SKEPTICISM AND ECLECTICISM
=The Appearances of Philosophic Skepticism.= We have now traced the
history of the positive and dogmatic aspect of the Hellenic-Roman
Period through its Ethical Division and far into the Religious Division
of the Period. The influence of the ethical movement did not disappear
until at least two centuries after the beginning of this era, and
the Schools themselves did not disappear until they were abolished
by Justinian in 529 A. D. But the Ethical Period may be said to close
at the beginning of this era, and even a century and a half before
that――about 150 B. C.――its positive and dogmatic character had been
lost. Eclecticism appeared in the Schools, and the last one hundred
and fifty years of the Ethical Period was in character transitional and
eclectic. This was caused by the growth and power of Skepticism, which
we have already pointed out as the undercurrent of the entire period.
Skepticism was the fundamental frame of mind of the eight hundred years
of this time. It was the negative side of the period in contrast with
the Schools. Philosophic Skepticism appeared contemporaneously with the
rise of the New Schools at the very beginning of the Period, and the
controversy between the Schools and Skepticism reached its height about
150 B. C. What was the result? Did philosophy turn, as in the Age of
Pericles, back to greater triumphs in speculation? No; the world was no
longer virile and no longer possessed the creative impulse. On account
of the attacks of Skepticism upon the Schools, philosophy dissolved
itself first into eclecticism, and then later by the introduction
of new elements from the East was superseded by religion. In the
philosophical sense, religion and eclecticism are both skeptical――both
have doubts of the ability of the reason to reach truth. Eclecticism
shows its Skepticism by doubting any one dogmatic scheme, and therefore
it constructs a compromise of all; religion crowns faith in place of
reason.
Philosophic Skepticism in these times did not appear except with
reference to the doctrines of the Schools. It arose as merely polemical
and antagonistic to the Schools’ teaching. While the Skepticism
of antiquity busied itself with the problem of knowledge, it was
superficial compared with modern Skepticism. Ancient Skepticism did
not doubt that the object of knowledge existed; it did not doubt that
the object of knowledge is external and even material. It assumed that
things exist which, to the modern Skeptic, is the problem at issue.
We shall look now at the appearances of philosophic Skepticism, and the
effect of this Skepticism upon the Schools in their turning to
eclecticism.
=The Three Phases of Philosophic Skepticism.= These are three somewhat
loosely connected appearances of Skepticism, and are determined in
their character in large measure by the doctrines which they attacked.
=1. The First Phase of Philosophic Skepticism is called Pyrrhonism=
(from about 300 to 230 B. C.). This was a Skepticism _directed against
the assumptions of the philosophy of Aristotle_. From the dates above
it will be seen to be contemporary with the founding of the Stoic
and Epicurean Schools, at the very beginning of the period. The two
representatives were Pyrrho (365–275 B. C.) of Elis and his pupil Timon
(320–230 B. C.) of Phlius. When Zeno had begun to teach in the Painted
Porch and Epicurus in the Gardens, when Theophrastus had succeeded his
master in the Lyceum and Polemo led the Academy, the Skeptic Pyrrho
began his personal instruction in the city of Elis. Pyrrho had but
little influence. He left no writings, and his doctrine became known
to the ancients through his pupil, Timon, who was the literary exponent
of this Skepticism. The teaching may be stated in the three following
sentences: (1) We can know nothing of the nature of things, but
only of the states of feeling into which they put us; (2) The only
correct attitude of mind is to withhold all judgment and restrain all
action; (3) The result of this suspense of judgment is ataraxia or
imperturbability. The Skeptic therefore sought the same internal peace
for which Stoic and Epicurean were seeking, but he was skeptical of
the Aristotelian metaphysics as an instrument to gain it. The opposite
of any conclusion being equally plausible, suspense of judgment is the
only peace of mind.
Pyrrhonism reminded the age after Aristotle that the problem of the
certitude of knowledge is fundamental and must be settled before any
philosophy can be constructed. The School was short lived, and people
disposed to be skeptical joined the Academy.
