[Sidenote: 1761.]
[Sidenote: 1762.]
[Sidenote: Jan. 4.]
Before the campaign closed in Germany, the great Minister who
had revealed to England for the first time the plenitude of her
strength in arms, and had turned that strength to such mighty
enterprises, was fallen from power. The accession of the new King
had brought with it a steady increase in the ascendency of John,
Earl of Bute, long a trusted member of his household and now his
chief adviser and friend. Blameless in private life and by no means
lacking in culture or accomplishments, Bute was both in council and
debate a man of distressing mediocrity. Possessing neither sense of
the ridiculous nor knowledge of his own limitations, and exalted
by mere accident to a position of great influence, he interpreted
the caprice of fortune as the reward of merit and aimed at once
at the highest office. He was, in fact, one of the many men who,
finding it no great exertion to climb up the winding stairs of a
cathedral tower, press on, ducking, stooping, and crawling to the
top, to find when they reach it that they dare not look down. Being
weak as well as ambitious he was compelled to fall back on intrigue
in default of ability to help him upward, and having succeeded in
displacing Lord Holderness as Secretary of State in March 1761,
he turned next to the ousting of Pitt himself. The opportunity
soon came. The French Court, weary of the war, approached Pitt
with proposals for peace. Resolved, as he said, that no Peace of
Utrecht should again sully the annals of England, Pitt not only
made large demands for the benefit of Britain, but insisted that
even a separate peace between Britain and France should not deter
King George from giving aid to the King of Prussia. Curiously
enough the negotiation was broken off owing precisely to one of
the most disgraceful concessions made at the Peace of Utrecht. The
Bourbon King of Spain, Charles the Third, who had succeeded to
the throne in 1759, cultivated the friendship of the Bourbon King
of France; and the result was a secret treaty of alliance between
them, which presently became famous as the Family Compact. Pitt no
sooner obtained an inkling of this agreement than he put an end
to negotiations with France, and advocated immediate declaration
of war against Spain. As shall presently be seen, he made his
preparations, which were effective enough; but above all he desired
to strike at Spain while she was still unready for war. The
Cabinet, however, was alarmed at so bold a measure, being too blind
to see that in such a case aggression is the truest precaution.
Many of the ministry had only with difficulty been persuaded
to second Pitt in the lofty language which he had held towards
France; and Bute, who abhorred all interference with affairs on the
Continent, was a leader among the dissentients. Lord Temple alone
stood by his great chief, so Pitt, unable to prevail, resigned, and
his solitary supporter with him. All power passed into the hands of
Bute; and within three months Spain, having gained the time that
she needed for her military preparations, assumed so offensive a
tone that Bute, as Pitt had predicted, was to his huge vexation
obliged to declare war against her himself. Such is the fashion in
which politicians make difficulties for generals.
[Sidenote: 1761.]
[Sidenote: June.]
Fortunately the designs of Pitt for the new year against both
France and Spain were fully matured, and the means of executing
them were ready to hand. In June 1761 two new regiments[378]
had been either raised or formed out of existing independent
companies, and thirteen more had been added in August and
October,[379] thus bringing the number of regiments of the Line
up to one hundred and fifteen. The total number of men voted by
Parliament for 1762 was little short of one hundred and fifty
thousand men, making with the German mercenaries a total of two
hundred and fifteen thousand men in British pay. There were thus
men in abundance for any enterprise; and the sphere of operations
had been marked out by Pitt. The conquest of Canada having been
completed by the end of 1760, there was no object in leaving a
large number of troops unemployed in America; and as early as in
January 1761 Pitt had written to Amherst that some of them would
be required in the autumn for the conquest of Dominica, St. Lucia,
and Martinique. Amherst was therefore instructed to send two
thousand men forthwith to Guadeloupe; to concert with the Governor
the means of taking the two first of the islands mentioned; and to
despatch six thousand more men rather later in the year for the
capture of Martinique.[380] Accordingly in the first days of June
1761 transports from America began to drop singly into Guadeloupe,
the fleet having been dispersed by a storm. By the 3rd of June
four ships had arrived, together with Lord Rollo, who had been
appointed by Amherst to take the command; and on the following day
the whole of these, together with one ship more from Guadeloupe
itself, made sail under escort of Sir J. Douglas's squadron to
beat back against the trade-wind to Dominica.[381] By noon of
the 6th they had arrived before Roseau, where the inhabitants
were summoned to surrender. The French replied by manning their
batteries and other defences, which included four separate lines
of entrenchments, ranged one above another. Rollo landed his men
and entered the town; when reflecting that the enemy might be
reinforced in the night he resolved, though it was already late,
to storm the entrenchments forthwith. He attacked accordingly, and
drove out the French in confusion with trifling loss to himself.
The French commander and his second being both taken prisoners,
no further resistance was made; and on the following day Dominica
swore allegiance to King George.
Therewith the operations in the West Indies for the time ceased,
though the preparations continued always; but, notwithstanding all
possible secrecy, the French in Martinique got wind of the intended
attack on that island, and took measures for their defence. Their
force was not wholly contemptible in so mountainous a country,
for it included twelve hundred regular troops, seven thousand
local militia, and four thousand hired privateersmen.[382] The
neighbouring English islands did what they could to help the mother
country. Antigua sent negroes and part of her old garrison, the
Thirty-eighth Foot, which had never left her since Queen Anne's
day; and Barbados raised five hundred negroes and as many white
men, which were the more acceptable since that island was, as
usual, the rendezvous for the expedition.[383] The first troops
to arrive in Carlisle Bay were a detachment from Belleisle,[384]
where, as well as in America, regiments had been lying idle;
and on Christmas Eve appeared the main army from America under
command of General Monckton. This was made up of eleven different
regiments,[385] besides a few companies of American rangers. In
all, the force entrusted to Monckton must have amounted to fully
eight thousand men.
