SIR:

Anxious as many members are to deliver their sentiments upon this most

important question, yet I am sure they will feel that it is due myself,

that it is due to this House, that it is due to the country, that I

should not permit the second night of this debate to close without

having stated to the House my views upon the matters in question and my

conduct, for which I have been called to account.

When I say that this is an important question, I say it in the fullest

expression of the term. It is a matter which concerns not merely the

tenure of office by one individual, or even by a government; it is a

question that involves principles of national policy, and the deepest

interests as well as the honor and dignity of England. I cannot think

that the course which has been pursued, and by which this question

has assumed its present shape, is becoming those by whose act it has

been brought under the discussion of Parliament, or such as fitting

the gravity and the importance of the matters which they have thus

led this House and the other House of Parliament to discuss. For if

that party in this country imagine that they are strong enough to

carry the Government by storm, and take possession of the citadel of

office; or if, without intending to measure their strength with that of

their opponents, they conceive that there are matters of such gravity

connected with the conduct of the Government, that it becomes their

duty to call upon Parliament solemnly to record its disapprobation

of what has passed, I think that either in the one case or in the

other, that party ought not to have been contented with obtaining the

expression of the opinion of the House of Lords, but they ought to have

sent down their resolution for the consent and concurrence of this

House; or, at least, those who act with them in political co-operation

here, should themselves have proposed to this House to come to a

similar resolution. But, be the road what it may, we have come to the

same end; and the House is substantially considering whether they will

adopt the resolution of the House of Lords, or the resolution which has

been submitted to them by my honorable and learned friend, the Member

for Sheffield.

Now, the resolution of the House of Lords involves the future as well

as the past. It lays down for the future a principle of national

policy which I consider totally incompatible with the interests, with

the rights, with the honor, and with the dignity of the country;

and at variance with the practice, not only of this, but of all

other civilized countries in the world. Even the person who moved

it was obliged essentially to modify it in his speech. But none of

the modifications contained in the speech were introduced in the

resolution adopted by the other House. The country is told that British

subjects in foreign lands are entitled--for that is the meaning of the

resolution--to nothing but the protection of the laws and the tribunals

of the land in which they happen to reside. The country is told the

British subjects abroad must not look to their own country for

protection, but must trust to that indifferent justice which they may

happen to receive at the hands of the government and tribunals of the

country in which they may be.

The House of Lords has not said that this proposition is limited

to constitutional countries. The House of Lords has not said that

the proposition is inapplicable, not only to arbitrary and despotic

countries, but even to constitutional countries where the courts of

justice are not free; although these limitations are stated in the

speech. The country is simply informed by the resolution, as it was

adopted, that, so far as foreign nations are concerned, the future rule

of the Government of England is to be, that, in all cases, and under

all circumstances, British subjects are to have the protection only

which the law and the tribunals of the land in which they happen to be

may give them.

No! I deny that proposition; and I say it is doctrine on which no

British Minister ever yet has acted, and on which the people of England

never will suffer any British Minister to act. Do I mean to say that

British subjects abroad are to be above the law, or are to be taken

out of the scope of the laws of the land in which they live? I mean

no such thing; I contend for no such principle. Undoubtedly, in the

first instance, British subjects are bound to have recourse for redress

to the means which the law of the land affords them, when that law

is available for such a purpose. That is the opinion which the legal

advisers of the Crown have given in numerous cases; and it is the

opinion on which we have founded our replies to many applications for

our interposition in favor of British subjects abroad.[9]

* * * * *

I say then, that if our subjects abroad have made complaints against

individuals, or against the government of a foreign country, if the

courts of law of that country can afford them redress, then, no doubt,

to those courts of justice the British subject ought in the first

instance to apply; and it is only on a denial of justice, or upon

decisions manifestly unjust, that the British Government should be

called upon to interfere. But there may be cases in which no confidence

can be placed in the tribunals, those tribunals being, from their

composition and nature, not of a character to inspire any hope of

obtaining justice from them. It has been said, “We do not apply this

rule to countries whose governments are arbitrary or despotic, because

there the tribunals are under the control of the government, and

justice cannot be had; and, moreover, it is not meant to be applied to

nominally constitutional governments where the tribunals are corrupt.”

But who is to be the judge, in such a case, whether the tribunals are

corrupt or not? The British Government, or the Government of the state

from which you demand justice?

I will take a transaction that occurred not long ago, as an instance

of a case in which, I say, the people of England would not permit a

British subject to be simply amenable to the tribunals of the foreign

country in which he happened to be. I am not going to talk of the

power of sending a man arbitrarily to Siberia; nor of a country

the constitution of which vests despotic power in the hands of the

sovereign. I will take a case which happened in Sicily, where, not long

ago, a decree was passed that any man who was found with concealed

arms in his possession should be brought before a court-martial, and,

if found guilty, should be shot. Now, this happened. An innkeeper of

Catania was brought before a court-martial, and accused under this

law by some police officers, who stated that they had discovered in

an open bin, in an open stable in his inn-yard, a knife which they

denounced as a concealed weapon. Witnesses having been examined, the

counsel for the prosecution stated that he gave up the case, as it

was evident there was no proof that the knife belonged to the man, or

that he was aware it was in the place where it was found. The counsel

for the defendant said that such being the opinion of the counsel for

the prosecution, it was unnecessary for him to go into the defence,

and he left his client in the hands of the court. The court, however,

nevertheless pronounced the man guilty of the charge brought against

him, and the next morning the man was shot.

Now what would the English people have said if this had been done to a

British subject? And yet everything done was the result of a law, and

the man was found guilty of an offence by a tribunal of the country.

I say, then, that our doctrine is that, in the first instance, redress

should be sought from the law courts of the country; but that in cases

where redress cannot be so had--and those cases are many--to confine a

British subject to that remedy only, would be to deprive him of the

protection which he is entitled to receive.

Then the question arises, how does this rule apply to the demands we

have made upon Greece? And here I must shortly remind the House of the

origin of our relations with Greece, and of the condition of Greece;

because those circumstances are elements that must enter into the

consideration of the course we have pursued.

It is well that Greece revolted from Turkey in 1820. In 1827, England,

France, and Russia determined upon interposing, and ultimately, in

1828, they resolved to employ forcible means in order to bring Turkey

to acknowledge the independence of Greece. Greece, by protocol in 1830,

and by treaty in 1832, was erected into a separate and independent

state. And whereas nearly from the year 1820 up to the time of that

treaty of 1832, when its independence was finally acknowledged, Greece

had been under a Republican form of government, with an Assembly and a

President, the three Powers determined that Greece should thenceforth

be a monarchy. But while England assented to that arrangement, and

considered that it was better that Greece should assume a monarchical

form of government, yet we attached to that assent an indispensable

condition, that Greece should be a constitutional monarchy. The British

Government could not consent to place the people of Greece, in their

independent political existence, under as arbitrary a government as

that from which they had revolted. Consequently, when the three Powers,

in the exercise of that function which had been devolved upon them by

the authority of the General Assembly of Greece, chose a sovereign for

Greece, (for that choice was made in consequence of, and by virtue

of the authority given to them by the General Assembly of Greece),

and when Prince Otho of Bavaria, then a minor, was chosen; the three

Powers, on announcing the choice they had made, at the same time

declared King Otho would, in concert with his people, give to Greece

constitutional institutions.

The choice and that announcement were ratified by the King of Bavaria

in the name, and on the behalf of his son. It was, however, understood,

that during the minority of King Otho, the establishment of the

constitution should be suspended; but that when he came of age, he

should enter into communication with his people, and, together with

them, arrange the form of constitution to be adopted. King Otho came

of age, but no constitution was given. There was a disinclination on

the part of his advisers to counsel him to fulfil that engagement.

The Government of England expressed an opinion, through various

channels, that that engagement ought to be fulfilled. But opinions

of a different kind reached the royal ear from other quarters. Other

governments, naturally--I say it without implying any imputation--are

attached to their own forms. Each government thinks its own form and

nature the best, and wishes to see that form, if possible, extended

elsewhere. Therefore, I do not mention this with any intention of

casting the least reproach upon Russia, or Prussia, or Austria. Those

three governments at that time were despotic. Their advice was given

and their influence was exerted to prevent the King of Greece from

granting a constitution to his people. We thought, however, that in

France we might find sympathy with our political opinions, and support

in the advice which we wished to give. But we were unfortunate. The

then Government of France, not at all undervaluing constitutional

institutions, thought that the time was not yet come when Greece could

be ripe for representative government. The King of Bavaria leaned also

to the same side. Therefore, from the time when the King came of age,

and for several years afterward, the English Government stood in this

position in Greece with regard to its government--that we alone were

anxious for the fulfilment of the engagement of the King, while all the

other Powers who were represented at Athens were averse to its being

made good, or at least were not equally desirous of urging it upon the

King of Greece. This necessarily placed us in a situation, to say the

least of it, of disfavor on the part of the agents of those Powers, and

on the part of the Government of Greece. I was sorry for it; at the

same time, I don’t think the people of this country will be of opinion

that we ought, for the sake of obtaining the mere good-will of the

Greek Government, to have departed from the principle which we had laid

down from the beginning. But it was so; and when people talk of the

antagonistic influences which were in conflict at the Greek Court; and

when people say, as I have heard it said, that our Ministers, and the

Ministers of foreign governments, were disputing about the appointment

of _mirarchs_ and _nomarchs_, and God knows what petty officers of the

state, I say that, as far as our Minister was concerned, that is a

statement entirely at variance with the fact. Our Minister, Sir Edmund

Lyons, never, during the whole time he was in Greece, asked any favor

of any sort or kind, for himself, or for any friend. No conduct of

that mean and low and petty description was carried on by any person

connected with the English Government. It was known that we wished the

Greek nation should have representative institutions, while, on the

other hand, other influences were exerted the other way; and that, and

that only, was the ground of the differences which existed.