=2. The Second Period of Philosophic Skepticism――The Skepticism of the
Academy= (280–129 B. C.). The Middle Academy and its Skepticism was
directed particularly against the Stoic teaching that an “apprehensive
presentation” guaranteed its own truth by the conviction of immediate
certainty. The two most distinguished representatives of this Skeptical
period of the Academy were Arcesilaus (315–241 B. C.) and Carneades
(214–129 B. C.). Carneades must be mentioned particularly as a genius
and a philosopher of great personal influence. “He was the greatest
philosopher of Greece in the four centuries from Chrysippus to Plotinus;
indeed, in ability and depth of thought he surpassed Chrysippus.”[38]
Carneades was the most formidable opponent of the Stoics. He had
listened to the Stoic lecturers, had studied their writings, and had
refuted them on their own grounds in brilliant lectures of his own.
The Skepticism of the Academy arose somewhat in this way. The rivalry
of the Porch and the Older Academy had grown apace and had been a
battle between two dogmatic Schools. The Academy was being worsted, its
ancient spirit was waning, and it had gradually deserted speculation
for ethics. Under Arcesilaus it was provoked to new life by the
aggressive dogmatism of the Stoics. Speculation, which it had ignored,
it now began to antagonize openly. Arcesilaus, in directing his attack
against the doctrine of “apprehensive presentation” of the Stoics,
came to conclusions but slightly different from Pyrrho. Carneades laid
out for himself a twofold task: (1) to refute all existing dogmas,
and (2) to evolve a theory of probability as the basis for practical
activity. He applied his Skepticism not only to speculation, like
Arcesilaus, but also to ethics and religion.[39]
The Academy did not fully adopt Skepticism, but used it as a weapon
against the Stoics. The Platonic tradition was kept alive within the
School, and Skepticism made no advance in the Academy after Carneades.
It did not even continue in the path marked out by him. In the next
generation the Academy became eclectic.
=3. The Third Period of Philosophic Skepticism――Sensationalistic
Skepticism= (during two centuries or more of the Christian era). The
chief representatives were Ænesidemus of Cnossus (first century A. D.),
Agrippa (about 200 A. D.), and Sextus Empiricus (about 200 A. D.).
This phase of Skepticism was represented mainly by physicians,
with arguments based upon empirical physiological grounds. When the
Academy passed from Skepticism to eclecticism, Skepticism became
centred in Alexandria. For two centuries before Galen (131–201 A. D.)
great discoveries had been made in medicine, but the meaning of the
discoveries had not been apprehended. There was a general feeling
among physicians of that time that there is no such thing as scientific
certainty; and skeptical arguments were constructed; based on the
empirical discoveries of the scientific circle of Alexandria. While
the arguments of the Academy were mostly formal attacks against the
Stoics, this Skeptical School of physicians returned to Pyrrhonism,
immensely reinforced with scientific material. It strove in vain to
disassociate itself from the Academy, for it used in one way or another
the formal arguments of the Skeptics of the Academy. In his eight books
on Pyrrhonism, Ænesidemus developed the reasons which induced Pyrrho
to call in question the possibility of knowledge. These are known in
philosophy as the ten “tropes,” or ten ways of justifying doubt.[40]
They were badly arranged by Ænesidemus and reduced to five by
Agrippa.[41]
=The Last Century and a Half of the Ethical Period.= (150 B. C.–1
A. D.). =Eclecticism.=――About 150 B. C. the Ethical Period became
eclectic. After 150 years of passionate controversy the Schools began
to compromise their differences and fuse into one another. They no
longer emphasized their differences, but began to point to their common
ground of unity. This tendency to fusion applies only to the Lyceum,
the Academy, and the Porch. The Epicurean School was never a party
to this eclecticism and always remained relatively stationary. The
fusion occurred only in the teaching of the Schools and not in their
organization. Externally the Schools remained separate bodies for six
hundred years longer. In the second century Hadrian and the Antonines
endowed separate chairs for them in the University of Athens. They
were not abolished as Schools until 529 A. D., by Justinian. Internally
their independent growth lasted only during the two centuries down
to the year 150 B. C. At this time their theoretic mission had been
completed. Their internal history from 100 B. C. to 529 A. D. was one
of compromise and adjustment. The year 150 B. C. is therefore important.
At this time the records of the Schools stop, controversy abates,
Stoicism and Epicureanism are introduced into Rome, and fusion of
doctrines begins.
