CHAPTER IX

[Sidenote: 1759.]

Never in the whole course of her history had come to England such

a year of triumph as 1759. Opening with the capture of Goree in

January, its later months had brought one unbroken tale of success,

of Madras saved and Masulipatam taken in India, of Quebec captured

in Canada, of Minden won in Germany, of one French fleet worsted

by Boscawen off the Portuguese coast, of another defeated by Hawke

in the romantic action of Quiberon Bay. Such was the story with

which King George the Second met his Parliament for the last time

in his life; and Pitt did not fail to turn it to good account. A

monument was voted to Wolfe in Westminster Abbey; thanks were given

to Hawke, Saunders and Holmes of the Navy, and to Monckton, Murray

and Townsend of the Army; and the military estimates were passed

with little difficulty. It was ordered that Ferdinand's army should

be augmented from Great Britain, Brunswick, and Hesse alike. The

full number of national troops voted for the British Establishment

exceeded one hundred thousand men; the embodied militia augmented

this total by twenty thousand, and the German troops in the pay

of England by fifty-five thousand more; while another twelve

thousand men at home and abroad, which were borne on the Irish

Establishment, raised it to close on one hundred and ninety

thousand men. Before the campaign of 1760 was opened, the infantry

of the British Line had increased to ninety-six regiments; England

contributing one new corps, Wales one, Scotland five, and Ireland

four, all of which were disbanded at the close of the war.[356]

To these there were added later in the year six new regiments

of Light Dragoons. The first was formed in August under Colonel

John Burgoyne, which took rank as the Sixteenth Dragoons, and is

now known to us as the Sixteenth Lancers; the second, created in

October by Lord Aberdour, soon perished and left no mark behind

it; and the third was raised under rather remarkable conditions

by Colonel John Hale in November. Colonel Hale, originally of

the Blues and later of the Forty-third Foot, was the officer who

brought back the despatches reporting the victory of Quebec.

Finding on his arrival in England in October that there was still

some alarm of a French invasion, he volunteered to form a regiment

of the footmen and chairmen of London and to lead them against

the best household troops of France; an offer which so delighted

Pitt that he reported it to the House of Commons. Finally, he

engaged himself to raise a strong regiment of light dragoons

without levy-money for men or horses, promising that any men or

horses objected to on review by the inspecting officer should be

replaced without expense to the country, and that the whole corps

should be completed within two months. The offer was accepted,

and the regiment was raised at the sole expense of the officers

within the space, as it is said, of seventeen days. The number

was not inappropriate; for though first known, during the few

years while Aberdour's lasted, as the Eighteenth, this regiment,

still conspicuous by the white facings and the badge of skull

and crossbones which Hale selected for it, remains with us as the

Seventeenth Lancers. The three remaining corps, which raised the

number of regiments of dragoons to twenty-one, were too short-lived

to merit more than mere mention.[357]

[Sidenote: 1760.]

[Sidenote: Feb.]

The menace of French invasion was rather ludicrously realised

in February by a descent of the French privateer, Thurot, with

five ships upon Carrickfergus. Landing about a thousand troops,

he received the surrender of the town after a skirmish with the

garrison, plundered it, contrary to the terms of the capitulation,

and re-embarked. His squadron, however, was almost immediately

caught by three British men-of-war, when after a short action

Thurot was killed and every one of his ships captured. This tragic

termination to Thurot's escapade relieved the general tension, and

restored the country's confidence.

So foolish a raid was not likely to produce any change in Pitt's

preparations for the reinforcement of Ferdinand, who needed to be

specially strengthened after the disasters that had befallen King

Frederick at Kunersdorf and at Maxen. In January it was decided

to send three more regiments of British cavalry to Germany; and a

few weeks later the number was increased to five. In May a further

reinforcement of six battalions and two regiments of Highlanders

was promised, and in June two additional regiments of cavalry;

making up a total of close on ten thousand men.[358] The troops

were shipped to the Weser instead of, as heretofore, to Emden, and

seem to have been despatched with commendable promptitude; for the

six regiments of foot, though only warned for service on the 1st

of May, were actually reviewed by Ferdinand in his camp at Fritzlar

on the 17th of June, and were declared by him to be in a most

satisfactory condition.[359]

[Sidenote: May.]

[Sidenote: June 20.]

[Sidenote: June 22.]

[Sidenote: June 24.]

[Sidenote: July.]

