This is a quality which all the people learned in Law have tried to
prove, until the Mutazilites denied it, and were followed by the
later Asharites, like Abul Maali and those who follow him. All the
exoterics of the Law go to prove it. For God says, “And eight shall
bear the Throne of thy Lord on that Day;”[82] and “He governeth all
the things from heaven even to the earth: hereafter shall they return
unto him, on the Day whose length shall be a thousand years, of those
which ye compute.”[83] Again, He says, “The angels ascend unto him
and the spirit;”[84] and, “Are Ye secure that He who dwelleth in
heaven will not cause the earth to swallow you up? and behold, it
shall shake.”[85] There are many other verses of this kind which, if
interpreted, would turn the whole of the Law into interpretation; and
if taken allegorically, would make it an allegory. All the religious
laws are based upon the principle that God is in heaven, from whence
he sends down angels to His Prophets with revelations, that from the
heaven, the religious books used to descend, and that towards it was
the Night Journey of the Prophet, till he reached near the lote-tree.
All the philosophers are, moreover, agreed that God and His Angels
are in heaven, as is the case with all the religions. The doubt which
led them to deny this idea of direction was that they thought that by
believing in direction it would be necessary to believe in space, which
in its turn leads to a belief in anthropomorphism. But we say that this
is not necessarily the case, for direction can exist without space. It
is nothing but the surfaces of the body surrounding it, which are six
in number. That is why we say that there is an above and a below, right
and left and before and behind for an animal. Or they are the surfaces
of a body surrounded by another body having the above-mentioned six
directions. So the directions, which are the surfaces of the body
itself, are not the spaces of the body in any respect. But the surfaces
of the surrounding bodies are space for it. The atmosphere surrounding
man, and the surfaces of the sky surrounding the surfaces of the
atmosphere, for they are the spaces for it. Such is also the case with
different surrounding and forming spaces for one another. As to the
last sky it is evident that beyond it there must be no body. For had it
been so, it would be necessary that beyond it be another body and so
on to infinity. So there is no space at all for the last body of the
universe, for it is not possible that in it be found any body, it being
necessary that there be found a body in every space. So when there
is an argument for the existence of a thing in that direction, it is
necessary that it be not a body. So one who denies His existence there
goes against his own ideas. He is existent, has a body, is not existent
without a body. They cannot say that beyond the universe is a void.
For the impossibility of a void has been made quite certain in the
philosophical sciences. For that upon which the name void is commonly
applied, are nothing but dimensions (_Abad_), in which there are no
bodies. For when these dimensions are once removed, there remains
nothing but non-existence. But if the void be supposed as existent, it
is necessary to admit the existence of accidents in something not a
body, for dimensions are accidents by their having a quality. But it is
said by the Ancients and established by past religions that that place
is the dwelling place of the spirits, God and angels. This place has no
space, and is not governed by time, because everything governed by time
and space can be corrupted. And it is necessary that the things there
be uncorrupted and uncreated. This has been made quite clear by what
I have said, for there cannot be found in that place anything but one
which is existent and at the same time can be felt, or is altogether
non-existent. It is self-evident that an existent object is always
referred to by its existence; that is, it is said that it exists, that
is, it has an existence. So if anything exists there, it must be the
noblest of all, and it is necessary that that existent thing should
be referred to by the best portion of the universe, which are the
heavens. God has said concerning the nobility of the heavens, “Verily
the creation of heaven and earth is more considerable than the creation
of man: but the greater part of men do not understand.”[86] All this is
perfectly clear to the learned men “Well grounded in knowledge.”[87]
Now it has become clear to you that belief in direction is necessary
by religion and reason, and that it forms a part of the Law, which
is based upon it. A denial of the principles is a denial of all the
religions. The cause of the difficulty in their understanding this, and
in their denial of anthropomorphism is, that there cannot be found in
the visible world an illustration of such a thing. This was just the
reason why the Law did not expressly deny an anthropomorphism. For to
the common people verification of an invisible object can only come
when its existence be known in the visible world, as knowledge, which
being a condition for their own existence as visible, could to them
become a condition for the existence of an invisible Maker. Now as
the case of the visible was unknown in the visible on the part of the
many, and none knew it but those who were well-grounded in knowledge,
the Law-giver forbade an inquiry into it, as for example knowledge of
the Soul. If it be needful for the common people to know anything,
then the Law gives examples from the visible world. And if one example
did not suffice for the understanding of the problem in view, then
many examples are given, as in the case of an account of the Day of
Judgment. The doubt which arises out of a denial of direction, on the
part of those denying it, is that the common people cannot comprehend
it, particularly so, because they have not been given before hand to
understand that God has no body. So it is necessary to take the action
of the Law as our example, otherwise we will have to interpret that
which the Law itself has not expressly said.
