This new diplomatic offensive cannot be successful unless it includes
the active participation of those countries that have a critical stake
in preventing Iraq from falling into chaos. To encourage their
participation, the United States should immediately seek the creation
of the Iraq International Support Group. The Support Group should also
include all countries that border Iraq as well as other key countries
in the region and the world.
The Support Group would not seek to impose obligations or undertakings
on the government of Iraq. Instead, the Support Group would assist
Iraq in ways the government of Iraq would desire, attempting to
strengthen Iraq's sovereignty--not diminish it.
It is clear to Iraq Study Group members that all of Iraq's neighbors
are anxious about the situation in Iraq. They favor a unified Iraq
that is strong enough to maintain its territorial integrity, but not
so powerful as to threaten its neighbors. None favors the breakup of
the Iraqi state. Each country in the region views the situation in
Iraq through the filter of its particular set of interests. For
example:
--Turkey opposes an independent or even highly autonomous Kurdistan
because of its own national security considerations.
--Iran backs Shia claims and supports various Shia militias in Iraq,
but it also supports other groups in order to enhance its influence
and hedge its bets on possible outcomes.
--Syria, despite facilitating support for Iraqi insurgent groups,
would be threatened by the impact that the breakup of Iraq would have
on its own multiethnic and multiconfessional society.
--Kuwait wants to ensure that it will not once again be the victim of
Iraqi irredentism and aggression.
--Saudi Arabia and Jordan share Sunni concerns over Shia ascendancy in
Iraq and the region as a whole.
--The other Arab Gulf states also recognize the benefits of an outcome
in Iraq that does not destabilize the region and exacerbate Shia-Sunni
tensions.
--None of Iraq's neighbors--especially major countries such as Egypt,
Saudi Arabia, and Israel--see it in their interest for the situation
in Iraq to lead to aggrandized regional influence by Iran. Indeed,
they may take active steps to limit Iran's influence, steps that could
lead to an intraregional conflict.
Left to their own devices, these governments will tend to reinforce
ethnic, sectarian, and political divisions within Iraqi society. But
if the Support Group takes a systematic and active approach toward
considering the concerns of each country, we believe that each can be
encouraged to play a positive role in Iraq and the region.
SAUDI ARABIA. Saudi Arabia's agreement not to intervene with
assistance to Sunni Arab Iraqis could be an essential quid pro quo for
similar forbearance on the part of other neighbors, especially Iran.
The Saudis could use their Islamic credentials to help reconcile
differences between Iraqi factions and build broader support in the
Islamic world for a stabilization agreement, as their recent hosting
of a meeting of Islamic religious leaders in Mecca suggests. If the
government in Baghdad pursues a path of national reconciliation with
the Sunnis, the Saudis could help Iraq confront and eliminate al Qaeda
in Iraq. They could also cancel the Iraqi debt owed them. In addition,
the Saudis might be helpful in persuading the Syrians to cooperate.
TURKEY. As a major Sunni Muslim country on Iraq's borders, Turkey can
be a partner in supporting the national reconciliation process in
Iraq. Such efforts can be particularly helpful given Turkey's interest
in Kurdistan remaining an integral part of a unified Iraq and its
interest in preventing a safe haven for Kurdish terrorists (the PKK).
EGYPT. Because of its important role in the Arab world, Egypt should
be encouraged to foster the national reconciliation process in Iraq
with a focus on getting the Sunnis to participate. At the same time,
Egypt has the means, and indeed has offered, to train groups of Iraqi
military and security forces in Egypt on a rotational basis.
JORDAN. Jordan, like Egypt, can help in the national reconciliation
process in Iraq with the Sunnis. It too has the professional
capability to train and equip Iraqi military and security forces.
RECOMMENDATION 4: As an instrument of the New Diplomatic Offensive, an
Iraq International Support Group should be organized immediately
following the launch of the New Diplomatic Offensive.
RECOMMENDATION 5: The Support Group should consist of Iraq and all the
states bordering Iraq, including Iran and Syria; the key regional
states, including Egypt and the Gulf States; the five permanent
members of the United Nations Security Council; the European Union;
and, of course, Iraq itself. Other countries--for instance, Germany,
Japan and South Korea--that might be willing to contribute to
resolving political, diplomatic, and security problems affecting Iraq
could also become members.
RECOMMENDATION 6: The New Diplomatic Offensive and the work of the
Support Group should be carried out with urgency, and should be
conducted by and organized at the level of foreign minister or above.
The Secretary of State, if not the President, should lead the U.S.
effort. That effort should be both bilateral and multilateral, as
circumstances require.
RECOMMENDATION 7: The Support Group should call on the participation
of the office of the United Nations Secretary-General in its work. The
United Nations Secretary-General should designate a Special Envoy as
his representative.
RECOMMENDATION 8: The Support Group, as part of the New Diplomatic
Offensive, should develop specific approaches to neighboring countries
that take into account the interests, perspectives, and potential
contributions as suggested above.