The campaign of 1759 having been prolonged so far into the winter,

Ferdinand gave his army rest until late in May. At length on

the 20th he called the infantry of the army of Hesse from its

cantonments, and posted the main body under his own command at

Fritzlar, with one corps advanced to Hersfeld on the Fulda to

protect his left, and a second under General Imhoff at Kirchhain,

on the Ohm. It was his intention that, in case of the enemy's

advance, Imhoff should call in the detachment from Hersfeld to

Homberg, a little to the south of Kirchhain on a bend of the

Ohm, where there was a position, before long to be better known

to us, in which he could bar the way to a far superior force.

Simultaneously the army of Westphalia moved to its line of the

previous year, from Coesfeld eastward to Hamm. In these positions

the Allies remained for nearly a month before the French made

the least sign of movement; when at last the army of the Lower

Rhine under the Count of St. Germain assembled at Düsseldorf, and

crossing the Rhine advanced to Dortmund. From this centre it was

open to St. Germain to advance either northward against Münster

or eastward against Lippstadt; but it was tolerably evident that

his real design was to join the army of the Main, and to operate

against the right flank of the Allied army of Hesse. At about the

same time Broglie concentrated the army of the Main a little to the

east of Giessen, and began his advance northward. The Hereditary

Prince at once fell back from Hersfeld with his detachment towards

the Ohm, while Ferdinand moved southward as far as Ziegenhain to

join Imhoff, with every intention of making Broglie fight him

before he advanced another mile. To his infinite disgust, however,

he learned that Imhoff had abandoned the position entrusted to

him, and had ordered the whole of the advanced corps back to

Kirchhain. Thus the most effective barrier in Hesse was opened

to the French; Ferdinand perforce halted; and Broglie pushed on

without delay to Homberg, whence turning eastward he encamped in

the face of Ferdinand's army at Neustadt. In this situation both

armies remained for a whole fortnight inactive, though not two

hours' march apart, neither daring to attack the other, and each

waiting for the other to make the next movement.

[Sidenote: July 8.]

[Sidenote: July 10.]

Broglie brought the deadlock to an end. Sending orders to St.

Germain to march from Dortmund on the 4th of July, and to meet

him at Corbach, he marched on the night of the 7th north-westward

upon Frankenberg. Ferdinand on learning of his movements next day

marched also northward with all speed, pushing forward a strong

advanced corps under the Hereditary Prince by way of Sachsenhausen

upon Corbach, to bar the outlet of the defile through which

Broglie's army must pass into the plain, and so to hinder his

junction with St. Germain. The French, however, had gained too long

a start. St. Germain, though he distressed his troops terribly by

the speed of his march, succeeded in passing through the defile

from the north; and Broglie, hastening up from the south, found his

troops forming in order of battle just as the Hereditary Prince

debouched into the plain from Sachsenhausen. As not more than ten

thousand of the French were yet deployed, the Prince attacked;

but was soon driven back by superior numbers as the rest of the

French came up, and finally retired with the loss of five hundred

men and fifteen guns, seven of which last were British. It fell to

the British infantry with the Prince, the Fifth, Twenty-fourth,

Fiftieth, and Fifty-first regiments, to cover the retreat; but so

hard were they pressed that the Prince only extricated them by

putting himself at the head of two squadrons of the First and Third

Dragoon Guards, and leading them to a desperate charge. Fortunately

the squadrons responded superbly,[360] and so the rear-guard was

saved; but the Prince had received an unpleasant reverse, and the

French had secured their first object with signal success.

[Sidenote: July 12.]

The Allied army of Westphalia, under General von Spörcke, arrived

on the scene in obedience to orders two days after the action, and

was posted at Volksmarsen on the Diemel to protect Ferdinand's

right; and then once more the two hosts remained motionless and

face to face, the French at Corbach, the Allies at Sachsenhausen.

Ferdinand's total force was sixty-six thousand men only, while

that of the French numbered one hundred and thirty thousand;[361]

yet such was the difference in the quality of the two armies that

Broglie dared not act except with extreme caution. His principal

object was to envelope Ferdinand's right and cut him off from

Westphalia at the line of the Diemel; and Ferdinand accordingly

resolved to distract Broglie's attention to the opposite flank.

[Sidenote: July 15.]

[Sidenote: July 16.]