One of the evils of the absence of constitutional institutions was that

the whole system of government grew to be full of every kind of abuse.

Justice could not be expected where judges of the tribunals were at the

mercy of the advisers of the Crown. The finances could not be in any

order where there was no public responsibility on the part of those

who were to collect or to spend the revenue. Every sort of abuse was

practised.

In all times in Greece, as is well known, there has prevailed,

from the daring habits of the people, a system of compulsory

appropriation--forcible appropriation by one man of that which

belonged to another; which, of course, is very disagreeable to those

who are the victims of the system, and exceedingly injurious to

the social condition, improvement, and prosperity of the country.

In short, what foreigners call brigandage, which prevailed under

the Turkish rule, has not, I am sorry to say, diminished under the

Greek sovereignty. Moreover, the police of the Greek Government

have practised abuses of the grossest description; and if I wanted

evidence on that subject, I could appeal to the honorable gentleman

who has just sat down, who, in a pamphlet, which all must have read,

or ought to read, has detailed the instances of barbarity of the

most revolting kind practised by the police. I have here depositions

of persons who have been subjected to the most abominable tortures

which human ingenuity could devise--tortures, inflicted upon both

sexes, most revolting and disgusting. One of the officers, a man of

the name of Tzino, at the head of the police, was himself in the

habit of inflicting the most diabolical tortures upon Greeks and

upon foreigners, Turks, and others. This man Tzino, instead of being

punished as he ought to have been, and as he deserved to be, not only

by the laws of nature, but by the laws of Greece--this person, I am

sorry to say, is held in great favor in quarters where he ought to have

received nothing but marks of indignation.

Well, this being the state of things in Greece, there have always been

in every town in Greece, a great number of persons whom we are bound to

protect--Maltese, Ionians, and a certain number of British subjects.

It became the practice of this Greek police to make no distinction

between the Maltese and Ionians, and their fellow-subjects. We shall

be told, perhaps, as we have already been told, that if the people of

the country are liable to have heavy stones placed upon their breasts,

and police officers to dance upon them; if they are liable to have

their own heads tied to their knees, and to be left for hours in that

state; or to be swung like a pendulum, and to be bastinadoed as they

swing, foreigners have no right to be better treated than the natives,

and have no business to complain if the same things are practised

upon them. We may be told this, but that is not my opinion, nor do I

believe it is the opinion of any reasonable man. Then, I say, that in

considering the case of the Ionians, for whom we demand reparation, the

House must look at and consider what was the state of things in this

respect in Greece; they must consider the practices that were going on,

and the necessity of putting a stop to the extension of these abuses to

British and Ionian subjects by demanding compensation, scarcely indeed

more than nominal in some cases; but the granting of which would be an

acknowledgement that such things should not be done toward us in the

future.

In discussing these cases, I am concerned to have to say that they

appear to me to have been dealt with elsewhere in a spirit and in

a tone which I think was neither befitting the persons concerning

whom, nor the persons by whom, nor the persons before whom the

discussion took place. It is often more convenient to treat matters

with ridicule than with grave argument; and we have had serious things

treated jocosely; and grave men kept in a roar of laughter, for an

hour together, at the poverty of one sufferer, or at the miserable

habitation of another; at the nationality of one injured man, or at

the religion of another; as if because a man was poor he might be

bastinadoed and tortured with impunity; as if a man who was born in

Scotland might be robbed without redressal, or because a man is of

the Jewish persuasion, he is fair game for any outrage.[10] It is a

true saying and has often been repeated, that a very moderate share of

wisdom is sufficient for the guidance of human affairs. But there is

another truth, equally indisputable, which is, that a man who aspires

to govern mankind ought to bring to the task generous sentiments,

compassionate sympathies, and noble and elevated thoughts.

Now, sir, with regard to these cases, I would take first that which I

think would first present itself to the mind of an Englishman--I mean

the insult offered by the arrest of the boat’s crew of her Majesty’s

ship _Fantôme_. The time has been when a man aspiring to a public

situation would have thought it his duty to vindicate the honor of the

British navy. Times are changed. It is said that in this case there

were only a few sailors taken out of a boat by some armed men--that

they were carried to the guardhouse, but were soon set at liberty

again--and why should we trouble our heads about so small a matter?

But did we ask anything extraordinary or unreasonable on account of

this insult? What we asked was an apology. I really did not expect to

live to see the day, when public men in England could think that in

requiring an apology for the arbitrary and unjustifiable arrest of a

British officer and British seamen in the performance of their duty, we

were making a demand “doubtful in its nature, and exaggerated in its

amount.” Now, what is the history of this case? For circumstances have

been referred to, in connection with it, which do not appear from the

statement of the case itself. The son of the Vice-Consul, who had dined

on board the _Fantôme_, was taken ashore in the evening by the coxswain

and a boat’s crew, and landed on the beach. The coxswain accompanied

the young gentleman to his father’s house, and on returning to the boat

was taken prisoner by the Greek guard. The guard went down to the boat,

and, finding the seamen in it were without arms, began thumping them

with the butt-ends of their muskets, and wounded one man in the hand

by a thrust of a bayonet. The guard then took the seamen prisoners,

and carried them to the guardhouse; where after a certain time they

were released through the interposition of the Vice-Consul, and they

returned to their ship. Excuses were given for this proceeding, and the

gist of them was this--that the guard thought the boat belonged to the

_Spitfire_, and that it had been seen landing rebels, one of whom had

escaped;--this supposed rebel being a boy of fourteen years old, who

had returned quietly to his father’s house.

The matter to which these excuses related occurred a little while

before, in consequence of the disorganized state of Greece--a

disorganization, by the by, which arises entirely from the acts of

the Government: because it has been, and still is, the practice of

the Government, instead of punishing brigands, to give amnesty to and

pardon them; and, indeed, it is even supposed that the officers of

the police sometimes go shares in the plunder. That, however, is a

matter of opinion; but it is a fact that the robbers are almost always

pardoned; and such is the encouragement thereby given to the system

of plunder that the robbers go about armed, in bands, and sometimes

actually attack and occupy towns.

An instance of this kind happened at Patras. Merenditi, the leader of a

band of robbers, attacked Patras; the governor had an armed force under

his orders; but, whether from a determination to follow the example

set by the government of showing deference to the robbers, or because

he thought that discretion is the better part of valor, he fled, and

left the town to the mercy of the banditti. The inhabitants, finding

themselves deserted by their natural defenders, threw themselves on

the protection of the foreign consular body, and begged and intreated

that the Consuls would intercede for them, and make some arrangement

with the robbers. Our Consul accordingly, at the intercession and with

the authority of the principal inhabitants of Patras, entered into

an arrangement with the leader of the robbers, by which that leader

consented to forego the plunder of the town, on condition that he

should receive a certain sum of money and be conveyed away from the

town in safety by one of the British ships of war. The people of Patras

were thankful. The money required by the robbers, which was reduced by

negotiation to one half of their original demand, was collected and

deposited in the hands of the Vice-Consul. Merenditi marched down to

the quay to embark; when the governor, who had run away from danger,

now advanced boldly with his men, and endeavored to attack the robbers’

rear-guard, and to take some of them prisoners before they could

embark. Our officers, however, said, “No. There is not only honor

amongst thieves, but honor to be observed towards thieves. We were

asked to make an arrangement, and to give our guarantee--we will abide

by that guarantee, and protect this man and his band.” Accordingly he

was protected, and went off with the ransom paid by the inhabitants

of the town. This was the matter which was alluded to, when the Greek

authorities said that the guard supposed the boat’s crew, whom they

had made prisoners, had been landing rebels from the _Spitfire_--they

pretended to suppose that the boat had landed some of Merenditi’s band.

Surely no defence is necessary for having demanded an apology for an

insult offered the British navy. I am induced to believe that the

governments of other countries would have taken more severe measures

under similar circumstances.

