Terms defined or explained.
1. Considering the things I am conscious of, some are internal or within
my mind, some external or without. Passion, thinking, volition, are
internal objects. Objects of sight, of hearing, of smell, of touch, of
taste, are external.
2. The faculty by which I discover an internal object, is termed an
internal sense: the faculty by which I discover an external object, is
termed an external sense. This distinction among the senses is made with
reference to their objects merely; for the senses, external and
internal, are equally powers or faculties of the mind.
3. But as self is an object, and the only one that cannot be termed
either external or internal, the faculty by which I am conscious of
myself, must be distinguished from both the internal and external
senses.
4. By sight we perceive the qualities of figure, colour, motion, &_c._:
by the ear we perceive the qualities high, low, loud, soft: by touch we
perceive rough, smooth, hot, cold, &_c._: by taste we perceive sweet,
sour, bitter, &_c._: by smell we perceive fragrant, stinking, &_c._
Qualities, from our very conception of them, are not capable of an
independent existence; but must belong to something of which they are
the qualities. A thing with respect to its qualities is termed a
subject, or _substratum_; because its qualities rest, as it were, upon
it, or are founded upon it. The subject or _substratum_ of visible
qualities, is termed _substance_, of audible qualities, _sound_; of
tangible qualities, _body_. In like manner, _taste_ is the _substratum_
of qualities perceived by our sense of tasting; and _smell_ is the
_substratum_ of qualities perceived by our sense of smelling.
5. Substance and sound are perceived existing in a certain place; often
at a considerable distance from the organ. But smell, touch, and taste,
are perceived at the organs of sense.
6. Objects of internal sense are conceived to be attributes:
deliberation, reasoning, resolution, willing, consenting, are internal
actions: passions and emotions are internal agitations. With regard to
the former, I am conscious of being active; with regard to the latter, I
am conscious of being passive.
7. Again, we are conscious of internal action as in the head; of
passions and emotions as in the heart.
8. Many actions may be exerted internally and many effects produced, of
which we are not conscious. When we investigate the ultimate cause of
animal motions, it is the most probable opinion, that they proceed from
some internal power: and if so, we are, in this particular, unconscious
of our own operations. But consciousness being imply’d in the very
conception of deliberating, reasoning, resolving, willing, consenting,
these operations cannot go on without our knowledge. The same is the
case of passions and emotions; for no internal agitation is denominated
a passion or emotion, but what we are conscious of.
9. The mind is not always in the same state: it is at times chearful,
melancholy, severe, peevish. These different states may not improperly
be denominated _tones_. An object, by making an impression, produceth an
emotion or passion, which again gives the mind a certain tone suited to
it.
10. _Perception_ and _sensation_ are commonly reckoned synonymous terms,
signifying the consciousness we have of objects; but, in accurate
language, they are distinguished. The consciousness we have of external
objects, is termed _perception_. Thus we are said to perceive a certain
animal, a certain colour, sound, taste, smell, &_c._ The consciousness
we have of pleasure or pain arising from external objects, is termed
_sensation_. Thus we have a sensation of cold, of heat, of the pain of a
wound, of the pleasure of a landscape, of music, of beauty, of
propriety, of behaviour, &_c._ The consciousness we have of internal
action, such as deliberation, resolution, choice, is never termed
either a perception or a sensation.
11. _Conception_ ought to be distinguished from perception. External
things and their attributes are objects of perception: relations among
things are objects of conception. I see two men, James and John: the
consciousness I have of them is a perception: but the consciousness I
have of their relation as father and son, is termed a _conception_.
Again, perception relates to objects really existing: conception to
fictitious objects, or to those framed by the imagination.
12. _Feeling_, beside denoting one of the external senses, has two
different significations. Of these the most common includes not only
sensation, but also that branch of consciousness which relates to
passions and emotions: it is proper to say, I have a feeling of cold, of
heat, or of pain; and it is not less proper to say, I have a feeling of
love, of hatred, of anger, or of any other passion. But it is not
applied to internal action: for it is not proper to say, that a man
feels himself deliberating or resolving. In a sense less common, feeling
is put for the thing that is felt; and in this sense it is a general
term for every one of our passions and emotions.
