“You mentioned Sir Henry Bulwer, in your note, in reply to the
apology of the Spanish Government, as the person whom you would have
preferred to send to Madrid; and that was enough to disgust the Spanish
Government and the Spanish people.”
No, at the time when the conduct of Sir Henry Bulwer became the subject
of discussion in this House, there was not a man of any side who did
not do him justice; and no one expressed himself more handsomely in
regard to Sir Henry Bulwer than did the Right Honorable Baronet, the
Member for Tamworth. Sir, it is not always fitting to tell diplomatic
secrets to the House of Commons. Yet I am obliged, in vindication of
myself, to do so on this occasion; and to tell the House, but of course
in strict confidence, that those two notes--namely, the note of apology
from the Spanish Government, and our note of answer, were mutually
communicated to and approved by each Government beforehand. Yes, those
notes were communicated confidentially and were agreed to by both
Governments before they were officially interchanged.
However, sir, the Right Honorable Baronet, the Member for Ripon,
says that these affairs of Spain were of long duration, and produced
disastrous consequences, because they were followed by events of the
greatest importance, as regards another country, namely, France.
He says, that out of those Spanish quarrels and Spanish marriages,
there arose differences between England and France, which led to no
slighter catastrophe than the overthrow of the French monarchy. This
is another instance of the fondness for narrowing down a great and
national question to the smallness of personal difference. It was my
dislike to M. Guizot, forsooth, arising out of these Spanish marriages,
which overthrew his administration, and with it the throne of France!
Why, sir, what will the French nation say when they hear this? They
are a high-minded and high-spirited nation, full of the sense of their
own dignity and honor--what will they say when they hear it stated
that it was in the power of a British Minister to overthrow their
Government, and their monarchy? Why, sir, it is a calumny on the French
nation to suppose that the personal hatred of any foreigner to their
Minister could have this effect. They are a brave, a generous, and a
noble-minded people; and if they had thought that a foreign conspiracy
had been formed against one of their Ministers--I say, that if the
French people had thought that a knot of foreign conspirators were
caballing against one of their Ministers, and caballing for no other
reason than that he had upheld, as he conceived, the dignity and
interests of his own country; and if they had thought that such a knot
of foreign conspirators had coadjutors in their own land, why, I say
that the French people, that brave, noble, and spirited nation, would
have scorned the intrigues of such cabal, and would have clung the
closer to, and have supported the more, the man against whom such a
plot had been made. If, then the French people had thought that I, or
any other Foreign Minister, was seeking to overthrow M. Guizot, their
knowledge of such a design, so far from assisting the purpose, would
have rendered him stronger than ever, in the post which he occupied.
No, Sir, the French Minister and the French monarchy were overthrown
by far different causes. And many a man, both in this country and
elsewhere, would have done well to have read a better lesson from the
events which then took place.
We had, indeed, a difference with the Government of France relative to
the Spanish marriages.[19] I do not wish to open again questions that
are gone by, or to remind the House or the country of the grounds of
complaint which we had then, as I think, justly, against those who
are no longer in power. But since I am pressed upon this matter, and
as it is one count of the long indictment preferred against me, I
must say, in my own defence, that the dissatisfaction which we felt
was not groundless. I must say, too, that I formed my judgment from
communications made to me by the noble Lord, (the Earl of Aberdeen),
whom I succeeded in the office I hold--from statements from his own
mouth, made to me in that interview which always take place between the
Foreign Minister who goes out, and the Minister who comes in. I learned
from that source, that promises had been made in regard to these
marriages--not only by a Minister to a Minister, but between far higher
personages--promises, the like of which, so far as I am aware of,
have never before in the history of Europe been broken; and yet those
promises were deliberately broken. If we felt dissatisfaction then at
those marriages, that dissatisfaction was just and well-founded; and
upon every ground of national interest and honor, we were entitled,
nay, bound, to express it.
Before I quit this subject, I must say that in my opinion the policy
which we have pursued in regard to France has been consistent with
the interests of this country, and has been characterized by an
observance of the principles which the honorable and learned gentleman
whose resolution we are discussing, thinks ought to govern our
foreign policy, and which are calculated to preserve, as they have
preserved, the peace of Europe. Our prompt acknowledgment in 1848
of the Government established in France, and the kindly relations
which we have maintained with the successive chiefs of administration
in that country, sufficiently show that we have been animated by a
kindly feeling towards the French nation; and that in our opinion
the maintenance of friendly relations with that country is not only
consistent with our interests and our dignity, but also forms a firm
foundation for the peace of Europe.
