Standard of Taste.
“That there is no disputing about taste”, meaning taste in its most
extensive sense, is a saying so generally received as to have become a
proverb. One thing indeed is evident, that if the proverb hold true with
respect to any one external sense, it must hold true with respect to
all. If the pleasures of the palate disdain a comparative trial and
reject all criticism, the pleasures of touch, of smell, of sound, and
even of sight, must be equally privileged. At this rate, a man is not
within the reach of censure, even where, insensible to beauty, grandeur,
or elegance, he prefers the Saracen’s head upon a sign-post before the
best tablature of Raphael, or a rude Gothic tower before the finest
Grecian building: nor where he prefers the smell of a rotten carcass
before that of the most odoriferous flower: nor jarring discords before
the most exquisite harmony.
But we must not stop here. If the pleasures of external sense be
exempted from criticism, why not every one of our pleasures, from
whatever source derived? If taste in the proper sense of the word cannot
be disputed, there is as little room for disputing it in its figurative
sense. The proverb accordingly comprehends both; and in that large sense
may be resolved into the following general proposition, That with
respect to the sensitive part of our nature, by which some objects are
agreeable, some disagreeable, there is not such a thing as _good_ or
_bad_, a _right_ or _wrong_; that every man’s taste is to himself an
ultimate standard without appeal; and consequently that there is no
ground of censure against any one, if such a one there be, who prefers
Blackmore before Homer, selfishness before benevolence, or cowardice
before magnanimity.
The proverb in the foregoing instances, is indeed carried very far. It
seems difficult, however, to sap its foundation, or with success to
attack it from any quarter. For in comparing the various tastes of
individuals, it is not obvious what standard must be appealed to. Is not
every man equally a judge of what is agreeable or disagreeable to
himself? Doth it not seem odd, and perhaps absurd, that a man _ought
not_ to be pleased when he is, or that he _ought_ to be pleased when he
is not?
This reasoning may perplex, but, in contradiction to sense and feeling,
will never afford conviction. A man of taste must necessarily feel the
reasoning to be false, however unqualified to detect the fallacy. At the
same time, though no man of taste will subscribe to the proverb as
holding true in every case, no man will venture to affirm that it holds
true in no case. Subjects there are undoubtedly, that we may like or
dislike indifferently, without any imputation upon our taste. Were a
philosopher to make a scale for human pleasures with many divisions, in
order that the value of each pleasure may be denoted by the place it
occupies, he would not think of making divisions without end, but would
rank together many pleasures arising perhaps from different objects,
either as being equally valuable, or differing so imperceptibly as to
make a separation unnecessary. Nature hath taken this course, so far as
appears to the generality of mankind. There may be subdivisions without
end; but we are only sensible of the grosser divisions, comprehending
each of them many pleasures of various kinds. To these the proverb is
applicable in the strictest sense; for with respect to pleasures of the
same rank, what ground can there be for preferring one before another?
If a preference in fact be given by any individual, it cannot be taste,
but custom, imitation, or some peculiarity of mind.
Nature in her scale of pleasures, has been sparing of divisions: she
hath wisely and benevolently filled every division with many pleasures;
in order that individuals may be contented with their own lot, without
envying the happiness of others: many hands must be employ’d to procure
us the conveniencies of life; and it is necessary that the different
branches of business, whether more or less agreeable, be filled with
hands. A taste too nice and delicate, would obstruct this plan; for it
would crowd some employments, leaving others, not less useful, totally
neglected. In our present condition, happy it is, that the plurality are
not delicate in their choice. They fall in readily with the occupations,
pleasures, food, and company, that fortune throws in their way; and if
at first there be any displeasing circumstance, custom soon makes it
easy.
The proverb will be admitted so far as it regards the particulars now
explained. But when apply’d in general to every subject of taste, the
difficulties to be encountered are insuperable. What shall we say, in
particular, as to the difficulty that arises from human nature itself?
