SECTION VII

SOULS OF FOOLS AND MONSTERS

A deformed child is born absolutely imbecile, it has no ideas and lives

without ideas; we have seen examples of this. How shall this animal be

defined? doctors have said that it is something between man and beast;

others have said that it had a sensitive soul, but not an intellectual

soul. It eats, drinks, sleeps, wakes, has sensations; but it does not

think.

Is there another life for this creature, or is there none? The question

has been posed, and has not yet been completely answered.

Some say that this creature must have a soul, because its father and

mother had one. But by this reasoning one would prove that if it came

into the world without a nose it would be deemed to have one, because

its father and its mother had noses.

A woman gives birth to child with no chin, its forehead is receding and

rather black, its nose is slim and pointed, its eyes are round, it bears

not a bad resemblance to a swallow; the rest of its body, nevertheless,

is made like ours. The parents have it baptised; by a plurality of votes

it is considered a man and possessor of an immortal soul. But if this

ridiculous little figure has pointed nails and beak-like mouth, it is

declared a monster, it has no soul, and is not baptised.

It is well known that in London in 1726 there was a woman who gave birth

every week to a rabbit. No difficulty was made about refusing baptism to

this child, despite the epidemic mania there was for three weeks in

London for believing that this poor rogue was making wild rabbits. The

surgeon who attended her, St. André by name, swore that nothing was

more true, and people believed him. But what reason did the credulous

have for refusing a soul to this woman's children? she had a soul, her

children should be provided with souls also; whether they had hands,

whether they had paws, whether they were born with a little snout or

with a face; cannot the Supreme Being bestow the gift of thought and

sensation on a little I know not what, born of a woman, shaped like a

rabbit, as well as to a little I know not what, shaped like a man? Shall

the soul that was ready to lodge in this woman's foetus go back again

into space?

Locke makes the sound observation, about monsters, that one must not

attribute immortality to the exterior of a body; that the form has

nothing to do with it. This immortality, he says, is no more attached to

the form of his face or his chest, than to the way his beard is dressed

or his coat cut.

He asks what is the exact measure of deformity by which you can

recognize whether or no a child has a soul? What is the precise degree

at which it must be declared a monster and deprived of a soul?

One asks still further what would be a soul which never has any but

fantastic ideas? there are some which never escape from them. Are they

worthy or unworthy? what is to be done with their pure spirit?

What is one to think of a child with two heads? without deformity apart

from this? Some say that it has two souls because it is provided with

two pineal glands, with two _corpus callosum_, with two _sensorium

commune_. Others reply that one cannot have two souls when one has only

one chest and one navel.[22]

In fine, so many questions have been asked about this poor human soul,

that if it were necessary to answer them all, this examination of its

own person would cause it the most intolerable boredom. There would

happen to it what happened to Cardinal de Polignac at a conclave. His

steward, tired of never being able to make him settle his accounts, made

the journey from Rome, and came to the little window of his cell

burdened with an immense bundle of papers. He read for nearly two hours.

At last, seeing that no reply was forthcoming, he put his head forward.

The cardinal had departed nearly two hours before. Our souls will depart

before their stewards have acquainted them with the facts: but let us be

exact before God, whatever sort of ignoramuses we are, we and our

stewards.

FOOTNOTES:

[21] Voltaire himself.

[22] The Chevalier d'Angos, learned astronomer, has carefully observed a

two-headed lizard for several days; and he has assured himself that the

lizard had two independent wills, each of which had an almost equal

power over the body. When the lizard was given a piece of bread, in such

a way that it could see it with only one head, this head wanted to go

after the bread, and the other wanted the body to remain at rest.

_STATES_, _GOVERNMENTS_

The ins and outs of all governments have been closely examined recently.

Tell me then, you who have travelled, in what state, under what sort of

government you would choose to be born. I imagine that a great

land-owning lord in France would not be vexed to be born in Germany; he

would be sovereign instead of subject. A peer of France would be very

glad to have the privileges of the English peerage; he would be

legislator. The lawyer and the financier would be better off in France

than elsewhere.

But what country would a wise, free man, a man with a moderate fortune,

and without prejudices, choose?

A member of the government of Pondicherry, a learned man enough,

returned to Europe by land with a Brahmin better educated than the

ordinary Brahmin. "What do you think of the government of the Great

Mogul?" asked the councillor.

