the land side,—where its entrenchments were strong and well armed,—unless
supported by a demonstration in force from the men of war approaching
the town where it looks toward the sea and where it was not covered by
earth-works, and being without the requisite pioneer corps and artillery
train for the conduct of a regular siege, before putting his army in
motion General Oglethorpe instructed the naval commanders to rendezvous
off the bar of the north channel, and blockade that and the Matanzas
pass to St. Augustine. Captain Warren, with two hundred sailors, was to
land on Anastasia island and erect batteries for bombarding the town in
front. When his land forces should come into position and be prepared
for the assault, he was to notify Sir Yelverton Peyton, commanding the
naval forces, and St. Augustine would thus be attacked on all sides.
Shortly after the middle of May, 1740, General Oglethorpe, with a land
army numbering over two thousand regulars, militia, and Indians, moved
upon St. Augustine. Fort Moosa,[88] situated within two miles of that
place, lay in his route. Upon his approach the garrison evacuated it and
retired within the lines of the town. Having burnt the gates of this fort
and caused three breaches in its walls, General Oglethorpe, on the 5th
of June, made his reconnoissances of the land defenses of St. Augustine
and prepared for the contemplated assault. Everything being in readiness,
the signal previously agreed upon to insure the coöperation of the naval
forces was given; but, to the General’s surprise and mortification, no
response was returned. His forces being disposed and eager for the attack,
the signal was repeated, but failed to evoke the anticipated answer.
Satisfied that the town could not be carried without the assistance of
the naval forces, and being ignorant of the cause of their non-action,
the General reluctantly withdrew his army and placed it in camp at a
convenient distance, there to remain until he could ascertain the reason
of the failure on the part of the navy to coöperate in the plan which had
been preconcerted. This failure was explained in this wise. Inside the
bar, and at such a remove that they could not be affected by the fire of
the British vessels of war,—the Flamborough, the Phœnix, the Squirrel, the
Tartar, the Spence, and the Wolf,—Spanish gallies and half gallies were
moored so as to effectually prevent the ascent of the barges intended for
the attack, and preclude a landing of troops upon Anastasia island. The
shallowness of the water was such that the men of war could not advance
near enough to dislodge them. Under the circumstances therefore, Sir
Yelverton Peyton found himself unable to respond to the important part
assigned him in the attack.
Advised of this fact, and chagrined at the non-realization of his
original plan of operations, Oglethorpe determined at once to convert
his purposed assault into a siege. The ships of war lying off the bar of
St. Augustine were directed to narrowly observe every avenue of approach
by water, and maintain a most rigid blockade. Colonel Palmer, with
ninety-five Highlanders and forty-two Indians, was left at Fort Moosa with
instructions to scout the woods incessantly on the land side and intercept
any cattle or supplies coming from the interior. To prevent surprise
and capture, he was cautioned to change his camp each night, and keep
always on the alert. He was to avoid anything like a general engagement
with the enemy. Colonel Vanderdussen, with his South Carolina regiment,
was ordered to take possession of a neck of land known as Point Quartel,
about a mile distant from the castle, and there erect a battery. General
Oglethorpe, with the men of his regiment and most of the Indians, embarked
in boats and effected a landing on Anastasia island, where, having driven
off a party of Spaniards there stationed as an advanced guard, he, with
the assistance of the sailors from the fleet, began mounting cannon with
which to bombard the town and castle.[89] Having by these dispositions
completed his investment, Oglethorpe summoned the Spanish Governor to
a surrender. Secure in his strong-hold, the haughty Don “sent him for
answer that he would be glad to shake hands with him in his castle.”
Indignant at such a response, the General opened his batteries upon the
castle and also shelled the town. The fire was returned both by the fort
and the half gallies in the harbor. So great was the distance, however,
that although the cannonade was maintained with spirit on both sides for
nearly three weeks, little damage was caused or impression produced.[90]
It being evident that the reduction of the castle could not be expected
from the Anastasia island batteries, Captain Warren offered to lead a
night attack upon the half gallies in the harbor which were effectually
preventing all ingress by boats. A council of war decided that in as much
as those galleys were covered by the guns of the castle, and could not be
approached by the larger vessels of the fleet, any attempt to capture them
in open boats would be accompanied by too much risk. The suggestion was
therefore abandoned.
