Philo follows what may have been a Hebrew tradition in explaining the

two names of God, "Elohim" and "Jehovah," as connoting His two chief

attributes: (1) the creative or beneficent, (2) the ruling or

judicial, or, as it is sometimes called, the law-giving power.[224]

Names, as we know, were always regarded by Philo as profound symbols,

and naturally the names of God are of vital import; and the twofold

expression for the Hebrew Deity, of which the higher critics have made

much destructive use, was noticed by the earliest commentators, but

made the basis by them of a constructive theology. The ruling and the

creative attributes of God are outlined and contained in the highest

mode of all, the Logos, "the reason of God in every phase and form of

it that is discoverable and realizable by man." For by the Logos, God

is both ruler and good.[225] This is the profound interpretation of

the story in Genesis, that "God placed at the east of the garden of

Eden the two Cherubim and a flaming sword, which turned every way to

keep the way of the tree of life" (Gen. iv. 24). The Cherubim are the

symbols of the powers of majesty and goodness; the flaming sword is

the Logos; "because," says our author quaintly, "all thought and

speech are the most mobile and the most ardent (_i.e._, the most

intensive) of things, and especially the thought and speech of the

only Principle."[226]

To correspond with the descending attributes of God we have the

ascending dispositions of man towards Him, fear, love, and thirdly

their synthesis in loving knowledge. When we are in the first stage of

religion we obey the law in hope of reward or fear of punishment; when

we have progressed higher in thought, we worship God as the good

Creator; when we have ascended one further stage, we surpass both fear

and love in an emotion which combines them, realizing, as Browning

puts it, that "God is law and God is love." In illustration of this

scheme of Philo's we may examine two passages out of his philosophical

commentary. In the first he is commenting upon the appearance of the

three angels to Abraham as he sat outside his tent (Gen. xviii).[227]

And, by the way, it may be remarked that the Midrash commenting on

this passage notes that it begins, "And the Lord appeared unto

Abraham," and then continues, "And he lifted up his eyes and looked,

and, lo, three men stood before him." Hence we may learn that it was

really the one God who appeared to the Patriarch, and that the three

angels were but a vision of his mind. This is the dominant note of

Philo's interpretation, but he as usual elaborates the old Midrash

philosophically.

"The words," he says, "are symbols of things apprehended by

intelligence alone--the soul receives a triple expression of

one being, of which one is the representative of the actual

existent, and the other two are shadows, as it were, cast

from this. So it happens also in the physical world, for

there often occur two shadows of bodies at rest or in

motion. Let no one suppose, however, that shadow is properly

used in relation to God. It is only a popular use of words

for the clearer understanding of our subject. The reality is

not so, but, as one standing nearest to the truth might say,

the middle one is the Father of the universe, who is called

in Scripture the 'Self-existent'; and those on either side

of Him are the two oldest and chief powers, the Creative and

the Regal. The middle one, then, being attended by the

others as by a bodyguard, presents to the contemplative mind

a mental image or representation now of one and now of

three; of one whenever the soul, being properly purified and

perfectly initiated, rises to the idea which is unmingled

and free from limitation, and requires nothing to complete

it; but of three whenever it has not yet been initiated into

the great mysteries, and still celebrates the lesser rites,

unable to apprehend the Being in itself without

modification, but apprehending it through its modes as

either creating or ruling. This is, as the proverb says, a

second-best course, but yet it partakes of godlike opinion.

But the former does not partake of--for it _is_ itself--the

Godlike opinion, or rather it is truth, which is more

precious than all opinion.

"Further, there are three classes of human character, to

each of which one of the three conceptions of God has been

assigned. The best class goes with the first, the conception

of the absolute Being; the next goes with the conception of

Him as a Benefactor, in virtue of which He is called God;

the third with the conception of Him as a Ruler, in virtue

of which He is called Lord. The noblest character serves Him

who is in all the purity of His absolute Being; it is

attracted by no other thing or aspect, but is solely and

intently devoted to the honor of the one and only Being; the

second is brought to the knowledge of the Father through His

beneficent power; the third through His regal power."

