BATTLE OF CHARLEROI
Toward the end of the third week of August, 1914, the atmosphere
of every European capital became tense with the realization that a
momentous crisis was impending. It was known that the French-British
armies confronted German armies of equal, if not of superior strength.
In Paris and London the military critics wrote optimistically that
the Germans were marching into a trap.
The British army had arrived at the front in splendid fighting
trim. It was difficult to restrain the impetuous valor of the French
soldiers. The skies were bright and there was confidence that the
Germans would unquestionably meet with a crushing defeat. Let us
glance at the line of the French and British armies stretched along
the Belgian frontier. It ran from within touch of Namur up the right
bank of the Sambre, through Charleroi to Binche and Mons, thence
by way of the coal barge canal just within the French frontier to
Condé. For the choice of a great battle ground there was nothing
particularly attractive about it in a military sense.
There is evidence to show in an official communiqué from General
Joffre published on August 24, 1914, that it was intended to be
merely the left wing of a gigantic French battle offensive--on
the adopted German plan--from Condé to Belfort. "An army," runs
the communiqué, "advancing from the northern part of the Woevre
and moving on Neufchâteau is attacking the German forces which have
been going through the Duchy of Luxemburg and are on the right bank
of the Samoy. Another army from the region of Sedan is traversing the
Belgian Ardennes and attacking the German forces marching between
the Lesse and the Meuse. A third army from the region of Chimay
has attacked the German right between the Sambre and the Meuse.
It is supported by the English army from the region of Mons."
These attacks comprised chiefly the battle of Dinant and cavalry
skirmishing, but the purpose of General Joffre was otherwise made
plain in throwing advance French troops across the Belgian frontier
into Ligny and Gembloux on the road to a recapture of Brussels.
This we have previously noted in another connection. The rout of
the French army in Lorraine, however, put an end to the grand
Condé-Belfort offensive.
Thus the Namur-Condé line became a main defensive position instead
of an offensive left wing sweep through Belgium upon Germany. As
such it was well enough--if its pivot on the fortress of Namur
held secure. Liege had already proved its vulnerability, but it
would seem that the French General Staff joined with General Michel,
the Commander of Namur, in believing the Namur forts would give
a better account. The French General Staff were informed of the
approximate strength of the advancing armies of Von Kluck and Von
Bülow, and had nothing to fear from inferiority in numbers. The
staff never gave out the strength of their forces, but there is
reason for believing the great armies were nearly equally matched
after mobilization--about 1,200,000 men.
Let us now see what was developing in the Ardennes away to the
French right. It has been established that woods, particularly
in summer, form the best cover from the observation or attacks
of airmen. The spreading, leafy boughs are difficult to penetrate
visually from a height of even a few hundred feet, at least to
obtain accurate information of what is transpiring beneath.
French air scouts brought in correct information that they had
seen the armies of the Duke of Württemberg and crown prince massed
along the southern Luxemburg and Belgian forest region. But under
the foliage there was another army unseen--that of General von
Hausen. The French moved their Fifth Army up to position on the
line of the Sambre. They advanced their Third Army, commanded by
General Ruffey, upon Luxemburg, and their Fourth Army under General
de Langle de Cary across the River Semois to watch the Meuse left
bank and gain touch with General Lanzerac. General de Cary came
from Sedan, throwing out detachments upon the Meuse left bank. These
operations were to confront the armies of the Duke of Württemberg
and crown prince.
But the French apparently knew nothing of the movements of the
army of General von Hausen. Their air scouts either could not
distinguish it from the armies of the Duke of Württemberg and the
crown prince, amid the forest of the Ardennes, or they did not
observe it at all. To the army of General von Hausen there clings
a good deal of mystery. When last noted by us, previous to the
minor battle of Dinant, it had been formed by forces drawn from
the armies of the Duke of Württemberg and crown prince. Ostensibly
at that time, it was destined to support, as a separate field force,
the armies of Von Kluck and von Bülow.
Possibly the Germans had begun to doubt how long Liege could hold
out. Von Kluck was compelled to mark time in his impetuous march
on Central Belgium. His losses had been heavy. Support in strength
seemed urgent. But this need passed as the Liege forts fell one
after the other under the fire of the German siege guns. General
von Hausen was released for action elsewhere. Thus we may assume,
he was ordered to follow the armies of the Duke of Württemberg
and crown prince down through the Ardennes to strike the Meuse
south of Namur. By this time he had been substantially reenforced.
Now under his command were the complete Twelfth and Nineteenth
Corps, and the Eleventh Reserve Corps. Also a cavalry division of
the Prussian Guard, with some other detachments of cavalry. His
Eleventh Reserve Corps were Hessians, the Twelfth and Nineteenth
Corps were Saxons. The latter two corps were regarded as among the
best in the German army. In the Franco-Prussian War they fought
with conspicuous bravery through every battle in which they were
engaged. They won the battle for Prussia at Gravelotte by turning
the French right and capturing St. Privat. They marched to Sedan
under the crown prince--subsequently the Emperor Frederick--to
occupy the first line in the hard fighting of the Givonne Valley.
During the siege of Paris they occupied a part of the German northern
line, finally to march in triumph into Paris. This infantry and
cavalry of the Prussian Guard stiffened Von Hausen's force into
an army of battle strength.