The Stoic School was the first to incline to eclecticism. Its own
doctrine was a kind of fusion of incoherent parts, and among the
Schools it could most easily welcome new doctrines. About 150 B. C.,
under the lead of Panætius and Posidonius, it adopted many of
the Platonic and Aristotelian teachings, tempered its own ethical
rigorism, and extended its scientific interests. At the same time
the Peripatetics of the Lyceum united the pantheism of the Stoics to
their own theism. After the death of Carneades in 129 B. C. the Academy
turned from Skepticism back to the Platonic tradition, but it was a
meagre Platonism adulterated with many foreign elements. For example,
Antiochus of Ascalon taught Cicero from the Academy at Athens in the
winter of 79–78 B. C. that Platonism and Aristotelianism were only
different aspects of the same doctrine.
There were two factors that prepared an easy way for the rapid spread
of eclecticism. One was the growing Skepticism that was so fundamental
in Hellenism, and the other was the adoption of Hellenic culture by
the Romans. Eclecticism is, after all, only another form of Skepticism.
Both exhibit the spirit of undecided conviction. Neither has regard
for the bonds of tradition, for both regard the individual superior to
every tradition or system. Eclecticism, indeed, attempts to reconcile
differing systems; but in doing this it casts a doubt upon the
infallibility of them all only to a lesser degree than Skepticism. The
spread of eclecticism was therefore only an extension from Greece of
the skeptical spirit upon the world, and the Roman world gave a glad
welcome to such a spirit. The Roman character was naturally eclectic.
After his first aversion the Roman was hospitable to all philosophies
and religions. In his practical way, undisturbed by philosophical
hair-splittings, he selected from the different systems what was suited
to his practical needs. Eclecticism found fertile ground in Roman
civilization.
In the Schools after the year 150 B. C. there appear many notable
names――notable not because they contributed to the theoretic advance
of philosophy, but for some other reason. In the Stoic School were
Panætius, Posidonius, and Boëthus; and later Seneca, Epictetus, and
Marcus Aurelius. Among the Academicians are Philo of Larissa and
Antiochus; among the Peripatetics of the same century is Andronicus;
and among the eclectic Platonists Plutarch is especially to be named;
these were all eclectics. The only one in this group of eclectics whom
we shall have time for a passing examination of is Cicero.
M. Tullius Cicero (106–43 B. C.) listened to Greek philosophy in
all the Schools in Athens and Rhodes. He read a good deal of Greek
literature, so that he had much philosophical material at his command.
He did not show much discretion in his selection of his material,
but he displayed a good deal of tact in using what the Roman people
would receive. The Greek mind spoke to the Roman through Cicero’s
voice almost as though the Roman were speaking for himself. It must
be admitted that Cicero’s acquaintance with Greek philosophy was on
the whole superficial, yet he was able to express certain aspects of
Greek philosophy with clearness for contemporary Latin readers and
for many generations succeeding them. He prided himself in his ability
to discuss both sides of a question without himself arriving at a
decision――after the manner of the Middle Academy, of which he inscribed
himself as a member. His books appeared in rather rapid succession.
Cicero does not therefore owe his prominence as a philosopher so
much to his own profound independence of thought as to his skill in
translating Greek thought to the Roman people. His metaphysics is an
eclecticism that is at bottom a skepticism. In view of the existing
philosophical warfare, he despaired of metaphysical or absolutely
complete knowledge. Yet upon ethical and religious questions he spoke
in no undecided manner, for in these realms he felt that we have more
than merely probable evidence. Since he was unable to refute Skepticism
in a scientific way, he took refuge in the immediate certainty of
consciousness in all matters that pertain to morals and religion. There
are certain ideas common to all men. These have not so much been taught
to all men by nature as they are inborn in all. They are convictions
implanted in us; there is a common human consciousness from which they
are derived, and they are confirmed by universal opinion. Ethical and
religious consciousness thus rests on immediate certainty. Man has
the innate ideas of duty, immortality, and God. Our belief in God’s
existence is supported by the teleological argument for Providence
and divine government. The high dignity of man rests upon this innate
conviction of freedom and immortality. Cicero shows his eclecticism
by moderating the Stoic doctrine of virtue: virtue in itself is _vita
beata_, but virtue plus happiness is _vita beatissima_. Unoriginal
and eclectic as Cicero’s philosophical position may be, it is of great
importance to the student of Roman history.