Do we not talk of a good and a bad taste? of a right and a wrong taste?
and upon that supposition, do we not, with great confidence, censure
writers, painters, architects, and every one who deals in the fine arts?
Are such criticisms absurd and void of foundation? Have the foregoing
expressions, familiar in all languages and among all people, no sort of
meaning? This can hardly be: what is universal must have a foundation in
nature. If we can reach this foundation, the standard of taste will no
longer be a secret.
All living creatures are by nature distributed into classes; the
individuals of each, however diversified by slighter differences, having
a wonderful uniformity in their capital parts internal and external.
Each class is distinguishable from others by an external form; and not
less distinguishable by an internal constitution, manifested by certain
powers, feelings, desires, and actions, peculiar to the individuals of
each class. Thus each class may be conceived to have a common nature,
which, in framing the individuals belonging to the class, is taken for a
model or standard.
Independent altogether of experience, men have a sense or conviction of
a common nature or standard, not only in their own species, but in every
species of animals. And hence it is a matter of wonder, to find any
individual deviating from the common nature of the species, whether in
its internal or external construction: a child born with an aversion to
its mother’s milk, is a matter of wonder, not less than if born without
a mouth, or with more than one[94].
With respect to this common nature or standard, we are so constituted as
to conceive it to be _perfect_ or _right_; and consequently that
individuals _ought_ to be made conformable to it. Every remarkable
deviation accordingly from the standard, makes an impression upon us of
imperfection, irregularity, or disorder: it is disagreeable and raises
in us a painful emotion: monstrous births, exciting the curiosity of a
philosopher, fail not at the same time to excite aversion in a high
degree.
Lastly, we have a conviction, that the common nature of man is
invariable not less than universal: we conceive that it hath no relation
to time nor to place; but that it will be the same hereafter as at
present, and as it was in time past; the same among all nations and in
all corners of the earth. Nor are we deceived: giving allowance for the
difference of culture and gradual refinement of manners, the fact
corresponds to our conviction.
This conviction of a common nature or standard, and of its perfection,
is the foundation of morality; and accounts clearly for that remarkable
conception we have, of a right and a wrong taste in morals. It accounts
not less clearly for the conception we have of a right and a wrong taste
in the fine arts. A person who rejects objects generally agreeable, and
delights in objects generally disagreeable, is condemned as a monster:
we disapprove his taste as bad or wrong; and we have a clear conception
that he deviates from the common standard. If man were so framed as not
to have any notion of a common standard, the proverb mentioned in the
beginning would hold universally, not only in the fine arts but in
morals: upon that supposition, the taste of every man, with respect to
both, would to himself be an ultimate standard. But the conviction of a
common standard being made a part of our nature, we intuitively conceive
a taste to be right or good if conformable to the common standard, and
wrong or bad if disconformable.
No particular concerning human nature is more universal, than the
uneasiness a man feels when in matters of importance his opinions are
rejected by others. Why should difference in opinion create uneasiness,
more than difference in stature, in countenance, or in dress? The sense
of a common standard is the only principle that can explain this
mystery. Every man, generally speaking, taking it for granted that his
opinions agree with the common sense of mankind, is therefore disgusted
with those of a contrary opinion, not as differing from him, but as
differing from the common standard. Hence in all disputes, we find the
parties, each of them equally, appealing constantly to the common sense
of mankind as the ultimate rule or standard. Were it not for this
standard, of which the conviction is universal, I cannot discover the
slightest foundation for rancor or animosity when persons differ in
essential points more than in points purely indifferent. With respect to
the latter, which are not supposed to be regulated by any standard,
individuals are permitted to think for themselves with impunity. The
same liberty is not indulged with respect to the former: for what
reason, other than that the standard by which these are regulated,
ought, as we judge, to produce an uniformity of opinion in all men? In a
word, to this sense of a common standard must be wholly attributed the
pleasure we take in those who espouse the same principles and opinions
with ourselves, as well as the aversion we have at those who differ from
us. In matters left indifferent by the standard, we find nothing of the
same pleasure or pain. A bookish man, unless sway’d by convenience,
relisheth not the contemplative more than the active part of mankind:
his friends and companions are chosen indifferently out of either class.