Observing the besiegers uncertain in their movements, and their operations
growing lax, and being sore pressed for provisions, the Spanish Governor
sent out a detachment of three hundred men against Colonel Palmer.
Unfortunately that officer, negligent of his instructions and apprehending
no danger from the enemy, remained two or three consecutive nights at
Fort Moosa. This detachment, under the command of Don Antonio Salgrado,
passed quietly out of the gates of St. Augustine during the night of June
14th, and after encountering a most desperate resistance, succeeded in
capturing Fort Moosa at day light, the next morning. Colonel Palmer fell
early in the action. The Highlanders “fought like lions,” and “made such
havoc with their broadswords as the Spaniards cannot easily forget.” This
hand-to-hand conflict was won at the cost to the enemy of more than one
hundred lives. Colonel Palmer, a Captain, and twenty Highlanders were
killed. Twenty-seven were captured. Those who escaped made their way to
Colonel Vanderdussen at Point Quartel. Thus was St. Augustine relieved
from the prohibition which had hitherto estopped all intercourse with the
surrounding country.
Shortly after the occurrence of this unfortunate event, the vessel which
had been blockading the Matanzas river was withdrawn. Taking advantage
of the opportunity thus afforded, some small vessels from Havana, with
provisions and reinforcements, reached St. Augustine by that narrow
channel, bringing great encouragement and relief to the garrison. This
reinforcement was estimated at seven hundred men, and the supply of
provisions is said to have been large. “Then,” writes Hewitt,[91] whose
narrative we have followed in the main, “all prospects of starving the
enemy being lost, the army began to despair of forcing the place to
surrender. The Carolinean troops, enfeebled by the heat, dispirited by
sickness, and fatigued by fruitless efforts, marched away in large bodies.
The navy being short of provisions, and the usual season of hurricanes
approaching, the commander judged it imprudent to hazard his Majesty’s
ships by remaining longer on that coast. Last of all, the General himself,
sick of a fever, and his regiment worn out with fatigue and rendered
unfit for action by a flux, with sorrow and regret followed, and reached
Frederica about the 10th of July, 1740.”
The Carolineans, under Colonel Vanderdussen, proved themselves
inefficient, “turbulent, and disobedient.” They lost not a single man in
action, and only fourteen deaths occurred from sickness and accident.
Desertions were frequent.[92]
Upon Oglethorpe’s regiment, and the Georgia companies, devolved the brunt
of the siege. On the 5th of July the artillery and stores on Anastasia
island were brought off, and the men crossed over to the mainland.[93]
Vanderdussen and his regiment at once commenced a disorderly retreat in
the direction of the St. Johns, leaving Oglethorpe and his men within
half-cannon shot of the castle. In his dispatch to the Secretary of State,
dated Camp on St. Johns in Florida, July 19th, 1740, the General thus
describes his last movements: “The Spaniards made a sally, with about 500
men, on me who lay on the land side. I ordered Ensign Cathcart with twenty
men, supported by Major Heron and Captain Desbrisay with upwards of 100
men, to attack them; I followed with the body. We drove them into the
works and pursued them to the very barriers of the covered way. After the
train and provisions were embarked and safe out of the harbour, I marched
with drums beating and colours flying, in the day, from my camp near the
town to a camp three miles distant, where I lay that night. The next day
I marched nine miles, where I encamped that night. We discovered a party
of Spanish horse and Indians whom we charged, took one horseman and killed
two Indians; the rest ran to the garrison. I am now encamped on St. Johns
river, waiting to know what the people of Carolina would desire me farther
to do for the safety of these provinces, which I think are very much
exposed to the half-galleys, with a wide extended frontier hardly to be
defended by a few men.”
In one of the Indian chiefs Oglethorpe found a man after his own heart.
