After this we must narrate how, when he had admitted certain persons to
be his disciples, he distributed them into different classes according
to their respective merits. For it was not fit that all of them should
equally participate of the same things, as they were naturally
dissimilar; nor was it indeed right that some should participate of all
the most honorable auditions, but others of none, or should not at all
partake of them. For this would be uncommunicative and unjust. While
therefore he imparted a convenient portion of his discourses to each, he
benefited as much as possible all of them, and preserved the proportion
of justice, by making each a partaker of the auditions according to his
desert. Hence, in conformity to this method, he called some of them
Pythagoreans, but others Pythagorists; just as we denominate some men
Attics, but others Atticists. Having therefore thus aptly divided their
names, some of them he considered to be genuine, but he ordained that
others should show themselves to be the emulators of these. He ordered
therefore that with the Pythagoreans possessions should be shared in
common, and that they should always live together; but that each of the
others should possess his own property apart from the rest, and that
assembling together in the same place, they should mutually be at
leisure for the same pursuits. And thus each of these modes was derived
from Pythagoras, and transmitted to his successors. Again, there were
also with the Pythagoreans two forms of philosophy; for there were
likewise two genera of those that pursued it, the Acusmatici, and the
Mathematici. Of these however the Mathematici are acknowledged to be
Pythagoreans by the rest; but the Mathematici do not admit that the
Acusmatici are so, or that they derived their instruction from
Pythagoras, but from Hippasus. And with respect to Hippasus, some say
that he was a Crotonian, but others a Metapontine. But the philosophy of
the Acusmatici consists in auditions unaccompanied with demonstrations
and a reasoning process; because it merely orders a thing to be done in
a certain way, and that they should endeavour to preserve such other
things as were said by him, as so many divine dogmas. They however
profess that they will not speak of them, and that they are not to be
spoken of; but they conceive those of their sect to be the best
furnished with wisdom, who retained what they had heard more than
others. But all these auditions are divided into three species. For some
of them indeed signify what a thing is; others what it _especially_ is;
but others, what ought, or what ought not, to be done. The auditions
therefore which signify what a thing is, are such as, What are the
islands of the blessed? The sun and moon. What is the oracle at Delphi?
The tetractys. What is harmony? That in which the Syrens subsist.[19]
But the auditions which signify what a thing _especially_ is, are such
as, What is the most just thing? To sacrifice. What is the wisest thing?
Number.[20] But the next to this in wisdom, is that which gives names to
things. What is the wisest of the things that are with us, [i. e. which
pertain to human concerns]? Medicine. What is the most beautiful?
Harmony. What is the most powerful? Mental decision. What is the most
excellent? Felicity. What is that which is most truly asserted? That men
are depraved. Hence they say that Pythagoras praised the Salaminian poet
Hippodomas, because he sings:
Tell, O ye Gods! the source from whence you came,
Say whence, O men! thus evil you became?
These therefore, and such as these, are the auditions of this kind. For
each of these shows what a thing _especially_ is. This however is the
same with what is called the wisdom of the seven wise men. For they
investigated, not what is _simply_ good, but what is _especially_ so;
nor what is difficult, but what is _most_ difficult; viz. for a man to
know himself. Nor did they investigate what is easy, but what is _most_
easy; viz. to do what you are accustomed to do. For it seems that such
auditions as the above, are conformable but posterior in time to such
wisdom as that of the seven wise men; since they were prior to
Pythagoras. The auditions likewise, respecting what should or should not
be done, were such as, That it is necessary to beget children. For it is
necessary to leave those that may worship the Gods after us. That it is
requisite to put the shoe on the right foot first. That it is not proper
to walk in the public ways, nor to dip in a sprinkling vessel, nor to be
washed in a bath. For in all these it is immanifest, whether those who
use them are pure. Others also of this kind are the following: Do not
assist a man in laying a burden down; for it is not proper to be the
cause of not laboring; but assist him in taking it up. Do not draw near
to a woman for the sake of begetting children, if she has gold. Speak
not about Pythagoric[21] concerns without light. Perform libations to
the Gods, from the handle of the cup, for the sake of an auspicious
omen, and in order that you may not drink from the same part [from which
you poured out the liquor.] Wear not the image of God in a ring, in
order that it may not be defiled. For it is a resemblance which ought to
be placed in the house. It is not right to use a woman ill; for she is a
suppliant. On this account also we bring her from the Vestal hearth, and
take her by the right hand. Nor is it proper to sacrifice a white cock;
for this also is a suppliant, and is sacred to the moon. Hence likewise
it announces the hours. To him who asks for counsel, give no other
advice than that which is the best: for counsel is a sacred thing.
