For convenience of arrangement I have followed the conquests both
of Canada and of India without interruption to their close. In
the earlier stages of the war, when England had not yet succeeded
in obtaining for herself the minister that she desired, it was
possible and in the fitness of narrative to turn from enterprise
to enterprise, fitfully undertaken, insufficiently provided for,
and committed to the wrong hands for execution; since all were
symptoms of one organic disorder. While the heart of England beat
weak, palpitating and intermittent, it could not but fail to drive
the blood to the extremities, and leave them cold and paralysed.
But when, under the treatment of Pitt, the heart revives and throbs
with strength and regularity, then we can watch member after member
tingling with new life and waking to new power; and the action of
each may be traced independently, for while their energy continues,
it is certain that the heart must be vigorous and sound. Since,
however, that work is now done, it behoves us to return, after long
digression, to England and to Pitt, and to take up the study where
it was laid down, in the spring of 1759.
[Sidenote: 1759.]
With the mighty enterprises, even now not yet wholly told, of
that year in memory, it is remarkable to note that the estimates
for 1759 showed little sign of what was to come. The British
Establishment was set down at but eighty-five thousand men, or
one thousand more than in the previous year; and the fact is the
more extraordinary in that, ever since the previous winter, the
French had been preparing for an invasion of Great Britain at
three different points with sixty-three thousand men. Vast numbers
of flat-bottomed boats had been collected at Dunkirk, Brest and
Havre de Grace; and the menace was serious, for the regular troops
left in England were but few, and the country was crowded with
French prisoners. Pitt, while reposing his chief trust in the navy,
was sufficiently disquieted in January to offer special terms to
recruits who would enlist for short service within the kingdom
only; and in May he called out the newly-embodied militia. Yet
only two new regiments of regulars were raised during the first
half of the year. The first of these, Eyre Coote's, has already
been seen at Wandewash; the second demands lengthier notice since
it signified a new departure. Mention has already been made of the
addition of light troops to certain regiments of cavalry: it was
now determined to form a complete regiment of Light Dragoons; which
service was entrusted to Colonel George Augustus Elliott,[347] an
officer who was to become famous for his defence of Gibraltar,
though not before his regiment had already won fame both for
him and for itself. Its actions will come before us very soon,
so for the present it will suffice to say that Elliott's Light
Dragoons are still with us, retaining the original number of their
precedence, as the Fifteenth Hussars.
Such additions were trifling enough if in view of no more than the
danger of invasion, but, seeing that Pitt abated not one jot of
his aggressive designs, they were of astonishing insignificance.
With the nature and extent of those designs the reader has already
been in great part acquainted; but it will be convenient to recall
the military situation in all parts of the world in the spring of
1759. Goree had already surrendered and was occupied by a British
garrison; Barrington was busy over the conquest of Guadaloupe; in
America Amherst was organising his expedition against Ticonderoga
and Crown Point, Forbes was struggling with the first difficulties
of his advance to Fort Duquêsne, and Wolfe was on his way to
Quebec; in India Lally had lately raised the siege of Madras and
liberated the garrison for work in the field, Forde had lately
fought Condore and was advancing on Masulipatam, and Clive was at
Moorshedabad securing the fruits of his victory at Plassey. Lastly,
ten thousand British troops were about to enter on their first
campaign under Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick. Yet it never occurred
to Pitt to recall one man of them, notwithstanding the peril of
invasion. It may be asked why the ten thousand, being so near home,
were not summoned from Germany, and of what possible service they
could have been on the Continent. The answer, which has already
been hinted at, will occur readily to those who have had the
patience to follow me so far, who have seen Guadeloupe worried into
submission by a handful of sickly troops, and watched Montreal and
Pondicherry drop at last into British hands like fruit ripe for the
plucking. Pitt spoke but half the truth when he spoke of conquering
America in Germany; it was not only America, but the East and West
Indies, in a word the British Empire. The war in Germany was in
fact nothing more than a diversion on a grand scale, and it is as
such that it must now be followed. The French likewise pursued
their idea of a diversion when they threatened a descent upon the
shores of Great Britain. It was a plan which they had employed with
some success in the days of King William and of Queen Anne, but it
had not saved them from Marlborough at Oudenarde, and it was not to
deliver them from the busy designs of Pitt.
Before entering on the campaigns of Prince Ferdinand it is
indispensable to attempt to grasp the general purport of the
operations on either side. The French had invaded Germany primarily
to take vengeance upon Prussia for King Frederick's scornful
treatment of Madame de Pompadour. Frederick, being already occupied
with the Saxons and Austrians to the south and with the Russians
on his flank to the eastward, could hardly have escaped disaster
with the French pressing on his other flank from the west. He
had indeed, in 1758, with the swiftness that characterised his
operations, made a dash upon the French and hurled them back at
Rossbach, and within a month dealt the Austrians as severe a
buffet at Leuthen with the same army. But to defeat two armies at
two points over two hundred miles apart within a few weeks, was a
strain that could not be repeated; and it was primarily to guard
Frederick's right or western flank that Ferdinand's army was called
into being. So far as Frederick was concerned it quite fulfilled
its purpose; but in the eyes of England its mission was somewhat
different. Under the Duke of Cumberland the force had been called
an army of observation, to secure the frontiers of Hanover; and
Cumberland, despite Frederick's warnings, had endeavoured to cover
Hanover by holding the line of the Weser, with results that were
seen at Hastenbeck. Under Ferdinand the army became an Allied Army
for active operations in concert with King Frederick;[348] but none
the less its chief function was to cover Hanover, Hesse-Cassel,
and Brunswick. For the French army, being lax in discipline,
behaved with shameful inhumanity towards the inhabitants of German
territory during this war; and there was always apprehension lest
the rulers of Hesse and Brunswick, from sheer compassion towards
their suffering people, should withdraw from the Alliance.
