"Assuredly not, sir. I detest the cold and barren name. It is a mere

negation. I want something positive. It is the part of a Christian to

believe--certainly not to deny."

"To be sure, Doctor, we are none of us Protestants; we are

Anglo-Catholics," said Araminta, answering for the feminine part of his

flock.

"I never viewed it in that light before," said Dr Smiler, looking

assuringly at Christina, who seemed greatly alarmed at what her father

might do. "Certainly religion is not a mere denial of error; it is far

more--an embracing of truth."

"There is no truth omitted in the faith of the Catholic Church," said

Mount Huxtable solemnly. "Some are more developed than they were at

first; and some, more recently planted, are even now in course of

growth, and, before many years elapse, will infallibly spread their

branches all over this barren land. But I will call on you to-morrow,"

he added, with a smile, and a bend of his head towards Christina, which

entirely barred up all the arguments that our Protestant champion might

have been inclined to advance. And in a short time the pic-nic came to

an end, and we all returned to Yawnham in the order we had come--always

excepting Mr Swallowlies, whom we overtook in the first half-mile,

still under his umbrageous sombrero, and still gesticulating with the

poker to guide his erratic calf.

LETTER FOURTH.

I had not sealed up the letter which I inclose to you herewith, my dear

Charles, and fortunately, as it turns out--for I have it now in my

power to tell you the conclusion of your machinations in this parish.

Three weeks have elapsed since the expedition to Holywell Tree. My

anger, I confess, with Dr Smiler was so hot that I never called at the

parsonage; and after the first Sunday I did not even go to church. The

communion-table is now surmounted by a gigantic crucifix--a cover of

bright velvet, with a golden star in the centre, hangs down to the

ground, while a vase of flowers stands on the middle of the table,

flanked at each side by immense candlesticks, with a candle of two or

three pounds' weight in each. There is a stone creding table, an eagle

at one side of the aisle in bronze, and the old recess in the porch is

cleared out, and a basin placed in it; but whether for the reception

of holy water or charitable pence I did not stop to inquire. There is

daily service at ten in the morning. The girls wear a regular uniform,

and call themselves Sisters of the Order of St Cecilia, and have

appointed Swallowlies their father confessor; and once or twice a-week,

I believe, he, or Rowdy, or Mount Huxtable, attends in the vestry, and

takes the young ladies, one by one, to a solitary conversation, with

the door locked. And the best of the affair is, that Tom Blazer and

his two military friends are as constant in their attendance as the

rest. But, with these exceptions, there is not a man to be seen in the

church, either on week-days or Sundays; for I am told that even John

Simpkins and Peter Bolt have struck for wages, and won't attend prayers

under half-a-crown a-week. So we have begun a subscription in the

parish for a district chapel; and in the mean time we stream off by the

hundred, either to the church or meeting-houses of the nearest parish.

Major M'Turk, I am sorry to say, has had many interviews with the

Reverend Mr Rowdy, and has become almost an infidel, with a leaning, if

anything, to the religion of the Buddhists in India, who fast, he says,

fifty times more, and go through a thousand times more painful penances

than either Puseyite or Papist.

This morning I was surprised to see Doctor Smiler coming up my garden

walk, as he used to do in the days of our friendship. He looked rather

downcast as he drew near the window, where I was busy getting my

fishing-flies in order, and coughed once or twice, as if to announce

his approach. I pretended not to hear him, and continued absorbed in

my lines and feathers; and, instead of coming in at the open door as

he has done for the last twenty years, he actually rang the bell, and

old Thomas had to bustle on his coat, and come out of the back-yard to

see who was there,--and I thought the old man's tone was a little sharp

when he announced Dr Smiler.

"How do you do, Doctor Smiler?" I said very courteously; "have the

kindness to be seated."

The Doctor sat down.

"Are you going to the brook to-day?" he inquired.

"Yes; if the wind holds, I shall try it for an hour or two this

evening. I hope Mrs Smiler is well."

"She is not well," he said.

"And Christina--Miss Christina?" I added, correcting myself.

"Dying," said the Doctor.

"Christina dying!" I exclaimed, starting up and taking the Doctor's

hand; "my dear Smiler, why didn't you tell us?--why didn't you send for

us?"

"I was ashamed, and that's the truth," said the Doctor. "Ah! Buddle,

you were wiser than I."

"How?--what? Is it that rascal Mount Huxtable?" I inquired.

"No doubt of it," replied Smiler. "He has ruined the happiness of my

daughter, turned away the hearts of my parishioners, and made me a

laughing-stock to the whole county."

"Is he not going to marry her, then?--did he not call on you after the

pic-nic?"

"No, he didn't call on me; but he consulted Christina's taste in all

things--got her to superintend the alterations in the church--the

candlesticks and flowers; he even asked her what style of paper she

liked for drawing rooms, and the poor girl expected every moment that

he would make a formal demand."

"It may come yet," I said, endeavouring to cheer him.

"It can't, my dear friend. I find he is married already."

"The villain!"

"He was an intimate friend of Charles Fustian," continued the Rector,

"and by his advice answered my advertisement for an anti-Tractarian

curate; by his advice also he concealed the fact of his marriage, and,

in the course of less than a month, see what he has done."

"He denied that he knew Charles Fustian."

"I accused him of the duplicity this morning, but he says it was for

the good of the flock; and as he is their shepherd for two years, he

has a greater interest in them than I."

"And how did he explain his speeches to Christina?"

"General observations," he says; "he wished her opinion on drawing-room

papers, and required her assistance in the interior arrangement of his

church."

"His church! the puppy! We shall petition the bishop."

"Of no use," said the Rector. "You will perceive, my dear Buddle,

that the generality of the bench are either very fond of power, and

flattered with Puseyite sycophancy; or anxious to keep pace with the

titled aristocracy, and very fond of 'gentility.' Now there is no

denying that the Tractarians are more polished men, and, as far as

the arts and refinements go, more cultivated men than the labouring

clergy generally, and therefore these two things keep them secure from

any authoritative condemnation--their truckling to their spiritual

superiors, and their standing in society. If Mount Huxtable had been a

vulgar fellow, though with the energy and holiness of St Paul,--if he

had stood up against his diocesan and vindicated his liberty, either

of speech or action, in the slightest degree--we could have hurled him

from the parish, probably into gaol, in spite of all the licenses in

the world; but I have no hope in this case."

"Then I have," I said, "for, from what you told me of the fellow's

hypocrisy, I have no doubt he was the very man who was received, as

they call it, into the Romish Church by Bishop Cunningham, three months

since."

"It is surely impossible, my dear Buddle; how could he officiate in our

church after being a professed papist?"

"Easily, my dear Smiler; it has very often been done, and is frequently

done at this moment. Take that account of the ceremony with you, and

tax him with it at once."

The Doctor folded up the paper, and went on,--

"But this is not all. How am I to atone to poor Mrs Blazer, and poor

Mrs Swainlove, for what has happened?"

"Why?--what has happened to the old ladies?"

"Jones has eloped with Araminta Blazer; and, in the same post-chaise,

Smith has carried off Tinderella Swainlove!"

"Why, they were almost professed unbelievers,--at least not at all

Tractarian."

"That doesn't matter. They are off, and what we have now to hope for

is--that they will go to Gretna Green. Young Pulser also has kicked Mr

Rowdy into the mill-pond, where he was nearly drowned, for something

or other he said or did to Priscilla Pulser at confession; and, to

complete the catalogue of woes, Mr Swallowlies has been arrested for

theft; for it appears that the calf which Janet Wheedler sold him was

not her own, but belonged to farmer Ruffhead."

What could I say to comfort the poor old rector under such a tremendous

cloud of calamity? The solitary glimpse of satisfaction, I confess,

which I individually caught from his narrative was, that Araminta had

shown the good taste to leave a friend of mine in the lurch. I will add

nothing to this letter, for I am hurrying off to assist the Doctor in

comforting his household, and recovering possession of his parish. How

we succeed in this, and what steps we take to regain the confidence

and affection of the flock, I shall not fail to inform you. Meanwhile,

reflect on all that has arisen from your introduction of these foreign

mummeries and superstitions into this quiet parish, and "how great

effects from little causes spring."--

Yours, &c.

T. BUDDLE.

AUSTRIA AND HUNGARY.

When Jellachich, on the 9th September 1848, passed the Drave, the

boundary of Croatia and of Hungary Proper, the war between Austria and

Hungary may be said to have commenced. Up to that time the hostilities

directed against Hungary had been confined to the attacks of her

revolted Sclavonic subjects in some parts of Croatia, and in the

counties on the Lower Danube. These revolts had been instigated, and

the attacks conducted, by officers in the Austrian service, who were

countenanced and aided by a party at the court, and who asserted that

they acted with the authority and in the interests of the Imperial

family. Still the emperor, on the demand of the Hungarian ministry,

had disavowed their proceedings. In May, he had publicly degraded

Jellachich from all his offices, as a rebel against the Hungarian

government. In July, he had formally announced to the diet, through his

representative the Archduke Palatine, his determination to maintain

the integrity of Hungary, and the laws he had sanctioned in April,

and repudiated, as a calumny, the assertion of Jellachich and the

other leaders of the revolt, that the emperor, or any other member of

the Imperial family, countenanced their proceedings. It is true that

Jellachich and another of these leaders had subsequently been received

by the emperor-king, and by several members of the Imperial family, in

a manner hardly consistent with their position as rebels; yet it was

possible that his majesty might still listen to other counsels--might

still resolve to pursue a constitutional course, and to preserve his

own faith inviolate. Even so late as the 9th September--the day on

which Jellachich passed the Drave--he solemnly renewed his promise to

maintain the integrity of Hungary and the laws of April. But upon the

4th September he had reinstated Jellachich in all his offices, civil

and military, knowing that he was then at the head of an army on the

frontiers of Hungary, preparing to invade that kingdom, and to force

the Hungarians to renounce the concessions made to them in April by

their king. It appeared that the Ban had been supplied with money and

with arms from Vienna while he was still nominally in disgrace, and

he was joined by Austrian regiments, which had marched from Southern

Hungary to put themselves under his orders. His advance, therefore, at

the head of an army composed of Austrian regiments and Croat forces,

was truly an invasion of Hungary by Austria.

The Hungarian forces collected to resist this invasion were still

without a commander-in-chief or a staff--without sufficient arms or

ammunition, and for the most part without military discipline or

organisation. We have already mentioned that, on the restoration of the

Ban to his offices and command, the Hungarian ministry resigned; but

Mazaros, minister of the war department, Kossuth, minister of finance,

and Szemere, minister of the interior, continued provisionally to

perform the duties of their offices. Their measures were so energetic,

that the Palatine called upon Count Louis Bathyanyi, the head of the

late ministry, to form another government. This step was approved

at Vienna; and Bathyanyi undertook the duty on the condition that

Jellachich should be ordered to retire, and, if he refused, should

be proclaimed a traitor. The king required a list of the proposed

ministry, which was immediately presented; but a week or more elapsed,

during which no answer was received, and during which Jellachich

continued to advance towards the capital of Hungary. The Palatine, at

the request of the diet, and after the measure had been approved by

the king, took command of the Hungarian troops opposed to the Ban,

which were then retiring upon Buda. Both parties, the invaders and the

invaded, appeared at this time to be countenanced by the Emperor of

Austria and King of Hungary; and the diet, while preparing for defence,

seems not to have relinquished all hope of a peaceful arrangement. The

Archduke Stephen, after joining the army, and hastily organising it,

opened communications with the Ban, and arranged a meeting in boats on

the Lake Balaton: but Jellachich did not keep his appointment; and the

Archduke Palatine, summoned to Vienna by the emperor, left the army,

passed through Pesth on his way to Vienna, and on his arrival there, as

we formerly stated, resigned the office of palatine. Shortly afterwards

he retired to his private residence on the Rhine.

Count Louis Bathyanyi, whose conditions had not yet been either

accepted or rejected, was thus left alone to carry on the whole

government; and the diet, for the purposes both of aiding and

controlling the administration of the minister, named a committee

of their number, called the "Committee of Defence," to assist in

conducting the government.

Jellachich had now established himself at Stuhlweissenberg, four or

five marches from Pesth; and the government at Vienna appears to have

anticipated that Hungary, left without a government, must fall into

confusion. But she preserved her loyal and constitutional attitude; and

while she was prepared to repel force by force, gave no pretext for

employing it. Count L. Bathyanyi was at length informed that his list

of the new ministry was not approved; and by an ordinance dated 25th

September, General Count Francis Lamberg was appointed to the command

of all the troops in Hungary, with power to restore order and to close

the diet. The time had arrived which the Hungarians had been most

desirous to avert, when they must either surrender their constitutional

rights or resist their king.

The murder of Count Lamberg by a frantic mob threw the diet into a

state of consternation. The regiment on which it most relied was the

regiment of Lamberg, and the Ban was at the gates of Buda. The diet

passed resolutions expressing its profound grief at the unhappy fate

of the count, and ordered criminal proceedings to be immediately

instituted against his murderers. The patriotism of the soldiers was

not shaken by the horrible event that had occurred; and they displayed

their wonted gallantry on the 29th, when the Ban was repulsed.

Immediately after the murder of General Lamberg, Count Louis Bathyanyi

resigned. There was now neither palatine nor minister in the kingdom,

and the enemy was about to attack the capital. In this emergency the

Committee of Defence, at the head of which was Louis Kossuth, took upon

itself the direction of affairs; and since that time it has governed

Hungary.

After the defeat of Jellachich, while he was on the frontiers of

Austria, followed by the Hungarian army, the king named Count Adam

Ricsay prime-minister, and by a new ordinance, countersigned Ricsay,

the diet was dissolved, its decrees annulled, and Jellachich appointed

commander-in-chief of all the troops in Hungary. The civil authorities

were suspended, and the country declared in a state of siege. At the

same time Jellachich was named royal commissioner, and invested with

executive power over the whole kingdom.

From the moment of Jellachich's nomination to the office of Ban of

Croatia, without the consent of the responsible Hungarian ministry, his

concert with a party hostile to Hungary at the imperial court had not

been doubtful; and that party had now prevailed upon the emperor-king

to adopt their views. The influence of the Ban was not shaken by

his defeat. The court had previously identified itself with his

proceedings, and he had faithfully, though not hitherto successfully,

espoused its cause. He had declared against the laws of April and the

separate ministry in Hungary, which these laws had established, and in

favour of a central government at Vienna for the whole dominions of

the emperor, which he proposed to force the Hungarians to accept. He

was no longer a Croat chief, asserting the national pretensions of his

countrymen, but an Austrian general, assailing the constitution and

the independence of Hungary. From the position at Raab, on the road to

Vienna, to which he had retreated after his reverse, he applied for

reinforcements to enable him again to advance towards Pesth. It was

the refusal of these reinforcements to march that led to the second

revolution at Vienna, which has been attributed to Hungarian agency.

