The most potent cause which led to the breaking down of the Tokugawa
Shōgunate, was the attitude which the empire had assumed toward foreign
nations. There were other causes which co-operated with this, but none
which were capable of such far-reaching and revolutionary effects. We have
seen that this attitude was due to the fears entertained concerning the
designs of the Portuguese and the Spanish. These fears may have been
unfounded, but they were none the less real and operative. Such fears may
have been stimulated by the Dutch, who had no reason to deal tenderly with
the fanatical enemies of the independence and religion of their country.
The spirit of trade with large profits was at the bottom of the great
enterprises which were sent out from Europe to the East and West Indies
during the seventeenth century.
The rivalry between the Dutch and Portuguese resulted in the banishment of
the latter, and the establishment of the Dutch at Nagasaki in 1640. They
occupied the little artificial island of Deshima, about three acres in
extent, where were erected their houses, their offices and stores, and
where for more than two hundred years their trade was conducted. And this,
together with a like limited arrangement with the Chinese, was the sole
foreign intercourse allowed with Japan.
It is plain now that this seclusion was a great mistake. It would have
been of inestimable value to this enterprising and progressive people, to
have kept in the race for improvement with the other nations of the world.
They would not at this late day be compelled, under a dreadful strain of
resources, to provide themselves with the modern appliances of
civilization. Long since they would have tried the experiments with which
they are now engaged, and would have found a way through the intricacies
of politics to a free and stable government. To Ieyasu and his successors
the way of safety seemed to be, to shut themselves up and sternly deny
admittance to the outside world, while they continued to work out their
destiny in their own way.
With whatever shortcomings the Dutch are to be charged in their
intercourse with Japan, the world owes a great debt of gratitude to them
for what they accomplished. Whatever was known concerning Japanese history
and civilization down to the times of Commodore Perry, came chiefly from
the Dutch. And not less than the debt of the rest of the world is that of
Japan herself. Although the influence of the government was always exerted
against the admission of foreign ideas, not a few of the seeds of western
civilization were by them planted in a fertile soil and bore abundant
fruit. To Kaempfer and Baron von Siebold particularly we must always look
for our knowledge of the Japan of the days of its seclusion. Many efforts
were made at successive times to open intercourse by the representatives
of different nations. The Russians were the most persistent, and their
attempts did not cease until the imprisonment of Captain Galowin in 1811.
In comparatively recent times numerous essays were made resulting in
disappointment. The American brig _Morrison_ in 1837, the British
surveying ship _Saramang_ in 1845, Captain Cooper in 1845, Commodore
Biddle in 1848, Admiral Cecille in 1848, Commander Glynn in 1849, and
Commander Matheson in the same year, all made efforts to communicate with
the government, but were rebuffed. It is plain that affairs were rapidly
verging towards a point when the isolation of Japan must be given up.
Several causes contributed to the creation of a special interest in the
United States of America, concerning the opening of negotiations with
Japan. One of these was the magnitude to which the whale fishery had
attained, and the large financial investments(262) held in this industry
by American citizens. A second cause was the opening of China to foreign
trade as a result of the opium war. But the most active cause was the
discovery of gold in California in 1848, and the consequent development of
that state as a centre of trade. It was an early scheme to run a line of
steamers from San Francisco to the newly opened ports of China. To
Hongkong the distance is about 6,149 nautical miles, and if a steamer is
to traverse the whole distance without a break, she must carry an enormous
load of coal. The only remedy lay in establishing a coaling station on the
Japanese islands, and this could only be effected when Japan abandoned her
policy of seclusion and entered with a free heart into the comity of
nations.
The interest of the government and people of the United States at last
eventuated in the expedition under Commodore Matthew C. Perry. He had for
a long time been convinced of the importance and feasibility of such an
undertaking, and when he was summoned to take charge of it he made the
most thorough preparation for his task.