"I think it abominable," answered the Brahmin. "How can you expect a

state to be happily governed by the Tartars? Our rajahs, our omrahs, our

nabobs, are very content, but the citizens are hardly so; and millions

of citizens are something."

Reasoning, the councillor and the Brahmin traversed the whole of Upper

Asia. "I make the observation," said the Brahmin, "that there is not one

republic in all this vast part of the world."

"Formerly there was the republic of Tyre," said the councillor, "but it

did not last long; there was still another one in the direction of

Arabia Petrea, in a little corner called Palestine, if one can honour

with the name of republic a horde of thieves and usurers sometimes

governed by judges, sometimes by a species of kings, sometimes by

grand-pontiffs, become slave seven or eight times, and finally driven

out of the country which it had usurped."

"I imagine," said the Brahmin, "that one ought to find very few

republics on the earth. Men are rarely worthy of governing themselves.

This happiness should belong only to little peoples who hide themselves

in islands, or among the mountains, like rabbits who shun carnivorous

beasts; but in the long run they are discovered and devoured."

When the two travellers reached Asia Minor, the councillor said to the

Brahmin: "Would you believe that a republic was formed in a corner of

Italy, which lasted more than five hundred years, and which owned Asia

Minor, Asia, Africa, Greece, Gaul, Spain and the whole of Italy?"

"She soon became a monarchy, then," said the Brahmin.

"You have guessed right," said the other. "But this monarchy fell, and

every day we compose beautiful dissertations in order to find the cause

of its decadence and downfall."

"You take a deal of trouble," said the Indian. "This empire fell because

it existed. Everything has to fall. I hope as much will happen to the

Grand Mogul's empire."

"By the way," said the European, "do you consider that there should be

more honour in a despotic state, and more virtue in a republic?"

The Indian, having had explained to him what we mean by honour, answered

that honour was more necessary in a republic, and that one had more need

of virtue in a monarchical state. "For," said he, "a man who claims to

be elected by the people, will not be if he is dishonoured; whereas at

the court he could easily obtain a place, in accordance with a great

prince's maxim, that in order to succeed a courtier should have neither

honour nor character. As regards virtue, one must be prodigiously

virtuous to dare to say the truth. The virtuous man is much more at his

ease in a republic; he has no one to flatter."

"Do you think," said the man from Europe, "that laws and religions are

made for climates, just as one has to have furs in Moscow, and gauzy

stuffs in Delhi?"

"Without a doubt," answered the Brahmin. "All the laws which concern

material things are calculated for the meridian one lives in. A German

needs only one wife, and a Persian three or four.

"The rites of religion are of the same nature. How, if I were Christian,

should I say mass in my province where there is neither bread nor wine?

As regards dogmas, that is another matter; the climate has nothing to do

with them. Did not your religion begin in Asia, whence it was driven

out? does it not exist near the Baltic Sea, where it was unknown?"

"In what state, under what domination, would you like best to live?"

asked the councillor.

"Anywhere but where I do live," answered his companion. "And I have met

many Siamese, Tonkinese, Persians and Turks who said as much."

"But, once again," persisted the European, "what state would you

choose?"

The Brahmin answered: "The state where only the laws are obeyed."

"That is an old answer," said the councillor.

"It is none the worse for that," said the Brahmin.

"Where is that country?" asked the councillor.

"We must look for it," answered the Brahmin.

_SUPERSTITION_

The superstitious man is to the rogue what the slave is to the tyrant.

Further, the superstitious man is governed by the fanatic and becomes

fanatic. Superstition born in Paganism, adopted by Judaism, infested the

Christian Church from the earliest times. All the fathers of the Church,

without exception, believed in the power of magic. The Church always

condemned magic, but she always believed in it: she did not

excommunicate sorcerers as madmen who were mistaken, but as men who were

really in communication with the devil.

To-day one half of Europe thinks that the other half has long been and

still is superstitious. The Protestants regard the relics, the

indulgences, the mortifications, the prayers for the dead, the holy

water, and almost all the rites of the Roman Church, as a superstitious

dementia. Superstition, according to them, consists in taking useless

practices for necessary practices. Among the Roman Catholics there are

some more enlightened than their ancestors, who have renounced many of

these usages formerly considered sacred; and they defend themselves

against the others who have retained them, by saying: "They are

indifferent, and what is merely indifferent cannot be an evil."