It is probable that the Hungarians would employ all the influence

they could command to prevent or impede the march of troops to attack

them; but it is remarkable that the prosecutions of persons engaged

in that revolution do not appear to have elicited anything that would

justify us in attributing the revolt of the Viennese to the Hungarians.

Attempts have also been made to implicate the Hungarians in the

atrocious murder of Latour, the minister of war, by the insurgents of

Vienna, but we have not been able to trace any foundation for such

a charge. The Hungarians were formidable enemies, and to them every

atrocity was attributed.

The Emperor of Austria was now at war with Hungary, and his enemies,

therefore, became her allies. The revolutionary party at Vienna for a

time regained the ascendency, and signalised it by the crime to which

we have referred. After Windischgratz and Jellachich had invested the

city, the Viennese applied to the Hungarians for aid; but their levies

and national guards had returned in great numbers to their homes, and

their army was not in a condition to make any impression upon that of

the emperor. It advanced, and was repulsed. The Austrian government, by

allying itself with rebellion and anarchy to subvert the established

constitution of Hungary, had driven the Hungarians, in self-defence,

into an alliance with the revolutionary party in Vienna against the

government.

The error into which it had been led ought now to have been manifest to

the Austrian cabinet; and it was not yet too late to remedy the evil.

By returning to the course of legality and good faith, the Imperial

government might have disarmed and regained Hungary. If there was

in that country, as there no doubt was, a party which was disposed

to sympathise with the republicans, and even with the worst of the

anarchists in Austria, they were without power or influence, and

their evil designs would at once have been frustrated, their opinions

repudiated, and the loyalty of the nation confirmed; but the court

had unfortunately placed itself in a position that left it but the

choice of abandoning and breaking faith with the rebels to Hungary,

whose eminent services at Vienna it was bound to acknowledge, or of

persevering in the breach of faith with Hungary, which his advisers had

forced upon the emperor-king. That the Hungarians had been ready to

support the cause of monarchy and order, so long as faith had been kept

with them, was put beyond all question by the vote of the diet, which,

on the motion of the responsible Hungarian ministry formed in April,

had placed forty thousand Hungarian troops at the disposal of the

emperor, for service in Italy, "to preserve the honour of the Austrian

arms," then endangered by the first reverses of Marshal Radetski. The

Wessemberg ministry appears to have contemplated restoring the king of

Hungary and his subjects to their legal and constitutional relations,

for it issued a circular declaring that the king intended to fulfil

the engagements he had entered into in April. But the power of the

minister was subordinate to that of a party at the court, whose views

were opposed to his own; and the acts of the government were not such

as to restore confidence in its sincerity, at all times a difficult

task for a government that has justly forfeited the confidence of a

whole nation. Hungary did not dare to suspend her preparations for

resistance; and the second revolution at Vienna, by occupying the

troops destined to attack her, gave her time to improve her means of

defence.

Had there been at Vienna a government capable of inspiring confidence

in its sincerity--a government possessing power or influence enough to

carry out conciliatory measures, to fulfil the engagements it might

contract--the differences between Austria and Hungary might still have

been amicably adjusted, by restoring the constitutional government

established in April. All the bloodshed and misery that has ensued, and

all the evils that may yet follow from the war, would thus have been

averted. But irresponsible advisers had more influence at the court

than the ostensible cabinet, and were blindly bent on returning to the

irretrievable past. They founded their hopes upon the devotion of that

noble army which had re-established order in Austria, and which, if

employed only to maintain order and the just rights of the monarchy,

would have encountered no opposition that it could not overcome.

Hungary, cordially reunited to Austria under the same sovereign, would

again have become, what the Emperor Francis declared it to be, "the

chief bulwark of the monarchy;" and the empire would have resumed its

position as the guardian of peace and order in Eastern Europe, and a

powerful support to the cause of constitutional monarchy and rational

liberty everywhere.

Unhappily for the Austrian empire, for Europe, and for "the good

cause," evil counsels prevailed, and Hungary was again invaded. Many

of the leading magnates adhered to the court, at which they had spent

their lives, and which was in fact their home. But there was hardly

a great family of which some wealthy and influential members did not

declare for their native country. A great majority of the resident

aristocracy--the numerous class of resident country gentlemen, almost

without exception--the body of inferior nobles or freeholders--the

peasant-proprietors and the labouring population, espoused the cause of

Hungary. The Protestant clergy in the Majjar country, to a man, and the

Roman Catholic clergy of Hungary in a body, urged their flocks to be

patient and orderly, to obey the government charged with the defence of

the country, and to be faithful and valiant in defending it.

The attacks of Jellachich, and of that portion of the Croats and

Serbes which had declared against Hungary, had failed to bring about

the submission of the diet, and had produced an alliance, dangerous

to the court, between its enemies in the Hereditary States and the

Hungarians, with whom it was now at war. The national assembly or

congress that met at Vienna was tainted with republican notions, and

divided into factions, influenced for the most part by feelings of

race. German unity, Sclave ascendency, and Polish regeneration, were

the ultimate objects of many of those who talked of liberty, equality,

and fraternity. The discussion of the constitution revealed the

discord in their opinions, and they seemed to agree in nothing but the

determination to overturn the ancient system of the empire.

Wearied by contentions, in which his character and feelings unfitted

him to take a part; distracted by diverse counsels; involved by a

series of intrigues, from which he could not escape, in conflicting

engagements; dreading the new order of things, and diffident of his own

ability to perform the duties it demanded of him, the Emperor Ferdinand

abdicated; and by a family arrangement the crown of Austria was

transferred, not to the next heir, but to the second in succession. The

crown of Hungary, as we formerly stated, had been settled by statute

on the heirs of the House of Hapsburg; but no provision had been made

for the case which had now arisen. The Hungarians held that their king

had no power to abdicate; that so long as he lived he must continue

to be their king; that if he became incapable of performing the regal

functions, the laws had reserved to the diet the power to provide for

their due performance; that the crown of Hungary was settled by statute

on the heirs of the House of Hapsburg, and the Emperor Francis Joseph

was not the heir. The laws of Hungary required that her king should be

legitimately crowned according to the ancient customs of the kingdom,

and should take the coronation oath before he could exercise his rights

or authority as sovereign. If he claimed the crown of Hungary as his

legal right, he was bound to abide by the laws on which that right was

founded. But these laws required that he should be crowned according

to the customs of Hungary, and that he should bind himself by a solemn

oath to maintain the constitution and the laws, including those passed

in March, sanctioned and put into operation in April 1848. In short,

that he should concede what Hungary was contending for.

The abdication of the Emperor Ferdinand, and the accession to

the Imperial throne of his youthful successor, presented another

opportunity of which the Austrian government might have gracefully

availed itself, to terminate the differences with Hungary. The young

emperor was fettered by no engagements, involved in none of the

intrigues that entangled his unwary predecessor, and entailed so great

evils upon the country. He was free to take a constitutional course

in Hungary, to confirm the concessions which had been voluntarily

made, and which could not now be recalled--to restore to the Imperial

government a character for good faith; and thus to have won the hearts

of the Hungarians. Supported by their loyal attachment to their king,

he might have peacefully worked out the reforms in the government

of his empire which the times and the circumstances demanded or

justified. But Count Stadion, the real head of the new ministry,

though possessed of many eminent qualities as a statesman, was deeply

imbued with the old longing after unity in the system of government:

he hoped to effect, by means of a constitution devised and framed for

that purpose, the amalgamation of the different parts of the empire,

which abler men had failed to accomplish under an absolute monarchy,

in circumstances more favourable to success. The opposition that was

inevitable in Hungary he proposed to overcome by force of arms; and,

at a moment when a desire for separate nationality was the predominant

feeling in the minds of all the different races in the empire, he had

the hardihood to imagine that he could frame a constitution capable

of overcoming this desire, and of fusing them all into one. It was

considered an advantage that the emperor, unfettered by personal

engagements to Hungary, was free to prosecute its subjugation, to

subvert its constitution, and to force the Hungarians to accept in its

place the constitution of Count Stadion, with seats in the Assembly

at Vienna for their representatives, under one central government for

the united empire. This may have been a desirable result to obtain; it

might, if attainable, have been ultimately conducive to the strength of

the empire and the welfare of all classes; but it was not to claim the

hereditary succession to a throne secured and guarded by statutes--it

was rather to undertake the conquest of a kingdom.

Windischgratz and Jellachich occupied Pesth without opposition, set

aside the constituted authorities, and governed the country, as far as

their army extended, by martial law. The Committee of Defence retired

beyond the Theis to Debreczin, in the heart of the Majjar country, and

appealed to the patriotism of the Hungarians. The army was rapidly

recruited, and was organised in the field, for the campaign may be

said to have endured throughout the whole winter. From time to time it

was announced from Vienna that the war was about to be terminated by

the advance of the imperial army, and the dispersion or destruction

of _Kossuth's faction_. The flight of Kossuth, and his capture as a

fugitive in disguise, were reported and believed. The delay in the

advance of the imperial army was attributed to the rigour of the

season and the state of the roads; and, when these impediments no

longer existed, to the incapacity of Windischgratz, who was roughly

handled by the government press of Vienna. The true cause was carefully

concealed. The resistance was not that of a faction, but of a nation.

That fact has been fully established by the events in this unfortunate,

unnecessary, and unnatural war.

The Austrian armies employed in Hungary have probably exceeded one

hundred and fifty thousand regular troops, aided by irregular bands

of Croats and Serbes, and latterly by a Russian corps of ten thousand

men. They established themselves both in Transylvania and in Hungary,

and were in possession of the whole of the fertile country from the

frontiers of Austria to the Theis, which flows through the centre of

the kingdom. From Transylvania, both the Austrian and the Russian

forces have been driven into Wallachia. From the line of the Theis

the imperial army has been forced across the Danube, on which they

were unable to maintain their positions. The sieges of Komorn and

Peterwardein, the two great fortresses on the Danube, of which the

capture or surrender has so often been announced, have been raised;

and the question is no longer whether Debreczin is to be occupied by

the Emperor's forces, but whether Vienna is safe from the Hungarians.

Opposed to the admirable army of Austria, these results could not have

been obtained unless the great body of the nation had been cordially

united, nor even then, unless by a people of great energy, courage, and

intelligence.

Had the government of Austria known how to win the hearts of the

Hungarians for their sovereign--had they but preserved the good faith

and the sanctity of the monarchy in Hungary, how secure and imposing

might the position of the Emperor have now been, in the midst of

all the troubles in Germany! Hungary desired no revolution; she had

peacefully obtained, by constitutional means, all she desired. Her

revolution had been effected centuries ago; and, with indigenous

institutions, to which her people were warmly attached, she would have

maintained, as she did maintain, her internal tranquillity and her

constitutional monarchy, whatever storms might rage around her.

The resources that Hungary has put forth in this contest have surprised

Europe, because Europe had not taken the trouble to calculate the

strength and the resources of Hungary. With a compact territory, equal

in extent to Great Britain and Ireland, or to Prussia, and the most

defensible frontier of any kingdom on the continent of Europe; with a

population nearly equal to that of England, and not much inferior to

that of Prussia;[6] with a climate equal to that of France, and soil

of greater natural fertility than any of these; with a representative

government long established, and free indigenous institutions,

which the people venerate; with a brave, energetic, and patriotic

population, predisposed to military pursuits, jealous of their national

independence, and of their personal liberty--ambitious of military

renown, proud of their traditionary prowess, and impressed with an

idea of their own superiority to the surrounding populations--Hungary,

as all who know the country and the people were aware, would be found

a formidable antagonist by any power that might attack her. But,

paradoxical and incredible as it may appear, we believe it is not the

less true, that, little as Hungary was known in most of the countries

of Europe, there was hardly a capital, in that quarter of the globe,

where more erroneous notions regarding it prevailed than in Vienna. In

other places there was ignorance; in the capital of Austria there was

the most absurd misapprehension. Though generally a calm, sensible man,

possessing a considerable amount of general information, an Austrian,

even after he has travelled, appears to be peculiarly incapable of

understanding a national character different from his own: this is true

even in respect to other Germans; and neither the proximity of the

countries, nor the frequent intercourse of their inhabitants, seems

to have enabled him to form any reasonable estimate of the Hungarian

character or institutions. We might adduce curious evidence of this

ignorance, even in persons of distinction; but we shall content

ourselves with quoting Mr Paget's observations on the subject, in June

1835:--

[6] The extent of Hungary, including Transylvania, is above 125,000

square miles; that of Great Britain and Ireland is 122,000, and that of

Prussia about 116,000. The population of Hungary, according to the best

authorities, is nearly fourteen millions; that of England (in 1841) was

nearly fifteen millions; that of Prussia about sixteen millions.

"The reader would certainly laugh, as I have often done

since, did I tell him one half of the foolish tales the good

Viennese told us of the country we were about to visit--no

roads! no inns! no police! We must sleep on the ground, eat

where we could, and be ready to defend our purses and our

lives at every moment. In full credence of these reports, we

provided ourselves most plentifully with arms, which were

carefully loaded, and placed ready for immediate use.... It

may, however, ease the reader's mind to know, that no occasion

to shoot anything more formidable than a partridge or a hare

presented itself, and that we finished our journey with the

full conviction, that travelling in Hungary was just as safe as

travelling in England.

Why, or wherefore, I know not, but nothing can exceed the

horror with which a true Austrian regards both Hungary and its

inhabitants. I have sometimes suspected that the bugbear with

which a Vienna mother frightens her squaller to sleep must be

an Hungarian bugbear; for in no other way can I account for

the inbred and absurd fear which they entertain for such near

neighbours. It is true, the Hungarians do sometimes talk about

liberty, constitutional rights, and other such terrible things,

to which no well-disposed ears should be open, and to which the

ears of the Viennese are religiously closed."

