subject of some debate. On this point, however, we have nothing stated
in the Scriptures. From them we learn only, that God has appointed it;
that he enjoins it to be offered in faith, that is, faith in Christ,
whose atonement is the meritorious and procuring cause of all the
blessings to which our desires can be directed; and that prayer so
offered is an indispensable condition of our obtaining the blessings for
which we ask. As a matter of inference, however, we may discover some
glimpses of the reason in the divine Mind on which its appointment
rests. That reason has sometimes been said to be the moral preparation
and state of fitness produced in the soul for the reception of the
divine mercies which the act and, more especially the habit of prayer
must induce. Against this stands the strong, and, in a Scriptural view,
fatal objection, that an efficiency is thus ascribed to the mere act of
a creature to produce those great, and, in many respects, radical
changes in the character of man, which we are taught, by inspired
authority, to refer to the direct influences of the Holy Spirit. What is
it that fits man for forgiveness, but simply repentance? Yet that is
expressly said to be the gift” of Christ, and supposes strong operations
of the illuminating and convincing Spirit of truth, the Lord and Giver
of spiritual life; and if the mere acts and habit of prayer had
efficiency enough to produce a Scriptural repentance, then every
formalist attending with ordinary seriousness to his devotions must, in
consequence, become a penitent. Again: if we pray for spiritual
blessings aright, that is, with an earnestness of desire which arises
from a due apprehension of their importance, and a preference of them to
all earthly good, who does not see that this implies such a deliverance
from the earthly and carnal disposition which characterizes our
degenerate nature, that an agency far above our own, however we may
employ it, must be supposed? or else, if our own prayers could be
efficient up to this point, we might, by the continual application of
this instrument, complete our regeneration, independent of that grace of
God, which, after all, this theory brings in. It may indeed be said,
that the grace of God operates by our prayers to produce in us a state
of moral fitness to receive the blessings we ask. But this gives up the
point contended for, the moral efficiency of prayer; and refers the
efficiency to another agent working by our prayers as an instrument.
Still, however, it may be affirmed, that the Scriptures no where
represent prayer as an instrument for improving our moral state, in any
other way than as the means of bringing into the soul new supplies of
spiritual life and strength. It is therefore more properly to be
considered as a condition of our obtaining that grace by which such
effects are wrought, than as the instrument by which it effects them. In
fact, all genuine acts of prayer depend upon a grace previously
bestowed, and from which alone the disposition and the power to pray
proceed. So it was said of Saul of Tarsus, Behold, he prayeth!” He
prayed in fact then for the first time; but that was in consequence of
the illumination of his mind as to his spiritual danger, effected by the
miracle on the way to Damascus, and the grace of God which accompanied
the miracle. Nor does the miraculous character of the means by which
conviction was produced in his mind, affect the relevancy of this to
ordinary cases. By whatever means God may be pleased to fasten the
conviction of our spiritual danger upon our minds, and to awaken us out
of the long sleep of sin, that conviction must precede real prayer, and
comes from the influence of his grace, rendering the means of conviction
effectual. Thus it is not the prayer which produces the conviction, but
the conviction which gives birth to the prayer; and if we pursue the
matter into its subsequent stages, we shall come to the same result. We
pray for what we feel we want; that is, for something not in our
possession; we obtain this either by impartation from God, to whom we
look up as the only Being able to bestow the good for which we ask him;
or else we obtain it, according to this theory, by some moral efficiency
being given to the exercise of prayer to work it in us. Now, the latter
hypothesis is in many cases manifestly absurd. We ask for pardon of sin,
for instance; but this is an act of God done _for_ us, quite distinct
from any moral change which prayer may be said to produce in us,
whatever efficiency we may ascribe to it; for no such change in us can
be pardon, since that must proceed from the party offended. We ask for
increase of spiritual strength; and prayer is the expression of that
want. But if it supply this want by its own moral efficiency, it must
supply it in proportion to its intensity and earnestness; which
intensity and earnestness can only be called forth by the degree in
which the want is felt, so that the case supposed is contradictory and
absurd, as it makes the sense of want to be in proportion to the supply
which ought to abate or remove it. And if it be urged, that prayer at
least produces in us a fitness for the supply of spiritual strength,
because it is excited by a sense of our wants, the answer is, that the
fitness contended for consists in that sense of want itself which must
be produced in us by the _previous_ agency of grace, or we should never
pray for supplies. There is, in fact, nothing in prayer simply which
appears to have any adaptation, as an _instrument_, to effect a moral
change in man, although it should be supposed to be made use of by the
influence of the Holy Spirit. The word of God is properly an instrument,
because it contains the doctrine which that Spirit explains and applies,
and the motives to faith and obedience which he enforces upon the
conscience and affections; and although prayer brings these truths and
motives before us, prayer cannot properly be said to be an instrument of
our regeneration, because that which is thus brought by prayer to bear
upon our case is the word of God itself introduced into our prayers,
which derive their sole influence in that respect from that
circumstance. Prayer simply is the application of an insufficient to a
sufficient Being for the good which the former cannot otherwise obtain,
and which the latter only can supply; and as that supply is dependent
upon prayer, and in the nature of the thing consequent, prayer can in no
good sense be said to be the instrument of supplying our wants, or
fitting us for their supply, except relatively, as a mere condition
appointed by the Donor.