Throughout the operations about to come under our notice the French
acted with at least two armies, jointly superior to Ferdinand's in
numbers, along two different lines. The northern army was known as
the Army of the Rhine, its base being Wesel on the Lower Rhine,
an outlying possession of King Frederick's, which had perforce
been abandoned by him at the opening of the war, and which despite
Ferdinand's efforts could never be recovered. This army was
destined to advance into Westphalia, and thence, if possible, into
Hanover; and a glance at the map will show that its simplest line
of advance was by the river Lippe. The second or southern army
of the French was known as the Army of the Main; having provided
itself with a base on that river by the treacherous capture of
Frankfort.[349] This was one of the many unscrupulous actions
whereby the French made themselves loathed in Europe; for Frankfort
being an Imperial Free Town was held always to be neutral. Still
the thing was done; and thereby was secured to the Army of the
Main, which had begun life as the Army of the Upper Rhine, not only
an excellent base but a sure means of retreat. For the Allies,
even if they defeated it, could not bar its way to the Rhine until
Frankfort should be first besieged and captured, which could not
but be a very arduous undertaking. The primary function of this
second army was the invasion of Hesse.
Ferdinand's task, with an inferior force, was in its essence
defensive. For him the supremely important thing was to retain
possession of the line of the Weser, on which waterway he depended
for his supplies alike from Germany and from England. Thus,
roughly speaking, the field of operations lay between the Rhine
on the one side and the Weser on the other, with the sea and the
Main for northern and southern boundaries; and the normal front
of the French would be to the east and of the Allies to the west.
But it must be remembered that in addition to the army operating
from Wesel against Ferdinand's front there was another operating
from Frankfort upon his left or southern flank; while there was
always the further danger that the Saxons might elude a Prussian
corps of observation, which was posted to check them, on the
south-east, and steal in upon Ferdinand's left rear. To defeat
these combinations it was of vital importance to Ferdinand to hold
in particular two fortresses--Münster in Westphalia, since the
French, if they took it, could push on unhindered to the Weser and
cut off his supplies; and Lippstadt on the Upper Lippe, which
secured communications between Münster and Cassel, or in other
words between Westphalia and Hesse, and contrariwise impeded the
joint action of the two French armies. For the rest it will be
useful to take note of three rivers which barred the advance of
the French northward from Frankfort to Cassel and beyond: namely,
counting from south to north, the Ohm, the Eder, and the Diemel.
With the last in particular, as the final barrier between Hesse and
Westphalia, we shall have much to do; so the reader would do well
to grasp its position once for all, not neglecting its relation to
the neighbouring waters of the Lippe and the Weser.
[Sidenote: End of March.]
[Sidenote: April 13.]
At the close of the campaign of 1758 Ferdinand's winter quarters
extended from Coesfeld, a little to westward of Münster, through
Münster, Lippstadt and Paderborn to the Diemel, his front facing
thus somewhat to south of south-east. The French army of the Rhine
under Marshal Contades was cantoned along that river from Wesel
southward almost to Coblentz; while the army of the Main, under the
Prince of Soubise, the defeated General of Rossbach, lay just to
north of the river about Frankfort. Ferdinand's first trouble was
with an advance of the Austrians upon his left flank by the river
Werra. This he headed back by a rapid march to Fulda; and, being
freed from this danger, he resolved to turn this enforced movement
to southward to account by making a bold stroke upon Frankfort, so
as, if possible, to paralyse the operations of the French on that
side by snatching from them their base. Unfortunately for him,
the incapable Soubise had been recalled to command the army for
invasion of England, and Marshal Broglie, who had succeeded him,
had entrenched himself in a strong position at Bergen, a little to
the north of Frankfort. There on the 13th of April, just five days
after the storm of Masulipatam, Ferdinand boldly attacked him,[350]
but was repulsed with a loss of over two thousand men, and
compelled to fall back to Ziegenhain, on the road to Cassel. His
audacious attempt to cripple one French army, before the campaign
had even been opened, had failed.
[Sidenote: May.]
[Sidenote: May 27.]
[Sidenote: May 29.]
