Frederica was visited on the 21st, and there Oglethorpe was saluted with

fifteen guns from the fort. The Magistrates and towns-people waited upon

him in a body, tendering their congratulations upon his return. Several

Indians were present who assured him that the Upper and Lower Creeks

were in readiness to come and see him so soon as they should be notified

of his presence.[65] In a letter[66] to Sir Joseph Jekyll, under date

19th September, 1738, General Oglethorpe, alluding to the fact that the

Spaniards, although having fifteen hundred men at St. Augustine,—there

being nothing but the militia in Georgia,—had delayed their contemplated

attack until the arrival of the Regular Troops, acknowledges that God had

thus given “the greatest marks of his visible Protection to the Colony.”

He advises Sir Joseph that the passage had been fine,—but one soldier

having died,—and that the inhabitants who had hitherto been so harrassed

by Spanish threats were now cheerful, believing that the worst was over,

and that,—relieved from the constant guard duty which they had been

compelled to perform, some times two days out of five, to the neglect of

their crops and improvements,—they might now prosecute their labors and

make comfortable provision for the future. Realizing the necessity of

opening direct communication between Frederica and the Soldiers Fort at

the south end of the island, on the 25th General Oglethorpe set every male

to work cutting a road to connect those points. So energetically was the

labor prosecuted, that although the woods were thick and the distance

nearly six miles, the task was compassed in three days.

To the Honorable Thomas Spalding[67] are we indebted for the following

description of this important avenue of communication: “This road after

passing out of the town of Frederica in a south-east direction, entered a

beautiful prairie of a mile over, when it penetrated a dense, close oak

wood; keeping the same course for two miles, it passed to the eastern

marsh that bounded St. Simon’s seaward. Along this marsh, being dry and

hard, no road was necessary, and none was made. This natural highway was

bounded on the east by rivers and creeks and impracticable marshes; it

was bounded on the west, (the island side) by a thick wood covered with

palmetto and vines of every character so as to be impracticable for any

body of men, and could only be traveled singly and alone. This winding

way along the marsh was continued for two miles, when it again passed

up to the high land which had become open and clear, and from thence it

proceeded in a direct line to the fort, at the sea entrance, around which,

for two hundred acres, five acre allotments of land for the soldiers had

been laid out, cleared, and improved. I have again been thus particular in

my description, because it was to the manner in which this road was laid

out and executed, that General Oglethorpe owed the preservation of the

fort and town of Frederica.... His fort and batteries at Frederica were so

situated as to water approaches, and so covered by a wood, that no number

of ships could injure them. And he now planned his land route in such a

manner, that again the dense wood of our eastern islands became a rampart

mighty to save. And fifty Highlanders and four Indians occupying these

woods did save.”

We learn from that admirable “History of the Rise, Progress, and

Present State of the Colony of Georgia,” contained in Dr. Harris’

Complete Collections of Voyages and Travels,[68] that “on the arrival

of the Regiment of which Mr. _Oglethorpe_ was appointed Colonel, he

distributed them in the properest manner for the Service of the Colony;

but notwithstanding this was of great Ease to the Trustees, and a vast

Security to the Inhabitants, yet Colonel Oglethorpe still kept up the same

Discipline, and took as much Care to form and regulate the Inhabitants

with respect to military Affairs as ever. He provided likewise different

Corps for different Services; some for ranging the Woods; others, light

armed, for sudden Expeditions; and he likewise provided Vessels for

scouring the Sea Coasts, and for gaining Intelligence. In all which

Services he gave at the same time his Orders and his Example; there being

nothing he did not which he directed others to do; so that if he was the

first Man in the Colony, his Pre-eminence was founded upon old _Homer’s_

Maxims: He was the most fatigued, and the first in Danger, distinguished

by his Cares and his Labours, not by any exterior Marks of Grandeur, more

easily dispensed with, since they were certainly needless.”