There were, no doubt, elements of discord in Hungary, of which Austria,

on former occasions as well as now, took advantage; but their value to

her in the present war has been greatly overrated. The population of

the kingdom, like that of the empire, is composed of various races,

amongst which there are differences of language, religion, customs,

and sentiments. Of the 14,000,000 of people who inhabit Hungary,

not more than 5,000,000 are Majjars, about 1,262,000 are Germans,

2,311,000 Wallacks, and, of the remaining 5,400,000, nine-tenths or

more are Sclaves. The Sclaves are therefore as numerous as the Majjars;

and, although these races had at all times combined against foreign

enemies, it was probable that they would not unite in a domestic

quarrel, as that with Austria might be considered. When a great part

of the colonists of the military frontier, chiefly Croats and Serbes,

took part against the government of Hungary, and asserted a Sclave

nationality as opposed to the Hungarian nationality, it was too hastily

assumed, by persons imperfectly informed, that the whole Sclavonic

population, equalling the Majjars in number, would be available to

Austria in the war. But the Sclaves of Hungary are a disunited race,

divided into nine different tribes, the greater part of which have

nothing in common except their origin. Most of these tribes speak

languages or dialects which are mutually unintelligible; and the

Sclaves of different tribes are sometimes obliged to use the Majjar

tongue as their only means of communication. Some belong to the Roman

Catholic Church, some to the Greek; others are Protestants--Lutheran

or Calvinist: and some, while they have submitted to the see of

Rome, retain many of their Greek forms and services, adhere to the

Greek calendar, and constitute a distinct communion. The Slovacks of

Northern Hungary, numbering 1,600,000, are partly Roman Catholics,

partly Protestants--and have no intercourse or community of language

or feeling with the Sclaves of Southern and Western Hungary, from whom

they are separated by the intervention of the Majjar country. The

Ruthenes, also in Northern Hungary, are distinct from the Slovacks,

occupy a different portion of the slopes and spurs of the Carpathians,

and have no connexion with the Sclaves on the right bank of the Danube,

from whom they are separated by the whole breadth of Hungary and

Transylvania at that point--they amount to about 400,000. The Croats,

not quite 900,000 in number, are partly Roman Catholics and partly

belong to the Greek Church. When religious toleration was established

in Hungary, they exercised the power enjoyed by the provincial assembly

to exclude Protestants from the country. The Shocks of Sclavonia

Proper, and the Rasciens of that province and of the Banat, amounting

respectively to above 800,000, and nearly half a million, are tribes of

the Serbe stock, of whom the greater part adhere to the Greek Church,

and whose language is different from that of the Croats, the Slovacks,

and the Ruthenes. The Bulgarians, about 12,000, the Montenegrins, about

2000, and the Wends from Styria, about 50,000, are small distinct

tribes, speaking different languages, and divided by religious

differences. But the whole of these Sclavonic tribes have this in

common, that they are all animated by a feeling of hatred to the German

race; and more than half of the Sclave population of Hungary has joined

the Hungarians against Austria.

There was also a belief that the Hungarians had oppressed the Sclaves,

and that the whole Sclave race would therefore combine to put down

their oppressors. This was another misapprehension. Great efforts have

been made by some of their poets and their journalists to persuade

the Sclaves that they were oppressed; and the Croat newspapers and

pamphlets of M. Gay, and the Austrian journals, have circulated this

belief over Germany, whence it was disseminated over Europe; but there

seems to have been no foundation for the charge. The Sclaves enjoyed

the same rights and privileges as the Hungarians; they were protected

by the same laws; they have shared equally with the Hungarians in all

the concessions obtained by the Diet of Hungary, to which the Sclaves

sent their own representatives, from the sovereign; they bore less than

their due proportion of the public burdens, and they were left in the

enjoyment of their own internal and municipal administration. Croatia,

where the movement in favour of what was called Illyrian nationality

originated fifteen or sixteen years ago, and where it was fostered,

curiously enough, by the patronage of two imperial governments--Croatia

does not appear to have any reason to complain of Hungarian oppression.

The Croats had their own provincial assembly or diet, which regulated

the internal affairs of the province, their own county assemblies,

their own Ban or governor, they elected their own county and municipal

officers; a great part of the province was organised as a part of

the military frontier, and was therefore removed from the control of

the Hungarian Diet, and brought more directly under the authorities

at Vienna. The only specific charge, so far as we have been able to

discover, that they brought against the Hungarians was, that the

Majjars desired to impose their language upon the Croats. The history

of the matter is this,--Latin had been the language of public business,

of debates, and of the decisions of courts of law in Hungary, till

the attempt of Joseph II. to substitute the German excited a strong

national movement in favour of the Majjar. From 1790 this movement

has been persevered in with the greatest steadiness; and in 1830 an

act was passed by the Diet, and sanctioned by the king, which decreed

that, after the 1st of January 1844, no one could be named to any

public office who did not know the Majjar. This completed the series

of measures which substituted that language for the Latin, a language

unintelligible to the great body of the people. If a living was to

be substituted for a dead language, no other than the Majjar could

well be selected. Besides being greatly more numerous than any other

tribe speaking one language, the Majjars were the wealthiest, the most

intelligent and influential; and their language was spoken not only by

their own race, but by a large proportion of the other inhabitants of

the country--probably by six or seven times as many persons as used

any other Hungarian dialect. The Croats, whose language was not that

of any other tribe, could not expect it to be chosen, and all that was

required of them to employ the Majjar where they had hitherto employed

the Latin language, and nowhere else. The county of Agram, the most

important and populous of the three counties of Croatia, repudiated

the notion of a separate Illyrian nationality, of which, however, the

county town was the centre; and clung to Hungary as the safeguard

of its liberty. The truth is that the Croats, of whose hostility to

the Hungarians we have heard so much, are nearly equally divided

between Hungary and Austria; and, but for the military organisation

which places so large a portion of that people at the disposal of

Austria--and that the most formidable portion--the agitators for

Illyrian nationality would probably have been put down by their own

countrymen. The Slovacks, a people of Bohemian origin, refugees from

religious persecution, have joined the Hungarians. A great part of

the people of Sclavonia Proper have refused to take part against

Hungary. The tribes that have engaged most extensively and violently

in hostilities against the Hungarians have been the people of Servian

race, and of the Greek church, in the counties of the Lower Danube, and

in Croatia. Amongst the Hungarian Sclaves of the Greek church, it is

well known that foreign influence has long been at work, for which the

Greek priesthood are ready instruments. The hopes of these tribes have

been turned towards the head of their church, and the sympathies of

thirty millions of Eastern Sclaves who belong to the same church.

Though feelings of nationality and of race have been developed in

Hungary, as elsewhere, to an extent hitherto unexampled, they have

there to contend with the craving for liberty, which has at the same

time acquired intensity, and which amongst the Sclaves has been

fostered and inflamed by the efforts of those who, for the purpose of

exciting them against the Majjars, would persuade them that they were

the victims of oppression. The more intelligent and influential are now

convinced, that it is to Hungary--to which they owe the liberty they

enjoy--and not to anarchy, or to Austria, against the attacks of whose

government Hungary has so long defended their freedom and her own, that

they must look for advancement.

The relative positions of the peasants and the nobles, and the

antagonism of these classes, enabled Austria to exercise great

influence and even power in Hungary. The peasant population, amounting

to three millions or more, now emancipated from their disabilities

and exclusive or disproportionate burdens, and raised to the rank and

wealth of freeholders and proprietors, by the liberality of the nobles,

have an equal interest with them in defending the institutions to which

they owe their elevation.

The elements of discord, although they were such as enabled agitators

to raise a part of the Sclaves against the Hungarians, when it was

resolved to retract the concessions that had been made to them,

would hardly have been found available for that purpose, had not the

instigators of the revolt acted in the name of the King of Hungary,

and of more than one imperial government; nor even then, perhaps, had

they not been enabled to dispose of the resources of the military

frontier. Now that the Hungarians have obtained important successes, it

is probable that the Sclaves will all join them. The movement of these

tribes against the Hungarians, which was caused by other influences

in addition to that of Austria, has thus tended to lead the imperial

government into hostility with Hungary, without contributing much to

its strength.

When the Austrian government resolved to subjugate Hungary, it was

presumed that they undertook the conquest of that country relying on

their own resources. But the success of the enterprise was so doubtful,

and a failure so hazardous to the empire, that we never could believe

it possible that it had been undertaken without an assurance of

support. It is true that the imperial government might at that time

have expected an adjustment of their differences with Sardinia; but

Venice still held out, peace with Sardinia had not been concluded,

the state of Italy was daily becoming more alarming, and the Austrian

cabinet knew that they could maintain their hold of Lombardy, and

reduce Venice, only by means of a powerful army. They were aware that

the condition of Galicia, and even of Bohemia, was precarious, and that

neither could safely be denuded of troops. The state of affairs in

Germany was not such as to give them confidence, still less to promise

them support; and the attitude they assumed towards the assembly at

Frankfort, though not unworthy of the ancient dignity of Austria,

was not calculated to diminish her anxiety. Even in the Hereditary

States all was not secure. They were aware that old sentiments and

feelings had been shaken and disturbed; that, although order had for

the time been restored, by the fidelity and courage of the army,

men's minds were still unsettled; and that, both in the capital and

in the provinces, there were factions whose sympathies were not with

the imperial government, and which, in case of disasters, might again

become formidable. The capital alone required a garrison of twenty

thousand men, to keep it in subjection--to preserve its tranquillity.

Putting aside, therefore, every consideration as to the justice of the

war, and looking merely to its probable consequences, it is obvious

that, without such a preponderance of power and resources as would

not only insure success, but insure it at once--by one effort--it

would have been madness in Austria, for the purpose of forcing her

constitution upon the Hungarians, to engage in a contest in which

she staked her power--her existence--and which could not fail to be

dangerous to her if it became protracted.

Let us then examine the resources of both parties, and see what was

the preponderance on the side of Austria, which would justify her in

undertaking so hazardous an enterprise, on the supposition that she

relied solely on her own resources.

The Austrian empire contains a population of 36,000,000; of these about

7,000,000 are Germans--about 15,500,000 are Sclaves,--nearly 8,000,000

are of Italian and Dacian races, and about 5,600,000 of Asiatic

races, including 5,000,000 of Majjars. If from these 36,000,000 we

deduct the population of Hungary, 14,000,000, of Lombardy and Venice,

4,876,000--or, together, nearly 19,000,000, hostile to Austria--and

the population of Galicia, 4,980,000, which did not contribute to

her strength, to say nothing of Bohemia or Vienna, or Crakow, there

will remain to Austria, to carry on the war, only 12,144,000. But,

as probably two millions of the Sclaves and other tribes of Hungary,

including the military frontier, may have been reckoned as on her

side, that number may be deducted from Hungary and added to Austria.

There will then remain to Hungary a population of 12,000,000,

concentrated in their own country for its defence, and to Austria about

14,000,000, whose military resources must be distributed over her whole

dominions--from the frontiers of Russia to those of Sardinia, from the

frontiers of Prussia to the confines of Turkey--to re-establish her

authority in Lombardy, to reduce Venice to submission, to hold the

Sardinians and the Italian republicans in check, to control and overawe

Galicia and Crakow, to garrison Vienna and maintain tranquillity at

home, and, finally, to conquer 12,000,000 of Hungarians. It is true

she had a noble army, and Hungary then had almost none, except such

levies as she had hastily raised, and which were as yet without skilful

commanders. But Austria knew by experience the difficulties and hazards

of a war in Hungary. Her government must have known the resources of

the country, the courage and patriotism of its inhabitants, and the

success that had attended their resistance to her forces on more than

one former occasion. Surrounded by difficulties at home, in Italy, and

in Germany, with full one half of the population of the empire hostile

to the government, she was undertaking an enterprise which her forces,

in circumstances far more favourable to success, had repeatedly failed

to accomplish.

Reviewing the whole of these considerations, therefore, we hold it

to be quite incredible that the Austrian government, having the

alternative of restoring peace, by permitting the King of Hungary to

fulfil his engagements to his subjects, could have preferred a war

for the subjugation of Hungary, if she had relied solely on her own

resources, or followed only her own impulses and the dictates of her

own interest. We cannot doubt that she was assured of foreign aid--that

her resolution to make war upon Hungary, rather than keep faith with

her, was adopted in concert with the power by which that aid was to

be furnished. If this inference be just, we may find in that concert

a reason for the extraordinary accumulation of Russian troops in

Wallachia and Moldavia, which appeared to threaten the Ottoman Porte,

but which also threatened Hungary, where the only corps that has been

actively employed found occupation. The feeling of Germany made it

unsafe to bring Russian troops into Austria; but the massing of Russian

troops in the Danubian principalities of Turkey excited no jealousy

in Germany. Austria, too, shrinking instinctively from the perils of

Russian intervention, while in reliance on that support she pursued a

bold and hazardous policy, with a confidence which otherwise would have

been unintelligible and misplaced, hoped perhaps to escape the danger

of having recourse to the aid on which she relied.

Having employed all her disposable means in the war, Austria now

maintains it at a disadvantage, for her own defence. Her armies have

been defeated, her resources exhausted or crippled, her capital is in

danger, and she must either concede the demands of the Hungarians, or

call in the armies of Russia to protect her government and enforce

her policy. What the demands of the Hungarians may now be, we know

not; but if they have wisdom equal to the courage and energy they have

displayed, they will be contented with the restitution of their legal

rights, which Austria may grant without dishonour, because in honour

and good faith they ought never to have been rejected. If they are

wise as they are brave, the Hungarians will seek to restore unity and

peace to the empire with which their lot has been cast--whose weakness

cannot be their strength--whose independence is necessary to their

own security. That the intervention of Russia would be fatal to the

Austrian empire, to its dignity, its power, its capacity to fulfil the

conditions of its existence as a great independent state--the guardian

of eastern Europe--is, we think, unquestionable. Attributing no

interested design to Russia--assuming that she desires nothing so much

as the strength and stability of the Austrian empire--we cannot doubt

that the re-establishment and maintenance of the imperial government's

authority by the military force of Russia, were it the best government

that ever existed, would desecrate, in the heart of every German, the

throne of the Kaiser, and cover it with dust and ashes. In a contest

between the Russians and the Hungarians, the sympathy of all Germany,

of all western Europe, would be with the Majjars. Half the Emperor

of Austria's own heart would be on the side of the loyal nation to

which his house owes so large a debt of gratitude; who, he must be

aware, have been alienated only by the errors and the injustice of his

advisers, and who, if they are sacrificed, will not, and cannot be

sacrificed to his interests. Hungary was perfectly satisfied with her

constitution and her government, as established by the laws of April

1848. She was loyal to her king, and careful of the honour of Austria,

which she sent her best troops to defend in another country; her crimes

have been her attachment to established institutions, and the courage

and patriotism with which she has defended them. This is not the spirit

which it can ever be the interest of a sovereign to extinguish in _his

own_ subjects. The desire to overturn established institutions is the

very evil which the Emperors of Austria and Russia profess to combat,

and their first efforts are to be directed against the only Christian

nation between the frontiers of Belgium and Russia--between Denmark and

Malta, which was satisfied with its institutions and government, and

determined to maintain them.