I now come to the case of the Ionians who were plundered in the

custom-house at Salcina. These men were passing by in boats; they were

summoned to go in by the officer in command, and, when in, they were

robbed. The men who robbed them were dressed like soldiers, but were

said to be banditti. The customs officer alleged that he was beaten

by the robbers, and compelled by them to order the Ionians to enter

the custom-house. It must be remembered, however, that a Greek vessel

lying in the custom-house was not plundered; while the Ionians were

plundered, stripped of their clothes, and severely beaten. It is absurd

to compare a case of this kind with that of travellers attacked by

robbers in passing through a country.

If the government officer was not acting in connivance with the

robbers, still, when foreigners were decoyed into a Greek custom-house

by one of its officers, and were there beaten and plundered, the Greek

Government must be held responsible for what was done. This, however,

is said to be a case in which the unhappy Ionian boatmen ought to have

gone to law. I should like to know whom they could have prosecuted?

In this instance, our demand was moderate; we asked nothing for the

indignity and injury the men suffered, but simply the amount of which

they had been robbed.

I next come to the case of the two Ionians who, very innocently, as

they imagined, on a national festival, according to the custom of

their own country, ornamented their little booths, in which they sold

trifling articles, with flags. The police interfered and took down the

flags. Some discussion arose about indignity offered to the British

flag. The matter was not satisfactorily explained, but we let it drop.

We did not insist on that; and, if that had been all, nothing further

would have been said. But the Ionians were arrested, manacled and

thumbscrewed; and in that state paraded through the town, and put in

prison. It was said, “How could they go to prison except through the

streets?” True; but there was no necessity for taking them through

streets which did not lie in their way. They were paraded, by way of

insult, through the streets of Patras, and dismissed next day, because

no charge could be maintained against them. Then it was said that the

application of the thumbscrew had not maimed them for life. Had that

indeed been the case, the men would have been entitled to compensation;

but for a very little thumbscrewing, applied during an evening walk, no

compensation ought to have been required. I am of a different opinion.

Thumbscrews are not as easy to wear as gloves, which can be put on and

pulled off at pleasure. We therefore felt it necessary to require, in

this case, the moderate compensation of £20 each, for the men who had

been ill treated; and the more so, because of the habitual infliction

of torture by the police.

Then came the case of two men, whose houses being infested by

disagreeable insects, thought proper in hot weather to sleep in the

streets. They were taken up by the police, carried before an officer,

and severely flogged with a whip in the sight of persons who deposed to

the fact. What right had the Greek authorities to flog these men? They

had committed no offence; there had been no trial, no condemnation, no

sentence. In this case, also, compensation was demanded, as a token

that persons under British protection cannot be ill treated with

impunity.

Then I come to the case of Mr. Finlay.[11] It is said that he is a

“cannie Scot”; that he speculated in land, buying in the cheapest, and

wishing to sell in the dearest market. His land was taken by the King

of Greece, for purposes of private enjoyment. Nobody will deny that it

is fitting the Sovereign of Greece should have a palace; and, if it

was necessary to take Mr. Finlay’s ground for site, or for the garden

attached to it--Mr. Finlay himself made no objection to that. All that

Mr. Finlay wanted was to be paid for his land at a very cheap rate.

That was a matter with which the Greek Government had nothing to do;

they had only to pay Mr. Finlay what was the value of the land at the

time when they took it from him.

The conduct of the Greek Government in Mr. Finlay’s case was very

different from that of Frederick the Great in a similar case towards

one of his subjects, a man of humble rank. This man refused to sell

his sovereign a little bit of ground on which a windmill stood, the

ground being necessary for the completion of a magnificent plan of

residence for the monarch. The conduct of the King of Prussia was very

different from that of the King of Greece. The King of Prussia, though

a conqueror in the field and the absolute monarch of a great country,

respected the rights of a subject however humble; and not only left

the monument of the independence of his subject, standing in the midst

of his ornamented grounds, but used to point to it with pride, feeling

that it was proof that though he was great and powerful, he knew how to

respect the rights of the meanest. For fourteen long years Mr. Finlay

was driven from pillar to post, put off with every sort of shuffling

and evasive excuse, and deprived of compensation for his land, unless

he would take what was wholly inadequate.

In 1843 came a revolution. Till 1843 the Greek Government had

continued arbitrary; the King declining, under the circumstances I

have mentioned, to grant a constitution. In 1843 the patience of the

Greeks was exhausted. They rose in Athens, and extorted by force that

which had been refused to reason. When the constitution was granted,

courts of justice were established, which were not indeed independent,

because the judges were liable, not only to be removed from one court

to another, but to be entirely dismissed at the will of the sovereign;

still in 1843 there were courts to which Mr. Finlay might, as it has

been stated, have applied. But they were of no competence with respect

to events which had happened before their creation. Mr. Finlay,

therefore, had no remedy. But I have heard it most triumphantly,

distinctly, positively asserted, that this case exhibits the bad faith

of the English Government; for that at the time when Mr. Wyse made his

demands on the Greek Government, we and he knew the case of Mr. Finlay

was absolutely, finally, and conclusively settled. No such thing. That

is an assertion absolutely, finally, and conclusively at variance with

the truth.

There had been an agreement made for arbitration in this case; and

a most curious sample it affords of the manner in which things are

carried on in Greece. Mr. Finlay said, “I will submit my claim to

arbitration.” “By all means,” was the reply of the Greek Government;

“you shall have one arbiter and we another.” But Mr. Finlay has been

described as a “cannie Scot,” and looking far into the future, he

foresaw a possibility, which might have struck a man even not so far

north, that the two arbiters might differ; and he suggested that an

umpire be appointed. The Greek Government said, “You are quite right.”

But Mr. Finlay, being a sensible man, did not like to submit his case

to a tribunal where there would be two to one against him, and so

he declined the arbitration. The Greek Government then gave up this

unreasonable proposal, which they had made just as if it had been quite

a matter of course, and a commission of arbitration was agreed upon,

consisting of two respectable people, and an umpire properly appointed.

If that arbitration had gone on, and the money awarded by it had been

paid, Mr. Finlay’s case would have been absolutely, finally, and

conclusively settled. But by the law of Greece, arbiters so appointed

must pronounce an award within three months, or, if they don’t, then

the arbitration falls and drops to the ground. The commissioners could

not make their award without certain documents, which could only be

furnished by an officer of the Greek Government. This officer, by some

unfortunate accident, did not furnish them, and the arbitration fell to

the ground by efflux of time.

Therefore, when Baron Gros came to inquire into the matter, he found

this case just as it had been when Mr. Finlay first made his complaint.

Baron Gros said to Mr. Finlay, “Why, your claim is settled.” “Settled?

No,” said Mr. Finlay. “Why, have you not received your money?” “Not

a farthing; and I don’t know what amount I am to receive.” In short,

his case was exactly in the same state in which it was before the

arbitration had been agreed to.

That was a case in which we made no specific demand. The only specific

demand was, that Mr. Finlay should receive whatever the value of his

land should be found to be. We fixed no sum: we were unable to fix

any; and the sum he received afterward was the amount which the two

arbiters, one named by Mr. Finlay, the other by the Greek Government,

were prepared to award, splitting the difference between their

respective estimates. I don’t think that in that case, the claim was

either doubtful in justice, or exaggerated in amount.

Then we came to the claim of M. Pacifico--a claim which has been the

subject of much unworthy comment. Stories have been told, involving

imputations on the character of M. Pacifico; I know nothing of the

truth or falsehood of these stories. All I know is that M. Pacifico,

after the time to which those stories relate, was appointed Portuguese

Consul, first to Morocco and afterward to Athens. It is not likely that

the Portuguese Government would select for appointments of that kind, a

person whose character they did not believe to be above reproach. But I

say, with those who have before had occasion to advert to the subject,

that I don’t care what M. Pacifico’s character is. I do not, and cannot

admit, that because a man may have acted amiss on some other occasion,

and in some other matter, he is to be wronged with impunity by others.

The rights of a man depend on the merits of the particular case; and

it is an abuse of argument to say that you are not to give redress to

a man, because in some former transaction he may have done something

which is questionable. Punish him if you will--punish him if he is

guilty, but don’t pursue him as a Pariah through life.

What happened in this case? In the middle of the town of Athens, in

a house which I must be allowed to say is not a wretched hovel, as

some people have described it;--but it does not matter what it is, for

whether a man’s home be a palace, or a cabin, the owner has a right to

be there safe from injury--well, in a house which is not a wretched

hovel, but which in the early days of King Otho was, I am told, the

residence of the Count Armansperg, the Chief of the Regency--a house

as good as the generality of those which existed in Athens before

the sovereign ascended the throne--M. Pacifico, living in this house

within forty yards of the great street, within a few minutes’ walk of

a guardhouse where soldiers were stationed, was attacked by a mob.

Fearing injury, when the mob began to assemble, he sent an intimation

to the British Minister, who immediately informed the authorities.

Application was made to the Greek Government for protection. No

protection was afforded. The mob, in which were soldiers and _gens

d’armes_, who, even if officers were not with them, ought, from a

sense of duty, to have interfered and to have prevented plunder--the

mob headed by the sons of the Minister of War, not children eight or

ten years old, but older--that mob, for nearly two hours, employed

themselves in gutting the house of an unoffending man, carrying away

or destroying every single thing the house contained, and left it a

perfect wreck.