Labors are good; but pleasures are in every respect bad. For as we came
into the present life for the purpose of punishment, it is necessary
that we should be punished. It is proper to sacrifice, and to enter
temples unshod. In going to a temple, it is not proper to turn out of
the way; for divinity should not be worshipped in a careless manner. It
is good to sustain, and to have wounds in the breast; but it is bad to
have them behind. The soul of man alone does not enter into those
animals, which it is lawful to kill. Hence it is proper to eat those
animals alone which it is fit to slay, but no other animal whatever. And
such were the auditions of this kind.
The most extended however were those concerning sacrifices, how they
ought to be performed at all other times, and likewise when migrating
from the present life; and concerning sepulture, and in what manner it
is proper to be buried. Of some of these therefore the reason is to be
assigned why they are ordered; such for instance as, it is necessary to
beget children, for the sake of leaving another that may worship the
Gods instead of yourself. But of others no reason is to be assigned. And
of some indeed, the reasons are assumed proximately; but of others,
remotely; such as, that bread is not to be broken, because it
contributes to the judgment in Hades. The probable reasons however,
which are added about things of this kind, are not Pythagoric, but were
devised by some who philosophized differently from the Pythagoreans, and
who endeavoured to adapt probability to what was said. Thus for
instance, with respect to what has been just now mentioned, why bread is
not to be broken, some say that it is not proper to dissolve that which
congregates. For formerly all those that were friends, assembled in a
barbaric manner to one piece of bread. But others say, that it is not
proper, in the beginning of an undertaking, to produce an omen of this
kind by breaking and diminishing. Moreover, all such precepts as define
what is to be done, or what is not to be done, refer to divinity as
their end; and every life is co-arranged so as to _follow God_. This
also is the principle and the doctrine of philosophy. For men act
ridiculously in searching for good any where else than from the Gods.
And when they do so, it is just as if some one, in a country governed by
a king, should reverence one of the citizens who is a magistrate, and
neglect him who is the ruler of all of them. For the Pythagoreans
thought that such men as we have just mentioned, performed a thing of
this kind. For since God is, and is the lord of all things, it is
universally acknowledged that good is to be requested of him. For all
men impart good to those whom they love, and to those with whom they are
delighted; but they give the contrary to good to those to whom they are
contrarily disposed. And such indeed is the wisdom of these precepts.
There was, however, a certain person named Hippomedon, an Ægean, a
Pythagorean and one of the Acusmatici, who asserted that Pythagoras gave
the reasons and demonstrations of all these precepts, but that in
consequence of their being delivered to many, and these such as were of
a more sluggish genius, the demonstrations were taken away, but the
problems themselves were left. Those however of the Pythagoreans that
are called _Mathematici_, acknowledge that these reasons and
demonstrations were added by Pythagoras, and they say still more than
this, and contend that their assertions are true, but affirm that the
following circumstance was the cause of the dissimilitude. Pythagoras,
say they, came from Ionia and Samos, during the tyranny of Polycrates,
Italy being then in a florishing condition; and the first men in the
city became his associates. But, to the more elderly of these, and who
were not at leisure [for philosophy], in consequence of being occupied
by political affairs, the discourse of Pythagoras was not accompanied
with a reasoning process, because it would have been difficult for them
to apprehend his meaning through disciplines and demonstrations; and he
conceived they would nevertheless be benefited by knowing what ought to
be done, though they were destitute of the knowledge of the _why_: just
as those who are under the care of physicians, obtain their health,
though they do not hear the reason of every thing which is to be done to
them. But with the younger part of his associates, and who were able
both to act and learn,—with these he conversed through demonstration and
disciplines. These therefore are the assertions of the Mathematici, but
the former, of the Acusmatici. With respect to Hippasus however
especially, they assert that he was one of the Pythagoreans, but that in
consequence of having divulged and described the method of forming a
sphere from twelve pentagons,[22] he perished in the sea, as an impious
person, but obtained the renown of having made the discovery. In
reality, however, this as well as every thing else pertaining to
geometry, was the invention of _that man_; for thus without mentioning
his name, they denominate Pythagoras. But the Pythagoreans say, that
geometry was divulged from the following circumstance: A certain
Pythagorean happened to lose the wealth which he possessed; and in
consequence of this misfortune, he was permitted to enrich himself from
geometry. But geometry was called by Pythagoras _Historia_. And thus
much concerning the difference of each mode of philosophising, and the
classes of the auditors of Pythagoras. For those who heard him either
within or without the veil, and those who heard him accompanied with
seeing, or without seeing him, and who are divided into interior and
exterior auditors, were no other than these. And it is requisite to
arrange under these, the political, economic and legislative
Pythagoreans.