THE MENACE TO UNPOPULAR GOVERNMENT OF THE COMMISSION FORM OF GOVERNMENT
FOR SMALLER CITIES
It took a flood and a hurricane which overwhelmed a prosperous city to
reverse the popular convictions which lie at the basis of government
in the United States. In 1900 Galveston was all but destroyed by the
waters of the Gulf rising during a hurricane. Confronted with a great
emergency in which quick and efficient action was imperative if the
city was to be restored at all, the people abandoned the fear of kings
and of centralized governmental power. The entire municipal power of
government, executive and legislative, was vested in a single board of
five commissioners. These were both the legislature and the executive.
They made the ordinances and wielded the executive power through
subordinate officers appointed by them. The governmental principle
which was thus applied in the commission plan is the concentration
of governmental power by the union of the legislative and executive
functions of government in the hands of a few[9] who are controlled
and prevented from becoming an unpopular government because they are
subject to the electorate through elections at frequent intervals. The
office of commissioner was made conspicuous and elections interesting.
The population of Galveston was about 40,000. Hence the entire city was
not so large but that a candidate might be personally known with a fair
degree of ease by the electorate, and with the least possible expense
make a personal canvass. It was, in short, a wieldy district. Hence
the coming forward of candidates was increased to the maximum, and the
need for a vote-directing machine practically eliminated. The maximum
amount of thought and intelligence was obtained from the voter because
his attention was concentrated on filling a few important offices.
Excessive and artificial political ignorance was thus diminished.
The ultimate result was a real expression of the will of the
electorate through the representatives chosen and full power in those
representatives to enact that will into law and also enforce the law
thus made. In actual operation the results of applying this principle
left little to be desired in Galveston. Here are the comments of a
keen observer,[10] writing in 1911:
To Americans accustomed to inefficiency in public office as contrasted
with private enterprise, the story of the achievements of this
Commission reads like a romance. Unhampered by checks and balances
and legal red-tape, the Commission reorganized the city government,
restored the city property, planned and financed and built the
great sea-wall that now bars out the sea, raised the ground level
of the city, and, withal, reduced the tax-rate and the debt! The
annual running expenses of the city were decreased one-third. The
new government displayed foresight, intelligence, and dispatch. It
appeared sensitive to that public clamor which the average politician
considers so needless.
There was striking change in the attitude of the public toward the
doings at City Hall. The people began to “take an interest” in their
common property, to discuss the doings of the Commission on street
corners, to have “civic pride” (since there was now at last something
to be proud of), to criticize or applaud the work of their servants.
They seemed to have actually a proprietary interest in the government!
Amid this widespread discussion the influence of the politicians of
the town was swamped and counted for only its true numerical strength.
Now every American city has its spells of good government--the
reactions that follow orgies of corruption and scandal--and the
fact that the new Galveston government saved money is not in itself
significant. The vital difference is that these good administrators
in Galveston, without building up personal “machines” or intrenching
themselves in power by the usual army-like methods of political
organization, were able to secure re-election again and again. They
won favor by serving all the people well. They did their work in the
spot-light of public scrutiny, where every citizen could see and
appreciate and applaud.
Unless, however, the fundamental principles at the basis of government
by commission are observed and applied, there can be much apparent
commission form of government for cities which will not in any way
militate against extra-legal unpopular government.
If, for instance, a municipal government by commission is planted
in a territory where several other municipal governments are also
operating, each with a long list of elective officers, very little
has been accomplished toward that centralization of governmental
power in a few commissioners which tends to eliminate extra-legal
government. Each of the municipal governments operating in the same
territory will divide the entire local governmental power among
them. The decentralization of governmental power will still exist in
exaggerated form and the political ignorance of the voter must still
be such that he will need to be advised and directed how to vote, and
the professional adviser and director to the politically ignorant
voter will still continue to satisfy that need. Once the professional
adviser and director to the politically ignorant voter is retained in
the district where the commission form of government operates, he will
begin to exercise an influence in the nomination and selection of the
commissioners. Extra-legal government as conducted by him may even
capture a majority of the commissioners and use the great governmental
power vested in them in a scandalous manner. The present situation in
Chicago well illustrates this danger. There the municipal government
is very highly centralized. The voter casts his ballot only for a
mayor every four years, a city clerk and the city treasurer every two
years and two aldermen from each of the 35 wards--one alderman being
selected from each ward every year. The other administrative officers
not under civil service are appointed by the mayor with the consent
of the council. If Chicago were the only local government in the
territory which it occupies it would be a fair type of responsible city
government wielding a highly centralized governmental power. Machine
politics would thrive only in the districts where the majority of
the voters were illiterate and where corrupt and illegal voting was
practiced on a considerable scale. But operating in the same territory
with the city of Chicago is the Sanitary District with 9 trustees,
and Cook County with 73 elective officers. It is the long ballot for
Cook County which causes the densest political ignorance on the part
of the voter and makes the existence of the professional adviser and
director of the politically ignorant voter necessary and therefore
the existence of extra-legal government certain and permanent. Such
an extra-legal government, when once established, naturally exerts a
great influence even in city elections. If the two principal party
vote-directing machines agree to divide the city and county governments
between them and each helps the other to appoint those who are to fill
the legal offices in that government which it is agreed each shall
control, the power of extra-legal government in the city will be very
great indeed. In the same way, if a commission form of government
be provided for smaller cities which must divide governmental power
with a township government, a county government, and a drainage or a
levee district, all operating in the same territory and all having a
considerable list of elective officers, there is little hope for a real
trial of the effect of the concentration of governmental power in a
few elective offices to disrupt extra-legal government. It is of the
utmost importance to the success of the commission form of government
for smaller cities that such government be the only local government
operating in the territory occupied by the city.