In the second passage, which occurs in the treatise on flight from the

world,[228] Philo is allegorizing the law about founding six cities of

refuge (Exodus xxxii). These are but material symbols for the six

stages of the ascent of the mind to the pure God-idea. The chief city,

the metropolis, is the Divine Logos, next come the two powers already

considered, and then three secondary powers, the retributive, the

law-giving, and the prohibitive. "Very beautiful and well-fenced

cities they are, worthy refuges of souls that merit salvation." Each

of these cities is an aspect of the religious mind; when it settles in

the first it obeys the law from fear of punishment and thinks of God

as the Judge; in the second it observes the precepts in hope of reward

and conceives God as the legislator of a fixed code; in the next it is

repentant and throws itself on God's grace, marking the first step of

the spiritual life. Then it ascends in order to the idea of God as the

governor of the universe, and the emotion which the rabbis called

[Hebrew: yrat shmim], the fear of Heaven; and to the idea of God as the

Creator and the universal Providence, which has as its emotional

reflex the love of Heaven, [Hebrew: 'hbt shmim].

But even this, which is the highest stage for many men, is not an

adequate conception. Above it is the contemplation of God, apart from

all manifestations in the perceptible world, in His ideal nature, the

Logos, which at once transcends and comprehends the universe. And the

attitude of this man can be best expressed perhaps by Spinoza's

phrase, "the intellectual love of God," _amor intellectualis Dei_. The

worshipper of the Logos has grasped and has harmonized all the

manifestations of the Deity; he sees and honors all things in God; he

comprehends the universe as the perfect manifestation of one good

Being.

Is this the highest point which man can reach? Many religious

philosophers have held that it is, but Philo, the mystic, yearning to

track out God "beyond the utmost bound of human thought," imagines one

higher condition. The Logos is only the image or the shadow of the

Godhead.[229] Above it is the one perfect reality, the transcendent

Essence. Now, man cannot by any intellectual effort attain knowledge

of the Infinite as He truly is, for this is above thought. But to a

few blessed mortals God of His grace vouchsafes a mystic vision of His

nature. Thus Moses, the perfect hierophant, had this perfect

apprehension, and passed from intellectual love to holy adoration. And

the true philosopher has as the goal of his aspirations the

heaven-sent ecstasy, in which he sees God no longer through His

effects, or in the modes of His activity, but through Himself in His

own essence. The philosopher, when he receives this vision ([Greek:

epopteia]) is possessed by the Shekinah,[230] and, losing

consciousness of his individuality, becomes at one with God.

So much for Philo's theory of man's upward progress. We may add a word

about his treatment of the problem which troubled thinkers in that

age, and which has harassed theologians ever since, viz., to show how

punishment and evil could be derived from a God who was all-powerful

and all-good. The Gnostics were driven by the difficulty to imagine an

evil world-power, which was in incessant conflict with the Good God:

and popular belief had conjured up a legion of subordinate powers, who

took part in the work of creation and the government of the world.

When Philo is speaking popularly, he accepts this current theology and

speaks also of a punitive power of God[231] ([Greek: dunamis

kolastikê]); but not when he is the philosopher. For then, in

perfect faith, he denies the absolute existence of evil. "It is

neither in Paradise nor indeed anywhere whatsoever."[232] Man,

however, by his free will causes evil in the human sphere; and when

God formed in man a rational nature capable of choosing for itself,

moral evil became the necessary contrary of good.[233] Moreover, the

punitive activity of God, though it seems to cause suffering and

misery, is in truth a good, simulating evil, and if men judged the

universal process as a whole, they would find it all good. The

existence of evil involves no derogation from the perfect unity of

God.

If we have understood correctly Philo's theology, neither Logos, nor

subordinate powers, nor angels, nor demons have an objective

existence; they are mere imaginings of varying incompleteness which

the limited minds of men, "moving in worlds not realized," make for

themselves of the one and only true God. Philo's theology is the

philosophical treatment of Jewish tradition, just as Philo's legal

exegesis is the philosophical treatment of the Torah. While

maintaining and striving to deepen the conception of God's unity, he

aims at expounding to the reason how, on the one hand, that unity is

revealed in the world about us, and how, on the other, we may advance

to its true comprehension. It was, however, unfortunate that Philo

expressed his theology in the current language, which was vague and

inexact, and adapted certain foreign theosophical ideas to Judaism;