It is difficult to mark the limits of superstition. A Frenchman

travelling in Italy finds almost everything superstitious, and is hardly

mistaken. The Archbishop of Canterbury maintains that the Archbishop of

Paris is superstitious; the Presbyterians make the same reproach against

His Grace of Canterbury, and are in their turn treated as superstitious

by the Quakers, who are the most superstitious of all in the eyes of

other Christians.

In Christian societies, therefore, no one agrees as to what superstition

is. The sect which seems to be the least attacked by this malady of the

intelligence is that which has the fewest rites. But if with few

ceremonies it is still strongly attached to an absurd belief, this

absurd belief is equivalent alone to all the superstitious practices

observed from the time of Simon the magician to that of Father

Gauffridi.

It is therefore clear that it is the fundamentals of the religion of one

sect which is considered as superstition by another sect.

The Moslems accuse all Christian societies of it, and are themselves

accused. Who will judge this great matter? Will it be reason? But each

sect claims to have reason on its side. It will therefore be force which

will judge, while awaiting the time when reason will penetrate a

sufficient number of heads to disarm force.

Up to what point does statecraft permit superstition to be destroyed?

This is a very thorny question; it is like asking up to what point one

should make an incision in a dropsical person, who may die under the

operation. It is a matter for the doctor's discretion.

Can there exist a people free from all superstitious prejudices? That is

to ask--Can there exist a nation of philosophers? It is said that there

is no superstition in the magistrature of China. It is probable that

none will remain in the magistrature of a few towns of Europe.

Then the magistrates will stop the superstition of the people from being

dangerous. These magistrates' example will not enlighten the mob, but

the principal persons of the middle-classes will hold the mob in check.

There is not perhaps a single riot, a single religious outrage in which

the middle-classes were not formerly imbrued, because these middle

classes were then the mob; but reason and time will have changed them.

Their softened manners will soften those of the lowest and most savage

populace; it is a thing of which we have striking examples in more than

one country. In a word, less superstition, less fanaticism; and less

fanaticism, less misery.

_TEARS_

Tears are the mute language of sorrow. But why? What connection is there

between a sad idea and this limpid, salt liquid, filtered through a

little gland at the external corner of the eye, which moistens the

conjunctiva and the small lachrymal points, whence it descends into the

nose and mouth through the reservoir called the lachrymal sack and its

ducts?

Why in women and children, whose organs are part of a frail and delicate

network, are tears more easily excited by sorrow than in grown men,

whose tissue is firmer?

Did nature wish compassion to be born in us at sight of these tears

which soften us, and lead us to help those who shed them? The woman of a

savage race is as firmly determined to help the child that cries as

would be a woman of the court, and maybe more, because she has fewer

distractions and passions.

In the animal body everything has an object without a doubt. The eyes

especially bear such evident, such proven, such admirable relation to

the rays of light; this mechanism is so divine, that I should be tempted

to take for a delirium of burning fever the audacity which denies the

final causes of the structure of our eyes.

The use of tears does not seem to have so well determined and striking

an object; but it would be beautiful that nature made them flow in order

to stir us to pity.

There are women who are accused of weeping when they wish. I am not at

all surprised at their talent. A live, sensitive, tender imagination can

fix itself on some object, on some sorrowful memory, and picture it in

such dominating colours that they wring tears from it. It is what

happens to many actors, and principally to actresses, on the stage.

The women who imitate them in their own homes add to this talent the

petty fraud of appearing to weep for their husbands, whereas in fact

they are weeping for their lovers. Their tears are true, but the object

of them is false.

One asks why the same man who has watched the most atrocious events

dry-eyed, who even has committed cold-blooded crimes, will weep at the

theatre at the representation of these events and crimes? It is that he

does not see them with the same eyes, he sees them with the eyes of the

author and the actor. He is no longer the same man; he was a barbarian,

he was agitated by furious passions when he saw an innocent woman

killed, when he stained himself with his friend's blood. His soul was

filled with stormy tumult; it is tranquil, it is empty; nature returns

to it; he sheds virtuous tears. That is the true merit, the great good

of the theatres; there is achieved what can never be achieved by the

frigid declamations of an orator paid to bore the whole of an audience

for an hour.

David the capitoul, who, without emotion, caused and saw the death of

innocent Calas on the wheel, would have shed tears at the sight of his

own crime in a well-written and well-spoken tragedy.

It is thus that Pope has said in the prologue to Addison's Cato:--

"Tyrants no more their savage nature kept;

And foes to virtue wondered how they wept."

