THE ADVANCES FROM MEDO TO KORONJE AND
MSALU
All that remained of the Portuguese _boma_ at Medo was the deep ditch by
which it had been surrounded, and the mound or earthwork fashioned from
the earth that had been excavated from it. Any buildings that these
fortifications may have been designed to protect had long ago been
burned to the ground, and save for a big red-brick store, with an iron
roof, situated outside the ditch, there was no habitable place in the
immediate vicinity. It can never have been of much military value,
except against attacks delivered by natives armed with primitive
weapons, and its capture and occupation by the British conferred upon
the latter no material advantage. Medo, however, or rather the place a
few miles east of it where Rock Camp had been formed, marks the
beginning of a stretch of very blind and difficult country, where big
clumps of bamboos are numerous, where bamboo-brakes of considerable
extent are not infrequently encountered, and where elephant grass nine
feet high is a common feature. Further on along the road, as the columns
advanced, more broken ground was met with, and numbers of isolated rocky
hills, often fantastically shaped—the solitary curved horn of the
rhinoceros being one of the forms most commonly represented—provided the
enemy with excellent observation-posts from which every movement of the
British troops could be watched and provided against.
On the 13th April the two columns camped at Medo, and on the following
day a strong officer’s patrol of the 4th Battalion of the 4th King’s
African Rifles went down the road toward Mwalia, and speedily found
itself engaged with the enemy. Von Lettow-Vorbeck and Kohl had allowed
the British, very slowly and painfully, to work their way inland from
the coast from a distance of eighty-four miles to Medo; and having now
drawn them on into a very difficult belt of country, they were preparing
to ambush the advance once or twice daily, to make the troops fight as
often as possible and in disadvantageous circumstances, for the
camping-ground and for their supply of water, and to withhold from them
any chance of dealing a very effective blow at their ubiquitous and
elusive enemy.
The campaign was at once more harassing and less hopeful than had been
the advance from Narungombe to Lukuledi in the preceding year, for then
“Linforce” had been working its way inland from Lindi, and there had
always been a chance of the enemy being enveloped by the converging
columns; and the country, though thick and difficult, had not been so
blind and so impenetrable as that through which “Pamforce” was at
present engaged in making its way. Now, too, there was no British force
closely co-operating with “Rosecol” and “Kartucol” to threaten the
enemy’s flank and rear, though some of General Northey’s troops had made
their way in a south-easterly direction from Mahenge, and were known to
have crossed the Rovuma, and Colonel Rose, while still in command in
Portuguese East Africa, had succeeded in getting the 3rd Battalion of
the 2nd King’s African Rifles dispatched to Mozambique, where, under
Colonel Phillips, they were brigaded with a Portuguese force under Major
Leal. There was, however, no immediate prospect of bringing von
Lettow-Vorbeck to a definite action, for there no longer existed German
posts, such as Ruponda, Massassi and Newala, the defence of which was
important to him because their capture would work him a measure of moral
and even of material injury. Instead von Lettow-Vorbeck, at this time,
seemed to have the whole of the vast continent of Africa into which to
retreat, and the prospect of surrounding or cutting off any large body
of his forces was felt by all to be more remote than ever.
None the less, “Pamforce” continued to move forward down the road from
Medo to Mwalia and from Mwalia to Koronje, with ever-lengthening lines
of communication stringing out behind it, and with daily ambushes
delaying its progress. These, often enough, were laid for it by small
enemy posts consisting of one native non-commissioned officer and half a
dozen _Askari_, but in such blind country it was on each occasion
necessary to clear up the situation before the advance could be
continued, lest the column should find themselves caught in some more
elaborate trap with results that might well prove to be disastrous.
Moreover, the character of the country, which greatly favoured the
tactics that the enemy was now adopting, practically confined the
British to a series of frontal attacks, as it did not admit of flanking
movements being successfully carried out.
* * * * *
On the 15th April “Rosecol” left the camp at Medo, and began to advance
down the road in the direction of Mwalia. The 4th Battalion of the 4th
King’s African rifles formed the advanced guard, the Gold Coast Regiment
being in reserve. The former’s advanced points were attacked, as usual,
and the Battalion engaged a small enemy rear-guard, the progress made
during the day amounting to only four and a half miles. From this time
onward, the Gold Coast Regiment and the 4th Battalion of the 4th King’s
African Rifles took it in turns to lead the advance, and each was
preceded at a short distance by an advanced detachment consisting of 300
rifles with the usual complement of machine and Lewis guns, and two
Stokes guns of the Gold Coast Regiment. This leading detachment had
points thrown out ahead on each side of the road and a line of
skirmishers deployed behind them, the remainder of the detachment
advancing in open order on both sides of the road, with connecting files
between them and the main body in their rear.
