
ultimatum, and sent M. Jules Lesseps with it to the palace. In order to
facilitate a solution of the difficulty, Sidi Mustapha tendered his
resignation, and the Bey finally threatened to abdicate in four days.
This seems to have brought matters to a deadlock. M. De Beauval
attempted to induce the Admiral to land troops at Goletta, but before he
had time to do further mischief, England, France, and Italy had agreed
to a _joint_ action regarding Tunis. The time for the French to take
Carthage had not yet come. A week later Haider Effendi, the Commissioner
Extraordinary of the Porte to “inquire into the state of affairs at
Tunis,” arrived at Goletta with three Ottoman ships. Before the vessels
finally anchored, Admiral D’Herbingham went on board, and endeavoured,
both by persuasion and threats, to induce Haider Effendi to refrain from
landing. The Turkish envoy prolonged the discussion sufficiently to
enable him to take up an advantageous position, and then quietly refused
to comply with the propositions made to him. The advent of Haider
Effendi added not a little to the difficulties of the situation. During
the month of May the revolution continued unabated. The rebels at Sfax
pronounced the deposition of the Bey and hoisted the Ottoman flag, and
the European colonists at Susa three times took refuge in the European
ships in the roadstead on the false alarm of a general rising. Meanwhile
the Bey held long conferences with Haider Effendi, and used every
exertion to prepare a small force to march into the disturbed districts.
During all this time the four fleets remained at Goletta and on the
coasts, while the tortuous diplomatic game was being played out at
Paris, London, Turin, and Constantinople. Lord Russell’s prompt and
vigorous action had at the onset nipped M. De Beauval’s schemes in the
bud by inducing M. Drouyn de Lhuys to accept the principle of joint
action in any case, but a fresh obstacle to his plans soon afterwards
presented itself. Italy now for the first time became a factor in the
Tunisian question. Her ships contained soldiers and engineers as well as
sailors; her press talked magnanimously of a wholly disinterested
Italian occupation on behalf of the Allied Powers; and France began to
perceive that her jealousy of England in Tunis must be henceforth
transferred to the proceedings of Italy.
The summer of 1864 passed away in groundless alarms. M. De Beauval made
various efforts to furnish an excuse for intervention by keeping alight
the smouldering embers of the insurrection, but he was doomed to
disappointment. The rebel chief Ali Ben Ghadam made his peace with the
Bey, and the influence of the Tijania confraternity, to which he
belonged, was also directed to putting an end to the conflict. After a
series of conferences held at Kairwán, the Sheikhs of the southern
tribes determined to give in their submission, provided the English
Consul-General would guarantee their personal safety, and at length the
revolutionary movement was successfully confined to the towns and
villages surrounding Susa. During all this time the French press
alternately denounced Turkey and England as the cause of the
insurrection, which it was alleged had been excited and fostered as an
excuse for bringing the Regency under the direct rule of the Porte. This
theory, however, was soon destined to receive a rude shock. When Ali Ben
Ghadam decided to abandon the _rôle_ of an agitator, and asked to be
allowed “to retire from the world and spend his days upon a small plot
of ground on which he would build a _zaouia_ of the Tijania
brotherhood,” he voluntarily placed in the hands of Muhamed es Sadek
three extraordinary letters which he had received from M. De Beauval
through one Giovannino Mattei, the French Vice-Consul of Sfax. They
merit to be handed down to posterity as unique specimens of diplomatic
ingenuity, and the more so as their authenticity never appears to have
been denied. It need hardly be said that the French naval and military
officers were entirely ignorant of these or any similar communications.
LETTER NO. 1 (_Literal Translation_).
In the name of the one God. From M. De Beauval, French Consul in Tunis,
to our beloved, respected, and learned Seïd Aly Ben Mohamed Ben Ghadam.