_THEIST_

The theist is a man firmly persuaded of the existence of a Supreme Being

as good as He is powerful, who has formed all beings with extension,

vegetating, sentient and reflecting; who perpetuates their species, who

punishes crimes without cruelty, and rewards virtuous actions with

kindness.

The theist does not know how God punishes, how he protects, how he

pardons, for he is not reckless enough to flatter himself that he knows

how God acts, but he knows that God acts and that He is just.

Difficulties against Providence do not shake him in his faith, because

they are merely great difficulties, and not proofs. He submits to this

Providence, although he perceives but a few effects and a few signs of

this Providence: and, judging of the things he does not see by the

things he sees, he considers that this Providence reaches all places and

all centuries.

Reconciled in this principle with the rest of the universe, he does not

embrace any of the sects, all of which contradict each other; his

religion is the most ancient and the most widespread; for the simple

worship of a God has preceded all the systems of the world. He speaks a

language that all peoples understand, while they do not understand one

another. He has brothers from Pekin to Cayenne, and he counts all wise

men as his brethren. He believes that religion does not consist either

in the opinions of an unintelligible metaphysic, or in vain display, but

in worship and justice. The doing of good, there is his service; being

submissive to God, there is his doctrine. The Mahometan cries to

him--"Have a care if you do not make the pilgrimage to Mecca!" "Woe unto

you," says a Recollet, "if you do not make a journey to Notre-Dame de

Lorette!" He laughs at Lorette and at Mecca; but he succours the needy

and defends the oppressed.

_TOLERANCE_

What is tolerance? it is the consequence of humanity. We are all formed

of frailty and error; let us pardon reciprocally each other's

folly--that is the first law of nature.

It is clear that the individual who persecutes a man, his brother,

because he is not of the same opinion, is a monster. That admits of no

difficulty. But the government! but the magistrates! but the princes!

how do they treat those who have another worship than theirs? If they

are powerful strangers, it is certain that a prince will make an

alliance with them. François I., very Christian, will unite with

Mussulmans against Charles V., very Catholic. François I. will give

money to the Lutherans of Germany to support them in their revolt

against the emperor; but, in accordance with custom, he will start by

having Lutherans burned at home. For political reasons he pays them in

Saxony; for political reasons he burns them in Paris. But what will

happen? Persecutions make proselytes? Soon France will be full of new

Protestants. At first they will let themselves be hanged, later they in

their turn will hang. There will be civil wars, then will come the St.

Bartholomew; and this corner of the world will be worse than all that

the ancients and moderns have ever told of hell.

Madmen, who have never been able to give worship to the God who made

you! Miscreants, whom the example of the Noachides, the learned Chinese,

the Parsees and all the sages, has never been able to lead! Monsters,

who need superstitions as crows' gizzards need carrion! you have been

told it already, and there is nothing else to tell you--if you have two

religions in your countries, they will cut each other's throat; if you

have thirty religions, they will dwell in peace. Look at the great Turk,

he governs Guebres, Banians, Greek Christians, Nestorians, Romans. The

first who tried to stir up tumult would be impaled; and everyone is

tranquil.

Of all religions, the Christian is without doubt the one which should

inspire tolerance most, although up to now the Christians have been the

most intolerant of all men. The Christian Church was divided in its

cradle, and was divided even in the persecutions which under the first

emperors it sometimes endured. Often the martyr was regarded as an

apostate by his brethren, and the Carpocratian Christian expired beneath

the sword of the Roman executioners, excommunicated by the Ebionite

Christian, the which Ebionite was anathema to the Sabellian.

This horrible discord, which has lasted for so many centuries, is a very

striking lesson that we should pardon each other's errors; discord is

the great ill of mankind; and tolerance is the only remedy for it.

There is nobody who is not in agreement with this truth, whether he

meditates soberly in his study, or peaceably examines the truth with his

friends. Why then do the same men who admit in private indulgence,

kindness, justice, rise in public with so much fury against these

virtues? Why? it is that their own interest is their god, and that they

sacrifice everything to this monster that they worship.

I possess a dignity and a power founded on ignorance and credulity; I

walk on the heads of the men who lie prostrate at my feet; if they

should rise and look me in the face, I am lost; I must bind them to the

ground, therefore, with iron chains.

Thus have reasoned the men whom centuries of bigotry have made powerful.