Is not that a case in which a man is entitled to redress from somebody?

I venture to think it is. I think that there is not a civilised country

where a man subject to such grievous wrong, not to speak of the insults

and injuries to the members of his family, would not justly expect

redress from some quarter or other. Where was he to apply for redress

at Athens? The Greek Government neglected its duty, and did not pursue

judicial inquiries, or institute legal prosecutions as it might have

done for the purpose of finding out and punishing some of the culprits.

The sons of the Minister of War were pointed out to the Government as

actors in the outrage. The Greek Government were told to “search a

particular house; and that some part of M. Pacifico’s jewels would

be found there.” They declined to prosecute the Minister’s sons, or

to search the house. But, it is said, M. Pacifico should have applied

to a court of law for redress. What was he to do? Was he to prosecute

a mob of five hundred persons? Was he to prosecute them criminally,

or in order to make them pay the value of his loss? Where was he to

find his witnesses? Why, he and his family were hiding or flying,

during the pillage, to avoid the personal outrages with which they

were threatened. He states that his own life was saved by the help of

an English friend. It was impossible, if he could have identified the

leaders, to have prosecuted them with success.

But what satisfaction would it have been to M. Pacifico, to have

succeeded in a criminal prosecution against the ringleaders of the

assault? Would that have restored to him his property? He wanted

redress, not revenge. A criminal prosecution was out of the question,

to say nothing of the chances, if not the certainty, of failure, in a

country where the tribunals are at the mercy of the advisers of the

Crown, the judges being liable to be removed, and being often actually

removed upon grounds of private and personal feeling. Was he to

prosecute for damages? His action would have lain against individuals,

and not, as in this country, against the hundred.[12] Suppose he had

been able to prove that one particular man carried off one particular

thing, or destroyed one particular article of furniture; what redress

could he anticipate by a lawsuit, which, as his legal advisers told

him, it would be vain for him to undertake? M. Pacifico truly said, “If

the man I prosecute is rich, he is sure to be acquitted; if he is poor,

he has nothing out of which to afford compensation if he is condemned.”

The Greek Government having neglected to give protection they were

bound to extend, and having abstained from taking means to afford

redress, this was a case in which we were justified in calling on the

Greek Government for compensation for the losses, whatever they might

be, which M. Pacifico had suffered. I think that claim was founded in

justice. The amount we did not pretend to fix. If the Greek Government

had admitted the principle of the claim, and had objected to the

account sent in by M. Pacifico--if they had said, “This is too much,

and we think a less sum sufficient,” that would have been a question

open to discussion, and which our Ministers, Sir E. Lyons at first,

or Mr. Wyse afterwards, would have been ready to have gone into, and

no doubt some satisfactory arrangement might thus have been effected

by the Greek Government. But the Greek Government denied altogether

the principle of the claim. Therefore, when Mr. Wyse came to make the

claim, he could not but demand that the claim should be settled, or be

placed in train of settlement, and that within a definite period, as he

fixed it, of twenty-four hours.

Whether M. Pacifico’s statement of his claim was exaggerated or not,

the demand was not for any particular amount of money. An investigation

might have been instituted, which those who acted for us were prepared

to enter into, fairly, dispassionately, and justly.

M. Pacifico having, from year to year, been treated either with answers

wholly unsatisfactory, or with a positive refusal, or with pertinacious

silence, it came at last to this, either that his demand was to be

abandoned altogether, or that, in pursuance of the notice we had given

the Greek Government a year or two before, we were to proceed to use

our own means of enforcing the claim. “Oh! but,” it is said, “what an

ungenerous proceeding to employ so large a force against so small a

power!” Does the smallness of a country justify the magnitude of its

evil acts? Is it held that if your subjects suffer violence, outrage,

plunder, in a country which is small and weak, you are to tell them

when they apply for redress, that the country is so weak and so small

that we cannot ask it for compensation? Their answer would be, that the

weakness and smallness of the country make it so much the more easy to

obtain redress. “No,” it is said, “generosity is to be the rule.” We

are to be generous to those who have been ungenerous to you; and we

cannot give you redress because we have such ample and easy means of

procuring it.

Well, then, was there anything so uncourteous in sending, to back

our demands, a force which should make it manifest to all the world

that resistance was out of the question? Why, it seems to me, on the

contrary, that it was more consistent with the honor and dignity of

the Government on whom we made those demands, that there should be

placed before their eyes a force, which it would be vain to resist,

and before which it would be no indignity to yield. If we had sent

merely a frigate and a sloop of war, or any force with which it was

possible their forces might have matched, we should have placed them

in a more undignified position by asking them to yield to so small a

demonstration. Therefore, so far from thinking that the amount of the

force which happened to be on the spot was any aggravation of what

was called the indignity of our demand, it seems to me that the Greek

Government, on the contrary, ought rather to have considered it as

diminishing the humiliation, whatever it might be, of being obliged

to give at last to compulsion, that which had been so long refused to

entreaty.

Well, then, however, did we, in the application of that force, either

depart from established usage, or do anything that was unnecessarily

pressing on the innocent and unoffending population of Greece? I say

the innocent and unoffending population, because it was against the

Government, and not against the nation, that our claim for redress was

directed. The courses that may be pursued in cases where wrong is done

by one Government towards the subjects of another are various. One is

what is commonly called “reprisals”; that is, the seizing something of

value, and holding it in deposit until your demands are complied with;

or, if you fail in that and don’t choose to resort to other methods,

applying that which you have seized, as a compensation for the wrong

sustained. That is one method. Another is the modified application

of war--such as a blockade--a measure frequently adopted by the

governments of maritime states when they demand redress for injuries.

Last come actual hostilities. Many instances of such measures have

been quoted in this debate as having been adopted by the governments

of other countries, especially by the French Government, when they

have had a demand to make for injuries sustained by their subjects;

and, by the by, when people complain of the peremptory manner in

which our demand was made, and the shortness of the time allowed for

consideration, I wish to call to the recollection of the Honorable

Gentlemen what was done by the French squadron no longer ago than 1848.

There was an insurrection at Naples, in May, 1848. The great street

of the town was filled with barricades, and the troops had to force

those barricades. To do that, they were obliged to occupy the houses

right and left, in order to turn those defences; and as they forced

one house after another, and passed on from house to house, they

neglected to leave any guards behind them. They were followed by the

Lazzaroni,[13] and the houses were plundered. Some French people

whose shops were thus rifled, complained to the French Minister, and

to the French Admiral--there being then a French squadron before the

port at Naples. The French Admiral, Admiral Baudin, quite cut out Sir

W. Parker, and being applied to by those French citizens, he sails

up the bay, lays his ships broadside to, in front of the palace, and

writes a note to the Government to say, that he has been called on by

his countrymen to protect them; and he adds--that letter being dated

half-past one on the 17th of May--that unless by three o’clock of that

very day he obtains a satisfactory assurance--a satisfactory assurance

that his countrymen shall be efficiently protected, reserving, he says,

for future discussion their claims for compensation--but--

“Unless in one hour and a half I get, on board this ship, a

satisfactory assurance that they shall be efficiently protected, I

shall land the crews of my fleet, and will take care of them myself.”

Well, then, I say that Sir W. Parker acted with the greatest moderation

in enforcing our demands. He began with reprisals, not with a blockade,

wishing to avoid all unnecessary interruption to the commerce of other

countries. But he made reprisals in a way which I believe has not often

been adopted. The Government was the offending party, and he took

possession of vessels belonging to the Government. Now, that is not the

usual plan, and for very good reasons.

Vessels belonging to governments are armed. They may feel it to be

their duty to defend themselves. To seize armed vessels would probably

lead to bloodshed; and reprisals are generally effected by seizing

merchant vessels belonging to the country on whom the demand is made.

But, the disparity of force being so great on this occasion, Sir W.

Parker began by seizing the few armed vessels belonging to the state.

He then gave the Government time to reflect upon that demonstration. It

was not attended to. Even then he did not immediately proceed to make

reprisals upon merchant vessels. He first laid an embargo upon them.

He gave notice that he had placed a lien upon them, and that they must

not quit their ports. That failed; then he took merchant vessels,

but only a limited number, and placed them under the custody of his

fleet, avoiding to subject commerce in general to any greater degree

of restraint than was unavoidably necessary for the execution of his

instructions. It has been said, that we seized upon fishing-boats, and

interrupted the coasting trade. I don’t believe that. On the contrary,

I believe that the embargo did not extend to fishing-boats, or to

vessels of small tonnage employed in the coasting trade of the country.

Well, sir, in that state of things, the French Government offered us

their good offices and mediation. We readily and cheerfully accepted

their good offices. We accepted them by a note of the 12th of February,

which has been laid on the table, and in which we distinctly stated the

grounds and conditions on which, and the extent to which, those good

offices were accepted.