13. That we cannot perceive an external object till an impression be
made upon our body, is probable from reason, and is ascertained by
experience. But it is not necessary that we be made sensible of the
impression. It is true, that in touching, tasting, and smelling, we feel
the impression made at the organ of sense: but in seeing and hearing, we
feel no impression. We know indeed by experience, that before we
perceive a visible object, its image is spread upon the _retina tunica_;
and that before we perceive a sound, an impression is made upon the drum
of the ear: and yet here, we are not conscious either of the organic
image or the organic impression: nor are we conscious of any other
operation preparatory to the act of perception. All we can say, is, that
we see that river, or hear that trumpet[96].
14. Objects once perceived may be recalled to the mind by the power of
memory. When I recall an object in this manner, it appears to me the
same as in the original survey, only more faint and obscure. For
example, I saw yesterday a spreading oak growing on the brink of a
river. I endeavour to recall it to my mind. How is this operation
performed? Do I endeavour to form in my mind a picture of it or
representative image? Not so. I transport myself ideally to the place
where I saw the tree yesterday; upon which I have a perception of the
tree and river, similar in all respects to the perception I had of it
when I viewed it with my eyes, only more obscure. And in this
recollection, I am not conscious of a picture or representative image,
more than in the original survey: the perception is of the tree itself,
as at first. I confirm this by another experiment. After attentively
surveying a fine statue, I close my eyes. What follows? The same object
continues, without any difference but that it is less distinct than
formerly. This indistinct secondary perception of an object, is termed
_an idea_. And therefore the precise and accurate definition of an idea,
in contradistinction to an original perception, is, “That perception or
consciousness of a real object, which a person has by exercising the
power of memory.” Every thing one is conscious of, whether internal or
external, passions, emotions, thinking, resolving, willing, heat, cold,
&_c._ as well as external objects, may be recalled as above by the power
of memory[97].
15. The original perceptions of external objects, are either simple or
complex. A sound may be so simple as not to be resolvable into parts: so
may a taste and a smell. A perception of touch, is generally compounded
of the more simple perceptions of hardness or softness, joined with
smoothness or roughness, heat or cold, &_c._ But of all the perceptions
of external sense, that of a visible object is the most complex; because
the eye takes in more particulars than any other organ. A tree is
composed of its trunk, branches, leaves: it has colour, figure, size:
every one of these separately produceth a perception in the mind of the
spectator, which are all combined into the complex perception of the
tree.
16. The original perception of an object of sight, is more complete,
lively, and distinct, than that of any other external sense: and for
that reason, an idea or secondary perception of a visible object, is
more distinct and lively than that of any other object. A fine passage
in music, may, for a moment, be recalled to the mind with tolerable
accuracy: but the idea of any other object, and also of sound after the
shortest interval, is extremely obscure.
17. As the range of an individual is commonly within narrow bounds of
space, opportunities seldom offer of an enlarged acquaintance with
external objects. Original perceptions therefore, and their
corresponding ideas, are a provision too scanty for the purposes of
life. Language is an admirable contrivance for supplying this
deficiency; for by language, the original perceptions of each individual
may be communicated to all; and the same may be done by painting and
other imitative arts. It is natural to suppose, that the most lively
ideas are the most susceptible of being communicated to others. This
holds more especially when language is the vehicle of communication; for
language hitherto has not arrived at any greater perfection than to
express clear and lively ideas. Hence it is, that poets and orators,
who are extremely successful in describing objects of sight, find
objects of the other senses too faint and obscure for language. An idea
thus acquired of an object at second hand, ought to be distinguished
from an idea of memory; though their resemblance has occasioned the same
term to be apply’d to both. This is to be regretted; for when knowledge
is to be communicated by language, ambiguity in the signification of
words is a great obstruction to accuracy of conception. Thus nature hath
furnished the means of multiplying ideas without end, and of providing
every individual with a sufficient stock to answer, not only the
necessities, but even the elegancies of life.
18. Further, man is endued with a sort of creative power: he can
fabricate images of things that have no existence. The materials
employ’d in this operation, are ideas of sight, which may be taken to
pieces and combined into new forms at pleasure: their complexity and
vivacity make them fit materials. But a man has no such power over any
of his other ideas, whether of the external or internal senses: he
cannot, after the utmost effort, combine these into new forms: his ideas
of such objects are too obscure for this operation. An image thus
fabricated cannot be called a secondary perception, not being derived
from an original perception: the poverty of language however, as in the
case immediately above mentioned, has occasioned the same term _idea_ to
be apply’d to all. This singular power of fabricating images independent
of real objects, is distinguished by the name _imagination_.
