THE ENGAGEMENT AT MEDO
Although the Great War had now been in progress for more than three
years and a half, the time-honoured British practice of attempting to
effect a military purpose while employing therefor a wholly inadequate
force had once more been resorted to. The difficulties which had been
experienced in feeding and supplying the columns of “Linforce” and
“Hanforce” during the operations which led to von Lettow-Vorbeck’s
retreat across the Rovuma, probably convinced the British Command that
any direct pursuit of the enemy into the country beyond that river, at a
time when the beginning of the rainy season was almost due, would be
attended by too great risks. The Germans, as they retired, always swept
the country clear of supplies of every description and of practically
all its able-bodied inhabitants, so an advancing British force would
depend entirely upon the provisions that could be conveyed to it from
Lindi along many miles of unmetalled motor-road, and thereafter by
head-carriage over tracks, most of which would be submerged as soon as
the waters of the Rovuma had been sufficiently swelled by the first
freshet to cause them to overflow their banks.
Direct pursuit being therefore out of the question, an advance westward
from Port Amelia had been determined upon, but unfortunate delays had
occurred, as we have seen, and by the time “Pamforce” had begun its
march inland, the enemy had been able to complete his arrangements for
its embarrassment and for his own security.
Towards the end of February, therefore, it was decided that “Pamforce”
must be strengthened if anything practical were to be achieved, and a
second column was dispatched to Port Amelia, the whole force being
placed under the command of General Edwards. It was General Edwards, it
will be remembered, who, while commanding the lines of communication
when the extended attack upon the Dar-es-Salaam-Lake Tanganyika Railway
was in progress in 1916, had inspected the Gold Coast Regiment
immediately after its arrival in East Africa.
“Pamforce” was now divided into two columns, one, under the command of
Colonel Rose, being composed of the Gold Coast Regiment, the 4th
Battalion of the 4th Regiment of the King’s African Rifles, the 22nd
D.M.B., and a body of the King’s African Rifles Mounted Infantry, and
the other, under the command of Colonel Giffard, comprising the 1st and
2nd Battalions of the 2nd Regiment of the King’s African Rifles. The
first was designated “Rosecol” and the second “Kartucol.”
* * * * *
A good deal of rain fell during March, deepening the swamp between
Bandari and Mtuge, which had already caused so much trouble, filling the
nullahs all along the road, and reducing the surface to a quagmire
which, in many places, made traffic very difficult, even though the
track had now been “corduroyed” from end to end. The journey up the road
from Mtuge to Meza, though the distance was only some four-and-sixty
miles, often took more than a week, and after the striking force had
been strengthened by the addition of “Kartucol” the work of moving the
new troops up to the front and of accumulating sufficient supplies to
render an advance in any degree continuous, when it could at last be
undertaken, proved to be at once slow and difficult.
Until the 27th March, therefore, the Gold Coast Regiment remained in
camp at Meza, sending out patrols in all directions, doing its best to
familiarize itself with the topographical features of the country in its
neighbourhood, and having occasional brushes with small parties of the
enemy, which more than once attempted to cut its lines of communication.
On the 27th March half the Gold Coast Regiment with the Stokes Battery
and half the 2nd Battalion of the 2nd Regiment of the King’s African
Rifles, marched up the road, and camped for the night at Natovi—eleven
miles distant—pushing on the next day to Namarika, some seven miles
further on. Heavy rain fell on both days very soon after the camp was
formed, and the bush-huts, called _banda_ in East Africa, constructed of
sticks and grass, afforded indifferent protection from the tropical
downpour, which turned the trodden mud of the camp into deep slush.