hence succeeding generations, paying regard to the pictorial

representation rather than to the principles of his thought, sought

and found in him evidence of theories of Divine government to which

Judaism was pre-eminently opposed. The first chapter of the Fourth

Gospel shows that gradual process of thought which finally made the

Logos doctrine the antithesis of Judaism. In the first verse we have a

thought which might well have been written by Philo himself: "In the

beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was

God." But in the fourteenth verse there is manifest the sharp

cleavage: "And the Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us, and we

beheld his glory, the glory as of the only begotten of the Father,

full of grace and truth." There may be a fine spiritual thought

beneath the letter here, but the notion of the Incarnation is not

Jewish, nor philosophical, nor Philonic. Philo's work was made to

serve as the guide of that Christian Gnosticism which, within the next

hundred years, proclaimed that Judaism was the work of an evil God,

and that the essential mission of Jesus--the good Logos--was to

dethrone Jehovah! But though the Logos conception was turned to

non-Jewish and anti-Jewish purposes, it was in Philo the offspring of

a pure and philosophical monotheism. Whatever the later abuse of his

teaching, Philo constructed a theology which, though affected by

foreign influences, was essentially true to Judaism; and more than

that, he was the first to weave the Jewish idea of God into the

world's philosophy.

* * * * *

VI

PHILO AS A PHILOSOPHER

Save for a few monographs of no great importance, because of the

absence of original thought, Philo's works form avowedly an exegesis

of the Bible and not a series of philosophical writings. Nor must the

reader expect to find an ordered system of philosophy in his separate

works, much more than in the writings of the rabbis. As Professor

Caird says,[234] "The Hebrew mind is intuitive, imaginative, incapable

of analysis or systematic connection of ideas." Philo's philosophical

conceptions lie scattered up and down his writings, "strung on the

thread of the Bible narrative which determines the sequence of his

thoughts." Nevertheless, though he has not given us explicit treatises

on cosmology, metaphysics, ethics, psychology, etc., and though he was

incapable of close logical thinking, he has treated all these subjects

suggestively and originally in the course of his commentary, and his

readers may gather together what he has dispersed, and find a

co-ordinated body of religious philosophy. However loosely they are

set forth in his treatises, his ideas are closely connected in his

mind. Herein he differs from his Jewish predecessors, for the notion

of the old historians of the Alexandrian movement, that there was a

systematic Jewish philosophy before Philo, does not appear to have

been well-founded. All that Aristeas and Aristobulus and the

Apocryphal authors had done was to assimilate certain philosophemes to

their religious ideas; they had not re-interpreted the whole system of

philosophy from a Jewish point of view or traced an independent

system, or an eclectic doctrine in the Holy Scriptures. This was the

achievement of Philo. His thought is not original in the sense of

presenting a new scheme of philosophy, but it is original in the sense

of giving a fresh interpretation to the philosophical ideas of his age

and environment. He ranges them under a new principle, puts them in a

new light, and combines them in a new synthesis. This again is

characteristic of the Jewish mind. Intent on God, it does not endeavor

to make its own analysis of the universe by independent reasoning, but

it utilizes the systems of other nations and endeavors to harmonize

them with its religious convictions. Hence it is that nearly all

Jewish philosophy appears to be eclectic; its writers have ranged

through the fields of thought of many schools and culled flowers from

each, which they bind together into a crown for their religion. They

do not, with few exceptions, pursue philosophy with the purpose of

widening the borders of secular knowledge; but rather in order to

bring the light of reason to illuminate and clarify faith, to

harmonize Judaism with the general culture of its environment, and to

revivify belief and ceremony with a new interpretation. All this

applies to our worthy, but at the same time he was a philosopher at

heart, because he believed that the knowledge of God came by

contemplation as well as by practice, and, further, because he had a

firm faith in the universalism of Judaism; and he believed that this

universal religion must comprehend all that is highest and truest in

human thought. Like most Jewish philosophers he is synthetic rather

than analytic, believing in intuition and distrusting the discursive

reason, careless of physical science and soaring into religious

metaphysics. Again, like most Jewish philosophers, he is deductive,

starting with a synthesis of all in the Divine Unity, and making no

fresh inductions from phenomena. It has been said that, though Philo

was a philosopher and a Jew, yet Saadia was the first Jewish

philosopher. But Philo's philosophical ideas are in complete harmony

with his Judaism; and if by the criticism it is meant that most of the

content of his works is based upon Greek models, it is true on the

other hand that the spirit which pervades them is essentially Jewish,

and that by the new force which he breathed into it he reformed and

gave a new direction to the Greek philosophy of his age.

