We were now in possession of the whole course of the Saale, and in
a fair way to turn the enemy's army. The calculations of the Duke
of Brunswick were completely frustrated. He had formed the idea of
coming up with us on the Mainc, of occupying our wings by detached
corps, and penetrating our centre before we could concentrate our
forces. He still possessed all the threads of that vast spy system
which had harassed France since the emigrations. He knew the force
and the route marked out for several corps which were marching from
Meudon, and he did not doubt of anticipating us. Napoleon took a
pleasure in cherishing this illusion; he made preparations, and caused
reconnaissances to be taken through the whole of that line. The Duke
had no longer any doubt of having penetrated our intentions; we were
to debouch by Kœnigshaften; he made certain of that; he felt perfectly
convinced of it. Our movements on his centre were only a snare, a
_ruse de guerre_; we wished to deceive him, in order to prevent him
from debouching by the forests of Thuringen, whilst we proceeded
towards Coburg and Memmingen, in woody and mountainous countries,
where his cavalry would have no opportunity of acting, or at least
would be deprived of its advantage. It was of the utmost importance to
anticipate us, and he hurried to Kœnigshaften.
The enemy were engaged in the woods; Napoleon marched on Schleitz,
sixty leagues from the presumed point of attack. The third corps
quietly reposed on the 10th at Nauenburgh, in the rear of the Duke
of Brunswick. Hostilities were of only two days' date, and that
Prince, who was already uncovered on his left, was on the eve of
being entirely cut to pieces. His communications with the Elbe were
in danger; and he was nearly reduced to the same extremities as Mack,
whom he had so violently censured. His advance-guard, on arriving
on the Mainc, found the field unoccupied. This circumstance seemed
incomprehensible; but still it never led him to suspect the danger to
which he was exposed. The rout of Saalfeld alone shook the confidence
which he had placed in his own safety. He hastily retraced his course.
Weimar and Hohenlohe were directed to come up speedily, and the army
of reserve was ordered to make a forced march. But some parties
mistook their route, and others did not use sufficient despatch, so
that a portion of the troops were not engaged in the battle. The Duke,
who was disconcerted at a system of movements so novel to him, knew
not what determination to adopt. All these marches and arrangements,
so rapidly succeeding each other, formed a mass of confusion, in
which he could discern neither plan nor object. The occupation of
Nauenburgh relieved him from this perplexity: he saw his left wing
about to be turned, or at least exposed; he would not wait longer; he
hastily rallied his army of reserve, which was advancing upon Halle,
and left Hohenlohe at the camp of Capellendorf to mask the retrograde
movement. His troops, who had not shared the disasters of Saalfeld
and Schleitz, ridiculed the beaten corps; they shouted “The King for
ever! the Queen for ever!” &c. They resolved to avenge the affront
offered to the Prussian arms: there were not enough Frenchmen for
them. The Duke himself had resumed his confidence. On the Auerstadt
road be found not more than thirty chasseurs. His communications
were free; it was impossible they could be intercepted: it was not
easy to surprise a skilful manœuvrer like the Duke. Hohenlohe's
Prussians were encamped behind the heights of Jena: their masses
extended as far as the eye could reach; they were prolonged beyond
Weimar. Napoleon reconnoitred them on the evening of the 13th, and
fixed the attack for the following day. In the night he distributed
orders for the movements of the different corps. “As to Davoust, he
must march on Apolda, so as to fall on the rear of the enemy's army.
He may take whatever route he may deem most expedient; I leave that
to himself, provided he take part in the battle: if Bernadotte be at
hand he may support him. Berthier, issue instructions accordingly.”
It was ten o'clock at night; all the arrangements were made, and yet
the general commanding the enemy's force flattered himself with the
hope that we could not debouch. But the axe of the pioneers removed
every obstacle; the rock was cut, and trenches were opened: the action
commenced on the right and the left; the conflict was terrible.
Davoust, in particular, was placed in a situation in which a man
of less firmness might have found his courage fail him. Bernadotte
refused to support him; he even forbade two divisions of the reserve
cavalry, which, however, were not under his command, from taking
part in the action. He paraded round Apolda, while 26,000 French
troops were engaged with 70,000 picked men, commanded by the Duke of
Brunswick and the King of Prussia. But this circumstance only added
to the glory of the commander, whom it might have ruined. Davoust's
plans were so well laid, his generals and his troops deployed with
such skill and courage, that Blucher, with his 12,000 cavalry, had
not the satisfaction to cut a single company. The King, the guards,
and the whole army, attacked our troops without obtaining better
success. Amidst the deluge of fire that surrounded them on all sides,
the French preserved all their national gaiety. A soldier, whom his
comrades had nicknamed _the Emperor_, impatient at the obstinacy
of the Prussians, exclaimed, “On with me, grenadiers!—Come, follow
the Emperor!”—He rushed into the thickest of the battle, the troop
followed him, and the Prussian guards were penetrated. He was made a
corporal: his friends remarked that he only wanted the protectorate.
