SIEGE AND FALL OF NAMUR
When the Germans occupied Brussels on August 20, 1914, we observed
that corps after corps did not enter the city, but swept to the
south. This was Von Kluck's left wing moving to attack the Allies
on the Sambre-Mons front. The forces which passed through Brussels
were Von Kluck's center, advancing south by east to fall in line
beside the right wing, which had mainly passed between Brussels
and Antwerp to the capture of Bruges and Ghent. The whole line
when re-formed on the French frontier would stretch from Mons to
the English Channel--the great right wing of the German armies.
Meanwhile, Von Bülow's second army had advanced up the valley of
the Meuse, with its right sweeping the Hisbaye uplands. Some part
of this army may have been transported by rail from Montmedy. Its
general advance in columns was directed chiefly upon the Sambre
crossings. As Von Kluck's wide swing through Belgium covered a
greater distance, Von Bülow's army was expected to strike the Allies
some twenty-four hours earlier. Its march, therefore, was in the
nature of an onrush.
But Von Bülow was now in the full tide of fighting strength--an
amazing spectacle to chance or enforced witnesses. Well may the
terrified peasants have stood hat in hand in the midst of their
ruined villages. Any door not left open was immediately broken
down and the interior searched. Here and there a soldier could be
seen carrying a souvenir from some wrecked château. But for the
most part everyone fled from before its path, leaving it silent
and abandoned. The field gray-green uniforms were almost invisible
in cover, in a half light, or when advancing through mist. No
conceivable detail seemed to have been overlooked. Each man carried
a complete equipment down to handy trifles, the whole weighed to
the fraction of an ounce, in carefully estimated proportions.
But this was not enough. Waiting for each column to pass were men
with buckets of drinking water, into which the soldiers dipped
their aluminum cups. Temporary field post offices were established
in advance, so that messages could be gathered in as the columns
passed. Here and there were men to offer biscuits and handfuls of
prunes. In methodical, machine-like progress came the ammunition
wagons, commissariat carts, field kitchens, teams of heavy horses
attached to pontoons, traction engines hauling enormous siege guns,
motor plows for excavating trenches, aeroplanes, carriages containing
surgeons, automobiles for the commanders, and motor busses in which
staff officers could be seen studying their maps. On some of these
vehicles were chalked Berlin-Paris. No branch of the service was
absent, no serviceable part if it overlooked--not even a complement
of grave diggers. It moved forward always at an even pace, as if on
parade, with prearranged signals passed down the line when there
was any obstacle, a descent or bend in the road.
The tramp of many thousands cast into the atmosphere clouds of
fine dust, but even those in rear marched through it as if their
lungs were made of steel. No permission was granted to open out
for the circulation of air, though it was the month of August. It
is safe to assert there was not a single straggler in Von Bülow's
army. At the first sign of it he was admonished with a vigor to
deter his comrades. Discipline was severely maintained. At every
halt the click of heels, and rattle of arms in salute went on down
the line with the sharp delivery of orders.
On Wednesday, August 12, 1914, the town of Huy, situated midway
between Liege and Namur, was seized. It possessed an old citadel,
but it was disarmed, and used now only as a storehouse. Some Belgian
detachments offered a slight resistance at the bridge, but were
speedily driven off. The capture of Huy gave the Germans control
of the railway from Aix-la-Chapelle to France, though broken at
Liege by the still standing northern forts. But they secured a
branch line of more immediate service, running from Huy into Central
Belgium.
On August 15, 1914, Von Bülow's vanguard came within sight of Namur.
Before evening German guns were hurling shells upon its forts. Began
then the siege of Namur. Namur, being the second fortress hope
of the Allies--the pivot upon which General Joffre had planned to
swing his army into Belgium in a sweeping attack upon the advancing
Germans--a brief survey of the city and fortifications will be
necessary. The situation of the city is not as imposing as that
of Liege. For the most part it sits on a hillside declivity, to
rest in the angle formed by the junction of the Sambre and Meuse.
It is a place of some historic and industrial importance, though
in the latter respect not so well known as Liege. To the west,
however, up the valley of the Sambre, the country presents the
usual features of a mining region--pit shafts, tall chimneys issuing
clouds of black smoke, and huge piles of unsightly débris. While
away to the north stretches the great plain of Central Belgium,
southward the Central Meuse offers a more picturesque prospect in
wooded slopes rising to view-commanding hilltops. Directly east,
the Meuse flows into the precipitous cut on its way to Liege.