When asked by some of the retreating troops to march with them, his reply
was, “No! I will not stir a foot till I see every man belonging to me
marched off before me; for I have always been the first in advancing
towards an enemy, and the last in retreating.”[94]
This failure to reduce St. Augustine may be fairly attributed
I; to the delay in inaugurating the movement, caused mainly,
if not entirely, by the tardiness on the part of the South
Carolina authorities in contributing the troops and provisions
for which requisition had been made;
II; to the reinforcement of men and supplies from Havanna
introduced into St. Augustine just before the English
expedition set out; thereby materially repairing the inequality
previously existing between the opposing forces;
III; to the injudicious movement against forts Francis de Papa
and Diego, which put the Spaniards on the alert, encouraged
concentration on their part, and foreshadowed an immediate
demonstration in force against their stronghold; and
IV; to the inability on the part of the fleet to participate
in the assault previously planned, and which was to have been
vigorously undertaken so soon as General Oglethorpe with
his land forces came into position before the walls of St.
Augustine.
V. The subsequent destruction of Colonel Palmer’s
command,—thereby enabling the enemy to communicate with and
draw supplies from the interior,—the lack of heavy ordnance
with which to reduce the castle from the batteries on Anastasia
island,—the impossibility of bringing up the larger war
vessels that they might participate in the bombardment,—the
inefficiency of Colonel Vanderdussen’s command,—the impatience
and disappointment of the Indian allies who anticipated
early capture and liberal spoils,—hot suns, heavy dews, a
debilitating climate, sickness among the troops, and the
arrival of men, munitions of war, and provisions through the
Matanzas river, in the end rendered quite futile every hope
which at the outset had been entertained for a successful
prosecution of the siege.
Great was the disappointment upon the failure of the expedition, and
unjust and harsh the criticisms levelled by not a few against its brave
and distinguished leader.[95] We agree with the Duke of Argyle who, in
the British House of Peers, declared “One man there is, my Lords, whose
natural generosity, contempt of danger, and regard for the public prompted
him to obviate the designs of the Spaniards, and to attack them in their
own territories; a man whom by long acquaintance I can confidently affirm
to have been equal to his undertaking, and to have learned the art of war
by a regular education, who yet miscarried in the design only for want of
supplies necessary to a possibility of success.”
Although this attempt,—so formidable in its character when we consider
the limited resources at command, and so full of daring when we
contemplate the circumstances under which it was undertaken,—eventuated
in disappointment, its effects were not without decided advantages to
the Colonies. For two years the Spaniards remained on the defensive,
and General Oglethorpe enjoyed an opportunity for strengthening his
fortifications on St. Simons island, so that when the counter blow was
delivered by his adversary he was in condition not only to parry it, but
also to severely punish the uplifted arm.[96]
For two months after the termination of this expedition, Oglethorpe lay
ill of a continued fever contracted during the exposures and fatigues
incident upon his exertions and anxieties during the siege. When, on the
second of September, Mr. Stephens called to see him at Frederica, he found
him still troubled with a lurking fever and confined to his bed. His
protracted sickness had so “worn away his strength” that he “seldom came
down stairs, but retained still the same vivacity of spirit in appearance
to all whom he talked with, though he chose to converse with very few.”[97]
Four companies of the regiment were now encamped at the south-east end
of St. Simons island, and the other two at Frederica. So soon as the men
recovered from the malady contracted at St. Augustine, they were busily
occupied in erecting new fortifications and strengthening the old. From
these two camps detachments garrisoned the advanced works, St. Andrew,
Fort William, St. George, and the outposts on Amelia island;—the details
being relieved at regular intervals.[98]
During the preceding seven years, which constituted the entire
life of the Colony, General Oglethorpe had enjoyed no respite from