From Natovi Lieutenant Clarke, with a patrol of thirty rifles, had been
sent out to try to intercept an enemy foraging party, and on the
following day Captain Leslie-Smith and fifty men had been left at
Namarika, when the rest of the Regiment advanced eight miles along the
road to Manambiri. On the 29th March patrols under Lieutenant Chaundler
and Lieutenant Beech were sent out, the first along the main road as far
as Kitambo, distant four miles from Manambiri, and the other along the
Nicoque-Medo road, which branches off to the north-west from the latter
place. Neither of these parties found any traces of the enemy, and
Lieutenant Clarke’s report, when he reached Manambiri the same
afternoon, was similarly negative. During the night, however, shots were
exchanged between an enemy patrol and an outpost furnished by the 4th
Battalion of the 4th King’s African Rifles.
On the 30th March Lieutenant Chaundler again patrolled to Kitambo, but
found that an enemy camp, which had been established just beyond that
village, was deserted. During the day Manambiri camp, which by now had
become a mere mud-hole, was rearranged, an endeavour being made to pitch
it upon higher ground.
On the 2nd April, an enemy patrol having fired upon a party of sappers
and miners near Namarika at about 7 a.m., Lieutenant Bisshopp with fifty
rifles was sent out to try to intercept him, marching through the bush
on a compass-bearing for a distance of eight miles. It was a toilsome
and comfortless task, cutting and forcing a way through dripping-wet
bush, but it led to no result.
On the 5th April Captain Harman patrolled along the main road to Medo
with half of I Company, and reached Namaaka, which is distant about four
miles from Manambiri. From Namaaka he sent out a small party which
engaged an enemy patrol, composed of about thirty men and two
machine-guns, which retired before it, though two men of I Company were
wounded.
On the 7th April the Headquarters of the Gold Coast Regiment, with A and
I Companies, advanced to Namaaka. This place was reached without
incident, but two miles further on the advanced guard came up against a
party of the enemy, about fifty strong with two machine-guns. A fight
ensued which lasted for about two hours, in the course of which one man
of the advanced guard was killed, and five men, two machine-gun carriers
and four carriers belonging to the Sierra Leone Carrier Corps were
wounded. The enemy was driven back to a position behind a large swamp,
from which it would have been very difficult to eject him unless he
could be outflanked. The advanced guard was not strong enough to attempt
this, and it accordingly fell back upon the main body. A patrol was then
sent round the north side of the swamp, only to find that the enemy had
retired.
On the 8th April, half of I Company, under Captain Webber, was sent
forward in the direction of Medo, and came into touch with the enemy at
a place about half a mile beyond the position behind the swamp which the
latter had evacuated on the preceding evening. As usual, the first
intimation received on this occasion of the proximity of the enemy was a
volley fired from cover, the men forming the advanced point being shot
down. This accomplished, the enemy blew his bugles and sounded the
charge. It had been previously arranged that, in the event of a fight
developing, the supporting section, under Lieutenant Bisshopp, should
move to the side of the road upon which the enemy appeared to be the
more numerous, in order to support the leading section, which was under
the command of Lieutenant Clarke. As the enemy came on, the shouting and
cheering which accompanied his charge indicated that he was strongest on
the left of the road, so Lieutenant Bisshopp with his party pushed
forward in that direction at the double, receiving a volley in partial
enfilade from the _Askari_ who were engaging Lieutenant Clarke’s
section, and whose onset had already been almost stopped by the latter.
As Lieutenant Bisshopp’s section continued at the double, they presently
met the enemy, who were also delivering an attack upon Lieutenant
Clarke’s flank; whereupon the _Askari_ faced about and bolted. Many of
them were wearing the green caps which are part of the service kit of
the men of the Gold Coast Regiment, and so confused at all times is
fighting in the bush, that one of Lieutenant Bisshopp’s party, seeing
his officers aiming at a retreating _Askari_, pulled his rifle down,
crying out that the fugitive was one of their own corps. The next
moment, this soldier fell, shot through the ankle, ejaculating many and
bitter things about the manners and morals of the “Germani.” I Company
then attacked and drove the enemy down the road for several miles, and
the other half of I Company having been sent forward to reinforce, a
strong post was established about two miles west of Namaaka, with a
picket thrown out a mile ahead of it. On this day I Company lost three
men killed and five men wounded.
