ACTION AT LA-FOURCHE CROSSING.
About six o’clock Saturday morning, twentieth June, 1863, the train
which left Brashear City for La-Fourche a few hours before, arrived at
the railroad bridge crossing Bayou La-Fourche, twenty-eight miles from
Brashear, fifty-two miles from Algiers, then a suburb of New Orleans,
upon the west bank of the Mississippi River.
Lieutenant-Colonel Stickney had under his command on the train:
one hundred and fifteen men One Hundred and Seventy-Sixth New York
Infantry, Major Morgans in command; seventy-five men Twenty-Third
Connecticut Infantry, Major Miller in command; forty-six men
Forty-Second Massachusetts Infantry, Lieutenant Tinkham in command;
and two pieces of artillery, a 6 Pr. gun and a 12 Pr. howitzer. This
force was in light marching order, having left at Brashear City all
knapsacks, extra clothing, and many of them their blankets.
There was posted at Terrebonne and La-Fourche, guarding the railroad
bridge, a force of about two hundred and fifty men with one 12 Pr. gun
and one 12 Pr. howitzer. This force, joined with the reënforcements
from Brashear, made Stickney’s command about five hundred and two men,
as follows: -- companies, one hundred and ninety-five men, Twenty-Third
Connecticut Infantry; -- companies, one hundred and fifty-four men, One
Hundred and Seventy-Sixth New York Infantry; one company, forty-six
men, Forty-Second Massachusetts Infantry; one company, thirty-seven
men, Twenty-Sixth Maine Infantry, under Captain Fletcher; one company,
fifty men, First Louisiana Cavalry, under Captain Blober; and about
twenty artillery-men, mostly from the Twenty-First Indiana Artillery.
Upon disembarking from the train, the commanding officer of the
post appeared to be much surprised at this appearance of additional
troops, and asked what was to be done. When informed that the post was
threatened by the enemy he laughed heartily, and told Stickney no enemy
had been seen around there for six months.
Captain Blober, on his return from a scout made the day before, ordered
by Lieutenant-Colonel Stickney by telegraph from Brashear, reported no
signs whatever of any force on the Bayou La-Fourche. Blober, ordered
to be sure and scout as far as Napoleonville, and beyond if possible,
only proceeded a mile or two beyond Labadieville, about twelve miles
from La-Fourche and nine miles from Thibodeaux. He reported that people
from Napoleonville _said_ no force was in that direction; the reason,
probably, why he did not carry out his orders. This company of the
First Louisiana Cavalry was composed of raw recruits, without much
drill or discipline. In his official report of the action Stickney
says: “Had their scouting been properly done, there was no necessity
whatever of the infantry force at Thibodeaux being captured.”
Colonel Major[15] with three regiments of Confederate Texan mounted
men was at that very moment on his way down from Plaquemine--forty
miles from Thibodeaux--and could not have been many miles away. On the
nineteenth June General “Dick” Taylor was at the Fausse Riviere, an
ancient bed of the Mississippi, some miles west of the present channel
and opposite Port Hudson, in company with Colonel Major and his men.
He had heard from some ladies of his acquaintance there, recently from
New Orleans, that the Federal force in that city was not over one
thousand men, and with the exception of a small garrison in the fort at
Donaldsonville there were no troops on the west bank of the river. This
was not true. There was scattered in the Parish towns on the west bank
a respectable force of detached Federal troops on guard and provost
duty. Taylor ordered Major to proceed at once, for the express purpose
of reaching the rear of Brashear City by the twenty-third, and to pass
Plaquemine at night to escape observation. Major could not do this. His
men, hungry for spoils, raided into that town, capturing some prisoners
and burning two steamers. Lieutenant White, of the Forty-Second
Massachusetts, with his unarmed colored engineer troops barely escaped
capture at the time.
[15] Colonel James P. Major commanded the Second Cavalry Brigade,
composed of mounted infantry, artillery and cavalry. His official
report, dated June 30th, 1863, does not give the strength of his
command, but enough is gleaned from it to know that he had regiments
commanded by Colonels W. P. Lane, B. W. Stone, and Joseph Phillip,
Colonel C. L. Pyron’s Second Texas Cavalry, and Captain O. J. Semmes’
battery.
Major captured Plaquemine June 18th, was at Bayou Goula at daylight on
the nineteenth, at dark sent a force under Colonel Lane through a swamp
direct to Thibodeaux, and at midnight followed with the rest of his
men, arriving at 3.30 A.M. on the twenty-first. The rest of
his report on this action does not agree with the facts.
The men lay around carelessly until afternoon, as it was extremely hot
and nothing could be had to eat. Lieutenant-Colonel Stickney, when he
left Brashear, did not apprehend any attack on that place for some
days, and intended to return as soon as possible. Not hearing from
Captain Blober, who had again been ordered to scout and cover the
roads about Thibodeaux, about four o’clock he got ready to go back
to Brashear upon the same train that brought him. An order was given
Lieutenant Tinkham to remain at La-Fourche with his detachment, as a
reënforcement to the post; Stickney remarked he did not dare to leave
without doing so. Orders had also been received from New Orleans to
return two companies infantry to Brashear.