[Sidenote: 1762.]
[Sidenote: January.]
[Sidenote: Jan. 24.]
On the 5th of January the transports weighed anchor and sailed
away to leeward, under escort of Admiral Rodney's fleet, past the
Pitons of St. Lucia, past the port of Castries and the bay which
Rodney was twenty years later to make famous, and on the 7th
anchored in St. Ann's Bay, just round the southern extremity of
Martinique, on the western side. Two brigades were then landed in
the Anse d'Arlet, a bay farther up the western coast, from which
they marched to the south of the bay that forms the harbour of
Fort Royal, but, finding the road impracticable for transport of
cannon, were re-embarked. On the 16th the entire army was landed
without loss of a man at Case Navire, a little to the north of
Negro Point. This Point forms the northern headland of the harbour,
and had at its foot a road leading due east over the mountains to
the capital town of Fort Royal,[386] some three miles away. The
way was blocked by deep gullies and ravines; while the French had
erected redoubts at every point of vantage, as well as batteries
on a hill beyond, named Morne Tortenson. Monckton was thus
compelled to erect batteries to silence the French guns before he
could advance farther. By the 24th this work was complete, and at
daybreak a general attack was made under the fire of the batteries
upon the French defences on Morne Tortenson, a party being at the
same time detached to turn the enemy's right flank. The turning
movement was completely successful; and the redoubts by the sea,
on the enemy's left, having been carried, the troops stormed post
after post, until at nine o'clock they were in possession not
only of the detached redoubts but of the entire position of Morne
Tortenson, with its guns and entrenchments. The French retired in
great confusion, some to Fort Royal and some to Morne Grenier, a
still higher hill to the north of Morne Tortenson. Simultaneously
two brigades under Brigadiers Haviland and Walsh attacked other
French posts to the north of Morne Tortenson and, after great
difficulty owing to the steepness of the ground, succeeded in
driving them also back to Morne Grenier. The losses of the British
in this action amounted to thirty-three officers and three hundred
and fifty men killed and wounded.
[Sidenote: Jan. 25.]
On the following day Monckton, being now within range, began to
throw up batteries against the citadel of Fort Royal, but finding
himself much annoyed by the French batteries on Morne Grenier to
his left, decided that these must first be silenced. Fortunately
the enemy saved him from further trouble by taking the offensive.
On the afternoon of the 27th they suddenly debouched in three
columns from Morne Grenier upon Haviland's brigade and the Light
Infantry of the army, on Monckton's left, and with unexpected
temerity ventured to attack. Unhappily for them, one column exposed
its flank to the Highlanders and was almost instantly routed.
The two remaining columns thereupon gave way, and the whole fled
back to Morne Grenier with the British in eager chase. Such was
the impetuosity of the pursuers that they plunged down into the
intervening ravine after the French, and swarming up Morne Grenier
"by every path, road, and passage where men could run, walk, or
creep,"[387] hunted the fugitives headlong before them. Night came
on, but the British officers would not stop until they had cleared
every Frenchman off the hill and captured all the works and cannon.
Monckton at once sent off more troops to support the pursuers,
and by one o'clock in the morning of the 28th Morne Grenier was
securely occupied, at a cost of little more than one hundred
British killed and wounded. The batteries on Morne Tortenson
were then completed, new batteries were constructed within four
hundred yards of the citadel, and on the 3rd of February Fort Royal
surrendered. Nine days more sufficed to reduce the rest of the
Island, and by the 12th of February Monckton's work was done.[388]
[Sidenote: Feb. 26-March 3.]
[Sidenote: June.]
He at once shipped off detachments to St. Lucia, Grenada, and St.
Vincent, which islands fell without resistance, and had made his
arrangements for the capture of Tobago also, when he received
orders requiring the presence of his troops elsewhere. War had
been declared against Spain; Lord Albemarle had been appointed
to command an expedition against Havanna; and Amherst had been
directed not only to embark four thousand men from America to
join him, but to collect eight thousand more for an attack on
Louisiana.[389] The stroke meditated by Pitt three months before
was now about to fall. In February 1762 Albemarle's troops
embarked; and on the 5th of March he sailed with four regiments
only,[390] under convoy of Admiral Sir George Pocock, to pick
up the remainder of his forces in the West Indies. On the 20th
of April he arrived at Barbados, and on the 25th at Fort Royal,
Martinique, where he took over from Monckton what he termed "the
remains of a very fine army," much reduced by sickness, which
brought his force to a strength of twelve thousand men of all
ranks.[391] Thence continuing his voyage he came on the 6th of
June into sight of Havanna. Twelve sail of the line were detached
to the mouth of the harbour to block in the Spanish fleet, and
on the following day the troops were landed safely a little to
the northward of the city. On the 8th the army advanced westward,
brushing away a force of militia that stood in its path, and on the
same day arrived before the principal defences of Havanna.
[Sidenote: July.]
