CHAPTER XIII

THE PRINCIPLE OF THE COMMISSION FORM OF GOVERNMENT APPLIED TO THE

LARGER CITIES

If the city be a larger one, with 100,000 male voters and upward,

and a population of 700,000 to 1,000,000 and upward, its government

by a small commission, each member of which is elected from a wieldy

district, or by a wieldy “quota” under the Hare plan, becomes

impossible. When districts begin to have more than 6,000 male voters

and a population of more than 50,000, or the “quotas” are over 6,000

male voters, they are probably no longer wieldy. Yet a commission of

16 and upward is no longer a body which can exercise legislative and

executive power in a convenient manner, like a board of 5, or even 9.

The problem of the application of the principles of the commission form

of government to the larger cities is therefore this: How can districts

or “quotas” be kept wieldy and the city at the same time be governed by

a small commission having both legislative and executive powers?

One solution of the problem is as follows: The control of the entire

executive and legislative power of the municipality should be vested

in the municipal council. This should be composed of as many members

as there are wieldy districts or wieldy “quotas” in the municipality.

Taking 3,000 voters as making up a wieldy district or “quota,” this

would give a city of 100,000 male voters a council of 33 and a city

of 300,000 male voters a council of 100. This last might be reduced

to 50 if the maximum of 6,000 male voters be taken as the measure

of a wieldy district or “quota.” This council should then appoint

the mayor and perhaps, with the mayor’s approval, the heads of the

departments, all to hold office at the pleasure of the council.[14]

The mayor and his heads of departments should then form a governing

commission or board with such executive and legislative powers as might

be conferred by ordinances passed by the council and subject at all

times to the control of the council. Such a scheme would retain the

system of electing representatives from wieldy districts. There would

rest upon them full responsibility for the exercise of the legislative

and executive power. Yet they would be left free to delegate executive

power and some legislative power to a commission of administrators

whose whole business it was to serve the municipal government. Such

a commission might be composed of the leaders of the majority of the

council or of expert municipal managers brought from any part of the

world, or both. The council should be left free to choose what method

it would adopt.

A plan of government for our larger cities frequently adopted is

this: Single aldermen are elected from each wieldy district in the

municipality. All the aldermen thus selected form a city council which

exercises the legislative power. The mayor is elected at large. He

presides over the city council and, with the heads of his executive

departments who hold at his pleasure, wields the entire executive

power. The new Cleveland charter gives the department heads seats

in the council with the right to address that body. There is here a

proximity of the executive and legislative power, rather than a real

union of it. Whatever union there may be is largely on the side of

giving the executive a position in the deliberations of the legislative

body. The council has no function in the actual exercise of the

executive power. The entire executive power is really concentrated in a

single individual elected at large and holding office for two and often

four years. This feature is in sharp contrast to the vesting of the

executive power in the representatives of wieldy districts or “quotas,”

who control and direct the exercise of that power by a single executive

who holds at their pleasure.

The one plan that should not be attempted in our larger cities is

that of providing for the union of the executive and legislative

functions in a few commissioners elected at large, thereby violating

the essential principle of electing representatives from wieldy

geographical districts or by wieldy “quotas.”

FOOTNOTES:

[14] See Richard S. Childs, “The Theory of the New Controlled-Executive

Plan,” _National Municipal Review_, II, 76 (January, 1913); C. G. Hoag,

“The Representative Plan of Government,” _The American City_, April,

1913.

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