his labors. Personally directing all movements,—supervising the
location, and providing for the comfort, safety, and good order of the
settlers,—accommodating their differences,—encouraging and directing their
labors,—propitiating the Aborigines,—influencing necessary supplies,
and inaugurating suitable defences, he had been constantly passing from
point to point finding no rest for the soles of his feet. Now in tent at
Savannah,—now in open boat reconnoitering the coast,—now upon the southern
islands,—his only shelter the wide-spreading live-oak,—designating
sites for forts and look-outs, and with his own hands planning military
works and laying out villages,—again in journeys oft along the Savannah,
the Great Ogeechee, the Alatamaha, the St. Johns, and far off into
the heart of the Indian country,—frequently inspecting his advanced
posts,—undertaking voyages to Charlestown and to England in behalf of
the Trust, and engaged in severe contests with the Spaniards, his life
had been one of incessant activity and solicitude. But for his energy,
intelligence, watchfulness, and self-sacrifice, the enterprise must have
languished. As we look back upon this period of trial, uncertainty, and
poverty, our admiration for his achievements increases the more narrowly
we scan his limited resources and opportunities, the more intelligently we
appreciate the difficulties he was called upon to surmount. Always present
wherever duty called or danger threatened, he never expected others to
press on where he himself did not lead. The only home he ever owned or
claimed in Georgia was on St. Simons island. The only hours of leisure he
ever enjoyed were spent in sight and sound of his military works along
the southern frontier, upon whose safe tenure depended the salvation of
the Colony. Just where the military road connecting Fort St. Simon with
Frederica, after having traversed the beautiful prairie,—constituting
the common pasture land of the village,—entered the woods, General
Oglethorpe established his cottage. Adjacent to it were a garden, and
an orchard of oranges, figs and grapes. Magnificent oaks threw their
protecting shadows above and around this quiet, pleasant abode, fanned by
delicious sea-breezes, fragrant with the perfume of flowers, and vocal
with the melody of song-birds. To the westward, and in full view, were the
fortifications and the white houses of Frederica. Behind rose a dense
forest of oaks. “This cottage and fifty acres of land attached to it,”
says the honorable Thomas Spalding in his “Sketch of the life of General
James Oglethorpe,”[99] “was all the landed domain General Oglethorpe
reserved to himself, and after the General went to England it became the
property of my father.... After the Revolutionary war, the buildings
being destroyed, my father sold this little property. But the oaks were
only cut down within four or five years past, and the elder people of
St. Simons yet feel as if it were sacrilege, and mourn their fall.” Here
the defences of St. Simons island were under his immediate supervision.
His troops were around him, and he was prepared, upon the first note of
warning, to concentrate the forces of the Colony for active operations. In
the neighborhood several of his officers established their homes. Among
them, “Harrington Hall,”—the country seat of the wealthy Huguenot, Captain
Raymond Demeré, enclosed with hedges of cassina,—was conspicuous for its
beauty and comfort.
Including the soldiers and their families, Frederica in 1740 is said to
have claimed a population of one thousand.[100] This estimate is perhaps
somewhat exaggerated, although much nearer the mark than that of the
discontents Tailfer, Anderson, and Douglas, who, in their splenetic and
jacobinical tract entitled “A True and Historical Narrative of the Colony
of Georgia in America,” assert that of the one hundred and forty-four lots
into which the town was divided, only “about fifty were built upon,” and
that “the number of the Inhabitants, notwithstanding of the Circulation of
the Regiment’s money, are not over _one hundred and twenty_ Men, Women,
and Children, and these are daily stealing away by all possible Ways.”[101]
As we have already seen, the town was regularly laid out in streets called
after the principal officers of Oglethorpe’s regiment; and, including the
military camp on the north, the parade on the east, and “a small wood on
the south which served as a blind to the enemy in case of attack from
ships coming up the river,” was about a mile and a half in circumference.
