FIRST DAY'S BATTLES
That first day of the battle of the Aisne, September 12, 1914,
which was indeed rather preparatory than actual, was also marked by
some unusually brilliant cavalry work in General Allenby's division.
The German line was on the farther side of the Aisne, but all the
hill country between the Marne and the Aisne had to be cleared of
the powerful rear guards of the retreating German army, or perhaps
it would be more correct to say the advance guards of the new German
line. Early in the morning the cavalry under General Allenby swept
out from the town of Braisne on the Vesle and harried in every
direction the strong detachments that had been sent forward, driving
them back to the Aisne. Over the high wooded ridge between the
Vesle and the Aisne the Germans were driven back, and the Third
Division, under General Hamilton, supported the cavalry in force,
so that, by the evening, General Hamilton's division was able to
camp below the hill of Brenelle, and even, before night fell, to
get their guns upon that height, from which they could reply to
the German batteries snugly ensconced upon the frowning ridge on
the northern bank of the Aisne.
The Fifth British Division, under Sir Charles Fergusson, found
itself in a tight place at the confluence of the Vesle and Aisne
Rivers, for at that point lay a stretch of flat bottomland exposed
to the German fire. By a ruse, which returned upon their own heads,
the Germans had preserved one bridge across the Aisne, the bridge at
Condé. This was done as a lure to Sir Charles Fergusson's forces,
but even more so it was intended as a sallying point as soon as
the German army deemed itself in a position to attack again. The
bridge was destined to figure in the events of the great conflict
when the grapple should come.
One of the most graphic of all the accounts of the fighting of that
day was from the pen of a major in the British field artillery,
and it presented in sharp and vivid colors how the field artillery
joined with the cavalry in clearing the German troops from the
hills between the Marne and the Aisne. He wrote:
"We got the order to go off and join a battery under Colonel ----'s
orders. We came en route under heavy shrapnel fire on the road. I
gave the order to walk, as the horses had hardly had any food for
a couple of days, and also I wanted to steady the show. I can't
say I enjoyed walking along at the head with old ---- behind me,
especially when six shrapnel burst right in front of us. We got
there just in time, rushed into action, and opened fire on a German
counterattack at short range, destroying the lot so far as I could
see.
"We then moved slightly to another position to take on a valley,
down which they were attacking, and were at it the whole day, firing
about 900 rounds into quantities of German attacks and counterattacks.
They cannot stand the shrapnel, and the moment I got one on them
they turned and bolted back to the wood.
"I got on to their trenches; one shell dropped in. [It would appear
from this that some of the advance guards of the new defense line
were either intrenching or occupying trenches made during the battles
of the Marne, probably the latter, or else the writer is speaking of
the actions of his battery on the 10th as well as the 12th before
the invaders had retreated across the Marne.] I was enfilading
them, and they tore out of the trenches, and so on, each trench in
turn, and fell in hundreds. Also, through the range finder, ----
saw I'd hit a machine gun, and they had abandoned it and another. So
it went all day, shells and bullets humming around, but only one of
my staff horses was hit. Our infantry advancing and retiring--others
advancing and coming back--Germans doing likewise, a hellish din
of shell fire, and me pouring in fire whenever I could see them.
"At last I got six shrapnel into a wood and cleared a heap of them
out and got into them with shrapnel. It was awful! The sergeant major
put his hand up to his head and said: "Oh, sir, it's terrible!" That
seemed to settle them, and at last we saw the infantry advancing
to their positions without resistance.
"Now was my chance. I determined to get those machine guns if I
could, as otherwise the infantry would. So I left ---- in command
and got the trumpeter, sergeant major, and six men with six rifles,
and went forward 'to reconnoiter,' as I reported to ---- after I
had gone. It was a weird ride, through thick black woods, holding
my revolver ready, going in front with the little trumpeter behind
and the others following some way in the rear. We passed some very
bad sights, and knew the woods were full of Germans who were afraid
to get away on account of the dreaded shell fire. We got in front
of our infantry, who were going to fire at us, but I shouted just
in time.
"At last we came to the edge of a wood, and in front of us, about
200 yards away, was a little cup-shaped copse, and the enemy's
trenches with machine guns a little farther on. I felt sure this
wood was full of Germans, as I had seen them go in earlier. I started
to gallop for it, and the others followed. Suddenly about fifty
Germans bolted out, firing at us. I loosed off my revolver as fast
as I could, and ---- loosed off his rifle from the saddle. They
must have thought we were a regiment of cavalry, for, except for
a few, they suddenly yelled and bolted. I stopped and dismounted
my lot to fire at them, to make sure that they didn't change their
minds.