The finances of the Trust being in a depressed condition, the General

drew largely upon his private fortune and pledged his individual credit

in conducting the operations necessary for the security of the southern

frontiers and in provisioning the settlers. To Alderman Heathcote he

writes: “I am here” [at Frederica] “in one of the most delightful

situations as any man could wish to be. A great number of Debts, empty

magazines, no money to supply them, numbers of people to be fed, mutinous

soldiers to command, a Spanish Claim and a large body of their Troops not

far from us. But as we are of the same kind of spirit, these Difficulties

have the same effect upon me, as those you met with in the City, had upon

you. They rather animate than daunt me.”[69]

Again, on the 16th of November, 1739, he advises the Trustees:[70] “I am

fortifying the Town of Frederica & hope I shall be repaid the Expences;

from whom I do not know, yet I could not think of leaving a number of good

houses and Merch’ts Goods and, which was more valuable, the Lives of Men,

Women and Children in an open Town at the mercy of every Party, and the

Inhabitants obliged either to fly to a Fort and leave their Effects, or

suffer with them.”

That the Trustees might be fully informed of the condition and needs of

the Province, Mr. Horton,—who commanded the Southern Division during

Oglethorpe’s absence,—was sent to London about the close of the year 1739.

The letter[71] of advice which he bore, contains an interesting account

of the affairs of the Colony. In it General Oglethorpe states that his

Regiment of Foot being unable to perform garrison duty and undertake the

requisite marches on the main to overtake Indians and horsemen, he had

been compelled to associate Indian allies whom he had armed, supplied with

ammunition, fed, and clothed, in consideration of their services. Sixty

Rangers, to act as scouts, had been recruited and mounted. By means of

his boats, and the Colony Periagua,—which had been fitted out with four

guns and a crew of forty men,—he had succeeded in driving the Spaniards

out of the mouth of the St. Johns river. The forts having been originally

built of earth and hastily constructed, had fallen sadly out of repair. To

place them in proper condition was then his earnest endeavor. “Upon the

Hostilities being committed,” so runs the letter, “I thought I should be

answerable for the blood of these people before God and man if I had left

them open to be surprised by Spanish Indians, and murdered in the night

and their houses burnt, and if I did not take all proper means for their

defence, they being under my charge.” With this end in view, he resolved

to enclose the town of Frederica with fortifications. This defensive work

is thus described: “It is half an Hexagon with two Bastions, and two half

Bastions and Towers, after Monsieur Vauban’s method, upon the point of

each Bastion. The Walls are of earth faced with Timber, 10 foot High in

the lowest place, and in the highest 13, and the Timbers from eight inches

to twelve inches thick. There is a wet Ditch 10 foot wide, and so laid out

that if we had an allowance for it, I can by widening the Ditch double

the thickness of the Wall and make a covered way. I hope in three months

it will be entirely finished, and in that time not only to fortify here

but to repair the Forts on Amelia and Saint Andrews. The Expence of these

small above mentioned Works, which is all that I can now make, will not

be great. Frederica will come within £500, St. Andrews £400, and Amelia

£100.”[72]

In the midst of his multifarious engagements and perplexities, in which

General Oglethorpe exhibited the highest executive ability, and an

activity and self abnegation worthy of all admiration, he was embarrassed

by treachery within his camp which well nigh eventuated in the most

serious consequences. A plan,—set on foot by one of the soldiers who had

been in the Spanish service,—to murder the officers and escape to the

enemy with such plunder as could be secured, was discovered in time to

prevent its execution. The ring-leaders were tried, convicted, whipped,

and drummed out of the regiment.