Having intelligence that a party of the enemy under General

Glaubitz, consisting of six battalions, a regiment of Hussars,

and a number of light troops, was on its way to Ziegenhain

from Marburg, evidently with the object of disturbing his

communications, Ferdinand, on the night of the 14th, detached the

Hereditary Prince to take command of six battalions which were

lying at Fritzlar, and to attack it. Accordingly on the following

morning the Prince marched rapidly southward, being joined on

the way by a regiment of German hussars, and by the Fifteenth

Light Dragoons, which had just arrived from England. On reaching

the vicinity of Ziegenhain, he found that Glaubitz was encamped

farther to the west, near the village of Emsdorff. His troops

being exhausted by a long march, the Prince halted for the night

at Treysa, and continuing his advance early on the morrow, picked

up two more bodies of irregulars, horse and foot, which were on

their way to him, and pushed on with his mounted troops only, to

reconnoitre the enemy's position. He found the French posted at the

mouth of a gorge in the mountains, fronting to north-east, astride

of the two roads that lead from Kirchhain to Fritzlar and to

Ziegenhain. Their right lay in rear of the village of Erxdorff, and

their left in front of the village of Emsdorff, resting on a forest

some three miles long. The Prince and General Lückner, who was with

him, entered the forest, but found neither picquets nor sentries;

they pushed forward through the corn-fields to within half a mile

of the camp, but saw neither vedettes, nor patrols, nor so much as

a main-guard; nay, Erxdorff itself, though within less than a mile

of the camp, was not occupied. They stole back well content with

what they had seen.

Waiting till eleven o'clock for his infantry to join him, the

Prince posted one battalion, Lückner's regiment of hussars and

the Fifteenth Light Dragoons, in a hollow a mile before Erxdorff;

then taking the five remaining battalions, together with the

irregular troops and four guns, he fetched a compass through the

forest and came in full upon the enemy's left flank. The French

were completely surprised. Two battalions had barely time to form

towards the forest before the Prince's infantry came upon them,

poured in a volley which laid three hundred men low, and drove back

the rest upon Glaubitz's remaining infantry, which was falling

in hurriedly in rear of the camp. Simultaneously Lückner, at the

sound of the firing, came galloping up on the French right with his

cavalry; whereupon the entire French force abandoned its camp and

retired through the woods in their rear towards Langenstein. Here

they rallied; but Lückner's single battalion hurried on beyond them

to bar their way over the Ohm to westward, while the Fifteenth,

pressing on along their flank, stationed itself across the road

to Amöneberg, and charging full upon them headed them back from

that side. With some difficulty the French repelled the attack,

and turning about to south-eastward made for a wood not far away,

hoping to pass through it and so to escape to the south. But on

arriving at the southern edge of the wood they found every outlet

blocked by the Prince's mounted irregulars. Perforce they turned

back through the wood again and emerged on to the open ground on

its western side, trusting that some marshy ground, which lay in

the way of the Prince's cavalry, would secure them from further

pursuit. But they had not marched over the plain for more than a

mile before the hussars and light dragoons were upon them again,

and the Fifteenth for the second time crashed single-handed into

the midst of them, cutting them down by scores and capturing one

battalion complete. With great difficulty the remnant of the French

beat back their pursuers and continued the retreat: half of them

had been killed or captured, or had dropped down unable to march

farther, but the rest struggled gallantly on. Reaching an open wood

they again halted and formed for action. The Prince, still close

at their heels with his cavalry, thereupon surrounded them and

summoned them to surrender; and the French commander, despairing

of further resistance in the exhausted state of his troops, was

obliged to yield.

So ended the action which is still commemorated on the appointments

of the Fifteenth Hussars by the name of Emsdorff. The French camp

had been surprised at noon; and the last fragment of their force

capitulated at six o'clock in the evening, having striven manfully

but in vain to shake off the implacable enemy that had hunted them

for nearly twenty miles. The loss of the French in killed and

wounded is unknown, though it must have been considerable, but the

prisoners taken numbered twenty-six hundred, while nine colours and

five guns were also captured. The total loss of the Prince's troops

did not exceed one hundred and eighty-six men and one hundred and

eighty-one horses, of which one hundred and twenty-five men and

one hundred and sixty-eight horses belonged to the Fifteenth.