After this alarm the French employed themselves busily in
entrenching themselves on the Main. Prince Henry of Prussia, by
King Frederick's direction, marched northward to relieve Ferdinand
from further trouble from the Austrians; and the enemy made little
movement during the ensuing month. On the 25th of April Contades
arrived at Düsseldorf from Paris with an approved plan of campaign
in his pocket, and proceeded to distribute the army of the Rhine
into four corps, two of them about Wesel, a third at Düsseldorf,
and a fourth about Cologne. This grouping, as Contades intended,
left Ferdinand in doubt whether his main design was aimed at
Westphalia or Hesse. The corps which guarded Westphalia included
the British contingent under Lord George Sackville, who had been
appointed to the command on the death of the Duke of Marlborough
in the previous year, and it lay a little to the west of Münster,
under the orders of the Hanoverian General von Spörcke. That
officer growing uneasy over Contades's movements, Ferdinand on the
16th of May marched from Ziegenhain, leaving sixteen thousand men
under General von Imhoff to protect Hesse, and on the 24th, having
effected his junction with Spörcke, cantoned his troops along the
Lippe from Coesfeld to Hamm. Meanwhile Contades, detaching a corps
of fifteen thousand men under Count d'Armentières to threaten
Münster, marched southward from Düsseldorf upon Giessen, there to
join Broglie and begin operations against Hesse. Ferdinand, in
the faint hope of recalling him to the Rhine, despatched a corps
under the Hereditary Prince of Brunswick, a most brilliant officer,
to alarm the French garrisons at Düsseldorf and other points on
the river; but Contades, adhering to his purpose, pushed forward
an advanced corps under M. de Noailles from Giessen to Marburg,
evidently intent on prosecuting his march to the north. Contades
was in overwhelming force. Noailles's corps at Marburg numbered
twenty thousand men, his own at Giessen close on sixty thousand,
while Broglie's reserve-corps at Friedberg, a little to the south
of Giessen, included close on twenty thousand more. He now sent
Broglie forward by Fritzlar upon Cassel, while he himself continued
his march due north through Waldeck upon Corbach. Imhoff, fearful
of being cut off and unable to defend Cassel, fell back towards
Lippstadt; and Broglie having left a force to occupy Cassel, turned
westward to rejoin Contades. On the 14th of June the whole were
again assembled together, Contades' corps lying a little to the
south of Paderborn, and Broglie's at Stadtbergen.
[Sidenote: June 11.]
[Sidenote: June 18.]
These movements caused Ferdinand the deepest anxiety. On the 11th
of June he concentrated and marched eastward to Büren, where he
halted and picked up Imhoff's corps; but even so he was weaker
than the enemy, for though he had recalled the Hereditary Prince
from Düsseldorf, he had been obliged to leave nine thousand men
under General Wangenheim at Dülmen, to watch d'Armentières's
designs against Münster. But worse was to come; for on the 18th
Broglie's corps, moving up to the right of Contades's, began
to edge Ferdinand's left wing back to the westward. Ferdinand,
accepting the inevitable, fell back on Lippstadt and crossed the
Lippe to Rietberg. His embarrassment was now extreme. He could not
divine whether the enemy designed to besiege Lippstadt or Münster
or both, or whether they meant to force a battle upon him against
greatly superior numbers. He was inclined to risk a battle, seeing
that, for all that he could do to prevent it, both fortresses
might be taken before his eyes; in which case he must needs cross
to the east side of the Weser. So critical did he consider the
position that he wrote to King George the Second for instructions,
and begged that ships might be ready to transport the garrison in
case it should be necessary to evacuate Emden. The King's answer
showed the Guelphic loyalty and courage at its noblest. He said
that since Ferdinand was inclined to hazard an action he also was
ready to take the risk, but that he left his General an absolutely
free hand, only assuring him that his confidence in him would be
unabated, whatever the result; and, lest Ferdinand should be in any
doubt, he caused a second letter to be written to him to the same
effect, but in stronger terms even than the first.[351]
[Sidenote: June 29.]
[Sidenote: July 3.]
[Sidenote: July 8.]
[Sidenote: July 10.]
[Sidenote: July 14.]
Meanwhile Contades marched up to Paderborn and halted for some
days, keeping Ferdinand still in doubt as to his intentions. At
last on the 29th he moved northward and pushed his light troops
forward to Bielefeld, showing plainly that his true aim was the
capture either of Hameln or of Minden on the Weser. Ferdinand
therefore recalled Wangenheim's corps from Dülmen to the main army;
whereupon, as he had expected, d'Armentières at once advanced to
besiege Münster. On the same day Ferdinand himself moved northward
and encamped parallel to Contades at Diessen, comforting himself
with the reflection that though his enemies might be nearer to
Minden than he, he at any rate was nearer to his food-supplies than
they.[352] It was, however, extremely difficult for him to obtain
intelligence of the French movements, since the two armies were
separated by a broad chain of wooded hills; and he consequently
hesitated for some days before he decided, on false information of
a French advance, to move towards Osnabrück. His intention was to
turn eastward from thence, and to take up a position which would
render it perilous for the French to attempt the siege either
of Hameln or Minden. He had made, however, but one march from
Osnabrück when he received the news that Broglie had surprised
Minden on the day before, and that the French had thus secured a
bridge over the Weser and free access into Hanover. This was a
most unpleasant surprise for Ferdinand. For a day he hesitated
whether or not to return to Münster, and then decided to fall back
to the Lower Weser, so as to save his magazine at Nienburg, and,
since the French had set the example of lawlessness at Frankfort,
to occupy the Imperial Free Town of Bremen. On the 14th of July
accordingly his headquarters were fixed at Stolzenau, between
Nienburg and Minden on the Weser, and a detachment was sent to
Bremen.