If we must inquire into the reason of the appointment of prayer, and it
can scarcely be considered as a purely arbitrary institution, that
reason seems to be, the preservation in the minds of men of a solemn and
impressive sense of God’s agency in the world, and the dependence of all
creatures upon him. Perfectly pure and glorified beings, no longer in a
state of probation, and therefore exposed to no temptations, may not
need this institution; but men in their fallen state are constantly
prone to forget God; to rest in the agency of second causes; and to
build upon a sufficiency in themselves. This is at once a denial to God
of the glory which he rightly claims, and a destructive delusion to
creatures, who, in forsaking God as the object of their constant
affiance, trust but in broken reeds, and attempt to drink from broken
cisterns which can hold no water.” It is then equally in mercy to us, as
in respect to his own honour and acknowledgment, that the divine Being
has suspended so many of his blessings, and those of the highest
necessity to us, upon the exercise of prayer; an act which acknowledges
his uncontrollable agency, and the dependence of all creatures upon him;
our insufficiency, and his fulness; and lays the foundation of that
habit of gratitude and thanksgiving which is at once so meliorating to
our own feelings, and so conducive to a cheerful obedience to the will
of God. And if this reason for the injunction of prayer is no where in
Scripture stated in so many words, it is a principle uniformly supposed
as the foundation of the whole scheme of religion which they have
revealed.
To this duty objections have been sometimes offered, at which it may be
well at least to glance. One has been grounded upon a supposed
predestination of all things which come to pass; and the argument is,
that as this established predetermination of all things cannot be
altered, prayer, which supposes that God will depart from it, is vain
and useless. The answer which a pious predestinarian would give to this
objection is, that the argument drawn from the predestination of God
lies with the same force against every other human effort, as against
prayer; and that as God’s predetermination to give food to man does not
render the cultivation of the earth useless and impertinent, so neither
does the predestination of things shut out the necessity and efficacy of
prayer. It would also be urged, that God has ordained the means as well
as the end; and although he is an unchangeable Being, it is a part of
the unchangeable system which he has established, that prayer shall be
heard and accepted. Those who have not these views of predestination
will answer the objection differently; for if the premises of such a
predestination as is assumed by the objection, and conceded in the
answer, be allowed, the answer is unsatisfactory. The Scriptures
represent God, for instance, as purposing to inflict a judgment upon an
individual or a nation, which purpose is often changed by prayer. In
this case either God’s purpose must be denied, and then his threatenings
are reduced to words without meaning; or the purpose must be allowed; in
which case either prayer breaks in upon predestination, if understood
absolutely, or it is vain and useless. To the objection so drawn out it
is clear that no answer is given by saying that the means as well as the
end are predestinated, since prayer in such cases is not a means to the
end, but an instrument of thwarting it; or is a means to one end in
opposition to another end, which, if equally predestinated with the same
absoluteness, is a contradiction. The true answer is, that although God
has absolutely predetermined some things, there are others which respect
his government of free and accountable agents, which he has but
conditionally predetermined. The true immutability of God consists, not
in his adherence to his purposes, but in his never changing the
principles of his administration; and he may therefore, in perfect
accordance with his preördination of things, and the immutability of his
nature, purpose to do, under certain conditions dependent upon the free
agency of man, what he will not do under others; and for this reason,
that an immutable adherence to the principles of a wise, just, and
gracious government requires it. Prayer is in Scripture made one of
these conditions; and if God has established it as one of the principles
of his moral government to accept prayer, in every case in which he has
given us authority to ask, he has not, we may be assured, entangled his
actual government of the world with the bonds of such an eternal
predestination of particular events, as either to reduce prayer to a
mere form of words, or not to be able himself, consistently with his
decrees, to answer it, whenever it is encouraged by his express
engagements.