It was the Fifteenth, in fact, that did all the fighting. The

other regiments engaged did not lose twenty men apiece. The

infantry could not keep pace with the pursuit after they reached

Langenstein, and the two other corps of cavalry, though they did

excellent work in heading back the enemy, never came to close

quarters. Lückner's hussars did not lose a man nor a horse, and of

the mounted irregulars but twenty-three men and horses were killed

or wounded. It was the Fifteenth alone, a young regiment that had

never been under fire, which thrice charged five times its numbers

of French infantry and rode through them; and the success of the

action was ascribed to them and to them only. Their gallantry

indeed was the amazement of the whole army.[362] The tradition of

charging home, as shall be seen in due time both in Flanders and in

Spain, remained with the regiment, and doubtless remains with it to

this day.

[Sidenote: July 23.]

[Sidenote: July 25-27.]

[Sidenote: July 29.]

[Sidenote: July 30.]

This brilliant exploit was some compensation to the Allies for

past mishaps; but a week later Broglie sought to turn the scale

by more serious operations. On the 23rd he divided his army into

three corps, of which he sent one round Ferdinand's left flank

under Prince Xavier of Saxony to threaten Cassel, and a second to

force back Spörcke on his right from Volksmarsen, while the main

body under his own command advanced to Sachsenhausen. Perforce

Ferdinand retreated north-westward to Kalle, his rear-guard being

incessantly and severely engaged throughout the movement; whereupon

Broglie, seeing the way to be clear, detached a corps under the

Chevalier de Muy, who had recently arrived to relieve the Count

of St. Germain, across the Diemel to Warburg, in order to cut off

the Allies from Westphalia. The Marshal himself meanwhile moved

up parallel to Ferdinand on the eastern side towards Kalle, and

Prince Xavier pressed still closer upon Cassel. It being evident

to Ferdinand that either Cassel or Westphalia must be abandoned,

he detached a force under General Kielmansegge to strengthen the

garrison of Cassel and resolved to attack de Muy. Accordingly, on

the afternoon of the 29th Spörcke's corps crossed the Diemel to

Liebenau, followed on the same evening by that of the Hereditary

Prince; and on the 30th their combined force, not exceeding in all

fourteen thousand men, encamped between Liebenau and Corbeke with

its left on the Diemel, facing west. At dawn of the same morning

Broglie's army debouched from several quarters simultaneously

against the Allied camp at Kalle, but drew off after some hours of

cannonade; and Ferdinand, satisfied through other signs that this

demonstration was intended only to cover the movement of the French

towards Cassel, resolved to pass the Diemel without delay and to

deliver his stroke against de Muy.

Spörcke and the Hereditary Prince had meanwhile reconnoitred de

Muy's position and had recommended that their own corps should

turn its left flank, while Ferdinand with the main army advanced

against its front. De Muy, with about twenty thousand men, occupied

a high ridge across a bend of the Diemel, facing north-east, with

his right resting on Warburg and his left near the village of

Ochsendorf. To his left rear rose a circular hill crowned by a

tower, and on his left front lay a village named Poppenheim. It

was arranged that the corps of Spörcke and the Hereditary Prince

should advance westward in two columns from Corbeke and form up in

three lines between the tower and Poppenheim, so as to fall on de

Muy's left flank and rear, while Ferdinand crossing the Diemel at

Liebenau should attack his centre and right. As the camp between

Liebenau and Corbeke lay about ten miles from de Muy's, and as

Ferdinand's camp lay some fifteen miles to the south of the Diemel

from Liebenau, the operation called for extreme nicety in the

execution.

[Sidenote: July 31.]

At nine o'clock on the evening of the 30th Ferdinand's army

marched from Kalle, and at six o'clock on the following morning the

heads of his columns passed the Diemel and debouched on the heights

of Corbeke. They arrived, however, at later than the appointed

hour. The passage of the Diemel had caused much delay; and not all

the haste of officers nor the eagerness of men could bring the army

forward the quicker. At seven o'clock Spörcke and the Hereditary

Prince, after much anxious waiting, decided to march from Corbeke

before more time should be lost. The northern column, which

included the right wing of all three arms, moved by Gross Eider and

Ochsendorf upon the tower; the southern, composed of the left wing,

by Klein Eider and Poppenheim. Both columns were led by British

troops--the northern by the Royal Dragoons, whose place was on the

extreme right of the first line, while the British grenadiers,

massed in two battalions under Colonels Maxwell and Daulhatt,[363]

marched at the head of the infantry. The southern was headed by

the Seventh Dragoons, with Keith's and Campbell's Highlanders[364]

following them to cover the grenadiers in second line.