In the afternoon the rest of the column arrived at Namaaka, and on the
9th April it went forward through I Company’s post, the 4th King’s
African Rifles being the advanced guard. The enemy were driven back
about four miles further down the road, and the column camped for the
night at a point to which the name of Rock Camp was given, on account of
a large isolated bluff which was situated near to it on the northern
side of the road.
From Rock Camp Lieutenant Reid was sent out to try to locate the road to
Kimone toward the south, and Lieutenant Cumming took out a patrol in a
north-easterly direction to the Montepuez River, which falls into the
sea about forty-five miles north of Port Amelia, and on the right bank
of which Medo is situated.
This place was now the immediate objective of “Pamforce,” the enemy
being believed to have occupied it in some strength, and to have
accumulated there a considerable quantity of supplies.
General Edwards and his Staff reached Rock Camp at 7.30 a.m. on the 10th
April, and at 1.30 p.m. the Gold Coast Regiment moved out towards Medo,
which was distant about seven miles.
[Illustration:
SKETCH TO ILLUSTRATE
OPERATIONS AGAINST MEDO.
]
The _boma_, or entrenched camp, at Medo—originally a stronghold of a
Portuguese revenue-farmer—occupied a situation on a piece of rising
ground some six or seven miles up the main road from Rock Camp. To the
south of the _boma_, and about three-quarters of a mile from it, lay the
village of Medo; and the country, which is here both rocky and hilly,
was for the most part parkland, studded with frequent trees and covered
with grass and patches of bush. Though some of it had the appearance of
being fairly open, it proved to be what is called “very blind,” no
extended view being obtainable in any direction.
The main road runs east and west from Rock Camp to Medo, passing through
broken country, and flanked on the left or southern side by Chirimba
Hill. This is an eminence several hundred feet in height and about two
miles in length—a mass of slate-grey rock rising out of a tangle of bush
and low forest, which clothes its lower slopes and overflows to the very
edge of the road. The summit of this hill is razor-edged and deeply
serrated throughout its length, rising into three principal peaks
divided by ravines; and its nature was such that no attempt could be
made to advance along it. Running parallel to the main road at a
distance of only a few hundred yards from it, Chirimba Hill commanded it
for a matter of about two miles, and completely dominated the position.
As usual, the enemy had selected a very awkward place in which to offer
this, his first serious resistance to the British advance in Portuguese
East Africa. He was six companies strong—say about eight hundred
men—with twelve machine-guns and one field gun which he had captured
from the Portuguese at Ngomano. The whole force was under the command of
Major Kohl, the ablest of von Lettow-Vorbeck’s lieutenants, to whom
throughout the campaign the task of harassing and delaying the British
advance, and of fighting rear-guard actions, was most frequently
confided by his chief. He had posted men in the thick bush along the
base of Chirimba Hill, and had occupied a strong position on high ground
astride the road on a very extended front, and most effectually
concealed in the bush.
When the Regiment moved forward on the afternoon of the 10th April,
Captain Harris with fifty rifles was sent out on the left to try to
establish himself on the eastern extremity of Chirimba Hill. This patrol
ran into an ambush before it had proceeded far upon its way, Sergeant
Flatman and one soldier being killed and several of the party wounded.
Though, after this, Captain Harris was at first forced to retire, he
succeeded in collecting his rather scattered men, and, advancing again,
made good a post on the slopes of the hill which had been his objective.
Meanwhile the advance-guard had come into action about three miles down
the road from Rock Camp, and it speedily became evident that the enemy
could not be ejected from the position he had taken up until Chirimba
Hill had been occupied. The Gold Coast Regiment accordingly camped at a
place two miles from Rock Camp, with an advanced post thrown out a mile
further down the road. Its further losses during the afternoon were 1
man killed, 10 wounded, and 1 carrier missing, who was believed to have
been killed.
