Nothing could have been more repugnant to the wishes of the
Dantzickers than having among them French custom-house officers, whom
for some time there had been an idea of establishing at Dantzic. I
repelled the proposition as strenuously as I possibly could. The
presence of these officers would have destroyed the small portion
of trade which I still tolerated, notwithstanding the outcries of
Napoleon.
This measure would have been felt as no less a grievance along the
whole coast of the Baltic, which, I frankly confess, I did not
watch with the vigilance that was prescribed to me. Complaints were
in consequence poured out against me; but I knew from whence they
proceeded, and I did not concern myself much about them. Napoleon
was, however, enraged at my indulgence; he reproached me for it. “To
allow the Prussians and Dantzickers to carry on trade,” said he, “is
to betray me,” * * * * * wrote to the same effect, and sent spies
in every direction. Napoleon became tired of reports and complaints.
He directed Bertrand to inform me how much he was dissatisfied with
me. That General wrote to me, “The Emperor knows, my dear Rapp, that
you permit contraband trade in Prussia and at Dantzic; I must inform
you that he is displeased with you,” &c. Outcries were raised, but
I paid no regard to them, and continued to exercise my power with
moderation. The Custom-house establishment was set on foot. It is
well known how severely it was felt, particularly in the conquered
countries. The individuals connected with this department in Dantzic
aped independence, and refused to obey any orders save those of the
Minister Sucy. In support of these pretensions reference was made
to the example of the Custom establishment of Hamburgh. I cut the
matter short, by sending the Director of the Customs to Weichselmunde,
where he underwent six days' imprisonment. Such an act of severity
was unexampled; it was accounted as great a crime as high treason.
The minister complained of it; but, to his great surprise, Napoleon
replied, that if I had inflicted punishment I had reasons for doing
so. “Besides,” said he, “Dantzic is in a state of siege, and in that
case a Governor is omnipotent.” The officers of the Customs learnt
that they had presumed too much on their credit; they became more
circumspect, and behaved themselves better to the Dantzickers. Trade
recovered a certain degree of security, which was augmented by my
releasing several ships that had been captured by our pirates. Fresh
remonstrances were made, but with no better success than before.
I received orders to commit all articles of English merchandize to the
flames. This measure would have been most disastrous: I evaded it, and
notwithstanding the presence of the officers of the Customs, Dantzic
lost no more than what amounted to two hundred francs, and Kœnigsberg
still less. I do not speak of the merchandize procured by captures.
The continental system, and the rigorous measures employed by Napoleon
in the North of Germany, excited more and more dissatisfaction. The
people were exasperated. I was frequently applied to for reports on
their situation: I described them such as they really were—oppressed,
ruined, and driven to the last extremity. I pointed out those secret
societies, in which the whole nation was enrolled, where hatred
brooded on vengeance, and despair collected and combined her plans.
But Napoleon looked upon those societies with contempt. He little
knew the character of the Germans. He thought they possessed neither
vigour nor energy; he compared them and their pamphlets to “those
little dogs who bark but dare not bite.” At a later period we learned,
by experience, what they were capable of.
I was also frequently called upon for reports respecting the affairs
of Russia and the army which was assembling at Wilna. I was applied
to for my opinion as to what course France or Germany would adopt,
in case of an expedition to the other side of the Niemen turning
out unfortunate, or failing altogether. My answer was literally as
follows. It will be difficult to give credit to a prediction which has
unfortunately been so fully realised:—
“If your Majesty should experience reverses, you may be assured that
the Russians and Germans would all rise in a mass to throw off the
yoke. A crusade would be set on foot. All your allies would abandon
you: even the King of Bavaria, on whom you place so much reliance,
would join the coalition. I make an exception only in favour of the
King of Saxony; he, perhaps, would remain faithful to you; but his
subjects would compel him to make common cause with your enemies.”
Napoleon, as may be supposed, was not well pleased with this
communication. He sent it to Marshal Davoust, directing him to peruse
it, and to write to inform me that the Emperor was greatly astonished
that one of his aides-de-camp could have presumed to address such
a letter to him,—that my reports resembled the pamphlets published
on the other side of the Rhine, which I appeared to find pleasure
in reading,—that, finally, the Germans should never be treated as
Spaniards. The Marshal executed his commission, and I was for a long
time out of favour with Napoleon. Experience has proved whether or not
my judgment was correct; and I took the liberty to make that remark to
the Emperor, as I shall state hereafter.
When he obliged the King of Prussia to send to Magdeburgh all the
prohibited merchandize which had been confiscated at Kœnigsberg, I
addressed him in the most urgent tone: I represented to him how much
that measure was calculated to excite discontent, and to exasperate
the nation. M. de Clerambaut, who was then Consul General, wrote to
him in the same strain; but our representations were not attended to.
The war with Russia was on the eve of breaking out; Napoleon
deliberated as to the course he should pursue with regard to Prussia.
To enter into an alliance with King William would not have been
the means of subduing the doubts and prejudices of that monarch.
To dethrone him would have been a violent measure; but it was one,
however, which was advised by many persons whom I will not name. The
Emperor was urged to deprive the Prussian monarch of his States, and
to keep possession of them himself. Perhaps William has never yet been
made fully acquainted with the danger which threatened him; I knew
its full extent: I pitied the King of Prussia and his subjects, and I
opposed the design to the utmost of my power.
Instructions had already been sent to * * * *. That general expected
to commence his march immediately. What was his astonishment when,
instead of an order for invading Prussia, he received information of a
treaty of alliance with that country? The intelligence of that event
afterwards reached me, and it afforded me great satisfaction.