Dealing with Iran and Syria is controversial. Nevertheless, it is our
view that in diplomacy, a nation can and should engage its adversaries
and enemies to try to resolve conflicts and differences consistent
with its own interests. Accordingly, the Support Group should actively
engage Iran and Syria in its diplomatic dialogue, without
preconditions.
The Study Group recognizes that U.S. relationships with Iran and Syria
involve difficult issues that must be resolved. Diplomatic talks
should be extensive and substantive, and they will require a balancing
of interests. The United States has diplomatic, economic, and military
disincentives available in approaches to both Iran and Syria. However,
the United States should also consider incentives to try to engage
them constructively, much as it did successfully with Libya.
Some of the possible incentives to Iran, Syria, or both include:
i. An Iraq that does not disintegrate and destabilize its neighbors
and the region.
ii. The continuing role of the United States in preventing the Taliban
from destabilizing Afghanistan.
iii. Accession to international organizations, including the World
Trade Organization.
iv. Prospects for enhanced diplomatic relations with the United
States.
v. The prospect of a U.S. policy that emphasizes political and
economic reforms instead of (as Iran now perceives it) advocating
regime change.
vi. Prospects for a real, complete, and secure peace to be negotiated
between Israel and Syria, with U.S. involvement as part of a broader
initiative on Arab-Israeli peace as outlined below.
RECOMMENDATION 9: Under the aegis of the New Diplomatic Offensive and
the Support Group, the United States should engage directly with Iran
and Syria in order to try to obtain their commitment to constructive
policies toward Iraq and other regional issues. In engaging Syria and
Iran, the United States should consider incentives, as well as
disincentives, in seeking constructive results.
IRAN. Engaging Iran is problematic, especially given the state of the
U.S.-Iranian relationship. Yet the United States and Iran cooperated
in Afghanistan, and both sides should explore whether this model can
be replicated in the case of Iraq.
Although Iran sees it in its interest to have the United States bogged
down in Iraq, Iran's interests would not be served by a failure of
U.S. policy in Iraq that led to chaos and the territorial
disintegration of the Iraqi state. Iran's population is slightly more
than 50 percent Persian, but it has a large Azeri minority (24 percent
of the population) as well as Kurdish and Arab minorities. Worst-case
scenarios in Iraq could inflame sectarian tensions within Iran, with
serious consequences for Iranian national security interests.
Our limited contacts with Iran's government lead us to believe that
its leaders are likely to say they will not participate in diplomatic
efforts to support stability in Iraq. They attribute this reluctance
to their belief that the United States seeks regime change in Iran.
Nevertheless, as one of Iraq's neighbors Iran should be asked to
assume its responsibility to participate in the Support Group. An
Iranian refusal to do so would demonstrate to Iraq and the rest of the
world Iran's rejectionist attitude and approach, which could lead to
its isolation. Further, Iran's refusal to cooperate on this matter
would diminish its prospects of engaging with the United States in the
broader dialogue it seeks.
RECOMMENDATION 10: The issue of Iran's nuclear programs should
continue to be dealt with by the United Nations Security Council and
its five permanent members (i.e., the United States, United Kingdom,
France, Russia, and China) plus Germany.
RECOMMENDATION 11: Diplomatic efforts within the Support Group should
seek to persuade Iran that it should take specific steps to improve
the situation in Iraq.
Among steps Iran could usefully take are the following:
--Iran should stem the flow of equipment, technology, and training to
any group resorting to violence in Iraq.
--Iran should make clear its support for the territorial integrity of
Iraq as a unified state, as well as its respect for the sovereignty of
Iraq and its government.
--Iran can use its influence, especially over Shia groups in Iraq, to
encourage national reconciliation.
--Iran can also, in the right circumstances, help in the economic
reconstruction of Iraq.
SYRIA. Although the U.S.-Syrian relationship is at a low point, both
countries have important interests in the region that could be
enhanced if they were able to establish some common ground on how to
move forward. This approach worked effectively in the early 1990s. In
this context, Syria's national interests in the Arab-Israeli dispute
are important and can be brought into play.
Syria can make a major contribution to Iraq's stability in several
ways. Accordingly, the Study Group recommends the following:
RECOMMENDATION 12: The United States and the Support Group should
encourage and persuade Syria of the merit of such contributions as the
following:
--Syria can control its border with Iraq to the maximum extent
possible and work together with Iraqis on joint patrols on the border.
Doing so will help stem the flow of funding, insurgents, and
terrorists in and out of Iraq.
--Syria can establish hotlines to exchange information with the
Iraqis.
--Syria can increase its political and economic cooperation with Iraq.