At Jena the victory had been no less brilliant: the rout was complete
and general; the enemy fled in the utmost confusion.
In the evening I was directed, together with the Grand Duke, to
pursue the wrecks of the Prussian army. We took some Saxon battalions,
and we entered _pêle-mêle_ with them into Weimar. We stationed our
posts before the town, despatched some parties of cavalry on Erfurt
road, and presented ourselves at the castle. M. de Pappenheim, whom I
recollected having seen in Paris, came out to meet us. He was quite
alarmed; but we assured him he had no cause for apprehension. All
the Court, with the exception of the Grand Duke and his family, were
at Weimar. The Duchess received us with perfect politeness. I was
acquainted with several ladies of her suite, one of whom has since
become my sister-in-law. I endeavoured to calm their fears. They
took courage. Some few disorders took place; but they were of little
importance.
Murat took up his quarters at the castle. I set out to join Napoleon
at Jena, in order to render him an account of the events of the
evening. He did not think that they would go beyond Weimar. He was
highly satisfied. The courage of the Duchess astonished him. He did
not imagine that the Court would have waited for him. He did not
like the family; this he often repeated. The night was far advanced,
and Napoleon had just received despatches from the second corps.
“Davoust,” said he to me, “has had a terrible engagement: he had
King William and the Duke of Brunswick opposed to him. The Prussians
fought desperately: they suffered dreadful slaughter. The Duke has
been dangerously wounded; and the whole army seems to be in terrible
disorder. Bernadotte did not behave well. He would have been pleased
had Davoust been defeated; but the affair reflects the highest honour
on the conqueror, and the more so as Bernadotte rendered his situation
a difficult one. That Gascon will never do better.”
The battle was lost. The Russians were no longer eager to carry on
the war; they wished for and invoked peace. They were anxious to
terminate a contest in which they had had such ill success. By dint
of wishing for an armistice, they at length persuaded themselves
that one had been granted. Kalkreuth announced it: Blucher swore
that it was concluded: how could it be discredited. Soult, however,
was not to be caught in the snare. The imprudent generosity evinced
at Austerlitz had rendered him distrustful. He refused to afford a
passage to the troops whom he had cut off. “The convention you speak
of is impossible!” said he to the Field Marshal. “Lay down your arms.
I must receive the Emperor's orders. You shall retire if he permit
it.” Kalkreuth was unwilling to resort to this kind of expedient. It
always has somewhat the appearance of a defeat: and he would rather
have experienced one in good earnest. Some other columns were more
fortunate. But it was only deferring the evil moment: they were
obliged to surrender some leagues further on. It was not worth while
to resort to the deception.
The King himself was disheartened by his misfortunes. Our hussars gave
him neither truce nor respite. He recollected all that Napoleon had
done to avoid hostilities; and he addressed a letter to him. It was
rather late to reply to overtures which had been so ill received. “It
would have been better,” said Napoleon, “had he explained himself two
days sooner; but no matter, I am willing to accede to any thing that
is compatible with the dignity and interests of France. I will send
Duroc to the King of Prussia. But there is something still more urgent
yet. Duroc, set out immediately. Proceed to Nauenburgh, to Dessau,
wherever we have wounded troops. See that they want for nothing: visit
them for me, each man individually. Give them all the consolation
their situation requires. Tell them—tell the Marshal, that he, his
generals and his troops, have acquired everlasting claims on my
gratitude.”
He was not satisfied with this message. He wrote to assure him how
much he was pleased with his conduct. His letter was inserted in
the order of the day. The troops were transported with it: even the
wounded men could not refrain from expressing their delight.
The Emperor established his head-quarters at Weimar. He shewed every
possible mark of respect to the Duchess, whom he found to be an
amiable and sensible woman, and of very dignified manners.
Meanwhile the enemy was rallying on Magdeburg. The wrecks of the army
that had been engaged at Jena, the army of reserve, and the troops
of Old and New Prussia, hastily repaired to that place. The Duke of
Wirtemberg had already taken a position at Halle; and Bernadotte
proceeded thither. His corps had not been engaged at Auerstadt; and he
was eager for an opportunity to compensate the portion of glory he had
lost. He attacked the Prussians with the bayonet; killing and routing
all that opposed him. The carnage was dreadful. On the following day,
Napoleon visited the field of battle. He was struck with the sight of
the heaps of dead which surrounded the bodies of some of our soldiers.
He approached; and, observing on their uniform the numbers of the
32d, “So many of that regiment,” said he, “have been killed in Italy,
in Egypt, and elsewhere, that I should think none can now remain.”
He proceeded to Dessau, and shewed every consideration to the old
Duke, who was there with his son. Some months before, a M. de Gussau,
who was attached to the Court of Baden, had said to me in Paris, “You
will probably go to war with the Prussians. Should that be the case,
and should you advance in this campaign as far as Dessau, I charge
you to respect its venerable sovereign, who is the father of his
subjects.” M. de Gussau must have been very much astonished to find,
that the French, instead of going only to Dessau, advanced as far as
the Niemen, and subsequently to twenty leagues beyond Moscow.