But in Belgian eyes the fame of Namur lay to a great extent in its
being the second of Brialmont's fortress masterpieces. Its plan
was that of Liege--a ring of outer detached forts, constructed on
the same armor-clad cupola principle. At Namur these were nine in
number, four major forts and five _fortins_. The distance between
each fort was on the average two and a half miles, with between
two and a half to five miles from the city as the center of the
circumference.
Facing Von Bülow's advance, fort Cognlée protected the Brussels
railway, while the guns of Marchovelette swept the space between
it and the left bank of the Meuse. In the southwest angle formed
by the Meuse, forts Maizeret, Andoy and Dave continued the ring.
Again in the angle of the Sambre and Meuse forts St. Héribert and
Malonne protected the city. North of the Sambre, forts Suarlée
and Emines completed the circle.
In the emergency Namur possessed one advantage over Liege. The
resistance of Liege gave Namur due warning of the German invasion,
and some days to prepare for attack. General Michel was in command
or the garrison of Namur, which comprised from 25,000 to 30,000
men. Doubtless reports had come to him of the situation at Liege.
He immediately set to work to overcome the cause of the failure
of Brialmont's plan at Liege, by constructing trenches between
the forts, protected by barbed wire entanglements, and mines in
advance of the German approach. As his circumference of defense
was less than that of Liege, his force promised to be capable of
a more prolonged resistance.
Besides the Allies were close at hand. Only eighteen miles separated
him from strong detachments of French infantry and artillery at
Dinant. As we have seen French cavalry had been thrown forward
as far as Gembloux on the road to Brussels, but ten miles to the
northeast of Namur. Somewhere between that place and Charleroi
French Chasseurs d'Afrique had advanced to occupy outpost positions.
His position appeared by no means hopeless--considerably better than
the unsupported field army at Liege. The armor of his forts was
calculated to withstand the 36-lb. shells of the heaviest German
fieldpieces, but comparatively slight damage was anticipated from the
known heavier howitzers. If the Germans purposed to assault Namur
in mass formation, as they had done at Liege, General Michel had
every reason to feel confident he could repulse them with tremendous
losses.
But the Germans had learned a severely taught lesson at Liege. They
had no intention of repeating those tactics. Behind a remarkable
screen of secrecy, they managed to conceal from General Michel--as
they did from the Allies--the existence of their enormous siege
guns. Whether they brought into action at Namur their famous
42-centimeters, capable of throwing a shell of high explosive power
weighing 2,500 lbs., is uncertain. In fact, it is still doubtful
where they were first fired at the allied enemy. Two are said to
have assisted in the final destruction of the northern forts of
Liege, and two were seen rolling over the field of Waterloo. The
Germans remained silent upon the subject, and nothing definite
about their first discharge was disclosed. But unquestionably their
fire was capable of demolishing into ruin any fort on earth within
a short period. It is certain, however, the Germans brought against
Namur their 28-centimeter guns, and probably some of 21-centimeter
caliber. These artillery weapons were quite formidable enough to
reduce the Namur forts. The former threw a shell of 750 pounds
from a range of three miles--beyond the reach of the Namur guns.
The latter projected shells of 250 pounds. The Germans are said
to have employed thirty-two of the heavier caliber guns, and a
large number of 21-centimeter.
Thus Namur was doomed before the bombardment commenced. Von Bülow's
left wing advanced up the Meuse north bank from Huy, some part of
it crossing to the south bank at Ardenne, where it came in touch
with the Saxon army.
At sundown of August 20, 1914, Von Bülow was in position before
Namur, three miles from its defenses. Darkness fell upon a hot
and sultry August atmosphere. Presently the flashes and boom of
the German guns began a bombardment of the trenches between forts
Cognelée and Marchovelette. It continued through the night. But
the Belgian fortress guns were outranged. It would have been a mere
waste of ammunition to reply. Neither could the Belgian infantry
venture on a counterattack, for the Germans were clearly observed
in overwhelming strength. At the outset the Germans devoted their
efforts to clearing the trenches of the Belgian infantry, leaving the
forts for subsequent demolition. The unfortunate Belgian infantry,
therefore, could do nothing but fire intermittent rifle volleys,
without any effect upon the Germans. They bravely bore this storm
of shells for ten hours. Not a man who lifted his head above the
German machine gun-swept parapets but was not instantly killed or
wounded. Thus the majority of the officers were killed, and the
ranks within the trenches decimated.