They have other powerful men beneath them, and these have still others,

who all enrich themselves with the spoils of the poor, grow fat on their

blood, and laugh at their stupidity. They all detest tolerance, as

partisans grown rich at the public expense fear to render their

accounts, and as tyrants dread the word liberty. And then, to crown

everything, they hire fanatics to cry at the top of their voices:

"Respect my master's absurdities, tremble, pay, and keep your mouths

shut."

It is thus that a great part of the world long was treated; but to-day

when so many sects make a balance of power, what course to take with

them? Every sect, as one knows, is a ground of error; there are no sects

of geometers, algebraists, arithmeticians, because all the propositions

of geometry, algebra and arithmetic are true. In every other science one

may be deceived. What Thomist or Scotist theologian would dare say

seriously that he is sure of his case?

If it were permitted to reason consistently in religious matters, it is

clear that we all ought to become Jews, because Jesus Christ our Saviour

was born a Jew, lived a Jew, died a Jew, and that he said expressly that

he was accomplishing, that he was fulfilling the Jewish religion. But it

is clearer still that we ought to be tolerant of one another, because we

are all weak, inconsistent, liable to fickleness and error. Shall a reed

laid low in the mud by the wind say to a fellow reed fallen in the

opposite direction: "Crawl as I crawl, wretch, or I shall petition that

you be torn up by the roots and burned?"

_TRUTH_

"Pilate therefore said unto him, Art thou a king then? Jesus answered,

Thou sayest that I am a king. To this end was I born, and for this cause

came I into the world, that I should bear witness unto the truth.

Everyone that is of the truth heareth my voice.

"Pilate saith unto Him, What is truth? And when he had said this he went

out, etc." (St. John xviii. 37.)

It is a sad thing for the human race that Pilate went out without

waiting for the answer; we should know what truth is. Pilate had very

little curiosity. The accused led before him, says he is king, that he

was to be king; and Pilate does not inquire how that can be. He is

supreme judge in Cæsar's name, he has power of life and death; his duty

was to probe the sense of these words. He ought to say--"Tell me what

you understand by being king. How were you born to be king and to bear

witness to the truth? It is maintained that truth reaches but with

difficulty to the ear of kings. I am judge, I have always had great

trouble in finding it. While your enemies are howling against you

without, give me some information on the point; you will be doing me the

greatest service that has ever been done a judge; and I much prefer to

learn to recognize truth, than to accede to the Jews' clamorous demand

to have you hanged."

We shall not dare, to be sure, seek what the author of all truth would

have been able to reply to Pilate.

Would he have said: "Truth is an abstract word which most men use

indifferently in their books and judgments, for error and falsehood?"

This definition would have been marvellously appropriate to all makers

of systems. Similarly is the word "wisdom" taken often for folly, and

"wit" for nonsense.

Humanly speaking, let us define truth, while waiting for a better

definition, as--"a statement of the facts as they are."

I suppose that if one had given only six months to teaching Pilate the

truths of logic, he would assuredly have made this conclusive syllogism.

One must not take away the life of a man who has only preached good

morality: well, the man who has been impeached has, on the showing of

his enemies even, often preached excellent morality; therefore he should

not be punished with death.

He might have drawn this further argument.

My duty is to disperse the riotous assemblage of a seditious people who

demand a man's death, unreasonably and without legal form; well, that is

the position of the Jews in this instance; therefore I must drive them

away and break up their meeting.

We suppose that Pilate knew arithmetic; hence we will not speak of those

forms of truth.

As regards mathematical truths, I think it would have taken at least

three years before he could have learned higher geometry. The truths of

physics combined with those of geometry would have demanded more than

four years. We spend six, ordinarily, in studying theology; I ask twelve

for Pilate, seeing that he was pagan, and that six years would not have

been too much for eradicating all his old errors, and six years more for

making him fit to receive a doctor's hood.

If Pilate had had a well-balanced mind, I should have asked only two

years to teach him metaphysical truth; and as metaphysical truth is

necessarily allied to moral truth, I flatter myself that in less than

nine years he would have become a real scholar and a perfectly honest

man.

I should then have said to Pilate:--Historical truths are merely

probabilities. If you had fought at the battle of Philippi, that is for

you a truth which you know by intuition, by perception. But for us who

dwell near the Syrian desert, it is merely a very probable thing, which

we know by hearsay. How much hearsay is necessary to form a conviction

equal to that of a man who, having seen the thing, can flatter himself

that he has a sort of certainty?

He who has heard the thing told by twelve thousand eyewitnesses, has

only twelve thousand probabilities, equal to one strong probability,

which is not equal to certainty.