If Russia engages seriously in the war, she will put forth her whole

strength, and Hungary may probably be overpowered; but can she forget

her wrongs or her successes?--will she ever again give her affection to

the man who, claiming her crown as his hereditary right, has crushed

her under the foot of a foreign enemy? If anything can extinguish

loyalty in the heart of a Hungarian, the attempt of the Emperor to

put the Muscovite's foot upon his neck will accomplish it. We can

imagine no degradation more deeply revolting to the proud Majjar, or

more likely to make him sum up all reasoning upon the subject with the

desperate resolution to sell his life as dearly as he can. There is

therefore much reason to fear lest a people, who but a few weeks ago

were certainly as firmly attached to monarchy as any people in Europe,

not excepting either the Spaniards or ourselves, should be driven by

the course Austria has pursued, and especially by the intervention

of Russia, to renounce their loyalty and consort with the enemies of

monarchy. Their struggle is now for life or death--it ceases to be a

domestic quarrel from the moment Russia engages in it; and Hungary must

seek such support as she can find. Austria has done everything she

could to convert the quarrel into a war of opinion, by representing it

and treating it as such; and now that she has brought to her aid the

great exemplar and champion of absolute monarchy, it is not impossible

that she may succeed.

Russia comes forward to re-establish by force of arms the authority of

a government which has been unable to protect itself against its own

subjects; and, when re-established, she will have to maintain it. How

long this military protection is to endure, after all armed opposition

is put down, no man can pretend to foretell. It must depend upon

events which are beyond the reach of human foresight. But a government

that is dependent for its authority on a foreign power, must, in

every sense of the term, cease to be an independent government. Is

it under Russian protection that Austria is to preserve Lombardy, or

to maintain her influence in Germany? Would the Sclavonic population

of Austria continue to respect a German government protected by a

nation of Sclaves--would they not rather feel that the real power was

that of their own race? Would the Austrians forget the humiliation

of Russian protection, or forgive the government that had sacrificed

their independence? Dependent upon Russian protection, the Austrian

government could no longer give security to Turkey, or counterbalance

the weight with which the power of Russia, whatever may be the

moderation of the reigning emperor, must continue to press upon the

frontiers of weaker countries. In such a state of things, the relations

of Austria to the rest of Europe would be changed--reversed. Instead

of being the bulwark of Germany and the safeguard of Turkey against

Russia, she would become the advanced post of Russia against both. Is

it to bring her to this condition that she has allowed herself to be

involved in the war with Hungary? Is it to arrive at this result that

she will consent to prolong it?

Of the effect, in Germany, of the Russian intervention in Austria,

it is almost superfluous to speak. The advance of Russian armies,

simultaneously with the dissolution of more than one refractory

assembly, has raised in the minds of men, already in a state of furious

excitement, a suspicion that these events are not unconnected, and

that the Emperor of Austria is not the only German sovereign who is

in league with the Czar! The time has arrived when the question must

be determined whether order or anarchy is to prevail; and we have no

doubt that, in Germany as in France, the friends of order will speedily

gain a complete ascendency--if there be no foreign, and above all, no

Russian intervention. But to very many of the patriotic friends of

order in Germany, Russian intervention in her affairs, or an appearance

of concert between their own government and Russia for the purpose of

influencing German interests, and suppressing German feelings, would

be intolerable. There is reason to apprehend that a great body of

true-hearted Germans, especially in the middle classes--whose power

must, after all, decide the contest, and who desire social order and

security under a constitutional monarchy--may fancy they see in the

advance of Russian forces, at a moment when the sovereigns, supported

by their armies, are making a stand against popular tyranny, cause

to fear that even their constitutional freedom is in danger. We are

satisfied that there are no reasonable grounds for such fears--that

the other governments of Germany are too wise to follow the example of

Austria in her conduct towards Hungary; but that example cannot fail

to produce distrust in many minds already disposed to it; and popular

movements are more influenced by passion than by reason.

It is impossible not to feel that Russia is about to occupy a new

position in Europe, which, if no event occurs to obstruct her in

her course, must greatly increase her influence and her power for

good or for evil. She is to be the protector of Austria, not against

foreign enemies, but against one of the nations of which that empire

is composed. She is to re-establish and maintain, by military force,

a government which has been unable to maintain itself against its

internal enemies--a government which a nation of fourteen millions of

people has rejected, fought, and beaten. A great power cannot interfere

in the internal affairs of another state, to the extent of maintaining

there by force of arms a government incapable of maintaining itself

against the nation, without getting involved in the relations of the

government it upholds, to an amount of which it is impossible to fix

or to predict the limits, but of which the tendency has ever been, and

must ever be, progressively to increase the power of the protecting

over the protected government; and the single fact that the interests

of Austria were in this manner inseparably bound up, for a time of

indefinite duration, with those of Russia, would give to the great

northern power a preponderance, both in Europe and in Asia, such as no

hereditary monarchy has possessed in modern times.

With 150,000 or 180,000 men in Hungary, Wallachia, and Moldavia,

the Russian armies would encircle the frontiers of Turkey, from the

shores of the Adriatic to the frontiers of Persia. With a government

in Austria dependent upon the support of those armies, the power that

has hitherto been the chief security of Turkey against the military

superiority of Russia, would be at the command of the court of St

Petersburg. The Sclavonic tribes, which form the chief part of the

Turkish population in Europe, seeing themselves enveloped by the armies

of Russia, guiding and controlling the power of Austria, in addition to

her own, must be thoroughly demoralised, even if Russia should abstain

from all attempts to debauch them. They will feel that they have no

course left but to court her, to look to her whose force is visibly

developed before them, is in contact with them, surrounds them, and

appears to be irresistible everywhere. They will find in the unity

of race an inducement to adhere to the rising destinies of the great

Sclavonic empire--their instincts will teach them to abandon, in time,

the fabric that is about to fall.

Forced to involve herself in all the relations of the government she

upholds, Russia will come into immediate contact with the minor German

monarchies, whose governments may also stand in need of protection.

There is no one kingdom in Germany that could then pretend to

counterbalance her power, or to resist her policy. The same interests

would carry her influence, and it may be her arms, into Italy. It will

no longer be necessary to negotiate the passage of the Dardanelles by

her fleet--the road will be open to her troops, and the passage of her

fleet will no longer be opposed.

We have not attributed to the Emperor Nicholas, or to Russia, any

ambitious ulterior views in affording assistance to Austria--we have

supposed him to be influenced only by the most generous feelings

towards a brother emperor. But, to suppose that he has no desire to

extend his own or his country's influence and power--that he will not

take advantage of favourable circumstances to extend them--would be

absurd; and were he to set out with the firmest resolution to avoid

such a result, the course on which he is now said to have entered, if

he conducts it to a successful issue, must, in spite of himself, lead

to that result. It is no answer, therefore, to say that the Emperor of

Russia does not desire to extend his territory; that he has abstained

with singular moderation from interfering in the affairs of Europe,

while every capital was in tumult, and every country divided against

itself. Giving him credit for every quality that can adorn the loftiest

throne, the consequences of his present policy, if it be successfully

carried out, are equally inevitable.

We must remember, on the other hand, that after all, the Emperor of

Russia is but a man--but one man, in an empire containing above sixty

millions of people. He is the greatest, no doubt, the most powerful,

perhaps the ablest and wisest--the presiding and the guiding mind, with

authority apparently absolute--but they little know the details of

an autocratic government, who suppose that he is uninfluenced by the

will of the nation, or has power to follow out his own intentions. He

must see with other men's eyes, he must hear with other men's ears, he

must speak with the tongues of other men. How much of what is said and

done in his name, in his vast empire, and in every foreign country,

is it possible that he can ever know? How much of his general policy

must, from time to time, be directed by events prepared or consummated

in furtherance of their own views, by his servants, and without his

knowledge! How often must he be guided by the form in which facts are

placed before him, and by the views of those who furnish them! It is

important, therefore, to inquire what are the feelings and opinions,

not of the Emperor only, but of his servants and guides--of the men

who pioneer for him, and prepare the roads on which per force he must

travel.

Shortly after the French revolution of February 1848, a Russian

diplomatic memoir was handed about with an air of mystery in certain

circles in Paris. M. de Bourgoing, formerly French minister at St

Petersburg, and author of a recent work, entitled, _Les guerres

d'idiome et de nationalité_, has published a commentary upon the

Russian memoir, which he tells us was prepared by one of the ablest and

best-informed employés in the Russian Chancellerie, after the events of

February. He further informs us that it was presented to the Emperor

of Russia, and, with the tacit consent of the Russian government, was

sent to be printed in a German capital, (the impression being limited

to twelve copies,) under the title of "_Politique et moyens d'action

de la Russie impartialement apprécié_." The object of M. Bourgoing's

commentary, as well as of his previous publication, appears to be

to remove exaggerated apprehensions of the aggressive power and

tendencies of Russia, and the fears of a general war in Europe, which

her anticipated intervention in Austria, and the occupation in force

of Wallachia and Moldavia by her troops, had excited in France. His

fundamental position appears to be, that the wars of 1848 and 1849

are essentially wars of language and race; that France has therefore

nothing to fear from them; and that Russia has neither a sufficient

disposable force, nor the slightest desire to interfere, in a manner

injurious to France, in the affairs of Western Europe. With this view

he combats, with a gentle opposition, the reasoning of the Russian

memoir, which he represents as "une déclaration où l'on est autorisé

à voir une espèce de manifeste envoyé sans éclat par la Russie à ce

qu'elle intitule la révolution." From the tendencies of M. Bourgoing's

writings, which occasionally peep out somewhat thinly clothed, though

they are generally well wrapped up, we should infer that the "ancien

ministre de France en Russie" does not consider his connexion with the

court of St Petersburg as finally terminated; and we do not doubt that

he has good warrant for all he says of the history of this memoir.

But, whether or not we may be disposed to assign to it a character

of so much authority as M. Bourgoing attributes to that document, we

cannot but regard it as a curious illustration of the kind of memoirs

that Russian diplomatists, "les plus habils et les plus instuits,"

present to the Emperor, and that the Russian government "tacitly

consents" to have transmitted to a German capital to be printed

"sur-le-champ."

The Russian memoir commences with the following general proposition,--

"Pour comprendre de quoi il s'agit dans la crise extrême où

l'Europe vient d'entrer, voici ce qu'il faudrait se dire:

Depuis longtemps il n'y a plus en Europe que deux puissances

réelles, la Révolution et la Russie. Ces deux puissances sont

maintenant en présence, et demain peut-être elles seront

aux prises. Entre l'une et l'autre, il n'y a ni traité ni

transaction possibles. La vie de l'une est la mort de l'autre.

De l'issue de la lutte engagée entre elles, la plus grande des

luttes dont le monde ait été témoin, dépend pour des siècles

tout l'avenir _politique et religieux_ de l'humanité.

La Russie est _avant tout l'empire chrétien_; le peuple

russe est chrétien, non-seulement _par l'orthodoxie_ de ses

croyances, mais par quelque chose de plus intime encore que

la croyance: il l'est par cette faculté du renoncement et du

sacrifice, qui sont comme le fond de sa nature morale.

Il y a heureusement sur le trône de Russie un souverain en qui

la pensée russe s'est incarnée, et dans l'état actuel du monde

la pensée russe est la seule qui soit placée assez en dehors

du milieu révolutionnaire pour pouvoir apprécier sainement les

faits qui s'y produisent.

Tout ce qui reste à la Bohême de vraie vie nationale est dans

_ces croyances hussites_, dans cette protestation toujours

vivante de sa nationalité slave opprimée contre _l'usurpation

de l'église romaine_, aussi bien que contre la domination de la

nation allemande. C'est là le lien qui l'unit à tout son passé

de lutte et de gloire, et c'est là aussi le chemin qui pourra

rattacher un jour le Tchèque de la Bohême à ses frères d'Orient.

On ne saurait assez insister sur ce point, car ce sont

précisément ces réminiscences sympathiques de l'église

d'Orient, ce sont ces retours vers la _vieille foi_ dont le

hussitisme dans son temps n'a été qu'une expression imparfaite

et défigurée, qui établissent une différence profonde entre la

Pologne et la Bohême, entre la Bohême ne subissant que malgré

elle le _joug de la communauté occidentale_, et cette Pologne

_factieusement catholique, seide fanatique de l'Occident_, et

toujours traître vis-à-vis des siens."

We add a few more extracts:--

"Que fera la Bohême, avec les peuples qui l'entourent, Moraves,

Slovaques, c'est-à-dire, sept ou huit millions d'hommes de même

langue et de même race qu'elle?... En general c'est une chose

digne de remarque, que cette faveur persévérante que la Russie,

le nom Russe, sa gloire, son avenir n'ont cessé de rencontrer

parmi les hommes nationaux de Prague."--(Page 15.)

At page 18 we find the following observations upon Hungary:--

"Cette enemie c'est la Hongrie, j'entend la Hongrie Magyar.

De tous les ennemis de la Russie c'est peut-être celui qui

la hait de la haine la plus furieuse. Le peuple Magyar, en

qui la ferveur révolutionnaire vient de s'associer, par la

plus étrange des combinaisons, à la brutalité d'une horde

asiatique, et dont on pourrait dire avec tout autant de

justice que des Turcs, qu'il ne fait que camper en Europe,

vit entouré de peuples Sclaves, qui lui sont tons également

odieux. Ennemi personel de cette race, il se retrouve, après

des siècles d'agitation et de turbulence, toujours encore

emprisonné au milieu d'elle. Tous ces peuple qui l'entourent,

Serbes, Croates, Slovaques, Transylvaniens, et jusqu' au petits

Russiens des Karpathes, sont les anneaux d'une chaine qu'il

croyait à tort jamais briser. Et maintenant il sent, audessus

de lui, une main qui pourra quand il lui plaira rejoindre ces

anneaux, et resserrer la chaine à volonté. De là sa haine

instinctive contre la Russie.

D'autre part, sur le foi de journalisme étranger, les meneurs

actuel du parti se sont sérieusement persuadé que le peuples

Magyar avait une grande mission à remplir dans l'Europe

orthodoxe, que c'était à lui en un mot à tenir en échec les

destinés de la Russie."

If these are the mutual sentiments of Russians and Majjars, we may form

some idea of the kind of warfare that is about to be waged in Hungary.