On the 16th April the advanced detachment was supplied by A Company and
two sections of I Company, under the command of Major Shaw. During the
day small engagements were fought with an enemy rear-guard, consisting
of one company, but the Stokes guns proved very useful and effective,
the enemy being shelled out of successive positions from which, but for
these guns, it would have cost much delay and probably many casualties
to eject him. As it was, only two men of the Regiment and one Sierra
Leone carrier were wounded. The column camped at 2 p.m., Major Shaw’s
detachment digging itself in about a mile further down the road.
On the 17th April the 4th Battalion of the 4th King’s African Rifles
furnished the advanced detachment, that regiment being at the head of
the column, with the Gold Coast Regiment following in reserve. During
the afternoon the King’s African Rifles became heavily engaged with the
enemy, who had been reinforced and was now opposing the advance with
three companies and six machine-guns. The road here ran through elephant
grass nine feet in height, and it was found impossible to locate the
enemy’s positions. On the other hand, the King’s African Rifles had dug
themselves in across the road, the lie of which was accurately known to
the Germans, and the former consequently sustained many casualties. The
4th Battalion of the 4th King’s African Rifles was a newly raised force,
largely composed of recruits, and the ordeal of being fired upon by an
invisible enemy, against whom no effective retaliation was possible, was
very severe. However, they held on, and in the afternoon A Company was
sent forward to reinforce them. This company and the two Stokes
gun-teams, which had been with the 4th Battalion of the 4th King’s
African Rifles all day, sustained 28 casualties before dark, losing 3
men and 1 battery gun-carrier killed, and 13 men, 6 battery gun-carriers
and 5 Sierra Leone carriers wounded.
Next morning the Gold Coast Regiment took over from the King’s African
Rifles the position which the latter had occupied during the night, and
was directed to hold the enemy in front while a strong detachment from
“Kartucol” attempted a wide flanking movement on the right. Captain Duck
with thirty rifles was sent forward from the position held by the
Regiment to get in touch with the enemy in order to give the flanking
detachment an objective. He speedily found and engaged the enemy,
whereupon the rest of “Kartucol” advanced through the Gold Coast
Regiment and joined in the fight. The enemy, however, had once again
reduced his rear-guard to a single company, and on the 19th April
“Kartucol” continued the advance, “Rosecol” following in the rear. On
the following day the two columns were to have exchanged places, but the
rations expected from the rear arrived so late on the night of the 19th
April that this arrangement could not be carried out. The delay had been
caused by the convoy being attacked by the enemy near Rock Camp. The
officer commanding this convoy was killed, and much confusion was
wrought by the ambush, though the carriers and their escort contrived to
get through with the loss of a few bags of mails. There were many
Europeans in camp who would far more willingly have foregone their
dinners. In a captured diary Kohl was subsequently found complaining
with disgust that the mails taken on this occasion contained no
information concerning the progress of the war in Europe, and mainly
consisted of “love to dear Jack.”
"Kartucol," therefore, continued the advance and occupied Mwalia, while
“Rosecol” camped for the night at Kalima, about four miles short of that
place. The distance from Medo to Mwalia is not quite five-and-twenty
miles. The column had left Medo on the 15th April and “Kartucol” had
reached Mwalia on the 20th April, the average daily progress being
therefore little more than four miles.
On the 21st April “Rosecol” remained in camp at Kalima, where it was
joined by General Edwards and his staff. “Kartucol” during the day was
shelled by the enemy, and on the 22nd April it moved forward and
occupied an enemy position two miles in front of the camp at Mwalia.
Both columns remained in these positions until the 26th April, when
“Rosecol” moved forward and occupied Makuku, about twelve miles down the
road, “Kartucol,” which had preceded it, having advanced three miles
further to a place called Mbalama. At Makuku the main road, hitherto
followed, which leads from Mtuge to Lusinje, is crossed by another which
runs south-west to Koronje; and Mbalama is situated some three miles
down this latter track.
On the 27th April “Rosecol” advanced through “Kartucol,” and marched
down the road towards Koronje, with Nanungu, some forty miles further to
the west and slightly south of the former place, as its ultimate
objective. The advanced detachment, under Major Shaw, consisted of the
Pioneer Company and A Company of the Gold Coast Regiment with two Stokes
guns. A small party of the enemy was engaged and driven back; “Rosecol”
camped for the night about four miles west of Mbalama.