At his suggestion the government procured all available books, maps, and
charts, and he made himself master of every conceivable detail. From
manufacturing establishments he secured models of railways, telegraphic
lines, and other interesting industrial equipments. He realized the
necessity of taking with him such a naval force that its appearance in
Japanese waters would produce a profound impression upon the government.
And knowing that all his predecessors, who had sought access by way of
Nagasaki, had been repelled, he resolved to avoid it and its Portuguese
and Dutch traditions and venture boldly into the bay of Yedo.
As soon as it was known that a diplomatic expedition was to be despatched
to Japan under the command of Commodore Perry he was deluged with
applications, both from England and America, to be permitted to join it.
But Perry resolutely declined all these enterprising offers. In his long
career as a naval officer he had seen the danger of admitting on board
men-of-war persons who were not under the authority of the commander. From
such dangers he meant to be free. He therefore refused to take on board
the ships of his squadron any but regularly accredited officers and men
over whom he exercised legitimate control. He even made it a rule that if
any of the officers kept diaries during the progress of the expedition,
they should be the property of the Navy Department and could not be
published without its permission and authority.
Commodore Perry carried with him a friendly letter from the President of
the United States to the Emperor of Japan,(263) who is therein addressed
as “Great and Good Friend.” The letter pointed out the contiguity of the
two countries and the importance of their friendship and commercial
intercourse; it announced that Commodore Perry had been sent to give
assurance of the friendly sentiment of the President, and to arrange for
privileges of trade, for the care of shipwrecked sailors, and for the
appointment of a convenient port where coal and other supplies might be
obtained by the vessels of the United States.
After some provoking delays and disappointments the expedition sailed from
Norfolk on the 24th of November, 1852,(264) proceeding by the way of the
cape of Good Hope to the China sea. There taking on board Dr. S. Wells
Williams as interpreter, and visiting several ports in China, the Bonin
islands, and the Ryūkyū islands, they sailed to Japan. The squadron, led
by the _Susquehanna_ and followed by the _Mississippi_, the _Plymouth_,
and the _Saratoga_, entered Yedo bay, July 8, 1853.(265)
[Illustration]
Commodore M. C. Perry.
The Japanese government had been warned of the preparation and coming of
this expedition by the Dutch. Eager to maintain their position with the
government the King of the Netherlands addressed to the Shōgun a letter in
1844 suggesting the relaxation of the laws excluding foreign nations from
trade. But in the following year he received an answer declining to make
any changes.
With all the warning, however, which the government had received and the
preparations which had been made for the momentous occasion, the
appearance of the squadron at the entrance of Yedo bay was an intense
surprise. Two large steam frigates—the _Susquehanna_ and the
_Mississippi_—and two sloops-of-war—the _Plymouth_ and the
_Saratoga_,—although much inferior to the squadron promised, composed such
an array as had never before made its appearance in Yedo bay. As they
plowed through the peaceful waters, in full view of the white-capped peak
of Fuji-yama, every height and vantage ground along the shore seemed alive
with troops and with wondering and alarmed inhabitants. The vessels came
to anchor off the village of Uraga, which is not far from the present site
of the dockyards at Yokosuka.
The account(266) of the preliminary negotiations conducted by Commodore
Perry with the officers of the government is interesting, as showing the
efforts made by them to send him to Nagasaki, and his absolute refusal to
go thither or conduct his business through the Dutch or Chinese. When
there seemed no other way, consent was given to receive, through an
officer of adequate rank, the letter from the President of the United
States to the Emperor of Japan. When he had formally delivered this
letter, he took his departure with an intimation that he would return at a
future day and receive the answer.(267)
There can be no doubt that the display of force which Commodore Perry took
care to make in all his transactions with the Japanese officials at the
same time that he was careful to convey assurances of his friendly
purposes and objects, produced a deep impression on the government with
which he had to deal. It is useless to deny that it was on this display of
force that Commodore Perry largely relied for the success of his
expedition. That he was prepared to use force had it been necessary we may
feel sure.(268) But the instructions of his government and his own sense
of international justice bound him to exhaust every peaceful resource
before resorting to measures of coercion.
