This is the 9th Symbol in the Protreptics, and is thus explained by
Iamblichus. “This symbol exhorts to prudence. For it excites in us an
appropriate conception with respect to the propriety of not opposing
sharp words to a man full of fire and wrath, nor contending with him.
For frequently by words you will agitate and disturb an ignorant man,
and will yourself suffer things dreadful and unpleasant.” Heraclitus
also testifies to the truth of this symbol. For he says, “It is
difficult to fight with anger: for whatever is necessary to be done
redeems the soul.” And this he says truly. For many, by gratifying
anger, have changed the condition of their soul, and have made death
preferable to life. But by governing the tongue, and being quiet,
friendship is produced from strife, the fire of anger being
extinguished; and you yourself will not appear to be destitute of
intellect.”
P. 200. _But this follows from the whole being naturally prior to the
part, and not the part to the whole._
For whole co-subverts, but is not co-subverted by part: since if whole
is taken away, part also is taken away; but the contrary does not
follow.
P. 231. _Such therefore as hope the intellective and gnostic part of
virtue, are denominated skilful and intelligent; but such as have
the ethical and pre-elective part of it, are denominated useful
and equitable._
The following account of the virtues is extracted from the Notes to my
Translation of the Phædo of Plato: The first of the virtues are the
physical, which are common to brutes, being mingled with the
temperaments, and for the most part contrary to each other; or rather
pertaining to the animal. Or it may be said that they are illuminations
from reason, when not impeded by a certain bad temperament: or that they
are the result of energies in a former life. Of these Plato speaks in
the Politicus and the Laws. The ethical virtues, which are above these,
are ingenerated by custom and a certain right opinion, and are the
virtues of children when well educated. These virtues also are to be
found in some brute animals. They likewise transcend the temperaments,
and on this account are not contrary to each other. These virtues Plato
delivers in the Laws. They pertain however at the same time both to
reason and the irrational nature. In the third rank above these are the
political virtues, which pertain to reason alone; for they are
scientific. But they are the virtues of reason adorning the irrational
part as its instrument; through prudence adorning the gnostic, through
fortitude the irascible, and through temperance the epithymetic power,
(or the power which is the source of desire;) but adorning all the parts
of the irrational nature through justice. And of these virtues Plato
speaks much in the Republic. These virtues too follow each other. Above
these are the cathartic virtues, which pertain to reason alone,
withdrawing from other things to itself, throwing aside the instruments
of sense as vain, repressing also the energies through these
instruments, and liberating the soul from the bonds of generation. Plato
particularly unfolds these virtues in the Phædo. Prior to these however
are the theoretic virtues, which pertain to the soul, introducing itself
to natures superior to itself, not only gnostically, as some one may be
induced to think from the name, but also orectically: for it hastens to
become, as it were, intellect instead of soul; and intellect possesses
both desire and knowledge. These virtues are the converse of the
political: for as the latter energize about things subordinate according
to reason, so the former about things more excellent according to
intellect. These virtues Plato delivers in the Theætetus.
According to Plotinus, there is also another gradation of the virtues
besides these, viz, the paradigmatic. For, as our eye, when it is first
illuminated by the solar light, is different from that which
illuminates, as being illuminated, but afterwards is in a certain
respect united and conjoined with it, and becomes, as it were,
solar-form; so also our soul at first indeed is illuminated by
intellect, and energizes according to the theoretic virtues, but
afterwards becomes, as it were, that which is illuminated, and energizes
uniformly according to the paradigmatic virtues. And it is the business
indeed of philosophy to make us intellect; but of theurgy to unite us to
intelligibles, so that we may energize paradigmatically. And as when
possessing the physical virtues, we know mundane bodies (for the
subjects to virtues of this kind are bodies); so from possessing the
ethical virtues, we know the fate of the Universe, because fate is
conversant with irrational lives. For the rational soul is not under
fate; and the ethical virtues are irrational, because they pertain to
the irrational part. According to the political virtues we know mundane
affairs, and according to the cathartic supermundane; but as possessing
the theoretic we know intellectual, and from the paradigmatic
intelligible natures. Temperance also pertains to the ethical virtues;
justice to the political, on account of compacts; fortitude to the
cathartic, through not verging to matter; and prudence to the theoretic.