After greetings, we have to inform you, first, that we solemnly swear by
the Almighty who sent the gospel with Christ that we will not hide from
you anything nor the wishes of our Government. The arrival of our ships
of war at the Goletta is with the object of forcing your Government to
accede to your demands, without which your property, your persons, and
your well-being will be imperilled. When we asked the Bey to comply with
your desires, he desired to have four days to consider his answer, at
the expiration of which time he replied that you had not made the
demands that we had stated to him, but that some evil-doers were
circulating these reports; in proof thereof he mentioned the arrival of
the Kabyles in order to pay him their accustomed homage. We were obliged
to wait. After a few days, some self-styled Sheikhs of the Kabyles came,
followed by others. On their arrival, the Bey informed us that all the
tribes were coming, which we know to be incorrect, as we are aware that
these individuals are the inhabitants of shores of the neighbouring
lakes, and consequently are people of no importance, their sole object
being to receive the robes (investiture) promised them by the Governors
as well as the protection of the Government. We feel confident that this
circumstance does not weaken your union and confederacy for the
attainment of your objects as well as the prosperity of your country. We
will now acquaint you with what will strengthen your cause, inasmuch as
the facts we narrate tend to the ruin of your country. Your Ministers
have made a treaty with the English just before your revolt, the first
condition of which is that the English shall have the right to possess
and hold immovable property, such as houses, farms, and lands. You will
be deprived, therefore, of this kind of property, because your fortunes
do not equal theirs. For instance, a field for which you cannot afford
to pay one thousand piastres, and in which, according to your manner of
farming, you could only sow one kaffis (measure) of wheat and another of
barley, the English can afford to pay ten thousand piastres for, because
by a superior mode of farming they could plant cotton and other rich
produce, which you have neither the means to do nor the custom.
Secondly, they desire to construct railroads similar to those in our own
countries, to remain in their possession until their income shall have
paid off the capital, the accounts to be accepted as presented by them.
This is just the manner to take possession of your country; for
according to their laws whoever obtains an uninterrupted possession of
anything for twenty years becomes the proprietor of it; and the lord of
the soil, notwithstanding the legal instruments he may possess, may ask
the Almighty for its restitution, their laws giving greater weight to
possession than to documents. Thirdly, to open in Tunis a bank with a
large capital, for the purpose of lending money at interest, thereby
converting all your people into debtors, thus carrying out the Arabic
proverb that “your creditor becomes your lord.” Fourthly, that all lands
and mountains where gold, silver, lead, and other minerals are found
shall appertain to the English, they having the right of working them on
their own account. The consequence will be that any one might be
dispossessed of his own lands by their researches, since, should they
discover any minerals, the lands will become their property, to the
exclusion of the rights of the true possessor, inasmuch as the mineral
grounds have been sold to them by the Government. These nefarious
transactions, which no one who has any feeling of humanity can tolerate,
have aroused the anger of my Government, and its object in sending the
fleet is to obtain the dismissal of the Minister and the abrogation of
the Organic Laws, upon which the aforesaid treaty is founded. As the
abrogation of the constitution will carry with it the annulment of the
aforesaid treaty as well as the fall of the Minister who is its maker,
with the aid of God there is not the slightest necessity for these
_disgraceful_ transactions. I must also acquaint you that France, my
powerful country, makes great efforts for the welfare of all countries,
and particularly for that of Tunis, owing to its proximity to Algeria,
and also for the princes of the Husseinite dynasty. I have also to
inform you that your Ministers are pressing the Bey to send a camp of
soldiers with artillery by way of “Bejia” and Kirwan, with the intention
of separating the tribes from you in order to weaken you. You must, and
it is your duty to come to “Sidy el Hatab” (a sanctuary within three
leagues of Tunis) with about four thousand horsemen, informing me of it
a day or two previous to your arrival. You will then ask for a general
conference, and I shall be with you and for you, and nothing shall occur
but what will be advantageous.
Greeting from the writer of these characters, Giannino, Consul at Sfax,
at present in Tunis, and who writes the present letter by order of M.
Consul Beauval, agent for the Emperor of France—may God render him
victorious—and from your affectionate friend Campenon, French colonel.