Next day, 28th April, the advance was continued, being led this time by
the 4th Battalion of the 4th King’s African Rifles, two Stokes guns of
the Gold Coast Regiment, as usual, accompanying the advanced detachment.
About six miles were covered during the day, and as “Rosecol” was
forming camp at about 3.30 p.m., patrols from the advanced detachment
came into touch with the enemy, and Lieutenant McEvoy was wounded in the
hand by a stray bullet, and a trumpeter belonging to the Stokes Gun
Battery was killed.
On the 29th April the enemy was found to have abandoned the positions
which he had occupied the night before; and at 7 a.m. the advanced
detachment, consisting of half I and B Companies with two of the Gold
Coast Stokes guns, advanced, the rest of “Rosecol” following half an
hour later. Major Shaw, who was, as usual, in command of the advanced
detachment, came into contact with the enemy at about 10.30 a.m., and
thereafter the latter fought an intermittent rear-guard action—a series
of harassing ambushes—until 4.30 p.m., when camps were formed for the
night, Major Shaw’s men occupying a position about a mile in advance of
the rest of the column. In the course of the day only two men of the
Gold Coast Regiment were wounded, the Stokes guns once more proving very
useful in dislodging the enemy from successive positions.
On the 30th April, “Kartucol” passed through “Rosecol” with the
intention of attacking an enemy position, which was known to be held by
four companies and one gun. The Headquarters of the Gold Coast Regiment,
with half the Stokes Battery, the Pioneers and I Company, marched in the
rear of “Kartucol” as reserve troops. Touch was not gained with the
enemy until the afternoon, but owing to the country traversed being very
difficult and blind, the progress made was so slow that no attack could
be delivered upon the German position owing to the lateness of the hour.
The two columns, therefore, formed a perimeter camp at about 4.30 p.m.
at a place on the Koronje road about four hundred yards west of the
Montepuez River. One Battalion from “Kartucol” occupied an advanced camp
about one thousand yards further down the road leading to Koronje.
On the 1st May, the 1st Battalion of the 2nd King’s African Rifles
advanced along the road toward Koronje, while the 2nd Battalion of the
same Regiment went out on the right to attempt to outflank the enemy’s
left. The country was still very difficult and extremely blind, and
progress was again very slow. It was subsequently discovered, moreover,
that from an observation post on the summit of Koronje Hill, to the left
of the road, the enemy could follow every movement of the British
troops. While, therefore, the 2nd Battalion of the 2nd King’s African
Rifles was laboriously working its way round to the right, its attempt
to surprise and outflank the enemy was foredoomed to failure from the
outset. Meanwhile, of course, this movement greatly delayed the advance
of the rest of the force.
The detachment of the Gold Coast Regiment which, under the command of
Major Shaw, was with “Kartucol,” was employed to escort the 22nd D.M.B.
and the ammunition column of that force.
At about 5 p.m. the 1st Battalion of the 2nd King’s African Rifles
became heavily engaged, and simultaneously an enemy party of about forty
rifles, which had worked its way through the bush to the rear, attacked
the D.M.B. which was being escorted by fifty rifles of I Company. The
latter, under Lieutenant Kay, acted with great steadiness and
promptitude. At the moment when the attack was delivered, the Mountain
Battery, which had just come out of action, was limbered up. For a
moment the guns were in peril, but Lieutenant Kay held the enemy and
beat off the attack while the mules and their loads were got away in
safety.
The sound of the firing misled the 2nd Battalion of the 2nd King’s
African Rifles, which was out on the right, with the result that it
rejoined the column in the rear of the enemy.
A perimeter camp was formed for the night, the 1st Battalion of the 2nd
King’s African Rifles digging themselves in at a point about eight
hundred yards in advance of the main body.
On the 2nd May, the 1st Battalion of the 2nd King’s African Rifles
pushed out patrols which quickly came into touch with the enemy, who was
soon after engaged by “Kartucol,” which drove him back. No progress,
however, was made during the day, and on the morrow it was found that,
while the enemy’s rear-guard was fighting “Kartucol,” the position at
Koronje had been evacuated. “Kartucol” then advanced and camped near
Koronje, the detachment of the Gold Coast Regiment under Major Shaw
rejoining “Rosecol” in the afternoon.
On the 4th May “Kartucol” again advanced and located a strong enemy
position near the Milinch hills, about six and a half miles west of
Koronje, through which the road passes. On this day three officers and
ten British non-commissioned officers belonging to the Gold Coast
Regiment arrived from Port Amelia.