Toward morning on August 21, 1914, the Belgians could stand the
tornado of death no longer. The demoralized troops fled from the
trenches, leaving the gap between forts Cognelée and Marchovelette
open. The Germans then opened fire on the forts. In comparison
with the new German siege howitzers, the old-fashioned Belgian
guns proved to be weak weapons. The tremendous pounding of the
German shells not only smashed the fort cupolas, and crumpled into
ruin the interior stone and steel protective armor, but quickly put
the Belgian guns out of action. Thus while fort Maizeret received
some 1,200 German shells at the speed of twenty to the minute, it was
able to reply with only ten shots. Forts Marchovelette and Maizeret
were the first to fall. Seventy-five men of the Marchovelette garrison
were found dead amid its ruins--nearly its total complement.
[Illustration: FRENCH INVASION OF ALSACE-LORRAINE]
Early on Friday morning of August 21, 1914, forts Andoy, Dave,
St. Héribert and Malonne were subjected to a similar furious
bombardment. After three hours of the cannonade Andoy, Dave and
St. Héribert surrendered. During the morning the Germans thrust
a force into the southern angle of the Sambre and Meuse. Here the
Belgian infantry offered a vigorous resistance. It was hoped that
the French at Dinant would hasten to their relief. But Dinant was
for the second time within a few days the scene of conflict. Some
6,000 French Turcos and artillery did arrive, but too late to be
of use in helping to save Namur. Shells now began to drop in the
city while aeroplanes flung down bombs. A thunderstorm rumbled in
combination with the continuous roar of the German guns. A panic
took hold of the citizens. Distracted men, women and children huddled
together in spellbound terror, or sought the shelter of their cellars.
The more superstitious pronounced this to be the end of all things,
from the eclipse of the sun which darkened the sky. Fort Malonne
succumbed sometime during the afternoon of August 21, 1914.
As at Liege, with General Leman, so in Namur General Michel foresaw
the city and forts' fate was imminent. Only the northwest forts
Suarlée, Emines and Cognelée held out. The Belgians and French
had been defeated by the Germans in the angle of the Sambre and
Meuse. The horizon revealed no sign of a French army advancing.
General Michel, therefore, decided upon the evacuation of the city
by the Belgian infantry. It was successfully accomplished, though
even more in the nature of a flight than at Liege. But General
Michel went with them, instead of remaining, like General Leman,
to fight the defense of his fortress to the last.
The retreating Belgians on August 22, 1914, had some adventurous
wandering before them. They had first to cut their way through
a body of German troops, then to become involved with a French
force near Charleroi. It took them seven days to reach Rouen by way
of Amiens. There they were embarked for sea transport to Ostend.
At Ostend, they joined the main Belgian army after its retreat
from Antwerp.
On Sunday morning, August 23, 1914, the Germans began the bombardment
of Fort Suarlée. This fort repeated the heroic resistance of Fort
Boncelles at Liege. It held out until the afternoon of August 25. It
was apparently then blown up by the explosion of its own magazine,
thus again repeating the end of Fort Loncin at Liege. Meantime the
Germans had succeeded in reducing Forts Cognelée and Emines.
The Germans entered Namur on the afternoon of August 23, 1914. There
seems to have been some oversight in the plan, for the advance guard
found themselves under fire of their own guns directed upon the citadel
and the Grande Place. This, however, was speedily rectified. Their
behavior was much the same as at Louvain and Brussels. They marched
in with bands playing and singing patriotic songs. Proclamations
were at once issued warning the citizens not to commit any hostile
act. The inhabitants were far too cowed to contemplate anything
but submission. Good discipline was preserved, and though the city
took fire that night there is nothing to show it was from German
design. The citizens were induced to come forth from their cellars
and hiding places to reopen the cafés and shops.
General von Bülow entered Namur on Monday morning August 24, 1914.
He was accompanied by Field Marshal Baron von der Goltz, recently
appointed Governor General of Belgium. Previous to the former Balkan
War he had been employed in reorganizing the Turkish army. An onlooker
in Namur thus describes the German Field Marshal:--"An elderly
gentleman covered with orders, buttoned in an overcoat up to his
nose, above which gleamed a pair of enormous spectacles."
General Michel attributed his defeat to the German siege guns. The
fire was so continuous upon the trenches that it was impossible
to hold them, and the forts simply crumpled under the storm of
shells. But back of General Michel's plea the allied Intelligence
Departments lacked efficiency or energy, or both, in not gaining
more than a hint, at any rate, of the enormous German siege guns
until they were actually thundering at the gates.
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