It is curious to observe the confidence with which the Russian

diplomatist assumes that the influence of his master over all the

Sclavonic tribes of Hungary is completely established, and points

to the Emperor of Russia, not to their sovereign, as the hand that

is to clench the chain by which the Majjars are enclosed. When it

is remembered that this memoir was circulated in Paris before any

differences had arisen between Austria and Hungary--that the first

movement hostile to the Majjars was made by Sclavonic tribes of the

Greek Church, headed by the Patriarch--that Austria long hesitated

before she resolved to break faith and peace with Hungary--that her own

resources were inadequate to the enterprise she undertook--that her

own interests appeared to forbid her undertaking it--one is forced to

ponder and reflect on the means and influences by which she may have

been led into so fatal an error.

We cannot refrain from giving one other extract from the Russian

memoir, which is too pungent to be omitted:--

"Quelle ne serait pas l'horrible confusion où tomberaient les

pays d'Occident aux prises avec la révolution, _si le légitime

souverain, si l'empereur orthodoxe d'Orient_, tardait longtemps

à y apparaître!

L'Occident s'en va; tout croule, tout s'abîme dans une

conflagration générale, l'EUROPE DE CHARLEMAGNE

aussi bien que l'Europe des traités de 1815, la PAPAUTE

DE ROME _et toutes les royautés de l'Occident, le

catholicisme_ et le protestantisme, _la foi depuis longtemps

perdue_ et la raison réduite à l'absurde, l'ordre désormais

impossible, la liberté desormais impossible, et sur toutes ces

ruines amoncelées par elle, _la civilisation_ se suicidant de

ses propres mains!

Et lorsque, audessus de cet immense naufrage, nous voyons,

_comme une arche sainte_, surnager cet empire plus immense

encore, _qui donc pourrait_ douter de sa mission? Et est-ce à

nous, ses enfans, à nous montrer sceptiques et pusillanimes?"

Such then, it appears, are the sentiments of some of the most

enlightened of the Russian diplomatists--such are the opinions

and views presented to the Emperor by the men on whose reports

and statements his foreign policy must of necessity be chiefly

founded--such, above all, are the feelings and aspirations, the

enmities and the means of action, which the nation fosters and on which

it relies.

It has been said that, in attacking the Hungarians, Russia is but

fighting her own battle against the Poles, who are said to compose a

large proportion of the Hungarian army; and those who desire to throw

discredit on the Hungarian movement have nicknamed it a Polo-Majjar

revolution. They must have been ignorant or regardless of the facts.

Whatever the Austrian journals or proclamations may assert, Russia must

know full well that in the Hungarian army there are not more than five

thousand Poles, and only two Polish general officers, Dembinsk and Bem.

That the Poles may think they see in a war between Russia and Hungary a

favourable opportunity to revolt, is not improbable, and that, if the

Poles should rise, they will find sympathy and support in the nation

that Russia is attacking, must be inevitable.

In the mean time, the Hungarians are preparing for the unequal contest.

They have a well-equipped army of 160,000 men in the field, and a levy

of 200,000 more has been ordered. Such is the national enthusiasm, that

this whole number may probably be raised. This feeling is not confined

to the Majjars, but extends to the Sclavonic population also.

The following extracts from a letter received on the 14th May, by one

of his correspondents, from an intelligent English merchant who has

just returned from a visit to the Sclavonic districts of northern

Hungary, on his commercial affairs, gives the latest authentic

intelligence we have seen of the state of things in the Slovack

counties, the only part of the country which the writer visited:--

"I am just returned from Hungary. I was exceedingly surprised

to see so much enthusiasm. My candid opinion is that, even

if the Russians join against them, the Hungarians will be

victorious. They are certainly short of arms; if they could

procure one or two hundred thousand muskets, the affair would

be closed immediately. In the mountains the cultivation of

the land proceeds as usual, although the whole neighbourhood

was full of contending troops. As I came out of Hungary, the

advanced guards were only two German miles apart. However, I

found no inconvenience; the roads were quite safe; and if it

were not for the guerillas, whom one expects every minute to

issue from the woods, the thing would go on, for a stranger,

comfortably enough. The new paper-money (Kossuth's) is taken

everywhere, not only for the common necessaries of life, but

also for large business transactions--the idea being that there

is about equal security for Hungarian as for the Austrian

bank-notes."

It must be confessed, that in circumstances calculated to try her

prudence, Russia has acted with singular composure and wisdom. She

abstained from interfering in the affairs of western Europe while the

tide of republican frenzy was in flood. She contented herself with

carefully and diligently increasing and organising her army--then,

probably, in a more inefficient state than at any time during the

last thirty years--and gradually concentrated her disposable troops

on her western frontier, where magazines have been prepared for it.

While continental Europe was convulsed by revolutions, she made no

aggression--the occupation of Wallachia and Moldavia was her only

move in advance. She avoided giving umbrage to the people, to the

sovereigns, or to the successive governments that were formed, and

established a right to demand confidence in her moderation and

forbearance. She came to the aid of Austria at first with a small

force in a distant province, just sufficient to show that the Austrian

government had her support, and not enough to excite the jealousy of

Germany. Now that her military preparations are completed, she comes

to protect Austria, not until she is called, and at a time when the

most formidable dangers she has to encounter are such as the friends of

order, triumphant in the west, and we trust dominant everywhere, would

be the last to evoke. Yet it is impossible to deny that the successful

execution of her present project would be a great revolution--that it

would more seriously derange the relative positions of nations, and the

balance of power, than any or all of those revolutions which the two

last eventful years have witnessed.

The adjustment of the differences between Austria and Hungary would

avert this danger--would remove all hazard of throwing the power of

Hungary into the scale with the enemies of monarchy--would re-establish

the Austrian empire upon the only basis on which, as it appears to us,

it is possible to reconstruct it as an independent empire; and would

be "a heavy blow and great discouragement" to the anarchists, whose

element is strife, whose native atmosphere is the whirlwind of evil

passions. But if this may not be--if Austria uses the power of Russia

to enforce injustice, and, with that view, is prepared to sacrifice

her own independence--we should refuse to identify the cause of

monarchy and order--the cause of constitutional liberty, morality, and

public faith--with the dishonest conduct of Austria, or the national

antipathies and dangerous aspirations of Russia.

FEUDALISM IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY.

It is not exactly the best of all times to point out things that may

be amiss in, nor to find fault with either portions or the whole of

institutions which have received the approving sanction of time and

experience; for the bad passions of the lower and less moral orders

of men, in most European nations, have of late been so completely

unchained, and the _débacle_ of the revolutionary torrent has been so

suddenly overwhelming, that no extra impetus is required to be put upon

it. Rather should we build up and repair the ancient dams and dikes of

society, anomalous and inconvenient though they may be, than attempt to

remove them, even for the sake of what may appear better ones, while

the waters of innovation are still out, and when the spirit of man is

brooding over them for the elaboration of some new chaos, some new

incarnation of evil. Nevertheless there are a few noxious, and many

harmless, anomalies and contradictions in the feudal or aristocratic

constitution of society, induced by the lapse of time, the wear and

tear of ages, which, though they may not admit of removal now, may

demand it on the first convenient opportunity; and then on several of

the sterner and more fundamental principles of feudalism in ancient

days, upon which the basis of modern society really exists, but which

have been lost sight of, and yet which are forced into prominent

notice, and ought to be put in action once more, by the morbid

tendencies of popular violence. We shall be acquitted of all desire

of change for change's sake; no one will accuse us of being habitual

violators of ancient things, customs, and laws: it is rather because

we love them, and venerate them, and wish to revive them on account of

their intrinsic excellence, that we would call our reader's attention

to a few things going on around us. He need not be afraid of our

troubling him with a dry treatise on the theory of government--we are

no constitution-mongers: he need not expect to be bored with pages of

statistical details, nor to be satiated with the nostrums of political

economy. We propose making one or two very commonplace observations,

professing to take no other guide than a small modicum of common sense,

and to have no other object than our readers' delectation and the good

of our country.

(1.) How was it that nobles came to be nobles and commons came to be

commons? how was it that the great territorial properties of this

kingdom were originally set agoing and maintained? and how was it that

you and I, and millions of others, came to be put in the apparently

interminable predicament of having to toil and struggle with the

world, or to be sentenced to something like labour, more or less

hard, for life; you and I, we say, you and I, and our fathers and our

children? Tell us that, gentle reader, whether you be good old Tory,

or moderate Conservative, or slippery Peelite, or coldblooded Whig,

or profligate Radical, or demoniac Chartist? FORCE, my good

friend--FORCE, PHYSICAL FORCE--a good strong hand, and stout

arm, and a heavy sword, and brave heart, and a firm determination--and

no shilly-shally hesitation as to legality or illegality, no maudlin

sympathy nor compunction--these were the things that did it; these

carried the day; these were the moving powers of old; they raised

the lever, and they settled down society into that bed in which it

has been arranging itself ever since. And right good things they

were, too, in their proper time and place; and so they ever will

be: they are some of the mainsprings of the world; they may become

concealed in their action, they may be forgotten, they may even fall

into temporary inaction, but they come out again into full play ever

and anon, and, when the wild storm of human passion drives over the

world in a reckless tornado, they go along with the whirlwind, and

they hover all around it, and they follow it, and they reassert their

permanent sway over mankind. The Norman William's barons, the noble

peers of Charlemagne, the princes and marshals of Napoleon, all found

their estates at the points of their swords; and, while they kept

their swords bright, their estates remained intact; but, when military

prowess declined, legal astuteness and commercial craft crept in,

and the broad lands decreased, because the sharp point and edge were

blunted. The remote origin, the first title of every crowned head and

noble family of Europe, is to be traced to the sword, or has been

derived from it. We speak not of _parvenus_, we allude to the great

families of the various realms of the ancient world; all _old_ and

_real_ nobility is of the sword, and of the sword only. The French used

to express this well, and understood the true footing on which nobility

ought to stand; they always talked of la noblesse de l'epée, as

contradistinguished from _la noblesse de la robe_: the former referred

to the feudal families and their descendants, the latter to those who

had become ennobled for services at the bar. As for nobility granted

for any commercial or pecuniary causes, they never dreamed of such a

thing; or, if a spurious ennobling took place, it was deemed a glaring

and an odious violation of the fundamental laws of aristocratic society.

Now the ideas of the world have become so changed, or rather so

corrupted, on this point, that the prime notion of nobility no longer

is attached to military tenure or service; but, on the contrary, we

find titles given, nay, bought and sold, for any the most miscellaneous

services, and the meridian of nobleness, of elevation, of power,

altogether eliminated from the qualifications that the nobleman ought

to possess. Back-stair services, lobby services, electioneering

services, counting-house services, any services as well as military

services, have been deemed sufficient causes for procuring a patent

of nobility to those who could allege them. Titles and causes of

distinction they might have been, but surely not of nobility, not of

hereditary honour and distinction, the tenure and essence of which

should ever be attached to territorial power gained and held by the

sword. And this lowering of the tone of nobility, this communising of

what ought to be ever held up as a thing apart, as a thing originating

with the first beginnings of a nation, and remaining fixed till the

nation becomes itself extinct, has done no good to society: it has not

raised the tone of the commons, it has only lowered that of the nobles:

it has emasculated the one without adding any strength to the other.

In all nations, as long as the nobility have remained essentially a

military order, holding their own by their own strength, the fortunes

of that nation have advanced; but whenever the nobles have become

degenerate, and therefore the commons licentious--the former holding

only by prescriptive respect, and the latter subjected to them only in

theory, not in practice--the fate of that nation has been pronounced,

and its decline has already begun. The destruction and absorption of

the good fiefs of France, in the time of Louis XI., laid the way for

the razing of the châteaux, and the decapitation of their owners by the

Cardinal de Richelieu, in the time of Louis XIII.; and this gradual

degenerating process of undermining the true strength of the nobles,

led to the corruption of the nation, and to its reduction to the

primary starting-point of society in the reign of Louis XVI. So, too,

in England, the sapping of the strength of the nobles, in the reign of

Henry VIII., added to the corrupt proceedings of the times of James I.,

caused the Great Rebellion in the reign of his successor. The nation

has never recovered from this fatal revolution of the seventeenth

century. Like France, England has shone awhile, and sustained itself

both in arts and arms; but the dissolving process has begun long ago

with us as it did with them. One order of the state--the order of

nobles--has been constantly decreasing in power and influence; and the

descent towards the level of anti-social democracy seems now as easy

and as broad as that to the shades of Avernus. The nobles of Russia, on

the contrary, still retain their feudal power--they all draw and use

the sword: their nation is on the ascendant. In Spain and Italy the

nobles have descended so far as almost to have lost their claim to the

title of _men_; while in most parts of Germany the result of recent

movements has shown that the power of the nobles had long been a mere

shadow; and they have evaporated in empty smoke, while the nations are

fast sinking to the level of a common and savage democracy.

We would propose a remedy for this state of things. We consider the

profession of arms, when joined to the holding of territorial power, as

the highest form of civilisation and political excellence to which man

has yet been able to rise. It constitutes that union of all the highest

and best feelings of human nature with the supreme possession of power

and influence over material objects--over land and the produce of

land--which seems to be the ultimate and the worthy object of the good

and great in all ages. And, therefore, the nearer a nobleman can revert

to the principles upon which his order is, or ought to be, based, the

greater security, in the working out both for himself and the nation,

that the strength and dignity of the whole people shall be maintained

inviolate. Of all men in the state, the noble is he who is most

endangered by any approximation to effeminacy and inactivity: he is the

representative, the _beau ideal_, of the virility of the whole nation:

he is the active principle of its force--the leader, the chief agent,

in building up the fortunes of his country. Let him but once degenerate

from the elevating task, and he renounces the main privileges of his

order, he does wrong both to his fellow-countrymen and to himself--he

diminishes his own force, and he weakens their national powers.

Whenever, therefore, any such departure, more or less wide, from the

ancient principles of his order has taken place, let the nobleman

hasten to return to them, if he would stop the course of ruin before it

become too late. We would hold it to be the duty of every nobleman in

this country--and we include herein his immediate descendants--to enter

the profession of arms, and to adopt no other save that of afterwards

serving the state in the senate: we hold it to be his duty to avoid all

approximation to the engagements of commerce--we would even say of the

law, of any of the learned professions. These pursuits are intended for

other orders of men, not less essential to the state than the noble,

but still different orders. The noble is the leader, the type, the

example of public military and political strength. Let him keep to that

lofty function, and discharge it and no other.