With regard to these problems of the Law, the people may be divided
into three classes. In the first place there are people who cannot
notice any doubt arising out of them, especially in things which the
Law has left to be taken exoterically. These people are the greatest
in number, and may be described as the masses. Then the second group
of men is one which has doubts; but has not power to solve them. These
are above the masses and below the learned people. It is for them
that there are found in the Law allegorical sayings, and it is they
whom God has censured. For there is no allegory in the Law for the
learned or the common people, and it is in this light that all the
allegorical sayings of the Quran should be understood. Their example
as regards the Law is like the example of the bread of wheat which
though a useful cereal for the large number of human beings, may prove
harmful to some. Such is also the case with religious teaching: it
is useful for the many but sometimes becomes harmful to some. The
following words of God point to the same thing. “He will not thereby
mislead any except the transgressors.”[88] But this is found only in
a few verses of the Quran about a few people. Most of the verses are,
however, those which speak of things invisible for which there is no
example in the visible world. So they are expressed by the things
nearest to them in the visible world, on account of their similarity.
Some people take the illustration as the thing illustrated, and hence
they fall into confusion and doubt. This is what is called allegorical
in the Law, and is not meant for the learned or the common people,
which in reality form two groups of men. For these are the people who
are really healthy, and delicate food is only fit for them. The other
group is a group of sick men who are always few in number. So God has
said, “But they whose hearts are perverse will follow that which is
parabolical therein, out of love of schism.”[89] These are the dogmatic
and the scholastic theologians. The worst which these people have
done in respect to the Law is that they have interpreted much which
they thought was not to be taken literally, and then said that their
interpretation was the thing intended, and that God had mentioned it
parabolically only to test and try His creatures. God forbid that
we should ever have such an idea about Him. The Divine Book is a
miracle of clearness and lucidity. So it is far from the real purpose
of the Law for one to say about a thing which is not parabolical,
that it is so, and then set about interpreting it according to his
own ideas, telling the people that their duty lies in believing
his interpretations. They have done so in the case of the verse of
Equalisation on the Throne, and others, saying that their exoteric
meaning is only parabolical. On the whole many interpretations, which
these people maintain to be the real purpose of the Law, when intently
looked into and deciphered, are found wanting in arguments, and not
serving the purpose which the exoteric meaning would have with regard
to the common people. The primary purpose of knowledge for the common
people is action, so that which is most useful in action is most
suitable for them. But for the learned men, the purpose of knowledge
is both knowledge and action. The man who interprets anything of the
Law, thinking that his interpretation is the real purpose of it, and
then discloses it to the common people, is like a man, who finds a
medicine which an expert physician had compounded to preserve the
health of all, or of a majority of the people; then there came a man
with whom that medicine did not agree on account of the coarseness
of his disposition. He presented it to some people, and then thought
that by some drug, which the first physician had clearly specified, as
composing that universally useful medicine, he did not mean the drug
commonly known by that name--but another which he really meant, but
used this name for it by a far-fetched metaphor. So he took out the
first drug from the compound, and placed another in its stead, which
he thought to be the one intended by the first physician. Then he
told the people that this was the medicine intended. The people began
to use that “improved” medicine, and many of them got injured by it.
Then there came another group of men, who, seeing the people sick on
account of that medicine, thought of curing them. So they changed some
of its drugs with some other than the first one, then presented it to
the people for quite another disease than that intended by the first
physician. Then there appeared another group which interpreted the
medicine in quite another way than the two preceding groups had done.
The fourth group gave a new interpretation to the drug and prescribed
it for a fourth kind of disease. So as time went on with that great
medicine, the interpretations of it took hold of the people instead of
the drugs, and they changed and transformed it altogether. As a result
the people were attacked by many different kinds of diseases, till the
usefulness of the medicine was altogether lost. Such is the condition
of those sects which have risen in Islam. For every one of them has
made interpretations quite different from the others, and maintained
that its interpretation shows the real purpose of the Law, which was
at last rent to piece, and lost its primary purpose altogether. The
Prophet, knowing that a thing like this would necessarily happen among
his people, said, “My people will shortly be divided into seventytwo
sects. All of them will be in hell, except one.” By this one he meant
the sect which followed the exoteric meanings of the Law, without
making any interpretations which may be disclosed to the people. If you
were to look into the Law and see the corruption which it has suffered
up to this time, through interpretations, the truth of this example
would become clear to you.