25 HODJIA 1280 = 1st June 1864.
(At the foot of the letter is a seal with red wax effaced and some
European letters.)
_P.S._—If you are unable to come, send us a certified document from the
principal chiefs of all the tribes and their followers, containing all
their demands from the Tunisian Government, as well as what may be
satisfactory to you.
LETTER NO. 2.
In the name of God. To the beloved, accomplished, and learned Seïd Aly
Ben Mohamed Ben Ghadam. We have to inform you that we have forwarded to
you three letters previous to the present one, and we do not know
whether they have reached you because we have not received any reply to
them. Their contents referred to many of your affairs in which we take
an interest, as the Almighty can witness. We are now obliged to allude
to some of them, and to acquaint you with what has now come to our
knowledge. In the first place, we swear by the gospel that we will not
hide anything from you, and that we are firmly supporting you in all
your demands, in all of which we concur with you, but that we shall
greatly regret if you relinquish any of them, being persuaded it will be
to your injury and will lead to the shedding of your blood, which the
Minister desires above all things. Amongst the matters discussed at the
Dar el Bey (residence of Ottoman Commissioner) was the requisition to
the Sultan to send ten thousand soldiers to attack you. When, however,
our Government became acquainted with it, it forced these troops to
return from Malta, and it addressed itself at the same time to the
Sultan, to whom it made known the oppression to which you were
subjected, and in consequence of which you had risen to demand your
rights. The Sultan acceded to its remonstrances and intrusted to us the
settlement of your affairs with the Bey. From this we derive two
advantages—first, your welfare, and, secondly, the prevention of the
arrival of Turkish troops in Africa, which does not suit us. When the
Minister became aware of it, he despatched General Sy Hussein to Susa to
spread the news that the French were aiming at the possession of Africa,
with a view to create enmity between us, having found us to be your
supporters. Should your demand for Turkish intervention become public,
our opposition to the arrival of Ottoman troops will be thereby
weakened. We also inform you that the Minister has sent yourself Ben
Beshir to “Bejia” for the purpose of inciting the tribes against you, so
that upon the arrival of the camp it may find them prepared to join it.
Be therefore on your guard, as we have apprised you of all that concerns
you. In short, we swear by the head of the Emperor of France, that
should the Minister remain in your country he will completely destroy
you. With salutations from the commander-in-chief of the French ships of
war stationed at the Goletta, from the French Consul-General in Tunis,
and from the French Colonel residing in Tunis.
10 _Moharrem_ 1281.
LETTER NO. 3.
To the beloved, well-guided, &c., Seïd Aly Ben Mohamed Ben Ghadam.
We inform you that we have previously sent you several letters to which
we have received no acknowledgment, in consequence of which we address
you the present letter, to the effect that we still adhere to our words
and give you our firm support, since we do not differ from you, as will
be verbally explained to you by the bearer. We have to request you on
the receipt of this letter to come to “Seïd Aly el Hattab,” or to some
other place near Tunis, there to convoke an assembly, and, amongst
others, to ask for me, in order to enable me to join the meeting, so
that your demand may be submitted through me, that the Bey may not again
say that you had not made such and such demands; because, whenever I
speak to him on the subject, he desires me not to listen to public
reports.
We believe that the camp will be delayed, notwithstanding that its
departure is purposely announced that you may hear of it and postpone
your advance, as your arrival is not desired, inasmuch as it would
strengthen our proofs against them (the Ministers), and which are
favourable to you. Pay no attention to the Minister’s statements,
because all his acts are contrary to truth: they are all intrigues
directed against you. In brief, the bearer of the letter will inform you
of all our intentions in your behalf, he being a trustworthy friend of
ours. When you come he will accompany you; listen to him, and do not act
in opposition to his advice.
Salutations from the French Consul-General in Tunis, from the commander-
in-chief of the French fleet at the Goletta, and from the French Colonel
residing in Tunis.
_Dated_ 15 _Moharrem_ 1281.