The entrance to the harbour of Havanna lies through a channel about
two hundred yards wide, which was defended by two forts at its
mouth, Fort Moro on the northern shore, and Fort Puntal opposite
to it, the town also being situated on the southern shore. On
the north side the ground rises rather abruptly from the harbour
into a ridge known as the Cavannos, at the end of which stands
Fort Moro, abutting on the open sea. A detached redoubt on these
heights was carried without difficulty on the 11th of June, and,
Fort Moro being found after reconnaissance to be surrounded with
impenetrable brushwood, the construction of a battery was begun
under cover of the trees. The work progressed slowly, for the
soil was thin, while the Spanish ships in the harbour caused the
besiegers no slight annoyance; so on the 13th a part of the British
force was landed at Chorera, on the other side of the harbour. It
was not until July that the British batteries could open a really
effective fire, but by the 15th, with the help of the fleet, the
enemy's guns were for the time silenced; and since trenches were
impossible in ground so rocky, approaches to Fort Moro were made
of gabions and cotton-bales. Still the work made little progress,
for the climate had begun to tell on the troops, and little more
than half of the men were fit for duty. Meanwhile the garrison of
Fort Moro continued to defend itself with the greatest obstinacy,
due in part to its confidence in the strength of the fort. The
ditch at the point of attack was seventy feet deep from the edge
of the counterscarp, except in one place, where a narrow ridge
of rock made it possible to reach the wall of the fort without
scaling-ladders. The only way to surmount such an obstacle was to
sink a shaft and blow the counterscarp into the ditch, but powder
was already running short; and Albemarle grew extremely anxious
over the issue of his operations.
[Sidenote: July 30.]
At length on the 27th Colonel Burton arrived from America with
three thousand men of the Forty-sixth, Fifty-eighth, Gorham's
rangers and Provincial troops, having lost five hundred men
captured by the French on the voyage. Three days later the mine
under the counterscarp was sprung with success, and Fort Moro
was carried by storm with trifling loss, the Spaniards offering
but little resistance. New batteries were then pushed forward
along the shore at the foot of the Cavannos in order to play on
the town. On the 10th of August these opened fire and on the
same evening silenced Fort Puntal. The Spaniards then proposed a
capitulation; and Albemarle, in consideration of their defence,
granted them the honours of war, being in truth devoutly thankful
to obtain possession of Havanna on any terms. His army was melting
away rapidly from disease; there was indeed one brigade of four
battalions which could not muster twenty men fit for duty.
Albemarle hastened to ship it back to America; but Amherst could
spare no more troops to replace these, having already reduced
his garrison to a strength of less than four thousand men.[392]
Albemarle hoped that rest and better quarters might restore the
health of the army after the work of the siege was done; but on
the contrary sickness increased. The losses actually caused by the
enemy's fire during the siege were rather less than a thousand men
killed and wounded, yet by the 18th of October the British had
buried over five thousand men dead from sickness alone.[393] Nor
did the transfer of the troops from Cuba to America serve to abate
the plague among them; for the hapless brigade first shipped off by
Albemarle lost three hundred and sixty men within a month after its
return. Yet at any rate Cuba was taken, and Cuba in those days was
reckoned a prize little less rich than India.
[Sidenote: June 27.]
[Sidenote: Sept. 18.]
The virtual destruction of the army before Havanna put all ideas
of an attack on Louisiana out of the question; and the French
seized the opportunity offered by the removal of so many troops
from Canada to send a small squadron and fifteen hundred troops
against Newfoundland. The British garrison being only one hundred
strong could offer no resistance, and the island was accordingly
surrendered. Amherst, however, sent his brother with a sufficient
force to recover it; and the French after a short defence
capitulated as prisoners of war. As Amherst's losses did not exceed
fifty men, and the captured French garrison numbered six hundred,
the enemy gained little by this brief occupation of Newfoundland.
[Illustration: GUADELOUPE, 1759.]
[Illustration: HAVANNA, 1762.]
[Illustration: MARTINIQUE, 1762.]
[Illustration: BELLEISLE, 1761.
_Walker & Boutall del._ _To face page 544._
]
[Sidenote: Aug. 1.]
[Sidenote: Sept. 24.]
[Sidenote: Sept. 25.]
[Sidenote: Oct. 4.]
[Sidenote: Oct. 5.]
But in India also there were troops lying idle since the fall
of Pondicherry, which could be employed against Spain. In June
Admiral Cornish received secret orders for an expedition, which
he communicated to the authorities at Calcutta; and on the 1st
of August the fleet sailed away to eastward with a force of one
thousand Europeans, half of them of Draper's regiment, and two
thousand Sepoys, under General Draper. On the 24th of September,
after much delay owing to stormy weather and the extremely
defective condition of Cornish's ships, the expedition entered the
bay of Manila and anchored off Fort Cavita. Draper decided not to
waste time in reducing the fort, so landed his troops unopposed on
the following day through a heavy surf, about a mile and a half
from the walls of the city. On the 26th he seized a detached fort
which had been abandoned by the Spaniards within two hundred yards
of the glacis, and began to construct a battery, while the ships
sailed up to draw the fire of the town upon themselves. On the 30th
a storeship arrived with entrenching tools, but was driven ashore
on the very same evening by a gale, and there lay hard and fast. By
singular good fortune, however, she had taken the ground at a
point where she served exactly to screen the rear of Draper's camp
from the Spanish cannon, while her stores were landed with greater
speed and safety than would have been possible had she remained
afloat; for the gale continued for several days and forbade the
passage of boats through the surf. Four days later the battery and
the ships opened a furious fire, which in four hours silenced the
enemy's guns, and by the next day had made a practicable breach.