The first to make a change in the religion--the great medicine--were
the Kharijites, who were followed by the Mutazilites. They were
succeeded by the Asharites, after whom came the Sufis. Last of all came
Al-Ghazzali, who went to the extreme and corrupted everything. He it is
who explained philosophy to the common people, and disclosed to them
the opinions of the philosophers as he understood them to be. This he
did in a book called _Al-Maqasid_, in which he thought he was refuting
them. He planned his _Refutation of the Philosophers_, and charged
them with infidelity in respect to three questions, tearing them to
pieces, as he thought, in regard to consensus of opinion; and calling
them innovators as regards other opinions. In this book he has advanced
many specious arguments and confused reasonings, which have led astray
many people both from religion and philosophy. Then he said in his
book _Jawahir al-Quran_ that the arguments which he had mentioned in
his _Refutation_ were controversial in their nature, while in fact
they were mentioned in his _Al Maznun ala Ghairi Ahlihi_. Then in his
_Mishkat ul Anwar_ he mentions grades of men really knowing God. He
says that all but those who believe that God is not the mover of the
first heaven, and that it is not He from whom this movement originates,
are precluded from it. This is an explanation from him of men learned
in divine science. He has said in many places that divine science
exists only by guesses, as opposed to certainties in other science. In
his book _Munqidh min al Dalal_ he has gone against the philosophers
and maintained that knowledge can only be acquired by privacy and
meditation, and that those in this rank are all very near to the
rank of the prophets. He has mentioned this very fact in his _Kimiya
i Saadat_. Men have become divided into parties on account of this
confusion. One party chose to censure the philosophers, while the other
agreed to interpret the Law, and make it conform to philosophy. All
this is wrong. The Law should be taken literally; and the conformity of
religion to philosophy should not be told to the common people. For by
an exposition of it we should be exposing the results of philosophy to
them, without their having intelligence enough to understand them. It
is neither permitted nor desirable to expose anything of the result of
philosophy to a man who has no arguments to advance, for there are no
arguments either with the learned people who have a mastery over both
the subjects, or with the common people who follow the exoteric of the
Law. So his action brought disorder in respect to both of these things,
religion and philosophy, in the mind of the common people, while he
saved them for the others. The disorder in religion came through his
exposing those interpretations which should not be exposed; and so
also the disorder in philosophy was the result of his mentioning those
things in his books which should not be put in the works on philosophy.
Now it was the result of his treatment of the subjects that many people
do not know the difference between the two, because of his bringing
both of them together. He has also insisted upon the fact that he knew
the cause of doing so, as he did in his _Al Tafriqa bain al Islami
wa-z Zindiqah_. In it he has noted down many kinds of interpretations
and has decided that their interpreters were not infidels though they
may go against the consensus of opinion. Since he has done so, he is
dangerous to the Law for some reasons, to philosophy for others, and to
both for some other reasons. So this man, by disclosing them, has shown
that he is dangerous for both the things in reality and profitable to
them only by accident. For teaching philosophy to one who is not fit
for it, will either falsify philosophy or religion absolutely or will
show conformity between them by accident only. The right thing would
have been not to disclose philosophy to the common people at all. But
if teaching of it was absolutely necessary, then only that section of
the people should have been taught who saw that religion was opposed
to philosophy, in order to show them that it was not so. And also it
might have been taught to those people who thought that philosophy
is opposed to religion. This may have been shown to either of these
sections, that in reality they did not possess a knowledge of their
substance and truth, that is, of religion and philosophy. Moreover,
they would know that the opinion about religion, that it was opposed to
philosophy was one which was either about some innovation in religion,
and not about its principles, or is an error in understanding that is,
a wrong interpretation of it, as was shown in the case of knowledge
about particulars and other things. That is why we were compelled in
this book to explain the principles of religion. These principles,
when intently looked into will be found in perfect agreement with
philosophy. Such is also the case with the opinion which says this
philosophy is opposed to religion. It only shows that the man has not
had a sufficient training in either philosophy or religion. This is the
reason that we were compelled to explain it in our tractate entitled
_Fasl al Maqal fi Muwafiqat il Hikmat lil Sharia_.
Now that this has become clear we would return to our former theme.