19. As ideas are the chief materials employ’d in thinking, reasoning,
and reflecting, it is of consequence that their nature and differences
be understood. It appears now, that ideas may be distinguished into
three kinds; first, Ideas or secondary perceptions, properly termed
_ideas of memory_; second, Ideas communicated by language or other
signs; and, third, Ideas of imagination. These ideas differ from each
other in many respects; but the chief foundation of the distinction is
the difference of their causes. The first kind are derived from real
existences that have been objects of our senses: language is the cause
of the second, or any other sign that has the same power with language;
and a man’s imagination is to himself the cause of the third. It is
scarce necessary to add, that an idea, originally of imagination, being
convey’d to others by language or any other vehicle, becomes in the mind
of those to whom it is convey’d an idea of the second kind; and again,
that an idea of this kind, being afterward recalled to the mind, becomes
in that circumstance an idea of memory.
20. Human nature is not so constituted, as that its objects are
perceived with indifferency: these, with very few exceptions, raise in
us either pleasant or painful emotions. External objects, at the same
time, appear in themselves agreeable or disagreeable; but with some
difference betwixt those which produce organic impressions, and those
which affect us from a distance. When we touch a soft and smooth body,
we have a pleasant feeling as at the place of contact; and this feeling
we distinguish not, at least not accurately, from the agreeableness of
the body itself. The same holds in general with regard to all the
organic impressions. It is otherwise in hearing and seeing. A sound is
perceived as in itself agreeable; and, at the same time, raises in the
hearer a pleasant emotion: an object of sight appears in itself
agreeable; and, at the same time, raises in the seer a pleasant emotion.
These are accurately distinguished. The pleasant emotion is felt as
within the mind: the agreeableness of the object is placed upon the
object, and is perceived as one of its qualities or properties. The
agreeable appearance of an object of sight, is termed _beauty_; and the
disagreeable appearance of such an object is termed _ugliness_.
21. But though beauty and ugliness, in their proper and genuine
signification, are confined to objects of sight; yet in a more lax and
figurative signification, they are apply’d to objects of the other
senses. They are sometimes apply’d even to abstract terms; for it is not
unusual to say, _a beautiful theorem, a beautiful constitution of
government_. But I am inclined to think, that we are led to use such
expression by conceiving the thing as delineated upon paper, and as in
some sort an object of sight.
22. A line composed by a precise rule, is perceived and said to be
regular. A straight line, a parabola, a hyperbola, the circumference of
a circle, and of an ellipse, are all of them regular lines. A figure
composed by a precise rule, is perceived and said to be regular. Thus a
circle, a square, a hexagon, an equilateral triangle, are regular
figures, being composed by a rule that determines the form of each. When
the form of a line or of a figure is ascertained by a rule that leaves
nothing arbitrary, the line and the figure are said to be perfectly
regular: this is the case of the figures now mentioned; and it is the
case of a straight line and of the circumference of a circle. A figure
and a line are not perfectly regular where any part or circumstance is
left arbitrary. A parallelogram and a rhomb are less regular than a
square: the parallelogram is subjected to no rule as to the length of
sides, other than that the opposite sides be equal: the rhomb is
subjected to no rule as to its angles, other than that the opposite
angles be equal. For the same reason, the circumference of an ellipse,
the form of which is susceptible of much variety, is less regular than
that of a circle.
23. Regularity, properly speaking, belongs, like beauty, to objects of
sight: like beauty, it is also apply’d figuratively to other objects.
Thus we say, _a regular government, a regular composition of music_,
and, _regular discipline_.
24. When two figures are composed of similar parts, they are said to be
uniform. Perfect uniformity is where the constituent parts of two
figures are precisely similar to each other. Thus two cubes of the same
dimensions are perfectly uniform in all their parts. An imperfect
uniformity is, where the parts mutually correspond, but without being
precisely similar. The uniformity is imperfect betwixt two squares or
cubes of unequal dimensions; and still more so betwixt a square and a
parallelogram.
25. Uniformity is also applicable to the constituent parts of the same
figure. The constituent parts of a square are perfectly uniform: its
sides are equal and its angles are equal. Wherein then differs
regularity from uniformity? for a figure composed of similar or uniform
parts must undoubtedly be regular. Regularity is predicated of a figure
considered as a whole composed of resembling or uniform parts:
uniformity again is predicated of these parts as related to each other
by resemblance. We say, a square is a regular, not an uniform figure:
but with respect to the constituent parts of a square, we say not that
they are regular, but that they are uniform.