That night the Spaniards made a sally upon the British position
with a thousand Indians, who, despite their ferocity and daring,
were driven back with heavy loss; and at dawn of the 6th Draper's
regiment and a party of sailors attacked the breach and carried the
fortifications with little difficulty. Thereupon Manila, with the
island of Luzon and its dependencies, surrendered to the British,
paying four million dollars for ransom of the town and of the
property contained therein. Thus fell Manila within ten days of the
arrival of the British; but the siege though short was attended by
much difficulty and hardship. Regular approaches were impracticable
owing to the incessant rain; while the surf made the landing of
troops and stores a matter of extreme labour and peril. Had not the
defences of the town been for the most part feeble and the spirit
of the garrison feebler still, the capture of the Philippines would
have been no such simple matter. The story of Manila is, however,
interesting as a comment on Wentworth's proceedings at Carthagena,
justifying to the full Vernon's predilection for a direct assault
at the earliest possible moment in all operations against the
Spaniard.
[Sidenote: Aug. 26.]
Yet another expedition brought the British face to face with their
new enemy on more familiar ground than Luzon. The Spaniards, on the
pretext of Portuguese friendship with England, in April invaded
Portugal, overran the country as far as the Douro from the north,
and threw another force against Almeida from the east. The injured
kingdom appealed to England for help; and in May orders were sent
to Belleisle for the despatch of four regiments of infantry,[394]
together with the detachment of the Sixteenth Light Dragoons, to
Portugal. Two more regiments were added from Ireland,[395] bringing
the total up to about seven thousand men; and simultaneously a
number of British officers were sent to take up commands in the
Portuguese army. Unfortunately there was some trouble over the
selection of a commander; and though the two regiments from Ireland
were actually in the Tagus by the first week in May, it was not
until June that the rest of the troops arrived, with the Count of
Lippe-Bückeburg, the famous artillerist, as Commander-in-Chief of
the Allied forces, and Lord Loudoun in command of the British. The
operations that followed were so trifling and of so short duration
that they are unworthy of detailed mention. The Spaniards captured
Almeida early in August; and Bückeburg was obliged to stand on the
defensive and cover Lisbon at the line of the Tagus. Two brilliant
little affairs, however, served to lift an officer, who so far was
little known, into a prominence which was one day to be disastrous
to himself and to England. This was Brigadier-General John
Burgoyne, Colonel of the Sixteenth Light Dragoons, who with four
hundred troopers of his regiment surprised the town of Valencia de
Alcantara after a forced march of forty-five miles, annihilated a
regiment of Spanish infantry and captured several prisoners. Not
content with this, he a month later surprised the camp of another
party of Spaniards at Villa Velha, on the south bank of the Tagus,
dispersed it with considerable loss and captured six guns, at a
cost of but one man killed and ten wounded. Such affairs, which
in Ferdinand's army were so common as seldom to be noticed, made
Burgoyne and the Sixteenth[396] the heroes of this short campaign;
but though the regiment has lived the rest of its life according
to this beginning, Burgoyne's career will end for us twenty years
hence at Saratoga.
From these scattered enterprises against Spain I return to
Ferdinand's last campaign against the old enemy in Germany. We left
the contending parties in their winter-quarters, the French army
of the Rhine cantoned along the river from Cleve to Cologne; the
army of the Main extending from Altenkirchen, a little to north of
Treves, north-eastward to Cassel and from Cassel south-eastward to
Langensalza; and the Allies, facing almost due south, stretched
from Münster to Halberstadt. The whole situation was, however,
changed in various respects. The French had resolved to throw their
principal strength into the army of the Main, which was accordingly
raised to eighty thousand men under the command of Soubise and
Marshal d'Estrées; Broglie having been recalled to France. The
army of the Rhine was reduced proportionately to thirty thousand
men under the Prince of Condé. The total numbers of the French,
though less than in previous years, still remained far superior
to Ferdinand's; but, on the other hand, owing to the change of
ministry in England and the reopening of negotiations by Bute, the
Court of Versailles was content to hold the ground already gained
without attempt at further conquest. Soubise and d'Estrées were
therefore instructed to cling fast to Cassel and Göttingen, to
spare the district between the Rhine and the Lahn with a view to
winter-quarters, and to destroy the forage between the Eder and the
Diemel so as to prevent Ferdinand from manœuvring on their flanks
and rear.
Ferdinand on his side, though still outmatched by the armies
opposed to him, was relatively stronger in numbers than in any
previous year, having a nominal total of ninety-five thousand
men ready for the field. Winter-quarters were little disturbed
during the early months of 1762, the country having been so much
devastated that neither side could move, from lack of forage,
until the green corn was already grown high. Towards the end of
May both armies began to concentrate; and Ferdinand, though much
delayed by the negligence of the British Ministry in recruiting the
British regiments to their right strength, determined to be first
in the field.
[Sidenote: June 18.]
[Sidenote: June 22.]