Observe too, that Plato in the Phædo calls the physical virtues servile,
because they may subsist in servile souls; but he calls the ethical
σκιογραφιαι _adumbrations_, because their possessors only know _that_
the energies of such virtues are right, but do not know _why_ they are
so. It is well observed too here, by Olympiodorus, that Plato calls the
cathartic and theoretic virtues, those which are in reality true
virtues. He also separates them in another way, viz. that the political
are not telestic, i. e. do not pertain to mystic ceremonies, but that
the cathartic and theoretic are telestic. Hence, Olympiodorus adds, the
cathartic virtues are denominated from the purification which is used in
the mysteries; but the theoretic from perceiving things divine. On this
account he accords with the Orphic verses, that
The soul that uninitiated dies,
Plung’d in the blackest mire in Hades lies.
For initiation is the divinely-inspired energy of the virtues.
Olympiodorus also further observes, that by the thyrsus-bearers, Plato
means those that energize according to the political virtues, but by the
Bacchuses those that exercise the cathartic virtues. For we are bound in
matter as Titans, through the great partibility of our nature; but we
rise from the dark mire as Bacchuses. Hence we become more prophetic at
the time of death: and Bacchus is the inspective guardian of death,
because he is likewise of every thing pertaining to the Bacchic sacred
rites.
All the virtues likewise exhibit their proper characters, these being
every where common, but subsisting appropriately in each. For the
characteristic property of fortitude is the not declining to things
subordinate; of temperance, a conversion from an inferior nature; of
justice, a proper energy, and which is adapted to being; and of
prudence, the election and selection of things good and evil.
Olympiodorus farther observes, that all the virtues are in the Gods. For
many Gods, says he, are adorned with their appellations; and all
goodness originates from the Gods. Likewise, prior, to things which
sometimes participate the virtues, as is our case, it is necessary there
should be natures which always participate them. In what order,
therefore, do the virtues appear? Shall we say in the psychical? For
virtue is the perfection of the soul; and election and pre-election are
the energies and projections of the soul. Hence the Chaldæan oracles
conjoin fontal virtue with fontal soul, or in other words, with soul
subsisting according to cause. But may it not also be said, that the
virtues naturally wish to give an orderly arrangement to that which is
disordered? If this be admitted, they will originate from the demiurgic
order. How then will they be cathartic there? May we not say,
Olympiodorus adds, that through the cathartic virtues considered
according to their causal subsistence in Jupiter the demiurgus, he is
enabled to abide in his accustomed mode, as Plato says in the Timæus?
And farther still, according to ancient theologists, he ascends to the
tower of Saturn, who is a _pure_ intellect.
As this distribution of the virtues, however, is at present no less
novel than important, the following discussion of them from the Αφορμαι
προς τα νοητα, or Auxiliaries to Intelligibles, of Porphyry, is added
for the sake of the genuinely philosophic reader:
“There is one kind of virtues pertaining to the political character, and
another to the man who tends to contemplation, and on this account is
called theoretic, and is now a beholder. And there are also other
virtues pertaining to intellect, so far as it is intellect, and separate
from soul. The virtues indeed of the political character, and which
consist in the moderation of the passions, are characterised by
following and being obedient to the reasoning about that which is
becoming in actions. Hence, looking to an innoxious converse with
neighbours, they are denominated, from the aggregation of fellowship,
political. And prudence indeed subsists about the reasoning part;
fortitude about the irascible part; temperance, in the consent and
symphony of the epithymetic with the reasoning part; and justice in each
of these performing its proper employment with respect to governing and
being governed. But the virtues of him who proceeds to the contemplative
life, consist in a departure from terrestrial concerns. Hence also, they
are called purifications, being surveyed in the refraining from
corporeal actions, and avoiding sympathies with the body. For these are
the virtues of the soul elevating itself to true being. The political
virtues, therefore, adorn the mortal man, and are the forerunners of
purifications. For it is necessary that he who is adorned by these,
should abstain from doing any thing precedaneously in conjunction with
body. Hence in purifications, not to opine with body, but to energize
alone, gives subsistence to prudence; which derives its perfection
through energizing intellectually with purity. But not to be similarly
passive with the body, constitutes temperance. Not to fear a departure
from body as into something void, and nonentity, gives subsistence to
fortitude. But when reason and intellect are the leaders, and there is
no resistance [from the irrational part,] justice is produced. The
disposition therefore, according to the political virtues, is surveyed
in the moderation of the passions; having for its end to live as man
conformable to nature. But the disposition according to the theoretic
virtues, is beheld in apathy;[108] the end of which is a similitude to
God.