The French Admiral, Count Bouet Willaumez, had for some time felt
misgivings as to the _bona fides_ of M. De Beauval’s policy, and the
perusal of these letters and other authentic reports induced him to make
such representations to the Imperial Government as produced the
indefinite postponement of the establishment of that “_prépondérance
naturelle_,” which again and again finds a place even in the
correspondence of M. Drouyn de Lhuys.
Meanwhile, although the rebellion was well-nigh stamped out, the fleets
still remained on the coast. Then came another diplomatic struggle. Who
was to go first? If France took the lead, it might be said she was
driven away by Turkey and England; supposing Italy was left behind,
there was a possibility of her carrying out a purely platonic occupation
on her own account; but if the Turkish Commissioner went before the
rest, the Moslem population would consider that he was flying from the
giaours. After weeks of correspondence, a programme was drawn up with
the assent of all parties. It is a noteworthy fact that Lord Russell and
Mr. Wood induced the other interested parties to leave the English ships
behind to keep the peace.
_Programme of the Departure of the French, Italian, and Turkish
Squadrons, fixed to take place on Friday the 23d September 1864, at 11
o’clock a.m._
1. The Vice-Admiral Count Bouet Willaumez, commander-in-chief of the
French squadron, will give the signal to his vessels to light their
fires by hoisting a yellow flag.
2. The Italian Admiral will simultaneously give the same signal.
3. The Turkish frigate will also light her fires.
4. When each of the squadrons shall be ready to start, the national flag
shall be hoisted to the mainmast of the ship bearing the commander-in-
chief.
5. The Turkish frigate shall do the same.
6. When the squadrons are on the point of departure, the French and
Italian Admirals shall give a signal by dipping their respective flags.
7. The two allied squadrons shall then move forward, with the exception
of the vessels of the commanders-in-chief.
8. The Turkish frigate shall then set sail.
9. The Admirals will start as soon as the Turkish fleet has passed them.
10. The squadrons will wait for their commanders-in-chief beyond Cape
Carthage.
Agreed to on board the “Solferino” in the roads of Tunis, 20th September
1864.
(Signed) BOUET WILLAUMEZ. ALBINI.
Soon after the departure of the fleets the Bey’s troops defeated the
rebels outside Susa; a rising in Djerba was promptly put down, and the
Bey’s authority re-established from Tabarca to the Tripolitan frontier.
Before he quitted Tunis, Muhamed es Sadek informed Haider Effendi that
recent events had convinced him that the only chance of preserving the
Regency from his neighbours was to follow the advice of England and
strengthen his connection with the Porte. “Assure my Imperial Master,”
he said, “that I look forward to an early opportunity of placing our
relations on a firm basis, and beyond the reach of cavil and dispute.”
On the 4th November a lamentable accident occurred to eight officers and
four men belonging to H.M.S. “Orlando.” Their boat was swamped returning
from an excursion to the coast, and none of the bodies were ever
recovered. Friends of the deceased often inquire for some memorial at
Tunis. None was ever erected here, but a tablet near the Auberge de
Castille in Malta records the date of the catastrophe and the names and
rank of the victims.
The Bey’s gratitude to England was almost boundless, and he addressed
the following letter to the Queen, in answer to a communication from
Lord Russell expressing Her Majesty’s satisfaction at the restoration of
peace in the Regency.
Praise be to God!
To the exalted sovereign who is praised both for her virtues and their
effects, which are as glorious as they surpass the power of description,
the offspring of powerful sovereigns, at whose commands both sword and
pen obey, our friend the Lady Victoria, Queen of Great Britain. May her
reign be exalted, and may the praises of her excellences never cease to
be repeated!
After the salutations the most suitable to your royal rank, which is
exalted above all description.
We have received from your illustrious Minister in Your Majesty’s name a
pledge of your gracious favour, emanating from that amity which has been
established and consolidated in the course of ages, and which, having
been transmitted as an inheritance by fathers and ancestors, has ever
been fruitful of beneficial effects, and has led to paths of prosperity.