The only problem which remains for us to solve, out of those which we
proposed is that of Divine Vision. It is thought for some reasons,
that it forms a part of the problem which we have just discussed, on
account of the words of God, “The sight comprehendeth him not, but He
comprehendeth the sight.”[90] And hence the Mutazilites have denied
it, setting aside the arguments found in the Law, in spite of their
greatness in number and fame, a very shameful act on their part. The
cause of this doubt of the Law that since the Mutazilites denied
physical attributes, and believed in exposing their ideas to every one,
it became necessary for them to deny direction also. And having once
denied direction they must also deny the Vision, for the thing seen
must be in some direction to one who sees it. To prove their point they
are constrained to set aside the traditional religion. They neglected
the Traditions because they were only isolated things which should not
be believed, if found opposed to the teachings of the Quran, that is,
opposed to the verse, “The sight comprehendeth Him not.” The Asharites
tried to mix together the two beliefs, that is, the denial of physical
attributes, and the possibility of vision of One having no body, by
means of our senses. It became difficult for them to prove it, and
they took refuge in many sophistical and conjectural arguments, that
is arguments which are thought to be correct but are in reality wrong.
It is so because it is possible to have the same grades in arguments
as there are among men. Just as there may be found men with perfect
excellence and those below them, till we may have a man who thinks
himself learned and yet he is not, being only a pedant, so there are
arguments which are extremely certain, and those below them, then,
there are specious arguments, and those which though really false seem
to be true. The statements of the Asharites in regard to this question
are of two kinds: those refuting the arguments of the Mutazilites, and
those proving the possibility of the Vision of One having no body, and
that there is no difficulty in our believing it. The statements by
which they have opposed the Mutazilites in their argument, that the
thing seen must have a direction for one who sees it, is that some
of them say that it is applied only to the visible, and not to the
invisible, world; and that it is not one of those cases in which the
condition of the one can be applied to the other. According to them
it is possible for a man to see an object having no direction, for he
sees by his power of sight only that which comes before his eyes. In
this they have mixed together the senses of sight with intelligence,
for the latter can perceive that which has no direction, that is, no
space; but for the perception of the eye there is a condition, that the
thing to be perceived be in a direction, not only that but a particular
direction too. So if we take the eye to be endowed with the power of
seeing, then it is not possible except under very limited conditions.
These are three in number-light, the intervention of a transparent body
between the eye and the object seen, and the possession of necessary
colours by the object. A refutation of these conditions in the eyes is
also a refutation of those primary principles of knowledge which are
known to all. It would be a refutation of the sciences of philosophy
and mathematics. The Asharites also maintain that one of the conditions
as we have said, for example, is that every rational being has a life,
it being apparent in the visible world as a condition for knowledge.
Hence we say to them that these are also conditions for seeing things
in the visible world. So according to their own principle is the
case of the visible and the invisible. In his book _Al Maqasid_ Abu
Hamid (Al Ghazzali) intended to oppose the premise that every object
perceivable must be in some direction to the one seeing it. He says
that a man sees himself reflected in a mirror and sees himself not in
any other direction but the opposite one. Hence he can see his self in
an opposite direction too. But this is a mistake, because what he sees
is not his self but only an image of it. This image is in the opposite
direction, being in the mirror, placed there.
Of the arguments which they advance to prove the vision of an object
having no body, two are famous ones. Of these the more famous is one
which says that an object seen is either because it has some colour, or
because it has a body, or it is a colour, or because it is existent.
Sometimes they mention many other causes than really do exist. They
say that it is wrong to suppose that it must be a body, otherwise, no
colour would be visible, it being also incorrect to suppose the space
to be the colour. Now when all the kinds of suppositions in the premise
have been refuted we shall have to believe that only an existent object
will be seen. The mistake in this statement is quite clear. For an
object is visible because of itself. This is the case with the colour
and the body: the colour being visible by itself, and the body through
the colour. That is why a thing which has no colour cannot be seen.
Had the existence of a thing been the only condition of visibility, it
would have been possible to see the sound and the senses. In that case
seeing, hearing, in fact all the five senses would have been only one,
which is quite contrary to our reason. This problem and others like it
have obliged the Mutakallimun to admit that it is possible to _hear_
the colour, and _see_ the sounds. But this is against nature, as man
has understood it to be. For it is absolutely evident that the sense of
seeing is quite different from that of hearing. Their actions are quite
distinct from one another, and the organ of the one cannot work as the
organ of the other. It is just as impossible to turn hearing as to turn
colour into sound. Those who say that sometimes sound can be seen,
should be asked to define the sense of seeing. They would necessarily
answer that it is a faculty which perceives those things which can be
seen, such as colour and so on. Then they should be asked to define the
sense of hearing. They would surely say that it is one sense by which
sounds can be heard. Then they should be asked whether at the time of
sound it is the sense of hearing only or seeing too. If they say that
it is hearing only, they admit that it cannot perceive colours. If
they say that it is seeing only, then it cannot hear sounds. If it is
neither alone, for it perceives colours, then it is seeing and hearing
both. But in this way everything can be proved to be one, even in the
case of contradictory things. This is a thing which our Mutakallimun
admit or they are compelled to do so. But it is clear that it is a
philosophical opinion which is only fit for those ancient people famous
for it.