As the men were about to board the cars up rode a cavalry-man in hot
haste, with bare breath enough to say, “the rebs are coming, three
divisions of them,” and told that they were already at Thibodeaux.
Blober’s cavalry detachment came in shortly after, with a loss of
two men in a close pursuit by the enemy. With no wish to weaken his
force just then, but desirous to increase it, the train was hastily
despatched to Terrebonne, three miles distant on the railroad, with
orders for Captain Barber, Company K, One Hundred and Seventy-Sixth
New York, posted with about sixty men and one piece of artillery in
a stockade, to evacuate. The gun and detachment of gunners left for
La-Fourche during the morning.
Throughout the morning crowds of colored people kept coming along the
road, from the direction of Thibodeaux, with reports that the enemy
were coming. Failing to obtain satisfactory news from these people
Captain Barber rode to that town to find out the facts, arriving just
as the cavalry scouts started for La-Fourche, and with them the captain
went. This left young Lieutenant Phœbus W. Lyon, One Hundred and
Seventy-Sixth New York, in command, without proper information of what
to expect. When the Confederate troopers appeared they did not dare to
attack the stockade, as they expected that the field-gun was there.
They showed the convenient flag of truce. To the sergeant who was
sent out to meet it a demand was made to see the commanding officer.
Lieutenant Lyon, alone, went to meet them some three hundred yards from
the stockade, and refused their demand for a surrender of the post,
when the Confederate commander pulled out a revolver, placed it behind
an ear of the lieutenant and demanded that he should go along with
him. To the charge of violating a flag of truce by such a demand no
attention was paid, and entirely at their mercy Lieutenant Lyon had to
go with them, a prisoner of war. The enemy made a feint to charge upon
the stockade, and then withdrew some distance. Without molestation the
Federal troops embarked upon the train, which arrived shortly after all
this occurred, and Lieutenant Lyon had to witness the evacuation, from
the woods where he was held, with chagrin.
At Thibodeaux the Confederates captured all the infantry stationed
there, also about one hundred men upon plantations in the vicinity
(forty-seven men of the Twelfth Maine, with Lieutenants Freeman
H. Chase and John W. Dana, convalescents sent by Stickney from
Brashear; forty others, also convalescents from Brashear; about ten
men Company D, One Hundred and Seventy-Sixth New York; and a few
plantation guards). At Terrebonne Captain William H. May, Twenty-Third
Connecticut, was taken prisoner.
When the cavalry-man had made his report all of the troops were ordered
to “fall in,” and a line of battle was formed. The position taken is
described by Lieutenant-Colonel Stickney in his official report as
follows: “The levee of the Bayou La-Fourche is about twelve feet high;
the railroad crosses the bayou over the top of the levee, nearly in a
direction perpendicular to that of the bayou, and is about twelve feet
above the level of the surrounding country. For five or six miles to
the east of La-Fourche Crossing a carriage-road runs up and down the
bayou on both sides close to the levee, passing under the railroad on
both sides of the bayou. We were on the east side of the bayou and
north of the railroad, our front being parallel with the railroad,
extending about one hundred and fifty yards from the levee, and being
about two hundred yards from the railroad. From the right of our front
I had a line of defence running perpendicular to and resting upon the
railroad. I was obliged to have my front farther from the railroad than
it otherwise would have been, on account of trees standing, which could
not be cut down. The country around was level, affording full play for
the artillery, and was covered with tall grass, which I subsequently
had cut down, as it concealed, in a measure, movements in our front.
“A detachment of about fifty men of the Twenty-Third Connecticut, under
command of Major Miller, was posted in the tall grass on both sides
of the road along the levee, lying down, about four hundred and fifty
yards in advance of the battle line.
“The remainder of the infantry was drawn up in line, with the right
flank in reverse, excepting the company of convalescent men, under
Captain Fletcher, Twenty-Sixth Maine, who were posted at the railroad
bridge.
“Captain Blober and his cavalry-men were posted so as to guard against
the turning of the right flank, with the detachment Forty-Second
Massachusetts in their front, and to the rear of the centre of the
battle line.
“The artillery was posted as follows: a 12 Pr. gun upon the railroad
bridge, near the left bank of the bayou; two 12 Pr. howitzers and one 6
Pr. gun on the battle line front, one of the howitzers being so placed
upon the extreme right so that its fire could be directed to the front
or right flank.”
These movements were the first indication of an action in which this
detachment of the Forty-Second had seen an opportunity to participate.