The Right Honorable Baronet, the Member for Ripon, has insinuated that
the Marquess of Normandy, in the period immediately preceding the
events of February, 1848, had been in too intimate connection with
some of the persons whom he describes as the parties who overthrew the
throne of France. I know not whom he means, but this I know, that the
person with whom the Marquess of Normandy was perhaps in the most
frequent communication, because he was an old and intimate friend, was
Count Mole; and I have yet to learn that he is a man who was likely
to do anything to overthrow, either intentionally or unintentionally,
the monarchy of France. But, if that insinuation was meant to convey
an imputation that the Marquess of Normandy had done anything, or had
held any intercourse inconsistent with his position as the ambassador
of a friendly Power, then I say that imputation is totally and entirely
unfounded.
Well, sir, I leave the sunny plains of Castile, and the gay vineyards
of France, and now I am taken to the mountains of Switzerland, as the
place where I am to render a stricter account.[20]
* * * * *
With regard to our policy with respect to Italy, I utterly deny the
charges that have been brought against us of having been the advocates,
supporters, and encouragers of revolution. It has always been the fate
of advocates of temperate reform and of constitutional improvement to
be run at as the fomenters of revolution. It is the easiest mode of
putting them down; it is the received formula. It is the established
practice of those who are the advocates of arbitrary government to say,
“Never mind real revolutionists; we know how to deal with them; your
dangerous man is the moderate reformer; he is such a plausible man; the
only way of getting rid of him is to set the world at him by calling
him a revolutionist.”
Now, there are revolutionists of two kinds in this world. In the first
place there are those violent, hot-headed, and unthinking men, who fly
to arms, who overthrow established governments, and who recklessly
without regard to consequences, and without measuring difficulties and
comparing strength, deluge their country with blood, and draw down
the greatest calamities on their fellow-countrymen. These are the
revolutionists of one class. But there are revolutionists of another
kind; blind-minded men, who, animated by antiquated prejudices,
and daunted by ignorant apprehensions, dam up the current of human
improvement, until the irresistible pressure of accumulated discontent
breaks down the opposing barriers, and overthrows and levels to the
earth those very institutions which a timely application of renovating
means would have rendered strong and lasting. Such revolutionists as
these are the men who call us revolutionists. It was not to make
revolutions that the Earl of Minto[21] went to Italy, or that we, at
the request of the Governments of Austria and Naples, offered our
mediation between contending parties.
* * * * *
With respect to the questions which arose last Autumn about Turkey, no
blame has been imputed to her Majesty’s Government for the course which
we pursued on that occasion in answer to the appeal made by Turkey,
to this country and to France, for moral and material assistance. On
that point all parties agreed. It is a proud and honorable recollection
which Englishmen may treasure up, that on any occasion like that, all
party differences were merged in high and generous national feeling;
and that men of all sides concurred in thinking, that the Government of
the Queen would not have been justified in rejecting an appeal so made,
on such a subject.
But it has been said that we ought to have confined our interference,
at first, to sending a despatch, and that we should not have sent
our fleet until we knew whether our despatches would produce the
desired effect. That would have been a very imprudent and unwise
course of proceeding. The agents of the two Imperial Governments
at Constantinople had used most menacing language to the Porte; had
demanded the surrender of the refugees in the most peremptory manner;
and said, that if they did not receive a categorical answer within a
limited time they would suspend diplomatic relations. In short, they
intimated that a refusal of their demands might lead to war. We had
no means at the time of knowing whether this violent and peremptory
language was or was not authorized by the Courts of Russia and Austria,
and whether those Governments were prepared to enforce by actual
hostilities the threat so held out. It was impossible to say what might
occur in the interval between the 6th and the 26th of October; between
the day when the despatches of the British Government were sent off
to St. Petersburgh and Vienna, and the day when, if it were necessary
on the receipt of those answers to send a fleet, that fleet, sent
only after the answers were received, could reach the place where its
services might be required. The Government did what men of prudence
would do, who mean to do that which they profess.[22]
But it has been said that the sending of this fleet was a threat
against Russia and Austria. I utterly deny that the sending of the
fleet was a threat against either one or the other. A fleet at the
Dardanelles was not a threat against Austria. If it had been in the
Adriatic, it might have been so regarded. A fleet in the Mediterranean
was not a threat against Russia. Had it forced its way through the
Dardanelles and Bosphorus, and had gone up to the Black Sea, and had
anchored off Sebastopol, it might have been so considered. But a fleet
at the mouth of the Dardanelles could be a threat against nobody; it
must be manifest to the world that it could only be a symbol and source
of support to the Sultan. It was a measure purely of defence and not a
measure of offence.