26. In things destined for the same use, as legs, arms, eyes, windows,
spoons, we expect uniformity. Proportion ought to govern parts intended
for different uses. We require a certain proportion betwixt a leg and an
arm; in the base, the shaft, the capital, of a pillar; and in the
length, the breadth, the height, of a room. Some proportion is also
required in different things intimately connected, as betwixt a
dwelling-house, the garden, and the stables. But we require no
proportion among things slightly connected, as betwixt the table a man
writes on and the dog that follows him. Proportion and uniformity never
coincide: things perfectly similar are uniform; but proportion is never
applied to them: the four sides and angles of a square are equal and
perfectly uniform; but we say not that they are proportional. Thus,
proportion always implies inequality or difference; but then it implies
it to a certain degree only: the most agreeable proportion resembles a
_maximum_ in mathematics; a greater or less inequality or difference is
less agreeable.
27. Order regards various particulars. First, in tracing or surveying
objects, we are directed by a sense of order: we conceive it to be more
orderly, that we should pass from a principle to its accessories and
from a whole to its parts, than in the contrary direction. Next, with
respect to the position of things, a sense of order directs us to place
together things intimately connected. Thirdly, in placing things that
have no natural connection, that order appears the most perfect, where
the particulars are made to bear the strongest relation to each other
that position can give them. Thus parallelism is the strongest relation
that position can bestow upon straight lines. If they be so placed as by
production to intersect each other, the relation is less perfect. A
large body in the middle and two equal bodies of less size, one on each
side, is an order that produces the strongest relation the bodies are
susceptible of by position. The relation betwixt the two equal bodies
would be stronger by juxtaposition; but they would not both have the
same relation to the third.
28. The beauty or agreeableness of an object, as it enters into the
original perception, enters also into the secondary perception or idea.
An idea of imagination is also agreeable; though in a lower degree than
an idea of memory, where the objects are of the same kind. But this
defect in the ideas of imagination is abundantly supply’d by their
greatness and variety. For the imagination acting without control, can
fabricate ideas of finer visible objects, of more noble and heroic
actions, of greater wickedness, of more surprising events, than ever in
fact existed. And by communicating these ideas in words, painting,
sculpture, &_c._ the influence of the imagination is not less extensive
than great.
29. In the nature of every man, there is somewhat original, that serves
to distinguish him from others, that tends to form a character, and,
with the concurrence of external accidents, to make him meek or fiery,
candid or deceitful, resolute or timorous, chearful or morose. This
original bent is termed _disposition_. Which must be distinguished from
a _principle_: no original bent obtains the latter appellation, but what
belongs to the whole species. A principle makes part of the common
nature of man: a disposition makes part of the nature of this or that
man. A _propensity_ comprehends both; for it signifies indifferently
either a principle or a disposition.
30. _Affection_, signifying a settled bent of mind toward a particular
being or thing, occupies a middle place betwixt propensity on the one
hand, and passion on the other. A propensity being original, must exist
before any opportunity be offered to exert it: affection can never be
original; because, having a special relation to a particular object, it
cannot exist till the object be presented. Again, passion depends on the
presence of the object, in idea at least, if not in reality: when the
idea vanishes, the passion vanishes with it. Affection, on the contrary,
once settled on a person, is a lasting connection; and, like other
connections, subsists even when we do not think of it. A familiar
example will clear the whole. There may be in the mind a propensity to
gratitude, which, through want of an object, happens never to be
exerted, and which therefore is never discovered even by the person who
has it. Another who has the same propensity, meets with a kindly office
that makes him grateful to his benefactor: an intimate connection is
formed betwixt them, termed _affection_; which, like other connections,
has a permanent existence, though not always in view. The affection, for
the most part, lies dormant, till an opportunity offer of exerting it:
in this circumstance, it is converted into the passion of gratitude; and
the opportunity is greedily seized for testifying gratitude in the most
complete manner.
31. _Aversion_, I think, must be opposed to affection, and not to
desire, as it commonly is. We have an affection for one person; we have
an aversion to another: the former disposes us to do good to its object,
the latter to do ill.