A second objection is, that as God is infinitely wise and good, his
wisdom and justice will lead him to bestow whatever is fit for us
without praying; and if any thing be not fit for us, we cannot obtain it
by praying.” To this Dr. Paley very well replies, that it may be
agreeable to perfect wisdom to grant that to our prayers which it would
not have been agreeable to the same wisdom to have given us without
praying for.” This, independent of the question of the authority of the
Scriptures which explicitly enjoin prayer, is the best answer which can
be given to the objection; and it is no small confirmation of it, that
it is obvious to every reflecting man, that for God to withhold favours
till asked for, tends,” as the same writer observes, to encourage
devotion among his rational creatures, and to keep up and circulate a
knowledge and sense of their dependency upon him.” But it is urged, God
will always do what is best from the moral perfection of his nature,
whether we pray or not.” This objection, however, supposes that there is
but one mode of acting for the best, and that the divine will is
necessarily determined to that mode only; both which positions,” says
Paley, presume a knowledge of universal nature, much beyond what we are
capable of attaining.” It is, indeed, a very unsatisfactory mode of
speaking, to say, God will always do what is best; since we can conceive
him capable in all cases of doing what is still better for the creature,
and also that the creature is capable of receiving more and more from
his infinite fulness for ever. All that can be rationally meant by such
a phrase is, that, in the circumstances of the case, God will always do
what is most consistent with his own wisdom, holiness, and goodness; but
then the disposition to pray, and the act of praying, add a new
circumstance to every case, and often bring many other new circumstances
along with them. It supposes humility, contrition, and trust, on the
part of the creature; and an acknowledgment of the power and compassion
of God, and of the merit of the atonement of Christ: all which are
manifestly new positions, so to speak, of the circumstances of the
creature, which, upon the very principle of the objection, rationally
understood, must be taken into consideration.
But if the efficacy of prayer as to ourselves be granted, its influence
upon the case of others is said to be more difficult to conceive. This
may be allowed without at all affecting the duty. Those who bow to the
authority of the Scriptures will see, that the duty of praying for
ourselves and for others rests upon the same divine appointment; and to
those who ask for the reason of such intercession in behalf of others,
it is sufficient to reply, that the efficacy of prayer being established
in one case, there is the same reason to conclude that our prayers may
benefit others, as any other effort we may use. It can only be by divine
appointment that one creature is made dependent upon another for any
advantage, since it was doubtless in the power of the Creator to have
rendered each independent of all but himself. Whatever reason,
therefore, might lead him to connect and interweave the interests of one
man with the benevolence of another, will be the leading reason for that
kind of mutual dependence which is implied in the benefit of mutual
prayer. Were it only that a previous sympathy, charity, and good will,
are implied in the duty, and must, indeed, be cultivated in order to it,
and be strengthened by it, the wisdom and benevolence of the institution
would, it is presumed, be apparent to every well constituted mind. That
all prayer for others must proceed upon a less perfect knowledge of them
than we have of ourselves, is certain; that all our petitions must be,
even in our own mind, more conditional than those which respect
ourselves, though many of these must be subjected to the principles of a
general administration, which we but partially apprehend; and that all
spiritual influences upon others, when they are subject to our prayers,
will be understood by us as liable to the control of their free agency,
must also be conceded; and, therefore, when others are concerned, our
prayers may often be partially or wholly fruitless. He who believes the
Scriptures will, however, be encouraged by the declaration that the
effectual fervent prayer of a righteous man,” for his fellow creatures,
availeth much;” and he who demands something beyond mere authoritative
declaration, as he cannot deny that prayer is one of those instruments
by which another may be benefited, must acknowledge that, like the
giving of counsel, it may be of great utility in some cases, although it
should fail in others; and that as no man can tell how much good counsel
may influence another, or in many cases say whether it has ultimately
failed or not, so it is with prayer. It is a part of the divine plan, as
revealed in his word, to give many blessings to man independent of his
own prayers, leaving the subsequent improvement of them to himself. They
are given in honour of the intercession of Christ, man’s great
Advocate;” and they are given, subordinately, in acceptance of the
prayers of Christ’s church, and of righteous individuals. And when many
or few devout individuals become thus the instruments of good to
communities, or to whole nations, there is no greater mystery in this
than in the obvious fact, that the happiness or misery of large masses
of mankind is often greatly affected by the wisdom or the errors, the
skill or the incompetence, the good or the bad conduct, of a few
persons, and often of one.