But then we are told that our fleet by anchoring within the outer and
inner castles of the Dardanelles, violated, not the Treaty of Unkiar
Skelessi, as was said by mistake, but the Treaty of London, concluded
in July, 1841, between the five Powers and Turkey, with respect to the
passage of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus. The British Government are
accused of violating that treaty by ordering Sir W. Parker to enter the
Dardanelles.
Now, by the Treaty of 1809, between England and Turkey, England bound
herself to respect the rule of the Turkish Empire, by which, while
Turkey is at peace, the Straits of Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus are
closed against the ships of war of foreign Powers. But it was not till
the Treaty of 1841 that the same engagement was also taken by all the
other four Powers. I concur entirely with the Right Honorable Baronet,
the Member for Ripon, in thinking that this was a wise and politic
arrangement, eminently advantageous to Turkey, and conducive to the
peace of Europe. Because when it is considered how easy it would be, if
these narrow straits were open to the armed ships of other countries
in times of peace, for any maritime Power when she had a discussion
of any kind with the Turkish Government, to support the friendly
representations of her Minister at Constantinople by the of course,
accidental visit of a large fleet off the Seraglio Point--whether
the fleet came from the Black Sea or the Mediterranean, it appears
essential for the maintenance of the independence of the Porte, that
no armed vessel of other Powers should, when the Porte is at peace, be
allowed to enter either of those straits.
By the Treaty of July, 1841, Austria, France, Great Britain, Russia,
and Prussia, all bound themselves to respect that regulation of the
Porte. It so happens, however, that that treaty did not specify
precisely what those straits are, whether they comprise the whole
distance between the Mediterranean and the Sea of Marmora, and the
whole distance between the Sea of Marmora and the Black Sea, or whether
they consist only of such portion of those channels as are technically
called the Straits of Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. At the entrance of
the Dardanelles from the Mediterranean, there is a broad bay between
the outer and the inner castles, and it is from the inner castles to
the Sea of Marmora that the channel continues narrow. At the inner
castles reside the Consuls; and it is there that tolls are taken from
vessels passing; and there the firmans are delivered to allow vessels
to pass up. In regulations established by the Porte in 1843, it was
stated in general terms, that foreign ships of war and merchantmen
should be admitted to this bay, between the outer and inner castles,
for safe anchorage, and to wait there to know whether they would be
allowed to go further. When the fleet under Sir W. Parker arrived
at Besica Bay, which is on the coast of Asia Minor, the Turkish
Government, who expressed great gratitude to Sir Stratford Canning for
the arrival of our fleet, stated an apprehension that the anchorage in
Besica Bay in certain states of wind and weather was not safe for large
ships and they offered to send an authority to admit the fleet under
Sir W. Parker, and not only it, but the French fleet also, into the
outer anchorage of the Dardanelles, at times when it would be dangerous
for them to remain at Besica Bay. That was communicated to the British
Consul at the Dardanelles, and to the Turkish Pasha in command there.
A week or ten days after Sir W. Parker had arrived at Besica Bay, the
wind coming on to blow from the quarter from which it made that open
anchorage insecure, Sir W. Parker went with his squadron to Barber’s
Bay, the outer anchorage of the Dardanelles. But I had written to Sir
Stratford Canning specially to desire that in order to avoid all cavil
and discussions, the fleet should not enter into the Dardanelles,
unless wanted at Constantinople for the purposes for which it was sent.
Sir Stratford Canning accordingly communicated with Sir W. Parker, and
after the squadron had remained a week or ten days in Barber’s Bay
to refit, it left that anchorage and returned to Besica Bay with the
understanding that if stress of weather should again drive it thence,
it should not return to Barber’s Bay, but should seek shelter elsewhere.