Philo's philosophy is certainly eclectic in some degree, and we find

in it ideas taken from the schools of Plato, Aristotle, Pythagoras,

and the Stoics. Its fixed point was his theology, and wherever he

finds anything to support this he adapts it to his purpose. He

approached philosophy from a position opposed to that of the Greeks:

they brought a questioning and free mind to the problems of the

universe; he comes full of religious preconceptions. Yet in this lies

his strength as well as his limitation, for he gains thus a point of

certainty and a clear end, which other eclectic systems of the day did

not possess. He welds together all the different elements of his

thought in the heat of his passion for God. His cosmology and his

ontology are a philosophical exposition of the Jewish conception of

God's relation to the universe, his ethics and his psychology of the

Jewish conception of man's relation to God.

The religious preconceptions of Philo drew him to Plato above all

other philosophers, so that his thought is essentially a religious

development of Platonism. It is not too much to say that Philo's work

has a double function, to interpret the Bible according to Platonic

philosophy and to interpret Plato in the spirit of the Bible. The

agreement was not the artificial production of the commentator, for in

truth Plato was in sympathy with the religious conscience as a whole.

The contrast between Hellenism and Hebraism is true, if we restrict it

to the average mind of the two races. The one is intent on things

secular, the other on God. But the greatest genius of the Hellenic

race, influenced perhaps by contact with Oriental peoples, possessed,

in a remarkable degree, the Hebraic spirit, which is zealous for God

and makes for righteousness. Plato was not only a great philosopher,

but also a great theologian, a great religious reformer, and a great

prophet, the most perfectly developed mind which the world, ancient or

modern, has known. His "Ideas," which are the archetypes of sensible

things, were not only logical concepts but also a kingdom of Heaven

connected with the human individual by the Divine soul. And as he grew

older so his religious feeling intensified, and he translated his

philosophy into theology and positive religion. Platonism, it has been

well said, is a temper as much as a doctrine; it is the spirit that

turns from the earth to Heaven, from creation to God. In his last

work, "The Laws," wherein he designs a theocratic state, which has

striking points of resemblance with the Jewish polity, he says: "The

conclusion of the matter is this, which is the fairest and truest of

all sayings, that for the good man to sacrifice and hold converse with

the Deity by means of prayers and service of every kind is the noblest

thing of all and the most conducive to a happy life, and above all

things fitting."[235]

This is typical of Plato's attitude towards life in his old age; and

further, his metaphysical system of monistic idealism is the most

remarkable approach to Hebrew monotheism which the Greek world made.

The Patristic writers in the first centuries of the Christian era were

so struck by this Hebraism in the Greek thinker, that they attributed

it to direct borrowing. Aristobulus had written of a translation of

the Pentateuch older than the Septuagint, which Plato was supposed to

have studied. Clement called him the Hebrew philosopher, Origen and

Augustine comment on his agreement with Genesis, and think that when

he was in Egypt he listened to Jeremiah.[236] Eusebius worked out in

detail his correspondences with the Bible. Some early neo-Platonist,

perhaps Numenius, declared that Plato was only the Attic Moses; and in

more modern times the Cambridge Platonists of the sixteenth century

harbored similar ideas, and Nietzsche spoke bitterly of the day when

"Plato went to school with the Jews in Egypt."

Of Philo, then, we may say, as Montaigne said of himself, that he was

a Platonist before he knew who Plato was. Yet he was the first

Hellenistic Jew who perceived the fundamental harmony between the

philosopher's idealism and Jewish monotheism, and he was the first

important commentator of Plato who developed the religious teaching of

his master into a powerful spiritual force.