[Sidenote: July 17.]
Meanwhile Contades proceeded to reap the fruit of his very
successful movements. Part of his light troops seized upon
Osnabrück, and the rest were sent to levy contributions in Hanover;
M. de Chevreuse was detached with three thousand men to besiege
Lippstadt; d'Armentières continued to besiege Münster; Broglie's
corps crossed the Weser on the 14th to invest Hameln; and on the
16th Contades with the main army debouched into the basin of
Minden, and pushed a part of his army as far to the northward
as Petershagen. Ferdinand, though he could bring but forty-five
thousand men into the field against sixty thousand, advanced
southward next day to offer him battle; but Contades retired
without awaiting his arrival and withdrew to an unassailable
position immediately to south of Minden. If he could hold Ferdinand
inactive while his several detachments did their work, it was of no
profit to him to hazard a general action.
[Sidenote: July.]
So far Contades's operations had been masterly. He had taken
Cassel, the capital of Hesse, and had invested both Lippstadt and
Münster; he had further taken Minden and invested Hameln; and thus
he bade fair to possess himself of the line of the Weser and to
carry the war straight into Hanover. Ferdinand's position was most
critical, and was not rendered more pleasant to him by a series of
uncomplimentary messages from Frederick the Great. But Contades,
from the moment that he declined battle, seems to have taken leave,
possibly from excessive confidence, of all energy and ability. His
position was, it is true, impregnable. His army lay immediately to
the south of Minden, communicating by three bridges with Broglie's
corps on the other side of the Weser. His right rested on the town
and the river, his left on a mass of wooded hills--the end of
the range that had separated his army from Ferdinand's--and the
whole of his front was covered by a wide morass, through which
ran a brook called the Bastau. But though unassailable from any
point, the position had conspicuous defects. In the first place,
it did not leave the army free to move in all directions; and in
the second, it necessitated the detachment of troops to the south
to maintain communication through Gohfeld and Hervorden with the
French base at Cassel. It was for Ferdinand, by skilful use of
these defects, to entice Contades from his pinfold to meet him in
the open field.
[Sidenote: July 28.]
[Sidenote: July.]
Returning to camp at Petershagen after Contades's withdrawal to
Minden, Ferdinand's first step was to push his picquets forward
into a chain of villages that lay in his front: Todtenhausen on the
bank of the Weser, Fredewald immediately to west of Todtenhausen,
Stemmern and Holthausen somewhat in advance of Fredewald, and
Nord Hemmern, Sud Hemmern, and Hille still farther to south and
west. The occupation of Hille brought his advanced posts to the
western edge of the morass that covered Contades's front, and
to the head of the one causeway that led across it. On the 22nd
Wangenheim's corps, about ten thousand strong, was pushed forward
to Todtenhausen, where it remained conspicuous, in advance of
the army. In the midst of these movements came the bad news of
the fall of Münster, which enabled d'Armentières to march from
thence to besiege Lippstadt, and Chevreuse to return with his
detachment to Minden; but this misfortune only quickened Ferdinand
to action. On the 27th the Hereditary Prince marched with six
thousand men south-westward towards Lübbecke, and on the following
day drove from it a body of French irregulars which was stationed
there for the protection of Contades's left flank. Then turning
eastward he pursued his march against the French communications.
Simultaneously, on the 28th, General Dreve led the garrison of
Bremen against Osnabrück, retook it, and hastened eastward to join
the Hereditary Prince. The junction effected, the two pressed on
towards Hervorden, and on the 31st established themselves astride
of the road by which all Contades's supplies must be brought up
from the south.
Here, therefore, was a menace in his rear to make the French
General uneasy in his position behind the morass; and now Ferdinand
added a temptation in his front to induce him the more readily
to quit it. On the 29th the Prince, leaving Wangenheim's corps
isolated about Todtenhausen, led the whole of the rest of the army
a short march to the south-west, and encamped between Fredewald
and Hille. Headquarters were at Hille, under guard of the Twelfth
and Twentieth Regiments of the British Foot, for the red-coats
held the place of honour on the right of the line; and picquets
were pushed on to Sud Hemmern, Hartum, and Hahlen, villages on the
eastern side of Hille, by the border of the morass. Finally, from
two to three thousand men were ordered to Lübbecke to maintain
communication with the Hereditary Prince. Such dispositions might
well have appeared hazardous; but Ferdinand had thought them out
in every detail. Wangenheim's corps, though isolated, was strongly
entrenched, with several guns; while his position covered the
only outlet by which the French could debouch from behind the
marsh. Thereby two important objects were gained. First, the safe
passage of convoys from the Lower Weser was assured; and secondly,
it was made certain that, before Contades could deploy to attack
Wangenheim in force, Ferdinand with the main army would have time
either to fall upon his flank or simply to join his own left to
Wangenheim's right. To ensure the swift execution of this latter
critical movement, Ferdinand directed all Generals to acquaint
themselves carefully with the ground, and in particular with the
outlets that led from his position to the open plain before Minden.