That pledge is the gratification which Your Majesty in her benevolence
(the full extent of which the bounds of a letter cannot possibly detail)
has felt in consequence of the restoration of peace in this kingdom and
of the return of the population to their accustomed obedience.
The admirer of your exalted character feels convinced that Your
Majesty’s wish is in unison with what is contained in the said kind
letter, to the effect that your sincere intention is the maintenance of
our present usages without diminution or disturbance. For this
expression of clear and manifest beneficence we shall be ever grateful.
Written by Your Majesty’s ever faithful humble servant of God, the
Muchir Mohamed Essadek Basha Bey, possessor of the Tunisian kingdom.
_The 11th Jumad el Thani_ 1281.
_11th November_ 1864.
The Bey now resolved to send an envoy to Constantinople to thank the
Sultan for his sympathy during the insurrection, and especially for a
donation from the Imperial privy purse of £50,000. At the same time
General Kheir-ed-Din had private instructions to bring about, if
possible, a clear and definite understanding as to the future relations
between the Regency and the Porte. It was arranged that the embassy
should leave Goletta on the 17th November. On the morning of the 12th M.
De Beauval called unexpectedly at the palace. He no sooner entered than
in an imperious manner he enjoined the Bey not to send any agent to
Stamboul. The discussion waxed warm between them, and De Beauval at last
told Muhamed es Sadek clearly that he would bar the passage of General
Kheir-ed-Din by force. He refused to take the Bey’s hand on leaving, and
quitted the room with angry and significant gestures. A cabinet council
was held immediately, and it was resolved to hasten the envoy’s
departure. Next evening General Kheir-ed-Din went on board the Tunisian
steamer the “Beshir” at dusk. At that time the French ironclad
“Invincible” was lying off Goletta. The commander at once sent a
messenger on board, who intimated to the General the desire of M. De
Beauval that he should put off his journey till instructions reached him
from Paris. Kheir-ed-Din demurred to such a request, and the French
officers left the ship. It grew dark, and the “Invincible” began to burn
blue-fires and discharge rockets. Suddenly the “Beshir” started on her
journey, and the “Invincible” followed in her wake. The two vessels
approached the islet of Zembra at the entrance of the Gulf of Tunis. A
dangerous channel between the rock and the mainland gives any vessel
taking it an advantage of several miles. The “Beshir” unhesitatingly
entered the passage at full speed and was lost in the darkness. It would
have been sheer madness for the “Invincible” to follow, and she returned
during the night to her anchorage at Goletta.
General Kheir-ed-Din did not only take with him to Constantinople a
simple letter of thanks. He received a memorandum containing certain
instructions which were to form the basis of a firman defining the
Turkish supremacy over Tunis. While Muhamed es Sadek was awaiting with
fear and trembling the result of his mission, he was agreeably surprised
by the recall of M. De Beauval. The French could never forgive him the
failure of his burlesque attempt to capture the Tunisian Envoy-
Extraordinary on the high seas, and he was summarily replaced by M. De
Bellecourt.
At the beginning of the year 1865 the Bey learned that General Kheir-ed-
Din’s mission had been completely successful. The conditions which were
to govern their future regulations were agreed on, and were embodied in
a confidential vizirial letter, which contained a distinct assurance
that upon the Bey’s application a regular firman would, be granted.[33]
It was, however, decided that the whole matter should be for the present
kept a profound secret. Prince Arthur of England arrived at Tunis during
the spring, and was, as usual, most hospitably entertained, and in the
month of May Earl Russell decided to confer on Muhamed es Sadek the
Grand Cross of the Bath.
This fact, coupled with the moral support he had doubtless received from
England during the campaign of M. De Beauval, made a deep impression
upon his mind. “Whenever my people see my breast covered with the ribbon
of the Bath,” he said to Mr. Wood, “they will appreciate and understand
the fresh protection they have thereby acquired, and to whom they must
turn for succour and counsel in their moments of perplexity and
embarrassment.”