Two methods of effecting this present themselves. In the first place, a

regulation might be easily and advantageously made, in connexion with

the army, whereby any nobleman, or son of a nobleman, or in fact any

person belonging to the class which the law might define to be noble,

(for some modification is wanted on this head,) might be allowed to

attach himself as a volunteer officer to any regiment, and be bound

to serve in it as such, without pay. He should receive his honorary

promotion the same as any other officer, and should be subject to all

the same duties and responsibilities; but "pay" he should not need;

himself or his family should provide for all his charges. Or, in the

second place, he should serve as an officer in a national force, the

constitution of which we propose and advocate below: in this case, too,

entirely without pay, and subject to all the articles of war. In either

instance, we think it the duty of the country to give the nobleman an

especial opportunity of serving her in a military manner; and we hold

it to be his especial duty--one of the most essential duties of his

order, without which his order degenerates and stultifies itself--to

serve as a military man, and to serve with distinction.

We often hear it said that the English are not a military people; that

they do not like an army; that they have a natural repugnance to the

military profession, and other similar pieces of nonsense or untruth.

Such libels as these on the innate courage of an Englishman, are never

uttered but by those who have something of the calf in their hearts;

the wish is father to the thought in all such declarations, when

seriously made; and, if alleged as matters of argument, they are used

only by the morbid lovers of _la paix à tout prix_ who infest our age

and country. It is just the same as when you hear a man say soberly,

that he does not like shooting, nor hunting, nor fishing; that he

cannot ride, nor drive, nor swim; that he cannot abide the country,

and that he prefers a constant residence in town. Such a man is not

only a useless, he is positively a noxious member of society--he is an

excrescence, a deformity, a nuisance, and the sooner his company is

avoided the better. Such men, however, do exist, and they do actually

say such things; but they are tokens of the debased and degrading

effects of over-civilisation, of social degeneracy, of national

humiliation; and whenever their sentiments shall come to be approved

of, or assented to, by any large portion of the people, then we may be

sure that the decline and fall of the nation are at hand, and that our

downward course is fairly commenced. No; the men and the nation that

can, in cool blood, repudiate the noble profession of arms, forfeit the

virility of their character, they may do very well for the offices that

slaves, and the puny denizens of crowded cities, can alone perform; but

they deserve to lose the last relics of their freedom, for thus daring

to contradict one of the great moral laws of nature. Force and courage

have been awarded to man like any other of his faculties and passions;

they were intended to be exercised, otherwise they would not have been

given: their exercise is both good and necessary; and, like their great

development, War, they are destined by our Maker to be the causes and

instruments of moral and physical purification and renovation. As long

as the mind and body of man continue what they are, the Profession of

Arms and the Science of War will be held in deserved honour among the

great and good of mankind.

Great evils have no doubt resulted from their use, and more especially

from their abuse; but not a whit greater than from the use and abuse

of any other of the faculties and propensities of man: not so much as

from the spirit of deceit and oppression, which is the concomitant of

trading and manufacturing operations; not so much as from the spirit

of religious fanaticism and superstition which haunts the human race;

not so much as from the gluttony and sensuality of civilised nations.

War and Arms are analogous to the Tempest and the Thunderbolt, but they

purify more than they destroy, and they elevate more than they depress.

The man that does not arm in defence of his country, of his family, and

of himself, deserves to die the death of a dog, or to clank about for

endless years in the fetters of a slave.

It has been well shown, by one of the most philosophic of modern

historians,[7] that the final causes of war are indissolubly united

with the moral constitution of man and human society; and that, as long

as man continues to be actuated by the same passions as hitherto, the

same causes of war must occur over and over again in endless cycles.

Not but that the pain and misery thereby caused are undoubted evils,

but that evil is permitted to form part of the moral and physical

system of the world; it is what constitutes that system a state of

probation and moral trial for man. When evil ceases to exist, men's

evil passions shall cease also, and the world shall become another

Eden; _but not till then_. The bearing of arms and the waging of war

are no disgrace to a nation; they are an honour and a blessing to

it if justly exercised, a disgrace and a curse, sooner or later, if

undertaken unjustly. Believing, therefore, that the proper maintenance

of a warlike spirit is absolutely essential to the welfare of any

nation, and knowing how much the pecuniary and political embarrassments

of our mighty though heterogeneous empire cripple the public means

(in appearance at least) for keeping up a sufficient military force,

we proceed to throw out the following hints for the formation of an

improved description of a national military force. And we may at

once observe, that it is one especially calculated to fall under the

direction of the nobles of the land, and to revive that portion of the

feudal spirit which depends on the proper constitution of the military

resources of a great people.

[7] ALISON, _History of Europe_, vol. x.

The military strength of this country lies at present concentrated in

the regular army, in the corps of veterans styled "pensioners," and, we

may very fairly add, in the "police." We have nothing to say except

in praise of these three bodies of men, the two latter of which are

most useful adjuncts and supporters to the former. But we not only wish

that the number of the regular army were _permanently and considerably

increased_, we could desire also that the number of the police were

augmented, and that they had more of military training about them. We

shall revert to one of these points, at least, at a future period. We

are also of opinion that the militia of the country should _always_ be

kept up, and regularly trained even in the intervals of war, were it

for no other purpose than to maintain some faint degree of military

spirit and knowledge among the common people. The question of expense

and of interruption to labour does not, we confess, stop us in the

least in our aspirations: we think that the country pays not a farthing

too much for its military and naval forces; and, as for interruption to

labour, anything that would draw off the attention of the lower orders

from the grinding and degrading occupations of manufacturing slavery,

we should consider one of the greatest benefits that could accrue to

the country.

We wish to call attention, however, to another method--by no means

a new one--of augmenting the military resources of the country, and

to throw out some hints for rendering that method more efficacious

than it may hitherto have been deemed. We allude to the system of

volunteers. And here let not our military readers laugh: we would

assure our gallant friends that we are fully aware of the thousand

and one objections that will be immediately started; we know how easy

it is to pooh-pooh a plan of this kind all to nothing. We can already

hear them calling out about the Lumber Troop, and the City Light

Horse: nay, we ourselves can actually remember that most astounding

and heart-stirring event of the late war, the storming of Putney, and

the battle of Wimbledon Common. We were present, gallant readers, not

as actors but as very juvenile spectators of that memorable combat, to

which Austerlitz, Borodino, and Waterloo were mere farces; so we know

all that is to be said _against_ the volunteers. And now just have the

goodness to let us say something _for_ them.

A volunteer force, if it is to be merely a parade force, a make-believe

force, is a "sham," a humbug, and a gross absurdity. If it is to be

a "National Guard," playing the part of armed politicians, it is a

dangerous nuisance, and ought never to be formed. If it is to consist

of a crowd of pot-bellied citizens, with red noses and spectacles, who

are afraid of firing off a musket, and cannot march above ten miles a

day, nor go more than six hours without plenty of provisions tucked

under their belts, nor sleep anywhere except between clean sheets and

warm blankets--why, a set of wooden posts, sculptured into the human

form, and painted to look like soldiers, would be far more serviceable.

We are not going to commit the absurdity of advocating the formation of

any such corps of men as these; but we wish to point out how a really

efficient corps of volunteers might be raised throughout the kingdom,

kept on a footing of constant service and readiness, costing the

country not one farthing, and constituting a really useful and valuable

auxiliary force to co-operate with the regular troops.

If these qualifications are to exist in any volunteer corps, then it

is quite manifest that the following kinds of persons cannot form part

of it. First of all, the whole generation of pot-bellied, red-nosed,

counter-thumping fellows, alluded to above, would not be admissible;

next, no man who is not endowed with a good quantity of bodily

activity, health, and vigour of mind, could remain in its ranks; and

further, no one need apply for admission who wanted merely to "play at

soldiers," or whose means and occupations would not allow of his giving

up regularly a certain portion of his best time to the service, and

_occasionally_ of absenting himself from home for even a considerable

period--say of one, two, or more months, and proceeding wherever the

government might wish him. Furthermore, no such corps could have the

smallest pretensions to be effective, if it were left to its own

guidance and command: it must be as much under the control, and at the

orders, of the commander-in-chief--for home service--(for we do not

contemplate the possibility of its being ordered abroad,) as any of

the regular corps in her Majesty's army.

It will be seen at once, from the above stipulations, that we do not

advert to anything at all resembling the loose and extremely local

organisation of the old volunteers of 1805 and the subsequent years.

Now, a volunteer corps can only be held together by the two following

principles:--first, a strong sense of public and patriotic duty; and,

secondly, an acute feeling of Honour, and the Pride of belonging

to a really distinguished arm of the service--a bona fide _corps

d'élite_. Whenever war breaks out, we know, and we feel the most hearty

satisfaction in knowing, that in every corner of the land--save,

perhaps, in the murky dens of misery, discontent, and degeneracy

abounding in our manufacturing towns--thousands of British hearts

will beat with a tenfold warmer glow than heretofore, and will burn

to give forth their best blood for the services of their country. Let

but the most distant intimation of foreign invasion be given, and

hundreds of thousands of brave and generous defenders of their beloved

native land will instantly step forth. But we would say that, if the

defence of the country from invasion be really desirable, it is not

sufficient that the _will_ to defend it be forthcoming at the proper

moment--the _knowledge how to do it_, the _preparatory training_, the

_formation of military habits_,--always a matter of slow growth,--the

_previous organisation of the defenders themselves_, is much more

important. In short, to keep the country safe from foreign invasion,

(we do not allude to the naval strength of the country, which, after

all, may prove abundantly sufficient for the purpose,) to take away

from a foreign enemy even the spirit to dare an invasion, the previous

formation, the constant maintenance of an efficient volunteer force

must necessarily be of great value.

The expediency of this will be heightened by the consideration that it

may, at any time, even of the most profound peace in Europe, be found

necessary suddenly to detach a large portion of the regular army for

the defence of our numerous colonial possessions, or that disturbances

among our manufacturing population at home may require a sudden

augmentation of the armed force of the country. In either of these

emergencies, the existence of a considerable body of armed men who,

though perhaps not equalling the regulars in _precision_ of discipline

and evolution, might yet be in far better training than the militia,

_and who should be kept so at no expense to the government_, would

evidently be of great value to the whole community.

We do not expect that many persons engaged in trade and manufactures,

nor indeed that many inhabitants in large towns--at least of those

classes--would like to enrol themselves in a corps the service of

which would be constant, and might frequently take them away for a

considerable time from their homes and occupations. We should not

wish to see them joining it, for, however warm their goodwill might

be, we know that their pockets and stomachs would be continually

rebelling, and that, far from being "volunteers," they would more

commonly be found as "deserters." We would rather see them staying

at home, and acting as good members of their municipalities, or as

special constables, or forming "street associations" for the keeping

of the peace--all most necessary and laudable purposes, and not a whit

less useful to the country than the serving as volunteers. We would

rather see the force we meditate drawn exclusively from the gentry

and the farmers of the country, and in fact from the same classes

as now furnish the yeomanry cavalry,--only, we would have it most

especially to include _all the gentry of the nation_: and we would

have it thereby made an _honour_ even to belong to the corps. To see a

country gentleman heading his tenants, and his sons serving in their

ranks, as some of themselves, and the younger gentry from the country

or provincial towns also coming forward for the permanent military

service of their country--coming forward as gentlemen, and serving as

gentlemen, with the name and title of gentlemen--and to see the stout

farmers of England, the real pride and bulwark of the realm, thus

linked with their best and natural friends and protectors in a common

bond of honour and of arms, would be the most glorious sight that this

nation would have witnessed for many a long year. It would give a new

stamp to society, and would infuse a vigorous energy of mind amongst us

that should go far towards counteracting the dangerous and emasculating

influence of the "large town system." The heart-blood of England would

begin to flow back again into its old and natural channels; and that

linking of lords and tenants, which can never be loosened without the

most fatal consequences, would be rendered closer and tighter than ever.

Men drawn from such classes as these, the adult sons of respectable

farmers, the sons of the country gentry, the younger gentry from the

towns, the farmers and the gentry themselves, (such at least as could

really be spared from their numerous avocations,) would constitute,

both in their physical and mental qualifications, the very best

description of volunteers that could be selected in any land, for they

would be the true _élite_ of the whole nation, the very pride and hope

of the country. It would be truly an honour to belong to such a corps,

whether the applicant for admission were a yeoman or a gentleman;

and, if properly organised and trained, it might be made a force of

paramount efficiency.

Now what would be some of the main characteristics of the men composing

such a force? for by those characteristics the nature and destination

of the force should be mainly guided. First of all, a large portion

would be able, as now, to serve on horseback: and this leads at once

to show that the yeomanry cavalry, if more frequently exercised, and

if kept out for longer periods of service, might, with an improvement

which we shall by-and-by suggest, become of great value in this

division of the national force.

Next, men of this kind would be more or less distinguished for

bodily activity--we mean activity, as distinguished from muscular

strength--though of this they would have in the old proportion of one

Englishman to any two Frenchmen, we have no doubt. Hence the force

would be fitter for the service of light than of heavy armed troops.

And, thirdly, from their pecuniary means they would be capable of

_distant_ and _rapid_ motion; and therefore they should form a corps

destined for quick and desultory rather than for slow and stationary

warfare.

From the very fact, however, of their forming a corps drawn from the

middle classes of provincial and urban society, and from their having

pecuniary means at their command, more than any other class of troops

could possibly hope for, they would be especially liable to relax in

discipline from the contamination of garrisons, or the seductions

of large towns. They would be formed of the finest young fellows

of the whole country; and therefore a residence at "Capua" would

be destructive of their military efficiency. The damage they would

reciprocally cause and sustain by being quartered in any large town for

a lengthened period, might be great; hence they should be confined as

much as possible to--where they would be most effective--operations in

the open field.

Again, if there are any two points of manly exercise in which the

gentry and yeomanry of this country are distinguished beyond any other

European nation, they are these--the being _good marksmen_, and _good

horsemen_.

We are thus naturally led to the determining of the exact description

of troops which should be constituted with such admirable materials--_a

vast body of riflemen_--some mounted, the others on foot. Such a

corps, or rather such an assemblage of corps, if properly organised

and trained, would not have its equal in the world. It would be formed

of the choicest spirits, the picked men of the nation, and it would be

organised upon the very points, as bases, upon which those men would

the most pride themselves, in which they would be the strongest, which

they would be the most accustomed to, and would the best understand.

They would have all the elements of good soldiers among them; all that

would be wanting would be good organisation and training.