Early in November, 1738, General Oglethorpe took up his temporary quarters

at Fort St. Andrew, on Cumberland island, that he might personally

superintend and encourage the construction of the military defenses

which were being there erected. This island was then garrisoned by the

companies which had been detailed from Gibraltar. In addition to their pay

these troops, for a limited period after their arrival in Georgia, had

been allowed extra provisions from the King’s store. When, in November,

these rations were discontinued, conceiving themselves wronged and

defrauded of their rights, the men became dissatisfied. As the General

was conversing at the door of his hut with Captain MacKay, a turbulent

fellow had the temerity to come up unannounced and demand a renewal of

the allowance. Oglethorpe replied that the terms of enlistment had been

fully complied with: and that if he desired any favor at his hand such

rude and disrespectful behavior was not calculated to secure a favorable

consideration of his application. The fellow thereupon became outrageously

insolent. Captain MacKay drew his sword, which the desperado wrested

from him, broke in half, and, having thrown the hilt at that officer’s

head, rushed away to the barracks. There snatching up a loaded gun and

crying aloud “One and All,” he ran back, followed by five or more of the

conspirators, and fired at the General. Being only a few paces distant,

the ball whizzed close by Oglethorpe’s ear, while the powder scorched

his face and singed his clothes. Another soldier presented his piece

and attempted to discharge it. Fortunately it missed fire. A third drew

his hanger and endeavored to stab the General, who, however, having by

this time unsheathed his sword, parried the thrust. An officer coming

up ran the ruffian through the body. Frustrated in their attempt at

assassination, the mutineers sought safety in flight, but were apprehended

and put in irons. After trial by court martial the ring-leaders were found

guilty and shot.[73]

Thus wonderfully was the General preserved for the important trusts

committed to his care, and so narrowly was a calamity averted which would

have plunged the Colony into the depths of uncertainty and peril. Had she

been deprived, at this trying moment, of Oglethorpe’s guidance, Georgia,

feeble and uncertain, would have been left well-nigh naked to her enemies.

Spanish emissaries from St. Augustine endeavored to inaugurate an

insurrection among the negroes of South Carolina. To them freedom and

protection were promised. Every inducement was offered which could

encourage not only desertion from, but also massacre of their owners.

Of the run-away slaves the Governor of Florida had formed a regiment,

appointing officers from among them, and placing both officers and

enlisted men upon the pay and rations allowed to the regular Spanish

soldiers. Of this fact the Carolina negroes were advised.[74] The

pernicious influence of such tampering with this servile population may be

more readily conjectured than described. Thus did Spain grow daily more

and more offensive in the development of her plans for the destruction

of the English Colonies adjacent to her possessions in Florida. To the

vigilance of Oglethorpe is Carolina largely indebted for her escape from

the horrors of a servile insurrection.[75]

By his personal interview with the Indians at Coweta town, Oglethorpe

had secured the good will of the Creeks, the Cousees, the Tallapousees,

the Cowetas, the Choctaws and the Chickesas, thus thwarting the

machinations of the Spanish and French, and relieving the Colony from

apprehensions of a most serious character. His energies were all directed

to a careful preparation to meet the Spanish storm which was gathering

and almost ready to burst upon the southern frontier of the Province.

Referring to this perilous and protracted journey performed by General

Oglethorpe to propitiate these Indian tribes and secure from them pledges

whose observance was essential to the continuance of the Colony, Mr.

Spalding[76] justly remarks, “When we call into remembrance the then

force of these tribes,—for they could have brought into the field twenty

thousand fighting men,—when we call to remembrance the influence the

French had everywhere else obtained over the Indians,—when we call to

remembrance the distance he had to travel through solitary pathways from

Frederica, exposed to summer suns, night dews, and to the treachery of

any single Indian who knew, and every Indian knew, the rich reward that

would have awaited him for the act from the Spaniards in St. Augustine or

the French in Mobile; surely we may proudly ask what soldier ever gave

higher proof of courage? What gentleman ever gave greater evidence of

magnanimity? What English governor of an American province ever gave such

assurance of deep devotion to public duty?”

But for this manly conference with the Red men in the heart of their own

country, and the admiration with which his presence, courage, and bearing

inspired the assembled Chiefs, Oglethorpe could not have compassed the

pacification and secured that treaty of amity so essential to the welfare

of the Colony now on the eve of most serious difficulties with the

Spaniards in Florida.