The government of the shōgun was greatly troubled by this responsibility
so suddenly laid upon it. They knew not what would be the result of their
refusal to enter upon negotiations when Perry returned. The seclusion in
which they had kept themselves so long had cut them off from a knowledge
of the relations in which the nations of the world stood to each other.
Notwithstanding Commodore Perry’s protestations of friendliness, they were
afraid of his great ships and their powerful armaments. Should they, as
they might easily do, make their way up the bay till they were within
gunshot of the capital, what resistance could the government show, or how
could it prevent them from battering down the castle and all the daimyōs’
residences.
The sentiment of loyalty to the emperor and opposition to the shōgun,
which had been growing up so insidiously and had now become really
formidable, was a source of the greatest perplexity to the Yedo
government. Should they proceed with their negotiations and make a treaty
with the Americans, this anti-shōgun sentiment was ready to manifest
itself against them with terrible effect. If they refused to negotiate,
then they must be ready to meet the invaders of their soil with their
miserable obsolete armor and with hearts that two hundred years of peace
had rendered more obsolete than their armor.
The first thing to be done was to consult the daimyōs and learn to what
extent they could rely on their co-operation. The daimyō of Mito,(269) a
descendant of the famous Mitsukuni, seemed to have inherited one at least
of the opinions of his ancestor. He advocated the observance of a greater
reverence for the emperor at Kyōto, and criticised the assumption of
imperial powers by the shōgun. At the same time he was an ardent
foreign-hater, and in 1841 had been placed in confinement because he had
melted down the bells of the Buddhist temples of his domains, and cast
cannon for their protection. But now he was pardoned and appointed to take
measures for the defence of the country. On the 15th of July—the American
squadron was still in the bay, for it left on the 17th—the daimyō of Mito
sent in to the government a memorial(270) setting forth his decisive views
on the subject. He gave ten reasons against a treaty and in favor of war.
We give them here in Mr. Nitobe’s translation:
“1. The annals of our history speak of the exploits of the great, who
planted our banners on alien soil; but never was the clash of foreign arms
heard within the precincts of our holy ground. Let not our generation be
the first to see the disgrace of a barbarian army treading on the land
where our fathers rest.
“2. Notwithstanding the strict interdiction of Christianity, there are
those guilty of the heinous crime of professing the doctrines of this evil
sect. If now America be once admitted into our favor, the rise of this
faith is a matter of certainty.
“3. What! Trade our gold, silver, copper, iron, and sundry useful
materials for wool, glass, and similar trashy little articles! Even the
limited barter of the Dutch factory ought to have been stopped.
“4. Many a time recently have Russia and other countries solicited trade
with us; but they were refused. If once America is permitted the
privilege, what excuse is there for not extending the same to other
nations?
“5. The policy of the barbarians is first to enter a country for trade,
then to introduce their religion, and afterward to stir up strife and
contention. Be guided by the experience of our forefathers two centuries
back; despise not the teachings of the Chinese Opium War.
“6. The Dutch scholars say that our people should cross the ocean, go to
other countries and engage in active trade. This is all very desirable,
provided they be as brave and strong as were their ancestors in olden
time; but at present the long-continued peace has incapacitated them for
any such activity.
“7. The necessity of caution against the ships now lying in the harbor
(_i.e._, Perry’s squadron) has brought the valiant _samurai_ to the
capital from distant quarters. Is it wise to disappoint them?
“8. Not only the naval defence of Nagasaki but all things relating to
foreign affairs have been entrusted to the two clans of Kuroda and
Nabeshima. To hold any conference with a foreign power outside of the port
of Nagasaki—as has been done this time at Uraga—is to encroach upon their
rights and trust. These powerful families will not thankfully accept an
intrusion into their vested authority.
“9. The haughty demeanor of the barbarians now at anchorage has provoked
even the illiterate populace. Should nothing be done to show that the
government shares the indignation of the people, they will lose all fear
and respect for it.