Not without reason Lieutenant-Colonel Stickney rode up to Lieutenant
Tinkham and asked him what he thought about the behavior of his men
under fire; the lieutenant answered, he did not know, but thought
they would fight. Cavalry-Captain Blober, a plucky little German, was
boiling over for a fight. He was just the man to put courage into any
one a little weak in the knees. Later in the day this captain captured
a Confederate bugler upon the road.
With nothing to eat since the evening before, a hot, dusty and tedious
ride in the cars early that morning, lounging around all day in a hot
sun, no wonder there were many anxious inquiries, at all hours of the
day, for some stimulant. Those who had it in their possession kept
still, and the welcome friend was hard to find. However, no sooner had
position in line been taken to meet the expected enemy, when out came
the secreted whiskey, and was passed around to those in need of it.
About five o’clock the enemy came marching down the bayou road,
mounted, in column of fours, and as soon as the head of the column was
in sight a shot was fired from the gun upon the bridge, causing them
to halt and retire. They soon advanced about one hundred skirmishers,
who drove in the Federal pickets and moved on until encountering the
detachment Twenty-Third Connecticut, hid in tall grass, who, after an
exchange of shots, fell back upon the right flank of the main line
without loss.
The artillery gave them a few solid shot and shell, when the enemy
retired towards Thibodeaux with their killed and wounded.
Even here, almost before a gun was fired, the malady which seemed to
have attacked some officers on duty in this section was made manifest.
Major Miller, Twenty-Third Connecticut, during the day had spoken to
Major Morgans and Lieutenant Tinkham about a surrender to the enemy;
said he was in favor of it, and that it was of no use to make a fight.
He got an unfavorable response from these officers, but the major
continued panic-struck, for, after the first fire by the enemy upon the
Twenty-Third Connecticut in the grass, as Lieutenant-Colonel Stickney
says in his official report: “I found Major Miller, some distance to
the rear of his command, crouching in the high weeds on the levee. I
ordered him under arrest, and put in command of this detachment the
next senior officer, who faithfully executed my order.”
Soon after the enemy’s disappearance, instead of promptly throwing
out his skirmishers to follow up their retrograde movement and
ascertain what they were doing, Stickney sent a flag of truce to
obtain permission to remove his hospital stores and sick from the
hospital, which was in front of his lines and exposed to his fire. The
truce party went two and one-half miles on the road before meeting
the Confederate pickets. True to their own cowardly use of flags of
truce, they refused to comply with Stickney’s request. This made no
difference, however, as they could not interfere where they were, and
the hospital contents were removed to the Federal rear, and, just
before dark, the building was burned, to prevent interference with the
range of fire. A building upon the other side of the bayou was also set
on fire, to enable movements of the enemy to be seen, as it was feared
they might come down on that side and attempt to cross the railroad
bridge.
The position in line of battle was maintained all night, ready to repel
at any moment an attack: the men rested upon the ground as best they
could; pickets were thrown out about four hundred yards to the front;
squads of cavalry kept scouting to the right and rear; everything upon
this Johnson Plantation that could be used for fuel was torn down to
keep fires going.
About eleven o’clock at night a train arrived from Algiers with five
companies, three hundred and six men, Twenty-Sixth Massachusetts
Infantry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Sawtelle. Being the senior officer,
Stickney tendered him the command, which Lieutenant-Colonel Sawtelle
refused. The Twenty-Sixth Massachusetts went into line on the front. No
demonstrations were made by the enemy during the night.
The next morning, Sunday, June 21st, Captain Grow with one section of
the Twenty-Fifth New York Battery and thirty men arrived from Algiers.
One gun went into position on the extreme left of the line to cover the
bayou road, and one gun was held in reserve, where it could be moved to
the front or upon the right flank, as occasion should require. Slight
earthworks were thrown up, at no point over two feet high, but they
extended only a few yards in either direction from the angle formed on
the right flank by the two fronts.
During the morning Confederate mounted troops appeared in small bodies
within range of the outposts, to reconnoitre the position. About four
o’clock in the afternoon nearly one hundred and fifty Confederates,
mounted and dismounted, attacked the outposts and pickets, but made no
attempt to advance in force. A desultory fire was maintained for one
hour and a half, when the enemy retired.
Shortly after noon a heavy rain commenced, and continued until about
half-past six o’clock, drenching the men to the skin, who maintained a
battle line the greater part of the day as they had during the night.
Stickney claims this was necessary, as he could not depend on the men
falling into position with sufficient alacrity at the least warning.
The Federal position at dusk was about the same as on the previous day,
except that two companies of the Twenty-Sixth Massachusetts were added
to the front line, two companies on the right flank in reverse, and one
company upon the railroad bridge in support of the gun placed there.