The fort was strongly built of tabby and well armed. Several eighteen
pounders, mounted on a ravelin in front, commanded the river, and the town
was defended on the land side by substantial intrenchments. The ditch at
the foot of these intrenchments was intended to admit the influx of the
tide, thus rendering the isolation of Frederica complete, and materially
enhancing the strength of its line of circumvallation. We reproduce from
“An Impartial Enquiry into the State and Utility of the Province of
Georgia”[102] the following contemporaneous notice: “There are many good
Buildings in the Town, several of which are Brick. There is likewise a
Fort and Store-house belonging to the Trust. The People have a Minister
who has a Salary from the Society for propagating the Gospel. In the
Neighbourhood of the Town, there is a fine Meadow of 320 Acres ditch’d in,
on which a number of Cattle are fed, and good Hay is likewise made from
it. At some Distance from the Town is the Camp for General _Oglethorpe’s_
Regiment. The Country about it is well cultivated, several Parcels of
Land not far distant from the Camp having been granted in small Lots to
the Soldiers, many of whom are married, and fifty-five Children were born
there in the last year. These Soldiers are the most industrious, and
willing to plant; the rest are generally desirous of Wives, but there are
not Women enough in the Country to supply them. There are some handsome
Houses built by the Officers of the Regiment, and besides the Town of
_Frederica_ there are other little Villages upon this Island. A sufficient
Quantity of Pot-herbs, Pulse, and Fruit is produced, there to supply both
the Town and Garrison; and the People of _Frederica_ have begun to malt
and to brew; and the Soldiers Wives Spin Cotton of the Country, which
they Knit into Stockings. At the Town of _Frederica_ is a Town-Court for
administering Justice in the Southern Part of the Province, with the same
Number of Magistrates as at _Savannah_.”
At the village of St. Simon, on the south point of the island, was
erected a watch-tower from which the movements of vessels at sea might be
conveniently observed. Upon their appearance, their number was at once
announced by signal guns, and a horseman dispatched to head quarters with
the particulars. A look-out was kept by a party of Rangers at Bachelor’s
Redoubt on the main, and a Corporal’s guard was stationed at Pike’s Bluff.
To facilitate communication with Darien a canal was cut through General’s
island. Defensive works were erected on Jekyll island, where Captain
Horton had a well improved plantation, and there a brewery was established
for supplying the troops with beer. On Cumberland island were three
batteries,—Fort St. Andrew,—built in 1736, on high commanding ground, at
the north-east point of the island,—a battery on the west to control the
inland navigation,—and Fort William,—a work of considerable strength and
regularity,—commanding the entrance to St. Mary’s river. Two companies of
Oglethorpe’s regiment were stationed near Fort St. Andrew. As many of the
soldiers were married, lots were assigned to them which they cultivated
and improved. Near this work was the little village of Barrimacké of
twenty-four families.
Upon Amelia island, where the orange trees were growing wild in the woods,
were stationed the Highlanders with their scout boats. They had a good
plantation,—upon which they raised corn enough for their subsistence,—a
little fort, and “a stud of horses and mares.”[103]
“Nowhere,” remarks Mr. Spalding,[104] “had mind, with the limited means
under its control, more strongly evinced its power. And it will be seen
hereafter, that it was to the great ability shown in the disposition of
these works, that not Georgia only, but Carolina owed their preservation;
for St. Simon’s was destined soon to become the Thermopylæ of the southern
Anglo American provinces.” Besides compassing the improvement of, and
garrisoning his defensive works along the southern frontier with the men
of his regiment, Oglethorpe kept in active service considerable bodies
of Indians whose mission was to harrass the Spaniards in Florida, annoy
their posts, and closely invest St. Augustine. So energetically did these
faithful allies discharge the duty assigned them, and so narrowly did
they watch and thoroughly plague the garrison and inhabitants of St.
Augustine, that they dared not venture any distance without the walls.
Adjacent plantations remained uncultivated; and, within the town, food,
fuel, and the necessaries of life became so scarce that the Spanish
government was compelled to support the population by stores sent from
Havana. To the efficient aid of his Indian allies was Oglethorpe on more
than one occasion indebted for the consummation of important plans. It
would not be an exaggeration to affirm that to their friendship, fidelity,
and valor, was the Colony largely beholden not only for its security,
but even for its preservation. “If we had no other evidence,” writes Mr.
Spalding, “of the great abilities of Oglethorpe but what is offered by
the devotion of the Indian Tribes to him, and to his memory afterwards
for fifty years, it is all-sufficient; for it is only master minds that
acquire this deep and lasting influence over other men.”