“10. Peace and prosperity of long duration have enervated the spirit,
rusted the armor, and blunted the swords of our men. Dulled to ease, when
shall they be aroused? Is not the present the most auspicious moment to
quicken their sinews of war?”
The government sent to all the daimyōs copies of the American letter to
the shōgun, and asked for their opinions concerning the course to be
pursued. Many answers were immediately received. They almost unanimously
declared against the opening of the country. Some advocated the
alternative suggested in the letter itself, to open the country
temporarily and try the experiment for three years, or five years, or ten
years. In the meantime the defences of the country and new and improved
arms and armaments could be perfected. The government did indeed busy
itself during Perry’s absence in hurrying forward defensive preparations.
The line of forts which still are visible in the shallow water of the bay
opposite Shinagawa, the southern suburb of the capital, were hastily
constructed. Bells from monasteries and metal articles of luxury were
melted down and cast into cannon. Lessons were given and became quickly
fashionable in the use of European small-arms and artillery. The military
class from the various clans flocked to Yedo and Kyōto in large numbers,
expecting to be called upon to defend their country against the impudent
intrusion of the barbarians.
During this busy time of perplexity and preparation the Shōgun
Ieyoshi,—the twelfth of the Tokugawa dynasty—died August 25, 1853. His son
Iesada succeeded him as the thirteenth shōgun. The death of the reigning
shōgun did not produce any marked effect upon the policy of the
government. Long before this time the custom of abdication, and the habits
of luxury and effeminacy in which the family of the shōgun was reared, had
dragged the house down to the usual impotent level. The government was
conducted by a system of bureaucracy which relieved the titular shōguns
from all responsibility and allowed them to live in profitless
voluptuousness. So that one died and another reigned in his stead without
causing more than a ripple upon the surface of current events.
Shortly after the departure of the American squadron from Yedo bay, the
Russian Admiral Pontiatine appeared in the harbor of Nagasaki, and made
application for a national agreement to open ports for trade, to adjust
the boundary line between the two nations across the island of Saghalien,
and to live in neighborly intimacy. English vessels were also in Chinese
waters watching the Russians, and the war, usually called the Crimean war,
actually broke out in the spring of 1854. A visit from these vessels might
therefore be expected at any time.
Commodore Perry during the interval between his two visits to Japan sailed
to the ports of China where the Taiping rebellion was then in action. The
confusion and insecurity occasioned by this uprising rendered the presence
of the squadron most acceptable to the American merchants.
On the 13th of February, 1854, he made his appearance a second time in
Yedo bay with a fleet of seven ships, viz., three steam frigates and four
sloops-of-war. Three additional vessels were to join, and did join, the
fleet in Yedo bay. So that when the fleet was all mustered there were ten
fully armed vessels, comprising such an array as had never before appeared
in Japanese waters.
After some haggling about the place where the negotiations should be
conducted, it was finally settled that the place of meeting should be at
Kanagawa, near the village (now the city) of Yokohama. Here after much
deliberation and discussion, proposals and amendments, banquets and
presents, a treaty was agreed upon. The signing and exchange took place on
the 31st of March, 1854. It was immediately sent to Washington for
ratification.
As this was the first formal treaty(271) made with any western country we
give a synopsis of its provisions.
Art. I. Peace and amity to exist between the two countries.
Art. II. The port of Shimoda to be opened immediately and the port of
Hakodate to be opened in one year, and American ships to be supplied with
necessary provisions in them.
Art. III. Shipwrecked persons of either nation to be cared for, and
expenses to be refunded.
Art. IV. Shipwrecked and other persons not to be imprisoned but to be
amenable to just laws.
Art. V. Americans at Shimoda and Hakodate not to be subject to
confinement; free to go about within defined limits.
Art. VI. Further deliberation to be held between the parties to settle
concerning trade and matters requiring to be arranged.