Having detached a strong corps under the Hereditary Prince to watch
the movements of Condé, he concentrated at Brakel, a little to the
east of Paderborn, and advanced to the Diemel, where he posted
the main army about Corbeke, with Granby's corps to westward of
it at Warburg. Hearing at the same time that the French had left
a corps under Prince Xavier on the east of the Weser to invade
Hanover, he detached General Lückner with a small force across
the river to keep an eye on him, sending also parties to seize
the Castle of Zappaburg, some few miles to south-east, to secure
communications with Lückner, and to occupy the passes leading from
the south of the Diemel into Hesse. Meanwhile, on the 22nd of June,
Soubise and d'Estrées moved northward from Cassel with the main
body of the army as far as Gröbenstein, fixed their headquarters
at Wilhelmsthal and halted. The design of this movement is
unintelligible unless, as is conjectured by one writer,[397] they
wished simply to amuse themselves at the castle of Wilhelmsthal;
but in any case they neglected all necessary precautions. Their
right flank rested on the large forest known as the Reinhardswald,
and might have been rendered absolutely secure by the occupation
of the Zappaburg, which commanded every road through that forest;
yet they had suffered this important post to fall into Ferdinand's
hands. Again, the occupation of the passes to the south of the
Diemel would have secured their front; but here also they had
allowed the Allies to be before them. None the less there they
remained, careless of all consequences, at Wilhelmsthal; while to
tempt an active enemy still farther, they stationed a corps under
M. de Castries before their right front at Carlsdorff, in absolute
isolation from their main body. Ferdinand saw his opportunity, and
though he could bring but fifty thousand men against their seventy
thousand, resolved to strike at once.
[Sidenote: June 23.]
On the 23rd he recalled Lückner from across the Weser to
Gottesbühren, a little to the north of the Zappaburg; and on
hearing of his safe arrival at eight o'clock of the same evening,
ordered the whole army to be under arms at midnight. For Lückner's
corps was but one of the toils which he was preparing to draw
around the unsuspecting French; and the places for the rest had
already been chosen. Spörcke, with twelve battalions of Hanoverians
and several squadrons, was to advance from the left of the main
body, turn a little to the eastward upon Humme after crossing the
Diemel, and, marching from thence southward, was to fall upon the
right flank and rear of Castries' corps at Hombrechsen. Lückner,
with six battalions and seven squadrons, was to march south-west
from Gottesbühren through the Zappaburg to Udenhausen, and form up
to the left of Spörcke on Castries' right rear. Colonel Riedesel
was to push forward from the Zappaburg with a body of irregulars to
Hohenkirch, on the south and left of Lückner. Meanwhile Ferdinand
was to advance with the main body in five columns between Liebenau
and Sielen, upon the front of the French principal army, while
Granby should move south upon Zierenberg and fall upon its left
flank. Supposing that every corps fulfilled its duty exactly in
respect of time and place, there was good hope that the entire
force of the French might be destroyed.
[Sidenote: June 24.]
Riedesel and Lückner were punctually in their appointed places at
seven o'clock on the morning of the 24th. Spörcke's two columns,
on emerging from the Reinhardswald at five o'clock, found only two
vedettes before them on the heights of Hombrechsen, and ascended
those heights unopposed. Then, however, not seeing Castries'
corps, which, as it chanced, was hidden from them by a wood, they
turned to their left instead of to their right, and advanced
unconsciously towards the front of the French main army. The
startled vedettes galloped back to give the alarm; and Castries
hurriedly calling his men to arms prepared to retreat. Pushing
forward his cavalry right and left to screen his movements from
Spörcke and from Riedesel, Castries quickly set his infantry in
order for march; and having contrived to hold Spörcke at bay for
an hour, began his retreat upon Wilhelmsthal and Cassel. Lückner
came up as he had been bidden at Udenhausen, but meeting part of
Spörcke's corps on its march in the wrong direction was fired upon
by it; and in the confusion Castries was able to make his escape.
Riedesel being weak in numbers could not stop him, though he fell
furiously with his hussars upon the rear-guard and cut one regiment
of French infantry to pieces; but except for this loss Castries
retired with little damage. Thus, as so often happens, failed the
most important detail of Ferdinand's elaborate combinations.
Meanwhile the French main army, startled out of its sleep by the
sound of the guns about Hombrechsen, was in absolute confusion.
Fortunately for the Marshals, the unlucky mistake as to Lückner's
corps which had saved Castries, saved them also, since it checked
Spörcke's advance against their right. Breaking up their camp with
amazing rapidity, they formed upon the heights and hastened their
baggage away towards Cassel. Lückner, awake to the miscarriage of
the turning movement on the French right, now begged Kielmansegge,
who commanded the left column of Spörcke's corps, to hasten with
him to Hohenkirchen, from whence a cross way to westward would
enable them to bar every road between Wilhelmsthal and Cassel. But
Kielmansegge persisted in attacking the right flank of the French
main body, despite the fact that it was covered by a brook running
through a swampy valley; and before he could effect his passage
over this obstacle, the opportunity for cutting off the French
retreat was lost.
Meanwhile the troops under Ferdinand in the centre advanced against
the French front, though very slowly. Spörcke's right column formed
up on their left, but being out of its right place hampered the
advance of the rest and caused lamentable delay. The French main
army, having cleared its baggage out of the way, was falling back
in several columns towards Wilhelmsthal, when the appearance of
Granby on their left showed them the full extent of their peril.
The flower of the French infantry was then collected under M. de
Stainville and thrown out on the left to cover the retreat of
the main body at any cost; and now the action began in earnest.