Contades meanwhile reasoned, as Ferdinand had hoped and intended,
in a very different fashion. The Allied army was, to his mind,
dispersed in every direction. Ten thousand men were with the
Hereditary Prince at Gohfeld; at least two thousand more at
Lübbecke; Ferdinand himself, with the greater portion of the army,
seemed so anxious to be within supporting distance of the Prince
that he had left Wangenheim in the air; while even Wangenheim's
corps was not united, but had detached a few battalions across
the river to keep an eye on Broglie. Still the interruption of
his own communications with Cassel was troublesome; and it would
be well to put an end to that and to all other difficulties by a
decisive blow and a brilliant victory. He therefore despatched the
Duke of Brissac with eight thousand men to Gohfeld to hold the
Hereditary Prince in check, threw eight bridges over the Bastau
for the passage of his troops across it in as many columns, and
ordered Broglie to be ready to cross the Weser with his corps to
form a ninth column upon his right. The total force which he could
bring into the plain of Minden was fifty-one thousand men with one
hundred and sixty-two guns. Against it, if all went well, Ferdinand
could oppose forty-one thousand men and one hundred and seventy
guns.
[Sidenote: Aug. 1.]
A fresh gale was blowing from the south-west which drowned the
stroke of the clocks of Minden, as midnight closed the last day of
July and ushered in the first of August. Already the French camp
was all alert in the darkness, and the columns were moving off,
not without confusion, to the bridges of the Bastau. An hour later
two white-coated deserters were brought in by a picquet to the
Prince of Anhalt, General Officer of the day in the Allied army,
with the important intelligence that the whole French army was in
motion. Ferdinand had seen signs of some stir on the previous
evening, and had directed that, on the observance of the slightest
movement at the advanced posts, information should be brought to
him at once. Yet two o'clock came, and three o'clock, before a
belated messenger arrived at headquarters from Anhalt with the
news. Instantly Ferdinand called the whole of his troops to arms,
and ordered them to march to their appointed positions. His orders
had already been issued, and were clear and precise enough. The
advance was to be in eight columns, and the formation for battle,
as usual, with infantry in the centre and cavalry on each flank.
The first or right-hand column consisted of twenty-four squadrons
of cavalry under Lord George Sackville, fifteen of them being
British squadrons of the Blues, First and Third Dragoon Guards,
Scots Greys, and Tenth Dragoons. The second was made up entirely
of German artillery; and the third under Major-General von Spörcke
comprised the Twelfth, Twentieth, Twenty-third, Twenty-fifth,
Thirty-seventh, and Fifty-first regiments of the British Line.
Seven out of the eight columns were formed and marched off with
great promptitude; but in Sackville's column all was confusion and
delay. Some of the regiments were ready and others were not; and
Sackville himself was not to be found. It was no good beginning for
the British cavalry.
Having given the alarm Ferdinand hastened, with a single
staff-officer accompanying him, to see for himself how matters
stood. It is not difficult to conceive of his anxiety. Owing to
the unpardonable neglect of Anhalt the French had gained two hours
upon him; and now, when the army had been at last set in motion,
the cavalry of his right wing was not moving with the rest. There
was therefore every likelihood that the village of Hahlen, on which
he had intended to rest his right flank, might be occupied by the
French before Sackville could be there to prevent them. Instantly
galloping away to Hartum he ordered the picquets stationed therein
to move at once to Hahlen, and then hurried back with all speed
to the latter village, only to learn the bad news that it was
already in possession of the French. Meanwhile not a word had
come from Wangenheim, who, for aught he knew, might be in serious
difficulties. Despatching his solitary aide-de-camp to Todtenhausen
to ascertain how matters were going on the left, he galloped on
alone with his groom into the plain of Minden. The wind was blowing
so furiously that not a sound even of cannon could be heard in the
direction of the Weser; but before long he caught sight of the
French advancing on Kuttenhausen, and of a dense cloud of smoke
rising before Todtenhausen. Evidently Wangenheim was hotly engaged.
But meanwhile from windward there came the roar of a furious
cannonade about Hille, where the causeway issued from the western
end of the morass. This could only be a diversion, for Ferdinand
had already sealed up the outlet of the causeway with five hundred
men and two guns; but to make assurance still surer he now ordered
two more guns and the detachment from Lübbecke to Hille, and sent
information to the Hereditary Prince of what was passing. Then,
galloping for a moment to the left, Ferdinand satisfied himself
that his columns were advancing, and turned back in the teeth of
the wind to Hahlen. There once again the stupidity of the Prince of
Anhalt had set matters wrong. He had duly brought up the picquets
from Hartum before Hahlen, as directed, but had halted instead of
clearing the French out of the village, and had thereby delayed the
deployment of the whole of Spörcke's column. He was bidden to take
the village at once, which he did without difficulty; but having
done so this hopeless officer proceeded to instal himself and his
picquets as if to stay there for ever.[353]
After the occupation of Hahlen, however, matters on the right began
to adjust themselves. Ferdinand ordered Captain Foy's battery to
the front of the village to cover the formation of the troops,
and was soon satisfied by the admirable working of these British
guns that all was safe in that quarter. Meanwhile his aide-de-camp
returned from Todtenhausen with intelligence that Wangenheim was
holding his own, though the enemy had gained ground on his right,
where his flank was uncovered. Probably few commanders have passed
through two worse hours than did Ferdinand at the opening of the
battle of Minden.