Art. VII. Trade in open ports to be subject to such regulations as the
Japanese government shall establish.
Art. VIII. Wood, water, provisions, coal, etc., to be procured only
through appointed Japanese officers.
Art. IX. If at any future day privileges in addition to those here
enumerated are granted to any other nation, the same to be allowed to
Americans.
Art. X. Ships of the United States not to resort to other ports than
Shimoda and Hakodate except in stress of weather.
Art. XI. Consuls or agents of the United States to reside at Shimoda.
Art. XII. The ratification of this treaty to be exchanged within eighteen
months.
-------------------------------------
As might have been expected, as soon as this treaty with the United States
had been signed there was a rush of other nations to obtain similar terms.
Admiral Sir John Sterling, acting in behalf of the government of Great
Britain, negotiated a treaty which was signed at Nagasaki on the 15th of
October, 1854. Admiral Pontiatine negotiated a similar treaty for Russia,
which was signed at Shimoda on the 7th of February, 1855. A treaty with
the Netherlands was signed on the 30th of January, 1856.
None of these were in any general sense commercial treaties, providing for
trade and making regulations by which it might be conducted. They were
rather preliminary conventions, making arrangements for vessels to obtain
necessary provisions, and stipulating for the protection of those
suffering shipwreck, and for vessels driven under stress of weather to
take shelter in the harbors of Japan. They each provided for admission to
two ports: The American treaty to Shimoda and Hakodate; the English treaty
to Nagasaki and Hakodate; the Russian treaty to Shimoda and Hakodate.
All these treaties contained what is called “the most favored nation
clause,” so that where the privileges granted to any one nation were in
excess of those granted previously to others, these privileges were also
without further negotiation extended to the nations that had already made
treaties.
These dealings with foreign nations produced the most intense excitement
throughout the empire. The old sentiment of hostility to foreign
intercourse showed itself in unmistakable intensity. The song of the Black
Ship, by which term the vessels of foreign nations were designated, was
heard everywhere. Two distinct parties came into existence called the
_Jo-i_ party, who wished to expel the barbarians; and the _Kai-koku_
party, who were in favor of opening the country.(272) The members of the
latter party were principally connected with the shōgun’s government, and
had become impressed with the folly of trying to resist the pressure of
the outside world. The _Jo-i_ party was made up of the conservative
elements in the country, who clung to the old traditions of Japan that had
matured during the two centuries of the Tokugawa rule. Besides these
conservatives there was also a party who nourished a traditional dislike
to the Tokugawa family, and was glad to see it involved in difficulties
which were sure to bring down upon it the vengeance of the nation. These
were chiefly found among the southwestern daimiates such as Satsuma,
Chōshū, Hizen, and Tosa. The daimyō of Mito(273) although connected with
the shōgun’s family was bitterly hostile to the policy of holding any
friendly relations with foreigners. He was therefore regarded as the head
of the _Jo-i_ party, and many of the disaffected _samurai_ rallied about
him as their champion and leader.
It was charged against the shōgun that in making treaties with foreign
nations he had transcended the powers(274) that rightly belonged to him.
He was not the sovereign of Japan and never had been. He was only the
chief executive under the emperor, and was not even next in rank to the
emperor. It was impossible, therefore, that treaties made by the shōgun
and not ratified by his sovereign should be regarded by the Japanese as
legitimate and binding.
The question of the legality of the treaties which the shōgun had made was
an important one, and interested not only the Japanese themselves but the
foreigners whose privileges under these treaties were at stake. There is
no doubt that Commodore Perry as well as all the subsequent negotiators,
believed that in making treaties with the shōgun they were dealing with a
competent authority. The precedents occurring in the history of Japan
seemed all to bear in this direction. The Portuguese and the Spanish had
dealt with the shōgun and never with the emperor. The Dutch had received
from Ieyasu the privileges of trade and had ever since continued under the
shōgun’s protection. Captain Saris in his negotiations in 1614 received
written assurances of protection and privileges of trade from the shōgun.