Taking up a strong position in a wood Stainville prepared to do
his utmost. Granby's infantry consisted of three battalions of
British Guards, the British grenadiers in three battalions, and the
Fifth and Eighth Foot,--some of the finest troops in the British
Army--but the fight was long and stubborn. Stainville appears at
first to have taken the offensive and to have fallen upon the head
of Granby's columns before the whole of his troops had come up, but
to have been gradually forced back as more and more of the British
battalions advanced into action. French and English came to close
quarters, guns were taken and retaken, and for a time two British
cannon remained in the hands of the French. Granby, however, seems
to have got the upper hand at last, to have surrounded the wood on
two sides and to have made his dispositions for surrounding it on
all sides, when Ferdinand's troops at last came up on Stainville's
rear and put an end to the conflict. The gallant Frenchman's
corps was nearly annihilated; fifteen hundred men were killed
and wounded, nearly three thousand surrendered to the Fifth Foot
alone,[398] and two battalions only made good their escape. The
Allied army advanced a little to the south of Wilhelmsthal; and so
the action came to an end.
The losses of the Allies were small, reaching but seven hundred
men killed and wounded, of which four hundred and fifty belonged
to Granby's corps. The result of the action was in fact a great
disappointment, due partly to the mistakes of Spörcke and
Kielmansegge, partly to the extreme slowness of Ferdinand's advance
in the centre. The main body of the Allies indeed seems to have
taken five hours to move from Gröbenstein to Wilhelmsthal, a
distance of little more than four miles; and the fact would appear
to indicate considerable clumsiness on the part of some officer or
officers in the handling of their men. Still the fact remained that
forty thousand men had attacked seventy thousand and driven them
back in confusion; and the French were not a little shamefaced and
discouraged over their defeat.
[Sidenote: July 1.]
[Sidenote: July 24.]
[Sidenote: Aug. 30.]
On the night of the action Soubise and d'Estrées fell back across
the Fulda and took up a position between Cassel and Lutternberg.
Ferdinand therefore ordered Granby's corps to a position near
Cassel and sent forward a detachment to clear the enemy from the
north bank of the Eder; whereupon the French evacuated Fritzlar and
retiring across the Fulda took post upon its eastern bank. Both
armies remained in this position until the 1st of July, Ferdinand
trying always to force the French back, but obliged to act with
caution, since Prince Xavier's Saxons had joined the French at
Lutternberg and might at any time give trouble on the eastern side
of the Weser. Finally on the 24th he boldly attacked the French
right at Lutternberg and completely defeated it.[399] The French
thereupon fell back to Melsungen on the Fulda, while Ferdinand took
up a position opposite to them on the western bank of the river
and threatened their communications with Frankfort. The Marshals
then summoned Condé from the Rhine, but Ferdinand continued to
press their communications so hard that at length they evacuated
Göttingen and retreated by Hersfeld and Fulda to Vilbel, a little
to the north of Frankfort; Ferdinand marching parallel with them
on their western flank to the Nidda, in the hope, which was
disappointed, of preventing their junction with Condé. So far he
had done well, for he had for the present driven the French armies
from Hesse.
[Sidenote: Sept. 7.]
[Sidenote: Sept. 15.]
Meanwhile Condé, obedient to orders, had marched towards Frankfort,
joining Soubise a little to the south of Friedberg on the 30th of
August. The Hereditary Prince, who had followed him closely all
the way from the Rhine, attacked him on the same day, apparently
in ignorance of the presence of Soubise's army, and was repulsed
with considerable loss. For the next few days the two armies
remained inactive, Ferdinand between the Nidder and Nidda with
his headquarters at Staden, facing south-west, and the French
opposite to him between Friedburg and Butzbach. Such a position,
while forces were so unequal, could not continue long; and on the
7th of September the French moved northward by Giessen towards the
Eder. Ferdinand, divining that their design was to cut him off from
Cassel, which it was his own intention to besiege, at once hurried
northward to stop them. It was a race between the two armies. The
French travelled due north by Giessen and Marburg, crossing the
Lahn above the latter town. Ferdinand made for Homberg on the
north bank of the Ohm, and turning north-westward from thence
marched on by Kirchhain and Wetter, where he overtook the French
advanced guard. On the following day he offered battle; but Soubise
declined, and, turning to the right about, repassed the Lahn and
encamped along the line of the Ohm, with his left at Marburg and
his right over against Homberg. Ferdinand thereupon took post in
full sight of the enemy on the opposite bank of the river, with his
left at Homberg and his right extended beyond Kirchhain. This was
the position from which he had intended Imhoff to cover Hesse in
1760; and he had no intention now of allowing the French to break
through it to Cassel, for he had made up his mind to recover Cassel
for himself.
[Sidenote: September.]
The valley of the Ohm south-eastward from Kirchhain is about eleven
hundred yards broad, rising gradually on the east bank of the river
to a height called the Galgenberg, and on the western bank to a
steep basaltic hill known as the Amöneberg. The Ohm itself between
these hills is from twenty to thirty feet wide and from five to
seven feet deep, flowing between steep banks. Just to the south
of the Amöneberg was a stone bridge by which stood a water-mill,
consisting of a massive court with a group of houses. The steep
sides of the Amöneberg frown close to it on the northern hand;
but to westward the ground rises in a gentle slope, through which
a hollow road, covered by an old redoubt, ran down to the mill.