At half-past one the Hereditary Prince, having posted his artillery

on the outskirts of Ochsendorf and Poppenheim, opened fire as the

signal for attack; and at the same time the British grenadiers

began to file through Ochsendorf. Certain French battalions, which

de Muy had thrown back _en potence_ to protect his left flank,

thereupon retired without firing, until it was perceived that

the Allies were making for the steep hill in rear of the French

position. Then one battalion of Regiment Bourbonnois deliberately

faced about and marched off to occupy the hill. To permit such a

thing would have been to derange the whole of the plans of the

Allies, so it was necessary to prevent it at any cost. Colonel

Beckwith with ten grenadiers ran forward, keeping out of sight

of the French, to reach the hill before them; the Prince himself

with thirty more hurried after him; and with this handful of men,

all panting and breathless, they crowned the crest of the height.

Bourbonnois arriving on the scene a little later found itself

greeted by a sharp fire, and, being unable to see the numbers

opposed to it, halted for ten minutes to allow its second battalion

to come up. The delay gave time for Daulhatt's entire battalion

of grenadiers to join Beckwith's little party; and then the two

battalions of Bourbonnois attacked in earnest, and the combat

between French and British, at odds of two against one, became most

fierce and stubborn. The disparity of numbers however, was too

great; and Daulhatt's men after a gallant struggle were beginning

to give way, when Maxwell's battalion came up in the nick of time

to support them. This reinforcement redressed the balance of the

fight; Daulhatt's men speedily rallied, and the contest for the

hill was renewed. The French, however, prepared to send fresh

battalions in support of Bourbonnois, and the situation of the

British became critical; for a battery of artillery, which was on

its way to the hill to support them, got into difficulties in a

defile near Ochsendorf and blocked the advance of the rest of the

northern column. Fortunately it was extricated, though none too

soon, and being brought up to the hill was speedily in action;

while the head of the southern column likewise coming up took the

French reinforcements in flank and drove them back in disorder. The

Royals and Seventh Dragoons were then let loose upon the broken

French battalions, completing their discomfiture and taking many

prisoners.

So far the turning movement had succeeded; but its success was

not yet assured, for only a portion of the southern column was

yet formed for action, and the troops on the field were becoming

exhausted. De Muy might yet have hoped to turn the scale in his

left, when his attention was suddenly called to the advance of

troops upon his front. After desperate but fruitless efforts it

had been found that the infantry of Ferdinand's army could not

hope to arrive in time to take part in the action. The British

battalions, urged by General Waldegrave, struggled manfully to get

forward, but the day was hot, and the ground was difficult and in

many places marshy: the men would not fall out, but they dropped

down insensible from fatigue in spite of themselves. Ferdinand

therefore ordered Lord Granby, who had succeeded to Sackville,

to advance with the twenty-two squadrons of British cavalry and

the British artillery alone. Away therefore they started at the

trot, the guns accompanying them at a speed which amazed all

beholders.[365] Two hours of trotting brought them at last within

sight of the enemy; and Granby at once turned them upon the cavalry

of de Muy's right wing. The pace was checked for a brief moment

as the squadrons formed in two lines for the attack. In the first

line from right to left were the First, Third, and Second Dragoon

Guards, in one brigade, the Blues, Seventh, and Sixth Dragoon

Guards in another; in the second line were the Greys, Tenth, Sixth,

and Eleventh Dragoons. Then the advance was resumed, Granby riding

at the head of the Blues, his own regiment, and well in front of

all. His hat flew from his head, revealing a bald head which shone

conspicuous in the sun, as the trot grew into gallop and the lines

came thundering on. The French squadrons wavered for a moment, and

then, with the exception of three only, turned and fled without

awaiting the shock. The scarlet ranks promptly wheeled round upon

the flank and rear of the French infantry; whereupon the three

French squadrons that had stood firm plunged gallantly down on the

flank of the King's Dragoon Guards, and overthrew them. But the

Blues quickly came up to liberate their comrades; and the devoted

little band of Frenchmen was cut to pieces. The French infantry,

finding itself now attacked on both flanks, broke and fled; and the

whole of de Muy's men, horse and foot, rushed down to the Diemel,

and, without even looking for the bridges, threw down their arms

and splashed frantically through the fords. A party of French

irregulars in Warburg tried likewise to escape, but was caught

by the cavalry and well-nigh annihilated. Finally, the British

batteries came down to the river at a gallop, unlimbered on the

bank, and played on the fugitives so destructively as wholly to

prevent them from reforming. Granby presently crossed the river in

pursuit with ten squadrons; and the fragments of de Muy's corps

retired in disorder to Volksmarsen. Thus brilliantly ended the

action of Warburg.