We have thus two factors to bear in mind with regard to the French
defensive position at Charleroi--the resisting power of the Namur
forts, and the unknown, to the French, proximity of Von Hausen's
army.
However substantial was the measure of reliance that the French
General Staff and General Michel placed on the Namur forts, evidently
General von Bülow regarded them as little more than passing targets
for his siege guns. He seemed to have made a comparatively simple
mathematical calculation of almost the number of shells necessary
to fire, and the hours to be consumed in reducing the Namur forts
to masses of débris.
We can picture General von Bülow as he sat in the motor car with
Marshal von der Goltz--the old gentleman with an overcoat buttoned
up to his nose in August, and huge spectacles. Doubtless discussion
ran mainly upon the impending attack of their Second Army on the
French right. Emphasis would have been laid on the positions of
the armies of the Duke of Württemberg and crown prince advancing
away to their left upon the forces of the French Generals Ruffey
and de Cary. But there was apparently a German gap here between
Von Bülow's army and the armies of the Duke of Württemberg and
crown prince, though we noticed previously Von Bülow's army came
in touch with Saxon troops half way between Huy and Namur, when a
detachment of Von Bülow's left wing was thrown across the Meuse at
Ardenne. This gap was faced by the French extreme right resting on
the southward Namur bend of the Meuse. It was possibly the "trap"
military critics of the moment foresaw for the Germans. Quite likely
the two German generals Von Bülow and Von der Goltz, chatting in
their motor car, referred to this gap, and it is hardly a stretch
of imagination to suggest a twinkle in the huge glasses of the
old gentleman in the August overcoat, when now and then the name
of Von Hausen was mentioned.
The German attack on the French right began early in the morning
of Friday, August 21, 1914. A party of German hussars crossed the
Meuse, rode through Charleroi, and trotted on toward the Sambre.
At first they were mistaken for a British cavalry patrol. Probably
the populace in Charleroi were not sufficiently familiar at that
time with the British hussar uniform to distinguish it from the
German. In all armies hussar uniforms bear a close resemblance. A
French officer, however, presently detected the situation. After
a skirmish the German hussars were driven off with the loss of a
few killed and wounded. But the raid evidently came out of the gap
as a surprise to the French. The citizens were promptly ordered to
their homes. Barricades were raised in the streets, and mitrailleuses
were placed in sweeping positions. An artillery engagement began at
Jemappe, nine miles above Namur on the left bank of the Sambre,
between Von Bülow's vanguard and the main French right. Later in
the day Von Bülow's vanguard artillery had advanced to open fire
on Charleroi and Thuin, seven miles beyond.
On Saturday, August 22, 1914, Von Bülow attacked Charleroi in full
strength. As we have seen, he had already practically settled with
Namur. Their main assault on Saturday was delivered on the Sambre
bridges at Chatelet and Thuin, below and above Charleroi, respectively.
Sometime on Saturday they succeeded in crossing to turn Charleroi
into one of the most frightful street battle grounds in history.
The conflict raged for the possession of iron foundries, glass
works, and other factories. The thoroughfares were swept by storms
of machine-gun fire. Tall chimneys toppled over and crashed to
the ground, burying defenders grouped near under piles of débris.
Desperate hand-to-hand encounters took place in workshops,
electric-power stations, and manufacturing plants. The normal whir
of machinery, now silent, was succeeded by the crack and spitting
of continuous rifle fire.
The French-Turco and Zouave troops fought with savage ferocity,
with gleaming eyes, using bayonets and knives to contest alleys
and passageways. House doors were battered in to reach those firing
from upper windows. Roofs and yard walls were scaled in chase of
fleeing parties. The Germans were driven out of Charleroi several
times, only to return in stronger force. Similarly with the French.
With each change of victors, the losing side turned to bombard
with a torrent of artillery shells the war-engulfed city.
At nightfall on August 22, 1914, Charleroi burst into flames. A
dread and significant glow fell upon the sky. Absent were the usual
intermittent flare of blast furnaces. The greater part of Charleroi
had become a heap of ruins. Those of its citizens still alive cowered
in holes or corners for shelter.
The battle of Charleroi went on throughout the night. Early on the
morning of Sunday, August 23, 1914, Von Hausen swept down through
the gap between the armies of Von Bülow and the Duke of Württemberg.
He crossed the Meuse, drove from before him the French detachments
watching it, and advanced to attack the rear of the French right.
Von Hausen took the French at Charleroi completely by surprise.
At the moment they could comprehend neither where he came from
nor the measure of his strength. But he was in army force.
The French were compelled to withdraw their right from Charleroi.
Von Hausen seized the advantage to hurl his forces upon their rear,
while Von Bülow thundered in assault more vigorously than ever on
the French front. A powerful force was hurled upon them from an
unexpected direction. Presently the retreat of the French Fifth
Army was threatened by the two Saxon corps of Von Hausen's army,
pressing on the French right flank and rear. In this emergency the
retirement of the French Fifth Army appears to have been undertaken
with spontaneous realization of utmost danger. It gave way before
the attacks of Von Bülow and Von Hausen to move southward, leaving
their British left wing without information of defeat.
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