It was because the shōgun’s power had become weakened, and there had grown
up an active sentiment against him, that the question in reference to his
legitimate authority arose. “Had the treaty” (with Perry) “been concluded
when the power of Yedo was at its former height, it is probable that no
questions would have been asked.”(275)
According to the terms of the treaty made with the United States it was
provided that a consul should be appointed “to reside at Shimoda at any
time after the expiration of eighteen months from the signing the treaty.”
In execution of this provision the United States government sent out
Townsend Harris, who arrived in August, 1856. After some hesitation he was
allowed to take up his residence at Shimoda. He was a man of great
patience and tact, and gradually urged his way into the confidence of the
government. He became the counsellor and educator of the officials in
everything pertaining to foreign affairs. He was received December 7,
1857, by the shōgun with the ceremony due to his new rank of
plenipotentiary which he had then received.(276) In a despatch, dated July
8, 1858, he tells of a severe illness which he had suffered; how the
shōgun sent two physicians to attend him, and when a bulletin was sent to
Yedo that his case was hopeless, the physicians “received peremptory
orders to cure me, and if I died they would themselves be in peril.”
The principal effort of Mr. Harris was the negotiation of a commercial
treaty which should make provision for the maintenance of trade in
specified ports of Japan. The treaties already made by Japan with foreign
nations only provided for furnishing vessels with needed supplies, and for
the protection of vessels driven by stress of weather and of persons
shipwrecked on the Japanese islands. It remained to agree upon terms,
which should be mutually advantageous, for the regular opening of the
ports for trade and for the residence at these ports of the merchants
engaged in trade.
The excitement occasioned by the steps already taken rendered the shōgun’s
government exceedingly reluctant to proceed further in this direction. It
was only after much persuasion, and with a desire to avoid appearing to
yield to the appearance of force(277) with which the English were about to
urge the negotiation of a commercial treaty, that at last, on the 17th of
June, 1857, a treaty “for the purpose of further regulating the
intercourse of American citizens within the empire of Japan” was duly
concluded. The port of Nagasaki was to be opened in addition to those
already stipulated. American citizens were to be permitted to reside at
Shimoda and Hakodate for the purpose of supplying the wants of the vessels
which visited there.
This does not seem to have been adequate, for only about a year later a
further treaty, revoking that of June, 1857, was arranged. It was signed
at Yedo on the 29th of July, 1858. Equivalent treaties were negotiated by
other nations, and it is under the terms of these that the intercourse
between Japan and the nations of Europe and America is still conducted.
They provided for the opening of the ports of Ni-igata and Hyōgo, and for
the closing of Shimoda, which had been found unsuitable, and the opening
in its place of Kanagawa.(278) They fixed dates for the opening of the
cities of Yedo and Ōsaka, and provided for the setting apart of suitable
concessions in each of them for residence and trade. They provided that
all cases of litigation in which foreigners were defendants should be
tried in the consular court of the nation to which the defendant belonged,
and all cases in which Japanese citizens were defendants should be tried
in Japanese courts. They fixed the limits within which foreigners at any
of the treaty ports could travel, but permitted the diplomatic agent of
any nation to travel without limitation. They prohibited the importation
of opium. Commercial regulations were attached to the treaties and made a
part of them, which directed that a duty of five _per centum_ should be
paid on all goods imported into Japan for sale, except that on
intoxicating liquors a duty of thirty-five _per centum_ should be exacted.
All articles of Japanese production exported were to pay a duty of five
_per centum_, except gold and silver coin and copper in bars. These trade
regulations stipulated that five years after the opening of Kanagawa the
export and import duties should be subject to revision at the desire of
either party. The treaties themselves provide that on and after 1872
either of the contracting parties may demand a revision of the same upon
giving one year’s notice of its desire.