A painter consorts with a poet or musician, as readily as with those of
his own art; and one is not the more agreeable to me for loving beef, as
I do, nor the less agreeable for preferring mutton.
I have said, that my disgust is raised, not by differing from me, but by
differing from what I judge to be the common standard. This point,
being of importance, ought to be firmly established. Men, it is true,
are prone to flatter themselves, by taking it for granted, that their
opinions and their taste are in all respects agreeable to the common
standard. But there may be exceptions, and experience shows there are
some. There are instances without number, of persons who cling to the
grosser amusements of gaming, eating, drinking, without having any
relish for more elegant pleasures, such, for example, as are afforded by
the fine arts. Yet these very persons, talking the same language with
the rest of mankind, pronounce in favour of the more elegant pleasures:
they invariably approve those who have a more refined taste, and are
ashamed of their own as low and sensual. It is in vain to think of
giving a reason for this singular impartiality against self, other than
the authority of the common standard. Every individual of the human
species, the most groveling not excepted, hath a natural sense of the
dignity of human nature[95]. Hence every man is esteemed and respected
in proportion to the dignity of his character, sentiments, and actions.
And from the instances now given we discover, that the sense of the
dignity of human nature is so vigorous, as even to prevail over
self-partiality, and to make us despise our own taste compared with the
more elevated taste of others.
In our sense of a common standard and in the pleasure individuals give
us by their conformity to it, a curious final cause is discovered. An
uniformity of taste and sentiment in matters of importance, forms an
intimate connection among individuals, and is a great blessing in the
social state. With respect to morals in particular, unhappy it would be
for mankind did not this uniformity prevail: it is necessary that the
actions of all men be uniform with respect to right and wrong; and in
order to uniformity of action, it is necessary that all men think the
same way in these particulars: if they differ through any irregular
bias, the common sense of mankind is appealed to as the rule; and it is
the province of judges, in matters especially of equity, to apply that
rule. The same uniformity, it is yielded, is not so strictly necessary
in other matters of taste: men, though connected in general as members
of the same state, are, by birth, office, or occupation, separated and
distinguished into different classes; and are thereby qualified for
different amusements: variety of taste, so far, is no obstruction to the
general connection. But with respect to the more capital pleasures, such
as are best enjoy’d in common, uniformity of taste is necessary for two
great ends, first to connect individuals the more intimately in the
social life, and next to advance these pleasures to their highest
perfection. With respect to the first, if instead of a common taste,
every man had a taste peculiar to himself, leading him to place his
happiness upon things indifferent or perhaps disagreeable to others,
these capital pleasures could not be enjoy’d in common: every man would
pursue his own happiness by flying from others; and instead of a natural
tendency to union, remarkable in the human species, union would be our
aversion: man would not be a consistent being: his interest would lead
him to society, and his taste would draw him from it. The other end will
be best explained by entering upon particulars. Uniformity of taste
gives opportunity for sumptuous and elegant buildings, for fine gardens,
and extensive embellishments, which please universally. Works of this
nature could never have reached any degree of perfection, had every man
a taste peculiar to himself: there could not be any suitable reward,
either of profit or honour, to encourage men of genius to labour in such
works. The same uniformity of taste is equally necessary to perfect the
arts of music, sculpture, and painting; and to support the expence they
require after they are brought to perfection. Nature is in every
particular consistent with herself. We are formed by nature to have a
high relish for the fine arts, which are a great source of happiness,
and extremely friendly to virtue. We are, at the same time, formed with
an uniformity of taste, to furnish proper objects for this high relish:
if uniformity of taste did not prevail, the fine arts could never have
made any figure.