On the 5th May, “Rosecol” advanced and took over from “Kartucol,” which
then fell back to the camp which the former had hitherto occupied. The
4th Battalion of the 4th King’s African Rifles encamped at a point down
the road about a mile in advance of the main body of “Rosecol”; and
patrols were sent out to the right and left to try to find a way round
the enemy’s position on the Milinch Hills. Both these patrols were
furnished by A Company of the Gold Coast Regiment, that on the right
being commanded by Captain Harris and that on the left by Lieutenant
Withers.
On the 6th May Captain Harris returned and reported that the country to
the north was much more open than that through which the columns had
recently been advancing, and that it would be almost impossible to make
a flanking movement from the right side of the road. On the 7th May
Lieutenant Withers came in from the south bringing a similar report; and
meanwhile patrols sent out by the 4th Battalion of the 4th King’s
African Rifles had on both days come into touch with the enemy just east
of the Milinch Hills, and reported that the position which he was
occupying was a very strong one. This was indeed the case, for the enemy
was posted on the crests and slopes of two hills, both of which
commanded the gut between them through which the road runs; yet on the
8th May it was discovered that the Germans had retired, and two
companies of the 4th Battalion of the 4th King’s African Rifles went
forward and occupied the position which he had evacuated.
Meanwhile the lines of communication were lengthening behind the
columns, and now measured approximately one hundred and forty miles from
Mtuge, which in its turn is twenty-eight miles by road from Port Amelia.
Also the heavy and increasing traffic over the road had not tended to
improve it; and though road corps, recruited from South Africa and East
Africa, toiled ceaselessly at its repair, the difficulties of transport
and supply were becoming daily more and more acute. At this time, the
columns at the front had been on very short commons for a considerable
period, and the company officers of the Gold Coast Regiment reported
that their men were not getting enough food to keep them fit to take
part in active operations of so trying and arduous a character as those
at present in progress.
On the 9th May the Gold Coast Regiment took over the Milinch Hills from
the 4th Battalion of the 4th King’s African Rifles; and on this day
local natives reported to Colonel Rose that von Lettow-Vorbeck, with a
large enemy force, was moving in a north-easterly direction toward
Lusinje. This place lies about thirty-seven miles almost due north of
Nanungu, on the main road from which the columns had branched off in a
south-westerly direction at Makuku, as already noted. Accordingly the
4th Battalion of the 4th King’s African Rifles was dispatched across
country to Msalu Boma, which is situated on that road at a point, as the
crow flies, about twenty-three miles north-west of Koronje, and
twenty-seven miles east by south of Lusinje. The orders issued to this
battalion of the King’s African Rifles were that they should deal with
any enemy parties weak enough to enable action to be taken with effect,
but to avoid any serious engagement with his numerically superior
forces.
It was believed that a fairly strong party of the enemy were occupying a
hill on the right side of the road at a place called Jirimita, about
five or six miles down the road from the pass through the Milinch Hills,
and at dawn on this day two patrols were sent out, one under the command
of Captain Leslie-Smith and the other under Lieutenant Bisshopp. Each
patrol consisted of seventy-five rifles, drawn respectively from A and I
Companies; and Captain Leslie-Smith, who went out on the right of the
road, had orders to make a flanking movement and to come back to the
highway at a point about four miles beyond Jirimita. Lieutenant
Bisshopp, on the left, was instructed to make a wider and longer sweep,
and to strike the road about three miles further on. It was hoped thus
to outflank the enemy and to cut off his retreat. It was a difficult
task in the broken country through which these two patrols had to work,
at once to maintain a correct sense of direction, and accurately to
estimate the distance traversed. However, both these small parties
started off, expecting to be a night or two in the bush, and each in the
end succeeded in exactly carrying out the orders issued to it.
Meanwhile, during the morning of the same day Lieutenant Wilson, with a
patrol of twenty rifles drawn from the Pioneer Company, got touch with
an enemy outpost of about the same strength at a point some two miles
west of the Milinch Hills; and at 4.45 p.m. a second officer’s patrol,
under Lieutenant Beech, was sent out down the road in the same direction
for a distance of two and a half miles without coming into contact with
the enemy, whose outpost had retired since the morning.
At 6 a.m. on the 10th May, Lieutenant Withers, with fifty rifles and one
Lewis gun of A Company, was sent down the road with orders to brush
aside any small party of the enemy that he might encounter, and
thereafter to try and ascertain the real strength of the force which was
opposing the advance of the column.