Between five and six o’clock Lieutenant Tinkham was ordered to advance
on the road to a point about one-quarter of a mile in front, with his
Forty-Second Massachusetts detachment and some fifty negroes, to take
down a rail fence that somewhat obstructed the view. While engaged in
this work the enemy could be seen about another quarter of a mile up
the road, somewhat covered by the woods. Captain Blober tried his best
to draw them on, by riding towards them and circling around as the
ground would permit, without effect. Lieutenant-Colonel Stickney rode
up and wanted a volley fired at them, but Lieutenant Tinkham informed
him it would do no good, as his men were armed with Springfield
smooth-bore guns that would not reach the distance. Finally a volley
was fired, without effect, when Stickney told the lieutenant to hold on
and he would send out a field-gun, which was done.
It was shortly after this fence was levelled that the enemy,
dismounted, with a yell, and opening fire at the same time, made
a charge. The field-gun, after three discharges of canister shot,
was abandoned by the Twenty-Fifth New York artillery-men, although
Lieutenant Tinkham suggested to the gunner in command to fire in
retreat. The gunner was either a coward or too frightened to listen
to any orders or suggestions, and the gun was left. As the gunners
retreated Lieutenant Tinkham, who had his men in line to the rear
in support, upon one side of the road, wheeled the detachment into
line across the bayou road and gave the enemy a volley from his
smooth-bores, carrying a ball and three buckshot to each musket, almost
point-blank in their faces. They were not over ten paces distant.
This volley staggered them for a few minutes, as well it might, for
an uglier weapon to face at close quarters than those Springfield
smooth-bore muskets, even in the hands of raw troops, could not be
found in the entire army at that time.
Promptly faced about, the detachment was double-quicked back to the
battle line as fast as the mud and slippery condition of the road
would allow, for the rain had caused the Louisiana soil of that region
to assume the consistency of a sticky paste, so well known to all
campaigners in the Gulf Department. With this uncertain footing, the
close proximity of the enemy, fairly on their heels,[16] yelling and
firing, and the balance of the Federal force in line of battle also
opening fire, placing the detachment between two lines of fire, it is
remarkable that the casualties were so few at this time. Not a man was
taken prisoner. Major Morgans did not expect the detachment would be
able to get back, but reserved the One Hundred and Seventy-Sixth New
York fire as long as he dared, and then opened an oblique firing, to
prevent any harm to the detachment, if possible.
[16] One of the curious events of the action, which also proves
the close proximity of the enemy, was that a Confederate
lieutenant-colonel, mounted upon an iron-grey horse, who must have
distanced his men in the charge they made, got around and ahead, by
the flank, and led the Forty-Second detachment on its retreat to the
main line. This officer came in contact with men of the Twenty-Sixth
Massachusetts, who made him a prisoner, as related later on in this
chapter.
The Forty-Second detachment was not out as skirmishers, and did not
have that formation. It was on a special duty and had performed that
duty. No orders were given the lieutenant except to support the
field-gun. What had become of the pickets and outposts Lieutenant
Tinkham did not know. The enemy were upon him almost without warning,
for they had crept up in the tall grass on his front. In his official
report Lieutenant-Colonel Stickney says: “The enemy advanced rapidly
and soon compelled the pickets to fall back on the main line, which
they reached in rather a straggling condition at our left wing.” This
could not mean the detachment Forty-Second Massachusetts, for they did
nothing of the kind. The detachment ran in, maintaining as good an
alignment as the slippery soil would allow.
A ridiculous proceeding occurred just after the detachment reached
the line. A second-lieutenant, an acting staff-officer, came up in an
excited manner and ordered Lieutenant Tinkham to go back and retake
the abandoned gun. Tinkham replied he would see him d--d first, and to
go and get it himself. With the darkness, fire opened on the enemy in
front, the bad condition of the ground and the uncertainty just where
the gun was at that moment, made the undertaking foolhardy, without a
chance for success; in reality giving the enemy a present of so many
prisoners. It was another instance of that want of judgment in an
inexperienced officer, of which many examples were furnished in the
whole history of General “Dick” Taylor’s raid towards New Orleans.
After reaching the line the detachment was posted on the extreme left,
resting on the bayou and covering the road. Firing was continuate until
about eight o’clock. The artillery used canister; there not being
any canister for the 6 Pr. gun, packages of musket ammunition were
used instead. The infantry were ordered to fire by rank, and opened
in that manner, soon substituting firing at will. The smoke became
quite dense and would not lift readily, on account of the dampness of
the atmosphere. Nothing could be seen in front, not even flashes of
the enemy’s guns; nothing to be heard, except continued reports of
artillery and musketry-firing.
When the order was given “cease firing,” pickets were thrown out, and
the abandoned gun, near the rail fence, left by the enemy when they
withdrew, was brought in to the Federal lines. The wounded within
reach were carried to a field-hospital that had been established in a
planter’s house, about one-quarter of a mile in the rear. The Federals
rested upon their arms, remaining in line of battle all night, with
what sleep they could obtain under the circumstances. Moans and cries
of the wounded, well to the front, could be distinctly heard. Totally
destitute of provisions, and hungry, having been without food of any
consequence for forty-eight hours, worn out by loss of sleep and
fatigue, nothing but the excitement could have held the men up so long
and prevented them from breaking down completely.