Fortunately for him the French had not executed their own manœuvres
without confusion and delay. It was one defect of Contades's
position that he could not debouch from behind the morass by
daylight, since he would have brought Ferdinand down instantly
upon his flank; and the indiscipline of the French army among both
officers and men was not calculated to favour orderly movement in
the dark. Broglie, a capable officer, had crossed the river, taken
up his appointed position on the right, and made his dispositions
to fall upon Wangenheim, punctually and in good order; but he dared
not attack until the rest of the army was formed, so contented
himself with a simple duel of artillery. The rest of the columns
shuffled here and there in helplessness and confusion; and it
was not until Broglie had waited for two full hours that most
of them were at last deployed in some kind of order. The French
line-of-battle was convex in form, following, as it were, the
contour of the walls of Minden, with the right resting on the
Weser and the left on the morass. Broglie's corps on the right
was drawn up in two lines, the first of infantry, the second of
cavalry, with two powerful batteries in advance. On his left
stood half of the infantry of Contades's army in two lines, with
thirty-four guns before them. Next to these, in the centre, were
fifty-five squadrons of cavalry in two lines, with a third line
of eighteen more in reserve; and next to this mass of horse stood
the left wing, composed of the rest of the infantry in two lines,
with thirty guns. Thus to all intent the French line-of-battle
consisted of a centre of cavalry with wings of infantry; but the
left wing of infantry was late in arriving at its position, and its
tardiness was not without effect on the issue of the action.
Observing the excellent practice of Foy's battery before Hahlen,
Ferdinand had already sent Macbean's British battery to join it
and ordered Hase's Hanoverian brigade of heavy guns to the same
position. Then seeing Spörcke's column of British infantry in
the act of deployment, he sent orders that its advance, when the
time should come, should be made with drums beating. The order
was either misdelivered or misunderstood, for to his surprise
the leading British brigade shook itself up and began to advance
forthwith. A flight of aides-de-camp galloped off to stop them;
and the line of scarlet halted behind a belt of fir-wood to await
the formation of the rest of the army. In the first line of
Spörcke's division stood, counting from right to left, the Twelfth,
Thirty-seventh, and Twenty-third, under Brigadier Waldegrave; and
in the second, which extended beyond the first on each flank, the
Twentieth, Fifty-first, and Twenty-fifth, under Brigadier Kingsley,
Hardenberg's Hanoverian battalion, and two battalions of Hanoverian
guards. There then they stood for a few minutes, while the second
line, which was only partially deployed, hastened to complete the
evolution; when suddenly to the general amazement the drums again
began to roll, and the first line stepped off once more, advancing
rapidly but in perfect order, straight upon the French horse. The
second line, though its formation was still incomplete, stepped
off likewise in rear of its comrades, deploying as it moved, and
therefore of necessity dropping somewhat in rear. And so the nine
battalions, with the leading brigade far in advance, swung proudly
forward into a cross-fire of more than sixty cannon, alone and
unsupported from the rest of the line.
No aide-de-camp, gallop though he might, could stop them now;
and their majestic bearing showed that they would not easily be
stopped by an enemy. The British, being on the right, were the
more exposed to destruction, for the French batteries on their
left were too remote to maintain a really deadly fire; but what
signified a cross-fire and three lines of horse to regiments that
had fought at Dettingen and Fontenoy? For nearly two hundred yards
of the advance the French guns tore great gaps in their ranks;
but they passed through the tempest of shot unbroken and untamed,
and pressed on with the same majestic steadiness against the huge
motionless bank of the French horse. Then at last the wall of men
and horses started into life, and eleven squadrons coming forward
from the rest bore straight down upon them. The scarlet battalions
stood firm until the enemy were within ten yards of them; then
pouring in one volley which strewed the ground with men and horses,
they hurled the squadrons back in confused fragments upon their
comrades, and continued their advance. Ferdinand, perceiving the
disorder of the French, sent an aide-de-camp at full speed to Lord
George Sackville to bring up the British cavalry and complete the
rout. Sackville disputed the meaning of the order for a time, and
then advancing his squadrons for a short distance, as if to obey
it, brought them once more to a halt. A second messenger came up in
hot haste to ask why the cavalry of the right did not come on, but
Sackville remained stationary, and the opportunity was lost.
Then shamed and indignant at their defeat the French horse rallied.
Four brigades of infantry and thirty-two guns came forward from the
French left to enfilade the audacious British foot; and Ferdinand,
since Sackville would not move, advanced Phillips's brigade of
heavy guns in order to parry, if possible, this flanking attack.
Then the second line of the French horse came thundering down,
eager to retrieve their defeat, upon the nine isolated battalions.