The Bey was strongly urged to invite the Emperor of the French, who was
meditating a second visit to Algeria, to include Tunis in his programme,
but he thought it most prudent to limit his attentions to a
congratulatory mission. Taib Bey (now a prisoner in the Bardo palace)
represented his brother on this occasion, and received the Grand Cross
of the Legion of Honour. When he came back, Taib told the Bey that the
Emperor had twice remarked to him that “he should much like to visit the
site of ancient Carthage, to elucidate some points with reference to his
history of the life of Cæsar.” “I did not fail to tell him,” added Taib,
“that they were all ploughed up, and that there was nothing whatever to
be seen.” The French about this time successfully pressed upon the Bey a
second telegraphic convention. During a great part of the year 1865
active negotiations were carried on to obtain a unanimous consent of the
Powers to the issue of the firman between Tunis and Turkey, but the
opposition of France prevented any agreement being arrived at. The Bey
on the 31st July received with great ceremony the insignia of the Bath
at the hands of Lord Yelverton, and although he is probably more
decorated than any other living man, he has always shown a marked
preference for his English order ever since. His satisfaction, however,
was not destined to be of long duration. The insurrection had hopelessly
crippled his finances; a letter had been intercepted from his Consul at
Bone, M. Allegro, offering to stir up an insurrection on the frontier in
the interest of France; it was no longer a secret that Marshals Randon
and MacMahon were again urging on the Emperor the necessity of asserting
French rights over Tunis; and at last, on the 21st September, Baron
Saillard arrived at Goletta as the bearer of an ultimatum. The Governors
of Tunis and Keff had administered the bastinado to two Algerian
subjects in the Tunisian service, some Arabs had attacked a coral boat,
and a forest had been burned on the frontier. Baron Saillard was
consequently instructed to demand from the Bey prompt and signal
satisfaction. This time Muhamed es Sadek surrendered at discretion: the
officials complained of were dismissed, the venerable Prime Minister was
sent to the French Consulate-General to ask pardon from Baron Saillard,
and a notice was issued that henceforth Algerian Arabs under all
circumstances would be treated as French subjects. At this price the Bey
of Tunis obtained another respite.
In 1866 the financial troubles of the Tunisian Government came more
prominently into notice. The state bonds remained unpaid; the European
merchants protested; and finally, M. Musalli (one of the Bey’s
interpreters) was sent to Paris to negotiate a loan. Money proved very
difficult to get, and even the Bey’s steamer the “Beshir” was seized for
debt at Malta.
The following year was not less disastrous for the Regency. The absence
of rain, which commenced in 1866, continued, and the complete failure of
the crops engendered first famine and then typhus. Italy now in turn
threatened an interruption of diplomatic relations, because the Bey
refused to pay the debts of the Tunisian princes, although their
creditors had been again and again warned of the risk they were running.
After much negotiations, an actual rupture was only prevented by the Bey
paying about thirty per cent. on the total sum claimed. Mr. Wood was
unfortunately absent, when, in September, the tribes around Beja once
more raised the standard of revolt. Troops had no sooner been sent to
the disaffected districts, when the news spread that Muhamed es Sadek’s
younger brother, Adil Bey, had left his palace at the Marsa to place
himself at the head of the insurgents. Sidi Adil was betrayed and fell
into the hands of Ali Bey. He was brought a prisoner to Tunis, and died
of “a rheumatic fever, caught by imprudent exposure in the Beja
mountains,” on the 5th November. It is popularly supposed he was
poisoned, but the evidence is exceedingly contradictory. Sidi Adil was
never a robust man, but persons who knew him represent him as being by
far the most intelligent and patriotic of the sons of Hussein Bey. He
indulged in dreams of becoming the real leader of the Arab tribes, but
he wholly failed in his attempt to realise them. The Bey now conceived
that a widespread conspiracy existed against his person, and his
suspicions were shared and fostered by Muhamed Khaznadar, who had held
the office of Prime Minister for over thirty years. On the 5th
September, General Sy Reschid and General Sy Ismael Sunni, two of the
most prominent members of the Beylical Council, were arrested in their
houses, dragged to the Bardo, and strangled by the common executioner.