Three and a half miles from the Milinch Hill Lieutenant Withers met a
small party of the enemy, which he drove back; and about five miles out
he found an enemy camp, strongly entrenched, which had evidently been
designed to accommodate some four companies, but which had been recently
burned. As far as it was possible to judge, this camp had been destroyed
and abandoned two days earlier; and though the tracks leading from it
were at once confused and confusing, conveying at first the impression
that the enemy had retired in a northerly direction, it was subsequently
ascertained that he had retreated down the main road. Just beyond the
burned camp this road was found to bifurcate, one fork leading
west-north-west and the other west-south-west. It was the latter route
which the enemy had taken.
The main patrol camped at a point where the road bifurcated, and sent
out small parties to reconnoitre along each of the forks, but neither of
them came into touch with the enemy.
On the 11th May the patrols under Captain Leslie-Smith and Lieutenant
Bisshopp, which had been sent out on the 9th May, rejoined the Regiment.
As has already been noted, they had achieved the difficult feat of
striking the road at the points aimed at, but for the rest, though
Lieutenant Bisshopp’s patrol had surprised and killed one enemy
_Askari_, who had probably been left behind to watch the movements of
the British, nothing more had been seen of the enemy, who must have
passed down the road while these patrols were still making their way
through the bush.
On the 12th May one of the battalions of the 2nd King’s African Rifles
from “Kartucol” took over from the Gold Coast Regiment, which returned
to the main camp occupied by “Rosecol.” On the following day the latter
marched across country, in the wake of the 4th Battalion of the 4th
King’s African Rifles, which had preceded them on the 9th May, in the
direction of Msalu Boma. The way led along a native footpath which only
admitted of men marching in single file, but in order to beat out a
track for the transport through the high grass and standing crops of
maize and millet, the column advanced four abreast—a hard task for
troops who had been insufficiently fed for many days, and who were now
required to cover between daybreak and dusk a distance of eighteen
miles. The column camped in the bush, and on the following day it joined
up with the 4th Battalion of the 4th King’s African Rifles at the _boma_
at Msalu. This place, too, had once been a stronghold of a Portuguese
revenue-farmer, and had been fortified against attack by the natives,
but it had now been completely destroyed by fire.
At Msalu news was received that von Lettow-Vorbeck and the whole of his
main force were at Nanungu, and that so far they had given no signs of
any intention to move to the north toward the Rovuma River, or south to
the Lurio, which divides the territory of the Nyassa Company from the
Province of Mozambique. It was also learned that the King’s African
Rifles Mounted Infantry were at Lusinje, some six-and-twenty miles along
the main road west by north of Msalu, and about thirty-two miles almost
due north of Nanungu.
“Rosecol” remained at Msalu on the 14th and 15th May, the neighbourhood
being clear of the enemy, but much infested by lions. The proximity of
these brutes got upon the nerves of some of the inmates of the camp, and
on the night of the 13th—14th May a carrier, who had had a nightmare in
which they played a prominent part, awoke in a panic, shattering the
silence with his yells and outcry. Instantly an indescribable scene
resulted. Tumbling over one another to get at the camp-fires, the
porters fought and scrambled for firebrands which they waved wildly, and
impeded by which they made desperate efforts to climb into neighbouring
trees. The country here is orchard-bush, and the only trees available
are small and stunted—altogether inadequate as places of refuge from the
onslaught of a lion. The terrified carriers, however, were long past
reason, and appeared to consider that their one chance of salvation lay
in getting even a foot or two above the ground. The lions on this
occasion existed only in their imagination, and order and confidence
were presently restored. During the same night, however, the 4th King’s
African Rifles lost two sentries, one killed and one badly mauled by
these brutes, so the terror of the carriers had at any rate some measure
of justification.
With the arrival of “Rosecol” at Msalu the second phase of the advance,
which had its beginning with the fight at Medo, may be regarded as
concluded. The enemy had offered a persistent and fairly effective
resistance to the progress of the columns along the main road through
the difficult country which lies between Medo and the Milinch Hills. His
main force, which was believed to be at Nanungu, was really encamped at
Wanakoti, about three and a half miles to the north of that place; and
against him were advancing “Kartucol” from the east, “Rosecol” from the
north-east, and a weak column of perhaps 800 rifles, which General
Northey had dispatched across the Rovuma in a south-easterly direction,
under the command of Colonel Griffiths. Von Lettow-Vorbeck still had the
choice of several lines of retreat, for at Wanakoti many tracks cross
one another, and though the road to Koronje on the east and to Chisona
on the north-west were closed to him by the British advance, the track
leading south-west to Mahu was still open, and while retreating along it
he would have opportunities of breaking off, should it suit his
convenience to do so, in almost any direction.