If you have the thing from only one of these witnesses, you know

nothing; you should be sceptical. If the witness is dead, you should be

still more sceptical, for you cannot enlighten yourself. If from several

witnesses who are dead, you are in the same plight. If from those to

whom the witnesses have spoken, your scepticism should increase still

more.

From generation to generation scepticism increases, and probability

diminishes; and soon probability is reduced to zero.

_TYRANNY_

One gives the name of tyrant to the sovereign who knows no laws but

those of his caprice, who takes his subjects' property, and who

afterwards enrols them to go to take the property of his neighbours.

There are none of these tyrants in Europe.

One distinguishes between the tyranny of one man and that of many. The

tyranny of many would be that of a body which invaded the rights of

other bodies, and which exercised despotism in favour of the laws

corrupted by it. Nor are there any tyrants of this sort in Europe.

Under which tyranny would you like to live? Under neither; but if I had

to choose, I should detest the tyranny of one man less than that of

many. A despot always has his good moments; an assembly of despots

never. If a tyrant does me an injustice, I can disarm him through his

mistress, his confessor or his page; but a company of grave tyrants is

inaccessible to all seductions. When it is not unjust, it is at the

least hard, and never does it bestow favours.

If I have only one despot, I am quit of him by drawing myself up against

a wall when I see him pass, or by bowing low, or by striking the ground

with my forehead, according to the custom of the country; but if there

is a company of a hundred despots, I am exposed to repeating this

ceremony a hundred times a day, which in the long run is very annoying

if one's hocks are not supple. If I have a farm in the neighbourhood of

one of our lords, I am crushed; if I plead against a relation of the

relations of one of our lords, I am ruined. What is to be done? I fear

that in this world one is reduced to being either hammer or anvil; lucky

the man who escapes these alternatives!

_VIRTUE_

SECTION I

It is said of Marcus Brutus that, before killing himself, he uttered

these words: "O virtue! I thought you were something; but you are only

an empty phantom!"

You were right, Brutus, if you considered virtue as being head of a

faction, and assassin of your benefactor; but if you had considered

virtue as consisting only of doing good to those dependent on you, you

would not have called it a phantom, and you would not have killed

yourself in despair.

I am very virtuous says this excrement of theology, for I have the four

cardinal virtues, and the three divine. An honest man asks him--"What is

the cardinal virtue?" The other answers--"Strength, prudence, temperance

and justice."

THE HONEST MAN:

If you are just, you have said everything; your strength, your prudence,

your temperance, are useful qualities. If you have them, so much the

better for you; but if you are just, so much the better for the others.

But it is not enough to be just, you must do good; that is what is

really cardinal. And your divine virtues, which are they?

THE EXCREMENT:

Faith, hope, charity.

THE HONEST MAN:

Is it a virtue to believe? either what you believe seems true to you,

and in this case there is no merit in believing; or it seems false to

you, and then it is impossible for you to believe.

Hope cannot be a virtue any more than fear; one fears and one hopes,

according as one receives a promise or a threat. As for charity, is it

not what the Greeks and the Romans understood by humanity, love of one's

neighbour? this love is nothing if it be not active; doing good,

therefore, is the sole true virtue.

THE EXCREMENT:

One would be a fool! Really, I am to give myself a deal of torment in

order to serve mankind, and I shall get no return! all work deserves

payment. I do not mean to do the least honest action, unless I am

certain of paradise.

THE HONEST MAN:

Ah, master! that is to say that, if you did not hope for paradise, and

if you did not fear hell, you would never do any good action. Believe

me, master, there are two things worthy of being loved for themselves,

God and virtue.

THE EXCREMENT:

I see, sir, you are a disciple of Fénélon.

THE HONEST MAN:

Yes, master.

THE EXCREMENT:

I shall denounce you to the judge of the ecclesiastical court at Meaux.

THE HONEST MAN:

Go along, denounce!

SECTION II

What is virtue? Beneficence towards the fellow-creature. Can I call

virtue things other than those which do me good? I am needy, you are

generous. I am in danger, you help me. I am deceived, you tell me the

truth. I am neglected, you console me. I am ignorant, you teach me.

Without difficulty I shall call you virtuous. But what will become of

the cardinal and divine virtues? Some of them will remain in the

schools.