For a moment the lines of scarlet seemed to waver under this triple
attack; but recovering themselves they closed up their ranks and
met the charging squadrons with a storm of musketry which blasted
them off the field. Then turning with equal fierceness upon the
French infantry they beat them also back with terrible loss. Again
an aide-de-camp flew from Ferdinand's side to Sackville, adjuring
him to bring up the British squadrons only, if no more, to make
good the success; but it was not jealousy of the foreign squadrons
under his command that kept Sackville back. The messenger delivered
his order; but not a squadron moved. Meanwhile Ferdinand had
hurried forward fresh battalions on his right to save the British
from annihilation; and now the third line of French horse, the
Gendarmerie and the Carbineers, essayed a third attack upon the
nine dauntless battalions and actually broke through the first
line; but was shattered to pieces by the second and sent the way
of its fellows. A fourth messenger was sent to Sackville, but with
no result. Ferdinand's impatience waxed hot. "When is that cavalry
coming?" he kept exclaiming. "Has no one seen that cavalry of the
right wing?" But no cavalry came. "Good God! is there no means of
getting that cavalry to advance," he ejaculated in desperation, and
sent a fifth messenger to bring up Lord Granby with the squadrons
of Sackville's second line only. Granby was about to execute the
order, when Sackville rode up and forbade him; and then, as if
still in doubt as to these repeated orders, Sackville trotted up
to Ferdinand and asked what they might mean. "My Lord," Ferdinand
is said to have answered, calmly, but with such contempt as may be
imagined, "the opportunity is now passed."
Nevertheless the astonishing attack of the British infantry had
virtually gained the day. Ferdinand's line had gained time to form
and to join with Wangenheim's; and the guns of the Allies coming
up gradually in increasing force silenced the inferior artillery
of the French. Ferdinand's left wing then took the offensive, and
the German cavalry by a brilliant charge dispersed the whole of
the infantry opposed to them. Between nine and ten o'clock the
struggle was practically over. The French were completely beaten,
and retreating rapidly under the guns of Minden to their pinfold
behind the marsh. Had Sackville's cavalry come forward when it was
bidden, it might have cut the flying French squadrons to pieces,
barred the retreat of most if not all of the French left wing, and
turned the victory into one of the greatest of all time. As things
happened, it fell to Foy and Macbean of the British Artillery to
gather the laurels of the pursuit. Hard though they had worked
all day, these officers limbered up their guns and moved with
astonishing rapidity along the border of the marsh, halting from
time to time to pound the retreating masses of the enemy; till at
last they unlimbered for good opposite the bridges of the Bastau
and punished the fugitives so heavily that they would not be
rallied until they had fled far beyond their camp.
Meanwhile the Hereditary Prince had engaged the Duke of Brissac at
Gohfeld and defeated him, so that the French communications with
Hervorden and Paderborn were hopelessly severed. The news of this
misfortune seems to have smitten Contades almost with panic. Had
he chosen to fall back by the line of his advance he could hardly
have been stopped by the inferior force of the Hereditary Prince,
and he would have found supplies and a good position at Hervorden.
But his defeat had crushed all spirit out of him. Abandoning his
communications with Paderborn he crossed the Weser in the night,
broke down the bridge of Minden, burned his bridges of boats, and
retired through a difficult and distressing country to Cassel, with
an army not only beaten but demoralised.
[Illustration: MINDEN. Aug. 1^{st} 1759.
The Action at the moment of the attack of the British Infantry.
_Walker & Boutall del._ _To face page 494._
]
So ended the battle of Minden, a day at once of pride and disgrace
to the British. The losses of the Allies amounted to twenty-six
hundred killed and wounded, of which the share of the British
amounted to close on fourteen hundred men.[354] Of the six devoted
regiments who went into action four thousand four hundred and
thirty-four strong, seventy-eight officers and twelve hundred
and fifty-two men, or about thirty per cent, were killed or
wounded; while the Hanoverian battalions with them, being on the
left or sheltered flank, lost but twelve per cent. The heaviest
sufferers were the Twelfth, which lost three hundred and two, and
the Twentieth, which lost three hundred and twenty-two of all
ranks; these regiments holding the place of honour on the right
of the first and second lines. The casualties of the French were
acknowledged in the official lists to amount to seven thousand,
though the letters of Broglie and Contades state the numbers
at from ten to eleven thousand; and the defeated army lost in
addition the greater part of its baggage, seventeen standards
and colours, and forty-three guns. From a military standpoint
the most remarkable feature in the action was the skill with
which Ferdinand contrived to entice his adversary into the field,
reflecting perhaps even more credit on his judgment of men than on
his knowledge of his profession. Once drawn from behind the morass
into the plain, Contades made singularly feeble and meaningless
dispositions: and the formation of his line with cavalry in the
centre and infantry on the flanks was, in the circumstances,
simply grotesque. He seems indeed to have had no very clear idea
as to what he really meant to do. If he had designed to overwhelm
Wangenheim's isolated corps--and no doubt he had some vague notion
of the kind--the obvious course was to launch Broglie straight at
him independently, and himself to protect Broglie's flank with the
main army. What he actually did was to turn Broglie's corps into
the right wing of an united army, and so practically to fetter
it for all decisive action. On the other hand, all preconcerted
arrangements on both sides were upset by the extraordinary attack
of the British infantry, a feat of gallantry and endurance that
stands, so far as I know, absolutely without a parallel. "I
never thought," said Contades bitterly, "to see a single line
of infantry break through three lines of cavalry ranked in
order of battle, and tumble them to ruin." "Never," grimly wrote
Westphalen, the chief of Ferdinand's staff, "were so many boots
and saddles seen on a battlefield as opposite to the English and
the Hanoverian Guards." Next to this attack the feature that
seems to have attracted most attention among both contemporary
and modern critics, was the remarkable efficiency of the British
artillery. The handling of the artillery generally at Minden,
which was entrusted to the Count of Lippe-Bückeburg, was very
greatly admired: but Westphalen, who passed lightly over the deeds
of the infantry, went out of his way to write that, though every
battery had done well, the English batteries had done wonders.