"This is no great discovery," some one will say; "there have been

volunteer rifle corps already. Of late days they started a thing of

the kind among the peaceable Glasgow bodies, and those treasonable

asses, the Irish. Irishmen that wanted to be rebels, and the English

Chartists that wanted to sack London, recommended their deluded

countrymen to 'club together and buy rifles.'" We acknowledge it--the

idea is old enough. We only mean to say, that if a volunteer force

be a desirable adjunct to our military system--and, under certain

regulations, it might no doubt become so--then a rifle corps, or

rather an army of volunteer riflemen, drawn from the classes specified

above, would constitute a most effective branch of the service. We

make no pretensions to the starting of a new idea; we merely endeavour

to render that idea practicable, and to point out how it may be best

realised.

The following points as to organisation we lay down as indispensable,

without which we should hardly care to see the force enrolled:--

1st, The only matter in which the volunteer spirit should subsist,

should be that of joining the corps in the first instance, and then

of equipping and maintaining the men, each at their own cost. Once

enrolled, it should no longer be at the option of the men whether they

served or not--nor _when_, nor _where_, nor _how_ they served: we mean

the force not to be a sham one; we do not want soldiers in joke, we

require them to come forward in good earnest. All matters concerning

the time, place, and mode of their service should lie with the

government. Once enrolled and trained, they should be at her Majesty's

disposal; they should be her _bonâ fide_ soldiers, only not drawing

pay, nor, except under certain circumstances, rations.

2d, The corps should be raised by counties, hundreds, and parishes,

and should be under the colonelcies of the Lords-Lieutenants or

their deputies. To keep up the _esprit de corps_ conjointly with the

spirit of local association and public patriotism, it is essential

that friends and neighbours, lords and tenants, should stand side by

side, fight in the same ranks, witness each other's brave deeds, and,

in every sense of the word, "put shoulder to shoulder." The several

counties might each furnish a regiment, and these regiments should then

be brigaded under the command of a general officer, appointed by the

commander-in-chief of her Majesty's forces. In the first instance, at

least, it would be desirable that a certain proportion of the officers

should be drawn from the half-pay list of the army, both for the sake

of instruction and example. Afterwards they should be taken _from the

ranks_, for the ranks in this corps would be, by the mere fact of

their organisation, composed of gentlemen and the best description

of yeomen--the latter, be it ever remembered, not unworthy to lead

their friends and neighbours; and the mode of so doing might be easily

arranged by the military authorities, on the combined footing of local

influence and personal merit.

3d, These corps, when organised, should be primarily intended for the

local defence of their several counties, or of any adjacent military

districts, into which the country might, from time to time, be divided.

But they should also be liable to serve, to the same extent as the

militia, anywhere within the European dominions of Her Majesty. We

do not contemplate the eventuality of their being ordered on foreign

service, though we strongly suspect that it would be very difficult to

keep such a corps always at home, when stirring scenes of national arms

and glory were to be met with away from their own shores. If, however,

the corps should be called on to do duty away from their own military

districts, then they should draw rations, clothes, equipments, and

ammunition, but _not pay_, the same as the regular troops.

4th, As it should be esteemed an honour to belong to such a corps,

so the members of it should not only be exempt from being drawn

for the militia, but they should also be free from paying for a

license to carry firearms and to shoot as sportsmen; and the cost

of their equipment should be such as to insure a certain degree of

respectability on the part of the volunteer. This preliminary expense,

added to that of maintaining himself on duty at his own cost, would

prevent any one but a man of a certain degree of substance from seeking

admission into the corps.

5thly, The acquisition of sufficient skill in the use of that deadliest

of all arms, the rifle, might be made by means of local meetings to

practise, at which heavy fines for non-attendance would not only

insure tolerable regularity, but would also provide a fund for prizes,

and for general purposes. At these meetings, which should be held

frequently, the knowledge of military evolutions, and the minutiæ of

drill might be readily communicated by the non-commissioned officers

of the pensioners' corps; and, from the circumstance of the men not

being mere clods from the plough tail, nor weavers from the loom, the

requisite amount of instruction would be conveyed in a comparatively

short time. We should suppose that, within six months from their first

organisation, if the discipline was well attended to, such corps might

be able to stand a field-day before their general officers. The cavalry

would not learn their duties so readily as the infantry, because the

men would have to teach not themselves alone, but also their horses;

and, though they would form a most effective and valuable species of

light cavalry, the combined practice of the rifle and the sabre would

demand a considerable time for the corps to be quite at home with

their duties. We would give them a year to make themselves complete.

A volunteer force of cavalry should never aim at being anything else

than a corps of light horse--they can never constitute effective heavy

cavalry. But as light horsemen possessing rifles, and able to use them

whether in the saddle or on the ground, they would become as formidable

to a European enemy as the African Arabs have been to the French, and

would be a match for any light cavalry that could be brought to act

against them. For all purposes, too, of local service they would be

admirably efficient.

6thly, The discipline of a volunteer corps is always the main

difficulty to be contended against in its practical management; but

we conceive that this difficulty would be lessened, in the present

instance, from the peculiarly good composition of the rank and file of

such a body of men. Several large classes of military offences could

not possibly prevail among them; and, for those that remained, the

ordinary articles of war would be sufficiently repressive. It should be

observed that we do not contemplate the granting leave to such corps

to disband themselves: the engagement once formed should be binding

for a certain moderate number of years, and the volunteer should

not have the faculty of releasing himself from his duties except by

becoming invalided. We imagine that the possibility of being ultimately

dismissed from such an honourable body of men, for ungentlemanlike

conduct, would constitute the most effectual check that could be

devised for the instances of breach of discipline likely to occur.

It should not be lost sight of that we advocate the formation of such a

force as a _corps d'élite_, as one elevated above the militia, and even

above the regular army, in the _morale_ of the men composing it, if

not in their _physique_; and therefore it may be very fairly inferred

that the members of it, feeling the _prestige_ attached to their name,

would act up to the dignity and honour of their station; that they

would not only behave as valiant soldiers in the field, but that they

would act as gentlemen in quarters. Drinking and gambling would be the

two main offences to provide against; but these, if discouraged, and

not practised by the officers, might be checked among the men. For all

quarrels and disputes likely to end in personal encounter, a special

tribunal of arbiters should be constituted among men and officers of

corresponding rank in the corps; and all duelling should be totally

prevented. The mere fact of sending or accepting a challenge should

involve, _ipso facto_, expulsion from the corps. The running into debt,

too, on the part of the members, should be most rigorously prevented,

and should incur the penalty of expulsion. By these and similar

regulations, combined with the judicious management of the superior

officers, we have no doubt that the discipline of such a body, (which

should be strict rather than lenient,) might be effectually maintained.

7thly, The arming and equipping of such a corps of men is a point of

importance, but by no means of difficulty. We may here disappoint

some of our pseudo-military readers; but we anticipate that the real

soldiers will agree with us, when we declare our conviction that a

military costume--we do not say a _uniform_ costume--but a _military_

one, would be altogether out of character and needless in such a case.

No: we would not have any of the smart shakos, and tight little green

jackets of the rifle brigade; no plumes nor feathers; no trailing

sabres for the officers, no cartouche boxes for the men--nothing at all

of the kind. We would put them all in uniform, but not in a uniform of

that nature--it should be one suited to the wearers, and to the nature

of their service.

Now the original intent and object of all uniform costume is, not the

ornamenting of the person; it is not the dressing of a young fellow,

until he becomes so handsome that the first woman he meets is ready to

surrender at discretion to him. It is not the uniform that makes the

soldier; it should be the soldier that should make the uniform; that is

to say, the kind of dress should be dictated both by the usual habits

and rank of the wearer, and by the service he is called on to perform.

Add to this that, provided the men all wear the same costume, no matter

what it may be, the great end of military costume, the holding the

men in distinct and united corps, is attained. The uniform does not

make a man fight a bit the better or worse: it is only for the sake of

evolutions and discipline that any uniform at all is needed.

We would therefore recommend the keeping in view of two principles,

in selecting the uniform of such corps; viz., utility and simplicity.

What are the duties a rifleman has to perform? Any man who ever went

deerstalking, any one who is accustomed to beat up the woods and covers

for cocks or pheasants, knows nine-tenths of a rifleman's duties. His

game is the enemy: whether he be a tall stag or a Frenchman, it is all

the same; a steady aim and a quick finger will do the job for him. And

now, dear reader, or gallant volunteer, or old fellow-shot, if you were

invited to go a-gunning, whether after stags, cocks, or men, how would

you like, if left to your own free choice, apart from all military

nonsense--how would you like to equip yourself? We know how we used to

go together over the Inverness-shire hills, and we know how we now go

through the Herefordshire preserves, and how we sometimes wander over

the Yorkshire moors; and it is just so that we should like to turn out.

You know the dress; we need hardly describe it: everybody knows it;

everybody has worn it. Just such a dress, then, as the volunteers would

wear at home in their field-sports and occupations, the very same, or

one of the same kind, would we recommend for their service as volunteer

riflemen.

A shooting-coat, made either of cloth or velveteen, differing in

colour, perhaps, for the different districts, or else one and the same

throughout the whole service--black, or dark brown, or dark green, or

any other colour that would suit the woodland and the moor; a waistcoat

to match, with those abundant pockets that the true shooter knows

how to make use of; trousers and stout boots, or else knee-breeches,

leathern leggings, and high-lows; in fact, whatever shooting costume

might be decided on by the gentry and authorities of the county for

their respective regiments. As for hats, either a plain round hat,

or else one of the soft felt ones, those most delightful friends to

the heated and exhausted sportsman. The only thing would be to have

everything cut after the same fashion, and the effect of uniformity

would be immediately attained, without running into any of those

excesses of paraphernalia which in former days brought down such

deserved ridicule on the corps of loyal volunteers. Every man should

wear round his waist a black leathern belt containing his bullets and

leathers; his caps would be stowed away in one of his pockets; and his

powder would travel well and dry in a horn or flask hung by a strap

over his shoulder. His rifle--we need hardly describe it--should be

rather longer and heavier than for sporting purposes, inasmuch as it

may have to be used against cavalry; and it should admit of having a

sword-bayonet fastened on at the muzzle. This bayonet might be worn

suspended, as a sword in its sheath, from the belt round the waist.

A black leathern knapsack, and a pilot-coat of warm stuff rolled up

on the top of it, would complete the costume of our volunteer; and he

would look more truly martial and serviceable, when thus equipped,

than if decked out with all kinds of lace and trimmings, and clad in a

jacket cut in the most _recherché_ style of military tailoring.

The officers should wear a precisely similar dress, but they might be

distinguished by gold or crimson sashes, according to rank, and might

wear round their breast, or on their hats, some further distinguishing

marks of their offices. The whole should be based on the idea of

equipping the corps as plain country gentlemen and yeomen going out to

do a day's serious business in the field; and if the business is not to

be serious, it is better to leave it alone than to attempt it.

Regard should be paid to the various inclinations and habits of

the districts from whence the regiments should be drawn, and, in

particular, those from Scotland should by all means retain some

strongly distinctive marks of their national costume: the plaid could

never be misapplied on their brawny shoulders.

We should suppose that it would cost each member of the corps at least

£10 or £15 to equip himself completely, and this would be by no means

too large a sum for the purposes required.

The costume of the mounted riflemen need not differ much from that of

the men on foot. The shooting-coat is as good on horseback as off; and

the only alteration we would recommend would be in the use of the stout

but supple black-jack hunting-boots now coming so much into fashion.

These admit of exercise on foot as well as in the saddle, and being

plain, quiet things, would be peculiarly suitable for the purpose

intended.

8thly, We are firmly persuaded that, if this experiment were tried in

any one county or district, it would be found to answer so well that

others would adopt and imitate it. The service it would render to

government might be most important in stirring times; and being a _bonâ

fide_ and really effective corps, it would revive the martial and manly

feelings of the people, now somewhat blunted by the long duration of

peace, and would diffuse a most wholesome spirit throughout the land.

From the sentiments of honour, and loyalty too, with which such a corps

would be animated, (for it would be composed of the very flower and

hope of the land,) it would, by its moral weight alone, keep in check

that crowd of discontented persons who always exist in our empire. The

loyal and honourable sentiments possessed by this corps would spread

themselves abroad among the people; the good example set would be

followed by the most respectable part of the nation, and a healthier

tone would be thereby given to society in general.

9thly, Taking into consideration the number of parishes, and the

population of Great Britain, (for we could not admit the Irish into our

loyal ranks) we should estimate the probable force that could thus be

raised and maintained at its own expense, at not less than 50,000 men,

of whom 10,000 would be effective light cavalry; and we should suppose

that at least 40,000 of this total number might be counted on for

active service, in any emergency.

The mere fact, if this calculation be not overrated, of our being

thereby able to add such a degree of strength to our regular army--or

that of our being able to replace such a number of our regular troops,

if called abroad suddenly for distant duty--or else, the knowledge that

there would always be such a numerous body of men in the country, armed

and arrayed in the support of the monarchy and the constitution; either

of these facts, taken separately, might justify the formation of such

a corps, but, taken conjointly, they seem to carry with them no small

weight.

An anomaly in the present constitution of noble society which

requires remedying, is the frequent inadequacy of the territorial

means possessed by noble families for the maintenance of their power

and dignity. This has reached to such a pitch, of late days, that

we have seen the ladies of two peers of the realm claiming public

support _in formâ pauperum_; and we have witnessed the breaking-up and

sale of such a princely establishment as that of Stowe. Many noble

families are forced to depend on public offices, and other indirect

sources, for the support of their members. Many noble families of

high distinction and renown are poorer than ordinary commoners. There

are very few estates of nobles (we say nothing of those of commoners)

which are not oppressed by mortgages, and which, in reality, confer

much less power than they nominally represent. From whatever causes

these circumstances may have arisen,--whether from the folly and

extravagance of the nobles themselves as a main cause, or from the

imprudence of the crown in making unworthy creations, as a subsidiary

cause--they have produced the most injurious effects upon the order,

and have even justified the boast of the first commoner who thought

himself superior to the last of the nobles. By few things has the

order been more injured in public opinion than by the inequality and

inadequacy of its territorial resources. This, too, becomes the more

painfully evident in a nation where commerce has been allowed to assume

an undue preponderance in the public mind, and where the means of

gaining money are so various and so many, that the rapid acquisition

of handsome fortunes is a very common occurrence. It is an evil, a

negation of the ends of life, and a main cause of the decline and fall

of a nation, that such a state of things should exist; but, seeing

that it does exist, it is doubly the duty and the interest of all who

have the honour and the permanency of national prosperity at heart, to

favour the establishment and the maintenance of the strongest possible

antagonistic principle--the forming and preserving of large territorial

possessions in favour of the order of nobles. Believing that the law of

primogeniture is the basis of all political freedom, we would urge the

expediency of modifying the law, so that certain great estates, like

the fiefs of old, should become inalienable by any person, unattachable

for any liabilities, and indivisible under any circumstances, in favour

of the order of nobles: and that the holders of such estates should

be nobles, and nobles only. In the same spirit we would say, that the

extent of territory should determine the rank of the noble, taking,

as the starting-point, the estates as they might exist at any period

of time; that to each title a certain territory should be inalienably

attached, and that the title itself should derive its name from that

territory--the holder of the territory, whoever he might be, always

taking the title. It would be productive of great good if facilities

were given as much as possible for massing together the properties

of the noble; and if estates widely spread over the kingdom could

be exchanged for others lying close together, and forming a compact

territory. The powers of the nobles are now greatly frittered away

and lost by the dispersion of their properties: he who holds nearly a

whole county continuously, like the Duke of Sutherland, is of much more

weight in the state than another, like the Duke of Devonshire, whose

estates, though of very great value, lie more widely scattered.