That many of the Confederates were crazy drunk and in no condition
to continue a steady fight seems to be fully established by the
information obtained on Tuesday, when an advance to Thibodeaux was
made. They were capable of making a bold dash, but no more; repulsed,
they could not maintain a destructive fire. What firing came from their
side was wild and high, as the total casualties to the entire Federal
force engaged amply testifies.
Notwithstanding General “Dick” Taylor, in his book called “Destruction
and Reconstruction,” says that Colonel Major had no artillery with
him, they fired a few shots from one field-gun while Tinkham and his
men were at the rail fence. Whether they ceased firing because their
ammunition was bad or damaged by rain, or compelled to do so by shots
from a gun of the Twenty-Fifth New York Battery that was placed in
position upon the right to engage their gun, is not known. Prisoners
stated that they had other guns in position, but the rain prevented
their use.
There were many sensational stories told next day of what was done
along the line. Some men of the One Hundred and Seventy-Sixth New York
claimed to have performed special feats of valor. A careful inspection
of the ground in front soon put to flight all belief in these camp
yarns. The enemy never got dangerously close, except in a few
individual cases. An attempt made by them to gain the rear and turn the
right flank caused the gunners of the Twenty-Fifth New York Battery to
become panic stricken and abandon their gun, a 12 Pr. howitzer, posted
at the angle made by the front and right flank thrown in reverse. This
made two guns that the Twenty-Fifth New York artillery-men abandoned in
this action, though only one came into possession of the enemy.
The actual Federal force in this action was eight hundred and
thirty-eight men; about six hundred were engaged; the balance were
posted upon the railroad bridge and to protect the right. The Federal
loss in this action was: three killed, ten wounded, Twenty-Sixth
Massachusetts Infantry; two killed, twelve wounded, One Hundred
and Seventy-Sixth New York Infantry; one killed, three wounded,
Forty-Second Massachusetts Infantry; two killed, sixteen wounded,
Twenty-Third Connecticut Infantry.
Lieutenant Starr, Twenty-Third Connecticut, was the only commissioned
officer injured in the action. He was wounded in the thigh, and
afterwards died in consequence of amputation.
The force of Confederates engaged is estimated to have been six hundred
men of the Second Texas Mounted Rangers, Colonel Pyron, claiming to be
the oldest regiment in the Confederate service, and that they never
before had been whipped in action.
As General Taylor has published that only two hundred men under
Colonel Pyron made an attack on La-Fourche Crossing, the attack being
repulsed with a loss to the Confederates of only fifty-five killed
and wounded,[17] the official report of Lieutenant-Colonel Stickney
is again quoted: “The enemy were engaged during the night in carrying
away their killed and wounded who were outside of our lines, and the
following morning fifty-three of their dead were counted inside of our
pickets. When we entered Thibodeaux, Tuesday morning, nearly sixty
wounded were found in the hospitals, from which I conclude that their
loss in killed and wounded must have been three hundred, taking fifty
as the number of their killed, and reckoning the ratio of killed to
wounded as one to four.”
[17] General Taylor relies on the official report of Colonel Major
for this statement. As a specimen of Confederate reports on their
operations west of the Mississippi River during June and July, the
following _extract_ of Major’s report of this action is given:
“At Paincourtville received a despatch from Colonel Lane stating he had
captured the town, taking one hundred and forty prisoners and a large
amount of stores, also a small force at Terrebonne Station, and that
there was a force in strong position, with artillery, at La-Fourche
Crossing. I pushed on and arrived at Thibodeaux at 3.30 A.M.,
on the twenty-first. Pickets reported reënforcements from New Orleans
during the night, and at sun-up reported the enemy advancing. I posted
Pyron’s regiment, West’s battery and two squadrons cavalry on east
bank La-Fourche, and moved them down towards the railroad bridge.
Lane, Stone and Phillip were posted at Terrebonne Station, and they
were moved forward to La-Fourche Crossing. The enemy fell back, and
my pursuit was checked by one of the heaviest rains I ever saw fall.
It rained until five P.M., and having only thirty rounds
of ammunition to the man when I started, and not over one hundred
cartridge boxes in the entire command, my ammunition was nearly all
ruined, and I found myself with an enemy in front, rear, and on the
flank, with only three rounds of ammunition to the man. I directed
Pyron, as soon as it stopped raining, to strengthen his picket and feel
the enemy, find his position, and test his strength, giving him some
discretion in the matter. He advanced his picket, driving the enemy
into his stronghold, and then charged his works, taking four guns and
causing a great many of the Federals to surrender. But night had come
on; it was very dark, the ammunition nearly all gone, and just at that
moment a train with about three hundred fresh men arrived from New
Orleans, and Pyron was forced to retire from a position won by a daring
assault, unequalled, I think, in this war. Had I known his intention to
assault the works I could have sent him such reënforcements as would
have insured success. Pyron’s strength in the attack was two hundred
and six. The enemy’s force, reported by themselves, was over one
thousand.”