The loss of the French was set down at from six to eight thousand

men, killed, wounded, and taken, while twelve guns remained as

trophies in the hands of the victors. The Allies lost just over

twelve hundred men, of whom no less than two hundred and forty

belonged to Maxwell's grenadiers; Daulhatt's battalion also

suffering very severely. The losses of the cavalry were trifling.

Altogether the action was a brilliant little affair, well designed

and, despite the tardiness of Ferdinand's arrival, well executed.

For the British it redeemed the character of the cavalry which had

been so shamefully sacrificed by Sackville at Minden; since it was

evidently the recollection of that disgrace which spurred Granby on

to so rapid an advance and so headlong an attack. For Ferdinand the

victory effectually opened the way into Westphalia.

[Sidenote: Aug. 10.]

Meanwhile it had been found impossible to defend Cassel against

Broglie's overwhelming numbers; and the town was accordingly

abandoned. It was no fault of Ferdinand's that Hesse was thus laid

at the mercy of the French; indeed, with an army weaker in numbers

by one-half than his enemy's, he had done well to save Westphalia.

He now took up a position along the Diemel from Trendelburg to

Stadtbergen, so as to seal up every passage over the river, while

Broglie posted his main army over against him on the opposite

bank. The Marshal's superiority in numbers, however, enabled him,

while holding the Allies in check with the bulk of his army, to

detach independent corps for minor operations, though he took

even such enterprises in hand with redoubled caution after the

lessons of Emsdorff and Warburg. His first essay was the reduction

of Ziegenhain, which surrendered after a siege of ten days; and

concurrently he moved a corps under Prince Xavier eastward against

Münden, which occupied Göttingen and pushed detachments forward as

far north as Nordheim and Einbeck. This latter movement carried

the war unpleasantly far into Hanoverian territory; but Ferdinand

none the less remained immovable on the Diemel. Broglie thereupon

broke up his camp on that river and shifted his position eastward

to Immenhausen, to support the operations of Prince Xavier. This

placed Ferdinand in an awkward dilemma. He had sent a few troops

to Beverungen on the Weser to check Xavier's advanced parties; but

this detachment, though it had done its work well, was not strong

enough to make head against an invasion in real force. Moreover

Einbeck was disagreeably near to the border of his brother's

dominions of Brunswick, which he would fain have saved from

invasion if he could. Yet he could not move to the east bank of the

Weser without uncovering Lippstadt, the one fortress which enabled

him to prevent the perfect concert of the French armies of the

Rhine and Main. In fact the situation was one of extreme trial and

embarrassment.

[Sidenote: Sept.]

Ferdinand, whose light troops and irregulars were never idle while

they could make mischief, first tried the effect of a raid with a

flying column upon Broglie's communications with Frankfort; but

this enterprise, though it alarmed the French and somewhat threw

back their preparations, only partially achieved its object. On

the other hand, it was always open to Ferdinand to stay where he

was till want of forage should compel Broglie to retire; but this,

though an infallible method, was slow, and would mean that the

country would be converted into a desert, through which it would be

impossible to follow the French during their retreat. He therefore

resolved to make a diversion by carrying the war suddenly to the

Rhine. Broglie, in his anxiety to invade Hanover and Brunswick, had

denuded Wesel of the greater part of its garrison. If Ferdinand

could snatch Wesel, the base of the Army of the Rhine, from him,

the diversion would be a telling stroke indeed.[366]

[Sidenote: Sept. 23.]

[Sidenote: Oct. 1-2.]

[Sidenote: October.]

All through the first days of September Ferdinand's preparations

for this undertaking went steadily and silently forward; and on

the 22nd a powerful train of siege-artillery, under the Count of

Lippe-Bückeburg, marched away for Wesel, followed three days later

by the Hereditary Prince with about ten thousand Hanoverians and

Hessians. The Count was to conduct the siege and the Prince to

cover it. Broglie, on learning of their departure, at once detached

a strong corps under the Marquis of Castries to follow them; to

which Ferdinand retorted by sending to the Prince one Hanoverian

and ten British battalions, together with a Hessian regiment and

three British regiments of cavalry.[367] Meanwhile the Prince's

advanced parties had crossed the Rhine below Wesel on the 29th of

September, and had surprised two or three small garrisons. The

commandant of Wesel thereupon broke down the bridge which connected

it with the western bank of the Rhine; and none too soon, for on

the 30th the Prince came up and invested the fortress. The siege,

however, progressed but slowly owing to rain and stormy weather;