It may appear an innovation, but we are persuaded that it would be only

a return to the fundamental and ancient principles of the constitution,

to make the possession of a real estate of a certain value, for a

certain time, a legal title to claim the right to nobility. Thus the

possession of an estate of £10,000 per annum clear rental, or of 5000

acres, by the same family, in direct descent for four generations,

should of itself constitute a right for its owner to be ranked in the

lowest order of nobility,--that of barons,--and the barony should give

its name to its possessor; while, the possession of land of greater

extent and value should modify the superior titles of those who held

them, until the highest rank in the peerage were attained. All nobles

holding not less than £100,000 per annum of clear rental, or 50,000

acres, should _ipso facto_ and _de jure_ become dukes, and so on in

proportion between these two extremes of the peerage. Baronets should

rank, in virtue of their estates, immediately after the barons; and

in their turn, too, the possession of a certain income from landed

property, such as £5000 a-year clear for four generations, in the

same family, should immediately entitle its owner to rank among the

baronets, and to have the style and privileges of that order.

It will be urged, on the other hand, that the crown would thereby be

deprived of the power of rewarding meritorious public servants, by

calling them up to the House of Peers, if the possession of a certain

large amount of landed property were made a _sine quâ non_ for every

creation. To this it may be replied that, though the prerogatives

of the crown require extension rather than contraction, yet that a

sufficient power of reward would be possessed, if men of eminence

in the public service, whether great commanders or distinguished

lawyers, were summoned to the Upper House for their lives only,

without their titles being made hereditary; and further, that other

distinctions might be given which would be fully sufficient rewards

in themselves without any encroachment being made on the privileges

of the order of nobles. Thus, in former times, when the honour of

knighthood was not so common as it has now become, a great general and

a great judge considered themselves rewarded enough if knighted: they

never thought of being created peers. And the fact is, that though

personal nobility--the nobility acquired by the performance of great

actions--is in itself of the highest value to the state, as well as to

the individual, it is not sufficiently valuable to entitle the heirs of

a great man to take perpetual rank among the great landed proprietors

of the realm. The duties and responsibilities of nobility depend more

upon the trust reposed in each member than upon that member's personal

qualifications. The noble cannot be separated from his lands nor from

his tenants, nor from the multifarious heavy responsibilities thereby

incurred; he is the representative of a great interest in the state; he

is the representative of his land, and of all connected with it; he is

the representative of a great class and gathering: his duties are not

merely personal; he cannot found his right to nobility upon personal

merit alone. Personal qualifications can give no valid right to

hereditary privileges, whereas land is perpetual--_rura manebunt_--and

the privileges as well as the duties attached to it should be perpetual

also.

It would, therefore, be another step towards constituting the

aristocracy of the state on a more solid and reasonable basis, if

the orders of baronets, and of knights of various descriptions, were

purified of their anomalies, and rendered attainable only under rules

of a more general and fixed nature than at present prevail. Both these

classes of nobles--for so they may be called--require considerable

purification; the former, that of baronet, should be made the

intermediate class between the nobles by personal merit, or knights,

and those who are nobles by their lands, the peers. As was observed

before, no baronetcy should be conferred unless a real estate of a

certain value could be shown to be possessed, _clear_ of all mortgage

and debt; and the retention of such an estate for a certain number of

generations should establish a legal claim to the title of baronet;

while the subsequent increase of the same estate, and a similar

retention of it for a certain number of descents, should establish a

further claim to the honour of the peerage. If the orders of knighthood

were made more difficult of entry, and if they were specially reserved

only for public personal services, they would rise again in public

estimation, and would be suitable for all purposes of reward required

by the sovereign.

At the same time, and as a consequence of this, peers and baronets

should not be admitted into the orders of knighthood--they should be

satisfied with their own dignities. The garter, the thistle, and the

shamrock should be reserved especially for the great military and naval

commanders of the realm: the bath, and perhaps one or two other new

orders, should be destined for men of eminence in whatever line of life

they might be able to render service to their country.

It is an opinion controverted by some, but it seems founded in reason,

that the twelve judges, who are at the head of their most honourable

profession, should not merely be allowed to sit on the benches of the

House of Lords, but that they should have the right of voting therein,

and, in fact, be summoned as peers for life upon their elevation to

the bench. No order of men in the whole state would exercise power

more conscientiously, and from no other source could the Upper House

derive at once such an immense increase of deliberative strength in the

revision and framing of the laws. The bench of spiritual lords, and the

bench of legal lords, ought to form two of the purest ornaments in the

bright galaxy of the peers of the realm.

We shall content ourselves for the present with indicating two other

points, recognised and admitted by the constitutional forms of the

government, but at present much lost sight of; and they may be

considered as affecting the lowest order--the very root of the whole

nobility of the land.

Members of the Lower House for counties are always called _knights_ of

the shires they represent; and so they ought to be. No person should

be eligible to represent a county unless previously adorned with the

honour either of knighthood or of the baronetage, or unless the younger

son of a peer of the realm; and indeed the attaching of titles of

nobility to the possession of estates of a certain value and fixity of

tenure, and the annexing of baronetcies to similar properties, would

put all the principal country gentlemen in a position suited to the

duties of a knight of the shire. We should not then see the absurd and

mischievous anomaly of an ambitious theorist of no landed property in

his own possession, but backed by the democrats of a manufacturing

district, thrust upon the legislature as the representative of a large

agricultural county. We should rather find the knights of the shires

forming a compact and most influential body in the imperial parliament,

the real representatives of the interests of their constituents, and

the main conservative element in the Lower House of the legislature.

The bearing of arms, and the gratuitous assumption of the title of

esquire, now so universally adopted, require to be more strictly

limited, unless it is desired that the whole system should fall from

inevitable ridicule into ultimate disuse. It is a kind of morbid

feeling that has thus been produced by national vanity, and will some

day or other work out its opposite extreme, unless restrained in due

time. For the undue granting of arms the Herald's College is greatly

responsible; but for the universal assumption of the correlative title,

society at large is to be blamed. It is one of the weaknesses of the

day, that men and things are no longer called by their true names,

and it indicates a downward progress in the national fortunes rather

than the contrary. The evil might be checked by the confining of the

right to wear _coats_ of arms or _shields_ to the orders of knighthood

only--as it used to be at the first institution of the custom; while

for all persons under that standing in society, some distinctive

badge or family token might be adopted, sufficient to identify their

lineage, yet showing a difference of grade. It is more difficult to

say how the appellations of the various classes of commoners shall be

settled; but there can be no doubt that the common herding of all men

together--whether under the names of esquires, gentlemen, or even of

"gents"--is an absurdity: mischievous, inasmuch as it tends to level

what ought to be unequal, and as it renders ridiculous what ought to be

respected.

We readily allow that the ideas propounded above are more or less

Utopian; so, however, are all ideas of change. With this excuse,

however, we content ourselves for the present. If we have advocated

any amendments, they are not in the direction of what is called,

falsely enough--_Progress_, but in that of what is really and truly

improvement, because it implies a reverting to the fundamental and

unalterable basis of the modern European social system. "Progress" now

means advancement in the cause of democracy--that is, in the path which

marks the decline and fall, and ultimate destruction of any old nation.

Far be it from us to lend a hand to aught that can assist this fatal

and destructive process. We would preserve, and restore, and improve,

rather than destroy. And it is because we believe this ancient spirit

of feudalism to be that which contains the great elements of national

prosperity, that we therefore advocate a return towards some of its

first principles. A further development of this we reserve for a future

occasion. But this we will maintain, that in the great cycle of years

which constitute the life of a people, the upward rising of the nation

is characterised by the active vitality of what we will call feudalism,

its downward sinking by the existence of democratic license and opulent

enervation, following upon the decline of warlike and chivalrous

pursuits. The process of corruption and of disintegration may be slow,

but it is not the less certain. It overtakes even the most prosperous

nations at last. Would that we could check and avert that evil from our

own country!

CIVIL REVOLUTION IN THE CANADAS.

Strange though it sound to speak of a revolution in these provinces,

where the representative of the crown is notoriously supported by a

large majority in the provincial parliament, and where, for years

past, there has scarcely been an inquiry made as to when a regiment

either came or went, or even how many troops were in the whole American

colonies; yet it is nevertheless a fact, that a more important and

effective revolution is now going on in the Canadas, than if half their

population were in open arms against the mother country.

Before attempting either to describe or to account--which we trust in

the course of this paper to be able to do--for this extraordinary state

of things, it will be necessary to touch upon a few leading events in

the history of both provinces, and, incidentally, upon the character

and intentions of the parties engaged in them.

It is well known to all English readers, that the French of Lower

Canada, forming a population of some four hundred thousand people,

after a long course of factious and embarrassing legislation; after

a species of civil, social, and parliamentary strife for nearly half

a century, which was far more withering in its effects upon the

prosperity of the country than a good fight in the beginning would have

been, finally, in 1837, took up arms against the British government.

Shortly afterwards they were joined by the party in Upper Canada

which had long made common cause with them, though without common

principles, aims, or hopes--the one's pride being indissolubly wedded

to institutions which were pregnant with retrogression and decay, the

other's chief merit consisting in pretension to raise men from beneath

old ruins, instead of bringing old ruins down upon them. Yet both

agreed in hating England, and in taking up arms, jointly and severally,

to overthrow her institutions. Whatever other lesson England might have

learned from the fact, she should at least have learned this--that it

was no ordinary feelings of desperation or of difference that made them

forego so much to each other, in order to strike an effectual blow at

her; and that it could be no ordinary circumstance, if it was even

in the nature of things, after they had become partners in the same

defeats and humiliations--after they had been made bed-fellows by the

same misfortunes--that could disunite them in favour of their common

enemy; and not only turn the tide of their hatred against each other,

but make the party that became loyal to England kiss the rod that had

so severely scourged it.

Probably this might have been thought difficult. But where the

hostility to England might have been regarded as accidental, rather

than of settled and determined principle, it might be urged that the

reconciling one or both these parties to the British government, might

not have been impossible; or the bringing the one back to loyalty, even

at the expense of its having to oppose the other, might still be in the

power of wise legislation.

This brings us to consider the character and the principles, the

prejudices and the predilections, of the two parties. And if the reader

will follow us over a little scrap of history, possibly new to him, if

we do not happen to differ on the road, we apprehend we shall agree in

summing up the general results.

For many parliaments previous to the rebellion in Lower Canada, the

majority in favour of the French was on an average equal to four-fifths

of each house. And, instead of this majority being diminished by

the agency of immigration, or by reason of the detachment of almost

every Englishman and American in the province from their cause--who

at first sided with them for the purpose of procuring the redress of

all real abuses, most, if not all, of which, arose from the nature of

their own institutions,--it continued to increase, until at last every

county in the province which had a preponderance of French influence,

sent a member to parliament to carry on a kind of civil war with the

government. Men of the first talents in the country, who had freely

spent the best of their lives and their efforts in its service, when

they were compelled to leave this faction, or take leave of their

loyalty to the crown, found that the breadth of their own intellects

was all they were ever able to detach from its ranks. Every concession

the imperial government could make, every effort to conciliate them,

was met only by fresh demands--demands conceived in a spirit of

hostility, and wilfully and knowingly of such a character as could not

be conceded. Yet their majorities continued, and even increased, in

parliament. In 1832, they carried their measures of hostility to the

British, and even the Irish population so far, as to refuse to employ

them for any purposes whatever, and, in some cases, those employed

were dismissed. It is matter of Lower Canadian history, that one of

their greatest grievances was, that they had not the control of the

appointments of judges and other public officers, and the apportioning

of their salaries; yet it is well known--it was publicly avowed by

them in Parliament--that their object was, to starve out the British

government, by starving out its officers. Still the French leaders who

mooted these measures gained in popularity, and the English members

for French counties continued to lessen. British manufactures were

solemnly denounced in their parliament, and the use of them declared

a disgrace to every Frenchman; and a tax, which they intended as a

prohibition, was attempted to be placed upon British emigrants: yet

withal, Mr Papineau, the great French leader, rose the higher, and his

party grew the stronger. The more, in short, the French leaders could

embarrass the government, and the more they could throw obstacles in

the way of the improvements incident to the activity and enterprise of

the English race, the more they rose in the estimation of the French

constituencies. They claimed, in truth, for these very acts, their

confidence, and they received what they claimed to the fullest extent.

In a well-written, and, considering all the circumstances, a temperate

address of the Constitutional Association of Montreal in 1832--an

association got up with the view of making the situation of the British

population known to the imperial government, and an association

that afterwards greatly contributed to save the province during the

rebellion--we find the following among other passages to the same

effect, upon this subject:--

"For half a century has the population of English and Irish

descent in Lower Canada been subjected to the domination of

a party whose policy has been to retain the distinguishing

attributes of a foreign race, and to crush in others that

spirit of enterprise which they are unable or unwilling to

emulate. During this period, a population, descended from

the same stock with ourselves, have covered a continent with

the monuments of their agricultural industry. Upper Canada

and the United States bear ample testimony of the flood-tide

of prosperity--the result of unrestricted enterprise, and of

equitable laws. Lower Canada, where another race predominates,

presents a solitary exception to this march of improvement.

There, surrounded by forests inviting industry, and offering

a rich reward to labour, an illiterate people, opposed to

improvements, have compressed their growing numbers almost

within the boundaries of their original settlements, and

present, in their mode of laws, in their mode of agriculture,

and peculiar customs, a not unfaithful picture of France in

the seventeenth century. There also may be witnessed the

humiliating spectacle of a rural population not unfrequently

necessitated to implore eleemosynary relief from the

legislature of the country."