What does it matter to me that you are temperate? you observe a precept

of health; you will have better health, and I am happy to hear it. You

have faith and hope, and I am happy still; they will procure you eternal

life. Your divine virtues are celestial gifts; your cardinal virtues are

excellent qualities which serve to guide you: but they are not virtues

as regards your fellow-creature. The prudent man does good to himself,

the virtuous man does good to mankind. St. Paul was right to tell you

that charity prevails over faith and hope.

But shall only those that are useful to one's fellow-creature be

admitted as virtues? How can I admit any others? We live in society;

really, therefore, the only things that are good for us are those that

are good for society. A recluse will be sober, pious; he will be clad in

hair-cloth; he will be a saint: but I shall not call him virtuous until

he has done some act of virtue by which other men have profited. So long

as he is alone, he is doing neither good nor evil; for us he is nothing.

If St. Bruno brought peace to families, if he succoured want, he was

virtuous; if he fasted, prayed in solitude, he was a saint. Virtue among

men is an interchange of kindness; he who has no part in this

interchange should not be counted. If this saint were in the world, he

would doubtless do good; but so long as he is not in the world, the

world will be right in refusing him the title of virtuous; he will be

good for himself and not for us.

But, you say to me, if a recluse is a glutton, a drunkard, given to

secret debauches with himself, he is vicious; he is virtuous, therefore,

if he has the opposite qualities. That is what I cannot agree: he is a

very disagreeable fellow if he has the faults you mention; but he is not

vicious, wicked, punishable as regards society to whom these infamies do

no harm. It is to be presumed that were he to return to society he would

do harm there, that he would be very vicious; and it is even more

probable that he would be a wicked man, than it is sure that the other

temperate and chaste recluse would be a virtuous man, for in society

faults increase, and good qualities diminish.

A much stronger objection is made; Nero, Pope Alexander VI., and other

monsters of this species, have bestowed kindnesses; I answer hardily

that on that day they were virtuous.

A few theologians say that the divine emperor Antonine was not virtuous;

that he was a stubborn Stoic who, not content with commanding men,

wished further to be esteemed by them; that he attributed to himself the

good he did to the human race; that all his life he was just, laborious,

beneficent through vanity, and that he only deceived men through his

virtues. "My God!" I exclaim. "Give us often rogues like him!"

_WHY?_

Why does one hardly ever do the tenth part of the good one might do?

Why in half Europe do girls pray to God in Latin, which they do not

understand?

Why in antiquity was there never a theological quarrel, and why were no

people ever distinguished by the name of a sect? The Egyptians were not

called Isiacs or Osiriacs; the peoples of Syria did not have the name of

Cybelians. The Cretans had a particular devotion to Jupiter, and were

never entitled Jupiterians. The ancient Latins were very attached to

Saturn; there was not a village in Latium called Saturnian: on the

contrary, the disciples of the God of truth taking their master's title,

and calling themselves "anointed" like Him, declared, as soon as they

could, an eternal war on all the peoples who were not anointed, and made

war among themselves for fourteen hundred years, taking the names of

Arians, Manicheans, Donatists, Hussites, Papists, Lutherans, Calvinists.

And lastly, the Jansenists and the Molinists have had no more poignant

mortification than that of not having been able to slaughter each other

in pitched battle. Whence does this come?

Why is the great number of hard-working, innocent men who till the land

every day of the year that you may eat all its fruits, scorned,

vilified, oppressed, robbed; and why is it that the useless and often

very wicked man who lives only by their work, and who is rich only

through their poverty, is on the contrary respected, courted,

considered?

Why is it that, the fruits of the earth being so necessary for the

conservation of men and animals, one yet sees so many years and so many

countries where there is entire lack of these fruits?

Why is the half of Africa and America covered with poisons?

Why is there no land where insects are not far in excess of men?

Why does a little whitish, evil-smelling secretion form a being which

has hard bones, desires and thoughts? and why do these beings always

persecute each other?

Why does so much evil exist, seeing that everything is formed by a God

whom all theists are agreed in naming "good?"

Why, since we complain ceaselessly of our ills, do we spend all our time

in increasing them?

Why, as we are so miserable, have we imagined that not to be is a great

ill, when it is clear that it was not an ill not to be before we were

born?

Why and how does one have dreams during sleep, if one has no soul; and

how is it that these dreams are always so incoherent, so extravagant, if

one has a soul?

Why do the stars move from west to east rather than from east to west?

Why do we exist? why is there anything?