There could be no mistake between the English and French Governments

upon that point. We took as our precedent the course that was pursued

in the sulphur questions at Naples, when M. Thiers was Minister. In

that case, we stated that reprisals would be suspended the moment any

French Minister on the spot declared himself authorized to negotiate.

In the said present case we went further, and said, that the moment the

good offices of France were officially offered and officially accepted,

we would send out instructions that the further making of reprisals

should be suspended. In both cases we said we could not release the

ships that had been detained, because by so doing we should give up the

security which we held in our hands against the offending Government.

It has been stated that a misunderstanding arose between the

Governments of France and England, in the course of the mediation, good

offices, or whatever it may be called. I cannot say that there was any

misunderstanding between M. Drouyn de Lhuys and myself, because it will

be seen from his own despatches laid before the French Chamber, that he

clearly understood the conditions on which the good offices of France

were accepted. He repeatedly states that England gives up none of her

demands--that is to say, that she gives up none of the principles of

her demands; and that the only questions which the French negotiator

is competent to discuss are those which did not involve the negation

of the principles of our demands. Well, what were those questions?

They were only the amount of money to be given to Mr. Finlay and to M.

Pacifico, but not the question whether those gentlemen were to receive

anything or nothing.

Then the question arose between us, what were the circumstances under

which the good offices were to cease, and coercive measures were to be

resumed; and it was distinctly understood on my part, as well as on

that of M. Drouyn de Lhuys, that Mr. Wyse was not to take upon himself

to determine when Baron Gros’s mission had failed; and that it was only

when Baron Gros should have announced that his mission had ceased, that

Mr. Wyse was to resume coercive measures. It was further agreed between

us, and especially on the 9th of April, that if a difference of opinion

arose between Baron Gros and Mr. Wyse, on those points which Baron Gros

was competent to discuss, Mr. Wyse was not to stand absolutely on his

difference, and that if he did not find it possible to give way, he

was, instead of saying, “Now, Baron Gros, your mission is at an end,”

to refer home for further instructions. It is said that it was wrong of

me not to have sent out to Mr. Wyse information of that understanding,

come to on the 9th of April with M. Drouyn de Lhuys. Well, but in the

first place I had already sent to Mr. Wyse, on the 25th of March,

instructions which, if acted on in the spirit in which they were

written, would render such a reference home altogether unnecessary. And

they did render such reference home altogether unnecessary; because

at last, when Baron Gros and Mr. Wyse came to the point of difference

as to the amount of money to be paid, and Baron Gros said, “I would

counsel the Government of Greece to pay 150,000 drachmas,” while Mr.

Wyse said he was ready to accept 180,000 drachmas, Mr. Wyse at last,

much more prudently than if he had referred this difference home, and

had exposed Greek commerce to the restraint to which a continuance of

the _status quo_ would have subjected it for a whole month, said, “I

will, if other things are agreed to, come down to your amount--I will

waive my opinion, and accept the sum you are willing to recommend the

Greek Government to give.” Therefore, practically, I say, and in the

result, the case did not arise to which those instructions could have

applied.

Those instructions, if they had reached Mr. Wyse, would not have

applied to the difference which did arise between him and Baron Gros;

for that difference was this--it turned upon the claims of M. Pacifico.

Baron Gros, on the 16th of April, was willing to recommend to the

Greek Government to take an engagement to investigate the claims of M.

Pacifico, in regard to the destruction of his Portuguese documents; and

to pay him whatever might be the amount which, upon investigation, he

might prove to be entitled to on that account; and to make a deposit of

150,000 drachmas as a pledge for the good faith with which they would

execute that engagement. The only difference between Baron Gros and Mr.

Wyse upon that occasion was, that Baron Gros proposed that the deposit,

which they had both agreed should consist of shares of the Bank of

Athens, should be left in the Bank of Athens; whereas Mr. Wyse required

that it should be deposited either in the Bank of England, or, if the

Greek Government preferred it, in the Bank of France. That seemed to be

a difference that might be easily settled. But, on the 22d of April,

Baron Gros altered his opinion. He retracted his opinion upon that

point, and stated that later information from Portugal had convinced

him, that M. Pacifico’s claim, in reference to the destruction of his

Portuguese documents, was wholly unfounded. Baron Gros said he would

no longer consent to recommend the Greek Government to enter into any

engagement to pay anything to M. Pacifico on that account. He would

agree to an investigation, but only provided that Portugal, and not the

Greek Government should pay what might turn out to be due. But this was

a point which Baron Gros was not competent to discuss. This new view

of his would have been a negation of the principle upon which one of

our claims rested; and, there being a difference of that kind between

Mr. Wyse and Baron Gros, Mr. Wyse had no occasion to refer for fresh

instructions--for he had received detailed instructions from me in a

despatch, dated the 25th of March, sufficient to guide his conduct upon

that point.

Baron Gros then withdrew from the negotiation, and that withdrawal

was officially communicated, not only to Mr. Wyse, but to the Greek

Government also. On the 24th, however, he received a despatch from

General Lahitte, giving an account of the conversation which had

passed between me and M. Drouyn de Lhuys, on the 9th; an account, by

the way, which was not quite accurate, because it made me say that if

any difference arose between Baron Gros and Mr. Wyse, Mr. Wyse should

refer home for instructions; whereas all that I agreed to was, that

such reference should be made in the case of irreconcilable difference

between them, as to the amount of money to be paid by the Greek

Government for those claims in regard to which we had not specified

fixed sums; that is to say, for Mr. Finlay’s land and for M. Pacifico’s

losses of furniture and goods at Athens. Baron Gros then proposed to

withdraw the note, by which he announced officially the cessation of

his functions, and he asked that his draft of arrangement, together

with Mr. Wyse’s draft, should be referred to London for decision.

An impression has gone abroad that on that occasion (the 24th), Baron

Gros received, and communicated to Mr. Wyse, not merely an account

of the conversation between me and M. Drouyn de Lhuys on the 9th of

April, but an account of the essential basis and an announcement

of the expected arrival of the draft of convention which had been

proposed to me by M. Drouyn de Lhuys for the first time on the 15th,

discussed on the 16th, agreed to on the 18th, and sent off on the

19th; and Mr. Wyse is greatly blamed by many persons, both here and

in France, upon the assumption that, whereas Baron Gros had informed

him, on the 24th of April, that the English and French Governments

had come to an agreement as to the essential bases of the convention

to be signed between England and Greece, and had moreover told him

that the convention itself would shortly be received at Athens--yet

nevertheless, with this knowledge of the facts, he renewed coercive

measures, and compelled the Greek Government to yield to his own

demands. This assertion, so far as Mr. Wyse is concerned, is positively

untrue. It is totally and wholly untrue. He received no communication

from Baron Gros on the 24th, and none earlier than the 2d of May,

relative to the draft of the convention agreed upon in London. Whether

Baron Gros received the information or not on the 24th by the _Vauban_,

I leave to be settled between him and his Government. The explanations

of General Lahitte would indeed lead to the inference that he did not.

The statement to which I refer was made by “our own correspondent” of

the _Times_. I may say, in passing that one person who has spoken on

this subject elsewhere, has had the substance of his speech claimed

publicly by the _Morning Herald_ as a compilation from its leading

articles; and another has obviously been more indebted to the _Times_

than to the blue books for the statements on which he has founded his

assertions. But the correspondent of the _Times_ stated distinctly, and

upon that statement public opinion in this country has been formed,

that Baron Gros did inform Mr. Wise on the 24th, that he had received

by the _Vauban_ a statement announcing the London convention, and that,

in spite of that information, Mr. Wyse resumed coercive measures.

I understand that the French Government say that this is an entire

mistake; that no information respecting the convention could have

been communicated to Mr. Wyse on the 24th, because Baron Gros did not

receive any by the _Vauban_, which arrived on that day. The complaint,

therefore, against Mr. Wyse, come from what quarter it may, and I have

no doubt it was sincerely believed at the moment it was made, that

complaint can no longer be maintained, and is withdrawn.

With respect to the other complaint, that I did not write to Mr. Wyse

an account of what had passed on the 9th of April, the simple reason

why I did not was, that he was already in possession of instructions

which were sufficient; that I could not have written till the 17th,

and that on the 15th another arrangement was proposed, which provided

an immediate settlement on the spot, and which therefore rendered any

further reference to me by him out of the question. But it was said

that if the French Government could have sent information to Baron Gros

by the _Vauban_, why could not we have sent at the same time similar

information to Mr. Wyse? Why, solely because we were in London, and

the French Government was in Paris, and that if a steamer had been

despatched by us from Portsmouth, it could not have got round to

Athens so soon as a steamer despatched by the French Government from

Marseilles or Toulon. But, as I have said, the convention of the 15th

having been agreed to, all further reference to me by Mr. Wyse, was

rendered unnecessary, because that convention was to be presented as an

ultimatum to the Greek Government, by the British and French diplomatic

agents.