On the 11th April the rest of “Rosecol” moved forward to the camp which
the Gold Coast Regiment had established over night, and at dawn the
advanced guard, consisting of I Company and two Stokes guns, advanced to
the forward post a mile further down the road. From this point an
officer’s patrol consisting of one section of I Company under Captain
Webber was sent out on the left to occupy the peak at the eastern
extremity of Chirimba Hill, at the foot of which a post had been
established by Captain Harris on the preceding evening. His right rested
on the road, the section being thence strung out through the bush to the
foot of the hill.
Simultaneously another section of I Company, under Lieutenant Barrett,
was pushed out on the right of the road, its left keeping touch with
Captain Webber’s right. Yet a third section of I Company, under
Lieutenant Bisshopp, was deployed on Lieutenant Barrett’s right.
Lieutenant Barrett’s section was the first to come into action, a small
party of the enemy opening fire upon it and then retiring. It was also
seen by one of the enemy’s observation-points posted on Chirimba Hill,
for it was shelled by the Portuguese field-gun, which was posted in the
bush somewhere in the neighbourhood of Medo _boma_ to the right front of
the advance. A section of A Company was sent out still more to the right
to move along a track to the north which ran parallel to the main road,
and was often described as “the telegraph road,” as there were vestiges
on it of a line which had been constructed by the Portuguese and
utilized by the enemy.
Major Shaw, who was in command of the advance, decided that it was not
possible to push on further until Chirimba Hill had been cleared of the
enemy, and a section of A Company was sent out to the left to reinforce
Captain Webber’s party. This part of the line came into action early in
the afternoon, and was engaged with the enemy, posted in the thick bush
and low forest on the lower slopes of Chirimba Hill, until about 4.30
p.m. By the end of the day all that had been achieved was the
establishment of a post, occupied by half of I Company under Captain
Webber, on the slopes of Chirimba Hill, the eastern extremity of which
had been cleared of the enemy; while on the right of the road a small
post had been established under a native non-commissioned officer, about
four hundred yards in advance of the point reached by Captain Webber on
the left of the line.
At 4 p.m. “Kartucol” advanced from Rock Camp through the bush to the
south of Chirimba Hill, for the purpose of taking up a position from
which to join on the morrow in a general attack upon Medo; and an hour
later “Rosecol” received orders to advance at 6 a.m. on the following
morning, the attack to be delivered by the Gold Coast Regiment, the 4th
Battalion of the 4th King’s African Rifles forming the force and column
reserve.
On the 12th April the advanced guard, consisting of B Company with two
Stokes guns, under Major Shaw, moved forward at 6 a.m., the 22nd D.M.B.
covering its advance by shelling the bush in which the enemy was
believed to have established himself. The broken, bush-covered country
lent itself to defence, and the enemy’s machine-gun and rifle fire from
the lower slopes of Chirimba Hill was persistent and galling, nor could
even his main position be accurately located. Early in the day, however,
three or four men of I Company scaled the higher peak of Chirimba Hill,
which overlooked that cleared of the enemy the night before, and
succeeded in ejecting therefrom a solitary _Askari_, who had evidently
been engaged in observing for the enemy’s gun.
At this time the advance of “Rosecol” was being opposed by about two
companies of the enemy, the remainder being held in reserve, though the
movement of “Kartucol” round the southern side of Chirimba Hill had not
yet been discovered by Kohl. The resistance offered was, as usual, of a
very determined character, and the progress made by the attacking force
was proportionately slow.
During the whole of the advance the Stokes guns belonging to the Gold
Coast Regiment were of the greatest assistance. Under the command of
Captain Foley and Lieutenant Lamont, these guns had been almost
continuously employed in all recent actions, and while the companies of
the Regiment had taken it in turn to bear the brunt of the work, the
Stokes gun team and their officers had a record of almost continuous
activity. On this occasion they had opened fire as soon as ever the
machine-guns came into action, throwing their shells about one hundred
and fifty to three hundred yards to the right and left of the advance on
both sides of the road. When the line halted to fire, fifteen minutes
were allowed the Stokes guns to take up fresh positions, generally about
fifty yards in the rear of the firing-line. This worked very well, and
the advance, though slow, was practically continuous until about 12.30
p.m., when the enemy developed a very stout resistance, and held the
Gold Coast Regiment up for nearly three hours.