These stipulations in reference to a revision of the treaties, and
especially of the tariff of duties to be paid on imported goods, have been
a source of great anxiety and concern to the Japanese government. The
small duty of five _per centum_, which it has been permitted to collect on
the goods imported, is scarcely more than enough to maintain the machinery
of collection. And while the initiative is given to it to ask for a
revision of the treaties, it has never yet been able to obtain the consent
of the principal nations concerned to any change in the original hard
terms.
Another provision in the treaties which has been the occasion of endless
debate is that which requires all foreigners to remain under the
jurisdiction of the consuls of their respective countries. It is claimed
on the part of the Japanese that this provision, which was reasonable when
the treaties were first made, is no longer just or necessary. The laws
have been so far perfected, their judges and officers have been so
educated, and the machinery of their courts have been so far conformed to
European practice that it is no longer reasonable that foreigners residing
in Japan should be under other than Japanese jurisdiction. It is earnestly
to be hoped that these sources of irritation between Japan and the treaty
powers may speedily be removed, and that the efforts of this progressive
race to fall into line in the march of civilization may be appreciated and
encouraged.
Any one who reads the diplomatic correspondence covering this period will
see how serious were the troubles with which the country was called upon
to deal. He will realize also how almost impossible it was for the
diplomatic representatives of the western powers to comprehend the
difficulties of the situation or know how to conduct the affairs of their
legations with justice and consideration.
A succession of murders and outrages occurred, which awakened the fears of
the foreign residents. It is plain enough now that this state of things
was not so much due to the want of effort on the part of the government to
carry out its agreements with foreign nations, as to the bitter and
irreconcilable party hatred which had sprung up in consequence of these
efforts. The feudal organization of the government, by which the first
allegiance was due to the daimyō, rendered the condition of things more
demoralized. It was an old feudal custom, whenever the retainers of a
daimyō wished to avenge any act without committing their lord, they
withdrew from his service and became _ronins_. Most of the outrages which
occurred during the years intervening between the formation of the
treaties and the restoration were committed by these masterless men.
Responsibility for them was disclaimed by the daimyōs, and the government
of Yedo was unable to extend its control over these wandering
swash-bucklers. There was no course for the foreign ministers to pursue
but to hold the shōgun’s government responsible for the protection of
foreigners and foreign trade. This government, which was called the
_bakufu_,(279) had made the treaties with the foreign powers, as many
claimed, without having adequate authority, and had thus assumed to be
supreme in matters of foreign intercourse. It was natural therefore that
the representatives of the treaty powers should look to the _bakufu_ for
the security of those who had come hither under the sanction of these
treaties.
It was in consequence a bloody time through which the country was called
to pass. The prime minister and the head of the _bakufu_ party was Ii
Kamon-no-kami,(280) the daimyō of Hikoné in the province of Mino. On
account of the youth of the shōgun he was created regent. He was a man of
great resolution and unscrupulous in the measures by which he attempted to
carry out the policy to which he was committed. By his enemies he was
called the “swaggering prime minister (_bakko genro_).” Assured that the
foreign treaties could not be abrogated without dangerous collisions with
foreign nations, he sought to crush the opposition which assailed them.
The daimyō of Mito, who had been the head of the anti-foreign party at
Yedo, he compelled to resign and confined him to his private palace in his
province. Numerous other persons who had busied themselves with
interfering with his schemes and in promoting opposition in Kyōto, he also
imprisoned.
Suddenly on the 23d of March, 1860, Ii Kamon-no-kami was assassinated as
he was being carried in his _norimono_ from his _yashiki_ outside the
Sakurada gate to the palace of the shōgun.
The assassins were eighteen _ronins_ of the province of Mito, who wished
to avenge the imprisonment of their prince. They carried the head of the
murdered regent to the Mito castle, and after exhibiting it to the
gloating eyes of the prince, exposed it upon a pike at the principal gate.
The death of the regent was an irreparable blow to the government. There
was no one who could take his place and assume his _rôle_. His loss must
be reckoned as one of the principal events which marked the decadence of
the shōgun’s power.