And when it is said that those demands of ours on the Greek Government

were so much repudiated by the Government of Russia and of France;

and that by putting forward those claims we ran the risk of involving

this country in a war with those Powers, I must be permitted to say,

that, with respect to Russia, the despatch of Count Nesselrode to Baron

Brunow, of the 19th of February, totally negatives that assertation. In

that despatch, Count Nesselrode admits that he was aware as long ago

as 1847, that our patience might be exhausted, and that we might have

recourse to coercive measures against Greece to enforce our claims;

and he says, moreover, that if lately, when we determined to enforce

our claims, we had asked Russia to give us her assistance, she would

have endeavored to persuade the Greek Government to come to an amicable

settlement with us; and if the efforts of Russia to that effect had

been unsuccessful, Russia could not then have expected that we should

indefinitely postpone coercive measures out of deference to her.

With respect to France, the much-talked-of convention of the 19th of

April was to be recommended by France to Greece in a way which made its

acceptance pretty certain; and in that convention there was at once

full acknowledgment of the principle of all our demands, and of the

amount which we thought it just and right to require. I am sorry that

the convention did not arrive before the other settlement took place,

but that was not the fault of our negotiator. It was not he who put

an end to Baron Gros’ functions, but Baron Gros himself. Baron Gros

formally and officially withdrew from the negotiation, and that by a

written communication, not addressed to Mr. Wyse alone, but to the

Greek Government also.

But it is said he was willing to retract it, and that on the 24th of

April he wrote to Mr. Wyse to say: “Send me back my note, and I will

give you back yours.” Now, to this Mr. Wyse said:

“I cannot exactly do what you wish, but I have another proposal to

make to you. You ask me to refer to England, and to maintain the

_status quo_ till I get an answer; but to keep the Greek vessels in

custody till that answer arrives would subject Greek commerce to

great inconvenience. Instead of this, I propose that if the Greek

Government will send me 180,000 drachmas with a letter that that sum

is in satisfaction of all our claims excepting M. Pacifico’s claim on

account of the loss of his Portuguese documents, I will----”

Do--what? Refer home? No. Continue the _status quo_? No.

“I will immediately release all the Greek merchant vessels. I will only

retain the few Government vessels as a pledge, leaving the wording of

the apology in the case of the _Fantôme_, and the compensation for the

loss sustained by M. Pacifico by the destruction of his Portuguese

documents, to be settled by future discussion.”

The effect of that arrangement would have been, that the points on

which Mr. Wyse and Baron Gros differed would have been left open for

future discussion; that coercive measures, as far as Greek commerce

was concerned, would have been entirely suspended; the convention of

London, of the 19th of April, would have arrived in time; but the Greek

Government indeed would, by that convention, have had to pay probably a

larger sum than the 180,000 drachmas. But what was Baron Gros’ answer

to that? He said, on the 24th, “I have withdrawn from the negotiation,

and I cannot therefore officially transmit to the Greek Government

your proposal.” Therefore it was not merely by his official notes

of the 22d April to Mr. Wyse and M. Londos, that Baron Gros withdrew

from the negotiation, for he repeated his withdrawal, in answer to

this proposition; but he intimated, in a private letter, that he had

made it known to the Greek Government. “To-morrow the 25th,” he said,

“I believe you will have, before five o’clock of the afternoon, your

letter and your money.”

Now, was Mr. Wyse in a hurry to resume coercive measures? Did he catch

at the first moment at which he might have been authorized to resume

hostilities? Far from it. He waited from the 22d to the 24th, and from

the 24th till five o’clock in the afternoon of the 25th, and it was not

till after that hour had passed, at which Baron Gros had led him to

expect that he would receive from the Greek Government an acceptance of

his conciliatory proposal; it was not till that hour had passed without

any communication arriving, that he announced, through the British

Consul, that the embargo would again be established.

It is plain, therefore, that Mr. Wyse did not put an end to Baron Gros’

functions, or show any impatience to renew coercive measures. Baron

Gros himself put an end to his own functions, in spite of Mr. Wyse’s

repeated entreaties that he would not do so; and when Baron Gros had

formally withdrawn, Mr. Wyse, instead of at once resuming coercive

measures, made another and a very conciliatory proposal; but Baron

Gros’ answer to this was a renewed declaration that he had withdrawn

from the negotiation, and that his official functions had ceased.

Since then, negotiations have taken place between the Governments of

England and France, which, I am happy to say, have been brought at

last to a satisfactory conclusion. We are ready to accept such parts

of the proposed convention as are still applicable to what remains to

be done. Having received and distributed to the claimants the 180,000

drachmas, we don’t insist upon the difference between the sum and the

sum that was to be required by the convention. The apology written

by M. Londos is retained, and cannot be returned to him, in order

that instead of it, he may send us the one proposed by M. Drouyn de

Lhuys. The only thing, therefore, that remains to be settled, is the

investigation of the claims of M. Pacifico on account of the loss of

his Portuguese documents. With regard to these claims, by arrangement

of the 27th of April, a material security was given in the shape of

a pecuniary deposit. The convention, of which I have drawn up the

details, contained on that point a diplomatic guarantee, instead of a

substantial guarantee; for it was a convention to be ratified by two

sovereigns, providing that a commission of arbitration which should

be named by three Governments to investigate was to be made not by a

commission, but by the British and Greek Governments jointly. We are

perfectly ready to substitute the one arrangement for the other, if

the Greek Government choose to adopt it; but we do not intend to urge

it upon them, if they do not. If they prefer the arrangement of the

convention, we are prepared to conclude a convention to that effect,

superseding the corresponding part of the arrangement which was

concluded at Athens.

There is, however, one point in Mr. Wyse’s arrangement which was

not included in the draft of the convention, because it applies

to circumstances of which we were not aware at the time when the

convention of London was framed. Mr. Wyse exacted an engagement on the

part of the Government of Greece that they should not put forward, or

support, if put forward by others, any claims for compensation arising

from losses or injuries consequent upon the coercive measures to which

we had recourse. The motive of Mr. Wyse for requiring that engagement

was, that he understood the Government of Greece had been collecting

and beating up for claims of that kind, which they meant to put forward

to a very large amount. We attach no value to that engagement as

bearing in any manner whatever upon the validity of any such claims.

Such claims can have no just foundations whatever; and if they were put

forward by the Greek Government our answer could only be, “These claims

have no foundation in right or reason, and we utterly and entirely

reject them.” But the value of that arrangement was, that by shutting

the door against such claims, it prevented the Greek Government from

raising discussions which might interrupt the good understanding and

friendly relations between the two countries. The British Government

are willing, instead of that engagement, to accept the good offices of

the French Government, whose good offices with the Government of Greece

under existing circumstances have some value, and who will advise the

King of Greece not to put forward any such unfounded claims, and with

that advice we shall be content.

Thus terminates all difference between the Governments of England and

France in regard to these matters; and I believe that if it had not

been for discussions which are now taking place in the French Assembly,

the distinguished individual who represents the French Government at

this Court, might have been present to hear the debate of to-night. So

much, then, with regard to the affairs of Greece, and the course which

we have pursued in regard to them; but there still remains the question

of the far-famed islands of Sapienza and Cervi.

Now, with respect to these islands, my opinion is clear and decided.

That opinion, as has been already stated this evening, is supported

by the opinion of my predecessor in office, the Earl of Aberdeen, as

appears by a despatch from him to Sir E. Lyons, which has been laid on

the table. The case is simply this: There are certain islands on the

coast of Greece, which originally belonged to Venice, and which, by

the Treaty of 1800, between Russia and the Porte, were erected into a

separate State.[14] The seven great islands and all the other islands,

great and small, inhabited and uninhabited on the coast of Albania

and of the Morea, were placed under feudal relations to Turkey; and

were secured by the guarantee of Russia; and it was declared that

the constitution which that State might give to itself should be

communicated to, and be sanctioned by, the two protecting Powers. At

that time the Morea and the other parts of Greece belonged to Turkey.

In 1803 these islands made their constitution, which, I presume, was

communicated to, and sanctioned by, the two protecting Powers; and

in 1804, in execution of that constitution they made a municipal

distribution of the smaller islands, allotting them respectively to the

seven larger islands; and in a public decree, which I cannot doubt must

have been made known both to Turkey and Russia, Sapienza aggregated to

Zante, and Cervi to Cerigo.

Now, can any man suppose that, if Cervi and Sapienza had been part

of the Turkish territory at that time, the Sultan would have allowed

his vassals of the Ionian State to appropriate to themselves what

belonged to him? or that Russia, who was still more vigilant, and was

under engagement, by guarantee, to defend and maintain the territory

of this Ionian State, would have permitted a proceeding, which on

such a supposition, would have thrown on her the duty of defending for

the Ionian State islands which belonged to Turkey? But these islands

have always been considered by the British Government, ever since

the Septinsular Republic was placed under the protection of England,

as belonging to the Ionian State; and it is well known that officers

quartered at Cerigo have been in the habit of going to Cervi for

purposes of amusement, and that that island has always been held to be

part of the Ionian territory.