Thus, upon a sense common to the species, is erected a standard of
taste, which without hesitation is apply’d to the taste of every
individual. This standard, ascertaining what actions are right what
wrong, what proper what improper, hath enabled moralists to establish
rules for our conduct from which no person is allowed to swerve. We have
the same standard for ascertaining in all the fine arts, what is
beautiful or ugly, high or low, proper or improper, proportioned or
disproportioned. And here, as in morals, we justly condemn every taste
that swerves from what is thus ascertained by the common standard.
The discovery of a rule or standard for trying the taste of individuals
in the fine arts as well as in morals, is a considerable advance, but
completes not our journey. We have a great way yet to travel. It is made
out that there is a standard: but it is not made out, by what means we
shall prevent mistaking a false standard for that of nature. If from
opinion and practice we endeavour to ascertain the standard of nature,
we are betray’d into endless perplexities. Viewing this matter
historically, nothing appears more various and more wavering than taste
in the fine arts. If we judge by numbers, the Gothic taste of
architecture will be preferred before that of Greece; and the Chinese
taste probably before both. It would be endless, to recount the various
tastes of gardening that have prevailed in different ages, and still
prevail in different countries. Despising the modest colouring of
nature, women of fashion in France daub their cheeks with a red powder.
Nay, the unnatural swelling in the neck, a disease peculiar to the
inhabitants of the Alps, is relished by that people. But we ought not to
be discouraged by such untoward instances. For do we not find the like
contradictions with respect to morals? was it not once held lawful, for
a man to expose his infant children, and, when grown up, to sell them
for slaves? was it not held equally lawful, to punish children for the
crime of their parents? was not the murder of an enemy in cold blood an
universal practice? what stronger instance can be given, than the
abominable practice of human sacrifices, not less impious than immoral?
Such aberrations from the rules of morality, prove only, that men,
originally savage and brutish, acquire not rationality or any delicacy
of taste, till they be long disciplined in society. To ascertain the
rules of morality, we appeal not to the common sense of savages, but of
men in their more perfect state: and we make the same appeal, in forming
the rules that ought to govern the fine arts. In neither can we safely
rely on a local or transitory taste; but on what is the most universal
and the most lasting among polite nations.
In this very manner, a standard for morals has been established with a
good deal of accuracy; and so well fitted for practice, that in the hand
of able judges it is daily apply’d with general satisfaction. The
standard of taste in the fine arts, is not yet brought to such
perfection. And there is an obvious reason for its slower progress. The
sense of a right and a wrong in action, is conspicuous in the breast of
every individual, almost without exception. The sense of a right and a
wrong in the fine arts, is more faint and wavering: it is by nature a
tender plant, requiring much culture to bring it to maturity: in a
barren soil it cannot live; and in any soil, without cultivation, it is
weak and sickly. I talk chiefly with relation to its more refined
objects: for some objects make such lively impressions of beauty,
grandeur, and proportion, as without exception to command the general
taste. There appears to me great contrivance, in distinguishing thus the
moral sense from a taste in the fine arts. The former, as a rule of
conduct and as a law we ought to obey, must be clear and authoritative.
The latter is not intitled to the same authority, since it contributes
to our pleasure and amusement only. Were it more strong and lively, it
would usurp upon our duty, and call off the attention from matters of
greater moment. Were it more clear and authoritative, it would banish
all difference of taste: a refined taste would not form a character, nor
be intitled to esteem. This would put an end to rivalship, and
consequently to all improvement.
But to return to our subject. However languid and cloudy the common
sense of mankind may be with respect to the fine arts, it is yet the
only standard in these as well as in morals. And when the matter is
attentively considered, this standard will be found less imperfect than
it appears to be at first sight. In gathering the common sense of
mankind upon morals, we may safely consult every individual. But with
respect to the fine arts, our method must be different: a wary choice is
necessary; for to collect votes indifferently, will certainly mislead
us: those who depend for food on bodily labour, are totally void of
taste; of such a taste at least as can be of use in the fine arts. This
consideration bars the greater part of mankind; and of the remaining
part, many have their taste corrupted to such a degree as to unqualify
them altogether for voting. The common sense of mankind must then be
confined to the few that fall not under these exceptions. But as such
selection seems to throw matters again into uncertainty, we must be more
explicit upon this branch of our subject.