Some of these statements will cause a smile to spread o’er the face of
men on the Federal side who were in this action.
Probably this is not an exaggeration, but many of the wounded must have
been slightly so, not going into the hospitals, except for occasional
treatment, else a larger number would have been captured. They left
some badly wounded upon the field. One poor fellow was found bleeding
to death from wounds, in a trench not over fifty feet in front of the
line.
Whether Lieutenant-Colonel Stickney is correct or not, in regard to the
Confederate dead, Lieutenant Cooke, Twenty-Sixth Massachusetts, reports
the following facts, viz.: “On the morning of the twenty-second, when
a lookout, stationed upon a house, reported a flag of truce coming, I
happened to be standing near Stickney, who immediately turned to me and
said: ‘Meet them as far outside of our picket line as you possibly can,
and I will despatch another officer immediately to act as messenger.’
I was upon my horse instantly, and galloped up the bayou road, running
my sword-point through my handkerchief corners to make a flag of
truce, meeting the party so far from our lines as to cause, I fancied,
a shade of disappointment to pass over the face of an officer in
charge, which quickly changed to a smile as we drew rein and saluted;
he introduced himself as Captain Johnson, of Texas, and remarked that
it was a singular coincidence that both sides should start out at the
same time for a truce, and was much astonished when I said that I had
come to meet him, having seen him approaching. He stated that he was
sent by Colonel Major to ask permission to drive upon the battle field
with their wagons and carry away their dead. The request was carried
to Lieutenant-Colonel Stickney, who replied that it was impossible
to grant it, but if they would send their wagons to the point of
negotiation he would receive and return them to the same point loaded.
This was a necessity, for the majority of their dead lay so near
our battle line had they been permitted to come near they would have
gained an accurate knowledge of our position and numbers. Colonel Major
assented to this modification of his request, and wagons soon began to
arrive and the work went on. After the transfer was made I inquired
of those who were engaged in the work how many dead they found, and
was told one hundred and sixty. These are the figures written in my
diary at the time. I was also told that in one place fifteen bodies
were found in such close proximity as to justify the statement that
they were slain in a heap. At my interview with Captain Johnson, he
complimented our forces in very flattering terms for the courage and
steadiness with which they met and repelled the assault; that had it
been known we had such a large and well-disciplined force their action
would have been less hasty and impetuous.”
The ground was cut at regular intervals by irrigating ditches, a
probable reason why the enemy made their attack dismounted. These
ditches made the ground unfavorable for cavalry.
Two of the unwounded prisoners captured (sixteen in number) came in and
surrendered to Lieutenant Tinkham, after the firing had ceased. They
must have secreted themselves under the lee of the bayou bank.
The killed and wounded of the Forty-Second detachment were:
Private Reuben Dyson, Company E, wounded fatally in the abdomen and
hip, and died in a short time after he was carried to the rear. When
wounded he clasped both hands across his abdomen and exclaimed: “What
have I done that they should hit me!”
Sergeant Edmand A. Jones, Company B, was slightly wounded in the left
shoulder.
Private William Whiting, Company B, was wounded by a bullet in the
back of his neck which passed out of his mouth, taking three teeth in
its course.
Private Daniel S. Woodman, Company B, was wounded in the right hand,
losing one finger and part of the thumb joint; also, shot in the right
breast, the ball entering about two inches above the right nipple,
passed through the upper part of his lung and came out through the
shoulder blade.
Private Dyson was buried on the field at La-Fourche. Private Woodman,
too dangerously wounded to be removed, was left in an abandoned
planter’s house in care of an old planter. Woodman had lain upon the
field all night; was carried to the hospital about noon next day, where
his wounds were dressed by surgeons of the Twenty-Third Connecticut and
Twenty-Sixth Massachusetts. His clothes were removed, as they were very
bloody, and he lay naked almost a week, when a comrade procured some
old, ragged clothing for him. He was brought from La-Fourche July 31st,
and came home with the regiment.
Early on the morning of Monday, June 22d, the enemy were found to have
retired near to Thibodeaux. Among the debris picked up upon the field
was found some muskets that were identified as belonging to the three
companies Forty-Second, captured at Galveston. The wounded were cared
for and the Federal dead buried.
A Confederate flag of truce came with a request for permission to bury
their dead and carry away their wounded. This was granted on condition
that all of their wounded men outside the camp lines should be paroled,
that none of their drivers should come within the outposts, and that
all wounded within the camp should be retained. They agreed to these
conditions, and men were engaged throughout the morning, with carts and
wagons furnished by the enemy, in carrying their dead to Thibodeaux.