At 2 p.m. two sections of A Company, under Captain Wheeler, were sent
forward to reinforce Major Shaw, and to extend the line on the right of
the advance; and an hour later the Headquarters of the Regiment, with
two sections of I Company, advanced, and Colonel Goodwin took over the
command from Major Shaw. The latter then went forward and assumed the
command of the firing-line, which at this time had worked its way along
the northern face of Chirimba Hill, and was getting clear of its western
extremity. Simultaneously fifty rifles of I Company, with one
machine-gun and one Lewis gun, under the command of Captain Harman, were
sent out to the right of the two sections of A Company, under Captain
Wheeler, with orders to extend the line to the right and to be prepared
to swing the right flank round so as to enfilade the enemy when the
advance was continued.
At about 3 p.m. “Kartucol,” on the southern side of Chirimba Hill, was
heard to be heavily engaged with the enemy, and the resistance offered
to the advance of the Gold Coast Regiment perceptibly slackened. Major
Shaw therefore worked round the western end of the hill and succeeded in
getting into touch with the King’s African Rifles, who had dug
themselves in in a hastily made perimeter camp. At the moment of Major
Shaw’s arrival the enemy was delivering a strong counter-attack upon the
leading troops of “Kartucol,” which were very hard pressed. Major Shaw
at once attacked vigorously, and a very sharp engagement ensued, which
resulted in the Gold Coast Regiment and the King’s African Rifles
driving the enemy back with considerable losses.
Meanwhile half of I Company, under Captain Harman, which, as we have
seen, had been sent out on the extreme right of the advance, had met a
large open swamp, the negotiation of which caused some delay; and as the
firing-line, commanded by Major Shaw, was wheeling steadily to the left,
following the configuration of the ground at the western extremity of
Chirimba Hill, touch with A Company was presently lost. Captain Harman
crossed from the right to the left of the main road, still without
regaining touch with A Company; and soon after firing broke out in front
of him. Advancing in the direction from which the sound came, touch with
the right of A Company was at last regained; but as the whole line
pushed forward the wheel to the left became more and more pronounced,
Major Shaw being engaged at this time in moving round the western
extremity of Chirimba Hill to go to the assistance of “Kartucol.” Just
as this movement began, fire was opened upon Captain Harman’s
half-company from the right flank and right rear, the enemy company,
which had hitherto been held in reserve, having been sent, it is
probable, to join up with the other companies which were delivering a
heavy attack upon the roughly made perimeter camp in which “Kartucol”
was defending itself. The half-section of I Company on the extreme right
of Captain Harman’s little party was hastily faced about to resist the
attack from the right rear, and the section bombers on its left drove
the enemy off from its right front. The attacking party to the right
rear, however, was more persistent, and Colour-Sergeant Thornett, with
three of his machine-gun team and three carriers, who at the moment when
fire was opened upon them had just loaded up in order to move forward,
were all hit, Colour-Sergeant Thornett being killed on the spot. These
losses were caused by a machine-gun which the enemy had captured from
the Portuguese. The reserve gun-team and carriers, however, behaved with
their usual coolness, and they succeeded in getting their gun away, only
leaving one box of ammunition behind them, which was recovered next day.
Sergeant Mudge was wounded badly in the groin and died in the course of
a few minutes, while Lieutenant Barrett was slightly wounded in the
thigh.
Meanwhile the half-section of I Company on the immediate left of the
party which had been thus roughly handled, had gone on with the main
advance, leaving only about twenty-five men to deal with the surprise
attack which had been delivered upon them. They succeeded, none the
less, in driving the enemy off; but recognizing the necessity of
guarding the right flank of the main advance against a possible renewed
attack, and hampered in his movements by the number of his casualties,
Captain Harman decided to remain where he was, and not to attempt for
the moment to regain touch with the troops on his left.