In some cases, however, it is necessary that municipal corporations
with special powers and functions and collecting taxes from a special
district for a special purpose should occupy territory in which several
other units of municipal government operate. For instance, the Sanitary
District in Cook County properly levies taxes upon property in the
city of Chicago and in part of Cook County, and builds a canal running
through Cook County and Will County. How is it possible to avoid having
the commissioners of such a sanitary district elected from the district
where its revenues are obtained? The answer is very simple. Such
commissioners should be appointed by the different municipal units of
government occupying the territory included in the sanitary district.
The city of Chicago, of course, should appoint the majority of the
commissioners. The municipal governments outside the city of Chicago
should be combined together in groups and the legislative bodies of
the municipalities in each group be given a voice in the selection
of commissioners for the Sanitary District. The same principle of
appointment may be adopted whenever a special board with special
functions is to occupy territory which includes several units of local
government.
The effectiveness of the commission form of government for cities to
oust extra-legal government requires the election of each commissioner
from a wieldy district, i.e., one not so large but that the candidate
who is willing to run may be known with a fair degree of ease by the
electorate and be able with the least expense to make a personal
canvass.[11] The supposed advantage of electing commissioners at large
from an unwieldy district is that this method insures the candidacy
and election of men prominent in the entire district and hence more
fit to hold office. But this is precisely what it does not do. It is
true such a plan _demands_ candidates with a wide general reputation
in the whole district. But such candidates do not come forward simply
because the method of election suggests that such candidates should
appear. Men with wide reputations in a large district are almost
certain to be occupying offices of greater importance in the state and
federal governments, or else they are not available at all for the
holding of public office. The leading citizen will not as a rule be a
candidate for a position in the municipal government. The available
candidates are almost sure in the long run to be men whose reputations
are confined to some district of the larger community. When they run
for election in a district which stretches beyond the zone of their
personal influence and reputation, some machinery for enlightening the
voters’ ignorance as to who they are and what they stand for must be
devised. This means that the candidate must have money and backing.
Those requirements may seriously limit the number of candidates and
therefore the choice of the voter. Furthermore, in promoting slates of
candidates care will usually be taken to select men with reference to
particular districts in the community at large, so that each district
will feel that it has a representative on the ticket. Thus a provision
for the election of commissioners at large from an unwieldy district
is likely to relapse in practice into the presentation of candidates
representing small districts, each with a local reputation in his own
district. This becomes in substance an election of commissioners from
districts and yet the range of choice by the voter resulting from the
coming forward of candidates will be very much restricted because
of the expense of making a canvass in the unwieldy district and the
necessity for an organized support. Candidates who are successful in
being elected from the unwieldy district are likely to be beholden to
an organization, whether it be temporary or permanent, which has aided
them in the election. A system of electing commissioners at large from
an unwieldy district in a greater or less degree produces a condition
which tends to keep alive the extra-legal government. On the other
hand, with elections in wieldy districts the number of candidates who
come forward is the largest possible. The choice of the voter is,
therefore, the widest. Each candidate may become most easily personally
known to the electorate. The sharp contest between individuals in a
small district is always peculiarly enlightening to the electorate
and stimulating to his interest in political matters. The expense of
a canvass may, therefore, be reduced without lessening the amount of
knowledge which the voter will obtain regarding issues and candidates.
The services of an extensive organization for the purpose of directing
the politically ignorant voter who to vote for would naturally give way
to organizations for dispensing actual knowledge concerning candidates
and conditions. The services of a highly developed and permanent
machine designed to direct the politically ignorant how to vote must
become of the least possible value.
The practice of the principle of selecting commissioners from wieldy
districts may take several forms, depending largely upon the size of
the electorate.
If the whole city is not more than a wieldy district in itself, then of
course the election of all the commissioners at large is in accordance
with the sound principle announced. Such election may very properly be
according to any one of several plans.