32. What is a sentiment? It is not a perception; for a perception
signifies our consciousness of external objects. It is not consciousness
of an internal action; such as thinking, suspending thought, inclining,
resolving, willing, &_c._ Neither is it a conception of relation amongst
objects or of their differences: a conception of this kind, is termed
_opinion_. The term _sentiment_ is appropriated to those thoughts that
are suggested by a passion or emotion.
33. _Attention_ is that state of mind which prepares a man to receive
impressions. According to the degree of attention, objects make a
stronger or weaker impression[98]. In an indolent state, or in a
reverie, objects make but a slight impression; far from what they make
when they command our attention. In a train of perceptions, no single
object makes such a figure as it would do single and apart: for when the
attention is divided among many objects, no single object is intitled to
a large share. Hence the stillness of night contributes to terror, there
being nothing to divert the attention.
Horror ubique animos, simul ipsa silentia terrent.
_Æneid._ 2.
_Zara._ Silence and solitude are ev’ry where!
Through all the gloomy ways and iron doors
That hither lead, nor human face nor voice
Is seen or heard. A dreadful din was wont
To grate the sense, when enter’d here, from groans
And howls of slaves condemn’d, from clink of chains,
And crash of rusty bars and creeking hinges:
And ever and anon the sight was dash’d
With frightful faces and the meagre looks
Of grim and ghastly executioners.
Yet more this stillness terrifies my soul
Than did that scene of complicated horrors.
_Mourning Bride, act 5. sc. 8._
And hence it is, that an object seen at the termination of a confined
view, is more agreeable than when seen in a group with the surrounding
objects.
The crow doth sing as sweetly as the lark
When neither is attended; and, I think,
The nightingale, if she should sing by day,
When ev’ry goose is cackling, would be thought
No better a musician than the wren.
_Merchant of Venice_
34. In matters of slight importance, attention, in a great measure, is
directed by will; and for that reason, it is our own fault if trifling
objects make any deep impression. Had we power equally to with-hold our
attention from matters of importance, we might be proof against any deep
impression. But our power fails us here: an interesting object seizes
and fixes the attention beyond the possibility of control; and while our
attention is thus forcibly attached by one object, others may solicit
for admittance; but in vain, for they will not be regarded. Thus a small
misfortune is scarce felt in presence of a greater:
_Lear._ Thou think’st ’tis much, that this contentious storm
Invades us to the skin; so ’tis to thee;
But where the greater malady is fix’d,
The lesser is scarce felt. Thou’d’st shun a bear;
But if thy flight lay tow’rd the roaring sea,
Thou’d’st meet the bear i’ th’ mouth. When the mind’s free,
The body’s delicate: the tempest in my mind
Doth from my senses take all feeling else,
Save what beats there.
_King Lear, act 3. sc. 5_.
35. _Genus_, _species_, _modification_, are terms invented to
distinguish beings from each other. Individuals are distinguished by
their qualities: a large class of individuals enjoying qualities in
common, is termed a _genus_: a subdivision of such class is termed a
_species_. Again, that circumstance which distinguisheth one genus, one
species, or even one individual, from another, is termed a
_modification_: the same particular that is termed a _property_ or
_quality_ when considered as belonging to an individual or a class of
individuals, is termed a _modification_ when considered as
distinguishing the individual or the class from another. A black skin
and soft curled hair, are properties of a negro: the same circumstances
considered as marks that distinguish a negro from a man of a different
species, are denominated _modifications_.
36. Objects of sight, being complex, are distinguishable into the
several particulars that enter into the composition: these objects are
all of them coloured; and they all have length, breadth, and thickness.
When I behold a spreading oak, I distinguish in this object, size,
figure, colour, and sometimes motion: viewing a flowing river, I
distinguish colour, figure, and constant motion: a dye has colour, black
spots, six plain surfaces, all equal and uniform. The objects of touch,
have all of them extension. Some of them are felt rough, some smooth:
some of them are hard, some soft. With respect to the other senses, some
of their objects are simple, some complex: a sound, a taste, a smell,
may be so simple as not to be distinguishable into any parts: others are
perceived to be compounded of different sounds, different tastes, and
different smells.