and meanwhile Castries was advancing by forced marches, despite the

dreadful state of the roads, along a route full fifty miles south

of the Prince's, to the Rhine. On the 12th of October he crossed

the river at Cologne and pushed on without delay to Rheinberg,

where he was joined by reinforcements from Brabant. Considering

the unspeakable difficulties of foul weather and almost impassable

roads, this march of Castries stands out as a very fine feat of

resolution and endurance.

The advance of French troops from the side of Brabant was a

complication which neither Ferdinand nor the Hereditary Prince

had foreseen. In fact it almost deprived the advance to Wesel of

the character of a diversion. Castries had in Rheinberg thirty

battalions and thirty-eight squadrons besides irregular troops,

and was expecting further reinforcements; whereas the Prince,

weakened by the absence of men in the trenches before Wesel, could

muster but twenty-one battalions and twenty-two squadrons to meet

him. It was open to the Prince either to fight against superior

numbers or to retreat; and he elected to fight. Castries had taken

up a position behind the Eugenian Canal, facing north-west, with

his right resting on Rheinberg, and with the abbey of Kloster

Kampen, on the northern side of the canal, before his left front.

Immediately before his left, but on his own side of the canal,

stood the village of Kampenbröck, consisting of several scattered

houses with gardens, ditches, and hedges. In front and to the

left, or western, side of Kampenbröck was a morass covered by a

straggling wood of sparse and stunted trees, through which were

cut paths to a bridge that connected the village with the abbey on

the other side of the canal. Across this bridge lay the Prince's

only way to penetrate into the French camp; and Castries had been

careful to guard the passage by posting no less than two thousand

irregular troops in and about the abbey. The only possible chance

for the Prince lay in an attack by surprise.

Waiting until the 15th to collect his troops, the Prince marched

from before Wesel in dead silence at one hour before midnight. The

force was disposed in five divisions. The Fifteenth Light Dragoons,

Royal and Inniskilling Dragoons, and Prussian hussars formed

the advanced guard; then came the support, of two battalions

of Highlanders and as many of British grenadiers; then the main

body of the Twentieth and Twenty-fifth British Foot, with eight

Hanoverian battalions, all under command of General Waldegrave;

then the reserve, of the Eleventh, Twenty-third, Thirty-third and

Fifty-first British Foot, with three German battalions, under

General Howard; then a rear-guard of the Tenth British Dragoons and

ten German squadrons.

[Sidenote: Oct. 16.]