Very early in the morning there reached the crossing about six hundred
men Fifteenth Maine Infantry, Colonel Isaac Dyer, a fresh regiment
from Pensacola and Key West, under orders to reënforce the troops at
Brashear City, and about eleven o’clock Colonel Cahill arrived from New
Orleans with the Ninth Connecticut Infantry, two additional companies
Twenty-Sixth Massachusetts, and another section of the Twenty-Fifth
New York Battery. Colonel Cahill assumed command of the forces at
La-Fourche.
The men who comprised the detachment Forty-Second Massachusetts behaved
admirably in this, their maiden action, with the exception of Sergeant
Albert L. Clark and Private John Donnelly, both of Company B, who
attempted to desert from their comrades, without leave, and board a
train about to start for Algiers. They threw away their guns, and did
not report to the detachment until Tuesday.
Lieutenant Clifford was not in this action, as he rejoined the
detachment from leave of absence after the action was over.
Other men, attached to the several commands, showed the white feather,
and the official report of Lieutenant-Colonel Stickney says: “Their
wounded in our hands thought that our troops must be regulars, so
steadily did they stand at their posts; but I regret to say that the
train in waiting on the track left at the commencement of the fight,
without orders, carrying away some cowardly soldiers, and that during
the battle some few left their ranks and sought shelter near and behind
the railroad.”
Among those who left by this train was the Twenty-Sixth Massachusetts
color-bearer with his flag. He was ordered back to his regiment in
a peremptory manner by General Emory, commanding the Defences of
New Orleans. A word of defence is due this color-bearer. A brave,
honorable and worthy man; when the darkness came on he was ordered
by his commanding officer to retire from the line and remain with his
color at a house just to the rear. Those panic-stricken men who ran
away from the ranks passed this house towards the railroad, shouting:
“All is lost, the rebs are inside of our lines and gobbling up the
whole force.” He supposed it to be true, and animated with a desire to
save his flag also ran to the railroad, tearing his flag from the lance
to secrete it upon his person. He felt the disgrace keenly, suffered
mental agony, and died from the effect upon him in September following.
None of his comrades thought him guilty of cowardice, rather a victim
to circumstances, for he could not see the true situation.
Lieutenant-Colonel Stickney officially makes special mention of two
officers and one private. He says: “Major Morgans, commanding the
One Hundred and Seventy-Sixth New York Regiment, through the action
encouraged his men, and to him is due, in a great degree, the fine
conduct that they showed. Captain Jenkins, commanding the Twenty-Third
Connecticut, displayed the greatest bravery and coolness. A Confederate
officer seized him by the throat, demanding a surrender. The assault
was immediately returned in precisely the same manner, when one of
Captain Jenkins’ men bayoneted the Confederate. I desire particularly
to mention Sergeant John Allyn, Company A, Forty-Seventh Massachusetts
Regiment, who has been with me since I was ordered to Brashear City,
and has at all times rendered the most valuable service, going on
dangerous scouts, once inside the enemy’s lines, and showing at all
times the greatest courage and remarkable sound judgment. His thorough
knowledge of the country and habit of reporting facts only were of the
greatest assistance to me.”
Two companion incidents to the hand-to-hand scrape of Captain
Jenkins are these: Lieutenant Cooke, acting adjutant Twenty-Sixth
Massachusetts, the action still in progress, was startled by the sudden
appearance before him, inside of the battle line, of a Confederate
lieutenant-colonel, who said: “Captain, I am badly wounded, will you
be kind enough to take me to the rear.” The lieutenant informed him he
would do so, when he felt justified in taking men from the ranks to act
as a guard, and conducted the wounded officer to a tent, standing not
more than twenty yards to the rear, and saw him comfortably stretched
out upon the straw. After the action was over, with no prospect of its
renewal, Lieutenant Cooke went to this tent for his prisoner, to find
him gone, without a clew to be obtained of his whereabouts. On the
reconnoissance to Thibodeaux, twenty-third, this wounded officer was
found in hospital, and paroled. He stated that while lying in the tent
it occurred to him that in the darkness he might walk out of our lines,
and did so without difficulty.
Another case of foolhardy bravery was exhibited by a fiery Texan
lieutenant, who rushed up to a field-gun, placing his hand upon it, in
face of a dozen men, and demanded its surrender. Three men answered
him; one with a bayonet, one with a musket ball, the other with the
butt of his gun, to send him down to mother earth fatally wounded, and
with curses upon his lips of the men who did their duty. He was carried
to the hospital, and lived four hours.
No further hostile movement was made by either combatants on Monday,
except at about dark the Confederates fired a few rounds from one
field-gun. On Tuesday, June 23d, an advance was made to Thibodeaux by a
part of the troops, now commanded by Colonel Cahill, to find the enemy
had gone. Colonel Major with his Texans were well on their way towards
the rear of Brashear City. At night the Fifteenth Maine Infantry was
sent back to New Orleans.