It is true that the seeds of neo-Platonism, _i.e._, the religious

re-interpretation of Platonism under the influence of Eastern thought,

had been sown already; and Philo must have received from his

environment to some extent the mystical version of the master's

system, with its goal of ecstatic union with God, and its tendency to

asceticism as a means thereto. But the earlier products of the

movement had been crude, and had lacked a powerful moving spirit. This

was provided by Philo when he introduced his overmastering conception

of God. The popular saying, "Either Plato Philonizes or Philo

Platonizes"[237] contains a deep truth in its first as well as in its

second part. It not only marks the likeness in style of the two

writers, but it suggests that Philo, on the one hand, made fruitful

the religious germ in Plato's teaching by his Hebraism, and, on the

other, nourished the philosophical seed in Judaism by his Platonism.

Plato's teaching falls into two main classes, the dialectical and the

mythical, and it is with the latter that Philo is in specially close

connection. For in his myths Plato tries to achieve a synthesis by

imaginative flight where he had failed by discursive reason. He

unifies experience by striking intuitions, something in the spirit of

a Hebrew prophet. Moreover his style, as well as his thought, has here

affinity with Jewish modes of thought. As Zeller says, speaking of the

myths: "From the first, in the act of producing his work he thinks in

images. They mark the point where it becomes evident that he cannot be

wholly a philosopher because he is still too much of a poet." And this

is true of all Philo's writings, and to generalize somewhat widely, of

most Jewish philosophy. In "The Timæus," particularly, Plato,

throughout, is the poet-philosopher, writing imaginative myths, which

present pictorially an idealistic scheme of the universe; and "The

Timæus" is for Philo, after the Bible, the most authoritative of

books, the source of his chief philosophical ideas.

The dominant philosophical principle of Plato is what is known as the

Theory of Ideas. He imagined a world of real existences, invisible,

incorporeal, eternal, grasped only by thought, prior to the objects of

the physical universe, and the models or archetypes of them. In "The

Timæus," which is a system of cosmology at once religious and

metaphysical, the "Ideas" are represented as the thoughts of the one

Supreme Mind, the intermediate powers by which the Supreme Unity,

known as the "Idea of the Good," or "the Creator," evolves the

material universe. Thus the universe is seen as the manifestation of

one Beneficent Spirit, who brings it into existence and rules over it

through His "ideal" thoughts. Philo adopts completely and uncritically

this theory of transcendental ideas in his philosophical exegesis of

the cosmogony in Genesis. "Without an incorporeal archetype God brings

no simple thing to fulfilment."[238] There is an idea of stars, of

grass, of man, of virtue, of music. And the Platonic conception

receives a religious sanction. The ideas are a necessary step between

God and the material universe, and those who deny them throw all

things into confusion.[239] "God would not touch matter Himself, but

He did not grudge a share of His nature to it through His powers, of

which the true name is ideas." We have already noticed[240] how

ingeniously Philo deduces the Theory of Ideas from the Biblical

account of the creation, and associates it with the Hebraic conception

of the ministerial Wisdom and Word. He, however, gives a new direction

to the Platonic theory, owing to his Hebraic conception of God. The

ideas with him are not the thoughts of an impersonal mind, but the

emanations of a personal, volitional Deity. Keeping close to Jewish

tradition, he says that they are the words of the Deity speaking. As

human speech consists of incorporeal ideas, which produce an effect

upon the minds of others, so the Divine speech is a pattern of

incorporeal ideas which impress themselves upon a formless void, and

so create the material world.[241] In this way Philo associates his

cosmology with his theology. The creative "Ideas" are equated

collectively with the Supreme Logos,[242] individually with the Logoi

which represent God's particular activities. Thus the Logos represents

the whole ideal or noetic world, "the kingdom of Heaven"; and it is in

this metaphysical sense that the Logos is the first creation, "the

first-born son of God," prior to the physical universe, which is His

grandson. The whole universe is thus seen as the orderly manifestation

of one principle. Philo, expanding a favorite image of the Haggadah,

illustrates God's creation by the simile of a king founding a city.

"He gets to him an architect, who first designs in his mind the parts

of the perfect city, and then, looking continually to his model,

begins to construct the city of stones and wood. So when God resolved

to found the world-city, He first brought its form into mind, and

using this as a model he completed the visible world."[243]

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