The Russian and Austrian Governments afterwards made representations
both to the Porte and to her Majesty’s Government on this matter;
stating that they considered the entrance of the British fleet into
Barber’s Bay as a contravention of the Treaty of July, 1841. It might
have been contended that the presence of the British fleet in the outer
bay was not a violation of what was intended by the treaty; because the
treaty bound the five Powers to conform to the regulations of the Porte
in regard to the two Straits of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles; and
the standing regulations of the Porte admitted ships of war, as well
as merchantmen, to enter into and remain in Barber’s Bay, and to wait
there for a decision whether they could be allowed to go farther up or
not. But the Government did not think it wise, right, or proper to take
their stand on so narrow a ground. Having desired that the Treaty of
July, 1841, should be concluded, they thought it better to adopt the
strictest interpretation of that treaty, the interpretation put upon
it by Russia, that the Straits of Bosphorus and Dardanelles should be
held to mean the whole distance between the Black Sea and the Sea of
Marmora on the one side, and between the Mediterranean and the Sea of
Marmora on the other; so that if British ships of war should not enter
the bay between the inner and outer castles of the Dardanelles on the
one side, Russian ships of war should not on the other hand be allowed
to anchor at Buyukdere in the Bosphorus, where merchant ships from the
Black Sea are in the custom of stopping. It is needless to mention that
this prohibition does not apply to light ships, such as corvettes and
steamers, employed for the missions at Constantinople; the firman of
the Porte being first obtained for their passing.
I believe I have now gone through all the heads of the charges which
have been brought against me in this debate. I think I have shown that
the foreign policy of the Government in all transactions with respect
to which its conduct has been impugned, has throughout been guided by
those principles which, according to the resolution of the honorable
and learned gentleman, the Member for Sheffield, ought to regulate the
conduct of the Government of England in the management of our foreign
affairs. I believe that the principles on which we have acted are those
which are held by the great mass of the people of this country. I am
convinced that these principles are calculated, so far as the influence
of England may be properly exercised with respect to the destinies
of other countries, to conduce to the maintenance of peace, to the
advancement of civilization, to the welfare and happiness of mankind.
I do not complain of the conduct of those who have made these matters
the means of attack upon her Majesty’s Ministers. The Government of a
great country like this is undoubtedly an object of fair and legitimate
ambition to men of all shades of opinion. It is a noble thing to be
allowed to guide the policy and to influence the destinies of such a
country; and, if ever it was an object of honorable ambition, more than
ever must it be so at the moment of which I am speaking. For while we
have seen as stated by the Right Honorable Baronet, the Member for
Ripon, the political earthquake rocking Europe from side to side--while
we have seen thrones shaken, shattered, levelled; institutions
overthrown and destroyed--while in almost every country of Europe
the conflict of civil war has deluged the land with blood; from the
Atlantic to the Black Sea, from the Baltic to the Mediterranean this
country has presented a spectacle honorable to the people of England,
and worthy of the admiration of mankind.
We have shown that liberty is compatible with order; that individual
freedom is reconcilable with obedience to law; we have shown the
example of a nation, in which every class of society accepts with
cheerfulness the lot which Providence has assigned to it; while at
the same time every individual of each class is constantly striving
to raise himself in the social scale--not by injustice and wrong,
not by violence and illegality--but by persevering good conduct, and
by the steady and energetic exertion of the moral and intellectual
faculties with which his Creator has endowed him. To govern such a
people as this, is indeed an object worthy of the ambition of the
noblest man who lives in the land; and therefore I find no fault with
those who may think the opportunity a fair one, for endeavoring to
place themselves in so distinguished and honorable a position. But
I contend that we have not in our foreign policy done anything to
forfeit the confidence of the country. We may not, perhaps, in this
matter or in that, have acted precisely up to the opinion of one person
or another--and hard indeed it is, as we all know by our individual and
private experience, to find any number of men agreeing entirely in any
matter, on which they may not be equally possessed of the details of
the facts, and circumstances, and reasons, and conditions which led to
action. But, making allowance for those differences of opinion which
may fairly and honorably arise among those who concur in general views,
I maintain that the principles which can be traced through all our
foreign transactions, as the guiding rule and directing spirit of our
proceedings, are such as deserve approbation. I therefore fearlessly
challenge the verdict which this House, as representing a political,
a commercial, a constitutional country, is to give on the question
now brought before it: whether the principles on which the foreign
policy of her Majesty’s Government has been conducted, and the sense
of duty which has led us ourselves bound to afford protection to our
fellow-subjects abroad, are proper and fitting guides for those who are
charged with the Government of England; and whether, as the Roman,
in days of old, held himself free from indignity, when he could say
_Civis Romanus sum_; so also a British subject, in whatever land he may
be, shall feel confident that the watchful eye and the strong arm of
England will protect him against injustice and wrong.