Wednesday morning, June 24th, at eight o’clock, five companies
Ninth Connecticut, under Lieutenant-Colonel Fitzgibbon, proceeded
to Terrebonne Station as guard to a construction train, repairing
the track for one mile beyond. Proceeding towards Chucahoula, twelve
miles from Bayou Bœuff, the bridge, one mile from the station, was
found to be on fire. This was extinguished, and the bridge repaired.
Skirmishers were then deployed and advanced towards the station, where
the enemy was found on the open land, behind buildings and fences,
who at once commenced a sharp fire. Confined to the narrow track, a
thickly-wooded swamp upon both sides, after engaging the enemy for one
hour Lieutenant-Colonel Fitzgibbon deemed it prudent to retire, also
being recalled by a signal-gun fired at La-Fourche Crossing, nine miles
distant, which the lieutenant-colonel says he heard. The Federal loss
was three wounded, and two men taken prisoners by the enemy.
Port Hudson still holding out, with work enough in prospect to occupy
the attention of all the available forces in the Department, the troops
that composed the force under General Emory, charged with the defence
of New Orleans, reduced to a low number, and Brashear City lost, with
all of the troops on duty between that place and La-Fourche Crossing,
there existed no further necessity for holding the railroad line to
Brashear. The ill-luck experienced by General Emory in losing post
after post, through cowardice and inefficiency of regimental officers,
surrendering without firing a gun, was not assuring as to how far he
could trust the balance of his force. Prudence dictated to withdraw his
troops close to the city where protection of the navy could be given.
The Confederates pushed up from Brashear, bold and fearless,
offering many opportunities to inflict some hard blows against their
undisciplined troops if any equally bold officers had been with the
Federal soldiers. This was not the case, and on June 26th the Federal
force fell back to Boutee Station, twenty-four miles from Algiers,
after they had spiked and abandoned three field-guns and some old iron
guns; an absurd gift to the enemy, without any valid excuse.
With the energy displayed by the enemy, which the Federals did not meet
with counter efforts, it was undoubtedly sound policy to allow them to
dash against the fortified defences whenever they felt so disposed.
They moved quickly from place to place, leaving stragglers and scouting
squads occupying all of the roads in the region of country upon the
left bank held by them, looting where they could. Many of them could
easily have been bagged by small forces equally as bold; by so doing
thrown them into much the same state of uncertainty where to look for a
blow as existed among the Federal officers.
While at Boutee Station orders from Colonel Cahill directed the
Forty-Second detachment to be temporarily attached to the Fifteenth
Maine and to proceed to the Metairie race-course, in New Orleans,
where a camp was formed, comprised of detachments One Hundred and
Seventy-Sixth New York, Twenty-Third Connecticut and Fifteenth Maine,
with Grow’s battery; Lieutenant-Colonel Stickney in command of the
force. These orders were countermanded on the same day and the
detachment ordered to rejoin the regiment, then in New Orleans, and did
so June 29th, bringing under guard to the provost-marshal some sixty
prisoners taken at La-Fourche and vicinity.
On the thirtieth June the Federal force drew back to Jefferson Station,
eight miles from Algiers, where fortifications of a formidable
character were thrown up by large gangs of negroes. This station was
an outpost to the Defences of New Orleans for some weeks, with pickets
upon the roads and railroad line back to Algiers, and the river
patroled by gunboats between Company Canal and Donaldsonville.
While the Confederates under General Taylor raided on the various posts
in the Parishes between the Atchafalaya and the Mississippi Rivers,
picking up all scattered troops found, to send them on parole to New
Orleans, the garrison in the defences of the city was quite small.
General Banks had drawn all the men he dared to take in front of Port
Hudson, even bringing troops from Ship Island and Pensacola. To offset
this General Emory had all troops in the garrison, on whatever duty,
kept ready from the nineteenth June until all danger was over to move
readily at any moment with two days cooked rations and one hundred
rounds per man. The Second Brigade, Second Division, was concentrated
as far as possible; all passes or leaves of absence were absolutely
stopped; convalescent soldiers were got together and organized, and
colored regiments, recruited from intelligent blacks of the city, were
organized for sixty days service, under colored officers. In this
manner were sufficient troops obtained to do the needed garrison duty,
furnish required guards and patrol service, while the regular forces
attended to the extreme outposts. The First Texas Cavalry, Colonel
Davis, did all of the scouting service, under direct orders from
General Emory.
This action at La-Fourche Crossing must not be confounded with the
disastrous engagement of July 13th at Bayou La-Fourche, in which the
Forty-Eighth, Forty-Ninth and Thirtieth Massachusetts Regiments formed
a part of the Federal forces; Colonel Dudley in command.