On the 5th of October, 1739, at his little town four miles from Savannah,

the venerable Tomo-chi-chi,—Oglethorpe’s earliest and best friend among

the Indians,—yielding to the effects of a lingering illness, died at

the advanced age of ninety-seven years. The General acted as one of the

pall-bearers, and the body of the old Chief, in accordance with his wish,

was interred, with becoming honors, in one of the public squares in

Savannah. In his last moments he expressed no little concern that he was

about to be taken away at a time when his services might prove of special

value to his friends, the English, against the Spaniards, and counseled

his people never to forget the favors he had received, when in England,

from the King, and to persevere in their amicable relations with the

colonists.[77] These injunctions were not unheeded. Toonahowi—the favorite

nephew of the aged Mico—accompanied General Oglethorpe in his expedition

against St. Augustine; and again, leading a party of Creek Indians,

brought off from the very walls of that city Don Romualdo Ruiz del Moral,

lieutenant of Spanish horse and nephew to the late governor of Florida,

and delivered him a prisoner to Oglethorpe. During the memorable and

successful resistance maintained when St. Simon’s island was attacked by

the Spaniards in 1742, this brave Indian, illustrating the valor, personal

courage, and friendship which characterized his distinguished uncle,

remained firm in his attachment to the colonists and rendered valuable

military service. On the 7th of July, although wounded in the right arm by

Captain Mageleto, he drew his pistol with the left, and shot the Captain

dead on the spot. This brave warrior and faithful ally was finally killed

in 1743, at Lake di Papa, while valiantly fighting for the English against

the Yemasee Indians.[78]

The disputes existing between England and Spain culminated in a

declaration of war in October, 1739. On the 15th of November intelligence

was brought to Frederica that a party of Spaniards had recently landed on

Amelia island in the night, and, concealing themselves in the woods, had,

on the ensuing morning, shot two unarmed Highlanders who were in quest

of fuel, and then, in the most inhuman manner, hacked their bodies with

their swords. Francis Brooks,—commanding the scout-boat,—heard the firing

and gave the alarm to the fort, which was garrisoned by a detachment from

Oglethorpe’s regiment. Although pursued, the enemy escaped, leaving behind

them the proofs of their inhuman butchery.[79] Informed of the outrage,

Oglethorpe manned a gunboat and followed in the hope of overtaking the

party. The effort proved futile, and the General, by way of retaliation,

passing up the St. Johns drove in the guards of Spanish horse posted on

that river, and detached Captain Dunbar to ascertain the location and

force of the enemy’s fort at Picolata. This incursion was followed by

another in January, which resulted in the capture of Forts Picolata and

St. Francis, the garrisons being made prisoners of war. In the assault

upon the latter work General Oglethorpe narrowly escaped death from a

cannon shot.[80]

Chafing under these repeated annoyances experienced at the hands of the

Spaniards, advised that the garrison at St. Augustine was suffering for

lack of provisions, and ascertaining that the galleys having been sent

to Havana for reinforcements and supplies, the St. Johns river and the

Florida coast were in a comparatively defenseless condition, the General

deemed it a fitting opportunity to attempt the reduction of St. Augustine

and the expulsion of the Spaniards from Florida. Admiral Vernon was

instructed to assume the offensive against the Spanish possessions in

the West Indies, while General Oglethorpe should conduct all available

forces against the seat of their dominion in Florida. The assistance of

Carolina was urgently invoked, but the authorities at first would not

acquiesce in the feasibility of the enterprise.[81] A rapid movement being

regarded essential to success, General Oglethorpe repaired to Charleston

to urge early and potent co-operation. As a result of the conference which

there ensued, the Legislature, by an act passed April 5th, 1740, agreed

to contribute a regiment of five hundred men to be commanded by Colonel

Vanderdussen, a troop of Rangers, presents for the Indians, and three

months’ provisions. A large schooner,—conveying ten carriages and sixteen

swivel guns, and fifty men under the command of Captain Tyrrell,—was also

furnished for the expedition. Commodore Vincent Price, with a small

fleet, pledged his assistance.

On the first of April General Oglethorpe published a manifesto, in which,

recognizing Alexander Vanderdussen, Esq., as Colonel of the Carolina

regiment, he empowered him for the space of four months to hold regimental

court martials for the trial of all offenders. At the expiration of that

period all connected with that regiment were to be suffered to return to

their homes. To the naval forces uniting in the expedition a full share of

all plunder was guaranteed. To the maimed and wounded, and to the widows

and orphans of such as might perish in the service, was promised whatever

share of the spoils should fall to the lot of the General in Chief. Indian

enemies, if taken captive, were to be treated as prisoners of war, and not

as slaves.[82]

The mouth of the St. Johns was designated as the point of rendezvous.