Now the second method which Mutakallimun have adopted for proving the
possibility of Divine Vision is that which has been mentioned by Abul
Maali in his book, _Al Irshad_. It says that the senses can only feel
the substance (_Zat_) of things, but that which separates the existent
thing from one another is not to be found in the substance only. So
the senses cannot perceive the substance, which is common to all the
existent things. They can only perceive a thing because it exists.
But all this is absurd, which is quite clear from the fact that if
sight were only able to perceive things then it would not have been
possible for it to differentiate between white and black, for there is
no difference between things about those qualities which are common
to all. This also becomes impossible as regards all the other senses.
The sense of seeing could not perceive different kinds of colours;
the sense of hearing cannot differentiate between tastes. It would be
necessary that the objects perceived by the senses be all of a kind,
and there should be no difference between objects perceived by seeing
and apprehended by hearing. This is contrary to that which man commonly
understands. In reality the senses perceive the substance of things by
the power which is vouchsafed to them. The cause of this mistake lies
in the fact that that which perceives a substance, is thought to be the
thing perceived. Had there not been said so much about these things,
and so much respect for those who said it, it would not have satisfied
anybody with a strong common sense.
The cause of such a perplexing situation in the Law, which has
compelled its votaries to take refuge in such worthless arguments,
as would bring a smile to the lips of anybody who has made the least
effort to distinguish between different kinds of arguments, is the
exposition of anthropomorphic qualities of God to the common people,
a fact which has been prohibited by God and His Prophet. It is so
because it is very difficult for a man to believe at the same time that
there exists One without a body, who can be seen with our eyes. For
the things which the senses comprehend are in the bodies or the bodies
themselves. Hence the Mutakallimun have tried to prove that the Divine
Vision will be an addition to our existing qualities at that moment.
This also should not have been disclosed to the common people. For
since their intellect cannot go beyond their imagination that which
they cannot imagine is non-existent for them. To imagine a thing which
has no body is not possible, and hence a belief in the existence of
an object which they cannot imagine, is impossible for them. It was
for this reason that the Law refused to disclose this secret to them,
and described God, for their sake, in terms which they can imagine,
ascribing to him the attributes of hearing, seeing, having a face, &c.
&c., at the same time telling them that He is not like anything which
can be imagined. Had the intention of the Law been to make clear to
the masses the fact of His having no body, it would not have mentioned
these things in detail. But as light was the highest of imaginable
things, it was given to them as an illustration of God, for it is the
best known of the things both to the senses and to the imagination.
Such is also the case in respect to the possibility of their
understanding the things of the Day of Judgment. These have also
been mentioned in terms which they can imagine. So now when the Law
has adopted this course about the apparent description of God, there
arises no doubt about him. For when it is said that He is Light or that
there is a curtain of light upon Him, as is mentioned in the Quran and
authentic Traditions, and when it is said that the Faithful will see
Him on the Day of Judgement as they see the sun, there arises no doubt
or suspicion out of it for the common or the learned people. It is so
because to the learned it is quite clear that that condition will be
an addition to our former knowledge. But when this is disclosed to
the common people, they cannot understand it, and hence they either
disbelieve the whole of the Law, or consider its exponent to be an
infidel. So one who adopts a method other than that laid down by the
Law in this respect, certainly goes astray. If you look a little
intently it will become clear to you, that in spite of the fact that
the Law has not given illustration of those things for the common
people, beyond which their imagination cannot go, it has also informed
the learned men of the underlying meanings of those illustrations. So
it is necessary to bear in mind the limits which the Law has set about
the instruction of every class of men, and not to mix them together.
For in this manner the purpose of the Law is multiplied. Hence it is
that the Prophet has said, “We, the prophets, have been commanded to
adapt ourselves to the conditions of the people, and address them
according to their intelligence.” He who tries to instruct all the
people in the matter of religion, in one and the same way, is like a
man who wants to make them alike in actions too, which is quite against
apparent laws and reason.
From the foregoing it must have become clear to you that the divine
vision has an exoteric meaning in which there is no doubt, if we take
the words of the Quran about God as they stand, that is, without
proving or disproving the anthropomorphic attribute of God. Now since
the first part of the Law has been made quite clear as to God’s purity,
and the quantity of the teaching fit for the common people, it is time
to begin the discussion about the actions of God, after which our
purpose in writing this tractate will be over.