The boundaries of Greece were settled by the Protocol of February,

1830, with the exception of an improvement in the northern frontier,

which was afterwards arranged between the Three Powers and the Porte,

and in the settlement of which we were assisted by an honorable and

gallant friend of mine, the Member for Portarlington, who was employed

in surveying that improved line. A map was attached to the Protocol of

February, 1830, and a red line, of which we have heard much, was drawn

upon that map to mark part of the boundary which, was established by

the Protocol; but that red line was mentioned in the Protocol only as

marking the northern boundary of Greece, east and west from sea to

sea, and it did not apply to the islands. The islands which were to

form part of the Greek State, were enumerated by name in the Protocol,

and neither Cervi nor Sapienza were included in that enumeration.

It is, therefore, impossible to contend that the public acts which

constituted the Kingdom of Greece included either of these islands

within its territory. If, then, the Greek Government has taken

possession of either of these two islands, it is the Greek Government

that has intruded upon the territory of the Ionian State; and the

British Government has not, by demanding the evacuation of those

islands, wanted to intrude upon the territory of the Kingdom of Greece.

But this question did not form part of the demands made by Mr. Wyse on

the 15th of January. It is a separate question, and remains open for

fair discussion between the Governments of Greece and England, and of

England, France, and Russia.

Our applications about these islands had remained unnoticed by the

Greek Government for ten years. It may be asked, then, why did we renew

them at this particular time? Because the Greek Government committed

last year an act of aggression on the island of Cervi which they had

never committed before. A boat going between Cerigo and Zante with

convicts was driven by stress of weather upon Cervi, when the convicts

were liberated, and other acts were committed as if the island had been

Greek territory. It became necessary, therefore, to call for an answer

to our application, and if no answer was given, to take possession of

the islands--an operation which could be performed by a boat’s crew,

without involving any greater employment of force. But, as has already

been stated, the Greek Government hearing that these islands were to be

taken possession of, at last broke their ten years’ silence, and made a

reply; and a discussion being thus opened, the forcible occupation was

suspended. With respect to the Government of Russia, that Government

was made aware so long ago as the beginning of last October, of the

instructions we had given for the occupation of those islands.

Having disposed of the matter of Greece, I now come to the wider

range which was taken last night by the Right Honorable Baronet, the

Member for Ripon.[15] That Right Honorable Baronet took, I think, a

proper view of the question before the House, because the resolution

which has been proposed is not confined to one particular act of her

Majesty’s Government with regard to foreign affairs, but does fully

involve and open the consideration of all the topics to which the Right

Honorable Gentleman adverted. I agree, however, with those honorable

gentlemen who have contended that the resolution does not imply an

absolute and entire approval of every act that has been done by the

Government; and, indeed, it would be unreasonable to propose such a

vote to the House: because it could hardly be expected that so large

a number of men, possessing different degrees of information, holding

different views, and not knowing exactly in all cases what have been

the grounds upon which the Government have acted, though they may

approve of the general principles which have guided the conduct of the

Government, should implicitly approve of everything we may have done.

The Right Honorable Baronet was justified in taking that larger range

into which he expatiated last night; but I must be allowed to set him

right as to the first point upon which he touched. He stated what was

quite true, that when he was a member of Earl Grey’s administration,

he concurred with me in many acts of foreign policy of which I was the

organ, which involved very active interposition in the affairs of other

countries. He instanced the negotiations in regard to Belgium, and its

separation from Holland. He has done justice to the views which guarded

the Government of that day, in their opinion that the independence

of Belgium would be a measure advantageous to the peace, present and

future, of Europe. But, then, he says, that case was different from

the acts of the present Government, because every step in that affair

was taken with the concurrence of all the five Powers who were parties

to the negotiation, The Right Honorable Baronet said that there were,

to be sure, some things which went beyond mere negotiation; there was

the siege of Antwerp, and the embargo laid by us upon Dutch ships.

He had concurred, he said, in both measures; but were those measures

steps taken with the full consent of all five Powers? Were those acts

measures of such description that they rendered it quite impossible

that the friendly relations of this country with other Powers could

be disturbed thereby? The Right Honorable Baronet must, I am sure,

recollect that Austria, Russia, and Prussia dissented from those

measures; that in consequence thereof they withdrew for a time from the

conference, and that a Prussian army was collected near the banks of

the Meuse, the presence of which rendered it necessary for the French

to send a very large force to Antwerp, much more than was required for

the mere siege of the citadel, and also to have a reserve ready in case

of need. I know very well that when people are out of office their

memory is not so quick and retentive as to things which happened while

they were in power as it would have been if they had remained in; but

on this point the Right Honorable Baronet made an important mistake,

especially as bearing upon the particular question now before the House.

I agree with the Right Honorable Baronet that, in regard to the affairs

of Belgium, the Government of England came to a wise determination. I

think that the arrangement which in 1815 had been thought conducive

to the peace of Europe, and by which, through the union of Belgium

with Holland, a Power of some consideration was to be formed in that

particular part of Europe, interposed between Germany on one side and

France on the other--I think that that arrangement, which originally,

by those who framed it, was, and not without reason, expected to prove

advantageous to the peace of Europe, had, by the course of events,

turned out to have a contrary tendency. The people of Belgium and of

Holland evidently could not coalesce; and if certain Powers of Europe

had combined at that moment to compel a reunion between these separated

portions of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, I doubt whether the reunion

could have been effected without the immediate explosion of a war in

Europe of the greatest magnitude; and I am quite sure that if it had

been effected, it could not have lasted, and the foundation must have

been laid thereby of future and inevitable disturbance. We carried out

our opinion upon that point to a practical result.

It is not to be disguised, at this time of day, that our opinion on

that matter was not shared by Austria, Russia, and Prussia. They

would much rather have seen the two countries reunited; and if that

reunion was at that time impossible, they would have been glad of an

arrangement which might have tended to render a reunion thereafter

more easy. This was not breach of faith on their part; they acted,

I am bound to say, with great good faith and honor in the whole

transaction; but they had that opinion which differed from the opinion

of England and France. Nevertheless, our arrangements prevailed; and

was that, now, an instance of a policy which deserves the censure and

condemnation of Parliament and of the country?

I remember of being taunted in this House by being told of my “little

experimental Belgium monarchy.” It was predicted that the experiment

would not succeed; it was said that there was no national feeling

among the Belgians; that they would, on the first opportunity, throw

themselves into the arms of their nearest neighbor; that we were only

laying the foundation of another change; and that our arrangement was

only “a transition state.” Why, if ever there was an experiment--call

it so if you will--that fully and completely succeeded, the erection

of Belgium into an independent State was that experiment. In times

when almost all the other countries in Europe have been convulsed

from top to bottom, Belgium has remained undisturbed. The people have

shown the most admirable devotion and attachment to their sovereign;

the sovereign the greatest confidence in, and love for, his people;

the nation has made rapid advances in industry and in the arts, in

everything which distinguishes a civilized state; all this reflects

the greatest honor upon the Belgian people; and they have, moreover,

acquired a spirit and sentiment of nationality which entitles them to

the respect of every other country in the world. I say, then, that so

far as we were concerned in effecting that arrangement, I think that is

a case to which we can refer with pride and satisfaction, and in regard

to which we can justly claim the approbation of Parliament and of the

country. But it was not altogether without encountering difficulty, not

only in other countries, but at home, that we were able to bring that

long negotiation to a successful issue.[16]

Then the Right Honorable Baronet says, that he was also a party to

another operation which differed in some degree from pure and mere

diplomatic intervention--the interference of this country in the

affairs of Portugal by the Quadruple Treaty of 1834.[17]

* * * * *

Now, the fault I find with those who are so fond of attacking me

either here or elsewhere, in this country or in others, is that they

try to bring down every question to a personal bearing. If they want

to oppose the policy of England, they say, “Let us get rid of the man

who happens to be the organ of that policy.” Why, it is like shooting

a policeman. As long as England is England, as long as the English

people are animated by the feelings and spirit and opinions which they

possess, you may knock down twenty foreign Ministers one after another,

but depend upon it no one will keep his place who does not act upon

the same principles. When it falls to my duty, in pursuance of my

functions, to oppose the policy of any Government, the immediate cry

is, “Oh, it’s all spite against this man, or that man, Count This, or

Prince That, that makes you do this.” So the Right Honorable Baronet

says our object in 1847 was merely to get rid of Costa Cabral; and, he

adds, Costa Cabral being now in office, our purpose has been defeated.

Now, as regards mere personal considerations, we did not care who was

Minister of Portugal; but we felt that there was in that country much

popular excitement, that party was arrayed against party, class against

class, that there were bitter animosities ready to break out, and we

knew perfectly well that if a member of the Cabral faction, was, at

that particular time, made Minister there would be a renewal of civil

war; we accordingly excluded, not forever, but merely for a time, and

until the Cortes should decide who was to have their confidence, and

who should be Minister, all men of the extreme parties, whether of the

Cabral faction or of the Junta faction. I, therefore, cannot admit the

triumph which the Right Honorable Baronet thinks he has obtained at my

expense, by the fact that Costa Cabral, in spite of our proceedings in

1847, is now, in 1850, Minister of Portugal.