At three o'clock on the morning of the 16th the advanced parties

of the Allies come upon the outposts of the French irregulars, a

mile and a half beyond Kloster Kampen. Despite the strict orders

of the Prince one or two shots were fired, but fortunately without

alarming the enemy; and the Allies pursued their march unmolested

to the bridge, thus cutting off the irregulars in the abbey from

the French main body. These isolated troops were then attacked and

utterly dispersed; and while the musketry was still crackling loud

round the abbey's walls the Prince stealing silently on with the

British grenadiers penetrated into the wood and into the village

of Kampenbröck, so quietly and yet so swiftly that he was in

possession before the enemy were aware of his presence. The French

in camp had, however, been alarmed by the firing, and some of the

principal officers had turned the men out and gone forward to the

wood to reconnoitre. One of these, the Chevalier d'Assas, on his

way to visit the picquets of his regiment, suddenly found himself

among the British grenadiers, but distinguishing no one but the

Prince in the darkness advanced towards him with the words, "Sir,

you are my prisoner." "On the contrary," answered the Prince, "you

are mine, for these are my grenadiers"; and as he spoke the men

closed round d'Assas with bayonets fixed. "Auvergne, Auvergne, the

enemy is on us,"[368] shouted d'Assas to his regiment without a

moment's hesitation at the top of his voice; and before the words

were out of his mouth a dozen bayonets pierced through his body and

laid him dead on the ground. None the less the devotion of the

gallant man sufficed to save the French army. Regiment Auvergne

came down at once to d'Assas' call; Castries hastily brought down

two more battalions to support it; and three more battalions

arrived directly after to protect their flank. The supports of

the Allies came up in their turn; and the fight swayed furiously

backward and forward until daylight, when the French brought

up additional battalions from their right. The reserves of the

Allies were promptly and frequently summoned, but through some

mistake were not to be found. Still the little force of British

and Hanoverians fought desperately on, until the Prince himself

fell wounded from his horse; and then, their ammunition being

exhausted, they yielded to superior numbers in front and flank and

suddenly gave way. The French broke their ranks with loud cries

of exultation for the pursuit, when the Fifteenth Light Dragoons

swooped down upon them, charging home as their custom is, broke

up two battalions completely, and drove the rest flying back in

confusion upon their comrades. The French cavalry now came forward

in overwhelming numbers and handled the British squadrons very

roughly; but the charge of the Fifteenth had given the infantry

time to rally, and to make their retreat in good order. The reserve

appeared at Kloster Kampen in time to cover the retiring troops,

and by noon the fight of Kloster Kampen was over.

The loss of the Allies amounted to nearly twelve hundred killed

and wounded and sixteen hundred prisoners, in addition to which

one gun and one British colour were captured. That of the French

was as heavy and heavier, amounting to twenty-seven hundred

killed and wounded and three hundred prisoners. The struggle was

unusually stubborn and murderous, and the fire of the British was

so rapid and deadly that three French brigades were almost wiped

out of existence.[369] Yet it is said that after this action the

Hereditary Prince would never take British troops under his

command again.[370] He admitted that General Waldegrave did wonders

in the combat,[371] but he complained of the behaviour of his

troops, though Waldegrave bore witness that not a man retired until

his ammunition was exhausted. It may have been that the Prince

was irritated by the failure of the reserve to arrive when it was

wanted; but no blame is imputed to any one for this mischance,

which appears to have been due simply to bad luck. Mauvillon, who

is always very frank in his criticism of the British, says flatly

that he does not believe in their misconduct on this occasion;

and as the only extant list of casualties, though very far from

complete, shows that they lost five hundred killed and wounded, it

should seem that the Prince's strictures were ill deserved. It was

hard, too, that he should have forgotten all that they had done for

him at Emsdorff and at Warburg, to say nothing of the fact that the

heroic charge of the Fifteenth probably saved his force from total

destruction at Kloster Kampen itself. Whether he himself should

have hazarded such an action against odds of two to one, with

the French bringing up reinforcements from the west, is another

question; for it was not as though the fall of Wesel were likely to

ensue speedily even if Castries were beaten, while the diversion

had proved to be no diversion whatever. On the other hand, the

destruction of his corps, or of the best part of it, would have

been a severe blow to Ferdinand. Nevertheless the stake, if he

should win it, was worth winning; though if he could have foreseen

what was immediately before him he would probably have hesitated to

play so desperate a game.

[Sidenote: October.]

After the action he retreated northward to Büderich, to find that

the bridge which he had thrown over the Rhine had been swept away

by floods, and that he could go no farther. His situation was

now desperate, for not only was his retreat cut off, but his

ammunition was exhausted. Still, wounded though he was, he faced

his difficulties with his usual energy, entrenched himself among

his waggons, reconstructed his bridge, and on the 18th crossed

the river unmolested, picking up the troops from before Wesel on

the eastern bank. Castries followed him as he retreated eastward,

thereby forcing him to remain in Westphalia for the protection of

Lippstadt and Münster, though the Prince none the less made shift

to detach a portion of his force to the assistance of Ferdinand.

[Sidenote: Aug. 15 and Nov. 3.]

For to Ferdinand also the failure before Wesel was a serious

matter. Any further stroke upon the French was impossible; and

the utmost for which he could hope was to drive them out of Hesse

and to hold Westphalia safe. He made an effort to expel the

French from Göttingen, but without success; and at last, driven

to desperation by three months of continuous rain, he cantoned a

force in winter-quarters before the town and closed the campaign,

leaving the French in possession of Hesse, of the Principality

of Göttingen, and of the defiles of Münden, which gave them free

ingress into Hanover and Brunswick. His own headquarters were fixed

at Warburg; those of the French at Cassel. Despite all his efforts,

superior numbers had told heavily against him; and though he had

fired a _feu de joie_ for the capture of Montreal, he probably

found less consolation in this than in the victories of his master

Frederick at Leignitz and Torgau, and in the expulsion of his

enemies' forces from Saxony.

A History of the British Army, Vol. 2 First Part—to the Close of the Seven Years' War · 第 9 / 13 章