And indeed some British guns which were attached to Wangenheim's
corps on the left earned not less praise than those of Foy and
Macbean on the right. The palm of the cavalry fell to the Germans,
and in particular to a few squadrons of Prussian dragoons lent by
Frederick the Great, which earned it brilliantly. It would have
fallen to the British but for Sackville.
The part played by this deplorable man did not end with the battle.
Ferdinand in general orders made scathing allusion to his conduct
without mentioning his name; and Sackville was presently superseded
and sent home. There he was tried by court-martial and pronounced
unfit to serve the King in any military capacity whatever--a hard
sentence but probably no more than just. Sackville was admitted to
be an extremely able man; and as he had passed through Fontenoy and
been wounded in that action, it is not easy to call him a coward.
But the courage of some men is not the same on every day; and the
evidence produced at the court-martial shows, I think, too plainly
that on the day of Minden Sackville's courage failed him.[355]
The King published the sentence of his dismissal from the Army
in a special order, with very severe but not undeserved comment;
and Lord George Sackville henceforth disappears from British
battlefields. But we shall meet with him again as a Minister of
War, and the meeting will not be a pleasant one.
[Sidenote: Aug. 2.]
[Sidenote: Aug. 5.]
[Sidenote: Aug. 18.]
[Sidenote: Aug. 24.]
[Sidenote: Aug. 25.]
[Sidenote: Sept. 19.]
On the day following the battle the Hereditary Prince crossed the
Weser in pursuit of the French, and overtaking their rear-guard
at Einbeck captured many prisoners and much spoil, but failed to
arrest the retreat of the main body. Contades, therefore, succeeded
in bringing his troops back to Cassel, half starved, worn out by
hard marching, and utterly demoralised by indiscipline and pillage.
D'Armentières, on hearing of his chief's defeat, raised the siege
of Lippstadt and marched eastward to meet him. Ferdinand meanwhile,
having received the surrender of Minden, advanced by Bielefeld and
Paderborn south-eastward upon Corbach, so as to turn Contades's
left flank. On the 18th Contades, seeing his communications
endangered, evacuated Cassel and retired by forced marches to
Marburg, where he took up a strong position. Cassel capitulated
to the Allies on the following day; and Ferdinand, while still
pursuing his march southward, detached seven thousand men to
recapture Münster. Marshal d'Estrées then arrived to supersede
Contades; but little came of this change of command. Renewed
menace from the westward upon the French communications forced him
to withdraw from the line of the Ohm and Lahn, and to fall back
to Giessen. Ferdinand at once laid siege to Marburg, which fell
within a week, and finally on the 19th of September he encamped
at Kroffdorf, a little to north-west of Giessen, over against the
French camp.
[Sidenote: Nov. 21.]
Meanwhile the siege of Münster had gone ill for the Allies,
and had been turned into a blockade. Ferdinand, after sending
additional troops thither, found himself too weak to attempt
further operations until the fall of the town; and during this
interval Broglie, who had been appointed to the supreme command,
had received a reinforcement of ten thousand Würtembergers.
Thus strengthened he tried incessantly with a detached corps of
twenty thousand men to interrupt Ferdinand's communications with
Cassel, but in vain; and finally the Hereditary Prince attacked
this corps at Fulda, defeated it signally, and then turning upon
Broglie's right flank forced him to retire to Friedberg. Ferdinand
then blockaded Giessen; but at this point further operations
were stayed. Ever since his disastrous defeat by the Russians at
Kunersdorf in August, Frederick the Great had pressed Ferdinand for
reinforcements; and the detachment of twelve thousand troops to the
King not only rendered the Prince powerless for further aggression,
but obliged him also to raise the blockade of Giessen. In January
1760 both armies retired into winter-quarters. The French occupied
much the same ground as at the beginning of the campaign; and the
Allies likewise were distributed into two divisions, the army of
Westphalia extending from Münster through Paderborn to the Weser,
the army of Hesse from Marburg eastward to the Werra. Thus ended
the campaign of 1759, leaving both parties in occupation of the
same territory as at its beginning; but it had branded the French
with the discredit of a great defeat, and had heightened in the
Allies their contempt for their enemy and their confidence in their
chief.