The town and castle of the Amöneberg itself was surrounded with
a wall and towers strong enough, on the south and south-western
sides, to defy all but heavy artillery. The bridge with the mill
and the castle beyond it were for some reason neglected by the
Allies. There had been some attempt to secure the bridge itself,
and a redoubt had been begun on Ferdinand's side of the river for
its defence; but the breastwork was not above three feet high and
as many feet thick, so that it could be commanded by an enemy's
fire, and the more easily since the western or French bank of the
river was the higher. The court of the mill was occupied by but
thirteen men; the old redoubt appears not to have been occupied
at all; and the garrison of the castle of Amöneberg consisted of
a single battalion of irregulars only. Yet the Amöneberg was an
advanced post over against the enemy's left wing and on the enemy's
side of the river; and the possession of the bridge was of vital
importance to the Allies, not only to ensure communication with
that advanced post, but to bar the advance of the French across the
Ohm and to secure to Ferdinand the means of taking the offensive.
The carelessness which allowed these points to remain so slenderly
guarded is therefore almost inexplicable.
[Sidenote: Sept. 21.]
The French were not slow to take advantage of the opening thus
afforded to them. On the night of the 20th they invested the castle
of the Amöneberg so closely that not a man of the garrison could
pass through their lines, and, driving the thirteen men from the
mill, occupied the court as well as the old redoubt with light
troops. This done they waited till morning, and at six o'clock,
under cover of a dense mist, opened a heavy fire on the bridge and
on the unfinished redoubt beyond it. The men in that redoubt, two
hundred Hanoverians, resisted stoutly, in order to gain time for
their supports to come up and for their artillery on the Galgenberg
to answer the French batteries. The corps in occupation of the
ground immediately before the Brückemühle (for so the mill was
named) was Zastrow's of seven battalions, seven squadrons and six
guns; while Wangenheim's corps of about the same strength lay on
his left, and Granby's[400] on the heights of Kirchhain to his
right. Ferdinand on hearing the sound of the firing hastened to
the scene of action and found the redoubt still safe, the two
hundred Hanoverians having held it stubbornly for two hours until
relieved by Zastrow. But meanwhile the French brought forward more
guns behind the veil of the mist; and presently thirty pieces of
cannon were playing furiously upon the redoubt, while the infantry
under cover of the fire renewed their attack on the bridge. Zastrow
continued to feed the redoubt with fresh troops, and so held his
ground; but the full significance of the attack was not realised
until at ten o'clock the mist rolled away, when it was seen by
the French dispositions that the enemy was bent upon carrying the
bridge at any cost. Then at last Ferdinand ordered up Granby's
corps from Kirchhain to Zastrow's assistance.
[Sidenote: Sept. 22.]
Meanwhile the fight waxed hotter. The superiority of the French
in artillery made itself felt; nine out of twelve of Zastrow's
guns were dismounted by noon, and the rest were silent for want of
ammunition. At length at four o'clock the British Guards and the
Highlanders arrived; and twelve German field-pieces attached to
Granby's corps came also into action. The French likewise brought
up reinforcements and the combat became livelier than ever. So
far the reliefs for the garrison in the redoubt had marched down
in regular order, but the fire of the French artillery was now
so terrible that the men were ordered to creep down singly and
dispersed, as best they could. British Guards replaced Hanoverians,
and Hessians replaced British Guards; regiment after regiment
taking its turn to send men to certain destruction. So the fight
wore on till the dusk lowered down and the flashes of the guns
turned from yellow to orange and from orange to red. The Hessians
piled up the corpses of the dead into a rampart and fired on, for
the redoubt though untenable must be held at any cost. At seven
o'clock the French by a desperate effort carried the passage of
the bridge and fought their way close up to the redoubt, but they
were met by the same dogged resistance and repulsed; and at eight
o'clock, after fourteen hours of severe fighting, they abandoned
the attack. Zastrow's and Granby's corps bivouacked about the
bridge, and Ferdinand took up his quarters in the mill; but on the
next day, none the less, the French after several unsuccessful
assaults forced the garrison of Amöneberg to an honourable
capitulation.
[Sidenote: November.]
The loss of the Allies in this action was about seven hundred and
fifty killed and wounded, more than a third of whom were British;
the Scots Guards suffering more heavily than any corps of the
troops engaged. The loss of the French rose to twelve hundred
men, and the failure of their attack decided the fate of Hesse.
Ferdinand, who on his advance southward had left behind a force to
blockade Cassel, was able within three weeks to spare troops enough
for a regular siege. On the 16th of October the trenches were
opened, and on the 1st of November the town surrendered. A few days
later came the news that preliminaries of a treaty had been signed.
For despite all the successes of the year nothing could deter Bute
from his resolution to make peace; and, indeed, knowledge of this
fact had latterly made English commanders negligent and British
troops backward in the field.[401] So with the fall of Cassel the
war came to an end.
The terms, including as they did the cession by the French of
India, except Pondicherry and Chandernagore, of French America,
Canada, Tobago, Dominica and St. Vincent, might not seem
unfavourable to England. But it was reasonably thought at the time
that Goree and Martinique should have been added, though Bute
was in such haste to bring the war to an end that it was only as
an afterthought that he exacted the cession of Florida by Spain
in exchange for Havanna. But the true blot on the treaty was the
desertion of Frederick the Great and the conclusion of a separate
peace, an exhibition of selfishness and folly which recalled the
Peace of Utrecht. Nevertheless Frederick was able to insist on
the conditions from which he had from the first resolved not to
recede, namely the retention of all that he had taken from Austria
in Silesia. In February 1763 the peace was finally concluded, and
Frederick entered Berlin with Ferdinand of Brunswick, who had
through five campaigns guarded his right flank, appropriately
seated at his right side.