Now come to Spain. It is perfectly true that the Right Honorable

Baronet was not in office when the Additional Articles of

1835--additional to the Treaty of 1834--were concluded. But what was

the Treaty of 1834--the Quadruple Treaty? It was a treaty to expel from

the peninsula not Don Miguel only, but Don Carlos also, who was then

at the head of the troops in Portugal; and, therefore, so far as the

spirit and provisions of that Treaty of 1834 went, the Right Honorable

Baronet cannot ride off by saying that it confined itself entirely to

Portugal, and did not extend to interference with Spain. Don Carlos was

at the time in Portugal, at the head of the troops, with the purpose

of getting back into Spain; and, had Don Miguel been successful in

Portugal, there is no doubt that Don Carlos would have availed himself

of the circumstance to enforce his claims upon Spain. Don Carlos having

been expelled from the Peninsula under the Treaty of 1834, came to

London for a time, and then returned to Spain. Hostilities were resumed

in Spain; and the Additional Articles of 1835 were then concluded, for

the purpose of giving to the Queen of Spain assistance, to enable her

to retain the Crown, and to expel Don Carlos from Spain.[18]

This was a case exactly similar to that of Portugal in the preceding

year. We had no particular interest, in the abstract, in determining

whether the Sovereign of Spain should be an infant princess, as

Isabella then was, or a full-grown prince; the mere abstract question

between Isabella and Carlos was one in regard to which we had nothing

to stake, and which the then Government of England would probably

not have thought it proper or useful to interfere with. Questions of

succession to a Crown have, indeed, at all times been matters with

which foreign Powers have concerned themselves; but it has only been

when some distant interest has made it worth their while to do so. But

in Spain, as in Portugal, the question was between arbitrary rule and

constitutional and parliamentary government, and in relation to Spain,

as well as to Portugal, we thought that the interests of England in

every point of view, commercial and political, would be benefited by

the establishment of constitutional government.

If England has any interest more than another with reference to Spain,

it is that Spain should be independent, that Spain should be Spanish.

Spain for the Spaniards, is the maxim upon which we proceed in our

policy with regard to Spain. Much evil must ever come to this country

from the fact of Spain being under the dictation of other Powers. It

is eminently for our interest that when we have the misfortune to be

in dispute or at war with any other Power, we should not, merely on

that account and without any offence to or from Spain herself, be at

war with Spain also. It is to our advantage that so long as we have

given no offence to Spain, and she none to us, differences with other

Powers should not involve us in war with her: and we considered

that the independence of Spain was more likely to be secured by a

Government controlled by a representative and national Assembly,

than by a Government purely arbitrary, and consisting merely of the

members who might form the Administration. Therefore, on the grounds

of strict policy, independently of the general sympathy which animated

the people as well as the Government of this country towards Spain at

that time, we thought it our interest to take part with Isabella, and

against the pretensions of Don Carlos. That policy was successful. The

Carlist cause failed; the cause of the constitution prevailed. But it

is said by the Right Honorable Baronet that General Narvaez is Minister

of Spain. I cannot see in that any defeat of the policy of England;

General Narvaez, indeed, is Minister of Spain, but the constitution has

of late been more strictly observed than it was at the period to which

the Right Honorable Baronet referred.

The Right Honorable Baronet finds fault with a certain despatch which,

in July, 1846 after the change of Ministry in this country, I wrote

to Sir Henry, then Mr. Bulwer, at Madrid; and the Right Honorable

Baronet says: “Here is an instance, not only of the interference of

the noble Viscount, but of the manner and tone he uses.” Now, as to

manner and tone, there have been certain communications made to other

British Ministers by persons in whom the Right Honorable Baronet has

confidence, which are certainly couched in terms which may possibly

admit of the application of some of those phrases which the Right

Honorable Baronet has applied to me. There was a certain despatch, for

example, addressed by the Earl of Aberdeen to Sir Edmund Lyons, our

Minister at Athens, which has already been read elsewhere, and which I

have got a copy of here, and which I think is a very curious specimen

of the manner in which the most mild and uninterfering of Foreign

Ministers can, when he so likes, deal with the internal arrangement of

other Governments.

Everybody knows who Sir Richard Church is; a most distinguished

soldier, who fought nobly in the cause of Greek independence, and for a

long time was properly respected and honored by the Greek Government.

But, in 1843, he was supposed to sympathize with the party who extorted

the constitution from the King. I believe that what he then did, was a

great service to the King; and that he was very instrumental in saving

King Otho from dangers to which he would otherwise have been exposed;

but, however, in 1844, he incurred the displeasure of the King, and

he was removed from the appointment of Inspector-General of the Greek

forces, which he had held; and he was succeeded by General Grivas, a

person whose conduct, as it appears from the despatch in question,

had not been altogether free from imputations of disloyalty. Well,

here are the instructions given on the subject to Sir Edmund Lyons, by

the Minister who never interfered with the internal affairs of other

countries, and especially with their purely domestic matters:

“Sir--Her Majesty’s Government have learned with deep concern the

dismissal of Sir Richard Church from the post of Inspector-General of

the Greek Army, which post he had so honorably and successfully filled

for many years.”

Perhaps so far it was natural for the English Government to regret the

dismissal of a meritorious English officer.

“Their regret is increased by finding that General Grivas, who so

recently engaged in open rebellion against the Throne, has been

appointed to succeed him.”

As to this point, one would have thought the King of Greece was himself

the best judge.

“Her Majesty’s Government do not propose to interfere in the matter;

since, however unjust the deprivation of General Church may have been,

and however injudicious the elevation of his successor, these acts were

certainly within the competence of the Greek Government.”

This is very handsome and candid.

“But,” continues the non-interfering Minister, “though her Majesty’s

Government abstain from interfering, they deem it an imperative duty on

their part--considering the position in which Great Britain stands with

regard to Greece, as a creating and guaranteeing Power, to express--”

They do not interfere-- “to express in the strongest terms their sense

of the injustice done to Sir Richard Church, one of the best, most

disinterested, and most efficient supporters of Greek independence,

by an abrupt and ungracious dismissal, unaccompanied by any word of

commendation or acknowledgment of his great services to Greece, and

also their sense of the excess of imprudence and impolicy exhibited

in the appointment to one of the most responsible offices under the

Crown of a man whose recent conduct has shown him to be an enemy to the

Throne, and a deliberate perverter of order and discipline.”

This was written by the Minister who never interfered with the internal

arrangements of other Powers.

“Her Majesty’s Government,” continues this mild despatch, “consider

themselves fully warranted by the overt acts of General Grivas himself,

in instructing you to make known these sentiments distinctly in

their name to the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs as well as to

the King himself--as well as to the King himself, should a favorable

opportunity present itself and at the same time to warn His Majesty

seriously--seriously and solemnly of the danger to which he will expose

his country and his Throne by a perseverance in so fatal a line of

policy as that which he has lately pursued.”

The writer of this despatch condemns me for my despatch of the 19th

of July, 1846, addressed to Sir Henry Bulwer--a despatch which was

not to be communicated to the Sovereign; and the concluding paragraph

of which the Right Honorable Baronet might as well have read, when he

read the other portion of it, because after stating to Sir Henry Bulwer

that, having just come into office, we thought it was essential that we

should explain to him the views we entertained as to the position of

Spain, and as to the conduct of the Spanish Government, the despatch

concluded with the following passage:

“It was certainly not for the purpose of subjecting the Spanish

nation to a grinding tyranny, that Great Britain entered into the

engagements of the quadruple alliance of 1835, and gave, in pursuance

of the stipulations of that treaty, that active assistance, which

contributed so materially to the expulsion of Don Carlos from Spain.

But her Majesty’s Government are so sensible of the inconvenience

of interfering, even by friendly advice, in the internal affairs of

independent States, that I have to abstain from giving you instructions

to make any representations whatever to the Spanish Ministers on these

matters. But, though you will, of course, take care to express on no

occasion on these subjects sentiments different from those which I

have thus explained to you; and although you will be careful not to

express those sentiments in any manner or upon any occasion so as to be

likely to create, increase, or encourage discontent, yet you need not

conceal from any of those persons who may have the power of remedying

the existing evils, the fact that such opinions are entertained by the

British Government.”

Now let the House, after comparing these two despatches, say whether

it is from that quarter that we deserve the condemnation that has been

passed upon us? “If I am worthy to be so treated I do not deserve to be

so treated by you.”

But it is said, nevertheless, to me:

“You cannot be commonly courteous or civil, even in your

reconciliations; your strong language led to a rupture of diplomatic

relations with Spain, and, when matters have been arranged again, you

have spoiled the grace and courtesy of the reconciliation by your

manner of accepting an apology.”