37. The eye at one look can take in a number of objects, as of trees in
a field, or men in a crowd: as these objects are distinct from each
other, each having a separate and independent existence, they are
distinguishable in the mind as well as in reality; and there is nothing
more easy, than to abstract from some and to confine our contemplation
to others. A large oak with its spreading branches, fixes our attention
upon itself, and abstracts us from the shrubs that surround it. In the
same manner, with respect to compounded sounds, tastes, or smells, we
can fix our thoughts upon any one of the component parts, abstracting
our attention from the rest. But the power of abstraction is not
confined to objects that are separable in reality as well as mentally:
it also takes place where there can be no real separation. The size, the
figure, the colour, of a tree, are inseparably connected, and cannot
exist independent of each other: the same of length, breadth, and
thickness: and yet we can mentally confine our observations to one of
these, neglecting or abstracting from the rest. Here abstraction takes
place where there cannot be a real separation.
38. This power of abstraction is of great utility. A carpenter considers
a log of wood, with regard to hardness, firmness, colour, and texture: a
philosopher, neglectting these properties, makes the log undergo a
chymical analysis; and examines its taste, its smell, and its component
principles: the geometrician confines his reasoning to the figure, the
length, breadth, and thickness. In general, every artist, abstracting
from all other properties, confines his observations to those which have
a more immediate connection with his profession.
39. Hence clearly appears the meaning of an _abstract term_, and
_abstract idea_. If in viewing an object, we can abstract from some of
its parts or properties, and attach ourselves to others; there must be
the same facility, when we recall this object to the mind in idea. This
leads directly to the definition of an abstract idea, _viz._ “A partial
view of a complex object, limited to one or more of the component parts
or properties, laying aside or abstracting from others.” A word that
denotes an abstract idea, is called an _abstract term_.
40. The power of abstraction is bestowed upon man, for the purposes
solely of reasoning. It tends greatly to the facility as well as
clearness of any process of reasoning, that, withdrawing from every
other circumstance, we can confine our attention to the single property
we desire to investigate.
41. Abstract ideas, may, I think, be distinguished into three different
kinds, all equally subservient to the reasoning faculty. Individuals
appear to have no end; and did we not possess the faculty of
distributing them into classes, the mind would be lost in an endless
variety, and no progress be made in knowledge. It is by the faculty of
abstraction that we distribute beings into _genera_ and _species_:
finding a number of individuals connected by certain qualities common to
all, we give a name to these individuals considered as thus connected;
which name, by gathering them together into one class, serves in a curt
manner to express the whole of these individuals as distinct from
others. Thus the word _animal_ serves to denote every being which hath
self-motion; and the words _man_, _horse_, _lion_, &_c._ answer similar
purposes. This is the first and most common sort of abstraction; and it
is of the most extensive use, by enabling us to comprehend in our
reasoning whole kinds and sorts, instead of individuals without end. The
next sort of abstract ideas and terms comprehends a number of individual
objects considered as connected by some occasional relation. A great
number of persons collected together in one place, without any other
relation but merely that of contiguity, are denominated _a crowd_: in
forming this term, we abstract from sex, from age, from condition, from
dress, &_c._ A number of persons connected by being subjected to the
same laws and to the same government, are termed _a nation_; and a
number of men subjected to the same military command, are termed _an
army_. A third sort of abstraction is, where a single property or part,
which may be common to many individuals, is selected to be the subject
of our contemplation; for example, whiteness, heat, beauty, length,
roundness, head, arm.
42. Abstract terms are a happy invention: it is by their means chiefly,
that the particulars which we make the subject of our reasoning, are
brought into close union, and separated from all others however
naturally connected. Without the aid of such terms, the mind could never
be kept steady to its proper subject, but would perpetually be in hazard
of assuming foreign circumstances or neglecting what are essential. In a
word, a general term denotes in a curt manner certain objects
occasionally combined. We can, without the aid of language, compare real
objects by intuition, when these objects are present; and, when absent,
we can compare them by means of the ideas we have of them: but when we
advance farther, and attempt to make inferences, and draw conclusions,
we always employ abstract terms, even in thinking. It would be as
difficult to reason without them, as to perform operations in algebra
without signs: for there is scarce any reasoning without some degree of
abstraction; and we cannot abstract to purpose without making use of
general terms. Hence it follows, that without language man would scarce
be a rational being.
43. The same thing, in different respects, has different names. With
respect to certain qualities, it is termed a _substance_; with respect
to other qualities, a _body_; and with respect to qualities of all
sorts, a _subject_: it is termed a _passive subject_ with respect to an
action exerted upon it; an _object_ with respect: to a percipient; a
_cause_ with respect to the effect it produces; and an _effect_ with
respect to its cause.