"I waited for a lull, and mounted all my lot behind the bushes
and made them spring as I gave the word to gallop for cover to the
woods where the Welsh company was. There I got ----, who understands
them (the guns), and an infantryman who volunteered to help, and
---- and I ran up to the Maxims and took out the breech mechanism
of both and one of the belts, and carried away one whole Maxim.
We couldn't manage the other.
"We got back very slowly on account of the gun, and the men went wild
with excitement that we had got one gun complete and the mechanism
and belt of the other."
With such incidents the pursuit of the Germans across the Marne
and to the Aisne was replete, and so thoroughly did the advance
French and English troops scour that country that when the morning
of September 13, 1914, dawned there was scarcely a German soldier
left on the southern side of the Aisne, west of Rheims.
The administration of the German armies meanwhile had been markedly
changed. In the turning movement on the Marne the plan was clearly
outlined, each commander had his instructions, and that was all.
But with the need for changes of plan there was need for a directing
head, and Field Marshal van Heeringen was sent in a hurry to take
charge of the Aisne. This placed both General von Kluck and General
von Bülow into subordinate positions. Field Marshal von Heeringen
held a deserved reputation as one of the most brilliant as well
as one of the most iron-willed of the German military leaders.
He had been the backbone of the crown prince's movement against
Troyon, a movement which, given a day or two longer, might have
meant the capture of Verdun.
This was not the only factor that was framing up to give the German
armies a decided advantage. The essential factor of the Aisne was
the arrival of General von Zwehl and his guns. On September 13,
1914, at 6 a. m., Zwehl arrived in Laon, and in less than an hour
he was in action on the Aisne front. The story of General von Zwehl
and his guns is essential to an understanding of the causes that
rendered the British victory of the Aisne a barren and a fruitless
victory at best.
The week of September 5-12, 1914, witnessed the entire series of
the battles of the Marne, which drove the Germans across the Marne
and across the Aisne, as well as a German victory which exerted
almost as powerful an influence in favor of the invaders as the
check at the Marne did for the defenders. This victory was the
fall of Maubeuge. It is going too far to say--as several military
writers have done--that General von Zwehl saved Germany, and that
unless he had arrived as opportunely as he did the "German retreat
to the Aisne valley would have been changed into a disastrous and
overwhelming rout." But it is not going too far to say that the
successful holding of the Aisne line was due to the victor of Maubeuge.
General von Zwehl was one of the iron-jawed battle-scarred warriors
of 1870, a man with a will as metallic as his own siege guns, and
a man who could no more be deflected from his purpose than a shell
could be diverted in its flight. He had been set to reduce Maubeuge
and he had done so with speed and with thoroughness. Maubeuge was
not protected by open-air earthworks, but by a circle of armor-plate
concrete forts. To the mighty siege guns handled by General von
Zwehl, these were no trouble, for Von Zwehl had not only the heavy
batteries attached to the Seventh Army Reserve, but he also had a
number of Von Kluck's guns and the majority of General von Bülow's,
neither of whom was expected to need siege guns in the forward
drive where mobility was an essential. In addition to this, General
von Zwehl also had the great siege train that had been prepared
for the reduction of Paris. What chance had Maubeuge against such
a potency?
On September 8, 1914, word reached General von Zwehl that the forward
drive had failed, that the main armies had been beaten back and
that he was to bring up his guns as rapidly as possible to cover
the retreat. As rapidly as he could, to General von Zwehl, meant
but one thing--to get there! He collected 9,000 reserve troops,
which was almost immediately swelled by another 9,000, and with
a total of 18,000 troops he started his siege trains for the town
of Laon, where Field Marshal von Heeringen had taken up his
headquarters. The weather turned bad, rendering the heavy guns
extremely difficult to handle, but there could be no delay, no
explanations, to General von Zwehl. If a gun was to be brought it
was to be brought and that was all about it! Four days and three
nights of almost continuous marching is killing. The German commander
cared nothing for that. The guns must be kept moving. Could he get
them there on time? In the last twenty-four hours of the march,
his 18,000 troops covered 41 miles and they arrived in Laon at six
o'clock in the morning of September 13, 1914, and were in action an
hour later. The problem, therefore, before the English and French at
the Aisne, was not the carrying of the river against a disheartened
and retreating army, but the carrying of the river against a
well-thought-out and forceful plan--a plan, moreover, backed up
by the most powerful artillery that the world has ever seen.
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