PREACHING is the discoursing publicly on any religious subject. From the
sacred records, says Robert Robinson, we learn that when men began to
associate for the purpose of worshipping the Deity, Enoch prophesied,
Jude 14, 15. We have a very short account of this prophet and his
doctrine; enough, however, to convince us that he taught the principal
truths of natural and revealed religion. Conviction of sin was in his
doctrine, and communion with God was exemplified in his conduct, Gen. v,
24; Heb. xi, 5, 6. From the days of Enoch to the time of Moses, each
patriarch worshipped God with his family: probably several assembled at
new moons, and alternately instructed the whole company. Noah,” it is
said, was a preacher of righteousness,” 1 Peter iii, 19, 20; 2 Peter ii,
5. Abraham commanded his household after him to keep the way of the
Lord, and to do justice and judgment, Gen. xviii, 19; and Jacob, when
his house lapsed to idolatry, remonstrated against it, and exhorted all
them that were with him to put away the strange gods, and go up with him
to Bethel, Gen. xxxv, 2, 3. Melchisedec, also, we may consider as the
father, the priest, and the prince, of his people; publishing the glad
tidings of peace and salvation, Gen. xiv; Heb. vii.
Moses was a most eminent prophet and preacher, raised up by the
authority of God, and by whom, it was said, came the law, John i, 17.
This great man had much at heart the promulgation of his doctrine: he
directed it to be inscribed on pillars, to be transcribed in books, and
to be taught both in public and private by word of mouth, Deut. iv, 9;
vi, 9; xvii, 18; xxvii, 8; xxxi, 19; Num. v, 23. He himself set the
example of each; and how he and Aaron preached, we may see by several
parts of his writings. The first discourse was heard with profound
reverence and attention; the last was both uttered and received with
raptures, Exod. iv, 31; Deut. xxxiii, 7, 8, &c. Public preaching does
not appear under this economy to have been attached to the priesthood:
priests were not officially preachers; and we have innumerable instances
of discourses delivered in assemblies by men of other tribes beside that
of Levi, Psalm lxviii, 11. Joshua was an Ephraimite; but, being full of
the spirit of wisdom, he gathered the tribes to Shechem, and harangued
the people of God, Deut. xxxiv, 9; Joshua xxiv. Solomon was a prince of
the house of Judah; Amos, a herdsman of Tekoa; yet both were preachers,
and one at least was a prophet, 1 Kings ii; Amos vii, 14, 15. When the
ignorant notions of Pagans, the vices of their practice, and the
idolatry of their pretended worship, were in some sad periods
incorporated into the Jewish religion by the princes of that nation, the
prophets and all the seers protested against this apostasy; and they
were persecuted for so doing. Shemaiah preached to Rehoboam, the
princes, and all the people at Jerusalem, 2 Chron. xii, 5; Azariah and
Hanani preached to Asa and his army, 2 Chron. xv, 1; xvi, 7; Micaiah, to
Ahab. Some of them opened schools, or houses of instruction; and there
to their disciples they taught the pure religion of Moses. At Naioth, in
the suburbs of Ramah, there was one where Samuel dwelt; and there was
one at Jericho, and a third at Bethel, to which Elijah and Elisha often
resorted. Thither the people went on Sabbath days and at new moons, and
received public lessons of piety and morality, 1 Sam. xix, 18; 2 Kings
ii, 2, 5; iv, 2, 3. Through all this period, however, there was a dismal
confusion of the useful ordinance of public preaching. Sometimes they
had no open vision, and the word of the Lord was precious, or scarce;
the people heard it only now and then. At other times they were left
without a teaching priest, and without law. And at other seasons again,
itinerants, both princes, priests, and Levites, were sent through all
the country, to carry the book of the law, and to teach in the cities.
In a word, preaching flourished when pure religion grew; and when the
last decayed, the first was suppressed. Moses had not appropriated
preaching to any order of men: persons, places, times, and manners, were
all left open and discretional. Many of the discourses were preached in
camps and courts, in streets, schools, cities, villages; sometimes, with
great composure and coolness; at other times, with vehement action and
rapturous energy; sometimes, in a plain, blunt style; at other times, in
all the magnificent pomp of eastern allegory. On some occasions, the
preachers appeared in public with visible signs, with implements of war,
with yokes of slavery, or something adapted to their subject. They gave
lectures on these, held them up to view, girded them on, broke them in
pieces, rent their garments, rolled in the dust, and endeavoured, by all
the methods they could devise, agreeably to the customs of their
country, to impress the minds of their auditors with the nature and
importance of their doctrines. These men were highly esteemed by the
pious part of the nation; and princes thought proper to keep seers and
others who were scribes, who read and expounded the law, 2 Chron. xxxiv,
29, 30; xxxv, 15. Hence, false prophets, bad men, who found their
account in pretending to be good, crowded the courts of princes.
Jezebel, an idolatress, had four hundred prophets of Baal; and Ahab, a
pretended worshipper of Jehovah, had as many pretended prophets of his
own profession, 2 Chron. xviii, 5.