“Since, however, of purification one kind consists in purifying, but
another pertains to those that are purified, the cathartic virtues are
surveyed according to both these significations of purification; for
they purify the soul, and are present with purification. For the end of
purification is to become pure. But since purification, and the being
purified, are an ablation of every thing foreign, the good resulting
from them will be different from that which purifies; so that if that
which is purified was good prior to the impurity with which it is
defiled, purification is sufficient. That, however, which remains after
purification, is good, and not purification. The nature of the soul also
was not good, but is that which is able to partake of good, and is
boniform. For if this were not the case, it would not have become
situated in evil. The good, therefore, of the soul consists in being
united to its generator; but its evil, in an association with things
subordinate to itself. Its evil also is two-fold; the one arising from
an association with terrestrial natures; but the other from doing this
with an excess of the passions. Hence all the political virtues, which
liberate the soul from one evil, may be denominated virtues, and are
honorable. But the cathartic are more honorable, and liberate it from
evil, so far as it is soul. It is necessary, therefore, that the soul
when purified should associate with its generator. Hence the virtue of
it after its conversion consists in a scientific knowledge of [true]
being; but this will not be the case unless conversion, precedes.
“There is therefore another genus of virtues after the cathartic and
political, and which are the virtues of the soul energizing
intellectually. And here, indeed, wisdom and prudence consist in the
contemplation of those things which intellect possesses. But justice
consists in performing what is appropriate in a conformity to, and
energizing according to intellect. Temperance is an inward conversion of
the soul to intellect. And fortitude is apathy; according to a
similitude of that to which the soul looks, and which is naturally
impassive. These virtues also, in the same manner as the others,
alternately follow each other.
“The fourth species of the virtues, is that of the paradigms subsisting
in intellect; which are more excellent than the psychical virtues, and
exist as the paradigms of these; the virtues of the soul being the
similitudes of them. And intellect indeed is that in which all things
subsist at once as paradigms. Here, therefore, prudence is science; but
intellect that knows [all things] is wisdom. Temperance is that which is
converted to itself. The proper work of intellect, is the performance of
its appropriate duty, [and this is justice[109]]. But fortitude is
sameness, and the abiding with purity in itself, through an abundance of
power. There are therefore four genera of virtues; of which, indeed,
some pertain to intellect, concur with the essence of it, and are
paradigmatic. Others pertain to soul now looking to intellect, and being
filled from it. Others belong to the soul of man, purifying itself, and
becoming purified from the body, and the irrational passions. And others
are the virtues of the soul of man, adorning the man, through giving
measure and bound to the irrational nature, and producing moderation in
the passions. And he, indeed, who has the greater virtues has also
necessarily the less; but the contrary is not true, that he who has the
less has also the greater virtues. Nor will he who possesses the
greater, energize precedaneously according to the less, but only so far
as the necessities of the mortal nature require. The scope also of the
virtues, is, as we have said, generically different in the different
virtues. For the scope of the political virtues, is to give measure to
the passions in their practical energies according to nature. But the
scope of the cathartic virtues, is entirely to obliterate the
remembrance of the passions. And the scope of the rest subsists
analogously to what has been before said. Hence, he who energizes
according to the practical virtues, is a _worthy_ man: but he who
energizes according to the cathartic virtues, is _a dæmoniacal man_, or
is also _a good dæmon_. He who energizes according to the intellectual
virtues alone, is _a God_. But he who energizes according to the
paradigmatic virtues, _is the father of the Gods_. We, therefore, ought
especially to pay attention to the cathartic virtues, since we may
obtain these in the present life. But through these, the ascent is to
the more honorable virtues. Hence it is requisite to survey to what
degree purification may be extended. For it is a separation from body,
and from the passive motion of the irrational part. But how this may so
effected, and to what extent, must now be said.