_First_: The candidates to the number of commissioners to be selected
receiving the highest vote at a single election may be declared
elected, although none receive an actual majority of the votes cast.
This is the simplest method. It is the one in use at Galveston, with a
population of about 40,000, and seems to have given satisfaction.
_Second_: The commissioners elected at large may be required to receive
an actual majority. If there are more than two candidates for each
place, this may be secured at a single election by the voters marking
their first and other choices for each of the places to be filled, so
that if no election is had by a majority according to the first choice
of the voters, the second and other choices may be used to indicate
which ones receive an actual majority. Or a second election may be held
at which only candidates in double the number of places to be filled
who have received the highest number of votes at the first election
are placed upon the final ballot. The second election may be required
even though candidates receiving the highest votes at the first
election actually receive a majority. This last is the plan adopted,
apparently with good results, in Des Moines, Iowa.[12]
_Third_: Then there is the Hare plan of proportional representation and
the single transferable vote.[13] To insure an election a candidate
need only obtain a “quota” of the votes cast--i.e., that number of
votes which can be obtained by the number of candidates equal to the
number of places to be filled, but by no more. Thus if the electorate
number 5,000 and there are 5 places to be filled, the “quota” or number
of votes required for an election would be 834. Five persons could
receive this number of votes, but the sixth candidate could not do
so. Each voter is allowed to indicate his first, second, third, and
other choices, but can indicate only one first choice and one second
choice, etc. At the first count only first choices are reckoned and
the candidates who have received a “quota” or more according to first
choices are declared elected. If all the places have not then been
filled up, the surplus votes of those candidates who have received
more than the “quota” are transferred according to the names marked
(2) on them. If these transfers do not bring the requisite number of
candidates up to the “quota,” the lowest candidate is eliminated and
his votes transferred according to the next preference, and so on
until all the places are filled. The object of this plan is to give
representation to minorities or to groups less than a majority.
So far as the disruption of extra-legal government by politocrats is
concerned, it is doubtful if it makes any difference which of the above
plans of election be adopted in commission-governed municipalities
which as a whole constitute only a single wieldy district of, let us
say, not to exceed 6,000 male voters and 50,000 inhabitants.
Suppose now the municipality be larger than a single wieldy district,
but still small enough so that it is very plainly a unit in its
interests and collective activities--let us say a city with not to
exceed 25,000 male voters and a population of not more than 150,000.
Here there will be a distinct danger in electing commissioners at large
at a single election at which are chosen those who obtain the highest
votes, even though less than a majority. If the choice is to be by a
plurality at a single election the municipality should be divided into
wards with a single commissioner elected from each, but no candidate
should be required to reside in the ward where he stands for election.
The Hare plan is entirely available and consistent with the choice
of commissioners from wieldy districts. In Des Moines, Iowa, with a
population of about 86,000, the double election plan seems to have
been used with success. This may also be regarded as consistent in a
way with the election of commissioners from wieldy districts. True,
a single district with a population of 80,000 might be regarded as
unwieldy for the purpose of a single election. But the double election
secures the same education for the electorate that the voter would
obtain in a single election in a district one-half as large. Hence a
wieldy district having a double election can be considerably larger
than a wieldy district having a single election.
Suppose, however, that the municipality be large enough to be readily
divided into as many wieldy districts as there are commissioners to
the number of from five to nine. For instance, let us assume a city
of to exceed 25,000 male voters and a population exceeding 150,000.
Here the district is too unwieldy for the election at large of those
candidates receiving the highest votes at a single election. It may be
doubted whether the double election will produce satisfactory results
in the way of securing a really intelligent vote. We have probably
come to a situation where the principle of electing commissioners from
wieldy districts requires either a division of the city into wards
with a commissioner elected from each, or else the election at large
of all the commissioners by the Hare plan, in which only a “quota” of
votes is required for a choice. The advantage which the Hare plan has
of permitting the candidates for commissioner to come from any part
of the city can be duplicated to some extent in the ward plan by not
requiring any residence by candidates in the ward of the city where
they stand for election. Under either arrangement candidates will in
all probability come from particular districts and localities where
their strength lies.
It is no part of the writer’s plan to discuss at length the comparative
merits of the system of election from wieldy geographical districts
and wieldy “quotas.” Each has its advantages and disadvantages. The
wieldy geographical district has the advantage of presenting an issue
of extreme simplicity to the voter and inducing interest in it by
the dramatic element of personal contest. The field in which the
candidates contest being limited, there is more concentrated work
upon the education of the electorate and the electorate focuses its
attention. It is not so clearly the fact that in a municipal election a
large minority may be wholly unrepresented as it might be in elections
to a national legislative body. The Hare plan insures minority
representation, or rather representation of different groups throughout
the district. It, however, departs from a desirable simplicity in
voting and vote-counting. It tends to eliminate the sharpness of
personal contest between candidates. Under the Hare plan candidates
will go on a still hunt all over the district for a “quota” and bid
to various classes and cliques in the municipality for first and
second choices. This develops what is called “minority thinking” and
“particularist politics.” The candidates do not run against each other
so much as they dodge in and out about each other. This also tends
to puzzle the voter, confuse the issues, and achieve results which
are unexpected. The test of the Hare plan in cities of over 150,000
inhabitants in the United States is, it is believed, still to be made.