The wounded men were carried back to the place where Colonel Goodwin had
established his Headquarters, the work being done in difficult
circumstances, no stretchers or stretcher-bearers being available.
Darkness fell, and Captain Harman’s little party, having found no
further trace of the enemy, gathered together and began to work over to
the left with the intention of regaining touch with the men under Major
Shaw’s command. These had now joined up with “Kartucol,” as already
mentioned, and had thereafter established themselves in the perimeter
camp which had been hastily dug earlier in the day by the King’s African
Rifles. Here, guided by the bugle-call of I Company, Captain Harman’s
party presently joined them; and the weary men of both columns dossed
down for the night on the bare ground to sleep as best they might,
without food or cover of any description.
While the engagement was in progress Colonel Rose and several members of
his staff had a very narrow escape. They had been walking up and down
the road at some distance to the rear when a loud explosion occurred
within a few feet of them, and a man of the 22nd D.M.B., who a few
moments before had been coming down the road toward them, was blown into
the air, receiving terrible injuries from which he shortly afterwards
died. It was a road-mine which he had touched off—a road-mine
constructed, as usual, of one of the 4·1 shells from the
_Koenigsberg_—and Colonel Rose and his companions, who as it was were
only spattered from head to foot with mud, had during the last quarter
of an hour repeatedly passed within a few inches of the spot where the
slightest pressure upon the surface of the road would have ignited the
charge. These road-mines were found with considerable frequency, and the
men of the Gold Coast Regiment had a rather embarrassing habit of
digging them up, and carrying them to their officers for inspection,
live-fuse and all, handling the lethal things with a reckless
familiarity which it was hair-erecting to witness. On the whole,
however, extraordinarily little damage was done by these man-traps.
Mention has been made of the good work done by the Stokes guns under
Captain Foley and Lieutenant Lamont. These guns, one of the notable
inventions of the Great War, proved to be the ideal artillery for
bush-warfare. Their discharge causes so slight a report that, when
rifle-fire is going on, it is practically inaudible, and it was
therefore very difficult for the enemy to locate the positions from
which the guns were shelling them. On the other hand, the Stokes guns
were very handy and could be got into action with great rapidity, while
the shells thrown by them burst with a particularly loud report that was
not without its moral effect, and threw a very effective charge.
The losses sustained by the Regiment from the 10th to the 12th of April
amounted to 4 Europeans—Colour-Sergeant Thornett, Sergeant Mudge, and
Sergeant Flatman—killed, and Lieutenant Barrett wounded; 10 men killed
and 40 wounded; and 1 carrier killed and 14 wounded—in all 69
casualties. Unfortunately the losses among the rank and file included a
number of old soldiers and section commanders, all of whom were at this
time doubly valuable owing to the experience which they had gained
during nearly four years of almost continuous warfare.
During these three days a great strain was imposed upon Captain J. M.
O’Brien, of the West African Medical Staff, and upon his assistants; and
Captain O’Brien, by no means for the first time, displayed almost
reckless courage while attending to the wounded under fire.
On the 13th April scouting parties sent out from the camp found that, as
usual, the enemy had retired. His primary object had been to delay and
embarrass the British advance, and to make it pay as heavily as might be
for its passage over a few miles of road lying through particularly
difficult country. This he had achieved; and if indeed the _boma_ at
Medo had contained any accumulation of supplies, he had also succeeded
in removing them before he was compelled to evacuate that place, for
none were found when the troops occupied Medo on the 13th April.
Meanwhile “Pamforce,” which throughout the three days’ fighting had been
engaged in attacking and being attacked by an enemy who, from beginning
to end, remained practically invisible, was no nearer the fulfilment of
its purpose—the wearing down or rounding up of von Lettow-Vorbeck’s
forces—than it had been when, more than three months earlier, it had
first landed at Port Amelia.