“In the first place, indeed, it is necessary that he who intends to
acquire this purification, should, as the foundation and basis of it,
know himself to be a soul bound in a foreign thing, and in a different
essence. In the second place, as that which is raised from this
foundation, he should collect himself from the body, and as it different
places, so as to be disposed in a manner perfectly impassive with
respect to the body. For he who energizes uninterruptedly according to
sense, though he may not do this with an adhering affection, and the
enjoyment resulting from pleasure, yet at the same time his attention is
dissipated about the body, in consequence of becoming through sense[110]
in contact with it. But we are addicted to the pleasures or pains of
sensibles, in conjunction with a promptitude, and converging sympathy;
from which disposition it is requisite to be purified. _This, however,
will be effected by admitting necessary pleasures, and the sensations of
them, merely as remedies, or as a liberation from pain, in order that
[the rational part] may not be impeded [in its energies._] Pain also
must be taken away. But if this is not possible, it must be mildly
diminished. And it will be diminished, if the soul is not co-passive
with it. Anger, likewise, must as much as possible be taken away; and
must by no means be premeditated. But if it cannot be entirely removed,
deliberate choice must not be mingled with it, but the unpremeditated
motion must be the impulse of the irrational part. _That however which
is unpremeditated is imbecile and small._ All fear, likewise, must be
expelled. For he who acquires this purification, will fear nothing.
Here, however, if it should take place, it will be unpremeditated. Anger
therefore and fear must be used for the purpose of admonition. But the
desire of every thing base must be exterminated. Such a one also, so far
as he is a cathartic philosopher, will not desire meats and drinks.
Neither must there be the unpremeditated in natural venereal connexions;
_but if this should take place, it must only be as far as to that
precipitate imagination which energizes in sleep_. In short, the
intellectual soul itself of the purified man, must be liberated from all
these [corporeal propensities.] He must likewise endeavour that what is
moved to the irrational nature of corporeal passions, may be moved
without sympathy, and without animadversion; so that the motions
themselves may be immediately dissolved, through their vicinity to the
reasoning power. This, however, will not take place while the
purification is proceeding to its perfection; but will happen to those
in whom reason rules without opposition. Hence in these, the inferior
part will so venerate reason, that it will be indignant if it is at all
moved, in consequence of not being quiet when its master is present, and
will reprove itself for its imbecility. These, however, are yet only
moderations of the passions, but at length terminate in apathy, for when
co-passivity is entirely exterminated, then apathy is present with him
who is purified from it. For passion becomes moved, when reason imparts
excitation, through verging [to the irrational nature.]”
P. 279. _The theorems of philosophy are to be enjoyed, as much as
possible, as if they were ambrosia and nectar, &c. &c._
This Sentence in the original of Arcerius is as follows: των κατα
φιλοσοφιαν θεωρηματων απολαυστεον, εφ’ οσον οιον, καθαπερ αμβροσιας και
νεκταρος· ακηρατον τε γαρ το απ’ αυτων ηδυ και το θειον το μεγαλοψυχον
δυναται τε ποιειν, και ει μη αïδιους, αïδιων γε επιστημονας.
In the edition of the Protreptics by Kiessling, which I did not see,
till the greater part of this work was printed, σοφιαν is substituted
for φιλοσοφιαν, but in my opinion very erroneously; and this German
editor, from not perceiving the necessity of reading ακηρατον τε γαρ το
απ’ αυτων ηδυ και θειον, το μεγαλοψυχον, κ. λ. instead of retaining the
reading of Arcerius, has made nonsense of this part of the Sentence. For
his version of it is: “Nam et sincera est eorum dulcedo, et divinam
naturam, animum magnum efficere possunt.”