_DECLARATION OF THE ADMIRERS, QUESTIONERS AND DOUBTERS WHO HAVE AMUSED

THEMSELVES BY PROPOUNDING TO THE SCHOLARS THE ABOVE QUESTIONS IN NINE

VOLUMES._[23]

We declare to the scholars that, being like them prodigiously ignorant

about the first principles of all things, and about the natural,

typical, mystic, allegorical sense of many things, we refer these things

to the infallible judgment of the Holy Inquisition of Rome, Florence,

Madrid, Lisbon, and to the decrees of the Sorbonne of Paris, perpetual

council of the Gauls.

Our errors springing in no wise from malice, but being the natural

consequence of human frailty, we hope that they will be pardoned to us

in this world and the other.

We beseech the small number of heavenly spirits who are still shut up in

France in mortal bodies, and who, from there, enlighten the universe at

_thirty sous_ the sheet, to communicate their luminousness to us for the

tenth volume which we reckon on publishing at the end of Lent 1772, or

in Advent 1773; and for their luminousness we will pay _forty sous_.

This tenth volume will contain some very curious articles, which, if God

favours us, will give new point to the salt which we shall endeavour to

bestow in the thanks we shall give to these gentlemen.

Executed on Mount Krapack, the thirtieth day of the month of Janus, the

year of the world

according to Scaliger 5722

according to Riccioli 5956

according to Eusebius 6972

according to the Alphonsine Tables 8707

according to the Egyptians 370000

according to the Chaldeans 465102

according to the Brahmins 780000

according to the philosophers infinity

FOOTNOTES:

[23] The Philosophical Dictionary was first published as "Questions on

the Encyclopedia," then reprinted as "Reason by Alphabet," and then

finally, with many additions, became the "Philosophical Dictionary."

TRANSCRIBER'S NOTES:

This text had three occurrences of "François I" followed by a

superscripted "er". These have be rendered as François Ier in this text.

The following words used an "oe" ligature in the original:

foetus

manoeuvre

oesophagus

Phoenicia

Phoenicians

subpoenaed

Variations in spelling and hyphenation have been left as in the original.

There is one occurrence of "Vistnou" and one of "Vitsnou". One of these

is clearly an error, but each has been left as in the original.

The symbol representing infinity has been replaced with the word

"infinity" on page 316, the last line of the text.

The following corrections have been made to the original text:

page 17: Nestor, in the "Iliad," wishing to insinuate himself

as a wise conciliator into the minds of Achilles and

Agamemnon{original had "Agamamemnon"},

page 40: Atheism is the vice of a few intelligent persons, and

superstition{original had "superstitution"} is the vice of

fools.

page 42: if it is a greater crime not to believe in the

Deity{original had "Diety"} than to have unworthy opinions

thereof:

page 54: They will say as much of the great moral maxims, of

Zarathustra's--"In doubt if an{original had "in"} action be

just, abstain...";

page 58: What time and what trouble for copying correctly in

Greek and Latin the works of Origen{original had "Origin"}, of

Clement of Alexandria, and of all those other authors called

"fathers."

page 101: we shall be convinced that we must not be vain about

anything, and yet we shall always{original had "aways"} have

vanity.

page 128: All that certain tyrants{original had "tryants"} of

the souls desire is that the men they teach shall have false

judgment.

page 166: and to surround him with little chubby, flushed faces

accompanied{original had "accompained"} by two wings; I laugh

and I pardon them with all my heart.

page 171: And an unfortunate{original had "unforunate"} idiot,

who had had enough courage to render very great services to the

king

page 220: Try to retake from the Mohammedans all that they

usurped; but it is easier to calumniate{original had

"calcumniate"} them.

pafe 224: It was allowed among the Egyptians{original had

"Egyptains"}, the Athenians and even among the Jews, to marry

one's sister on the father's side.

page 251: Your parents have told you that you should bow before

this man; you respect him before knowing whether he merits your

respect;{original had colon} you grow in years and in

knowledge;

page 280: (Corporalitas animæ in ipso Evangelio relucescit, De

Anima,{original had period} cap. vii.)

page 295: "She soon became a monarchy, then,{original had

period}" said the Brahmin.

page 315: we refer these things to the infallible{original had

"infallable"} judgment of the Holy Inquisition of Rome,

Florence, Madrid, Lisbon,

End of Project Gutenberg's Voltaire's Philosophical Dictionary, by Voltaire

Voltaire's Philosophical Dictionary · 第 7 / 7 章