The city gates were shut during the perpetration of this outrage, and
before any of the European Consuls could leave Tunis, both the victims
had ceased to live. No occurrence had caused such widespread
disapprobation since the judicial murder of the Jew Sfez ten years
before. Mr. Werry at once repaired to the Bardo to remonstrate with the
Bey. Muhamed es Sadek declared that he had ample proof of the guilt of
the accused, and that, as the constitution had not been again put in
force since its suspension in 1864, he was not bound to bring them to
trial.
The famine, cholera, and typhus continued their ravages far into 1868,
and the Bey and the Beylical Government were alike on the verge of
bankruptcy. Mr. Wood hurried back to Tunis to endeavour to prevent the
apparently inevitable collapse. In addition to the two foreign loans of
1863 and 1865, the Bey had created an internal debt with various
European merchants by a series of operations called “conversions.” These
loans and the usurious interest paid upon them were by no means the only
cause of the national insolvency. The insurrection had involved the
Government in extraordinary expenses; the State Treasurer, Caid Nessim,
had crossed the Mediterranean to Leghorn, leaving a deficit of twenty-
five millions of francs; and the pestilence and famine of 1866, 1867,
and 1868 had prevented the collection of the usual amount of revenue.
But there was another and more serious reason even than these: the Bey
was surrounded by Memelouk Ministers and favourites, who invariably
entered his service without a piastre, and heaped up enormous fortunes
in the midst of the general ruin. The Prime Minister, Mustapha, himself
was a Greek slave from Scio; and the _teskera_ or order for the purchase
of General Kheir-ed-Din, when a handsome Circassian youth of sixteen,
has lately figured as an exhibit in the dispute as to the Ben Ayad
succession. Ahmed Bey in 1855 left 120,000,000 of francs in the Tunisian
treasury, to be dissipated by his successor, Muhamed “the Magnificent,”
in cargoes of beautiful Georgian, Turkish, and Circassian slave-girls
from Stamboul, leaving only a very small surplus to be swallowed up by
French engineers in bringing pure water to Tunis over the aqueduct of
Adrian. From the hour of his accession to the throne, Muhamed es Sadek
was almost in the power of a series of Memelouk favourites, who found in
foreign loans that source of profit which the diminished revenues of the
country no longer afforded.
In 1868 it was already evident that the Bey must compound with his
creditors. The clamours of the French, Italian, and English bondholders
could not much longer pass unheeded, and very serious remonstrances were
addressed to the Tunisian Government by the foreign representatives. The
French Chargé d’Affaires at first sought to propound a scheme
exclusively under French auspices, but now, as in 1864, neither Italy
nor England would consent to be ignored in the arrangement. It is under
these circumstances that the International Financial Commission came
into existence, in virtue of two proclamations bearing date the 5th July
1869 and 23d March 1870, and made with the concurrence of the three
interested Powers, under whose guarantee the Bey’s decrees were to be
carried out. The only advantage secured by France was the right of
appointing a French employé as “inspector of finance,” whereas the other
functionaries of the Executive Council are Tunisians. Although the
Tunisian bonds of the Unified Debt of 125,000,000 francs were destined
to become an important factor in the Tunisian question, the history of
the Financial Commission is neither edifying nor interesting. Everybody
who got “into” the Commission upheld it, and everybody who was kept
outside in the cold denounced it. Its chief memorial will be a score of
unreadable pamphlets in support of both sides of the case. During the
past ten years the much-abused Commission has paid a fair proportion of
the coupons as they became due, and the various “inspectors of finance”
have been eminently honest, if not universally popular. The sources of
Tunisian revenue having now become more than ever impaired by recent
events, the creditors of the Tunisian Government will not probably
object to a fresh financial adjustment, provided always that the present
obligations are paid them at par. If this course is not thought
expedient, they will certainly prefer to see the joint guarantee of the
three Powers remain undisturbed.