The story of the war in Germany should not be closed without some
few words as to Ferdinand, who, little though we know of him, was
the greatest commander that led British troops to victory in Europe
between Marlborough and Wellington. It was no small feat to have
fought through five campaigns successfully, always with one army
against two, and with at most four men against five. It is true
that the conception of his most skilful movements may often be
traced to Westphalen, the chief of his staff; but it is not every
commander who knows when to take advice and how to act on it,
or is so sure of the confidence of his troops that he can trust
them always to make the best of it. Moreover, he was confronted,
though in a smaller degree, with many of the difficulties that
afflicted Marlborough. His army was not an army of Allies, though
generally so styled, but a mercenary army of German troops in the
pay of England. So far he had the advantage of the great Duke; but
his force was compounded of several different elements, British,
Hanoverians, Hessians, Brunswickers and Bückeburgers, who were
divided by not a little jealousy as to their respective precedence,
privileges, and superiority. Of all of these the British gave him
the most trouble. Their insular contempt for all foreigners was
heightened by the knowledge that their comrades were mercenaries
paid by their own nation; and they claimed the best quarters,
the post of danger and the post of honour on all occasions. In
one respect perhaps they did show superiority to the rest of the
army, namely when actually on the field of battle; for beyond all
doubt theirs is the chief credit for the success at Minden, at
Warburg, at Emsdorff, at Wilhelmsthal, and in a lesser degree at
Vellinghausen. In every action indeed they did well, and at Minden
and Emsdorff they accomplished what probably no other troops in the
army would have attempted. But there were scores of minor actions
fought during these campaigns by German troops only, which could
be matched against any other of their achievements; and there were
grave defects which marred not a little the general efficiency
of the British. In the first place there was a large number of
British officers of all ranks from the general to the ensign who,
though brave enough, knew nothing of their duty. In the second,
as Turenne had noticed a century earlier in Flanders, they were
extremely negligent in the matter of outposts, patrols, and guards,
owing partly to inexperience, partly to their more luxurious life
at home, and partly to the contempt of danger and the spirit of
gambling which is so strong in the race. Frequently Ferdinand,
though quite alive to the valour of British troops in action,
dared not trust them as advanced parties; whereupon the red-coats
themselves, quite confident of their own sufficiency, grumbled
because the foremost place was not given to them. Such jealousies
as these gave endless trouble; and the disposition of the various
corps, particularly of Granby's division of the Guards and Blues,
required careful study as a matter not of military exigency but of
policy and tact, lest the various nationalities in the army should
fall at variance and take to fighting among themselves. Lastly, the
British soldiers, taken as a whole, were men of inferior character
to the Germans and of less experience in war; and by loose
behaviour in quarters and on the march they set a bad example,
which came ill from the men that looked down on all the rest of the
army.
Such were the troubles which hampered Ferdinand and his staff at
every turn; yet under his guidance the machine worked always with
the least possible friction and the greatest development of power.
He was in fact not only a great soldier but a great governor and
leader of men. He combined patience, tact, and self-control with a
genial and hearty courtesy, he had the faculty of selecting good
men for his instruments, and above all he worked without fear or
favour in noble singleness of purpose for the common cause. Of
his merits as a General his campaigns speak sufficiently; and it
is only necessary to add that their history was thought worthy of
official study and compilation fifty years ago by the Prussian
General Staff. British troops may feel proud to have so served
under so able a soldier and so great and gallant a man in the
campaigns which they fought in Germany for the conquest of their
own empire.
AUTHORITIES.--For the expedition to Belleisle there is little
beyond the official papers in the Record Office, _W.O., Orig.
Corres._, vol. xxi., and the accounts to be found in such
histories as Entick's. The like is true of the operations in
Portugal, except that few original papers are to be found in the
Record Office. As to Martinique there is again little besides the
Official Papers, C. O., _America and West Indies_, vol. cii.,
with the letter in the Bouquet Papers already quoted. For Havanna
there is a printed account of the siege, and the original papers
in _C. O., America and West Indies, Havanna_. For Manila, see
_Admiral's despatches, East Indies_, and the account in Entick.
The _Annual Register_ is also a source of information in default
of better in all the above expeditions.
For Ferdinand's campaigns, the most readable account is that
of Mauvillon, being written in German of rare clearness and
simplicity. There are also the histories of Tempelhof and
Archenholtz, _La Vie Militaire de Ferdinand_, _Mémoires de
Bourcet_, and Westphalen's _Feldzüge Herzogs Ferdinand_, in
which last is printed every document that came to Ferdinand's
headquarters, besides a great many more, with quotations from
all other writers on the subject--an exhaustive work of six huge
volumes, without an index. Ferdinand's original letters, with
some from Granby and other officers, will be found in the Record
Office, _F. O. Mil. Auxiliary Expeditions_, vols. xxviii.-xxxi.,
xxxiii., xxxiv., xxxvii.-xliv., xlix., l. The letters in the
Belvoir Papers, _Hist. Manuscript Commission_, are disappointing.
[Illustration: WARBURG, 31^{st} July 1760.]
[Illustration: WILHELMSTHAL, 24^{th} June 1762.
Dispositions at the opening of the attack of the Allies.]
[Illustration: VELLINGHAUSEN, 15^{th} 16^{th} July 1761.
The attack of 16^{th} July.]
[Illustration: Part of HESSE-CASSEL
_Walker & Boutall, del._ _To face page 560._
]