Nothing tends more than voluptuousness to corrupt the whole internal
frame, and to vitiate our taste, not only in the fine arts, but even in
morals. It never fails, in course of time, to extinguish all the
sympathetic affections, and to bring on a beastly selfishness which
leaves nothing of man but the shape. About excluding persons of this
stamp there will be no dispute. Let us next bring under trial, the
opulent whose chief pleasure is expence. Riches, coveted by most men for
the sake of superiority and to command respect, are generally bestow’d
upon costly furniture, numerous attendants, a princely dwelling, every
thing superb and gorgeous, to amaze and humble all beholders.
Simplicity, elegance, propriety, and every thing natural, sweet, or
amiable, are despised or neglected; for these are not at the command of
riches, and make no figure in the public eye. In a word, nothing is
relished, but what serves to gratify pride, by an imagined exaltation of
the possessor above those he reckons the vulgar. Such a tenor of life
contracts the heart and makes every principle give way to self-interest.
Benevolence and public spirit, with all their refined emotions, are
little felt and less regarded. And if these be excluded, there can be no
place for the faint and delicate emotions of the fine arts.
The exclusion of classes so many and various, reduces within a narrow
compass those who are qualified to be judges in the fine arts. Many
circumstances are necessary to form a judge of this sort: there must be
a good natural taste: this taste must be improved by education,
reflection, and experience: it must be preserved alive, by a regular
course of life, by using the goods of fortune with moderation, and by
following the dictates of improved nature which gives welcome to every
rational pleasure without deviating into excess. This is the tenor of
life which of all contributes the most to refinement of taste; and the
same tenor of life contributes the most to happiness in general.
If there appear much uncertainty in a standard that requires so painful
and intricate a selection, we may possibly be reconciled to it by the
following consideration, That, with respect to the fine arts, there is
less difference of taste than is commonly imagined. Nature hath marked
all her works with indelible characters of high or low, plain or
elegant, strong or weak. These, if at all perceived, are seldom
misapprehended by any taste; and the same marks are equally perceptible
in works of art. A defective taste is incurable; and it hurts none but
the possessor, because it carries no authority to impose upon others. I
know not if there be such a thing as a taste naturally bad or wrong; a
taste, for example, that prefers a groveling pleasure before one that is
high and elegant. Groveling pleasures are never preferred: they are only
made welcome by those who know no better. Differences about objects of
taste, it is true, are endless: but they generally concern trifles, or
possibly matters of equal rank where the preference may be given either
way with impunity. If, on any occasion, the dispute go deeper and
persons differ where they ought not, a depraved taste will readily be
discovered on one or other side, occasioned by imitation, custom, or
corrupted manners, such as are described above.
If, after all that is said, the standard of taste be thought not yet
sufficiently ascertained, there is still one resource in which I put
great confidence. What I have in view, are the principles that
constitute the sensitive part of our nature. By means of these
principles, common to all men, a wonderful uniformity is preserved among
the emotions and feelings of different individuals; the same object
making upon every person the same impression; the same in kind, at
least, if not in degree. There have been aberrations, as above observed,
from these principles; but soon or late they always prevail, by
restoring the wanderers to the right track. The uniformity of taste here
accounted for, is the very thing that in other words is termed the
common sense of mankind. And this discovery leads us to means for
ascertaining the common sense of mankind or the standard of taste, more
unerringly than the selection above insisted on. Every doubt with
relation to this standard, occasioned by the practice of different
nations and different times, may be cleared by applying to the
principles that ought to govern the taste of every individual. In a
word, a thorough acquaintance with these principles will enable us to
form the standard of taste; and to lay a foundation for this valuable
branch of knowledge, is the declared purpose of the present
undertaking.