Runners were sent from the Uchee town to the Indian allies to inform them

of the contemplated demonstration against St. Augustine, and to request a

junction of their forces at Frederica at the earliest moment. This done,

the General returned at once to St. Simons island where he devoted himself

to equipping his forces and collecting the requisite munitions of war.

Anticipating the concentration of his forces, and wishing to reduce the

posts through which the enemy derived supplies from the country, General

Oglethorpe, with four hundred men of his own regiment and a considerable

force of Indians led by Molochi,—son of Prim, the late Chief of the

Creeks,—Raven, war chief of the Cherokees, and Toonahowi, nephew of

Tomo-chi-chi, on the 9th of May passed over into Florida, and within a

week succeeded in capturing Fort Francis de Papa[83] seventeen miles north

of St. Augustine, and Fort Diego[84] situated on the plains twenty-five

miles from St. Augustine. The latter work was defended by eleven guns and

fifty regulars, besides Indians and negroes. Leaving Lieutenant Dunbar

and sixty men to hold this post, the General returned with the rest of

his command to the place of rendezvous where, on the 19th of May, he was

joined by Captain McIntosh with a company of Highlanders, and by the

Carolina troops under Colonel Vanderdussen. The anticipated horsemen,

pioneers, and negroes, however, did not arrive.

From the best information he could obtain,—gathered from prisoners and

otherwise,—General Oglethorpe ascertained that the Castle of St. Augustine

at that time consisted of a fort, built of soft stone. Its curtain was

sixty yards in length, its parapet nine feet thick, and its rampart

twenty feet high, “casemated underneath for lodgings, and arched over and

newly made bomb-proof.” Its armament consisted of fifty cannon,—sixteen

of brass,—and among them some twenty-four pounders. The garrison had

been for some time working upon a covered-way, but this was still in an

unfinished condition. The town of St. Augustine was protected by a line

of intrenchments with ten salient angles, in each of which some field

pieces were mounted. In January, 1740, the Spanish forces in Florida, by

establishment, consisted of the following organizations:[85]

1 Troop of Horse, numbering 100 officers and men.

1 Company of Artillery, ” 100 ” ” ”

3 Independent Companies of old Troops, each ” 100 ” ” ”

2 Companies of the Regiment of Austurias, ” ” 53 ” ” ”

1 Company ” ” ” Valencia, ” 53 ” ” ”

1 ” ” ” ” Catalonia, ” 53 ” ” ”

2 Companies ” ” ” Cantabria, ” ” 53 ” ” ”

2 ” ” ” ” Mercia, ” ” 53 ” ” ”

Armed Negroes, 200 ” ” ”

White Transports for labor, 200

1 Company of Militia, (strength unknown.)

Indians, (number not ascertained.)

It was General Oglethorpe’s original purpose, as foreshadowed in his

dispatch of the 27th of March, 1740,[86] with four hundred regular troops

of his regiment, one hundred Georgians, and such additional forces as

South Carolina could contribute, to advance directly upon St. Augustine,

and attack, by sea and land, the town and the island in its front. Both of

these, he believed, could be taken “sword in hand.” He would then summon

the castle to surrender, or surprise it. Conceiving that the castle would

be too small to afford convenient shelter for the two thousand one hundred

men, women, and children of the town, he regarded the capitulation of the

fortress as not improbable. Should it refuse to surrender, however, he

proposed to shower upon it “Granado-shells from the Cohorns and Mortars,

and send for the Artillery and Pioneers and the rest of the Aid promised

by the Assembly;[87] also for Mortars and Bombs from _Providence;_” and,

if the castle should not have yielded prior to the arrival of “these

Aids,” he was resolved to open trenches and conduct a siege which he

reckoned would be all the easier, the garrison having been weakened by the

summer’s blockade.

About the time of the concentration of the Georgia and Carolina forces

for combined operations against St. Augustine, that town was materially

reinforced by the arrival of six Spanish half-galleys,—manned by two

hundred regular troops and armed with long brass nine-pounder guns,—and

two sloops loaded with provisions.

Warned by the preliminary demonstration which eventuated, as we have seen,

in the capture of forts Francis de Papa and Diego, the enemy massed all

detachments within the lines of St. Augustine, collected cattle from the

adjacent region, and prepared for a vigorous defense.

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