If the principles of the commission form of government be applied
faithfully and completely, there is no doubt that extra-legal
government in its present violent form must go. The voter’s duty
will be simple and he can perform it with the maximum amount of
intelligence. The function of the electorate in voting is vital
because it confers the whole power of the local government upon a body
which is directly responsible to the electorate. What place, then, is
there for the professional adviser and director to the politically
ignorant voter? None! There is no such political ignorance as calls
for a director and adviser. The voter needs only enlightenment as
to which of two honest and fairly efficient men has a program which
the voter on the whole favors. The voter is seeking information of a
highly organized sort. He can obtain that only by the use of his mind
and a consideration of the promises and programs of the candidates.
The candidates now must make an appeal to the voter’s intelligence.
What, then, is the need of the present-day extra-legal government? Of
course, parties and party organizations will spring up, but they will
cease to be mere machines for directing the ignorant voter how to cast
his ballot. Instead, they will become instruments for disseminating
propaganda on social, economic, and governmental issues.
Once the extra-legal government is eliminated by the concentration of
governmental power in the hands of a few, each of whom is elected to
office from a wieldy district or by a wieldy “quota,” the electorate
may with perfect safety secure control of its representatives in a
variety of ways. It may insist upon the recall, the initiative, and
the referendum. It is the promotion of these expedients while the
ballot is still left as long as at present and the governmental power
decentralized as it now is that tends to promote the existence and
security of extra-legal unpopular government. With irresponsible
extra-legal government replaced by a responsible legal government
subject to frequent elections, one might hazard the guess that neither
the recall, the initiative, nor the referendum would be much used.
The primaries would be utterly out of place. No party names would
appear on any ballot. In theory every individual legally qualified for
office would have the privilege of running at an election. Individuals
should be allowed to put themselves up. To discourage the running of
irresponsible persons who have no real chance of election a sum should
be forfeited by all candidates who do not receive a certain percentage
of the vote cast. Parties with principles and programs would naturally
be the only ones which would have any standing. It is highly improbable
that any such parties would exist for municipal elections. If they did,
they should be left free to run their affairs in their own way, since
their candidates must always compete with individuals who wish to come
forward in opposition.
FOOTNOTES:
[9] The question is frequently put whether it is better to have
five commissioners and let them choose their own chairman as a mere
presiding officer, or to provide that one commissioner specially
elected shall be chairman, with special executive and administrative
powers. The two plans represent simply a difference in the degree
with which the executive and legislative powers are united. If one
commissioner is elected specially as a chairman or a mayor, with
administrative and executive duties, and the other commissioners are
merely an advisory board, you have a certain degree of separation
of the executive and legislative functions. The chairman or mayor
must in that case be elected at large from the city. His office will
be so conspicuous and important as to overshadow the offices of the
commissioners, and there will be the probability of deadlocks between
the executive and the commissioners exercising the legislative power.
If, on the other hand, all the commissioners are equally possessed
of the executive and legislative power, there is a complete union of
both functions. The majority of the commission then becomes entirely
responsible, not only for the making, but for the enforcement, of
the laws and administrative measures. So far as the disrupting of
extra-legal government in cities the size of Galveston is concerned,
it is believed not to make any material difference which plan be
adopted. The surer course is that of making the majority of all the
commissioners responsible for the exercise of the entire legislative
and executive powers.
It is entirely in accordance with the principle of the union of
executive and legislative powers in the commission that it hire a
professional municipal administrator to hold office at the pleasure
of the commission and delegate to him such executive duties and
legislative power, subject always to the control of the commission, as
the commission sees fit.
[10] Richard S. Childs, _Short-Ballot Principles_, pp. 66-67.
[11] For a further exposition of a wieldy district see Richard S.
Childs, _Short-Ballot Principles_, pp. 51-58.
[12] John J. Hamilton, _Dethronement of the City Boss_, pp. 158-168.
[13] See _Encyclopedia Brittanica_, 11th ed., XXIII, 115 (from which
the description in the text is largely taken); Richard S. Childs,
_Short-Ballot Principles_, p. 58; Ramsay Muir, _Peers and Bureaucrats_,
pp. 236-39; C. G. Hoag, “The Representative Council Plan of City
Government,” _The American City_, April, 1913.